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From: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
To: Boqun Feng <boqun.feng@gmail.com>
Cc: "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@kernel.org>,
	Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>,
	Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>,
	Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>, Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
	kasan-dev@googlegroups.com, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kbuild@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, x86@kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 03/23] kcsan: Avoid checking scoped accesses from nested contexts
Date: Mon, 29 Nov 2021 11:57:30 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <YaSyGr4vW3yifWWC@elver.google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <YaSTn3JbkHsiV5Tm@boqun-archlinux>

On Mon, Nov 29, 2021 at 04:47PM +0800, Boqun Feng wrote:
> Hi Marco,
> 
> On Thu, Nov 18, 2021 at 09:10:07AM +0100, Marco Elver wrote:
> > Avoid checking scoped accesses from nested contexts (such as nested
> > interrupts or in scheduler code) which share the same kcsan_ctx.
> > 
> > This is to avoid detecting false positive races of accesses in the same
> 
> Could you provide an example for a false positive?
> 
> I think we do want to detect the following race:
> 
> 	static int v = SOME_VALUE; // a percpu variable.
> 	static int other_v = ... ;
> 
> 	void foo(..)
> 	{
> 		int tmp;
> 		int other_tmp;
> 
> 		preempt_disable();
> 		{
> 			ASSERT_EXCLUSIVE_ACCESSS_SCOPED(v);
> 			tmp = v;
> 			
> 			other_tmp = other_v; // int_handler() may run here
> 			
> 			v = tmp + 2;
> 		}
> 		preempt_enabled();
> 	}
> 
> 	void int_handler() // an interrupt handler
> 	{
> 		v++;
> 	}
> 
> , if I understand correctly, we can detect this currently, but with this
> patch, we cannot detect this if the interrupt happens while we're doing
> the check for "other_tmp = other_v;", right? Of course, running tests
> multiple times may eventually catch this, but I just want to understand
> what's this patch for, thanks!

The above will still be detected. Task and interrupt contexts in this
case are distinct, i.e. kcsan_ctx differ (see get_ctx()).

But there are rare cases where kcsan_ctx is shared, such as nested
interrupts (NMI?), or when entering scheduler code -- which currently
has a KCSAN_SANITIZE := n, but I occasionally test it, which is how I
found this problem. The problem occurs frequently when enabling KCSAN in
kernel/sched and placing a random ASSERT_EXCLUSIVE_ACCESS_SCOPED() in
task context, or just enable "weak memory modeling" without this fix.
You also need CONFIG_PREEMPT=y + CONFIG_KCSAN_INTERRUPT_WATCHER=y.

The emphasis here really is on _shared kcsan_ctx_, which is not too
common. As noted in the commit description, we need to "[...] setting up
a watchpoint for a non-scoped (normal) access that also "conflicts" with
a current scoped access."

Consider this:

	static int v;
	int foo(..)
	{
		ASSERT_EXCLUSIVE_ACCESS_SCOPED(v);
		v++; // preempted during watchpoint for 'v++'
	}

Here we set up a scoped_access to be checked for v. Then on v++, a
watchpoint is set up for the normal access. While the watchpoint is set
up, the task is preempted and upon entering scheduler code, we're still
in_task() and 'current' is still the same, thus get_ctx() returns a
kcsan_ctx where the scoped_accesses list is non-empty containing the
scoped access for foo()'s ASSERT_EXCLUSIVE.

That means, when instrumenting scheduler code or any other code called
by scheduler code or nested interrupts (anything where get_ctx() still
returns the same as parent context), it'd now perform checks based on
the parent context's scoped access, and because the parent context also
has a watchpoint set up on the variable that conflicts with the scoped
access we'd report a nonsensical race.

This case is also possible:

	static int v;
	static int x;
	int foo(..)
	{
		ASSERT_EXCLUSIVE_ACCESS_SCOPED(v);
		x++; // preempted during watchpoint for 'v' after checking x++
	}

Here, all we need is for the scoped access to be checked after x++, end
up with a watchpoint for it, then enter scheduler code, which then
checked 'v', sees the conflicting watchpoint, and reports a nonsensical
race again.

By disallowing scoped access checking for a kcsan_ctx, we simply make
sure that in such nested contexts where kcsan_ctx is shared, none of
these nonsensical races would be detected nor reported.

Hopefully that clarifies what this is about.

Thanks,
-- Marco

  reply	other threads:[~2021-11-29 11:54 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 34+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-11-18  8:10 [PATCH v2 00/23] kcsan: Support detecting a subset of missing memory barriers Marco Elver
2021-11-18  8:10 ` [PATCH v2 01/23] kcsan: Refactor reading of instrumented memory Marco Elver
2021-11-18 11:08   ` Mark Rutland
2021-11-18  8:10 ` [PATCH v2 02/23] kcsan: Remove redundant zero-initialization of globals Marco Elver
2021-11-18 11:09   ` Mark Rutland
2021-11-18  8:10 ` [PATCH v2 03/23] kcsan: Avoid checking scoped accesses from nested contexts Marco Elver
2021-11-29  8:47   ` Boqun Feng
2021-11-29 10:57     ` Marco Elver [this message]
2021-11-29 14:26       ` Boqun Feng
2021-11-29 14:42         ` Marco Elver
2021-11-18  8:10 ` [PATCH v2 04/23] kcsan: Add core support for a subset of weak memory modeling Marco Elver
2021-11-18  8:10 ` [PATCH v2 05/23] kcsan: Add core memory barrier instrumentation functions Marco Elver
2021-11-18  8:10 ` [PATCH v2 06/23] kcsan, kbuild: Add option for barrier instrumentation only Marco Elver
2021-11-18  8:10 ` [PATCH v2 07/23] kcsan: Call scoped accesses reordered in reports Marco Elver
2021-11-18  8:10 ` [PATCH v2 08/23] kcsan: Show location access was reordered to Marco Elver
2021-11-18  8:10 ` [PATCH v2 09/23] kcsan: Document modeling of weak memory Marco Elver
2021-11-18  8:10 ` [PATCH v2 10/23] kcsan: test: Match reordered or normal accesses Marco Elver
2021-11-18  8:10 ` [PATCH v2 11/23] kcsan: test: Add test cases for memory barrier instrumentation Marco Elver
2021-11-18  8:10 ` [PATCH v2 12/23] kcsan: Ignore GCC 11+ warnings about TSan runtime support Marco Elver
2021-11-18  8:10 ` [PATCH v2 13/23] kcsan: selftest: Add test case to check memory barrier instrumentation Marco Elver
2021-11-18  8:10 ` [PATCH v2 14/23] locking/barriers, kcsan: Add instrumentation for barriers Marco Elver
2021-11-18  8:10 ` [PATCH v2 15/23] locking/barriers, kcsan: Support generic instrumentation Marco Elver
2021-11-18  8:10 ` [PATCH v2 16/23] locking/atomics, kcsan: Add instrumentation for barriers Marco Elver
2021-11-18  8:10 ` [PATCH v2 17/23] asm-generic/bitops, " Marco Elver
2021-11-18  8:10 ` [PATCH v2 18/23] x86/barriers, kcsan: Use generic instrumentation for non-smp barriers Marco Elver
2021-11-18  8:10 ` [PATCH v2 19/23] x86/qspinlock, kcsan: Instrument barrier of pv_queued_spin_unlock() Marco Elver
2021-11-18  8:10 ` [PATCH v2 20/23] mm, kcsan: Enable barrier instrumentation Marco Elver
2021-11-18  8:10 ` [PATCH v2 21/23] sched, kcsan: Enable memory " Marco Elver
2021-11-18  8:10 ` [PATCH v2 22/23] objtool, kcsan: Add memory barrier instrumentation to whitelist Marco Elver
2021-11-18  8:10 ` [PATCH v2 23/23] objtool, kcsan: Remove memory barrier instrumentation from noinstr Marco Elver
2021-11-19 20:31   ` Josh Poimboeuf
2021-11-19 21:31     ` Marco Elver
2021-11-23 11:29     ` Marco Elver
2021-11-24 17:53       ` Josh Poimboeuf

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