* [PATCH v6 0/7] enable CAAM's HWRNG as default
@ 2020-01-08 15:40 Andrey Smirnov
2020-01-08 15:40 ` [PATCH v6 1/7] crypto: caam - use struct hwrng's .init for initialization Andrey Smirnov
` (7 more replies)
0 siblings, 8 replies; 18+ messages in thread
From: Andrey Smirnov @ 2020-01-08 15:40 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-crypto
Cc: Andrey Smirnov, Chris Healy, Lucas Stach, Horia Geantă,
Herbert Xu, Iuliana Prodan, linux-kernel, linux-imx
Everyone:
This series is a continuation of original [discussion]. I don't know
if what's in the series is enough to use CAAMs HWRNG system wide, but
I am hoping that with enough iterations and feedback it will be.
Changes since [v1]:
- Original hw_random replaced with the one using output of TRNG directly
- SEC4 DRNG IP block exposed via crypto API
- Small fix regarding use of GFP_DMA added to the series
Chagnes since [v2]:
- msleep in polling loop to avoid wasting CPU cycles
- caam_trng_read() bails out early if 'wait' is set to 'false'
- fixed typo in ZII's name
Changes since [v3]:
- DRNG's .cra_name is now "stdrng"
- collected Reviewd-by tag from Lucas
- typo fixes in commit messages of the series
Changes since [v4]:
- Dropped "crypto: caam - RNG4 TRNG errata" and "crypto: caam -
enable prediction resistance in HRWNG" to limit the scope of the
series. Those two patches are not yet ready and can be submitted
separately later.
- Collected Tested-by from Chris
Changes since [v5]:
- Series is converted back to implementing HWRNG using a job ring
as per feedback from Horia.
Feedback is welcome!
Thanks,
Andrey Smirnov
[discussion] https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/9850669/
[v1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20191029162916.26579-1-andrew.smirnov@gmail.com
[v2] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20191118153843.28136-1-andrew.smirnov@gmail.com
[v3] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20191120165341.32669-1-andrew.smirnov@gmail.com
[v4] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20191121155554.1227-1-andrew.smirnov@gmail.com
[v5] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20191203162357.21942-1-andrew.smirnov@gmail.com
Andrey Smirnov (7):
crypto: caam - use struct hwrng's .init for initialization
crypto: caam - drop global context pointer and init_done
crypto: caam - simplify RNG implementation
crypto: caam - check if RNG job failed
crypto: caam - invalidate entropy register during RNG initialization
crypto: caam - enable prediction resistance in HRWNG
crypto: caam - limit single JD RNG output to maximum of 16 bytes
drivers/crypto/caam/caamrng.c | 391 ++++++++++++----------------------
drivers/crypto/caam/ctrl.c | 33 ++-
drivers/crypto/caam/desc.h | 2 +
drivers/crypto/caam/intern.h | 5 -
drivers/crypto/caam/jr.c | 1 -
drivers/crypto/caam/regs.h | 7 +-
6 files changed, 174 insertions(+), 265 deletions(-)
--
2.21.0
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 18+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v6 1/7] crypto: caam - use struct hwrng's .init for initialization
2020-01-08 15:40 [PATCH v6 0/7] enable CAAM's HWRNG as default Andrey Smirnov
@ 2020-01-08 15:40 ` Andrey Smirnov
2020-01-08 15:40 ` [PATCH v6 2/7] crypto: caam - drop global context pointer and init_done Andrey Smirnov
` (6 subsequent siblings)
7 siblings, 0 replies; 18+ messages in thread
From: Andrey Smirnov @ 2020-01-08 15:40 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-crypto
Cc: Andrey Smirnov, Chris Healy, Lucas Stach, Horia Geantă,
Herbert Xu, Iuliana Prodan, linux-kernel, linux-imx
Make caamrng code a bit more symmetric by moving initialization code
to .init hook of struct hwrng.
Signed-off-by: Andrey Smirnov <andrew.smirnov@gmail.com>
Cc: Chris Healy <cphealy@gmail.com>
Cc: Lucas Stach <l.stach@pengutronix.de>
Cc: Horia Geantă <horia.geanta@nxp.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: Iuliana Prodan <iuliana.prodan@nxp.com>
Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-imx@nxp.com
---
drivers/crypto/caam/caamrng.c | 47 ++++++++++++++++++-----------------
1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/caam/caamrng.c b/drivers/crypto/caam/caamrng.c
index e8baacaabe07..1ce7fbd29e85 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/caam/caamrng.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/caam/caamrng.c
@@ -256,6 +256,7 @@ static void caam_cleanup(struct hwrng *rng)
}
rng_unmap_ctx(rng_ctx);
+ caam_jr_free(rng_ctx->jrdev);
}
static int caam_init_buf(struct caam_rng_ctx *ctx, int buf_id)
@@ -274,28 +275,43 @@ static int caam_init_buf(struct caam_rng_ctx *ctx, int buf_id)
return 0;
}
-static int caam_init_rng(struct caam_rng_ctx *ctx, struct device *jrdev)
+static int caam_init(struct hwrng *rng)
{
+ struct caam_rng_ctx *ctx = rng_ctx;
int err;
- ctx->jrdev = jrdev;
+ ctx->jrdev = caam_jr_alloc();
+ err = PTR_ERR_OR_ZERO(ctx->jrdev);
+ if (err) {
+ pr_err("Job Ring Device allocation for transform failed\n");
+ return err;
+ }
err = rng_create_sh_desc(ctx);
if (err)
- return err;
+ goto free_jrdev;
ctx->current_buf = 0;
ctx->cur_buf_idx = 0;
err = caam_init_buf(ctx, 0);
if (err)
- return err;
+ goto free_jrdev;
+
+ err = caam_init_buf(ctx, 1);
+ if (err)
+ goto free_jrdev;
- return caam_init_buf(ctx, 1);
+ return 0;
+
+free_jrdev:
+ caam_jr_free(ctx->jrdev);
+ return err;
}
static struct hwrng caam_rng = {
.name = "rng-caam",
+ .init = caam_init,
.cleanup = caam_cleanup,
.read = caam_read,
};
@@ -305,14 +321,12 @@ void caam_rng_exit(void)
if (!init_done)
return;
- caam_jr_free(rng_ctx->jrdev);
hwrng_unregister(&caam_rng);
kfree(rng_ctx);
}
int caam_rng_init(struct device *ctrldev)
{
- struct device *dev;
u32 rng_inst;
struct caam_drv_private *priv = dev_get_drvdata(ctrldev);
int err;
@@ -328,21 +342,11 @@ int caam_rng_init(struct device *ctrldev)
if (!rng_inst)
return 0;
- dev = caam_jr_alloc();
- if (IS_ERR(dev)) {
- pr_err("Job Ring Device allocation for transform failed\n");
- return PTR_ERR(dev);
- }
rng_ctx = kmalloc(sizeof(*rng_ctx), GFP_DMA | GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!rng_ctx) {
- err = -ENOMEM;
- goto free_caam_alloc;
- }
- err = caam_init_rng(rng_ctx, dev);
- if (err)
- goto free_rng_ctx;
+ if (!rng_ctx)
+ return -ENOMEM;
- dev_info(dev, "registering rng-caam\n");
+ dev_info(ctrldev, "registering rng-caam\n");
err = hwrng_register(&caam_rng);
if (!err) {
@@ -350,9 +354,6 @@ int caam_rng_init(struct device *ctrldev)
return err;
}
-free_rng_ctx:
kfree(rng_ctx);
-free_caam_alloc:
- caam_jr_free(dev);
return err;
}
--
2.21.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 18+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v6 2/7] crypto: caam - drop global context pointer and init_done
2020-01-08 15:40 [PATCH v6 0/7] enable CAAM's HWRNG as default Andrey Smirnov
2020-01-08 15:40 ` [PATCH v6 1/7] crypto: caam - use struct hwrng's .init for initialization Andrey Smirnov
@ 2020-01-08 15:40 ` Andrey Smirnov
2020-01-13 9:41 ` Horia Geanta
2020-01-08 15:40 ` [PATCH v6 3/7] crypto: caam - simplify RNG implementation Andrey Smirnov
` (5 subsequent siblings)
7 siblings, 1 reply; 18+ messages in thread
From: Andrey Smirnov @ 2020-01-08 15:40 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-crypto
Cc: Andrey Smirnov, Chris Healy, Lucas Stach, Horia Geantă,
Herbert Xu, Iuliana Prodan, linux-kernel, linux-imx
Leverage devres to get rid of code storing global context as well as
init_done flag.
Signed-off-by: Andrey Smirnov <andrew.smirnov@gmail.com>
Cc: Chris Healy <cphealy@gmail.com>
Cc: Lucas Stach <l.stach@pengutronix.de>
Cc: Horia Geantă <horia.geanta@nxp.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: Iuliana Prodan <iuliana.prodan@nxp.com>
Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-imx@nxp.com
---
drivers/crypto/caam/caamrng.c | 60 ++++++++++++-----------------------
drivers/crypto/caam/intern.h | 5 ---
drivers/crypto/caam/jr.c | 1 -
3 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 46 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/caam/caamrng.c b/drivers/crypto/caam/caamrng.c
index 1ce7fbd29e85..fe187db91233 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/caam/caamrng.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/caam/caamrng.c
@@ -70,6 +70,7 @@ struct buf_data {
/* rng per-device context */
struct caam_rng_ctx {
+ struct hwrng rng;
struct device *jrdev;
dma_addr_t sh_desc_dma;
u32 sh_desc[DESC_RNG_LEN];
@@ -78,13 +79,10 @@ struct caam_rng_ctx {
struct buf_data bufs[2];
};
-static struct caam_rng_ctx *rng_ctx;
-
-/*
- * Variable used to avoid double free of resources in case
- * algorithm registration was unsuccessful
- */
-static bool init_done;
+static struct caam_rng_ctx *to_caam_rng_ctx(struct hwrng *r)
+{
+ return container_of(r, struct caam_rng_ctx, rng);
+}
static inline void rng_unmap_buf(struct device *jrdev, struct buf_data *bd)
{
@@ -143,7 +141,7 @@ static inline int submit_job(struct caam_rng_ctx *ctx, int to_current)
static int caam_read(struct hwrng *rng, void *data, size_t max, bool wait)
{
- struct caam_rng_ctx *ctx = rng_ctx;
+ struct caam_rng_ctx *ctx = to_caam_rng_ctx(rng);
struct buf_data *bd = &ctx->bufs[ctx->current_buf];
int next_buf_idx, copied_idx;
int err;
@@ -246,17 +244,18 @@ static inline int rng_create_job_desc(struct caam_rng_ctx *ctx, int buf_id)
static void caam_cleanup(struct hwrng *rng)
{
+ struct caam_rng_ctx *ctx = to_caam_rng_ctx(rng);
int i;
struct buf_data *bd;
for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
- bd = &rng_ctx->bufs[i];
+ bd = &ctx->bufs[i];
if (atomic_read(&bd->empty) == BUF_PENDING)
wait_for_completion(&bd->filled);
}
- rng_unmap_ctx(rng_ctx);
- caam_jr_free(rng_ctx->jrdev);
+ rng_unmap_ctx(ctx);
+ caam_jr_free(ctx->jrdev);
}
static int caam_init_buf(struct caam_rng_ctx *ctx, int buf_id)
@@ -277,7 +276,7 @@ static int caam_init_buf(struct caam_rng_ctx *ctx, int buf_id)
static int caam_init(struct hwrng *rng)
{
- struct caam_rng_ctx *ctx = rng_ctx;
+ struct caam_rng_ctx *ctx = to_caam_rng_ctx(rng);
int err;
ctx->jrdev = caam_jr_alloc();
@@ -309,28 +308,11 @@ static int caam_init(struct hwrng *rng)
return err;
}
-static struct hwrng caam_rng = {
- .name = "rng-caam",
- .init = caam_init,
- .cleanup = caam_cleanup,
- .read = caam_read,
-};
-
-void caam_rng_exit(void)
-{
- if (!init_done)
- return;
-
- hwrng_unregister(&caam_rng);
- kfree(rng_ctx);
-}
-
int caam_rng_init(struct device *ctrldev)
{
+ struct caam_rng_ctx *ctx;
u32 rng_inst;
struct caam_drv_private *priv = dev_get_drvdata(ctrldev);
- int err;
- init_done = false;
/* Check for an instantiated RNG before registration */
if (priv->era < 10)
@@ -342,18 +324,16 @@ int caam_rng_init(struct device *ctrldev)
if (!rng_inst)
return 0;
- rng_ctx = kmalloc(sizeof(*rng_ctx), GFP_DMA | GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!rng_ctx)
+ ctx = devm_kzalloc(ctrldev, sizeof(*ctx), GFP_DMA | GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!ctx)
return -ENOMEM;
- dev_info(ctrldev, "registering rng-caam\n");
+ ctx->rng.name = "rng-caam";
+ ctx->rng.init = caam_init;
+ ctx->rng.cleanup = caam_cleanup;
+ ctx->rng.read = caam_read;
- err = hwrng_register(&caam_rng);
- if (!err) {
- init_done = true;
- return err;
- }
+ dev_info(ctrldev, "registering rng-caam\n");
- kfree(rng_ctx);
- return err;
+ return devm_hwrng_register(ctrldev, &ctx->rng);
}
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/caam/intern.h b/drivers/crypto/caam/intern.h
index c7c10c90464b..6d64931409eb 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/caam/intern.h
+++ b/drivers/crypto/caam/intern.h
@@ -161,7 +161,6 @@ static inline void caam_pkc_exit(void)
#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_FSL_CAAM_RNG_API
int caam_rng_init(struct device *dev);
-void caam_rng_exit(void);
#else
@@ -170,10 +169,6 @@ static inline int caam_rng_init(struct device *dev)
return 0;
}
-static inline void caam_rng_exit(void)
-{
-}
-
#endif /* CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_FSL_CAAM_RNG_API */
#ifdef CONFIG_CAAM_QI
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/caam/jr.c b/drivers/crypto/caam/jr.c
index fc97cde27059..f15d0d92c031 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/caam/jr.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/caam/jr.c
@@ -53,7 +53,6 @@ static void unregister_algs(void)
caam_qi_algapi_exit();
- caam_rng_exit();
caam_pkc_exit();
caam_algapi_hash_exit();
caam_algapi_exit();
--
2.21.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 18+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v6 3/7] crypto: caam - simplify RNG implementation
2020-01-08 15:40 [PATCH v6 0/7] enable CAAM's HWRNG as default Andrey Smirnov
2020-01-08 15:40 ` [PATCH v6 1/7] crypto: caam - use struct hwrng's .init for initialization Andrey Smirnov
2020-01-08 15:40 ` [PATCH v6 2/7] crypto: caam - drop global context pointer and init_done Andrey Smirnov
@ 2020-01-08 15:40 ` Andrey Smirnov
2020-01-08 15:40 ` [PATCH v6 4/7] crypto: caam - check if RNG job failed Andrey Smirnov
` (4 subsequent siblings)
7 siblings, 0 replies; 18+ messages in thread
From: Andrey Smirnov @ 2020-01-08 15:40 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-crypto
Cc: Andrey Smirnov, Chris Healy, Lucas Stach, Horia Geantă,
Herbert Xu, Iuliana Prodan, linux-kernel, linux-imx
Rework CAAM RNG implementation as follows:
- Make use of the fact that HWRNG supports partial reads and will
handle such cases gracefully by removing recursion in caam_read()
- Convert blocking caam_read() codepath to do a single blocking job
read directly into requested buffer, bypassing any intermediary
buffers
- Convert async caam_read() codepath into a simple single
reader/single writer FIFO use-case, thus simplifying concurrency
handling and delegating buffer read/write position management to KFIFO
subsystem.
- Leverage the same low level RNG data extraction code for both async
and blocking caam_read() scenarios, get rid of the shared job
descriptor and make non-shared one as a simple as possible (just
HEADER + ALGORITHM OPERATION + FIFO STORE)
- Split private context from DMA related memory, so that the former
could be allocated without GFP_DMA.
NOTE: On its face value this commit decreased throughput numbers
reported by
dd if=/dev/hwrng of=/dev/null bs=1 count=100K [iflag=nonblock]
by about 15%, however commits that enable prediction resistance and
limit JR total size impact the performance so much and move the
bottleneck such as to make this regression irrelevant.
NOTE: On the bright side, this commit reduces RNG in kernel DMA buffer
memory usage from 2 x RN_BUF_SIZE (~256K) to 32K.
Signed-off-by: Andrey Smirnov <andrew.smirnov@gmail.com>
Cc: Chris Healy <cphealy@gmail.com>
Cc: Lucas Stach <l.stach@pengutronix.de>
Cc: Horia Geantă <horia.geanta@nxp.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: Iuliana Prodan <iuliana.prodan@nxp.com>
Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-imx@nxp.com
---
drivers/crypto/caam/caamrng.c | 325 ++++++++++++----------------------
1 file changed, 112 insertions(+), 213 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/caam/caamrng.c b/drivers/crypto/caam/caamrng.c
index fe187db91233..3960f5c81c97 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/caam/caamrng.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/caam/caamrng.c
@@ -7,35 +7,12 @@
*
* Based on caamalg.c crypto API driver.
*
- * relationship between job descriptors to shared descriptors:
- *
- * --------------- --------------
- * | JobDesc #0 |-------------------->| ShareDesc |
- * | *(buffer 0) | |------------->| (generate) |
- * --------------- | | (move) |
- * | | (store) |
- * --------------- | --------------
- * | JobDesc #1 |------|
- * | *(buffer 1) |
- * ---------------
- *
- * A job desc looks like this:
- *
- * ---------------------
- * | Header |
- * | ShareDesc Pointer |
- * | SEQ_OUT_PTR |
- * | (output buffer) |
- * ---------------------
- *
- * The SharedDesc never changes, and each job descriptor points to one of two
- * buffers for each device, from which the data will be copied into the
- * requested destination
*/
#include <linux/hw_random.h>
#include <linux/completion.h>
#include <linux/atomic.h>
+#include <linux/kfifo.h>
#include "compat.h"
@@ -45,38 +22,34 @@
#include "jr.h"
#include "error.h"
+/* length of descriptors */
+#define CAAM_RNG_MAX_FIFO_STORE_SIZE U16_MAX
+
+#define CAAM_RNG_FIFO_LEN SZ_32K /* Must be a multiple of 2 */
+
/*
- * Maximum buffer size: maximum number of random, cache-aligned bytes that
- * will be generated and moved to seq out ptr (extlen not allowed)
+ * See caam_init_desc()
*/
-#define RN_BUF_SIZE (0xffff / L1_CACHE_BYTES * \
- L1_CACHE_BYTES)
+#define CAAM_RNG_DESC_LEN (CAAM_CMD_SZ + \
+ CAAM_CMD_SZ + \
+ CAAM_CMD_SZ + CAAM_PTR_SZ_MAX)
-/* length of descriptors */
-#define DESC_JOB_O_LEN (CAAM_CMD_SZ * 2 + CAAM_PTR_SZ_MAX * 2)
-#define DESC_RNG_LEN (3 * CAAM_CMD_SZ)
-
-/* Buffer, its dma address and lock */
-struct buf_data {
- u8 buf[RN_BUF_SIZE] ____cacheline_aligned;
- dma_addr_t addr;
- struct completion filled;
- u32 hw_desc[DESC_JOB_O_LEN];
-#define BUF_NOT_EMPTY 0
-#define BUF_EMPTY 1
-#define BUF_PENDING 2 /* Empty, but with job pending --don't submit another */
- atomic_t empty;
+typedef u8 caam_rng_desc[CAAM_RNG_DESC_LEN];
+
+enum {
+ DESC_ASYNC,
+ DESC_SYNC,
+ DESC_NUM,
};
/* rng per-device context */
struct caam_rng_ctx {
struct hwrng rng;
struct device *jrdev;
- dma_addr_t sh_desc_dma;
- u32 sh_desc[DESC_RNG_LEN];
- unsigned int cur_buf_idx;
- int current_buf;
- struct buf_data bufs[2];
+ struct device *ctrldev;
+ caam_rng_desc *desc;
+ struct work_struct worker;
+ struct kfifo fifo;
};
static struct caam_rng_ctx *to_caam_rng_ctx(struct hwrng *r)
@@ -84,228 +57,152 @@ static struct caam_rng_ctx *to_caam_rng_ctx(struct hwrng *r)
return container_of(r, struct caam_rng_ctx, rng);
}
-static inline void rng_unmap_buf(struct device *jrdev, struct buf_data *bd)
+static void caam_rng_done(struct device *jrdev, u32 *desc, u32 err,
+ void *context)
{
- if (bd->addr)
- dma_unmap_single(jrdev, bd->addr, RN_BUF_SIZE,
- DMA_FROM_DEVICE);
-}
-
-static inline void rng_unmap_ctx(struct caam_rng_ctx *ctx)
-{
- struct device *jrdev = ctx->jrdev;
-
- if (ctx->sh_desc_dma)
- dma_unmap_single(jrdev, ctx->sh_desc_dma,
- desc_bytes(ctx->sh_desc), DMA_TO_DEVICE);
- rng_unmap_buf(jrdev, &ctx->bufs[0]);
- rng_unmap_buf(jrdev, &ctx->bufs[1]);
-}
-
-static void rng_done(struct device *jrdev, u32 *desc, u32 err, void *context)
-{
- struct buf_data *bd;
-
- bd = container_of(desc, struct buf_data, hw_desc[0]);
+ struct completion *done = context;
if (err)
caam_jr_strstatus(jrdev, err);
- atomic_set(&bd->empty, BUF_NOT_EMPTY);
- complete(&bd->filled);
-
- /* Buffer refilled, invalidate cache */
- dma_sync_single_for_cpu(jrdev, bd->addr, RN_BUF_SIZE, DMA_FROM_DEVICE);
-
- print_hex_dump_debug("rng refreshed buf@: ", DUMP_PREFIX_ADDRESS, 16, 4,
- bd->buf, RN_BUF_SIZE, 1);
+ complete(done);
}
-static inline int submit_job(struct caam_rng_ctx *ctx, int to_current)
+static u32 *caam_init_desc(u32 *desc, dma_addr_t dst_dma, int len)
{
- struct buf_data *bd = &ctx->bufs[!(to_current ^ ctx->current_buf)];
- struct device *jrdev = ctx->jrdev;
- u32 *desc = bd->hw_desc;
- int err;
+ init_job_desc(desc, 0); /* + 1 cmd_sz */
+ /* Generate random bytes: + 1 cmd_sz */
+ append_operation(desc, OP_ALG_ALGSEL_RNG | OP_TYPE_CLASS1_ALG);
+ /* Store bytes */
+ append_fifo_store(desc, dst_dma, len, FIFOST_TYPE_RNGSTORE);
- dev_dbg(jrdev, "submitting job %d\n", !(to_current ^ ctx->current_buf));
- init_completion(&bd->filled);
- err = caam_jr_enqueue(jrdev, desc, rng_done, ctx);
- if (err)
- complete(&bd->filled); /* don't wait on failed job*/
- else
- atomic_inc(&bd->empty); /* note if pending */
+ print_hex_dump_debug("rng job desc@: ", DUMP_PREFIX_ADDRESS,
+ 16, 4, desc, desc_bytes(desc), 1);
- return err;
+ return desc;
}
-static int caam_read(struct hwrng *rng, void *data, size_t max, bool wait)
+static int caam_rng_read_one(struct device *jrdev,
+ void *dst, int len,
+ void *desc,
+ struct completion *done)
{
- struct caam_rng_ctx *ctx = to_caam_rng_ctx(rng);
- struct buf_data *bd = &ctx->bufs[ctx->current_buf];
- int next_buf_idx, copied_idx;
+ dma_addr_t dst_dma;
int err;
- if (atomic_read(&bd->empty)) {
- /* try to submit job if there wasn't one */
- if (atomic_read(&bd->empty) == BUF_EMPTY) {
- err = submit_job(ctx, 1);
- /* if can't submit job, can't even wait */
- if (err)
- return 0;
- }
- /* no immediate data, so exit if not waiting */
- if (!wait)
- return 0;
-
- /* waiting for pending job */
- if (atomic_read(&bd->empty))
- wait_for_completion(&bd->filled);
- }
-
- next_buf_idx = ctx->cur_buf_idx + max;
- dev_dbg(ctx->jrdev, "%s: start reading at buffer %d, idx %d\n",
- __func__, ctx->current_buf, ctx->cur_buf_idx);
+ len = min_t(int, len, CAAM_RNG_MAX_FIFO_STORE_SIZE);
- /* if enough data in current buffer */
- if (next_buf_idx < RN_BUF_SIZE) {
- memcpy(data, bd->buf + ctx->cur_buf_idx, max);
- ctx->cur_buf_idx = next_buf_idx;
- return max;
+ dst_dma = dma_map_single(jrdev, dst, len, DMA_FROM_DEVICE);
+ if (dma_mapping_error(jrdev, dst_dma)) {
+ dev_err(jrdev, "unable to map destination memory\n");
+ return -ENOMEM;
}
- /* else, copy what's left... */
- copied_idx = RN_BUF_SIZE - ctx->cur_buf_idx;
- memcpy(data, bd->buf + ctx->cur_buf_idx, copied_idx);
- ctx->cur_buf_idx = 0;
- atomic_set(&bd->empty, BUF_EMPTY);
-
- /* ...refill... */
- submit_job(ctx, 1);
+ init_completion(done);
+ err = caam_jr_enqueue(jrdev,
+ caam_init_desc(desc, dst_dma, len),
+ caam_rng_done, done);
+ if (!err)
+ wait_for_completion(done);
- /* and use next buffer */
- ctx->current_buf = !ctx->current_buf;
- dev_dbg(ctx->jrdev, "switched to buffer %d\n", ctx->current_buf);
+ dma_unmap_single(jrdev, dst_dma, len, DMA_FROM_DEVICE);
- /* since there already is some data read, don't wait */
- return copied_idx + caam_read(rng, data + copied_idx,
- max - copied_idx, false);
+ return err ?: len;
}
-static inline int rng_create_sh_desc(struct caam_rng_ctx *ctx)
+static void caam_rng_maybe_refill_fifo(struct caam_rng_ctx *ctx)
{
- struct device *jrdev = ctx->jrdev;
- u32 *desc = ctx->sh_desc;
-
- init_sh_desc(desc, HDR_SHARE_SERIAL);
-
- /* Generate random bytes */
- append_operation(desc, OP_ALG_ALGSEL_RNG | OP_TYPE_CLASS1_ALG);
-
- /* Store bytes */
- append_seq_fifo_store(desc, RN_BUF_SIZE, FIFOST_TYPE_RNGSTORE);
-
- ctx->sh_desc_dma = dma_map_single(jrdev, desc, desc_bytes(desc),
- DMA_TO_DEVICE);
- if (dma_mapping_error(jrdev, ctx->sh_desc_dma)) {
- dev_err(jrdev, "unable to map shared descriptor\n");
- return -ENOMEM;
- }
+ if (kfifo_len(&ctx->fifo) <= CAAM_RNG_FIFO_LEN / 2)
+ schedule_work(&ctx->worker);
+}
- print_hex_dump_debug("rng shdesc@: ", DUMP_PREFIX_ADDRESS, 16, 4,
- desc, desc_bytes(desc), 1);
+static void caam_rng_fill_async(struct caam_rng_ctx *ctx)
+{
+ struct scatterlist sg[1];
+ struct completion done;
+ int len, nents;
+
+ sg_init_table(sg, ARRAY_SIZE(sg));
+ nents = kfifo_dma_in_prepare(&ctx->fifo, sg, ARRAY_SIZE(sg),
+ CAAM_RNG_FIFO_LEN);
+ if (!nents)
+ return;
+
+ len = caam_rng_read_one(ctx->jrdev, sg_virt(&sg[0]),
+ sg[0].length,
+ &ctx->desc[DESC_ASYNC],
+ &done);
+ if (len < 0)
+ return;
+
+ kfifo_dma_in_finish(&ctx->fifo, len);
+ caam_rng_maybe_refill_fifo(ctx);
+}
- return 0;
+static void caam_rng_worker(struct work_struct *work)
+{
+ struct caam_rng_ctx *ctx = container_of(work, struct caam_rng_ctx,
+ worker);
+ caam_rng_fill_async(ctx);
}
-static inline int rng_create_job_desc(struct caam_rng_ctx *ctx, int buf_id)
+static int caam_read(struct hwrng *rng, void *dst, size_t max, bool wait)
{
- struct device *jrdev = ctx->jrdev;
- struct buf_data *bd = &ctx->bufs[buf_id];
- u32 *desc = bd->hw_desc;
- int sh_len = desc_len(ctx->sh_desc);
+ struct caam_rng_ctx *ctx = to_caam_rng_ctx(rng);
+ int out;
- init_job_desc_shared(desc, ctx->sh_desc_dma, sh_len, HDR_SHARE_DEFER |
- HDR_REVERSE);
+ if (wait) {
+ struct completion done;
- bd->addr = dma_map_single(jrdev, bd->buf, RN_BUF_SIZE, DMA_FROM_DEVICE);
- if (dma_mapping_error(jrdev, bd->addr)) {
- dev_err(jrdev, "unable to map dst\n");
- return -ENOMEM;
+ return caam_rng_read_one(ctx->jrdev, dst, max,
+ ctx->desc[DESC_SYNC], &done);
}
- append_seq_out_ptr_intlen(desc, bd->addr, RN_BUF_SIZE, 0);
+ out = kfifo_out(&ctx->fifo, dst, max);
+ caam_rng_maybe_refill_fifo(ctx);
- print_hex_dump_debug("rng job desc@: ", DUMP_PREFIX_ADDRESS, 16, 4,
- desc, desc_bytes(desc), 1);
-
- return 0;
+ return out;
}
static void caam_cleanup(struct hwrng *rng)
{
struct caam_rng_ctx *ctx = to_caam_rng_ctx(rng);
- int i;
- struct buf_data *bd;
- for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
- bd = &ctx->bufs[i];
- if (atomic_read(&bd->empty) == BUF_PENDING)
- wait_for_completion(&bd->filled);
- }
-
- rng_unmap_ctx(ctx);
+ flush_work(&ctx->worker);
caam_jr_free(ctx->jrdev);
+ kfifo_free(&ctx->fifo);
}
-static int caam_init_buf(struct caam_rng_ctx *ctx, int buf_id)
+static int caam_init(struct hwrng *rng)
{
- struct buf_data *bd = &ctx->bufs[buf_id];
+ struct caam_rng_ctx *ctx = to_caam_rng_ctx(rng);
int err;
- err = rng_create_job_desc(ctx, buf_id);
- if (err)
- return err;
-
- atomic_set(&bd->empty, BUF_EMPTY);
- submit_job(ctx, buf_id == ctx->current_buf);
- wait_for_completion(&bd->filled);
+ ctx->desc = devm_kcalloc(ctx->ctrldev, DESC_NUM, sizeof(*ctx->desc),
+ GFP_DMA | GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!ctx->desc)
+ return -ENOMEM;
- return 0;
-}
+ if (kfifo_alloc(&ctx->fifo, CAAM_RNG_FIFO_LEN, GFP_DMA | GFP_KERNEL))
+ return -ENOMEM;
-static int caam_init(struct hwrng *rng)
-{
- struct caam_rng_ctx *ctx = to_caam_rng_ctx(rng);
- int err;
+ INIT_WORK(&ctx->worker, caam_rng_worker);
ctx->jrdev = caam_jr_alloc();
err = PTR_ERR_OR_ZERO(ctx->jrdev);
if (err) {
+ kfifo_free(&ctx->fifo);
pr_err("Job Ring Device allocation for transform failed\n");
return err;
}
- err = rng_create_sh_desc(ctx);
- if (err)
- goto free_jrdev;
-
- ctx->current_buf = 0;
- ctx->cur_buf_idx = 0;
-
- err = caam_init_buf(ctx, 0);
- if (err)
- goto free_jrdev;
-
- err = caam_init_buf(ctx, 1);
- if (err)
- goto free_jrdev;
+ /*
+ * Fill async buffer to have early randomness data for
+ * hw_random
+ */
+ caam_rng_fill_async(ctx);
return 0;
-
-free_jrdev:
- caam_jr_free(ctx->jrdev);
- return err;
}
int caam_rng_init(struct device *ctrldev)
@@ -324,10 +221,12 @@ int caam_rng_init(struct device *ctrldev)
if (!rng_inst)
return 0;
- ctx = devm_kzalloc(ctrldev, sizeof(*ctx), GFP_DMA | GFP_KERNEL);
+ ctx = devm_kzalloc(ctrldev, sizeof(*ctx), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!ctx)
return -ENOMEM;
+ ctx->ctrldev = ctrldev;
+
ctx->rng.name = "rng-caam";
ctx->rng.init = caam_init;
ctx->rng.cleanup = caam_cleanup;
--
2.21.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 18+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v6 4/7] crypto: caam - check if RNG job failed
2020-01-08 15:40 [PATCH v6 0/7] enable CAAM's HWRNG as default Andrey Smirnov
` (2 preceding siblings ...)
2020-01-08 15:40 ` [PATCH v6 3/7] crypto: caam - simplify RNG implementation Andrey Smirnov
@ 2020-01-08 15:40 ` Andrey Smirnov
2020-01-08 15:40 ` [PATCH v6 5/7] crypto: caam - invalidate entropy register during RNG initialization Andrey Smirnov
` (3 subsequent siblings)
7 siblings, 0 replies; 18+ messages in thread
From: Andrey Smirnov @ 2020-01-08 15:40 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-crypto
Cc: Andrey Smirnov, Chris Healy, Lucas Stach, Horia Geantă,
Herbert Xu, Iuliana Prodan, linux-kernel, linux-imx
We shouldn't stay silent if RNG job fails. Add appropriate code to
check for that case and propagate error code up appropriately.
Signed-off-by: Andrey Smirnov <andrew.smirnov@gmail.com>
Cc: Chris Healy <cphealy@gmail.com>
Cc: Lucas Stach <l.stach@pengutronix.de>
Cc: Horia Geantă <horia.geanta@nxp.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: Iuliana Prodan <iuliana.prodan@nxp.com>
Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-imx@nxp.com
---
drivers/crypto/caam/caamrng.c | 17 +++++++++++++----
1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/caam/caamrng.c b/drivers/crypto/caam/caamrng.c
index 3960f5c81c97..554aafbd4d11 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/caam/caamrng.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/caam/caamrng.c
@@ -52,6 +52,11 @@ struct caam_rng_ctx {
struct kfifo fifo;
};
+struct caam_rng_job_ctx {
+ struct completion *done;
+ int *err;
+};
+
static struct caam_rng_ctx *to_caam_rng_ctx(struct hwrng *r)
{
return container_of(r, struct caam_rng_ctx, rng);
@@ -60,12 +65,12 @@ static struct caam_rng_ctx *to_caam_rng_ctx(struct hwrng *r)
static void caam_rng_done(struct device *jrdev, u32 *desc, u32 err,
void *context)
{
- struct completion *done = context;
+ struct caam_rng_job_ctx *jctx = context;
if (err)
- caam_jr_strstatus(jrdev, err);
+ *jctx->err = caam_jr_strstatus(jrdev, err);
- complete(done);
+ complete(jctx->done);
}
static u32 *caam_init_desc(u32 *desc, dma_addr_t dst_dma, int len)
@@ -89,6 +94,10 @@ static int caam_rng_read_one(struct device *jrdev,
{
dma_addr_t dst_dma;
int err;
+ struct caam_rng_job_ctx jctx = {
+ .done = done,
+ .err = &err,
+ };
len = min_t(int, len, CAAM_RNG_MAX_FIFO_STORE_SIZE);
@@ -101,7 +110,7 @@ static int caam_rng_read_one(struct device *jrdev,
init_completion(done);
err = caam_jr_enqueue(jrdev,
caam_init_desc(desc, dst_dma, len),
- caam_rng_done, done);
+ caam_rng_done, &jctx);
if (!err)
wait_for_completion(done);
--
2.21.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 18+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v6 5/7] crypto: caam - invalidate entropy register during RNG initialization
2020-01-08 15:40 [PATCH v6 0/7] enable CAAM's HWRNG as default Andrey Smirnov
` (3 preceding siblings ...)
2020-01-08 15:40 ` [PATCH v6 4/7] crypto: caam - check if RNG job failed Andrey Smirnov
@ 2020-01-08 15:40 ` Andrey Smirnov
2020-01-08 15:40 ` [PATCH v6 6/7] crypto: caam - enable prediction resistance in HRWNG Andrey Smirnov
` (2 subsequent siblings)
7 siblings, 0 replies; 18+ messages in thread
From: Andrey Smirnov @ 2020-01-08 15:40 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-crypto
Cc: Andrey Smirnov, Aymen Sghaier, Vipul Kumar, Chris Healy,
Lucas Stach, Horia Geantă,
Herbert Xu, Iuliana Prodan, linux-kernel, linux-imx
In order to make sure that we always use non-stale entropy data, change
the code to invalidate entropy register during RNG initialization.
Signed-off-by: Aymen Sghaier <aymen.sghaier@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Vipul Kumar <vipul_kumar@mentor.com>
[andrew.smirnov@gmail.com ported to upstream kernel, rewrote commit msg]
Signed-off-by: Andrey Smirnov <andrew.smirnov@gmail.com>
Cc: Chris Healy <cphealy@gmail.com>
Cc: Lucas Stach <l.stach@pengutronix.de>
Cc: Horia Geantă <horia.geanta@nxp.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: Iuliana Prodan <iuliana.prodan@nxp.com>
Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-imx@nxp.com
---
drivers/crypto/caam/ctrl.c | 11 ++++++++---
drivers/crypto/caam/regs.h | 3 ++-
2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/caam/ctrl.c b/drivers/crypto/caam/ctrl.c
index c99a6a3b22de..22d8676dd610 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/caam/ctrl.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/caam/ctrl.c
@@ -338,8 +338,12 @@ static void kick_trng(struct platform_device *pdev, int ent_delay)
ctrl = (struct caam_ctrl __iomem *)ctrlpriv->ctrl;
r4tst = &ctrl->r4tst[0];
- /* put RNG4 into program mode */
- clrsetbits_32(&r4tst->rtmctl, 0, RTMCTL_PRGM);
+ /*
+ * Setting both RTMCTL:PRGM and RTMCTL:TRNG_ACC causes TRNG to
+ * properly invalidate the entropy in the entropy register and
+ * force re-generation.
+ */
+ clrsetbits_32(&r4tst->rtmctl, 0, RTMCTL_PRGM | RTMCTL_ACC);
/*
* Performance-wise, it does not make sense to
@@ -369,7 +373,8 @@ static void kick_trng(struct platform_device *pdev, int ent_delay)
* select raw sampling in both entropy shifter
* and statistical checker; ; put RNG4 into run mode
*/
- clrsetbits_32(&r4tst->rtmctl, RTMCTL_PRGM, RTMCTL_SAMP_MODE_RAW_ES_SC);
+ clrsetbits_32(&r4tst->rtmctl, RTMCTL_PRGM | RTMCTL_ACC,
+ RTMCTL_SAMP_MODE_RAW_ES_SC);
}
static int caam_get_era_from_hw(struct caam_ctrl __iomem *ctrl)
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/caam/regs.h b/drivers/crypto/caam/regs.h
index 05127b70527d..c191e8fd0fa7 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/caam/regs.h
+++ b/drivers/crypto/caam/regs.h
@@ -487,7 +487,8 @@ struct rngtst {
/* RNG4 TRNG test registers */
struct rng4tst {
-#define RTMCTL_PRGM 0x00010000 /* 1 -> program mode, 0 -> run mode */
+#define RTMCTL_ACC BIT(5) /* TRNG access mode */
+#define RTMCTL_PRGM BIT(16) /* 1 -> program mode, 0 -> run mode */
#define RTMCTL_SAMP_MODE_VON_NEUMANN_ES_SC 0 /* use von Neumann data in
both entropy shifter and
statistical checker */
--
2.21.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 18+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v6 6/7] crypto: caam - enable prediction resistance in HRWNG
2020-01-08 15:40 [PATCH v6 0/7] enable CAAM's HWRNG as default Andrey Smirnov
` (4 preceding siblings ...)
2020-01-08 15:40 ` [PATCH v6 5/7] crypto: caam - invalidate entropy register during RNG initialization Andrey Smirnov
@ 2020-01-08 15:40 ` Andrey Smirnov
2020-01-20 16:38 ` Horia Geanta
2020-01-21 16:38 ` Horia Geanta
2020-01-08 15:40 ` [PATCH v6 7/7] crypto: caam - limit single JD RNG output to maximum of 16 bytes Andrey Smirnov
2020-01-22 15:11 ` [PATCH v6 0/7] enable CAAM's HWRNG as default Horia Geanta
7 siblings, 2 replies; 18+ messages in thread
From: Andrey Smirnov @ 2020-01-08 15:40 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-crypto
Cc: Andrey Smirnov, Chris Healy, Lucas Stach, Horia Geantă,
Herbert Xu, Iuliana Prodan, linux-kernel, linux-imx
Instantiate CAAM RNG with prediction resistance enabled to improve its
quality (with PR on DRNG is forced to reseed from TRNG every time
random data is generated).
Signed-off-by: Andrey Smirnov <andrew.smirnov@gmail.com>
Cc: Chris Healy <cphealy@gmail.com>
Cc: Lucas Stach <l.stach@pengutronix.de>
Cc: Horia Geantă <horia.geanta@nxp.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: Iuliana Prodan <iuliana.prodan@nxp.com>
Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-imx@nxp.com
---
drivers/crypto/caam/caamrng.c | 3 ++-
drivers/crypto/caam/ctrl.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++----
drivers/crypto/caam/desc.h | 2 ++
drivers/crypto/caam/regs.h | 4 +++-
4 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/caam/caamrng.c b/drivers/crypto/caam/caamrng.c
index 554aafbd4d11..91ccde0240fe 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/caam/caamrng.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/caam/caamrng.c
@@ -77,7 +77,8 @@ static u32 *caam_init_desc(u32 *desc, dma_addr_t dst_dma, int len)
{
init_job_desc(desc, 0); /* + 1 cmd_sz */
/* Generate random bytes: + 1 cmd_sz */
- append_operation(desc, OP_ALG_ALGSEL_RNG | OP_TYPE_CLASS1_ALG);
+ append_operation(desc, OP_ALG_ALGSEL_RNG | OP_TYPE_CLASS1_ALG |
+ OP_ALG_PR_ON);
/* Store bytes */
append_fifo_store(desc, dst_dma, len, FIFOST_TYPE_RNGSTORE);
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/caam/ctrl.c b/drivers/crypto/caam/ctrl.c
index 22d8676dd610..85c2e831839a 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/caam/ctrl.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/caam/ctrl.c
@@ -36,7 +36,8 @@ static void build_instantiation_desc(u32 *desc, int handle, int do_sk)
init_job_desc(desc, 0);
op_flags = OP_TYPE_CLASS1_ALG | OP_ALG_ALGSEL_RNG |
- (handle << OP_ALG_AAI_SHIFT) | OP_ALG_AS_INIT;
+ (handle << OP_ALG_AAI_SHIFT) | OP_ALG_AS_INIT |
+ OP_ALG_PR_ON;
/* INIT RNG in non-test mode */
append_operation(desc, op_flags);
@@ -275,12 +276,25 @@ static int instantiate_rng(struct device *ctrldev, int state_handle_mask,
return -ENOMEM;
for (sh_idx = 0; sh_idx < RNG4_MAX_HANDLES; sh_idx++) {
+ const u32 rdsta_if = RDSTA_IF0 << sh_idx;
+ const u32 rdsta_pr = RDSTA_PR0 << sh_idx;
+ const u32 rdsta_mask = rdsta_if | rdsta_pr;
/*
* If the corresponding bit is set, this state handle
* was initialized by somebody else, so it's left alone.
*/
- if ((1 << sh_idx) & state_handle_mask)
- continue;
+ if (rdsta_if & state_handle_mask) {
+ if (rdsta_pr & state_handle_mask)
+ continue;
+
+ dev_info(ctrldev,
+ "RNG4 SH%d was previously instantiated without prediction resistance. Tearing it down\n",
+ sh_idx);
+
+ ret = deinstantiate_rng(ctrldev, rdsta_if);
+ if (ret)
+ break;
+ }
/* Create the descriptor for instantiating RNG State Handle */
build_instantiation_desc(desc, sh_idx, gen_sk);
@@ -302,7 +316,7 @@ static int instantiate_rng(struct device *ctrldev, int state_handle_mask,
rdsta_val = rd_reg32(&ctrl->r4tst[0].rdsta) & RDSTA_IFMASK;
if ((status && status != JRSTA_SSRC_JUMP_HALT_CC) ||
- !(rdsta_val & (1 << sh_idx))) {
+ (rdsta_val & rdsta_mask) != rdsta_mask) {
ret = -EAGAIN;
break;
}
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/caam/desc.h b/drivers/crypto/caam/desc.h
index 4b6854bf896a..e796d3cb9be8 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/caam/desc.h
+++ b/drivers/crypto/caam/desc.h
@@ -1254,6 +1254,8 @@
#define OP_ALG_ICV_OFF (0 << OP_ALG_ICV_SHIFT)
#define OP_ALG_ICV_ON (1 << OP_ALG_ICV_SHIFT)
+#define OP_ALG_PR_ON BIT(1)
+
#define OP_ALG_DIR_SHIFT 0
#define OP_ALG_DIR_MASK 1
#define OP_ALG_DECRYPT 0
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/caam/regs.h b/drivers/crypto/caam/regs.h
index c191e8fd0fa7..fe1f8c1409fd 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/caam/regs.h
+++ b/drivers/crypto/caam/regs.h
@@ -524,9 +524,11 @@ struct rng4tst {
u32 rsvd1[40];
#define RDSTA_SKVT 0x80000000
#define RDSTA_SKVN 0x40000000
+#define RDSTA_PR0 BIT(4)
+#define RDSTA_PR1 BIT(5)
#define RDSTA_IF0 0x00000001
#define RDSTA_IF1 0x00000002
-#define RDSTA_IFMASK (RDSTA_IF1 | RDSTA_IF0)
+#define RDSTA_IFMASK (RDSTA_PR1 | RDSTA_PR0 | RDSTA_IF1 | RDSTA_IF0)
u32 rdsta;
u32 rsvd2[15];
};
--
2.21.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 18+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v6 7/7] crypto: caam - limit single JD RNG output to maximum of 16 bytes
2020-01-08 15:40 [PATCH v6 0/7] enable CAAM's HWRNG as default Andrey Smirnov
` (5 preceding siblings ...)
2020-01-08 15:40 ` [PATCH v6 6/7] crypto: caam - enable prediction resistance in HRWNG Andrey Smirnov
@ 2020-01-08 15:40 ` Andrey Smirnov
2020-01-13 14:10 ` Horia Geanta
2020-01-22 15:11 ` [PATCH v6 0/7] enable CAAM's HWRNG as default Horia Geanta
7 siblings, 1 reply; 18+ messages in thread
From: Andrey Smirnov @ 2020-01-08 15:40 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-crypto
Cc: Andrey Smirnov, Chris Healy, Lucas Stach, Horia Geantă,
Herbert Xu, Iuliana Prodan, linux-kernel, linux-imx
In order to follow recommendation in SP800-90C (section "9.4 The
Oversampling-NRBG Construction") limit the output of "generate" JD
submitted to CAAM. See
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-crypto/VI1PR0402MB3485EF10976A4A69F90E5B0F98580@VI1PR0402MB3485.eurprd04.prod.outlook.com/
for more details.
This change should make CAAM's hwrng driver good enough to have 999
quality rating.
Signed-off-by: Andrey Smirnov <andrew.smirnov@gmail.com>
Cc: Chris Healy <cphealy@gmail.com>
Cc: Lucas Stach <l.stach@pengutronix.de>
Cc: Horia Geantă <horia.geanta@nxp.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: Iuliana Prodan <iuliana.prodan@nxp.com>
Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-imx@nxp.com
---
drivers/crypto/caam/caamrng.c | 5 +++--
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/caam/caamrng.c b/drivers/crypto/caam/caamrng.c
index 91ccde0240fe..2b75ffffcac9 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/caam/caamrng.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/caam/caamrng.c
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@
#include "error.h"
/* length of descriptors */
-#define CAAM_RNG_MAX_FIFO_STORE_SIZE U16_MAX
+#define CAAM_RNG_MAX_FIFO_STORE_SIZE 16
#define CAAM_RNG_FIFO_LEN SZ_32K /* Must be a multiple of 2 */
@@ -134,7 +134,7 @@ static void caam_rng_fill_async(struct caam_rng_ctx *ctx)
sg_init_table(sg, ARRAY_SIZE(sg));
nents = kfifo_dma_in_prepare(&ctx->fifo, sg, ARRAY_SIZE(sg),
- CAAM_RNG_FIFO_LEN);
+ CAAM_RNG_MAX_FIFO_STORE_SIZE);
if (!nents)
return;
@@ -241,6 +241,7 @@ int caam_rng_init(struct device *ctrldev)
ctx->rng.init = caam_init;
ctx->rng.cleanup = caam_cleanup;
ctx->rng.read = caam_read;
+ ctx->rng.quality = 999;
dev_info(ctrldev, "registering rng-caam\n");
--
2.21.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 18+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v6 2/7] crypto: caam - drop global context pointer and init_done
2020-01-08 15:40 ` [PATCH v6 2/7] crypto: caam - drop global context pointer and init_done Andrey Smirnov
@ 2020-01-13 9:41 ` Horia Geanta
2020-01-27 13:44 ` Andrey Smirnov
0 siblings, 1 reply; 18+ messages in thread
From: Horia Geanta @ 2020-01-13 9:41 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Andrey Smirnov, linux-crypto
Cc: Chris Healy, Lucas Stach, Herbert Xu, Iuliana Prodan,
linux-kernel, dl-linux-imx
On 1/8/2020 5:42 PM, Andrey Smirnov wrote:
> @@ -342,18 +324,16 @@ int caam_rng_init(struct device *ctrldev)
> if (!rng_inst)
> return 0;
>
> - rng_ctx = kmalloc(sizeof(*rng_ctx), GFP_DMA | GFP_KERNEL);
> - if (!rng_ctx)
> + ctx = devm_kzalloc(ctrldev, sizeof(*ctx), GFP_DMA | GFP_KERNEL);
> + if (!ctx)
> return -ENOMEM;
>
> - dev_info(ctrldev, "registering rng-caam\n");
> + ctx->rng.name = "rng-caam";
> + ctx->rng.init = caam_init;
> + ctx->rng.cleanup = caam_cleanup;
> + ctx->rng.read = caam_read;
>
> - err = hwrng_register(&caam_rng);
> - if (!err) {
> - init_done = true;
> - return err;
> - }
> + dev_info(ctrldev, "registering rng-caam\n");
>
> - kfree(rng_ctx);
> - return err;
> + return devm_hwrng_register(ctrldev, &ctx->rng);
This means hwrng_unregister() is called only when ctrldev is removed.
OTOH caam_rng_init() could be called multiple times, e.g. if there's only one
jrdev left in the system and it's removed then added back.
This will lead to caam_rng_init() -> hwrng_register() called twice
with the same "rng-caam" name, without a hwrng_unregister() called in-between.
Horia
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 18+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v6 7/7] crypto: caam - limit single JD RNG output to maximum of 16 bytes
2020-01-08 15:40 ` [PATCH v6 7/7] crypto: caam - limit single JD RNG output to maximum of 16 bytes Andrey Smirnov
@ 2020-01-13 14:10 ` Horia Geanta
2020-01-27 13:42 ` Andrey Smirnov
0 siblings, 1 reply; 18+ messages in thread
From: Horia Geanta @ 2020-01-13 14:10 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Andrey Smirnov, linux-crypto
Cc: Chris Healy, Lucas Stach, Herbert Xu, Iuliana Prodan,
linux-kernel, dl-linux-imx
On 1/8/2020 5:42 PM, Andrey Smirnov wrote:
> In order to follow recommendation in SP800-90C (section "9.4 The
> Oversampling-NRBG Construction") limit the output of "generate" JD
> submitted to CAAM. See
> https://lore.kernel.org/linux-crypto/VI1PR0402MB3485EF10976A4A69F90E5B0F98580@VI1PR0402MB3485.eurprd04.prod.outlook.com/
> for more details.
>
> This change should make CAAM's hwrng driver good enough to have 999
> quality rating.
>
[...]
> @@ -241,6 +241,7 @@ int caam_rng_init(struct device *ctrldev)
> ctx->rng.init = caam_init;
> ctx->rng.cleanup = caam_cleanup;
> ctx->rng.read = caam_read;
> + ctx->rng.quality = 999;
>
AFAICS the maximum value of hwrng.quality is 1024.
Any reason why it's configured to be lower, now that CAAM RNG-based DRBG
is configured to reseed as requested by FIPS spec to behave as a TRNG?
Horia
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 18+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v6 6/7] crypto: caam - enable prediction resistance in HRWNG
2020-01-08 15:40 ` [PATCH v6 6/7] crypto: caam - enable prediction resistance in HRWNG Andrey Smirnov
@ 2020-01-20 16:38 ` Horia Geanta
2020-01-21 6:20 ` Horia Geanta
2020-01-21 16:38 ` Horia Geanta
1 sibling, 1 reply; 18+ messages in thread
From: Horia Geanta @ 2020-01-20 16:38 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Andrey Smirnov, linux-crypto
Cc: Chris Healy, Lucas Stach, Herbert Xu, Iuliana Prodan,
linux-kernel, dl-linux-imx
On 1/8/2020 5:42 PM, Andrey Smirnov wrote:
> @@ -275,12 +276,25 @@ static int instantiate_rng(struct device *ctrldev, int state_handle_mask,
> return -ENOMEM;
>
> for (sh_idx = 0; sh_idx < RNG4_MAX_HANDLES; sh_idx++) {
> + const u32 rdsta_if = RDSTA_IF0 << sh_idx;
> + const u32 rdsta_pr = RDSTA_PR0 << sh_idx;
> + const u32 rdsta_mask = rdsta_if | rdsta_pr;
> /*
> * If the corresponding bit is set, this state handle
> * was initialized by somebody else, so it's left alone.
> */
> - if ((1 << sh_idx) & state_handle_mask)
> - continue;
> + if (rdsta_if & state_handle_mask) {
> + if (rdsta_pr & state_handle_mask)
> + continue;
> +
> + dev_info(ctrldev,
> + "RNG4 SH%d was previously instantiated without prediction resistance. Tearing it down\n",
> + sh_idx);
> +
> + ret = deinstantiate_rng(ctrldev, rdsta_if);
> + if (ret)
> + break;
In case state handle 0 is deinstantiated, its reinstantiation with PR support
will have the side effect of re-generating JDKEK, TDKEK, TDSK.
This needs to be avoided, since other SW components (like OP-TEE f/w)
could have black keys in use. Overwriting the KEK registers would no longer
allow CAAM to decrypt them.
Horia
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 18+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v6 6/7] crypto: caam - enable prediction resistance in HRWNG
2020-01-20 16:38 ` Horia Geanta
@ 2020-01-21 6:20 ` Horia Geanta
0 siblings, 0 replies; 18+ messages in thread
From: Horia Geanta @ 2020-01-21 6:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Andrey Smirnov, linux-crypto
Cc: Chris Healy, Lucas Stach, Herbert Xu, Iuliana Prodan,
linux-kernel, dl-linux-imx
On 1/20/2020 6:38 PM, Horia Geanta wrote:
> On 1/8/2020 5:42 PM, Andrey Smirnov wrote:
>> @@ -275,12 +276,25 @@ static int instantiate_rng(struct device *ctrldev, int state_handle_mask,
>> return -ENOMEM;
>>
>> for (sh_idx = 0; sh_idx < RNG4_MAX_HANDLES; sh_idx++) {
>> + const u32 rdsta_if = RDSTA_IF0 << sh_idx;
>> + const u32 rdsta_pr = RDSTA_PR0 << sh_idx;
>> + const u32 rdsta_mask = rdsta_if | rdsta_pr;
>> /*
>> * If the corresponding bit is set, this state handle
>> * was initialized by somebody else, so it's left alone.
>> */
>> - if ((1 << sh_idx) & state_handle_mask)
>> - continue;
>> + if (rdsta_if & state_handle_mask) {
>> + if (rdsta_pr & state_handle_mask)
>> + continue;
>> +
>> + dev_info(ctrldev,
>> + "RNG4 SH%d was previously instantiated without prediction resistance. Tearing it down\n",
>> + sh_idx);
>> +
>> + ret = deinstantiate_rng(ctrldev, rdsta_if);
>> + if (ret)
>> + break;
> In case state handle 0 is deinstantiated, its reinstantiation with PR support
> will have the side effect of re-generating JDKEK, TDKEK, TDSK.
> This needs to be avoided, since other SW components (like OP-TEE f/w)
> could have black keys in use. Overwriting the KEK registers would no longer
> allow CAAM to decrypt them.
>
Never mind, looks like there is logic in place to check whether
keys have been generated or not, by looking at RDSTA[SKVN].
Horia
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 18+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v6 6/7] crypto: caam - enable prediction resistance in HRWNG
2020-01-08 15:40 ` [PATCH v6 6/7] crypto: caam - enable prediction resistance in HRWNG Andrey Smirnov
2020-01-20 16:38 ` Horia Geanta
@ 2020-01-21 16:38 ` Horia Geanta
2020-01-22 13:37 ` Horia Geanta
1 sibling, 1 reply; 18+ messages in thread
From: Horia Geanta @ 2020-01-21 16:38 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Andrey Smirnov, linux-crypto
Cc: Chris Healy, Lucas Stach, Herbert Xu, Iuliana Prodan,
linux-kernel, dl-linux-imx
On 1/8/2020 5:42 PM, Andrey Smirnov wrote:
> @@ -275,12 +276,25 @@ static int instantiate_rng(struct device *ctrldev, int state_handle_mask,
> return -ENOMEM;
>
> for (sh_idx = 0; sh_idx < RNG4_MAX_HANDLES; sh_idx++) {
> + const u32 rdsta_if = RDSTA_IF0 << sh_idx;
> + const u32 rdsta_pr = RDSTA_PR0 << sh_idx;
> + const u32 rdsta_mask = rdsta_if | rdsta_pr;
> /*
> * If the corresponding bit is set, this state handle
> * was initialized by somebody else, so it's left alone.
> */
> - if ((1 << sh_idx) & state_handle_mask)
> - continue;
> + if (rdsta_if & state_handle_mask) {
> + if (rdsta_pr & state_handle_mask)
instantiate_rng() is called with
state_handle_mask = rd_reg32(&ctrl->r4tst[0].rdsta) & RDSTA_IFMASK;
so if (rdsta_pr & state_handle_mask) will always be false,
leading to unneeded state handle re-initialization.
Horia
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 18+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v6 6/7] crypto: caam - enable prediction resistance in HRWNG
2020-01-21 16:38 ` Horia Geanta
@ 2020-01-22 13:37 ` Horia Geanta
2020-01-27 13:45 ` Andrey Smirnov
0 siblings, 1 reply; 18+ messages in thread
From: Horia Geanta @ 2020-01-22 13:37 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Andrey Smirnov, linux-crypto
Cc: Chris Healy, Lucas Stach, Herbert Xu, Iuliana Prodan,
linux-kernel, dl-linux-imx
On 1/21/2020 6:38 PM, Horia Geanta wrote:
> On 1/8/2020 5:42 PM, Andrey Smirnov wrote:
>> @@ -275,12 +276,25 @@ static int instantiate_rng(struct device *ctrldev, int state_handle_mask,
>> return -ENOMEM;
>>
>> for (sh_idx = 0; sh_idx < RNG4_MAX_HANDLES; sh_idx++) {
>> + const u32 rdsta_if = RDSTA_IF0 << sh_idx;
>> + const u32 rdsta_pr = RDSTA_PR0 << sh_idx;
>> + const u32 rdsta_mask = rdsta_if | rdsta_pr;
>> /*
>> * If the corresponding bit is set, this state handle
>> * was initialized by somebody else, so it's left alone.
>> */
>> - if ((1 << sh_idx) & state_handle_mask)
>> - continue;
>> + if (rdsta_if & state_handle_mask) {
>> + if (rdsta_pr & state_handle_mask)
> instantiate_rng() is called with
> state_handle_mask = rd_reg32(&ctrl->r4tst[0].rdsta) & RDSTA_IFMASK;
> so if (rdsta_pr & state_handle_mask) will always be false,
> leading to unneeded state handle re-initialization.
>
Sorry, I missed this change:
-#define RDSTA_IFMASK (RDSTA_IF1 | RDSTA_IF0)
+#define RDSTA_IFMASK (RDSTA_PR1 | RDSTA_PR0 | RDSTA_IF1 | RDSTA_IF0)
which means code is correct (though I must admit not so intuitive).
Horia
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 18+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v6 0/7] enable CAAM's HWRNG as default
2020-01-08 15:40 [PATCH v6 0/7] enable CAAM's HWRNG as default Andrey Smirnov
` (6 preceding siblings ...)
2020-01-08 15:40 ` [PATCH v6 7/7] crypto: caam - limit single JD RNG output to maximum of 16 bytes Andrey Smirnov
@ 2020-01-22 15:11 ` Horia Geanta
7 siblings, 0 replies; 18+ messages in thread
From: Horia Geanta @ 2020-01-22 15:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Andrey Smirnov, linux-crypto
Cc: Chris Healy, Lucas Stach, Herbert Xu, Iuliana Prodan,
linux-kernel, dl-linux-imx, Andrei Botila, Laurentiu Tudor
On 1/8/2020 5:41 PM, Andrey Smirnov wrote:
> Everyone:
>
> This series is a continuation of original [discussion]. I don't know
> if what's in the series is enough to use CAAMs HWRNG system wide, but
> I am hoping that with enough iterations and feedback it will be.
>
Testing on DPAA2-based Layerscape platforms, for e.g. LS1088A:
[...]
[ 12.379136] caam_jr 8010000.jr: 20000256: CCB: desc idx 2: RNG: Prediction resistance
[ 12.387036] hwrng: no data available
[...]
caamrng driver fails, because RNG initialization is skipped
in ctrl.c - caam_probe():
[...]
np = of_find_compatible_node(NULL, NULL, "fsl,qoriq-mc");
ctrlpriv->mc_en = !!np;
[...]
/*
* If SEC has RNG version >= 4 and RNG state handle has not been
* already instantiated, do RNG instantiation
* In case of SoCs with Management Complex, RNG is managed by MC f/w.
*/
if (!ctrlpriv->mc_en && rng_vid >= 4) {
[...]
NXP is working at adding RNG Prediction Resistance support in MC f/w
(will be available in v10.20.1).
However, there's a backwards-compatibility requirement: kernel should work
with older MC f/w versions.
To fix this, my suggestion is to force RNG (re)initialization in case
MC f/w is present and its version is < 10.20.1, i.e.:
if ((!ctrlpriv->mc_en || (fsl_mc_get_version() < "10.20.1")) &&
rng_vid >= 4) {
[...]
fsl_mc_get_version() - I've made this up, it currently doesn't exist,
it should be added in fsl-mc bus driver (drivers/bus/fsl-mc).
We will provide this shortly, the plan being to integrate this change
as part of this series.
Thanks,
Horia
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 18+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v6 7/7] crypto: caam - limit single JD RNG output to maximum of 16 bytes
2020-01-13 14:10 ` Horia Geanta
@ 2020-01-27 13:42 ` Andrey Smirnov
0 siblings, 0 replies; 18+ messages in thread
From: Andrey Smirnov @ 2020-01-27 13:42 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Horia Geanta
Cc: linux-crypto, Chris Healy, Lucas Stach, Herbert Xu,
Iuliana Prodan, linux-kernel, dl-linux-imx
On Mon, Jan 13, 2020 at 6:10 AM Horia Geanta <horia.geanta@nxp.com> wrote:
>
> On 1/8/2020 5:42 PM, Andrey Smirnov wrote:
> > In order to follow recommendation in SP800-90C (section "9.4 The
> > Oversampling-NRBG Construction") limit the output of "generate" JD
> > submitted to CAAM. See
> > https://lore.kernel.org/linux-crypto/VI1PR0402MB3485EF10976A4A69F90E5B0F98580@VI1PR0402MB3485.eurprd04.prod.outlook.com/
> > for more details.
> >
> > This change should make CAAM's hwrng driver good enough to have 999
> > quality rating.
> >
> [...]
> > @@ -241,6 +241,7 @@ int caam_rng_init(struct device *ctrldev)
> > ctx->rng.init = caam_init;
> > ctx->rng.cleanup = caam_cleanup;
> > ctx->rng.read = caam_read;
> > + ctx->rng.quality = 999;
> >
> AFAICS the maximum value of hwrng.quality is 1024.
>
> Any reason why it's configured to be lower, now that CAAM RNG-based DRBG
> is configured to reseed as requested by FIPS spec to behave as a TRNG?
>
Only my reading of the old version of corresponding documentation
which listed this field as being per mil. Will fix in v7.
Thanks,
Andrey Smirnov
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 18+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v6 2/7] crypto: caam - drop global context pointer and init_done
2020-01-13 9:41 ` Horia Geanta
@ 2020-01-27 13:44 ` Andrey Smirnov
0 siblings, 0 replies; 18+ messages in thread
From: Andrey Smirnov @ 2020-01-27 13:44 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Horia Geanta
Cc: linux-crypto, Chris Healy, Lucas Stach, Herbert Xu,
Iuliana Prodan, linux-kernel, dl-linux-imx
On Mon, Jan 13, 2020 at 1:41 AM Horia Geanta <horia.geanta@nxp.com> wrote:
>
> On 1/8/2020 5:42 PM, Andrey Smirnov wrote:
> > @@ -342,18 +324,16 @@ int caam_rng_init(struct device *ctrldev)
> > if (!rng_inst)
> > return 0;
> >
> > - rng_ctx = kmalloc(sizeof(*rng_ctx), GFP_DMA | GFP_KERNEL);
> > - if (!rng_ctx)
> > + ctx = devm_kzalloc(ctrldev, sizeof(*ctx), GFP_DMA | GFP_KERNEL);
> > + if (!ctx)
> > return -ENOMEM;
> >
> > - dev_info(ctrldev, "registering rng-caam\n");
> > + ctx->rng.name = "rng-caam";
> > + ctx->rng.init = caam_init;
> > + ctx->rng.cleanup = caam_cleanup;
> > + ctx->rng.read = caam_read;
> >
> > - err = hwrng_register(&caam_rng);
> > - if (!err) {
> > - init_done = true;
> > - return err;
> > - }
> > + dev_info(ctrldev, "registering rng-caam\n");
> >
> > - kfree(rng_ctx);
> > - return err;
> > + return devm_hwrng_register(ctrldev, &ctx->rng);
> This means hwrng_unregister() is called only when ctrldev is removed.
>
> OTOH caam_rng_init() could be called multiple times, e.g. if there's only one
> jrdev left in the system and it's removed then added back.
> This will lead to caam_rng_init() -> hwrng_register() called twice
> with the same "rng-caam" name, without a hwrng_unregister() called in-between.
>
True, but the logic you describe is broken in reality due to circular
reference from HWRNG, which we never fixed. I'll fix both in v7.
Thanks,
Andrey Smirnov
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 18+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v6 6/7] crypto: caam - enable prediction resistance in HRWNG
2020-01-22 13:37 ` Horia Geanta
@ 2020-01-27 13:45 ` Andrey Smirnov
0 siblings, 0 replies; 18+ messages in thread
From: Andrey Smirnov @ 2020-01-27 13:45 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Horia Geanta
Cc: linux-crypto, Chris Healy, Lucas Stach, Herbert Xu,
Iuliana Prodan, linux-kernel, dl-linux-imx
On Wed, Jan 22, 2020 at 5:37 AM Horia Geanta <horia.geanta@nxp.com> wrote:
>
> On 1/21/2020 6:38 PM, Horia Geanta wrote:
> > On 1/8/2020 5:42 PM, Andrey Smirnov wrote:
> >> @@ -275,12 +276,25 @@ static int instantiate_rng(struct device *ctrldev, int state_handle_mask,
> >> return -ENOMEM;
> >>
> >> for (sh_idx = 0; sh_idx < RNG4_MAX_HANDLES; sh_idx++) {
> >> + const u32 rdsta_if = RDSTA_IF0 << sh_idx;
> >> + const u32 rdsta_pr = RDSTA_PR0 << sh_idx;
> >> + const u32 rdsta_mask = rdsta_if | rdsta_pr;
> >> /*
> >> * If the corresponding bit is set, this state handle
> >> * was initialized by somebody else, so it's left alone.
> >> */
> >> - if ((1 << sh_idx) & state_handle_mask)
> >> - continue;
> >> + if (rdsta_if & state_handle_mask) {
> >> + if (rdsta_pr & state_handle_mask)
> > instantiate_rng() is called with
> > state_handle_mask = rd_reg32(&ctrl->r4tst[0].rdsta) & RDSTA_IFMASK;
> > so if (rdsta_pr & state_handle_mask) will always be false,
> > leading to unneeded state handle re-initialization.
> >
> Sorry, I missed this change:
> -#define RDSTA_IFMASK (RDSTA_IF1 | RDSTA_IF0)
> +#define RDSTA_IFMASK (RDSTA_PR1 | RDSTA_PR0 | RDSTA_IF1 | RDSTA_IF0)
>
> which means code is correct (though I must admit not so intuitive).
Renamed this to RDSTA_MASK in v7, to, hopefully make things more clear.
Thanks,
Andrey Smirnov
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 18+ messages in thread
end of thread, other threads:[~2020-01-27 13:45 UTC | newest]
Thread overview: 18+ messages (download: mbox.gz / follow: Atom feed)
-- links below jump to the message on this page --
2020-01-08 15:40 [PATCH v6 0/7] enable CAAM's HWRNG as default Andrey Smirnov
2020-01-08 15:40 ` [PATCH v6 1/7] crypto: caam - use struct hwrng's .init for initialization Andrey Smirnov
2020-01-08 15:40 ` [PATCH v6 2/7] crypto: caam - drop global context pointer and init_done Andrey Smirnov
2020-01-13 9:41 ` Horia Geanta
2020-01-27 13:44 ` Andrey Smirnov
2020-01-08 15:40 ` [PATCH v6 3/7] crypto: caam - simplify RNG implementation Andrey Smirnov
2020-01-08 15:40 ` [PATCH v6 4/7] crypto: caam - check if RNG job failed Andrey Smirnov
2020-01-08 15:40 ` [PATCH v6 5/7] crypto: caam - invalidate entropy register during RNG initialization Andrey Smirnov
2020-01-08 15:40 ` [PATCH v6 6/7] crypto: caam - enable prediction resistance in HRWNG Andrey Smirnov
2020-01-20 16:38 ` Horia Geanta
2020-01-21 6:20 ` Horia Geanta
2020-01-21 16:38 ` Horia Geanta
2020-01-22 13:37 ` Horia Geanta
2020-01-27 13:45 ` Andrey Smirnov
2020-01-08 15:40 ` [PATCH v6 7/7] crypto: caam - limit single JD RNG output to maximum of 16 bytes Andrey Smirnov
2020-01-13 14:10 ` Horia Geanta
2020-01-27 13:42 ` Andrey Smirnov
2020-01-22 15:11 ` [PATCH v6 0/7] enable CAAM's HWRNG as default Horia Geanta
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