[PATCH] Allow to exclude specific file types in LoadPin

[PATCH] Allow to exclude specific file types in LoadPin

[Ke Wu]

Linux kernel already provide MODULE_SIG and KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG to
make sure loaded kernel module and kernel image are trusted. This
patch adds a kernel command line option "loadpin.exclude" which
allows to exclude specific file types from LoadPin. This is useful
when people want to use different mechanisms to verify module and
kernel image while still use LoadPin to protect the integrity of
other files kernel loads.

Signed-off-by: Ke Wu <mikewu@google.com>
---
 Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/LoadPin.rst | 10 ++++++
 security/loadpin/loadpin.c                | 37 +++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 47 insertions(+)

diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/LoadPin.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/LoadPin.rst
index 32070762d24c..716ad9b23c9a 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/LoadPin.rst
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/LoadPin.rst
@@ -19,3 +19,13 @@ block device backing the filesystem is not read-only, a sysctl is
 created to toggle pinning: ``/proc/sys/kernel/loadpin/enabled``. (Having
 a mutable filesystem means pinning is mutable too, but having the
 sysctl allows for easy testing on systems with a mutable filesystem.)
+
+It's also possible to exclude specific file types from LoadPin using kernel
+command line option "``loadpin.exclude``". By default, all files are
+included, but they can be excluded using kernel command line option such
+as "``loadpin.exclude=kernel-module,kexec-image``". This allows to use
+different mechanisms such as ``CONFIG_MODULE_SIG`` and
+``CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG`` to verify kernel module and kernel image while
+still use LoadPin to protect the integrity of other files kernel loads. The
+full list of valid file types can be found in ``kernel_read_file_str``
+defined in ``include/linux/fs.h``.
diff --git a/security/loadpin/loadpin.c b/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
index 055fb0a64169..8ee0c58fea40 100644
--- a/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
+++ b/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
@@ -45,6 +45,8 @@ static void report_load(const char *origin, struct file *file, char *operation)
 }
 
 static int enforce = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_LOADPIN_ENFORCE);
+static char *exclude_read_files[READING_MAX_ID];
+static int ignore_read_file_id[READING_MAX_ID];
 static struct super_block *pinned_root;
 static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(pinned_root_spinlock);
 
@@ -129,6 +131,12 @@ static int loadpin_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id)
 	struct super_block *load_root;
 	const char *origin = kernel_read_file_id_str(id);
 
+	/* If the file id is excluded, ignore the pinning. */
+	if ((unsigned int)id < READING_MAX_ID && ignore_read_file_id[id]) {
+		report_load(origin, file, "pinning-excluded");
+		return 0;
+	}
+
 	/* This handles the older init_module API that has a NULL file. */
 	if (!file) {
 		if (!enforce) {
@@ -187,10 +195,37 @@ static struct security_hook_list loadpin_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_load_data, loadpin_load_data),
 };
 
+static void parse_exclude(void)
+{
+	int i, j;
+	char *cur;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(exclude_read_files); i++) {
+		cur = exclude_read_files[i];
+		if (!cur)
+			break;
+		if (*cur == '\0')
+			continue;
+
+		for (j = 0; j < ARRAY_SIZE(kernel_read_file_str); j++) {
+			if (strcmp(cur, kernel_read_file_str[j]) == 0) {
+				pr_info("excluding: %s\n",
+					kernel_read_file_str[j]);
+				ignore_read_file_id[j] = 1;
+				/*
+				 * Can not break, because one read_file_str
+				 * may map to more than on read_file_id.
+				 */
+			}
+		}
+	}
+}
+
 static int __init loadpin_init(void)
 {
 	pr_info("ready to pin (currently %senforcing)\n",
 		enforce ? "" : "not ");
+	parse_exclude();
 	security_add_hooks(loadpin_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(loadpin_hooks), "loadpin");
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -203,3 +238,5 @@ DEFINE_LSM(loadpin) = {
 /* Should not be mutable after boot, so not listed in sysfs (perm == 0). */
 module_param(enforce, int, 0);
 MODULE_PARM_DESC(enforce, "Enforce module/firmware pinning");
+module_param_array_named(exclude, exclude_read_files, charp, NULL, 0);
+MODULE_PARM_DESC(exclude, "Exclude pinning specific read file types");
-- 
2.22.0.rc1.257.g3120a18244-goog

Re: [PATCH] Allow to exclude specific file types in LoadPin

[Kees Cook]

On Wed, May 29, 2019 at 03:43:50PM -0700, Ke Wu wrote:
> Linux kernel already provide MODULE_SIG and KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG to
> make sure loaded kernel module and kernel image are trusted. This
> patch adds a kernel command line option "loadpin.exclude" which
> allows to exclude specific file types from LoadPin. This is useful
> when people want to use different mechanisms to verify module and
> kernel image while still use LoadPin to protect the integrity of
> other files kernel loads.

Cool; I like this. A few thoughts below...

> 
> Signed-off-by: Ke Wu <mikewu@google.com>
> ---
>  Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/LoadPin.rst | 10 ++++++
>  security/loadpin/loadpin.c                | 37 +++++++++++++++++++++++
>  2 files changed, 47 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/LoadPin.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/LoadPin.rst
> index 32070762d24c..716ad9b23c9a 100644
> --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/LoadPin.rst
> +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/LoadPin.rst
> @@ -19,3 +19,13 @@ block device backing the filesystem is not read-only, a sysctl is
>  created to toggle pinning: ``/proc/sys/kernel/loadpin/enabled``. (Having
>  a mutable filesystem means pinning is mutable too, but having the
>  sysctl allows for easy testing on systems with a mutable filesystem.)
> +
> +It's also possible to exclude specific file types from LoadPin using kernel
> +command line option "``loadpin.exclude``". By default, all files are
> +included, but they can be excluded using kernel command line option such
> +as "``loadpin.exclude=kernel-module,kexec-image``". This allows to use
> +different mechanisms such as ``CONFIG_MODULE_SIG`` and
> +``CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG`` to verify kernel module and kernel image while
> +still use LoadPin to protect the integrity of other files kernel loads. The
> +full list of valid file types can be found in ``kernel_read_file_str``
> +defined in ``include/linux/fs.h``.
> diff --git a/security/loadpin/loadpin.c b/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
> index 055fb0a64169..8ee0c58fea40 100644
> --- a/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
> +++ b/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
> @@ -45,6 +45,8 @@ static void report_load(const char *origin, struct file *file, char *operation)
>  }
>  
>  static int enforce = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_LOADPIN_ENFORCE);
> +static char *exclude_read_files[READING_MAX_ID];
> +static int ignore_read_file_id[READING_MAX_ID];

Since this is set up at init, let's mark ignore_read_file_id with
__ro_after_init.

>  static struct super_block *pinned_root;
>  static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(pinned_root_spinlock);
>  
> @@ -129,6 +131,12 @@ static int loadpin_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id)
>  	struct super_block *load_root;
>  	const char *origin = kernel_read_file_id_str(id);
>  
> +	/* If the file id is excluded, ignore the pinning. */
> +	if ((unsigned int)id < READING_MAX_ID && ignore_read_file_id[id]) {

Can you use ARRAY_SIZE(ignore_read_file_id) here instead of
READING_MAX_ID?

> +		report_load(origin, file, "pinning-excluded");
> +		return 0;
> +	}
> +
>  	/* This handles the older init_module API that has a NULL file. */
>  	if (!file) {
>  		if (!enforce) {
> @@ -187,10 +195,37 @@ static struct security_hook_list loadpin_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
>  	LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_load_data, loadpin_load_data),
>  };
>  
> +static void parse_exclude(void)

Please mark this __init (since it's called from another __init
function).

> +{
> +	int i, j;
> +	char *cur;
> +
> +	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(exclude_read_files); i++) {
> +		cur = exclude_read_files[i];
> +		if (!cur)
> +			break;
> +		if (*cur == '\0')
> +			continue;
> +
> +		for (j = 0; j < ARRAY_SIZE(kernel_read_file_str); j++) {
> +			if (strcmp(cur, kernel_read_file_str[j]) == 0) {
> +				pr_info("excluding: %s\n",
> +					kernel_read_file_str[j]);
> +				ignore_read_file_id[j] = 1;
> +				/*
> +				 * Can not break, because one read_file_str
> +				 * may map to more than on read_file_id.
> +				 */
> +			}
> +		}
> +	}
> +}
> +
>  static int __init loadpin_init(void)
>  {
>  	pr_info("ready to pin (currently %senforcing)\n",
>  		enforce ? "" : "not ");
> +	parse_exclude();
>  	security_add_hooks(loadpin_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(loadpin_hooks), "loadpin");
>  	return 0;
>  }
> @@ -203,3 +238,5 @@ DEFINE_LSM(loadpin) = {
>  /* Should not be mutable after boot, so not listed in sysfs (perm == 0). */
>  module_param(enforce, int, 0);
>  MODULE_PARM_DESC(enforce, "Enforce module/firmware pinning");
> +module_param_array_named(exclude, exclude_read_files, charp, NULL, 0);
> +MODULE_PARM_DESC(exclude, "Exclude pinning specific read file types");
> -- 
> 2.22.0.rc1.257.g3120a18244-goog
> 

Everything else looks good; thanks!

-- 
Kees Cook

[PATCH v2] Allow to exclude specific file types in LoadPin

[Ke Wu]

Linux kernel already provide MODULE_SIG and KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG to
make sure loaded kernel module and kernel image are trusted. This
patch adds a kernel command line option "loadpin.exclude" which
allows to exclude specific file types from LoadPin. This is useful
when people want to use different mechanisms to verify module and
kernel image while still use LoadPin to protect the integrity of
other files kernel loads.

Signed-off-by: Ke Wu <mikewu@google.com>
---
Changelog since v1:
- Mark ignore_read_file_id with __ro_after_init.
- Mark parse_exclude() with __init.
- Use ARRAY_SIZE(ignore_read_file_id) instead of READING_MAX_ID.


 Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/LoadPin.rst | 10 ++++++
 security/loadpin/loadpin.c                | 38 +++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 48 insertions(+)

diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/LoadPin.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/LoadPin.rst
index 32070762d24c..716ad9b23c9a 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/LoadPin.rst
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/LoadPin.rst
@@ -19,3 +19,13 @@ block device backing the filesystem is not read-only, a sysctl is
 created to toggle pinning: ``/proc/sys/kernel/loadpin/enabled``. (Having
 a mutable filesystem means pinning is mutable too, but having the
 sysctl allows for easy testing on systems with a mutable filesystem.)
+
+It's also possible to exclude specific file types from LoadPin using kernel
+command line option "``loadpin.exclude``". By default, all files are
+included, but they can be excluded using kernel command line option such
+as "``loadpin.exclude=kernel-module,kexec-image``". This allows to use
+different mechanisms such as ``CONFIG_MODULE_SIG`` and
+``CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG`` to verify kernel module and kernel image while
+still use LoadPin to protect the integrity of other files kernel loads. The
+full list of valid file types can be found in ``kernel_read_file_str``
+defined in ``include/linux/fs.h``.
diff --git a/security/loadpin/loadpin.c b/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
index 055fb0a64169..d5f064644c54 100644
--- a/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
+++ b/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
@@ -45,6 +45,8 @@ static void report_load(const char *origin, struct file *file, char *operation)
 }
 
 static int enforce = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_LOADPIN_ENFORCE);
+static char *exclude_read_files[READING_MAX_ID];
+static int ignore_read_file_id[READING_MAX_ID] __ro_after_init;
 static struct super_block *pinned_root;
 static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(pinned_root_spinlock);
 
@@ -129,6 +131,13 @@ static int loadpin_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id)
 	struct super_block *load_root;
 	const char *origin = kernel_read_file_id_str(id);
 
+	/* If the file id is excluded, ignore the pinning. */
+	if ((unsigned int)id < ARRAY_SIZE(ignore_read_file_id) &&
+	    ignore_read_file_id[id]) {
+		report_load(origin, file, "pinning-excluded");
+		return 0;
+	}
+
 	/* This handles the older init_module API that has a NULL file. */
 	if (!file) {
 		if (!enforce) {
@@ -187,10 +196,37 @@ static struct security_hook_list loadpin_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_load_data, loadpin_load_data),
 };
 
+static void __init parse_exclude(void)
+{
+	int i, j;
+	char *cur;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(exclude_read_files); i++) {
+		cur = exclude_read_files[i];
+		if (!cur)
+			break;
+		if (*cur == '\0')
+			continue;
+
+		for (j = 0; j < ARRAY_SIZE(kernel_read_file_str); j++) {
+			if (strcmp(cur, kernel_read_file_str[j]) == 0) {
+				pr_info("excluding: %s\n",
+					kernel_read_file_str[j]);
+				ignore_read_file_id[j] = 1;
+				/*
+				 * Can not break, because one read_file_str
+				 * may map to more than on read_file_id.
+				 */
+			}
+		}
+	}
+}
+
 static int __init loadpin_init(void)
 {
 	pr_info("ready to pin (currently %senforcing)\n",
 		enforce ? "" : "not ");
+	parse_exclude();
 	security_add_hooks(loadpin_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(loadpin_hooks), "loadpin");
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -203,3 +239,5 @@ DEFINE_LSM(loadpin) = {
 /* Should not be mutable after boot, so not listed in sysfs (perm == 0). */
 module_param(enforce, int, 0);
 MODULE_PARM_DESC(enforce, "Enforce module/firmware pinning");
+module_param_array_named(exclude, exclude_read_files, charp, NULL, 0);
+MODULE_PARM_DESC(exclude, "Exclude pinning specific read file types");
-- 
2.22.0.rc1.257.g3120a18244-goog

Re: [PATCH v2] Allow to exclude specific file types in LoadPin

[James Morris]

On Thu, 30 May 2019, Ke Wu wrote:

> Linux kernel already provide MODULE_SIG and KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG to
> make sure loaded kernel module and kernel image are trusted. This
> patch adds a kernel command line option "loadpin.exclude" which
> allows to exclude specific file types from LoadPin. This is useful
> when people want to use different mechanisms to verify module and
> kernel image while still use LoadPin to protect the integrity of
> other files kernel loads.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Ke Wu <mikewu@google.com>
> ---
> Changelog since v1:
> - Mark ignore_read_file_id with __ro_after_init.
> - Mark parse_exclude() with __init.
> - Use ARRAY_SIZE(ignore_read_file_id) instead of READING_MAX_ID.

Looks good!

Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>


-- 
James Morris
<jmorris@namei.org>

Re: [PATCH v2] Allow to exclude specific file types in LoadPin

[Kees Cook]

On Thu, May 30, 2019 at 12:22:08PM -0700, Ke Wu wrote:
> Linux kernel already provide MODULE_SIG and KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG to
> make sure loaded kernel module and kernel image are trusted. This
> patch adds a kernel command line option "loadpin.exclude" which
> allows to exclude specific file types from LoadPin. This is useful
> when people want to use different mechanisms to verify module and
> kernel image while still use LoadPin to protect the integrity of
> other files kernel loads.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Ke Wu <mikewu@google.com>

Thanks for the updates!

Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

James, I don't have anything else planned for loadpin this cycle. Do you
want me to push this to Linus in the next cycle, or do you want to take
it into one of your trees?

Thanks!

-Kees

> ---
> Changelog since v1:
> - Mark ignore_read_file_id with __ro_after_init.
> - Mark parse_exclude() with __init.
> - Use ARRAY_SIZE(ignore_read_file_id) instead of READING_MAX_ID.
> 
> 
>  Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/LoadPin.rst | 10 ++++++
>  security/loadpin/loadpin.c                | 38 +++++++++++++++++++++++
>  2 files changed, 48 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/LoadPin.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/LoadPin.rst
> index 32070762d24c..716ad9b23c9a 100644
> --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/LoadPin.rst
> +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/LoadPin.rst
> @@ -19,3 +19,13 @@ block device backing the filesystem is not read-only, a sysctl is
>  created to toggle pinning: ``/proc/sys/kernel/loadpin/enabled``. (Having
>  a mutable filesystem means pinning is mutable too, but having the
>  sysctl allows for easy testing on systems with a mutable filesystem.)
> +
> +It's also possible to exclude specific file types from LoadPin using kernel
> +command line option "``loadpin.exclude``". By default, all files are
> +included, but they can be excluded using kernel command line option such
> +as "``loadpin.exclude=kernel-module,kexec-image``". This allows to use
> +different mechanisms such as ``CONFIG_MODULE_SIG`` and
> +``CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG`` to verify kernel module and kernel image while
> +still use LoadPin to protect the integrity of other files kernel loads. The
> +full list of valid file types can be found in ``kernel_read_file_str``
> +defined in ``include/linux/fs.h``.
> diff --git a/security/loadpin/loadpin.c b/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
> index 055fb0a64169..d5f064644c54 100644
> --- a/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
> +++ b/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
> @@ -45,6 +45,8 @@ static void report_load(const char *origin, struct file *file, char *operation)
>  }
>  
>  static int enforce = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_LOADPIN_ENFORCE);
> +static char *exclude_read_files[READING_MAX_ID];
> +static int ignore_read_file_id[READING_MAX_ID] __ro_after_init;
>  static struct super_block *pinned_root;
>  static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(pinned_root_spinlock);
>  
> @@ -129,6 +131,13 @@ static int loadpin_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id)
>  	struct super_block *load_root;
>  	const char *origin = kernel_read_file_id_str(id);
>  
> +	/* If the file id is excluded, ignore the pinning. */
> +	if ((unsigned int)id < ARRAY_SIZE(ignore_read_file_id) &&
> +	    ignore_read_file_id[id]) {
> +		report_load(origin, file, "pinning-excluded");
> +		return 0;
> +	}
> +
>  	/* This handles the older init_module API that has a NULL file. */
>  	if (!file) {
>  		if (!enforce) {
> @@ -187,10 +196,37 @@ static struct security_hook_list loadpin_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
>  	LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_load_data, loadpin_load_data),
>  };
>  
> +static void __init parse_exclude(void)
> +{
> +	int i, j;
> +	char *cur;
> +
> +	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(exclude_read_files); i++) {
> +		cur = exclude_read_files[i];
> +		if (!cur)
> +			break;
> +		if (*cur == '\0')
> +			continue;
> +
> +		for (j = 0; j < ARRAY_SIZE(kernel_read_file_str); j++) {
> +			if (strcmp(cur, kernel_read_file_str[j]) == 0) {
> +				pr_info("excluding: %s\n",
> +					kernel_read_file_str[j]);
> +				ignore_read_file_id[j] = 1;
> +				/*
> +				 * Can not break, because one read_file_str
> +				 * may map to more than on read_file_id.
> +				 */
> +			}
> +		}
> +	}
> +}
> +
>  static int __init loadpin_init(void)
>  {
>  	pr_info("ready to pin (currently %senforcing)\n",
>  		enforce ? "" : "not ");
> +	parse_exclude();
>  	security_add_hooks(loadpin_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(loadpin_hooks), "loadpin");
>  	return 0;
>  }
> @@ -203,3 +239,5 @@ DEFINE_LSM(loadpin) = {
>  /* Should not be mutable after boot, so not listed in sysfs (perm == 0). */
>  module_param(enforce, int, 0);
>  MODULE_PARM_DESC(enforce, "Enforce module/firmware pinning");
> +module_param_array_named(exclude, exclude_read_files, charp, NULL, 0);
> +MODULE_PARM_DESC(exclude, "Exclude pinning specific read file types");
> -- 
> 2.22.0.rc1.257.g3120a18244-goog
> 

-- 
Kees Cook

Re: [PATCH v2] Allow to exclude specific file types in LoadPin

[James Morris]

On Thu, 30 May 2019, Kees Cook wrote:

> On Thu, May 30, 2019 at 12:22:08PM -0700, Ke Wu wrote:
> > Linux kernel already provide MODULE_SIG and KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG to
> > make sure loaded kernel module and kernel image are trusted. This
> > patch adds a kernel command line option "loadpin.exclude" which
> > allows to exclude specific file types from LoadPin. This is useful
> > when people want to use different mechanisms to verify module and
> > kernel image while still use LoadPin to protect the integrity of
> > other files kernel loads.
> > 
> > Signed-off-by: Ke Wu <mikewu@google.com>
> 
> Thanks for the updates!
> 
> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
> 
> James, I don't have anything else planned for loadpin this cycle. Do you
> want me to push this to Linus in the next cycle, or do you want to take
> it into one of your trees?

You should push it directly to Linus.


> 
> Thanks!
> 
> -Kees
> 
> > ---
> > Changelog since v1:
> > - Mark ignore_read_file_id with __ro_after_init.
> > - Mark parse_exclude() with __init.
> > - Use ARRAY_SIZE(ignore_read_file_id) instead of READING_MAX_ID.
> > 
> > 
> >  Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/LoadPin.rst | 10 ++++++
> >  security/loadpin/loadpin.c                | 38 +++++++++++++++++++++++
> >  2 files changed, 48 insertions(+)
> > 
> > diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/LoadPin.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/LoadPin.rst
> > index 32070762d24c..716ad9b23c9a 100644
> > --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/LoadPin.rst
> > +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/LoadPin.rst
> > @@ -19,3 +19,13 @@ block device backing the filesystem is not read-only, a sysctl is
> >  created to toggle pinning: ``/proc/sys/kernel/loadpin/enabled``. (Having
> >  a mutable filesystem means pinning is mutable too, but having the
> >  sysctl allows for easy testing on systems with a mutable filesystem.)
> > +
> > +It's also possible to exclude specific file types from LoadPin using kernel
> > +command line option "``loadpin.exclude``". By default, all files are
> > +included, but they can be excluded using kernel command line option such
> > +as "``loadpin.exclude=kernel-module,kexec-image``". This allows to use
> > +different mechanisms such as ``CONFIG_MODULE_SIG`` and
> > +``CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG`` to verify kernel module and kernel image while
> > +still use LoadPin to protect the integrity of other files kernel loads. The
> > +full list of valid file types can be found in ``kernel_read_file_str``
> > +defined in ``include/linux/fs.h``.
> > diff --git a/security/loadpin/loadpin.c b/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
> > index 055fb0a64169..d5f064644c54 100644
> > --- a/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
> > +++ b/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
> > @@ -45,6 +45,8 @@ static void report_load(const char *origin, struct file *file, char *operation)
> >  }
> >  
> >  static int enforce = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_LOADPIN_ENFORCE);
> > +static char *exclude_read_files[READING_MAX_ID];
> > +static int ignore_read_file_id[READING_MAX_ID] __ro_after_init;
> >  static struct super_block *pinned_root;
> >  static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(pinned_root_spinlock);
> >  
> > @@ -129,6 +131,13 @@ static int loadpin_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id)
> >  	struct super_block *load_root;
> >  	const char *origin = kernel_read_file_id_str(id);
> >  
> > +	/* If the file id is excluded, ignore the pinning. */
> > +	if ((unsigned int)id < ARRAY_SIZE(ignore_read_file_id) &&
> > +	    ignore_read_file_id[id]) {
> > +		report_load(origin, file, "pinning-excluded");
> > +		return 0;
> > +	}
> > +
> >  	/* This handles the older init_module API that has a NULL file. */
> >  	if (!file) {
> >  		if (!enforce) {
> > @@ -187,10 +196,37 @@ static struct security_hook_list loadpin_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> >  	LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_load_data, loadpin_load_data),
> >  };
> >  
> > +static void __init parse_exclude(void)
> > +{
> > +	int i, j;
> > +	char *cur;
> > +
> > +	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(exclude_read_files); i++) {
> > +		cur = exclude_read_files[i];
> > +		if (!cur)
> > +			break;
> > +		if (*cur == '\0')
> > +			continue;
> > +
> > +		for (j = 0; j < ARRAY_SIZE(kernel_read_file_str); j++) {
> > +			if (strcmp(cur, kernel_read_file_str[j]) == 0) {
> > +				pr_info("excluding: %s\n",
> > +					kernel_read_file_str[j]);
> > +				ignore_read_file_id[j] = 1;
> > +				/*
> > +				 * Can not break, because one read_file_str
> > +				 * may map to more than on read_file_id.
> > +				 */
> > +			}
> > +		}
> > +	}
> > +}
> > +
> >  static int __init loadpin_init(void)
> >  {
> >  	pr_info("ready to pin (currently %senforcing)\n",
> >  		enforce ? "" : "not ");
> > +	parse_exclude();
> >  	security_add_hooks(loadpin_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(loadpin_hooks), "loadpin");
> >  	return 0;
> >  }
> > @@ -203,3 +239,5 @@ DEFINE_LSM(loadpin) = {
> >  /* Should not be mutable after boot, so not listed in sysfs (perm == 0). */
> >  module_param(enforce, int, 0);
> >  MODULE_PARM_DESC(enforce, "Enforce module/firmware pinning");
> > +module_param_array_named(exclude, exclude_read_files, charp, NULL, 0);
> > +MODULE_PARM_DESC(exclude, "Exclude pinning specific read file types");
> > -- 
> > 2.22.0.rc1.257.g3120a18244-goog
> > 
> 
> 

-- 
James Morris
<jmorris@namei.org>

Re: [PATCH v2] Allow to exclude specific file types in LoadPin

[Kees Cook]

On Fri, May 31, 2019 at 06:11:44AM +1000, James Morris wrote:
> On Thu, 30 May 2019, Ke Wu wrote:
> 
> > Linux kernel already provide MODULE_SIG and KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG to
> > make sure loaded kernel module and kernel image are trusted. This
> > patch adds a kernel command line option "loadpin.exclude" which
> > allows to exclude specific file types from LoadPin. This is useful
> > when people want to use different mechanisms to verify module and
> > kernel image while still use LoadPin to protect the integrity of
> > other files kernel loads.
> > 
> > Signed-off-by: Ke Wu <mikewu@google.com>
> > ---
> > Changelog since v1:
> > - Mark ignore_read_file_id with __ro_after_init.
> > - Mark parse_exclude() with __init.
> > - Use ARRAY_SIZE(ignore_read_file_id) instead of READING_MAX_ID.
> 
> Looks good!
> 
> Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>

Thanks! Applied to my for-next/loadpin branch at
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux.git
and should be visible in linux-next in a few days.

-- 
Kees Cook

Re: [PATCH v2] Allow to exclude specific file types in LoadPin

[Ke Wu]

Thanks for pushing the patch!


On Thu, May 30, 2019 at 7:23 PM Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote:
>
> On Fri, May 31, 2019 at 06:11:44AM +1000, James Morris wrote:
> > On Thu, 30 May 2019, Ke Wu wrote:
> >
> > > Linux kernel already provide MODULE_SIG and KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG to
> > > make sure loaded kernel module and kernel image are trusted. This
> > > patch adds a kernel command line option "loadpin.exclude" which
> > > allows to exclude specific file types from LoadPin. This is useful
> > > when people want to use different mechanisms to verify module and
> > > kernel image while still use LoadPin to protect the integrity of
> > > other files kernel loads.
> > >
> > > Signed-off-by: Ke Wu <mikewu@google.com>
> > > ---
> > > Changelog since v1:
> > > - Mark ignore_read_file_id with __ro_after_init.
> > > - Mark parse_exclude() with __init.
> > > - Use ARRAY_SIZE(ignore_read_file_id) instead of READING_MAX_ID.
> >
> > Looks good!
> >
> > Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
>
> Thanks! Applied to my for-next/loadpin branch at
> git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux.git
> and should be visible in linux-next in a few days.
>
> --
> Kees Cook



-- 
Ke Wu | Software Engineer | mikewu@google.com | Google Inc.

[PATCH v3] Allow to exclude specific file types in LoadPin

[Ke Wu]

Linux kernel already provide MODULE_SIG and KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG to
make sure loaded kernel module and kernel image are trusted. This
patch adds a kernel command line option "loadpin.exclude" which
allows to exclude specific file types from LoadPin. This is useful
when people want to use different mechanisms to verify module and
kernel image while still use LoadPin to protect the integrity of
other files kernel loads.

Signed-off-by: Ke Wu <mikewu@google.com>
---
Changelog since v2:
- Make size of exclude_read_files and ignore_read_file_id to be
  equal to the size of kernel_read_file_str.

Changelog since v1:
- Mark ignore_read_file_id with __ro_after_init.
- Mark parse_exclude() with __init.
- Use ARRAY_SIZE(ignore_read_file_id) instead of READING_MAX_ID.


 Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/LoadPin.rst | 10 ++++++
 security/loadpin/loadpin.c                | 42 +++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 52 insertions(+)

diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/LoadPin.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/LoadPin.rst
index 32070762d24c..716ad9b23c9a 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/LoadPin.rst
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/LoadPin.rst
@@ -19,3 +19,13 @@ block device backing the filesystem is not read-only, a sysctl is
 created to toggle pinning: ``/proc/sys/kernel/loadpin/enabled``. (Having
 a mutable filesystem means pinning is mutable too, but having the
 sysctl allows for easy testing on systems with a mutable filesystem.)
+
+It's also possible to exclude specific file types from LoadPin using kernel
+command line option "``loadpin.exclude``". By default, all files are
+included, but they can be excluded using kernel command line option such
+as "``loadpin.exclude=kernel-module,kexec-image``". This allows to use
+different mechanisms such as ``CONFIG_MODULE_SIG`` and
+``CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG`` to verify kernel module and kernel image while
+still use LoadPin to protect the integrity of other files kernel loads. The
+full list of valid file types can be found in ``kernel_read_file_str``
+defined in ``include/linux/fs.h``.
diff --git a/security/loadpin/loadpin.c b/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
index 055fb0a64169..baa8a5b08c53 100644
--- a/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
+++ b/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
@@ -45,6 +45,12 @@ static void report_load(const char *origin, struct file *file, char *operation)
 }
 
 static int enforce = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_LOADPIN_ENFORCE);
+/*
+ * The size should be READING_MAX_ID + 1 to be equal to the size of
+ * kernel_read_file_str.
+ */
+static char *exclude_read_files[READING_MAX_ID + 1];
+static int ignore_read_file_id[READING_MAX_ID + 1] __ro_after_init;
 static struct super_block *pinned_root;
 static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(pinned_root_spinlock);
 
@@ -129,6 +135,13 @@ static int loadpin_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id)
 	struct super_block *load_root;
 	const char *origin = kernel_read_file_id_str(id);
 
+	/* If the file id is excluded, ignore the pinning. */
+	if ((unsigned int)id < ARRAY_SIZE(ignore_read_file_id) &&
+	    ignore_read_file_id[id]) {
+		report_load(origin, file, "pinning-excluded");
+		return 0;
+	}
+
 	/* This handles the older init_module API that has a NULL file. */
 	if (!file) {
 		if (!enforce) {
@@ -187,10 +200,37 @@ static struct security_hook_list loadpin_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_load_data, loadpin_load_data),
 };
 
+static void __init parse_exclude(void)
+{
+	int i, j;
+	char *cur;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(exclude_read_files); i++) {
+		cur = exclude_read_files[i];
+		if (!cur)
+			break;
+		if (*cur == '\0')
+			continue;
+
+		for (j = 0; j < ARRAY_SIZE(kernel_read_file_str); j++) {
+			if (strcmp(cur, kernel_read_file_str[j]) == 0) {
+				pr_info("excluding: %s\n",
+					kernel_read_file_str[j]);
+				ignore_read_file_id[j] = 1;
+				/*
+				 * Can not break, because one read_file_str
+				 * may map to more than on read_file_id.
+				 */
+			}
+		}
+	}
+}
+
 static int __init loadpin_init(void)
 {
 	pr_info("ready to pin (currently %senforcing)\n",
 		enforce ? "" : "not ");
+	parse_exclude();
 	security_add_hooks(loadpin_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(loadpin_hooks), "loadpin");
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -203,3 +243,5 @@ DEFINE_LSM(loadpin) = {
 /* Should not be mutable after boot, so not listed in sysfs (perm == 0). */
 module_param(enforce, int, 0);
 MODULE_PARM_DESC(enforce, "Enforce module/firmware pinning");
+module_param_array_named(exclude, exclude_read_files, charp, NULL, 0);
+MODULE_PARM_DESC(exclude, "Exclude pinning specific read file types");
-- 
2.22.0.rc1.257.g3120a18244-goog

Re: [PATCH v3] Allow to exclude specific file types in LoadPin

[Kees Cook]

On Fri, May 31, 2019 at 11:25:53AM -0700, Ke Wu wrote:
> Linux kernel already provide MODULE_SIG and KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG to
> make sure loaded kernel module and kernel image are trusted. This
> patch adds a kernel command line option "loadpin.exclude" which
> allows to exclude specific file types from LoadPin. This is useful
> when people want to use different mechanisms to verify module and
> kernel image while still use LoadPin to protect the integrity of
> other files kernel loads.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Ke Wu <mikewu@google.com>
> ---
> Changelog since v2:
> - Make size of exclude_read_files and ignore_read_file_id to be
>   equal to the size of kernel_read_file_str.

Thanks! I've fixed this differently and it should be visible shortly.

-Kees

> 
> Changelog since v1:
> - Mark ignore_read_file_id with __ro_after_init.
> - Mark parse_exclude() with __init.
> - Use ARRAY_SIZE(ignore_read_file_id) instead of READING_MAX_ID.
> 
> 
>  Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/LoadPin.rst | 10 ++++++
>  security/loadpin/loadpin.c                | 42 +++++++++++++++++++++++
>  2 files changed, 52 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/LoadPin.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/LoadPin.rst
> index 32070762d24c..716ad9b23c9a 100644
> --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/LoadPin.rst
> +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/LoadPin.rst
> @@ -19,3 +19,13 @@ block device backing the filesystem is not read-only, a sysctl is
>  created to toggle pinning: ``/proc/sys/kernel/loadpin/enabled``. (Having
>  a mutable filesystem means pinning is mutable too, but having the
>  sysctl allows for easy testing on systems with a mutable filesystem.)
> +
> +It's also possible to exclude specific file types from LoadPin using kernel
> +command line option "``loadpin.exclude``". By default, all files are
> +included, but they can be excluded using kernel command line option such
> +as "``loadpin.exclude=kernel-module,kexec-image``". This allows to use
> +different mechanisms such as ``CONFIG_MODULE_SIG`` and
> +``CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG`` to verify kernel module and kernel image while
> +still use LoadPin to protect the integrity of other files kernel loads. The
> +full list of valid file types can be found in ``kernel_read_file_str``
> +defined in ``include/linux/fs.h``.
> diff --git a/security/loadpin/loadpin.c b/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
> index 055fb0a64169..baa8a5b08c53 100644
> --- a/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
> +++ b/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
> @@ -45,6 +45,12 @@ static void report_load(const char *origin, struct file *file, char *operation)
>  }
>  
>  static int enforce = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_LOADPIN_ENFORCE);
> +/*
> + * The size should be READING_MAX_ID + 1 to be equal to the size of
> + * kernel_read_file_str.
> + */
> +static char *exclude_read_files[READING_MAX_ID + 1];
> +static int ignore_read_file_id[READING_MAX_ID + 1] __ro_after_init;
>  static struct super_block *pinned_root;
>  static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(pinned_root_spinlock);
>  
> @@ -129,6 +135,13 @@ static int loadpin_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id)
>  	struct super_block *load_root;
>  	const char *origin = kernel_read_file_id_str(id);
>  
> +	/* If the file id is excluded, ignore the pinning. */
> +	if ((unsigned int)id < ARRAY_SIZE(ignore_read_file_id) &&
> +	    ignore_read_file_id[id]) {
> +		report_load(origin, file, "pinning-excluded");
> +		return 0;
> +	}
> +
>  	/* This handles the older init_module API that has a NULL file. */
>  	if (!file) {
>  		if (!enforce) {
> @@ -187,10 +200,37 @@ static struct security_hook_list loadpin_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
>  	LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_load_data, loadpin_load_data),
>  };
>  
> +static void __init parse_exclude(void)
> +{
> +	int i, j;
> +	char *cur;
> +
> +	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(exclude_read_files); i++) {
> +		cur = exclude_read_files[i];
> +		if (!cur)
> +			break;
> +		if (*cur == '\0')
> +			continue;
> +
> +		for (j = 0; j < ARRAY_SIZE(kernel_read_file_str); j++) {
> +			if (strcmp(cur, kernel_read_file_str[j]) == 0) {
> +				pr_info("excluding: %s\n",
> +					kernel_read_file_str[j]);
> +				ignore_read_file_id[j] = 1;
> +				/*
> +				 * Can not break, because one read_file_str
> +				 * may map to more than on read_file_id.
> +				 */
> +			}
> +		}
> +	}
> +}
> +
>  static int __init loadpin_init(void)
>  {
>  	pr_info("ready to pin (currently %senforcing)\n",
>  		enforce ? "" : "not ");
> +	parse_exclude();
>  	security_add_hooks(loadpin_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(loadpin_hooks), "loadpin");
>  	return 0;
>  }
> @@ -203,3 +243,5 @@ DEFINE_LSM(loadpin) = {
>  /* Should not be mutable after boot, so not listed in sysfs (perm == 0). */
>  module_param(enforce, int, 0);
>  MODULE_PARM_DESC(enforce, "Enforce module/firmware pinning");
> +module_param_array_named(exclude, exclude_read_files, charp, NULL, 0);
> +MODULE_PARM_DESC(exclude, "Exclude pinning specific read file types");
> -- 
> 2.22.0.rc1.257.g3120a18244-goog
> 

-- 
Kees Cook

[PATCH v4] Allow to exclude specific file types in LoadPin

[Ke Wu]

Linux kernel already provide MODULE_SIG and KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG to
make sure loaded kernel module and kernel image are trusted. This
patch adds a kernel command line option "loadpin.exclude" which
allows to exclude specific file types from LoadPin. This is useful
when people want to use different mechanisms to verify module and
kernel image while still use LoadPin to protect the integrity of
other files kernel loads.

Signed-off-by: Ke Wu <mikewu@google.com>
---
Changelog since v3:
- Undo patch v3 change.
- Use ignore_read_file_id rahther than kernel_read_file_str when
  iterating to prevent out-of-bounds write.

Changelog since v2:
- Make size of exclude_read_files and ignore_read_file_id to be
  equal to the size of kernel_read_file_str.

Changelog since v1:
- Mark ignore_read_file_id with __ro_after_init.
- Mark parse_exclude() with __init.
- Use ARRAY_SIZE(ignore_read_file_id) instead of READING_MAX_ID.


 Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/LoadPin.rst | 10 ++++++
 security/loadpin/loadpin.c                | 44 +++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 54 insertions(+)

diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/LoadPin.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/LoadPin.rst
index 32070762d24c..716ad9b23c9a 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/LoadPin.rst
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/LoadPin.rst
@@ -19,3 +19,13 @@ block device backing the filesystem is not read-only, a sysctl is
 created to toggle pinning: ``/proc/sys/kernel/loadpin/enabled``. (Having
 a mutable filesystem means pinning is mutable too, but having the
 sysctl allows for easy testing on systems with a mutable filesystem.)
+
+It's also possible to exclude specific file types from LoadPin using kernel
+command line option "``loadpin.exclude``". By default, all files are
+included, but they can be excluded using kernel command line option such
+as "``loadpin.exclude=kernel-module,kexec-image``". This allows to use
+different mechanisms such as ``CONFIG_MODULE_SIG`` and
+``CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG`` to verify kernel module and kernel image while
+still use LoadPin to protect the integrity of other files kernel loads. The
+full list of valid file types can be found in ``kernel_read_file_str``
+defined in ``include/linux/fs.h``.
diff --git a/security/loadpin/loadpin.c b/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
index 055fb0a64169..ae59b812f4c8 100644
--- a/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
+++ b/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
@@ -45,6 +45,8 @@ static void report_load(const char *origin, struct file *file, char *operation)
 }
 
 static int enforce = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_LOADPIN_ENFORCE);
+static char *exclude_read_files[READING_MAX_ID];
+static int ignore_read_file_id[READING_MAX_ID] __ro_after_init;
 static struct super_block *pinned_root;
 static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(pinned_root_spinlock);
 
@@ -129,6 +131,13 @@ static int loadpin_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id)
 	struct super_block *load_root;
 	const char *origin = kernel_read_file_id_str(id);
 
+	/* If the file id is excluded, ignore the pinning. */
+	if ((unsigned int)id < ARRAY_SIZE(ignore_read_file_id) &&
+	    ignore_read_file_id[id]) {
+		report_load(origin, file, "pinning-excluded");
+		return 0;
+	}
+
 	/* This handles the older init_module API that has a NULL file. */
 	if (!file) {
 		if (!enforce) {
@@ -187,10 +196,43 @@ static struct security_hook_list loadpin_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_load_data, loadpin_load_data),
 };
 
+static void __init parse_exclude(void)
+{
+	int i, j;
+	char *cur;
+
+	/* Robustness check: size of kernel_read_file_str should be size of
+	 * ignore_read_file_id + 1.
+	 */
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(ARRAY_SIZE(kernel_read_file_str) <
+		     ARRAY_SIZE(ignore_read_file_id));
+
+	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(exclude_read_files); i++) {
+		cur = exclude_read_files[i];
+		if (!cur)
+			break;
+		if (*cur == '\0')
+			continue;
+
+		for (j = 0; j < ARRAY_SIZE(ignore_read_file_id); j++) {
+			if (strcmp(cur, kernel_read_file_str[j]) == 0) {
+				pr_info("excluding: %s\n",
+					kernel_read_file_str[j]);
+				ignore_read_file_id[j] = 1;
+				/*
+				 * Can not break, because one read_file_str
+				 * may map to more than on read_file_id.
+				 */
+			}
+		}
+	}
+}
+
 static int __init loadpin_init(void)
 {
 	pr_info("ready to pin (currently %senforcing)\n",
 		enforce ? "" : "not ");
+	parse_exclude();
 	security_add_hooks(loadpin_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(loadpin_hooks), "loadpin");
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -203,3 +245,5 @@ DEFINE_LSM(loadpin) = {
 /* Should not be mutable after boot, so not listed in sysfs (perm == 0). */
 module_param(enforce, int, 0);
 MODULE_PARM_DESC(enforce, "Enforce module/firmware pinning");
+module_param_array_named(exclude, exclude_read_files, charp, NULL, 0);
+MODULE_PARM_DESC(exclude, "Exclude pinning specific read file types");
-- 
2.22.0.rc1.311.g5d7573a151-goog