From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
To: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Dan Carpenter <error27@gmail.com>,
linux-block@vger.kernel.org, Julia Lawall <julia.lawall@inria.fr>,
Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>,
Hongchen Zhang <zhanghongchen@loongson.cn>,
Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
"Christian Brauner (Microsoft)" <brauner@kernel.org>,
David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@kernel.org>,
Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>,
"Fabio M. De Francesco" <fmdefrancesco@gmail.com>,
Christophe JAILLET <christophe.jaillet@wanadoo.fr>,
linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
maobibo <maobibo@loongson.cn>,
Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>,
Sedat Dilek <sedat.dilek@gmail.com>
Subject: Re: block: sleeping in atomic warnings
Date: Tue, 7 Feb 2023 19:35:54 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <Y+KoGikLhfhDoMWv@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAHk-=whL+9An7TP-4vCyZUKP_2bZSLe-ZFR1pGA1DbkrTRLyeQ@mail.gmail.com>
On Tue, Feb 07, 2023 at 10:57:08AM -0800, Linus Torvalds wrote:
> On Tue, Feb 7, 2023 at 10:36 AM Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> wrote:
> >
> > Also note that keys are normally added using an ioctl, which can only be
> > executed after the filesystem was mounted. The only exception is the key
> > associated with the "test_dummy_encryption" mount option.
>
> Could we perhaps then replace the
>
> fscrypt_destroy_keyring(s);
>
> with a more specific
>
> fscrypt_destroy_dummy_keyring(s);
>
> thing, that would only handle the dummy encryption case?
Sure, they would still need to do most of the same things though.
> Or could we just *fix* the dummy encryption test to actually work like
> real encryption cases, so that it doesn't have this bogus case?
We've wanted to do that for a very long time, but there never has been a way to
actually do it. Especially with the filesystem-level keyring now, if the kernel
doesn't automatically add the key for test_dummy_encryption, then userspace
would have to do it *every time it mounts the filesystem*.
The point of the "test_dummy_encryption" mount option is that you can just add
it to the mount options and run existing tests, such as a full run of xfstests,
and test all the encrypted I/O paths that way. Which is extremely useful; it
wouldn't really be possible to properly test the encryption feature without it.
So that's why we've gone through some pain to keep "test_dummy_encryption"
working over time.
Now, it's possible that "the kernel automatically adds the key for
test_dummy_encryption" could be implemented a bit differently. It maybe could
be done at the last minute, when the key is being looked for due to a user
filesystem operation, instead of during the mount itself. That would eliminate
the need to call fscrypt_destroy_keyring() from __put_super(), which would avoid
the issue being discussed here. I'll see if there's a good way to do that.
- Eric
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-02-07 19:36 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 25+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-01-29 6:04 [PATCH v4] pipe: use __pipe_{lock,unlock} instead of spinlock Hongchen Zhang
2023-01-29 7:33 ` Linus Torvalds
2023-02-03 2:24 ` Hongchen Zhang
2023-02-06 15:58 ` Luis Chamberlain
2023-02-06 16:07 ` Linus Torvalds
2023-02-06 16:13 ` Julia Lawall
2023-02-06 16:45 ` Dan Carpenter
2023-02-06 17:54 ` Luis Chamberlain
2023-02-07 7:02 ` Dan Carpenter
2023-02-06 18:25 ` Linus Torvalds
2023-02-07 13:37 ` xen: sleeping in atomic warnings Dan Carpenter
2023-02-07 14:03 ` Juergen Gross
2023-02-07 14:06 ` block: " Dan Carpenter
2023-02-07 16:15 ` Linus Torvalds
2023-02-07 17:53 ` Eric Biggers
2023-02-07 18:24 ` Linus Torvalds
2023-02-07 18:36 ` Eric Biggers
2023-02-07 18:57 ` Linus Torvalds
2023-02-07 19:09 ` Linus Torvalds
2023-02-07 19:35 ` Eric Biggers [this message]
2023-02-07 19:49 ` Linus Torvalds
2023-02-08 6:53 ` Eric Biggers
2023-02-07 18:31 ` Jens Axboe
2023-02-08 3:15 ` Yu Kuai
2023-02-03 1:42 ` [PATCH v4] pipe: use __pipe_{lock,unlock} instead of spinlock Hongchen Zhang
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