From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>,
Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>,
X86 ML <x86@kernel.org>, LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [5.2 REGRESSION] Generic vDSO breaks seccomp-enabled userspace on i386
Date: Wed, 24 Jul 2019 01:56:34 +0200 (CEST) [thread overview]
Message-ID: <alpine.DEB.2.21.1907240155080.2034@nanos.tec.linutronix.de> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <201907231636.AD3ED717D@keescook>
On Tue, 23 Jul 2019, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Wed, Jul 24, 2019 at 12:59:03AM +0200, Thomas Gleixner wrote:
> > And as we have sys_clock_gettime64() exposed for 32bit anyway you need to
> > deal with that in seccomp independently of the VDSO. It does not make sense
> > to treat sys_clock_gettime() differently than sys_clock_gettime64(). They
> > both expose the same information, but the latter is y2038 safe.
>
> Okay, so combining Andy's ideas on aliasing and "more seccomp flags",
> we could declare that clock_gettime64() is not filterable on 32-bit at
> all without the magic SECCOMP_IGNORE_ALIASES flag or something. Then we
> would alias clock_gettime64 to clock_gettime _before_ the first evaluation
> (unless SECCOMP_IGNORE_ALIASES is set)?
>
> (When was clock_gettime64() introduced? Is it too long ago to do this
> "you can't filter it without a special flag" change?)
clock_gettime64() and the other sys_*time64() syscalls which address the
y2038 issue were added in 5.1
Thanks,
tglx
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-07-23 23:56 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 27+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-07-19 17:03 [5.2 REGRESSION] Generic vDSO breaks seccomp-enabled userspace on i386 Sean Christopherson
2019-07-19 17:40 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-07-22 17:16 ` Kees Cook
2019-07-22 18:31 ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-07-22 18:39 ` Kees Cook
2019-07-22 19:17 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-07-22 23:28 ` Kees Cook
2019-07-22 23:47 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-07-23 9:18 ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-07-23 14:04 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-07-23 15:14 ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-07-23 21:55 ` Kees Cook
2019-07-23 22:55 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-07-23 22:59 ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-07-23 23:43 ` Kees Cook
2019-07-23 23:56 ` Thomas Gleixner [this message]
2019-07-26 18:01 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-07-27 17:49 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-07-27 18:43 ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-07-27 21:52 ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-07-28 0:33 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-07-28 9:57 ` Arnd Bergmann
2019-07-28 10:30 ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-07-28 15:27 ` Arnd Bergmann
2019-07-28 18:14 ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-07-28 18:16 ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-07-28 11:13 ` Thomas Gleixner
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