From: Christophe de Dinechin <christophe.de.dinechin@gmail.com>
To: Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com>
Cc: Christophe de Dinechin <christophe.de.dinechin@gmail.com>,
Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>,
Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>,
KVM list <kvm@vger.kernel.org>,
x86@kernel.org, Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>,
open list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
"Peter Zijlstra (Intel)" <peterz@infradead.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC] KVM: x86: tell guests if the exposed SMT topology is trustworthy
Date: Fri, 8 Nov 2019 16:35:17 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <E392C60C-A596-49DD-B604-8B3C473ACAA2@dinechin.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <713ECF67-6A6C-4956-8AC6-7F4C05961328@oracle.com>
> On 7 Nov 2019, at 16:02, Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com> wrote:
>
>
>
>> On 7 Nov 2019, at 16:00, Christophe de Dinechin <christophe.de.dinechin@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>
>>
>> I share that concern about the naming, although I do see some
>> value in exposing the cpu_smt_possible() result. I think it’s easier
>> to state that something does not work than to state something does
>> work.
>>
>> Also, with respect to mitigation, we may want to split the two cases
>> that Paolo outlined, i.e. have KVM_HINTS_REALTIME,
>> KVM_HINTS_CORES_CROSSTALK and
>> KVM_HINTS_CORES_LEAKING,
>> where CORES_CROSSTALKS indicates there may be some
>> cross-talk between what the guest thinks are isolated cores,
>> and CORES_LEAKING indicates that cores may leak data
>> to some other guest.
>>
>> The problem with my approach is that it is shouting “don’t trust me”
>> a bit too loudly.
>
> I don’t see a value in exposing CORES_LEAKING to guest. As guest have nothing to do with it.
The guest could display / expose the information to guest sysadmins
and admin tools (e.g. through /proc).
While the kernel cannot mitigate, a higher-level product could for example
have a policy about which workloads can be deployed on a system which
may leak data to other VMs.
Christophe
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-11-08 15:35 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 22+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-11-05 16:17 [PATCH RFC] KVM: x86: tell guests if the exposed SMT topology is trustworthy Vitaly Kuznetsov
2019-11-05 17:17 ` Liran Alon
2019-11-05 17:30 ` Liran Alon
2019-11-05 17:35 ` Jim Mattson
2019-11-05 19:37 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-11-05 23:25 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-11-07 10:38 ` Vitaly Kuznetsov
[not found] ` <943488A8-2DD7-4471-B3C7-9F21A0B0BCF9@dinechin.org>
2019-11-07 15:02 ` Liran Alon
2019-11-08 15:35 ` Christophe de Dinechin [this message]
2019-11-08 15:52 ` Liran Alon
2019-11-05 20:02 ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-11-05 23:25 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-11-06 8:32 ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-11-20 10:13 ` Wanpeng Li
2019-11-05 23:51 ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-11-06 8:32 ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-11-06 9:41 ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-11-05 23:56 ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-12-06 4:01 ` Ankur Arora
2019-12-06 13:46 ` Vitaly Kuznetsov
2019-12-06 20:31 ` Ankur Arora
2019-12-09 9:15 ` Paolo Bonzini
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