From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
To: x86@kernel.org
Cc: LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH 00/13] x86/fault: #PF improvements, mostly related to USER bit
Date: Mon, 19 Nov 2018 14:45:24 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <cover.1542667307.git.luto@kernel.org> (raw)
This series is a whole bunch of page fault cleanups, plus a couple
of OOPS diagnostic improvements. The overall goals are to clean up
handling of the faulting CPL, the USER bit in the error_code, and
the log messages generated by #PF OOPSes.
This series can also be seen as CET preparation. CET introduces the
WRUSS instruction, which is the very first way for CPL 0 code to
cause a #PF fault with the USER bit set. Let's get the page fault
code into shape before we start using WRUSS :)
Andy Lutomirski (13):
x86/fault: Check user_mode(regs) when avoiding an mmap_sem deadlock
x86/fault: Check user_mode(regs) when validating a stack extension
x86/cpufeatures, x86/fault: Mark SMAP as disabled when configured out
x86/fault: Fold smap_violation() into do_user_addr_fault()
x86/fault: Fix SMAP #PF handling buglet for implicit supervisor
accesses
x86/fault: Improve the condition for signalling vs OOPSing
x86/fault: Make error_code sanitization more robust
x86/fault: Don't set thread.cr2, etc before OOPSing
x86/fault: Remove sw_error_code
x86/fault: Don't try to recover from an implicit supervisor access
x86/oops: Show the correct CS value in show_regs()
x86/fault: Decode page fault OOPSes better
x86/vsyscall/64: Use X86_PF constants in the simulated #PF error code
arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c | 2 +-
arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h | 8 +-
arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c | 5 +-
arch/x86/mm/fault.c | 224 ++++++++++++++---------
4 files changed, 150 insertions(+), 89 deletions(-)
--
2.17.2
next reply other threads:[~2018-11-19 22:45 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 25+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-11-19 22:45 Andy Lutomirski [this message]
2018-11-19 22:45 ` [PATCH 01/13] x86/fault: Check user_mode(regs) when avoiding an mmap_sem deadlock Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-20 8:14 ` [tip:x86/mm] " tip-bot for Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-20 8:15 ` [PATCH 01/13] " Peter Zijlstra
2018-11-19 22:45 ` [PATCH 02/13] x86/fault: Check user_mode(regs) when validating a stack extension Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-20 7:39 ` Ingo Molnar
2018-11-20 8:13 ` Ingo Molnar
2018-11-19 22:45 ` [PATCH 03/13] x86/cpufeatures, x86/fault: Mark SMAP as disabled when configured out Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-20 8:15 ` [tip:x86/mm] " tip-bot for Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-19 22:45 ` [PATCH 04/13] x86/fault: Fold smap_violation() into do_user_addr_fault() Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-20 8:15 ` [tip:x86/mm] " tip-bot for Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-19 22:45 ` [PATCH 05/13] x86/fault: Fix SMAP #PF handling buglet for implicit supervisor accesses Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-20 8:16 ` [tip:x86/mm] " tip-bot for Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-19 22:45 ` [PATCH 06/13] x86/fault: Improve the condition for signalling vs OOPSing Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-20 8:16 ` [tip:x86/mm] " tip-bot for Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-19 22:45 ` [PATCH 07/13] x86/fault: Make error_code sanitization more robust Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-20 8:17 ` [tip:x86/mm] " tip-bot for Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-19 22:45 ` [PATCH 08/13] x86/fault: Don't set thread.cr2, etc before OOPSing Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-20 8:17 ` [tip:x86/mm] " tip-bot for Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-19 22:45 ` [PATCH 09/13] x86/fault: Remove sw_error_code Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-19 22:45 ` [PATCH 10/13] x86/fault: Don't try to recover from an implicit supervisor access Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-19 22:45 ` [PATCH 11/13] x86/oops: Show the correct CS value in show_regs() Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-19 22:45 ` [PATCH 12/13] x86/fault: Decode page fault OOPSes better Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-27 14:46 ` Sean Christopherson
2018-11-19 22:45 ` [PATCH 13/13] x86/vsyscall/64: Use X86_PF constants in the simulated #PF error code Andy Lutomirski
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