From: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
To: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>,
keyrings@vger.kernel.org,
linux-integrity <linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org>,
Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>,
David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>,
Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>,
"David S . Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
"Serge E . Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
keescook@chromium.org, gregkh@linuxfoundation.org,
torvalds@linux-foundation.org, scott.branden@broadcom.com,
weiyongjun1@huawei.com, nayna@linux.ibm.com, ebiggers@google.com,
ardb@kernel.org, nramas@linux.microsoft.com, lszubowi@redhat.com,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com,
"konrad.wilk@oracle.com" <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 00/13] Enroll kernel keys thru MOK
Date: Thu, 16 Sep 2021 19:58:48 -0600 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <DFCC5EFE-13A5-40C8-84AA-96877B2B7932@oracle.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210916221416.onvqgz5iij3c7e6j@redhat.com>
> On Sep 16, 2021, at 4:14 PM, Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com> wrote:
>
> On Thu, Sep 16, 2021 at 06:15:50PM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
>> On Wed, 2021-09-15 at 15:28 -0600, Eric Snowberg wrote:
>>>> On Sep 15, 2021, at 11:57 AM, Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> wrote:
>>>>
>>>> On Tue, 2021-09-14 at 17:14 -0400, Eric Snowberg wrote:
>>>>> Back in 2013 Linus requested a feature to allow end-users to have the
>>>>> ability "to add their own keys and sign modules they trust". This was
>>>>> his *second* order outlined here [1]. There have been many attempts
>>>>> over the years to solve this problem, all have been rejected. Many
>>>>> of the failed attempts loaded all preboot firmware keys into the kernel,
>>>>> including the Secure Boot keys. Many distributions carry one of these
>>>>> rejected attempts [2], [3], [4]. This series tries to solve this problem
>>>>> with a solution that takes into account all the problems brought up in
>>>>> the previous attempts.
>>>>>
>>>>> On UEFI based systems, this series introduces a new Linux kernel keyring
>>>>> containing the Machine Owner Keys (MOK) called machine. It also defines
>>>>> a new MOK variable in shim. This variable allows the end-user to decide
>>>>> if they want to load MOK keys into the machine keyring. Mimi has suggested
>>>>> that only CA keys contained within the MOK be loaded into the machine
>>>>> keyring. All other certs will load into the platform keyring instead.
>>>>>
>>>>> By default, nothing changes; MOK keys are not loaded into the machine
>>>>> keyring. They are only loaded after the end-user makes the decision
>>>>> themselves. The end-user would set this through mokutil using a new
>>>>> --trust-mok option [5]. This would work similar to how the kernel uses
>>>>> MOK variables to enable/disable signature validation as well as use/ignore
>>>>> the db. Any kernel operation that uses either the builtin or secondary
>>>>> trusted keys as a trust source shall also reference the new machine
>>>>> keyring as a trust source.
>>>>>
>>>>> Secure Boot keys will never be loaded into the machine keyring. They
>>>>> will always be loaded into the platform keyring. If an end-user wanted
>>>>> to load one, they would need to enroll it into the MOK.
>>>>>
>>>>> Steps required by the end user:
>>>>>
>>>>> Sign kernel module with user created key:
>>>>> $ /usr/src/kernels/$(uname -r)/scripts/sign-file sha512 \
>>>>> machine_signing_key.priv machine_signing_key.x509 my_module.ko
>>>>>
>>>>> Import the key into the MOK
>>>>> $ mokutil --import machine_signing_key.x509
>>>>>
>>>>> Setup the kernel to load MOK keys into the .machine keyring
>>>>> $ mokutil --trust-mok
>>>>>
>>>>> Then reboot, the MokManager will load and ask if you want to trust the
>>>>> MOK key and enroll the MOK into the MOKList. Afterwards the signed kernel
>>>>> module will load.
>>>>>
>>>>> I have included links to both the mokutil [5] and shim [6] changes I
>>>>> have made to support this new functionality.
>>>>
>>>> How hard it is to self-compile shim and boot it with QEMU (I
>>>> do not know even the GIT location of Shim)?
>>>
>>> It is not hard, that is the setup I use for my testing. Upstream shim
>>> is located here [1]. Or you can use my repo which contains the necessary
>>> changes [2].
>>>
>>> [1] https://github.com/rhboot/shim
>>> [2] https://github.com/esnowberg/shim/tree/mokvars-v2
>>>
>>
>> So, my 2nd Q would be: which order these should be upstreamed?
>>
>> Linux patch set cannot depend on "yet to be upstreamed" things.
>>
>> Code changes look good enough to me.
>
> We can carry this support in shim before it's in kernel. Eric's current
> patch for shim and mokutil looks mostly reasonable, though I see a few
> minor nits we'll have to sort out.
Thanks Peter. Previously I had not sent it for a shim review since I wanted
to make sure this approach had a path forward. I’ll work on submitting the
shim changes for review now.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-09-17 1:59 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 28+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-09-14 21:14 [PATCH v6 00/13] Enroll kernel keys thru MOK Eric Snowberg
2021-09-14 21:14 ` [PATCH v6 01/13] integrity: Introduce a Linux keyring called machine Eric Snowberg
2021-09-14 21:14 ` [PATCH v6 02/13] integrity: Do not allow machine keyring updates following init Eric Snowberg
2021-09-14 21:14 ` [PATCH v6 03/13] KEYS: CA link restriction Eric Snowberg
2021-09-16 20:05 ` Nayna
2021-09-14 21:14 ` [PATCH v6 04/13] integrity: restrict INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MACHINE to restrict_link_by_ca Eric Snowberg
2021-09-14 21:14 ` [PATCH v6 05/13] integrity: add new keyring handler for mok keys Eric Snowberg
2021-09-14 21:14 ` [PATCH v6 06/13] KEYS: Rename get_builtin_and_secondary_restriction Eric Snowberg
2021-09-14 21:14 ` [PATCH v6 07/13] KEYS: add a reference to machine keyring Eric Snowberg
2021-09-14 21:14 ` [PATCH v6 08/13] KEYS: Introduce link restriction for machine keys Eric Snowberg
2021-09-14 21:14 ` [PATCH v6 09/13] KEYS: integrity: change link restriction to trust the machine keyring Eric Snowberg
2021-09-14 21:14 ` [PATCH v6 10/13] KEYS: link secondary_trusted_keys to machine trusted keys Eric Snowberg
2021-09-14 21:14 ` [PATCH v6 11/13] integrity: store reference to machine keyring Eric Snowberg
2021-09-14 21:14 ` [PATCH v6 12/13] integrity: Trust MOK keys if MokListTrustedRT found Eric Snowberg
2021-09-16 22:19 ` Peter Jones
2021-09-17 2:00 ` Eric Snowberg
2021-09-17 15:03 ` Peter Jones
2021-09-17 16:06 ` Eric Snowberg
2021-09-14 21:14 ` [PATCH v6 13/13] integrity: Only use machine keyring when uefi_check_trust_mok_keys is true Eric Snowberg
2021-09-15 17:57 ` [PATCH v6 00/13] Enroll kernel keys thru MOK Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-09-15 21:28 ` Eric Snowberg
2021-09-16 15:15 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-09-16 22:14 ` Peter Jones
2021-09-17 1:58 ` Eric Snowberg [this message]
2021-09-21 21:03 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-09-16 20:03 ` Nayna
2021-09-17 1:55 ` Eric Snowberg
2021-09-17 18:02 ` Mimi Zohar
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