Re: [PATCH v8 5/9] seccomp: split mode set routines

From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>,
	LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	"Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)" <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>,
	Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>,
	Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>, Julien Tinnes <jln@chromium.org>,
	David Drysdale <drysdale@google.com>,
	Linux API <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>,
	"x86@kernel.org" <x86@kernel.org>,
	"linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org" 
	<linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>,
	linux-mips@linux-mips.org,
	linux-arch <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>,
	linux-security-module <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v8 5/9] seccomp: split mode set routines
Date: Wed, 25 Jun 2014 11:07:51 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CALCETrVNwhWSPNiBiZmgP1nD9zLJPTk6cH0yo=85rbxTPTYFRg@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAGXu5jL17k6=GXju6x+eLU20FMwBHhnuRiHoQD1Bzj_EmpiKjg@mail.gmail.com>

On Wed, Jun 25, 2014 at 11:00 AM, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote:
> On Wed, Jun 25, 2014 at 10:51 AM, Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> wrote:
>> On 06/25, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>>>
>>> On Wed, Jun 25, 2014 at 10:32 AM, Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> wrote:
>>> > On 06/25, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>>> >>
>>> >> Write the filter, then smp_mb (or maybe a weaker barrier is okay),
>>> >> then set the bit.
>>> >
>>> > Yes, exactly, this is what I meant. Plas rmb() in __secure_computing().
>>> >
>>> > But I still can't understand the rest of your discussion about the
>>> > ordering we need ;)
>>>
>>> Let me try again from scratch.
>>>
>>> Currently there are three relevant variables: TIF_SECCOMP,
>>> seccomp.mode, and seccomp.filter.  __secure_computing needs
>>> seccomp.mode and seccomp.filter to be in sync, and it wants (but
>>> doesn't really need) TIF_SECCOMP to be in sync as well.
>>>
>>> My suggestion is to rearrange it a bit.  Move mode into seccomp.filter
>>> (so that filter == NULL implies no seccomp) and don't check
>
> This would require that we reimplement mode 1 seccomp via mode 2
> filters. Which isn't too hard, but may add complexity.
>
>>> TIF_SECCOMP in secure_computing.  Then turning on seccomp is entirely
>>> atomic except for the fact that the seccomp hooks won't be called if
>>> filter != NULL but !TIF_SECCOMP.  This removes all ordering
>>> requirements.
>>
>> Ah, got it, thanks. Perhaps I missed somehing, but to me this looks like
>> unnecessary complication at first glance.
>>
>> We alredy have TIF_SECCOMP, we need it anyway, and we should only care
>> about the case when this bit is actually set, so that we can race with
>> the 1st call of __secure_computing().
>>
>> Otherwise we are fine: we can miss the new filter anyway, ->mode can't
>> be changed it is already nonzero.
>>
>>> Alternatively, __secure_computing could still BUG_ON(!seccomp.filter).
>>> In that case, filter needs to be set before TIF_SECCOMP is set, but
>>> that's straightforward.
>>
>> Yep. And this is how seccomp_assign_mode() already works? It is called
>> after we change ->filter chain, it changes ->mode before set(TIF_SECCOMP)
>> just it lacks a barrier.
>
> Right, I think the best solution is to add the barrier. I was
> concerned that adding the read barrier in secure_computing would have
> a performance impact, though.
>

I can't speak for ARM, but I think that all of the read barriers are
essentially free on x86.  (smp_mb is a very different story, but that
shouldn't be needed here.)

--Andy