From: "Yang, Weijiang" <weijiang.yang@intel.com>
To: Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com>
Cc: <seanjc@google.com>, <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
<dave.hansen@intel.com>, <kvm@vger.kernel.org>,
<linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, <x86@kernel.org>,
<yuan.yao@linux.intel.com>, <peterz@infradead.org>,
<rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>, <mlevitsk@redhat.com>,
<john.allen@amd.com>, Zhang Yi Z <yi.z.zhang@linux.intel.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v9 13/27] KVM: x86: Refresh CPUID on write to guest MSR_IA32_XSS
Date: Fri, 26 Jan 2024 17:30:09 +0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <ad97d210-0ef3-4500-b26f-65aad0a444a3@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <ZbI+pexl9Th0KiiU@chao-email>
On 1/25/2024 6:57 PM, Chao Gao wrote:
> On Tue, Jan 23, 2024 at 06:41:46PM -0800, Yang Weijiang wrote:
>> Update CPUID.(EAX=0DH,ECX=1).EBX to reflect current required xstate size
>> due to XSS MSR modification.
>> CPUID(EAX=0DH,ECX=1).EBX reports the required storage size of all enabled
>> xstate features in (XCR0 | IA32_XSS). The CPUID value can be used by guest
>> before allocate sufficient xsave buffer.
>>
>> Note, KVM does not yet support any XSS based features, i.e. supported_xss
>> is guaranteed to be zero at this time.
>>
>> Opportunistically modify XSS write access logic as:
>> If XSAVES is not enabled in the guest CPUID, forbid setting IA32_XSS msr
>> to anything but 0, even if the write is host initiated.
> any reason to allow host to write 0? looks we are not doing this for many
> other MSRs.
Paolo mentioned this point for many times, and the latest one can be found at:
Re: [PATCH v5 04/19] KVM:x86: Refresh CPUID on write to guest MSR_IA32_XSS - Paolo Bonzini (kernel.org) <https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/CABgObfbvr8F8g5hJN6jn95m7u7m2+8ACkqO25KAZwRmJ9AncZg@mail.gmail.com/>
For other MSRs, Sean proposed to enforce the policy in batch, but the work is delayed.
>> Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
>> Co-developed-by: Zhang Yi Z <yi.z.zhang@linux.intel.com>
>> Signed-off-by: Zhang Yi Z <yi.z.zhang@linux.intel.com>
>> Signed-off-by: Yang Weijiang <weijiang.yang@intel.com>
>> Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
>> ---
>> arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 3 ++-
>> arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 15 ++++++++++++++-
>> arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 16 ++++++++++++----
>> 3 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
>> index 40dd796ea085..6efaaaa15945 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
>> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
>> @@ -772,7 +772,6 @@ struct kvm_vcpu_arch {
>> bool at_instruction_boundary;
>> bool tpr_access_reporting;
>> bool xfd_no_write_intercept;
>> - u64 ia32_xss;
>> u64 microcode_version;
>> u64 arch_capabilities;
>> u64 perf_capabilities;
>> @@ -828,6 +827,8 @@ struct kvm_vcpu_arch {
>>
>> u64 xcr0;
>> u64 guest_supported_xcr0;
>> + u64 guest_supported_xss;
>> + u64 ia32_xss;
>>
>> struct kvm_pio_request pio;
>> void *pio_data;
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
>> index acc360c76318..3ab133530573 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
>> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
>> @@ -275,7 +275,8 @@ static void __kvm_update_cpuid_runtime(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_cpuid_e
>> best = cpuid_entry2_find(entries, nent, 0xD, 1);
>> if (best && (cpuid_entry_has(best, X86_FEATURE_XSAVES) ||
>> cpuid_entry_has(best, X86_FEATURE_XSAVEC)))
>> - best->ebx = xstate_required_size(vcpu->arch.xcr0, true);
>> + best->ebx = xstate_required_size(vcpu->arch.xcr0 |
>> + vcpu->arch.ia32_xss, true);
>>
>> best = __kvm_find_kvm_cpuid_features(vcpu, entries, nent);
>> if (kvm_hlt_in_guest(vcpu->kvm) && best &&
>> @@ -312,6 +313,17 @@ static u64 vcpu_get_supported_xcr0(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>> return (best->eax | ((u64)best->edx << 32)) & kvm_caps.supported_xcr0;
>> }
>>
>> +static u64 vcpu_get_supported_xss(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>> +{
>> + struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *best;
>> +
>> + best = kvm_find_cpuid_entry_index(vcpu, 0xd, 1);
>> + if (!best)
>> + return 0;
>> +
>> + return (best->ecx | ((u64)best->edx << 32)) & kvm_caps.supported_xss;
>> +}
>> +
>> static bool kvm_cpuid_has_hyperv(struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entries, int nent)
>> {
>> #ifdef CONFIG_KVM_HYPERV
>> @@ -362,6 +374,7 @@ static void kvm_vcpu_after_set_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>> }
>>
>> vcpu->arch.guest_supported_xcr0 = vcpu_get_supported_xcr0(vcpu);
>> + vcpu->arch.guest_supported_xss = vcpu_get_supported_xss(vcpu);
>>
>> kvm_update_pv_runtime(vcpu);
>>
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
>> index b3a39886e418..7b7a15aab3aa 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
>> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
>> @@ -3924,20 +3924,28 @@ int kvm_set_msr_common(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
>> vcpu->arch.ia32_tsc_adjust_msr += adj;
>> }
>> break;
>> - case MSR_IA32_XSS:
>> - if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
>> - !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_XSAVES))
>> + case MSR_IA32_XSS: {
> unnecessary bracket.
Yes, will remove it.
>
>> + /*
>> + * If KVM reported support of XSS MSR, even guest CPUID doesn't
> IIUC, below code doesn't check if KVM reported support of XSS MSR. so, the comment
> doesn't match what the code does.
Here I refers to what it does in patch 12.
>> + * support XSAVES, still allow userspace to set default value(0)
>> + * to this MSR.
>> + */
>> + if (!guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_XSAVES) &&
>> + !(msr_info->host_initiated && data == 0))
>> return 1;
>> /*
>> * KVM supports exposing PT to the guest, but does not support
>> * IA32_XSS[bit 8]. Guests have to use RDMSR/WRMSR rather than
>> * XSAVES/XRSTORS to save/restore PT MSRs.
>> */
>> - if (data & ~kvm_caps.supported_xss)
>> + if (data & ~vcpu->arch.guest_supported_xss)
>> return 1;
>> + if (vcpu->arch.ia32_xss == data)
>> + break;
>> vcpu->arch.ia32_xss = data;
>> kvm_update_cpuid_runtime(vcpu);
>> break;
>> + }
>> case MSR_SMI_COUNT:
>> if (!msr_info->host_initiated)
>> return 1;
>> --
>> 2.39.3
>>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-01-26 9:30 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 55+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-01-24 2:41 [PATCH v9 00/27] Enable CET Virtualization Yang Weijiang
2024-01-24 2:41 ` [PATCH v9 01/27] x86/fpu/xstate: Always preserve non-user xfeatures/flags in __state_perm Yang Weijiang
2024-01-30 1:29 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2024-01-24 2:41 ` [PATCH v9 02/27] x86/fpu/xstate: Refine CET user xstate bit enabling Yang Weijiang
2024-01-24 2:41 ` [PATCH v9 03/27] x86/fpu/xstate: Add CET supervisor mode state support Yang Weijiang
2024-01-24 2:41 ` [PATCH v9 04/27] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce XFEATURE_MASK_KERNEL_DYNAMIC xfeature set Yang Weijiang
2024-01-24 2:41 ` [PATCH v9 05/27] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce fpu_guest_cfg for guest FPU configuration Yang Weijiang
2024-01-30 1:29 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2024-01-30 15:00 ` Yang, Weijiang
2024-01-24 2:41 ` [PATCH v9 06/27] x86/fpu/xstate: Create guest fpstate with guest specific config Yang Weijiang
2024-01-30 1:38 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2024-01-30 14:54 ` Yang, Weijiang
2024-01-24 2:41 ` [PATCH v9 07/27] x86/fpu/xstate: Warn if kernel dynamic xfeatures detected in normal fpstate Yang Weijiang
2024-01-24 2:41 ` [PATCH v9 08/27] KVM: x86: Rework cpuid_get_supported_xcr0() to operate on vCPU data Yang Weijiang
2024-01-24 2:41 ` [PATCH v9 09/27] KVM: x86: Rename kvm_{g,s}et_msr() to menifest emulation operations Yang Weijiang
2024-01-25 3:43 ` Chao Gao
2024-01-24 2:41 ` [PATCH v9 10/27] KVM: x86: Refine xsave-managed guest register/MSR reset handling Yang Weijiang
2024-01-25 10:17 ` Chao Gao
2024-01-26 9:13 ` Yang, Weijiang
2024-01-24 2:41 ` [PATCH v9 11/27] KVM: x86: Add kvm_msr_{read,write}() helpers Yang Weijiang
2024-01-24 2:41 ` [PATCH v9 12/27] KVM: x86: Report XSS as to-be-saved if there are supported features Yang Weijiang
2024-01-25 10:37 ` Chao Gao
2024-01-24 2:41 ` [PATCH v9 13/27] KVM: x86: Refresh CPUID on write to guest MSR_IA32_XSS Yang Weijiang
2024-01-25 10:57 ` Chao Gao
2024-01-26 9:30 ` Yang, Weijiang [this message]
2024-01-24 2:41 ` [PATCH v9 14/27] KVM: x86: Initialize kvm_caps.supported_xss Yang Weijiang
2024-01-26 1:35 ` Chao Gao
2024-01-24 2:41 ` [PATCH v9 15/27] KVM: x86: Load guest FPU state when access XSAVE-managed MSRs Yang Weijiang
2024-01-24 2:41 ` [PATCH v9 16/27] KVM: x86: Add fault checks for guest CR4.CET setting Yang Weijiang
2024-01-24 2:41 ` [PATCH v9 17/27] KVM: x86: Report KVM supported CET MSRs as to-be-saved Yang Weijiang
2024-01-24 2:41 ` [PATCH v9 18/27] KVM: VMX: Introduce CET VMCS fields and control bits Yang Weijiang
2024-01-24 2:41 ` [PATCH v9 19/27] KVM: x86: Use KVM-governed feature framework to track "SHSTK/IBT enabled" Yang Weijiang
2024-01-24 2:41 ` [PATCH v9 20/27] KVM: VMX: Emulate read and write to CET MSRs Yang Weijiang
2024-01-24 2:41 ` [PATCH v9 21/27] KVM: x86: Save and reload SSP to/from SMRAM Yang Weijiang
2024-01-26 3:17 ` Chao Gao
2024-01-26 6:51 ` Chao Gao
2024-01-24 2:41 ` [PATCH v9 22/27] KVM: VMX: Set up interception for CET MSRs Yang Weijiang
2024-01-26 3:54 ` Chao Gao
2024-01-26 9:36 ` Yang, Weijiang
2024-01-24 2:41 ` [PATCH v9 23/27] KVM: VMX: Set host constant supervisor states to VMCS fields Yang Weijiang
2024-01-26 6:31 ` Chao Gao
2024-01-26 9:37 ` Yang, Weijiang
2024-01-24 2:41 ` [PATCH v9 24/27] KVM: x86: Enable CET virtualization for VMX and advertise to userspace Yang Weijiang
2024-01-26 7:50 ` Chao Gao
2024-01-26 12:54 ` Yang, Weijiang
2024-01-24 2:41 ` [PATCH v9 25/27] KVM: nVMX: Introduce new VMX_BASIC bit for event error_code delivery to L1 Yang Weijiang
2024-01-26 7:54 ` Chao Gao
2024-01-24 2:41 ` [PATCH v9 26/27] KVM: nVMX: Enable CET support for nested guest Yang Weijiang
2024-01-29 7:04 ` Chao Gao
2024-01-30 7:38 ` Yang, Weijiang
2024-01-24 2:42 ` [PATCH v9 27/27] KVM: x86: Stop emulating for CET protected branch instructions Yang Weijiang
2024-01-26 8:53 ` Chao Gao
2024-01-26 12:56 ` Yang, Weijiang
2024-01-30 1:40 ` [PATCH v9 00/27] Enable CET Virtualization Edgecombe, Rick P
2024-01-30 15:05 ` Yang, Weijiang
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