From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
To: x86@kernel.org
Cc: LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH 07/13] x86/fault: Make error_code sanitization more robust
Date: Mon, 19 Nov 2018 14:45:31 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <b31159bd55bd0c4fa061a20dfd6c429c094bebaa.1542667307.git.luto@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <cover.1542667307.git.luto@kernel.org>
In-Reply-To: <cover.1542667307.git.luto@kernel.org>
The error code in a page fault on a kernel address indicates
whether that address is mapped, which should not be revealed in a signal.
The normal code path for a page fault on a kernel address sanitizes the bit,
but the paths for vsyscall emulation and SIGBUS do not. Both are
harmless, but for subtle reasons. SIGBUS is never sent for a kernel
address, and vsyscall emulation will never fault on a kernel address
per se because it will fail an access_ok() check instead.
Make the code more robust by adding a helper that sets the relevant
fields and sanitizing the error code in the helper. This also
cleans up the code -- we had three copies of roughly the same thing.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
---
arch/x86/mm/fault.c | 30 +++++++++++++++++++++---------
1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
index bd89b6f83aa2..fac931d89c23 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
@@ -631,6 +631,24 @@ pgtable_bad(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code,
oops_end(flags, regs, sig);
}
+static void set_signal_archinfo(unsigned long address,
+ unsigned long error_code)
+{
+ struct task_struct *tsk = current;
+
+ /*
+ * To avoid leaking information about the kernel page
+ * table layout, pretend that user-mode accesses to
+ * kernel addresses are always protection faults.
+ */
+ if (address >= TASK_SIZE_MAX)
+ error_code |= X86_PF_PROT;
+
+ tsk->thread.trap_nr = X86_TRAP_PF;
+ tsk->thread.error_code = error_code | X86_PF_USER;
+ tsk->thread.cr2 = address;
+}
+
static noinline void
no_context(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code,
unsigned long address, int signal, int si_code)
@@ -656,9 +674,7 @@ no_context(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code,
* faulting through the emulate_vsyscall() logic.
*/
if (current->thread.sig_on_uaccess_err && signal) {
- tsk->thread.trap_nr = X86_TRAP_PF;
- tsk->thread.error_code = error_code | X86_PF_USER;
- tsk->thread.cr2 = address;
+ set_signal_archinfo(address, error_code);
/* XXX: hwpoison faults will set the wrong code. */
force_sig_fault(signal, si_code, (void __user *)address,
@@ -821,9 +837,7 @@ __bad_area_nosemaphore(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code,
if (likely(show_unhandled_signals))
show_signal_msg(regs, error_code, address, tsk);
- tsk->thread.cr2 = address;
- tsk->thread.error_code = error_code;
- tsk->thread.trap_nr = X86_TRAP_PF;
+ set_signal_archinfo(address, error_code);
if (si_code == SEGV_PKUERR)
force_sig_pkuerr((void __user *)address, pkey);
@@ -937,9 +951,7 @@ do_sigbus(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code, unsigned long address,
if (is_prefetch(regs, error_code, address))
return;
- tsk->thread.cr2 = address;
- tsk->thread.error_code = error_code;
- tsk->thread.trap_nr = X86_TRAP_PF;
+ set_signal_archinfo(address, error_code);
#ifdef CONFIG_MEMORY_FAILURE
if (fault & (VM_FAULT_HWPOISON|VM_FAULT_HWPOISON_LARGE)) {
--
2.17.2
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-11-19 22:45 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 25+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-11-19 22:45 [PATCH 00/13] x86/fault: #PF improvements, mostly related to USER bit Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-19 22:45 ` [PATCH 01/13] x86/fault: Check user_mode(regs) when avoiding an mmap_sem deadlock Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-20 8:14 ` [tip:x86/mm] " tip-bot for Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-20 8:15 ` [PATCH 01/13] " Peter Zijlstra
2018-11-19 22:45 ` [PATCH 02/13] x86/fault: Check user_mode(regs) when validating a stack extension Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-20 7:39 ` Ingo Molnar
2018-11-20 8:13 ` Ingo Molnar
2018-11-19 22:45 ` [PATCH 03/13] x86/cpufeatures, x86/fault: Mark SMAP as disabled when configured out Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-20 8:15 ` [tip:x86/mm] " tip-bot for Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-19 22:45 ` [PATCH 04/13] x86/fault: Fold smap_violation() into do_user_addr_fault() Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-20 8:15 ` [tip:x86/mm] " tip-bot for Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-19 22:45 ` [PATCH 05/13] x86/fault: Fix SMAP #PF handling buglet for implicit supervisor accesses Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-20 8:16 ` [tip:x86/mm] " tip-bot for Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-19 22:45 ` [PATCH 06/13] x86/fault: Improve the condition for signalling vs OOPSing Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-20 8:16 ` [tip:x86/mm] " tip-bot for Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-19 22:45 ` Andy Lutomirski [this message]
2018-11-20 8:17 ` [tip:x86/mm] x86/fault: Make error_code sanitization more robust tip-bot for Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-19 22:45 ` [PATCH 08/13] x86/fault: Don't set thread.cr2, etc before OOPSing Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-20 8:17 ` [tip:x86/mm] " tip-bot for Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-19 22:45 ` [PATCH 09/13] x86/fault: Remove sw_error_code Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-19 22:45 ` [PATCH 10/13] x86/fault: Don't try to recover from an implicit supervisor access Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-19 22:45 ` [PATCH 11/13] x86/oops: Show the correct CS value in show_regs() Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-19 22:45 ` [PATCH 12/13] x86/fault: Decode page fault OOPSes better Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-27 14:46 ` Sean Christopherson
2018-11-19 22:45 ` [PATCH 13/13] x86/vsyscall/64: Use X86_PF constants in the simulated #PF error code Andy Lutomirski
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