From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
To: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com>
Cc: dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, tglx@linutronix.de, bp@alien8.de,
luto@kernel.org, mingo@redhat.com, linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org,
x86@kernel.org, seanjc@google.com, kai.huang@intel.com,
cathy.zhang@intel.com, cedric.xing@intel.com,
haitao.huang@intel.com, mark.shanahan@intel.com, hpa@zytor.com,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH V2 15/32] x86/sgx: Support relaxing of enclave page permissions
Date: Fri, 4 Mar 2022 10:59:26 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <YiHU7kHM6IqUJl8n@iki.fi> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <f0029cda125be9eb4eb2e051ab41d500081c6e2c.1644274683.git.reinette.chatre@intel.com>
On Mon, Feb 07, 2022 at 04:45:37PM -0800, Reinette Chatre wrote:
> In the initial (SGX1) version of SGX, pages in an enclave need to be
> created with permissions that support all usages of the pages, from
> the time the enclave is initialized until it is unloaded. For example,
> pages used by a JIT compiler or when code needs to otherwise be
> relocated need to always have RWX permissions.
>
> With the SGX2 function ENCLU[EMODPE] an enclave is able to relax
> the EPCM permissions of its pages after the enclave is initialized.
> Relaxing EPCM permissions is not possible from outside the enclave,
> including from the kernel. The kernel does control the PTEs though
> and the enclave still depends on the kernel to install PTEs with the
> new relaxed permissions before it (the enclave) can access the pages
> using the new permissions.
>
> Introduce ioctl() SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RELAX_PERMISSIONS to support
> relaxing of EPCM permissions done from within the enclave. With
> this ioctl() the user specifies a page range and the permissions to
> be applied to all pages in the provided range. After checking
> the new permissions (more detail below) the PTEs are reset and
> it is ensured that any new PTEs will contain the new, relaxed,
> permissions.
>
> The permission change request could fail on any page within the
> provided range. To support partial success the ioctl() returns
> an error code based on failures encountered by the kernel and
> the number of pages that were successfully changed.
>
> Checking user provided new permissions
> ======================================
>
> Enclave page permission changes need to be approached with care and
> for this reason permission changes are only allowed if
> the new permissions are the same or more restrictive that the
> vetted permissions. Thus, even though an enclave is able to relax
> the EPCM permissions of its pages beyond what was originally vetted,
> the kernel will not. The kernel will only install PTEs that respect
> the vetted enclave page permissions.
>
> For example, enclave pages with vetted EPCM permissions in brackets
> below are allowed to have PTE permissions as follows:
> * (RWX) R => RW => RX => RWX
> * (RW) R => RW
> * (RX) R => RX
>
> Signed-off-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com>
> ---
> Changes since V1:
> - Change terminology to use "relax" instead of "extend" to refer to
> the case when enclave page permissions are added (Dave).
> - Use ioctl() in commit message (Dave).
> - Add examples on what permissions would be allowed (Dave).
> - Split enclave page permission changes into two ioctl()s, one for
> permission restricting (SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RESTRICT_PERMISSIONS)
> and one for permission relaxing (SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RELAX_PERMISSIONS)
> (Jarkko).
> - In support of the ioctl() name change the following names have been
> changed:
> struct sgx_page_modp -> struct sgx_enclave_relax_perm
> sgx_ioc_page_modp() -> sgx_ioc_enclave_relax_perm()
> sgx_page_modp() -> sgx_enclave_relax_perm()
> - ioctl() takes entire secinfo as input instead of
> page permissions only (Jarkko).
> - Fix kernel-doc to include () in function name.
> - Introduce small helper to check for SGX2 readiness instead of
> duplicating the same two checks in every SGX2 supporting ioctl().
> - Fixups in comments
> - Move kernel-doc to function that provides documentation for
> Documentation/x86/sgx.rst.
> - Remove redundant comment.
> - Make explicit which member of struct sgx_enclave_relax_perm is
> for output (Dave).
>
> arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h | 19 +++
> arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c | 199 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> 2 files changed, 218 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h
> index f4b81587e90b..5c678b27bb72 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h
> @@ -29,6 +29,8 @@ enum sgx_page_flags {
> _IOW(SGX_MAGIC, 0x03, struct sgx_enclave_provision)
> #define SGX_IOC_VEPC_REMOVE_ALL \
> _IO(SGX_MAGIC, 0x04)
> +#define SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RELAX_PERMISSIONS \
> + _IOWR(SGX_MAGIC, 0x05, struct sgx_enclave_relax_perm)
>
> /**
> * struct sgx_enclave_create - parameter structure for the
> @@ -76,6 +78,23 @@ struct sgx_enclave_provision {
> __u64 fd;
> };
>
> +/**
> + * struct sgx_enclave_relax_perm - parameters for ioctl
> + * %SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RELAX_PERMISSIONS
> + * @offset: starting page offset (page aligned relative to enclave base
> + * address defined in SECS)
> + * @length: length of memory (multiple of the page size)
> + * @secinfo: address for the SECINFO data containing the new permission bits
> + * for pages in range described by @offset and @length
> + * @count: (output) bytes successfully changed (multiple of page size)
> + */
> +struct sgx_enclave_relax_perm {
> + __u64 offset;
> + __u64 length;
> + __u64 secinfo;
> + __u64 count;
> +};
> +
> struct sgx_enclave_run;
>
> /**
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c
> index b8336d5d9029..9cc6af404bf6 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c
> @@ -698,6 +698,202 @@ static long sgx_ioc_enclave_provision(struct sgx_encl *encl, void __user *arg)
> return sgx_set_attribute(&encl->attributes_mask, params.fd);
> }
>
> +static unsigned long vm_prot_from_secinfo(u64 secinfo_perm)
> +{
> + unsigned long vm_prot;
> +
> + vm_prot = _calc_vm_trans(secinfo_perm, SGX_SECINFO_R, PROT_READ) |
> + _calc_vm_trans(secinfo_perm, SGX_SECINFO_W, PROT_WRITE) |
> + _calc_vm_trans(secinfo_perm, SGX_SECINFO_X, PROT_EXEC);
> + vm_prot = calc_vm_prot_bits(vm_prot, 0);
> +
> + return vm_prot;
> +}
> +
> +/**
> + * sgx_enclave_relax_perm() - Update OS after permissions relaxed by enclave
> + * @encl: Enclave to which the pages belong.
> + * @modp: Checked parameters from user on which pages need modifying.
> + * @secinfo_perm: New validated permission bits.
> + *
> + * Return:
> + * - 0: Success.
> + * - -errno: Otherwise.
> + */
> +static long sgx_enclave_relax_perm(struct sgx_encl *encl,
> + struct sgx_enclave_relax_perm *modp,
> + u64 secinfo_perm)
> +{
> + struct sgx_encl_page *entry;
> + unsigned long vm_prot;
> + unsigned long addr;
> + unsigned long c;
> + int ret;
> +
> + vm_prot = vm_prot_from_secinfo(secinfo_perm);
> +
> + for (c = 0 ; c < modp->length; c += PAGE_SIZE) {
> + addr = encl->base + modp->offset + c;
> +
> + mutex_lock(&encl->lock);
> +
> + entry = xa_load(&encl->page_array, PFN_DOWN(addr));
> + if (!entry) {
> + ret = -EFAULT;
> + goto out_unlock;
> + }
> +
> + /*
> + * Changing EPCM permissions is only supported on regular
> + * SGX pages.
> + */
> + if (entry->type != SGX_PAGE_TYPE_REG) {
> + ret = -EINVAL;
> + goto out_unlock;
> + }
> +
> + /*
> + * Do not accept permissions that are more relaxed
> + * than vetted permissions.
> + * If this check fails then EPCM permissions may be more
> + * relaxed that what would be allowed by the kernel via
> + * PTEs.
> + */
> + if ((entry->vm_max_prot_bits & vm_prot) != vm_prot) {
> + ret = -EPERM;
> + goto out_unlock;
> + }
> +
> + /*
> + * Change runtime protection before zapping PTEs to ensure
> + * any new #PF uses new permissions.
> + */
> + entry->vm_run_prot_bits = vm_prot;
> +
> + mutex_unlock(&encl->lock);
> + /*
> + * Do not keep encl->lock because of dependency on
> + * mmap_lock acquired in sgx_zap_enclave_ptes().
> + */
> + sgx_zap_enclave_ptes(encl, addr);
> + }
> +
> + ret = 0;
> + goto out;
> +
> +out_unlock:
> + mutex_unlock(&encl->lock);
> +out:
> + modp->count = c;
> +
> + return ret;
> +}
> +
> +/*
> + * Ensure enclave is ready for SGX2 functions. Readiness is checked
> + * by ensuring the hardware supports SGX2 and the enclave is initialized
> + * and thus able to handle requests to modify pages within it.
> + */
> +static int sgx_ioc_sgx2_ready(struct sgx_encl *encl)
> +{
> + if (!(cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SGX2)))
> + return -ENODEV;
> +
> + if (!test_bit(SGX_ENCL_INITIALIZED, &encl->flags))
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +/*
> + * Return valid permission fields from a secinfo structure provided by
> + * user space. The secinfo structure is required to only have bits in
> + * the permission fields set.
> + */
> +static int sgx_perm_from_user_secinfo(void __user *_secinfo, u64 *secinfo_perm)
> +{
> + struct sgx_secinfo secinfo;
> + u64 perm;
> +
> + if (copy_from_user(&secinfo, (void __user *)_secinfo,
> + sizeof(secinfo)))
> + return -EFAULT;
> +
> + if (secinfo.flags & ~SGX_SECINFO_PERMISSION_MASK)
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + if (memchr_inv(secinfo.reserved, 0, sizeof(secinfo.reserved)))
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + perm = secinfo.flags & SGX_SECINFO_PERMISSION_MASK;
> +
> + if ((perm & SGX_SECINFO_W) && !(perm & SGX_SECINFO_R))
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + *secinfo_perm = perm;
> +
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +/**
> + * sgx_ioc_enclave_relax_perm() - handler for
> + * %SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RELAX_PERMISSIONS
> + * @encl: an enclave pointer
> + * @arg: userspace pointer to a &struct sgx_enclave_relax_perm instance
> + *
> + * SGX2 distinguishes between relaxing and restricting the enclave page
> + * permissions maintained by the hardware (EPCM permissions) of pages
> + * belonging to an initialized enclave (after %SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_INIT).
> + *
> + * EPCM permissions can be relaxed anytime directly from within the enclave
> + * with no visibility from the kernel. This is accomplished with
> + * ENCLU[EMODPE] run from within the enclave. Accessing pages with
> + * the new, relaxed permissions requires the kernel to update the PTE
> + * to handle the subsequent #PF correctly.
> + *
> + * Enclave page permissions are not allowed to exceed the
> + * maximum vetted permissions maintained in
> + * &struct sgx_encl_page->vm_max_prot_bits. If the enclave
> + * exceeds these permissions by running ENCLU[EMODPE] from within the enclave
> + * the kernel will prevent access to the pages via PTE and
> + * VMA permissions.
> + *
> + * Return:
> + * - 0: Success
> + * - -errno: Otherwise
> + */
> +static long sgx_ioc_enclave_relax_perm(struct sgx_encl *encl, void __user *arg)
> +{
> + struct sgx_enclave_relax_perm params;
> + u64 secinfo_perm;
> + long ret;
> +
> + ret = sgx_ioc_sgx2_ready(encl);
> + if (ret)
> + return ret;
> +
> + if (copy_from_user(¶ms, arg, sizeof(params)))
> + return -EFAULT;
> +
> + if (sgx_validate_offset_length(encl, params.offset, params.length))
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + ret = sgx_perm_from_user_secinfo((void __user *)params.secinfo,
> + &secinfo_perm);
> + if (ret)
> + return ret;
> +
> + if (params.count)
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + ret = sgx_enclave_relax_perm(encl, ¶ms, secinfo_perm);
> +
> + if (copy_to_user(arg, ¶ms, sizeof(params)))
> + return -EFAULT;
> +
> + return ret;
> +}
> +
> long sgx_ioctl(struct file *filep, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
> {
> struct sgx_encl *encl = filep->private_data;
> @@ -719,6 +915,9 @@ long sgx_ioctl(struct file *filep, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
> case SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_PROVISION:
> ret = sgx_ioc_enclave_provision(encl, (void __user *)arg);
> break;
> + case SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RELAX_PERMISSIONS:
> + ret = sgx_ioc_enclave_relax_perm(encl, (void __user *)arg);
> + break;
> default:
> ret = -ENOIOCTLCMD;
> break;
> --
> 2.25.1
>
Definitive NAK.
Should be dropped from the next patch set version. We *do not* want to
artificially construct an extra round-trip to EMODPE flow.
BR, Jarkko
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-03-04 9:00 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 130+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-02-08 0:45 [PATCH V2 00/32] x86/sgx and selftests/sgx: Support SGX2 Reinette Chatre
2022-02-08 0:45 ` [PATCH V2 01/32] x86/sgx: Add short descriptions to ENCLS wrappers Reinette Chatre
2022-02-08 0:45 ` [PATCH V2 02/32] x86/sgx: Add wrapper for SGX2 EMODPR function Reinette Chatre
2022-02-08 0:45 ` [PATCH V2 03/32] x86/sgx: Add wrapper for SGX2 EMODT function Reinette Chatre
2022-02-08 0:45 ` [PATCH V2 04/32] x86/sgx: Add wrapper for SGX2 EAUG function Reinette Chatre
2022-02-08 0:45 ` [PATCH V2 05/32] Documentation/x86: Document SGX permission details Reinette Chatre
2022-02-08 0:45 ` [PATCH V2 06/32] x86/sgx: Support VMA permissions more relaxed than enclave permissions Reinette Chatre
2022-03-07 17:10 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-03-07 17:36 ` Reinette Chatre
2022-03-08 8:14 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-03-08 9:06 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-03-08 9:12 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-03-08 16:04 ` Reinette Chatre
2022-03-08 17:00 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-03-08 17:49 ` Reinette Chatre
2022-03-08 18:46 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-03-11 11:06 ` Dr. Greg
2022-02-08 0:45 ` [PATCH V2 07/32] x86/sgx: Add pfn_mkwrite() handler for present PTEs Reinette Chatre
2022-02-08 0:45 ` [PATCH V2 08/32] x86/sgx: x86/sgx: Add sgx_encl_page->vm_run_prot_bits for dynamic permission changes Reinette Chatre
2022-03-04 8:55 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-03-04 19:19 ` Reinette Chatre
2022-02-08 0:45 ` [PATCH V2 09/32] x86/sgx: Export sgx_encl_ewb_cpumask() Reinette Chatre
2022-02-08 0:45 ` [PATCH V2 10/32] x86/sgx: Rename sgx_encl_ewb_cpumask() as sgx_encl_cpumask() Reinette Chatre
2022-02-08 0:45 ` [PATCH V2 11/32] x86/sgx: Move PTE zap code to new sgx_zap_enclave_ptes() Reinette Chatre
2022-02-08 0:45 ` [PATCH V2 12/32] x86/sgx: Make sgx_ipi_cb() available internally Reinette Chatre
2022-02-08 0:45 ` [PATCH V2 13/32] x86/sgx: Create utility to validate user provided offset and length Reinette Chatre
2022-02-08 0:45 ` [PATCH V2 14/32] x86/sgx: Keep record of SGX page type Reinette Chatre
2022-02-08 0:45 ` [PATCH V2 15/32] x86/sgx: Support relaxing of enclave page permissions Reinette Chatre
2022-03-04 8:59 ` Jarkko Sakkinen [this message]
2022-02-08 0:45 ` [PATCH V2 16/32] x86/sgx: Support restricting " Reinette Chatre
2022-02-21 0:49 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-02-22 18:35 ` Reinette Chatre
2022-02-23 15:46 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-02-23 19:55 ` Reinette Chatre
2022-02-28 12:27 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-02-23 19:21 ` Dhanraj, Vijay
2022-02-23 22:42 ` Reinette Chatre
2022-02-28 12:24 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-02-28 13:19 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-02-28 15:16 ` Dave Hansen
2022-02-28 17:44 ` Dhanraj, Vijay
2022-03-01 13:26 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-03-01 13:42 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-03-01 17:48 ` Reinette Chatre
2022-03-02 2:05 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-03-02 2:11 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-03-02 4:03 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-03-02 22:57 ` Reinette Chatre
2022-03-03 16:08 ` Haitao Huang
2022-03-03 21:23 ` Reinette Chatre
2022-03-03 21:44 ` Dave Hansen
2022-03-05 3:19 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-03-06 0:15 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-03-06 0:25 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-03-10 5:43 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-03-10 5:59 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-03-03 23:18 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-03-04 4:03 ` Haitao Huang
2022-03-04 8:30 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-03-04 15:51 ` Haitao Huang
2022-03-05 1:02 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-03-06 14:24 ` Haitao Huang
2022-03-03 23:12 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-03-04 0:48 ` Reinette Chatre
2022-03-10 6:10 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-03-10 18:33 ` Haitao Huang
2022-03-11 12:10 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-03-11 12:16 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-03-11 12:33 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-03-11 17:53 ` Reinette Chatre
2022-03-11 18:11 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-03-11 19:28 ` Reinette Chatre
2022-03-14 3:42 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-03-14 3:45 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-03-14 3:54 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-03-14 15:32 ` Reinette Chatre
2022-03-17 4:30 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-03-17 22:08 ` Reinette Chatre
2022-03-17 22:51 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-03-18 0:11 ` Reinette Chatre
2022-03-20 0:24 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-03-28 23:22 ` Reinette Chatre
2022-03-30 15:00 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-03-30 15:02 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-03-14 2:49 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-03-14 2:50 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-03-14 2:58 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-03-14 15:39 ` Haitao Huang
2022-03-17 4:34 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-03-17 14:42 ` Haitao Huang
2022-03-17 4:37 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-03-17 14:47 ` Haitao Huang
2022-03-17 7:01 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-03-17 7:11 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-03-17 14:28 ` Haitao Huang
2022-03-17 21:50 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-03-17 22:00 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-03-17 22:23 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-02-08 0:45 ` [PATCH V2 17/32] selftests/sgx: Add test for EPCM permission changes Reinette Chatre
2022-02-08 0:45 ` [PATCH V2 18/32] selftests/sgx: Add test for TCS page " Reinette Chatre
2022-02-08 0:45 ` [PATCH V2 19/32] x86/sgx: Support adding of pages to an initialized enclave Reinette Chatre
2022-02-19 11:57 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-02-19 12:01 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-02-20 18:40 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-02-22 19:19 ` Reinette Chatre
2022-02-23 15:46 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-03-07 16:16 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-02-08 0:45 ` [PATCH V2 20/32] x86/sgx: Tighten accessible memory range after enclave initialization Reinette Chatre
2022-02-08 0:45 ` [PATCH V2 21/32] selftests/sgx: Test two different SGX2 EAUG flows Reinette Chatre
2022-03-07 16:39 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-02-08 0:45 ` [PATCH V2 22/32] x86/sgx: Support modifying SGX page type Reinette Chatre
2022-02-08 0:45 ` [PATCH V2 23/32] x86/sgx: Support complete page removal Reinette Chatre
2022-02-08 0:45 ` [PATCH V2 24/32] Documentation/x86: Introduce enclave runtime management section Reinette Chatre
2022-02-08 0:45 ` [PATCH V2 25/32] selftests/sgx: Introduce dynamic entry point Reinette Chatre
2022-02-08 0:45 ` [PATCH V2 26/32] selftests/sgx: Introduce TCS initialization enclave operation Reinette Chatre
2022-02-08 0:45 ` [PATCH V2 27/32] selftests/sgx: Test complete changing of page type flow Reinette Chatre
2022-02-08 0:45 ` [PATCH V2 28/32] selftests/sgx: Test faulty enclave behavior Reinette Chatre
2022-02-08 0:45 ` [PATCH V2 29/32] selftests/sgx: Test invalid access to removed enclave page Reinette Chatre
2022-02-08 0:45 ` [PATCH V2 30/32] selftests/sgx: Test reclaiming of untouched page Reinette Chatre
2022-02-08 0:45 ` [PATCH V2 31/32] x86/sgx: Free up EPC pages directly to support large page ranges Reinette Chatre
2022-02-08 0:45 ` [PATCH V2 32/32] selftests/sgx: Page removal stress test Reinette Chatre
2022-02-22 20:27 ` [PATCH V2 00/32] x86/sgx and selftests/sgx: Support SGX2 Nathaniel McCallum
2022-02-22 22:39 ` Reinette Chatre
2022-02-23 13:24 ` Nathaniel McCallum
2022-02-23 18:25 ` Reinette Chatre
2022-03-02 16:57 ` Nathaniel McCallum
2022-03-02 21:20 ` Reinette Chatre
2022-03-03 1:13 ` Nathaniel McCallum
2022-03-03 17:49 ` Reinette Chatre
2022-03-04 0:57 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
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