* [PATCH 3.16 01/61] slcan: Fix memory leak in error path
2020-06-09 18:03 [PATCH 3.16 00/61] 3.16.85-rc1 review Ben Hutchings
@ 2020-06-09 18:03 ` Ben Hutchings
2020-06-09 18:03 ` [PATCH 3.16 02/61] can: slcan: Fix use-after-free Read in slcan_open Ben Hutchings
` (60 subsequent siblings)
61 siblings, 0 replies; 66+ messages in thread
From: Ben Hutchings @ 2020-06-09 18:03 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel, stable
Cc: akpm, Denis Kirjanov, Lukas Bulwahn, Jouni Hogander,
Marc Kleine-Budde, Wolfgang Grandegger
3.16.85-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jouni Hogander <jouni.hogander@unikie.com>
commit ed50e1600b4483c049ce76e6bd3b665a6a9300ed upstream.
This patch is fixing memory leak reported by Syzkaller:
BUG: memory leak unreferenced object 0xffff888067f65500 (size 4096):
comm "syz-executor043", pid 454, jiffies 4294759719 (age 11.930s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
73 6c 63 61 6e 30 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 slcan0..........
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
backtrace:
[<00000000a06eec0d>] __kmalloc+0x18b/0x2c0
[<0000000083306e66>] kvmalloc_node+0x3a/0xc0
[<000000006ac27f87>] alloc_netdev_mqs+0x17a/0x1080
[<0000000061a996c9>] slcan_open+0x3ae/0x9a0
[<000000001226f0f9>] tty_ldisc_open.isra.1+0x76/0xc0
[<0000000019289631>] tty_set_ldisc+0x28c/0x5f0
[<000000004de5a617>] tty_ioctl+0x48d/0x1590
[<00000000daef496f>] do_vfs_ioctl+0x1c7/0x1510
[<0000000059068dbc>] ksys_ioctl+0x99/0xb0
[<000000009a6eb334>] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x78/0xb0
[<0000000053d0332e>] do_syscall_64+0x16f/0x580
[<0000000021b83b99>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[<000000008ea75434>] 0xffffffffffffffff
Cc: Wolfgang Grandegger <wg@grandegger.com>
Cc: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
Cc: Lukas Bulwahn <lukas.bulwahn@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jouni Hogander <jouni.hogander@unikie.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
---
drivers/net/can/slcan.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
--- a/drivers/net/can/slcan.c
+++ b/drivers/net/can/slcan.c
@@ -620,6 +620,7 @@ err_free_chan:
sl->tty = NULL;
tty->disc_data = NULL;
clear_bit(SLF_INUSE, &sl->flags);
+ free_netdev(sl->dev);
err_exit:
rtnl_unlock();
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 66+ messages in thread* [PATCH 3.16 02/61] can: slcan: Fix use-after-free Read in slcan_open
2020-06-09 18:03 [PATCH 3.16 00/61] 3.16.85-rc1 review Ben Hutchings
2020-06-09 18:03 ` [PATCH 3.16 01/61] slcan: Fix memory leak in error path Ben Hutchings
@ 2020-06-09 18:03 ` Ben Hutchings
2020-06-09 18:03 ` [PATCH 3.16 03/61] slcan: not call free_netdev before rtnl_unlock " Ben Hutchings
` (59 subsequent siblings)
61 siblings, 0 replies; 66+ messages in thread
From: Ben Hutchings @ 2020-06-09 18:03 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel, stable
Cc: akpm, Denis Kirjanov, Jouni Hogander, David Miller,
Lukas Bulwahn, Oliver Hartkopp, Wolfgang Grandegger,
Marc Kleine-Budde
3.16.85-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jouni Hogander <jouni.hogander@unikie.com>
commit 9ebd796e24008f33f06ebea5a5e6aceb68b51794 upstream.
Slcan_open doesn't clean-up device which registration failed from the
slcan_devs device list. On next open this list is iterated and freed
device is accessed. Fix this by calling slc_free_netdev in error path.
Driver/net/can/slcan.c is derived from slip.c. Use-after-free error was
identified in slip_open by syzboz. Same bug is in slcan.c. Here is the
trace from the Syzbot slip report:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0x197/0x210 lib/dump_stack.c:118
print_address_description.constprop.0.cold+0xd4/0x30b mm/kasan/report.c:374
__kasan_report.cold+0x1b/0x41 mm/kasan/report.c:506
kasan_report+0x12/0x20 mm/kasan/common.c:634
__asan_report_load8_noabort+0x14/0x20 mm/kasan/generic_report.c:132
sl_sync drivers/net/slip/slip.c:725 [inline]
slip_open+0xecd/0x11b7 drivers/net/slip/slip.c:801
tty_ldisc_open.isra.0+0xa3/0x110 drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c:469
tty_set_ldisc+0x30e/0x6b0 drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c:596
tiocsetd drivers/tty/tty_io.c:2334 [inline]
tty_ioctl+0xe8d/0x14f0 drivers/tty/tty_io.c:2594
vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:46 [inline]
file_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:509 [inline]
do_vfs_ioctl+0xdb6/0x13e0 fs/ioctl.c:696
ksys_ioctl+0xab/0xd0 fs/ioctl.c:713
__do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:720 [inline]
__se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:718 [inline]
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x73/0xb0 fs/ioctl.c:718
do_syscall_64+0xfa/0x760 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
Fixes: ed50e1600b44 ("slcan: Fix memory leak in error path")
Cc: Wolfgang Grandegger <wg@grandegger.com>
Cc: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net>
Cc: Lukas Bulwahn <lukas.bulwahn@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jouni Hogander <jouni.hogander@unikie.com>
Acked-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net>
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: slc_free_netdev() calls free_netdev() here, so
delete the direct call to free_netdev()]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
---
--- a/drivers/net/can/slcan.c
+++ b/drivers/net/can/slcan.c
@@ -620,7 +620,7 @@ err_free_chan:
sl->tty = NULL;
tty->disc_data = NULL;
clear_bit(SLF_INUSE, &sl->flags);
- free_netdev(sl->dev);
+ slc_free_netdev(sl->dev);
err_exit:
rtnl_unlock();
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 66+ messages in thread* [PATCH 3.16 03/61] slcan: not call free_netdev before rtnl_unlock in slcan_open
2020-06-09 18:03 [PATCH 3.16 00/61] 3.16.85-rc1 review Ben Hutchings
2020-06-09 18:03 ` [PATCH 3.16 01/61] slcan: Fix memory leak in error path Ben Hutchings
2020-06-09 18:03 ` [PATCH 3.16 02/61] can: slcan: Fix use-after-free Read in slcan_open Ben Hutchings
@ 2020-06-09 18:03 ` Ben Hutchings
2020-06-09 18:03 ` [PATCH 3.16 04/61] slip: Fix memory leak in slip_open error path Ben Hutchings
` (58 subsequent siblings)
61 siblings, 0 replies; 66+ messages in thread
From: Ben Hutchings @ 2020-06-09 18:03 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel, stable
Cc: akpm, Denis Kirjanov, David S. Miller, Oliver Hartkopp, yangerkun
3.16.85-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net>
commit 2091a3d42b4f339eaeed11228e0cbe9d4f92f558 upstream.
As the description before netdev_run_todo, we cannot call free_netdev
before rtnl_unlock, fix it by reorder the code.
This patch is a 1:1 copy of upstream slip.c commit f596c87005f7
("slip: not call free_netdev before rtnl_unlock in slip_open").
Reported-by: yangerkun <yangerkun@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
---
drivers/net/can/slcan.c | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
--- a/drivers/net/can/slcan.c
+++ b/drivers/net/can/slcan.c
@@ -620,7 +620,10 @@ err_free_chan:
sl->tty = NULL;
tty->disc_data = NULL;
clear_bit(SLF_INUSE, &sl->flags);
+ /* do not call free_netdev before rtnl_unlock */
+ rtnl_unlock();
slc_free_netdev(sl->dev);
+ return err;
err_exit:
rtnl_unlock();
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 66+ messages in thread* [PATCH 3.16 04/61] slip: Fix memory leak in slip_open error path
2020-06-09 18:03 [PATCH 3.16 00/61] 3.16.85-rc1 review Ben Hutchings
` (2 preceding siblings ...)
2020-06-09 18:03 ` [PATCH 3.16 03/61] slcan: not call free_netdev before rtnl_unlock " Ben Hutchings
@ 2020-06-09 18:03 ` Ben Hutchings
2020-06-09 18:03 ` [PATCH 3.16 05/61] slip: Fix use-after-free Read in slip_open Ben Hutchings
` (57 subsequent siblings)
61 siblings, 0 replies; 66+ messages in thread
From: Ben Hutchings @ 2020-06-09 18:03 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel, stable
Cc: akpm, Denis Kirjanov, Oliver Hartkopp, Lukas Bulwahn,
David S. Miller, Jouni Hogander
3.16.85-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jouni Hogander <jouni.hogander@unikie.com>
commit 3b5a39979dafea9d0cd69c7ae06088f7a84cdafa upstream.
Driver/net/can/slcan.c is derived from slip.c. Memory leak was detected
by Syzkaller in slcan. Same issue exists in slip.c and this patch is
addressing the leak in slip.c.
Here is the slcan memory leak trace reported by Syzkaller:
BUG: memory leak unreferenced object 0xffff888067f65500 (size 4096):
comm "syz-executor043", pid 454, jiffies 4294759719 (age 11.930s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
73 6c 63 61 6e 30 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 slcan0..........
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
backtrace:
[<00000000a06eec0d>] __kmalloc+0x18b/0x2c0
[<0000000083306e66>] kvmalloc_node+0x3a/0xc0
[<000000006ac27f87>] alloc_netdev_mqs+0x17a/0x1080
[<0000000061a996c9>] slcan_open+0x3ae/0x9a0
[<000000001226f0f9>] tty_ldisc_open.isra.1+0x76/0xc0
[<0000000019289631>] tty_set_ldisc+0x28c/0x5f0
[<000000004de5a617>] tty_ioctl+0x48d/0x1590
[<00000000daef496f>] do_vfs_ioctl+0x1c7/0x1510
[<0000000059068dbc>] ksys_ioctl+0x99/0xb0
[<000000009a6eb334>] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x78/0xb0
[<0000000053d0332e>] do_syscall_64+0x16f/0x580
[<0000000021b83b99>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[<000000008ea75434>] 0xfffffffffffffff
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net>
Cc: Lukas Bulwahn <lukas.bulwahn@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jouni Hogander <jouni.hogander@unikie.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
---
drivers/net/slip/slip.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
--- a/drivers/net/slip/slip.c
+++ b/drivers/net/slip/slip.c
@@ -867,6 +867,7 @@ err_free_chan:
sl->tty = NULL;
tty->disc_data = NULL;
clear_bit(SLF_INUSE, &sl->flags);
+ free_netdev(sl->dev);
err_exit:
rtnl_unlock();
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 66+ messages in thread* [PATCH 3.16 05/61] slip: Fix use-after-free Read in slip_open
2020-06-09 18:03 [PATCH 3.16 00/61] 3.16.85-rc1 review Ben Hutchings
` (3 preceding siblings ...)
2020-06-09 18:03 ` [PATCH 3.16 04/61] slip: Fix memory leak in slip_open error path Ben Hutchings
@ 2020-06-09 18:03 ` Ben Hutchings
2020-06-09 18:03 ` [PATCH 3.16 06/61] slip: not call free_netdev before rtnl_unlock " Ben Hutchings
` (56 subsequent siblings)
61 siblings, 0 replies; 66+ messages in thread
From: Ben Hutchings @ 2020-06-09 18:03 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel, stable
Cc: akpm, Denis Kirjanov, Jouni Hogander, Lukas Bulwahn,
David Miller, Oliver Hartkopp, syzbot+4d5170758f3762109542
3.16.85-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jouni Hogander <jouni.hogander@unikie.com>
commit e58c1912418980f57ba2060017583067f5f71e52 upstream.
Slip_open doesn't clean-up device which registration failed from the
slip_devs device list. On next open after failure this list is iterated
and freed device is accessed. Fix this by calling sl_free_netdev in error
path.
Here is the trace from the Syzbot:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0x197/0x210 lib/dump_stack.c:118
print_address_description.constprop.0.cold+0xd4/0x30b mm/kasan/report.c:374
__kasan_report.cold+0x1b/0x41 mm/kasan/report.c:506
kasan_report+0x12/0x20 mm/kasan/common.c:634
__asan_report_load8_noabort+0x14/0x20 mm/kasan/generic_report.c:132
sl_sync drivers/net/slip/slip.c:725 [inline]
slip_open+0xecd/0x11b7 drivers/net/slip/slip.c:801
tty_ldisc_open.isra.0+0xa3/0x110 drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c:469
tty_set_ldisc+0x30e/0x6b0 drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c:596
tiocsetd drivers/tty/tty_io.c:2334 [inline]
tty_ioctl+0xe8d/0x14f0 drivers/tty/tty_io.c:2594
vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:46 [inline]
file_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:509 [inline]
do_vfs_ioctl+0xdb6/0x13e0 fs/ioctl.c:696
ksys_ioctl+0xab/0xd0 fs/ioctl.c:713
__do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:720 [inline]
__se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:718 [inline]
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x73/0xb0 fs/ioctl.c:718
do_syscall_64+0xfa/0x760 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
Fixes: 3b5a39979daf ("slip: Fix memory leak in slip_open error path")
Reported-by: syzbot+4d5170758f3762109542@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net>
Cc: Lukas Bulwahn <lukas.bulwahn@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jouni Hogander <jouni.hogander@unikie.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: sl_free_netdev() calls free_netdev() here, so
delete the direct call to free_netdev()]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
---
--- a/drivers/net/slip/slip.c
+++ b/drivers/net/slip/slip.c
@@ -867,7 +867,7 @@ err_free_chan:
sl->tty = NULL;
tty->disc_data = NULL;
clear_bit(SLF_INUSE, &sl->flags);
- free_netdev(sl->dev);
+ sl_free_netdev(sl->dev);
err_exit:
rtnl_unlock();
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 66+ messages in thread* [PATCH 3.16 06/61] slip: not call free_netdev before rtnl_unlock in slip_open
2020-06-09 18:03 [PATCH 3.16 00/61] 3.16.85-rc1 review Ben Hutchings
` (4 preceding siblings ...)
2020-06-09 18:03 ` [PATCH 3.16 05/61] slip: Fix use-after-free Read in slip_open Ben Hutchings
@ 2020-06-09 18:03 ` Ben Hutchings
2020-06-09 18:03 ` [PATCH 3.16 07/61] net-sysfs: Fix reference count leak in rx|netdev_queue_add_kobject Ben Hutchings
` (55 subsequent siblings)
61 siblings, 0 replies; 66+ messages in thread
From: Ben Hutchings @ 2020-06-09 18:03 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel, stable
Cc: akpm, Denis Kirjanov, Oliver Hartkopp, David S. Miller, yangerkun
3.16.85-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: yangerkun <yangerkun@huawei.com>
commit f596c87005f7b1baeb7d62d9a9e25d68c3dfae10 upstream.
As the description before netdev_run_todo, we cannot call free_netdev
before rtnl_unlock, fix it by reorder the code.
Signed-off-by: yangerkun <yangerkun@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
---
drivers/net/slip/slip.c | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
--- a/drivers/net/slip/slip.c
+++ b/drivers/net/slip/slip.c
@@ -867,7 +867,10 @@ err_free_chan:
sl->tty = NULL;
tty->disc_data = NULL;
clear_bit(SLF_INUSE, &sl->flags);
+ /* do not call free_netdev before rtnl_unlock */
+ rtnl_unlock();
sl_free_netdev(sl->dev);
+ return err;
err_exit:
rtnl_unlock();
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 66+ messages in thread* [PATCH 3.16 07/61] net-sysfs: Fix reference count leak in rx|netdev_queue_add_kobject
2020-06-09 18:03 [PATCH 3.16 00/61] 3.16.85-rc1 review Ben Hutchings
` (5 preceding siblings ...)
2020-06-09 18:03 ` [PATCH 3.16 06/61] slip: not call free_netdev before rtnl_unlock " Ben Hutchings
@ 2020-06-09 18:03 ` Ben Hutchings
2020-06-09 18:03 ` [PATCH 3.16 08/61] net-sysfs: fix netdev_queue_add_kobject() breakage Ben Hutchings
` (54 subsequent siblings)
61 siblings, 0 replies; 66+ messages in thread
From: Ben Hutchings @ 2020-06-09 18:03 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel, stable
Cc: akpm, Denis Kirjanov, Lukas Bulwahn, David Miller, Jouni Hogander
3.16.85-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jouni Hogander <jouni.hogander@unikie.com>
commit b8eb718348b8fb30b5a7d0a8fce26fb3f4ac741b upstream.
kobject_init_and_add takes reference even when it fails. This has
to be given up by the caller in error handling. Otherwise memory
allocated by kobject_init_and_add is never freed. Originally found
by Syzkaller:
BUG: memory leak
unreferenced object 0xffff8880679f8b08 (size 8):
comm "netdev_register", pid 269, jiffies 4294693094 (age 12.132s)
hex dump (first 8 bytes):
72 78 2d 30 00 36 20 d4 rx-0.6 .
backtrace:
[<000000008c93818e>] __kmalloc_track_caller+0x16e/0x290
[<000000001f2e4e49>] kvasprintf+0xb1/0x140
[<000000007f313394>] kvasprintf_const+0x56/0x160
[<00000000aeca11c8>] kobject_set_name_vargs+0x5b/0x140
[<0000000073a0367c>] kobject_init_and_add+0xd8/0x170
[<0000000088838e4b>] net_rx_queue_update_kobjects+0x152/0x560
[<000000006be5f104>] netdev_register_kobject+0x210/0x380
[<00000000e31dab9d>] register_netdevice+0xa1b/0xf00
[<00000000f68b2465>] __tun_chr_ioctl+0x20d5/0x3dd0
[<000000004c50599f>] tun_chr_ioctl+0x2f/0x40
[<00000000bbd4c317>] do_vfs_ioctl+0x1c7/0x1510
[<00000000d4c59e8f>] ksys_ioctl+0x99/0xb0
[<00000000946aea81>] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x78/0xb0
[<0000000038d946e5>] do_syscall_64+0x16f/0x580
[<00000000e0aa5d8f>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[<00000000285b3d1a>] 0xffffffffffffffff
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Lukas Bulwahn <lukas.bulwahn@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jouni Hogander <jouni.hogander@unikie.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
---
net/core/net-sysfs.c | 24 +++++++++++++-----------
1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
--- a/net/core/net-sysfs.c
+++ b/net/core/net-sysfs.c
@@ -786,21 +786,23 @@ static int rx_queue_add_kobject(struct n
error = kobject_init_and_add(kobj, &rx_queue_ktype, NULL,
"rx-%u", index);
if (error)
- return error;
+ goto err;
dev_hold(queue->dev);
if (net->sysfs_rx_queue_group) {
error = sysfs_create_group(kobj, net->sysfs_rx_queue_group);
- if (error) {
- kobject_put(kobj);
- return error;
- }
+ if (error)
+ goto err;
}
kobject_uevent(kobj, KOBJ_ADD);
return error;
+
+err:
+ kobject_put(kobj);
+ return error;
}
#endif /* CONFIG_SYSFS */
@@ -1145,21 +1147,21 @@ static int netdev_queue_add_kobject(stru
error = kobject_init_and_add(kobj, &netdev_queue_ktype, NULL,
"tx-%u", index);
if (error)
- return error;
+ goto err;
dev_hold(queue->dev);
#ifdef CONFIG_BQL
error = sysfs_create_group(kobj, &dql_group);
- if (error) {
- kobject_put(kobj);
- return error;
- }
+ if (error)
+ goto err;
#endif
kobject_uevent(kobj, KOBJ_ADD);
- return 0;
+err:
+ kobject_put(kobj);
+ return error;
}
#endif /* CONFIG_SYSFS */
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 66+ messages in thread* [PATCH 3.16 08/61] net-sysfs: fix netdev_queue_add_kobject() breakage
2020-06-09 18:03 [PATCH 3.16 00/61] 3.16.85-rc1 review Ben Hutchings
` (6 preceding siblings ...)
2020-06-09 18:03 ` [PATCH 3.16 07/61] net-sysfs: Fix reference count leak in rx|netdev_queue_add_kobject Ben Hutchings
@ 2020-06-09 18:03 ` Ben Hutchings
2020-06-09 18:04 ` [PATCH 3.16 09/61] net-sysfs: Call dev_hold always in netdev_queue_add_kobject Ben Hutchings
` (53 subsequent siblings)
61 siblings, 0 replies; 66+ messages in thread
From: Ben Hutchings @ 2020-06-09 18:03 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel, stable
Cc: akpm, Denis Kirjanov, David S. Miller, Eric Dumazet, Jouni Hogander
3.16.85-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
commit 48a322b6f9965b2f1e4ce81af972f0e287b07ed0 upstream.
kobject_put() should only be called in error path.
Fixes: b8eb718348b8 ("net-sysfs: Fix reference count leak in rx|netdev_queue_add_kobject")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Jouni Hogander <jouni.hogander@unikie.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
---
net/core/net-sysfs.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
--- a/net/core/net-sysfs.c
+++ b/net/core/net-sysfs.c
@@ -1158,6 +1158,7 @@ static int netdev_queue_add_kobject(stru
#endif
kobject_uevent(kobj, KOBJ_ADD);
+ return 0;
err:
kobject_put(kobj);
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 66+ messages in thread* [PATCH 3.16 09/61] net-sysfs: Call dev_hold always in netdev_queue_add_kobject
2020-06-09 18:03 [PATCH 3.16 00/61] 3.16.85-rc1 review Ben Hutchings
` (7 preceding siblings ...)
2020-06-09 18:03 ` [PATCH 3.16 08/61] net-sysfs: fix netdev_queue_add_kobject() breakage Ben Hutchings
@ 2020-06-09 18:04 ` Ben Hutchings
2020-06-09 18:04 ` [PATCH 3.16 10/61] net-sysfs: Call dev_hold always in rx_queue_add_kobject Ben Hutchings
` (52 subsequent siblings)
61 siblings, 0 replies; 66+ messages in thread
From: Ben Hutchings @ 2020-06-09 18:04 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel, stable
Cc: akpm, Denis Kirjanov, Tetsuo Handa, Lukas Bulwahn, David Miller,
Hulk Robot, Jouni Hogander
3.16.85-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jouni Hogander <jouni.hogander@unikie.com>
commit e0b60903b434a7ee21ba8d8659f207ed84101e89 upstream.
Dev_hold has to be called always in netdev_queue_add_kobject.
Otherwise usage count drops below 0 in case of failure in
kobject_init_and_add.
Fixes: b8eb718348b8 ("net-sysfs: Fix reference count leak in rx|netdev_queue_add_kobject")
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Lukas Bulwahn <lukas.bulwahn@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
---
net/core/net-sysfs.c | 7 +++++--
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/net/core/net-sysfs.c
+++ b/net/core/net-sysfs.c
@@ -1143,14 +1143,17 @@ static int netdev_queue_add_kobject(stru
struct kobject *kobj = &queue->kobj;
int error = 0;
+ /* Kobject_put later will trigger netdev_queue_release call
+ * which decreases dev refcount: Take that reference here
+ */
+ dev_hold(queue->dev);
+
kobj->kset = net->queues_kset;
error = kobject_init_and_add(kobj, &netdev_queue_ktype, NULL,
"tx-%u", index);
if (error)
goto err;
- dev_hold(queue->dev);
-
#ifdef CONFIG_BQL
error = sysfs_create_group(kobj, &dql_group);
if (error)
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 66+ messages in thread* [PATCH 3.16 10/61] net-sysfs: Call dev_hold always in rx_queue_add_kobject
2020-06-09 18:03 [PATCH 3.16 00/61] 3.16.85-rc1 review Ben Hutchings
` (8 preceding siblings ...)
2020-06-09 18:04 ` [PATCH 3.16 09/61] net-sysfs: Call dev_hold always in netdev_queue_add_kobject Ben Hutchings
@ 2020-06-09 18:04 ` Ben Hutchings
2020-06-09 18:04 ` [PATCH 3.16 11/61] selinux: cleanup error reporting in selinux_nlmsg_perm() Ben Hutchings
` (51 subsequent siblings)
61 siblings, 0 replies; 66+ messages in thread
From: Ben Hutchings @ 2020-06-09 18:04 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel, stable
Cc: akpm, Denis Kirjanov, Tetsuo Handa, Lukas Bulwahn, David Miller,
Jouni Hogander, syzbot
3.16.85-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jouni Hogander <jouni.hogander@unikie.com>
commit ddd9b5e3e765d8ed5a35786a6cb00111713fe161 upstream.
Dev_hold has to be called always in rx_queue_add_kobject.
Otherwise usage count drops below 0 in case of failure in
kobject_init_and_add.
Fixes: b8eb718348b8 ("net-sysfs: Fix reference count leak in rx|netdev_queue_add_kobject")
Reported-by: syzbot <syzbot+30209ea299c09d8785c9@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Lukas Bulwahn <lukas.bulwahn@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jouni Hogander <jouni.hogander@unikie.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
---
net/core/net-sysfs.c | 7 +++++--
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/net/core/net-sysfs.c
+++ b/net/core/net-sysfs.c
@@ -782,14 +782,17 @@ static int rx_queue_add_kobject(struct n
struct kobject *kobj = &queue->kobj;
int error = 0;
+ /* Kobject_put later will trigger rx_queue_release call which
+ * decreases dev refcount: Take that reference here
+ */
+ dev_hold(queue->dev);
+
kobj->kset = net->queues_kset;
error = kobject_init_and_add(kobj, &rx_queue_ktype, NULL,
"rx-%u", index);
if (error)
goto err;
- dev_hold(queue->dev);
-
if (net->sysfs_rx_queue_group) {
error = sysfs_create_group(kobj, net->sysfs_rx_queue_group);
if (error)
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 66+ messages in thread* [PATCH 3.16 11/61] selinux: cleanup error reporting in selinux_nlmsg_perm()
2020-06-09 18:03 [PATCH 3.16 00/61] 3.16.85-rc1 review Ben Hutchings
` (9 preceding siblings ...)
2020-06-09 18:04 ` [PATCH 3.16 10/61] net-sysfs: Call dev_hold always in rx_queue_add_kobject Ben Hutchings
@ 2020-06-09 18:04 ` Ben Hutchings
2020-06-09 18:04 ` [PATCH 3.16 12/61] selinux: convert WARN_ONCE() to printk() " Ben Hutchings
` (50 subsequent siblings)
61 siblings, 0 replies; 66+ messages in thread
From: Ben Hutchings @ 2020-06-09 18:04 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel, stable; +Cc: akpm, Denis Kirjanov, Paul Moore, Richard Guy Briggs
3.16.85-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
commit e173fb2646a832b424c80904c306b816760ce477 upstream.
Convert audit_log() call to WARN_ONCE().
Rename "type=" to nlmsg_type=" to avoid confusion with the audit record
type.
Added "protocol=" to help track down which protocol (NETLINK_AUDIT?) was used
within the netlink protocol family.
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
[Rewrote the patch subject line]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
---
security/selinux/hooks.c | 7 +++----
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -4683,10 +4683,9 @@ static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct soc
err = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(sksec->sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm);
if (err) {
if (err == -EINVAL) {
- audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
- "SELinux: unrecognized netlink message"
- " type=%hu for sclass=%hu\n",
- nlh->nlmsg_type, sksec->sclass);
+ WARN_ONCE(1, "selinux_nlmsg_perm: unrecognized netlink message:"
+ " protocol=%hu nlmsg_type=%hu sclass=%hu\n",
+ sk->sk_protocol, nlh->nlmsg_type, sksec->sclass);
if (!selinux_enforcing || security_get_allow_unknown())
err = 0;
}
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 66+ messages in thread* [PATCH 3.16 12/61] selinux: convert WARN_ONCE() to printk() in selinux_nlmsg_perm()
2020-06-09 18:03 [PATCH 3.16 00/61] 3.16.85-rc1 review Ben Hutchings
` (10 preceding siblings ...)
2020-06-09 18:04 ` [PATCH 3.16 11/61] selinux: cleanup error reporting in selinux_nlmsg_perm() Ben Hutchings
@ 2020-06-09 18:04 ` Ben Hutchings
2020-06-09 18:04 ` [PATCH 3.16 13/61] selinux: Print 'sclass' as string when unrecognized netlink message occurs Ben Hutchings
` (49 subsequent siblings)
61 siblings, 0 replies; 66+ messages in thread
From: Ben Hutchings @ 2020-06-09 18:04 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel, stable; +Cc: akpm, Denis Kirjanov, Paul Moore, Richard Guy Briggs
3.16.85-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
commit d950f84c1c6658faec2ecbf5b09f7e7191953394 upstream.
Convert WARN_ONCE() to printk() in selinux_nlmsg_perm().
After conversion from audit_log() in commit e173fb26, WARN_ONCE() was
deemed too alarmist, so switch it to printk().
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
[PM: Changed to printk(WARNING) so we catch all of the different
invalid netlink messages. In Richard's defense, he brought this
point up earlier, but I didn't understand his point at the time.]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
---
security/selinux/hooks.c | 7 ++++---
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -4683,9 +4683,10 @@ static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct soc
err = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(sksec->sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm);
if (err) {
if (err == -EINVAL) {
- WARN_ONCE(1, "selinux_nlmsg_perm: unrecognized netlink message:"
- " protocol=%hu nlmsg_type=%hu sclass=%hu\n",
- sk->sk_protocol, nlh->nlmsg_type, sksec->sclass);
+ printk(KERN_WARNING
+ "SELinux: unrecognized netlink message:"
+ " protocol=%hu nlmsg_type=%hu sclass=%hu\n",
+ sk->sk_protocol, nlh->nlmsg_type, sksec->sclass);
if (!selinux_enforcing || security_get_allow_unknown())
err = 0;
}
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 66+ messages in thread* [PATCH 3.16 13/61] selinux: Print 'sclass' as string when unrecognized netlink message occurs
2020-06-09 18:03 [PATCH 3.16 00/61] 3.16.85-rc1 review Ben Hutchings
` (11 preceding siblings ...)
2020-06-09 18:04 ` [PATCH 3.16 12/61] selinux: convert WARN_ONCE() to printk() " Ben Hutchings
@ 2020-06-09 18:04 ` Ben Hutchings
2020-06-09 18:04 ` [PATCH 3.16 14/61] selinux: rate-limit netlink message warnings in selinux_nlmsg_perm() Ben Hutchings
` (48 subsequent siblings)
61 siblings, 0 replies; 66+ messages in thread
From: Ben Hutchings @ 2020-06-09 18:04 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel, stable
Cc: akpm, Denis Kirjanov, Stephen Smalley, Marek Milkovic, Paul Moore
3.16.85-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Marek Milkovic <mmilkovi@redhat.com>
commit cded3fffbeab777e6ad2ec05d4a3b62c5caca0f3 upstream.
This prints the 'sclass' field as string instead of index in unrecognized netlink message.
The textual representation makes it easier to distinguish the right class.
Signed-off-by: Marek Milkovic <mmilkovi@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
[PM: 80-char width fixes]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
---
security/selinux/hooks.c | 5 +++--
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -4685,8 +4685,9 @@ static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct soc
if (err == -EINVAL) {
printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: unrecognized netlink message:"
- " protocol=%hu nlmsg_type=%hu sclass=%hu\n",
- sk->sk_protocol, nlh->nlmsg_type, sksec->sclass);
+ " protocol=%hu nlmsg_type=%hu sclass=%s\n",
+ sk->sk_protocol, nlh->nlmsg_type,
+ secclass_map[sksec->sclass - 1].name);
if (!selinux_enforcing || security_get_allow_unknown())
err = 0;
}
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 66+ messages in thread* [PATCH 3.16 14/61] selinux: rate-limit netlink message warnings in selinux_nlmsg_perm()
2020-06-09 18:03 [PATCH 3.16 00/61] 3.16.85-rc1 review Ben Hutchings
` (12 preceding siblings ...)
2020-06-09 18:04 ` [PATCH 3.16 13/61] selinux: Print 'sclass' as string when unrecognized netlink message occurs Ben Hutchings
@ 2020-06-09 18:04 ` Ben Hutchings
2020-06-09 18:04 ` [PATCH 3.16 15/61] selinux: properly handle multiple messages in selinux_netlink_send() Ben Hutchings
` (47 subsequent siblings)
61 siblings, 0 replies; 66+ messages in thread
From: Ben Hutchings @ 2020-06-09 18:04 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel, stable
Cc: akpm, Denis Kirjanov, Paul Moore, Vladis Dronov, Florian Weimer
3.16.85-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Vladis Dronov <vdronov@redhat.com>
commit 76319946f321e30872dd72af7de867cb26e7a373 upstream.
Any process is able to send netlink messages with invalid types.
Make the warning rate-limited to prevent too much log spam.
The warning is supposed to help to find misbehaving programs, so
print the triggering command name and pid.
Reported-by: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Vladis Dronov <vdronov@redhat.com>
[PM: subject line tweak to make checkpatch.pl happy]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
---
security/selinux/hooks.c | 9 +++++----
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -4683,11 +4683,12 @@ static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct soc
err = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(sksec->sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm);
if (err) {
if (err == -EINVAL) {
- printk(KERN_WARNING
- "SELinux: unrecognized netlink message:"
- " protocol=%hu nlmsg_type=%hu sclass=%s\n",
+ pr_warn_ratelimited("SELinux: unrecognized netlink"
+ " message: protocol=%hu nlmsg_type=%hu sclass=%s"
+ " pig=%d comm=%s\n",
sk->sk_protocol, nlh->nlmsg_type,
- secclass_map[sksec->sclass - 1].name);
+ secclass_map[sksec->sclass - 1].name,
+ task_pid_nr(current), current->comm);
if (!selinux_enforcing || security_get_allow_unknown())
err = 0;
}
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 66+ messages in thread* [PATCH 3.16 15/61] selinux: properly handle multiple messages in selinux_netlink_send()
2020-06-09 18:03 [PATCH 3.16 00/61] 3.16.85-rc1 review Ben Hutchings
` (13 preceding siblings ...)
2020-06-09 18:04 ` [PATCH 3.16 14/61] selinux: rate-limit netlink message warnings in selinux_nlmsg_perm() Ben Hutchings
@ 2020-06-09 18:04 ` Ben Hutchings
2020-06-09 18:04 ` [PATCH 3.16 16/61] drivers: usb: core: Don't disable irqs in usb_sg_wait() during URB submit Ben Hutchings
` (46 subsequent siblings)
61 siblings, 0 replies; 66+ messages in thread
From: Ben Hutchings @ 2020-06-09 18:04 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel, stable
Cc: akpm, Denis Kirjanov, Dmitry Vyukov, stable, Paul Moore, Stephen Smalley
3.16.85-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
commit fb73974172ffaaf57a7c42f35424d9aece1a5af6 upstream.
Fix the SELinux netlink_send hook to properly handle multiple netlink
messages in a single sk_buff; each message is parsed and subject to
SELinux access control. Prior to this patch, SELinux only inspected
the first message in the sk_buff.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
---
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -4669,39 +4669,59 @@ static int selinux_tun_dev_open(void *se
static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
- int err = 0;
- u32 perm;
+ int rc = 0;
+ unsigned int msg_len;
+ unsigned int data_len = skb->len;
+ unsigned char *data = skb->data;
struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ u16 sclass = sksec->sclass;
+ u32 perm;
- if (skb->len < NLMSG_HDRLEN) {
- err = -EINVAL;
- goto out;
- }
- nlh = nlmsg_hdr(skb);
+ while (data_len >= nlmsg_total_size(0)) {
+ nlh = (struct nlmsghdr *)data;
- err = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(sksec->sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm);
- if (err) {
- if (err == -EINVAL) {
+ /* NOTE: the nlmsg_len field isn't reliably set by some netlink
+ * users which means we can't reject skb's with bogus
+ * length fields; our solution is to follow what
+ * netlink_rcv_skb() does and simply skip processing at
+ * messages with length fields that are clearly junk
+ */
+ if (nlh->nlmsg_len < NLMSG_HDRLEN || nlh->nlmsg_len > data_len)
+ return 0;
+
+ rc = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm);
+ if (rc == 0) {
+ rc = sock_has_perm(current, sk, perm);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ } else if (rc == -EINVAL) {
+ /* -EINVAL is a missing msg/perm mapping */
pr_warn_ratelimited("SELinux: unrecognized netlink"
- " message: protocol=%hu nlmsg_type=%hu sclass=%s"
- " pig=%d comm=%s\n",
- sk->sk_protocol, nlh->nlmsg_type,
- secclass_map[sksec->sclass - 1].name,
- task_pid_nr(current), current->comm);
- if (!selinux_enforcing || security_get_allow_unknown())
- err = 0;
+ " message: protocol=%hu nlmsg_type=%hu sclass=%s"
+ " pid=%d comm=%s\n",
+ sk->sk_protocol, nlh->nlmsg_type,
+ secclass_map[sclass - 1].name,
+ task_pid_nr(current), current->comm);
+ if (selinux_enforcing && !security_get_allow_unknown())
+ return rc;
+ rc = 0;
+ } else if (rc == -ENOENT) {
+ /* -ENOENT is a missing socket/class mapping, ignore */
+ rc = 0;
+ } else {
+ return rc;
}
- /* Ignore */
- if (err == -ENOENT)
- err = 0;
- goto out;
+ /* move to the next message after applying netlink padding */
+ msg_len = NLMSG_ALIGN(nlh->nlmsg_len);
+ if (msg_len >= data_len)
+ return 0;
+ data_len -= msg_len;
+ data += msg_len;
}
- err = sock_has_perm(current, sk, perm);
-out:
- return err;
+ return rc;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 66+ messages in thread* [PATCH 3.16 16/61] drivers: usb: core: Don't disable irqs in usb_sg_wait() during URB submit.
2020-06-09 18:03 [PATCH 3.16 00/61] 3.16.85-rc1 review Ben Hutchings
` (14 preceding siblings ...)
2020-06-09 18:04 ` [PATCH 3.16 15/61] selinux: properly handle multiple messages in selinux_netlink_send() Ben Hutchings
@ 2020-06-09 18:04 ` Ben Hutchings
2020-06-09 18:04 ` [PATCH 3.16 17/61] drivers: usb: core: Minimize irq disabling in usb_sg_cancel() Ben Hutchings
` (45 subsequent siblings)
61 siblings, 0 replies; 66+ messages in thread
From: Ben Hutchings @ 2020-06-09 18:04 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel, stable
Cc: akpm, Denis Kirjanov, David Mosberger, Greg Kroah-Hartman
3.16.85-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: David Mosberger <davidm@egauge.net>
commit 98b74b0ee57af1bcb6e8b2e76e707a71c5ef8ec9 upstream.
usb_submit_urb() may take quite long to execute. For example, a
single sg list may have 30 or more entries, possibly leading to that
many calls to DMA-map pages. This can cause interrupt latency of
several hundred micro-seconds.
Avoid the problem by releasing the io->lock spinlock and re-enabling
interrupts before calling usb_submit_urb(). This opens races with
usb_sg_cancel() and sg_complete(). Handle those races by using
usb_block_urb() to stop URBs from being submitted after
usb_sg_cancel() or sg_complete() with error.
Note that usb_unlink_urb() is guaranteed to return -ENODEV if
!io->urbs[i]->dev and since the -ENODEV case is already handled,
we don't have to check for !io->urbs[i]->dev explicitly.
Before this change, reading 512MB from an ext3 filesystem on a USB
memory stick showed a throughput of 12 MB/s with about 500 missed
deadlines.
With this change, reading the same file gave the same throughput but
only one or two missed deadlines.
Signed-off-by: David Mosberger <davidm@egauge.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
---
drivers/usb/core/message.c | 15 +++++++--------
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/usb/core/message.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/core/message.c
@@ -306,9 +306,10 @@ static void sg_complete(struct urb *urb)
*/
spin_unlock(&io->lock);
for (i = 0, found = 0; i < io->entries; i++) {
- if (!io->urbs[i] || !io->urbs[i]->dev)
+ if (!io->urbs[i])
continue;
if (found) {
+ usb_block_urb(io->urbs[i]);
retval = usb_unlink_urb(io->urbs[i]);
if (retval != -EINPROGRESS &&
retval != -ENODEV &&
@@ -519,12 +520,10 @@ void usb_sg_wait(struct usb_sg_request *
int retval;
io->urbs[i]->dev = io->dev;
- retval = usb_submit_urb(io->urbs[i], GFP_ATOMIC);
-
- /* after we submit, let completions or cancellations fire;
- * we handshake using io->status.
- */
spin_unlock_irq(&io->lock);
+
+ retval = usb_submit_urb(io->urbs[i], GFP_NOIO);
+
switch (retval) {
/* maybe we retrying will recover */
case -ENXIO: /* hc didn't queue this one */
@@ -594,8 +593,8 @@ void usb_sg_cancel(struct usb_sg_request
for (i = 0; i < io->entries; i++) {
int retval;
- if (!io->urbs[i]->dev)
- continue;
+ usb_block_urb(io->urbs[i]);
+
retval = usb_unlink_urb(io->urbs[i]);
if (retval != -EINPROGRESS
&& retval != -ENODEV
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 66+ messages in thread* [PATCH 3.16 17/61] drivers: usb: core: Minimize irq disabling in usb_sg_cancel()
2020-06-09 18:03 [PATCH 3.16 00/61] 3.16.85-rc1 review Ben Hutchings
` (15 preceding siblings ...)
2020-06-09 18:04 ` [PATCH 3.16 16/61] drivers: usb: core: Don't disable irqs in usb_sg_wait() during URB submit Ben Hutchings
@ 2020-06-09 18:04 ` Ben Hutchings
2020-06-09 18:04 ` [PATCH 3.16 18/61] USB: core: Fix free-while-in-use bug in the USB S-Glibrary Ben Hutchings
` (44 subsequent siblings)
61 siblings, 0 replies; 66+ messages in thread
From: Ben Hutchings @ 2020-06-09 18:04 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel, stable
Cc: akpm, Denis Kirjanov, Alan Stern, David Mosberger, Greg Kroah-Hartman
3.16.85-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: David Mosberger <davidm@egauge.net>
commit 5f2e5fb873e269fcb806165715d237f0de4ecf1d upstream.
Restructure usb_sg_cancel() so we don't have to disable interrupts
while cancelling the URBs.
Suggested-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
Signed-off-by: David Mosberger <davidm@egauge.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
---
drivers/usb/core/message.c | 37 +++++++++++++++++--------------------
1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/usb/core/message.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/core/message.c
@@ -581,31 +581,28 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(usb_sg_wait);
void usb_sg_cancel(struct usb_sg_request *io)
{
unsigned long flags;
+ int i, retval;
spin_lock_irqsave(&io->lock, flags);
+ if (io->status) {
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&io->lock, flags);
+ return;
+ }
+ /* shut everything down */
+ io->status = -ECONNRESET;
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&io->lock, flags);
- /* shut everything down, if it didn't already */
- if (!io->status) {
- int i;
-
- io->status = -ECONNRESET;
- spin_unlock(&io->lock);
- for (i = 0; i < io->entries; i++) {
- int retval;
-
- usb_block_urb(io->urbs[i]);
+ for (i = io->entries - 1; i >= 0; --i) {
+ usb_block_urb(io->urbs[i]);
- retval = usb_unlink_urb(io->urbs[i]);
- if (retval != -EINPROGRESS
- && retval != -ENODEV
- && retval != -EBUSY
- && retval != -EIDRM)
- dev_warn(&io->dev->dev, "%s, unlink --> %d\n",
- __func__, retval);
- }
- spin_lock(&io->lock);
+ retval = usb_unlink_urb(io->urbs[i]);
+ if (retval != -EINPROGRESS
+ && retval != -ENODEV
+ && retval != -EBUSY
+ && retval != -EIDRM)
+ dev_warn(&io->dev->dev, "%s, unlink --> %d\n",
+ __func__, retval);
}
- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&io->lock, flags);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(usb_sg_cancel);
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 66+ messages in thread* [PATCH 3.16 18/61] USB: core: Fix free-while-in-use bug in the USB S-Glibrary
2020-06-09 18:03 [PATCH 3.16 00/61] 3.16.85-rc1 review Ben Hutchings
` (16 preceding siblings ...)
2020-06-09 18:04 ` [PATCH 3.16 17/61] drivers: usb: core: Minimize irq disabling in usb_sg_cancel() Ben Hutchings
@ 2020-06-09 18:04 ` Ben Hutchings
2020-06-09 18:04 ` [PATCH 3.16 19/61] scsi: mptfusion: Add bounds check in mptctl_hp_targetinfo() Ben Hutchings
` (43 subsequent siblings)
61 siblings, 0 replies; 66+ messages in thread
From: Ben Hutchings @ 2020-06-09 18:04 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel, stable
Cc: akpm, Denis Kirjanov, Alan Stern, Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable
3.16.85-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
commit 056ad39ee9253873522f6469c3364964a322912b upstream.
FuzzUSB (a variant of syzkaller) found a free-while-still-in-use bug
in the USB scatter-gather library:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in atomic_read
include/asm-generic/atomic-instrumented.h:26 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in usb_hcd_unlink_urb+0x5f/0x170
drivers/usb/core/hcd.c:1607
Read of size 4 at addr ffff888065379610 by task kworker/u4:1/27
CPU: 1 PID: 27 Comm: kworker/u4:1 Not tainted 5.5.11 #2
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS
1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
Workqueue: scsi_tmf_2 scmd_eh_abort_handler
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0xce/0x128 lib/dump_stack.c:118
print_address_description.constprop.4+0x21/0x3c0 mm/kasan/report.c:374
__kasan_report+0x153/0x1cb mm/kasan/report.c:506
kasan_report+0x12/0x20 mm/kasan/common.c:639
check_memory_region_inline mm/kasan/generic.c:185 [inline]
check_memory_region+0x152/0x1b0 mm/kasan/generic.c:192
__kasan_check_read+0x11/0x20 mm/kasan/common.c:95
atomic_read include/asm-generic/atomic-instrumented.h:26 [inline]
usb_hcd_unlink_urb+0x5f/0x170 drivers/usb/core/hcd.c:1607
usb_unlink_urb+0x72/0xb0 drivers/usb/core/urb.c:657
usb_sg_cancel+0x14e/0x290 drivers/usb/core/message.c:602
usb_stor_stop_transport+0x5e/0xa0 drivers/usb/storage/transport.c:937
This bug occurs when cancellation of the S-G transfer races with
transfer completion. When that happens, usb_sg_cancel() may continue
to access the transfer's URBs after usb_sg_wait() has freed them.
The bug is caused by the fact that usb_sg_cancel() does not take any
sort of reference to the transfer, and so there is nothing to prevent
the URBs from being deallocated while the routine is trying to use
them. The fix is to take such a reference by incrementing the
transfer's io->count field while the cancellation is in progres and
decrementing it afterward. The transfer's URBs are not deallocated
until io->complete is triggered, which happens when io->count reaches
zero.
Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
Reported-and-tested-by: Kyungtae Kim <kt0755@gmail.com>
CC: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/Pine.LNX.4.44L0.2003281615140.14837-100000@netrider.rowland.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
---
drivers/usb/core/message.c | 9 ++++++++-
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/drivers/usb/core/message.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/core/message.c
@@ -584,12 +584,13 @@ void usb_sg_cancel(struct usb_sg_request
int i, retval;
spin_lock_irqsave(&io->lock, flags);
- if (io->status) {
+ if (io->status || io->count == 0) {
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&io->lock, flags);
return;
}
/* shut everything down */
io->status = -ECONNRESET;
+ io->count++; /* Keep the request alive until we're done */
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&io->lock, flags);
for (i = io->entries - 1; i >= 0; --i) {
@@ -603,6 +604,12 @@ void usb_sg_cancel(struct usb_sg_request
dev_warn(&io->dev->dev, "%s, unlink --> %d\n",
__func__, retval);
}
+
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&io->lock, flags);
+ io->count--;
+ if (!io->count)
+ complete(&io->complete);
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&io->lock, flags);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(usb_sg_cancel);
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 66+ messages in thread* [PATCH 3.16 19/61] scsi: mptfusion: Add bounds check in mptctl_hp_targetinfo()
2020-06-09 18:03 [PATCH 3.16 00/61] 3.16.85-rc1 review Ben Hutchings
` (17 preceding siblings ...)
2020-06-09 18:04 ` [PATCH 3.16 18/61] USB: core: Fix free-while-in-use bug in the USB S-Glibrary Ben Hutchings
@ 2020-06-09 18:04 ` Ben Hutchings
2020-06-09 18:04 ` [PATCH 3.16 20/61] scsi: mptfusion: Fix double fetch bug in ioctl Ben Hutchings
` (42 subsequent siblings)
61 siblings, 0 replies; 66+ messages in thread
From: Ben Hutchings @ 2020-06-09 18:04 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel, stable
Cc: akpm, Denis Kirjanov, Dan Carpenter, Johannes Thumshirn,
Martin K. Petersen
3.16.85-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
commit a7043e9529f3c367cc4d82997e00be034cbe57ca upstream.
My static checker complains about an out of bounds read:
drivers/message/fusion/mptctl.c:2786 mptctl_hp_targetinfo()
error: buffer overflow 'hd->sel_timeout' 255 <= u32max.
It's true that we probably should have a bounds check here.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
---
drivers/message/fusion/mptctl.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
--- a/drivers/message/fusion/mptctl.c
+++ b/drivers/message/fusion/mptctl.c
@@ -2698,6 +2698,8 @@ mptctl_hp_targetinfo(unsigned long arg)
__FILE__, __LINE__, iocnum);
return -ENODEV;
}
+ if (karg.hdr.id >= MPT_MAX_FC_DEVICES)
+ return -EINVAL;
dctlprintk(ioc, printk(MYIOC_s_DEBUG_FMT "mptctl_hp_targetinfo called.\n",
ioc->name));
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 66+ messages in thread* [PATCH 3.16 20/61] scsi: mptfusion: Fix double fetch bug in ioctl
2020-06-09 18:03 [PATCH 3.16 00/61] 3.16.85-rc1 review Ben Hutchings
` (18 preceding siblings ...)
2020-06-09 18:04 ` [PATCH 3.16 19/61] scsi: mptfusion: Add bounds check in mptctl_hp_targetinfo() Ben Hutchings
@ 2020-06-09 18:04 ` Ben Hutchings
2020-06-09 18:04 ` [PATCH 3.16 21/61] mwifiex: Fix possible buffer overflows in mwifiex_cmd_append_vsie_tlv() Ben Hutchings
` (41 subsequent siblings)
61 siblings, 0 replies; 66+ messages in thread
From: Ben Hutchings @ 2020-06-09 18:04 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel, stable
Cc: akpm, Denis Kirjanov, Dan Carpenter, Martin K. Petersen,
Greg Kroah-Hartman, Tom Hatskevich
3.16.85-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
commit 28d76df18f0ad5bcf5fa48510b225f0ed262a99b upstream.
Tom Hatskevich reported that we look up "iocp" then, in the called
functions we do a second copy_from_user() and look it up again.
The problem that could cause is:
drivers/message/fusion/mptctl.c
674 /* All of these commands require an interrupt or
675 * are unknown/illegal.
676 */
677 if ((ret = mptctl_syscall_down(iocp, nonblock)) != 0)
^^^^
We take this lock.
678 return ret;
679
680 if (cmd == MPTFWDOWNLOAD)
681 ret = mptctl_fw_download(arg);
^^^
Then the user memory changes and we look up "iocp" again but a different
one so now we are holding the incorrect lock and have a race condition.
682 else if (cmd == MPTCOMMAND)
683 ret = mptctl_mpt_command(arg);
The security impact of this bug is not as bad as it could have been
because these operations are all privileged and root already has
enormous destructive power. But it's still worth fixing.
This patch passes the "iocp" pointer to the functions to avoid the
second lookup. That deletes 100 lines of code from the driver so
it's a nice clean up as well.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200114123414.GA7957@kadam
Reported-by: Tom Hatskevich <tom2001tom.23@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
---
drivers/message/fusion/mptctl.c | 213 ++++++++------------------------
1 file changed, 50 insertions(+), 163 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/message/fusion/mptctl.c
+++ b/drivers/message/fusion/mptctl.c
@@ -100,19 +100,19 @@ struct buflist {
* Function prototypes. Called from OS entry point mptctl_ioctl.
* arg contents specific to function.
*/
-static int mptctl_fw_download(unsigned long arg);
-static int mptctl_getiocinfo(unsigned long arg, unsigned int cmd);
-static int mptctl_gettargetinfo(unsigned long arg);
-static int mptctl_readtest(unsigned long arg);
-static int mptctl_mpt_command(unsigned long arg);
-static int mptctl_eventquery(unsigned long arg);
-static int mptctl_eventenable(unsigned long arg);
-static int mptctl_eventreport(unsigned long arg);
-static int mptctl_replace_fw(unsigned long arg);
-
-static int mptctl_do_reset(unsigned long arg);
-static int mptctl_hp_hostinfo(unsigned long arg, unsigned int cmd);
-static int mptctl_hp_targetinfo(unsigned long arg);
+static int mptctl_fw_download(MPT_ADAPTER *iocp, unsigned long arg);
+static int mptctl_getiocinfo(MPT_ADAPTER *iocp, unsigned long arg, unsigned int cmd);
+static int mptctl_gettargetinfo(MPT_ADAPTER *iocp, unsigned long arg);
+static int mptctl_readtest(MPT_ADAPTER *iocp, unsigned long arg);
+static int mptctl_mpt_command(MPT_ADAPTER *iocp, unsigned long arg);
+static int mptctl_eventquery(MPT_ADAPTER *iocp, unsigned long arg);
+static int mptctl_eventenable(MPT_ADAPTER *iocp, unsigned long arg);
+static int mptctl_eventreport(MPT_ADAPTER *iocp, unsigned long arg);
+static int mptctl_replace_fw(MPT_ADAPTER *iocp, unsigned long arg);
+
+static int mptctl_do_reset(MPT_ADAPTER *iocp, unsigned long arg);
+static int mptctl_hp_hostinfo(MPT_ADAPTER *iocp, unsigned long arg, unsigned int cmd);
+static int mptctl_hp_targetinfo(MPT_ADAPTER *iocp, unsigned long arg);
static int mptctl_probe(struct pci_dev *, const struct pci_device_id *);
static void mptctl_remove(struct pci_dev *);
@@ -123,8 +123,8 @@ static long compat_mpctl_ioctl(struct fi
/*
* Private function calls.
*/
-static int mptctl_do_mpt_command(struct mpt_ioctl_command karg, void __user *mfPtr);
-static int mptctl_do_fw_download(int ioc, char __user *ufwbuf, size_t fwlen);
+static int mptctl_do_mpt_command(MPT_ADAPTER *iocp, struct mpt_ioctl_command karg, void __user *mfPtr);
+static int mptctl_do_fw_download(MPT_ADAPTER *iocp, char __user *ufwbuf, size_t fwlen);
static MptSge_t *kbuf_alloc_2_sgl(int bytes, u32 dir, int sge_offset, int *frags,
struct buflist **blp, dma_addr_t *sglbuf_dma, MPT_ADAPTER *ioc);
static void kfree_sgl(MptSge_t *sgl, dma_addr_t sgl_dma,
@@ -656,19 +656,19 @@ __mptctl_ioctl(struct file *file, unsign
* by TM and FW reloads.
*/
if ((cmd & ~IOCSIZE_MASK) == (MPTIOCINFO & ~IOCSIZE_MASK)) {
- return mptctl_getiocinfo(arg, _IOC_SIZE(cmd));
+ return mptctl_getiocinfo(iocp, arg, _IOC_SIZE(cmd));
} else if (cmd == MPTTARGETINFO) {
- return mptctl_gettargetinfo(arg);
+ return mptctl_gettargetinfo(iocp, arg);
} else if (cmd == MPTTEST) {
- return mptctl_readtest(arg);
+ return mptctl_readtest(iocp, arg);
} else if (cmd == MPTEVENTQUERY) {
- return mptctl_eventquery(arg);
+ return mptctl_eventquery(iocp, arg);
} else if (cmd == MPTEVENTENABLE) {
- return mptctl_eventenable(arg);
+ return mptctl_eventenable(iocp, arg);
} else if (cmd == MPTEVENTREPORT) {
- return mptctl_eventreport(arg);
+ return mptctl_eventreport(iocp, arg);
} else if (cmd == MPTFWREPLACE) {
- return mptctl_replace_fw(arg);
+ return mptctl_replace_fw(iocp, arg);
}
/* All of these commands require an interrupt or
@@ -678,15 +678,15 @@ __mptctl_ioctl(struct file *file, unsign
return ret;
if (cmd == MPTFWDOWNLOAD)
- ret = mptctl_fw_download(arg);
+ ret = mptctl_fw_download(iocp, arg);
else if (cmd == MPTCOMMAND)
- ret = mptctl_mpt_command(arg);
+ ret = mptctl_mpt_command(iocp, arg);
else if (cmd == MPTHARDRESET)
- ret = mptctl_do_reset(arg);
+ ret = mptctl_do_reset(iocp, arg);
else if ((cmd & ~IOCSIZE_MASK) == (HP_GETHOSTINFO & ~IOCSIZE_MASK))
- ret = mptctl_hp_hostinfo(arg, _IOC_SIZE(cmd));
+ ret = mptctl_hp_hostinfo(iocp, arg, _IOC_SIZE(cmd));
else if (cmd == HP_GETTARGETINFO)
- ret = mptctl_hp_targetinfo(arg);
+ ret = mptctl_hp_targetinfo(iocp, arg);
else
ret = -EINVAL;
@@ -705,11 +705,10 @@ mptctl_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned
return ret;
}
-static int mptctl_do_reset(unsigned long arg)
+static int mptctl_do_reset(MPT_ADAPTER *iocp, unsigned long arg)
{
struct mpt_ioctl_diag_reset __user *urinfo = (void __user *) arg;
struct mpt_ioctl_diag_reset krinfo;
- MPT_ADAPTER *iocp;
if (copy_from_user(&krinfo, urinfo, sizeof(struct mpt_ioctl_diag_reset))) {
printk(KERN_ERR MYNAM "%s@%d::mptctl_do_reset - "
@@ -718,12 +717,6 @@ static int mptctl_do_reset(unsigned long
return -EFAULT;
}
- if (mpt_verify_adapter(krinfo.hdr.iocnum, &iocp) < 0) {
- printk(KERN_DEBUG MYNAM "%s@%d::mptctl_do_reset - ioc%d not found!\n",
- __FILE__, __LINE__, krinfo.hdr.iocnum);
- return -ENODEV; /* (-6) No such device or address */
- }
-
dctlprintk(iocp, printk(MYIOC_s_DEBUG_FMT "mptctl_do_reset called.\n",
iocp->name));
@@ -754,7 +747,7 @@ static int mptctl_do_reset(unsigned long
* -ENOMSG if FW upload returned bad status
*/
static int
-mptctl_fw_download(unsigned long arg)
+mptctl_fw_download(MPT_ADAPTER *iocp, unsigned long arg)
{
struct mpt_fw_xfer __user *ufwdl = (void __user *) arg;
struct mpt_fw_xfer kfwdl;
@@ -766,7 +759,7 @@ mptctl_fw_download(unsigned long arg)
return -EFAULT;
}
- return mptctl_do_fw_download(kfwdl.iocnum, kfwdl.bufp, kfwdl.fwlen);
+ return mptctl_do_fw_download(iocp, kfwdl.bufp, kfwdl.fwlen);
}
/*=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=*/
@@ -784,11 +777,10 @@ mptctl_fw_download(unsigned long arg)
* -ENOMSG if FW upload returned bad status
*/
static int
-mptctl_do_fw_download(int ioc, char __user *ufwbuf, size_t fwlen)
+mptctl_do_fw_download(MPT_ADAPTER *iocp, char __user *ufwbuf, size_t fwlen)
{
FWDownload_t *dlmsg;
MPT_FRAME_HDR *mf;
- MPT_ADAPTER *iocp;
FWDownloadTCSGE_t *ptsge;
MptSge_t *sgl, *sgIn;
char *sgOut;
@@ -808,17 +800,10 @@ mptctl_do_fw_download(int ioc, char __us
pFWDownloadReply_t ReplyMsg = NULL;
unsigned long timeleft;
- if (mpt_verify_adapter(ioc, &iocp) < 0) {
- printk(KERN_DEBUG MYNAM "ioctl_fwdl - ioc%d not found!\n",
- ioc);
- return -ENODEV; /* (-6) No such device or address */
- } else {
-
- /* Valid device. Get a message frame and construct the FW download message.
- */
- if ((mf = mpt_get_msg_frame(mptctl_id, iocp)) == NULL)
- return -EAGAIN;
- }
+ /* Valid device. Get a message frame and construct the FW download message.
+ */
+ if ((mf = mpt_get_msg_frame(mptctl_id, iocp)) == NULL)
+ return -EAGAIN;
dctlprintk(iocp, printk(MYIOC_s_DEBUG_FMT
"mptctl_do_fwdl called. mptctl_id = %xh.\n", iocp->name, mptctl_id));
@@ -826,8 +811,6 @@ mptctl_do_fw_download(int ioc, char __us
iocp->name, ufwbuf));
dctlprintk(iocp, printk(MYIOC_s_DEBUG_FMT "DbG: kfwdl.fwlen = %d\n",
iocp->name, (int)fwlen));
- dctlprintk(iocp, printk(MYIOC_s_DEBUG_FMT "DbG: kfwdl.ioc = %04xh\n",
- iocp->name, ioc));
dlmsg = (FWDownload_t*) mf;
ptsge = (FWDownloadTCSGE_t *) &dlmsg->SGL;
@@ -1234,13 +1217,11 @@ kfree_sgl(MptSge_t *sgl, dma_addr_t sgl_
* -ENODEV if no such device/adapter
*/
static int
-mptctl_getiocinfo (unsigned long arg, unsigned int data_size)
+mptctl_getiocinfo (MPT_ADAPTER *ioc, unsigned long arg, unsigned int data_size)
{
struct mpt_ioctl_iocinfo __user *uarg = (void __user *) arg;
struct mpt_ioctl_iocinfo *karg;
- MPT_ADAPTER *ioc;
struct pci_dev *pdev;
- int iocnum;
unsigned int port;
int cim_rev;
struct scsi_device *sdev;
@@ -1276,14 +1257,6 @@ mptctl_getiocinfo (unsigned long arg, un
return -EFAULT;
}
- if (((iocnum = mpt_verify_adapter(karg->hdr.iocnum, &ioc)) < 0) ||
- (ioc == NULL)) {
- printk(KERN_DEBUG MYNAM "%s::mptctl_getiocinfo() @%d - ioc%d not found!\n",
- __FILE__, __LINE__, iocnum);
- kfree(karg);
- return -ENODEV;
- }
-
/* Verify the data transfer size is correct. */
if (karg->hdr.maxDataSize != data_size) {
printk(MYIOC_s_ERR_FMT "%s@%d::mptctl_getiocinfo - "
@@ -1389,15 +1362,13 @@ mptctl_getiocinfo (unsigned long arg, un
* -ENODEV if no such device/adapter
*/
static int
-mptctl_gettargetinfo (unsigned long arg)
+mptctl_gettargetinfo (MPT_ADAPTER *ioc, unsigned long arg)
{
struct mpt_ioctl_targetinfo __user *uarg = (void __user *) arg;
struct mpt_ioctl_targetinfo karg;
- MPT_ADAPTER *ioc;
VirtDevice *vdevice;
char *pmem;
int *pdata;
- int iocnum;
int numDevices = 0;
int lun;
int maxWordsLeft;
@@ -1412,13 +1383,6 @@ mptctl_gettargetinfo (unsigned long arg)
return -EFAULT;
}
- if (((iocnum = mpt_verify_adapter(karg.hdr.iocnum, &ioc)) < 0) ||
- (ioc == NULL)) {
- printk(KERN_DEBUG MYNAM "%s::mptctl_gettargetinfo() @%d - ioc%d not found!\n",
- __FILE__, __LINE__, iocnum);
- return -ENODEV;
- }
-
dctlprintk(ioc, printk(MYIOC_s_DEBUG_FMT "mptctl_gettargetinfo called.\n",
ioc->name));
/* Get the port number and set the maximum number of bytes
@@ -1514,12 +1478,10 @@ mptctl_gettargetinfo (unsigned long arg)
* -ENODEV if no such device/adapter
*/
static int
-mptctl_readtest (unsigned long arg)
+mptctl_readtest (MPT_ADAPTER *ioc, unsigned long arg)
{
struct mpt_ioctl_test __user *uarg = (void __user *) arg;
struct mpt_ioctl_test karg;
- MPT_ADAPTER *ioc;
- int iocnum;
if (copy_from_user(&karg, uarg, sizeof(struct mpt_ioctl_test))) {
printk(KERN_ERR MYNAM "%s@%d::mptctl_readtest - "
@@ -1528,13 +1490,6 @@ mptctl_readtest (unsigned long arg)
return -EFAULT;
}
- if (((iocnum = mpt_verify_adapter(karg.hdr.iocnum, &ioc)) < 0) ||
- (ioc == NULL)) {
- printk(KERN_DEBUG MYNAM "%s::mptctl_readtest() @%d - ioc%d not found!\n",
- __FILE__, __LINE__, iocnum);
- return -ENODEV;
- }
-
dctlprintk(ioc, printk(MYIOC_s_DEBUG_FMT "mptctl_readtest called.\n",
ioc->name));
/* Fill in the data and return the structure to the calling
@@ -1575,12 +1530,10 @@ mptctl_readtest (unsigned long arg)
* -ENODEV if no such device/adapter
*/
static int
-mptctl_eventquery (unsigned long arg)
+mptctl_eventquery (MPT_ADAPTER *ioc, unsigned long arg)
{
struct mpt_ioctl_eventquery __user *uarg = (void __user *) arg;
struct mpt_ioctl_eventquery karg;
- MPT_ADAPTER *ioc;
- int iocnum;
if (copy_from_user(&karg, uarg, sizeof(struct mpt_ioctl_eventquery))) {
printk(KERN_ERR MYNAM "%s@%d::mptctl_eventquery - "
@@ -1589,13 +1542,6 @@ mptctl_eventquery (unsigned long arg)
return -EFAULT;
}
- if (((iocnum = mpt_verify_adapter(karg.hdr.iocnum, &ioc)) < 0) ||
- (ioc == NULL)) {
- printk(KERN_DEBUG MYNAM "%s::mptctl_eventquery() @%d - ioc%d not found!\n",
- __FILE__, __LINE__, iocnum);
- return -ENODEV;
- }
-
dctlprintk(ioc, printk(MYIOC_s_DEBUG_FMT "mptctl_eventquery called.\n",
ioc->name));
karg.eventEntries = MPTCTL_EVENT_LOG_SIZE;
@@ -1614,12 +1560,10 @@ mptctl_eventquery (unsigned long arg)
/*=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=*/
static int
-mptctl_eventenable (unsigned long arg)
+mptctl_eventenable (MPT_ADAPTER *ioc, unsigned long arg)
{
struct mpt_ioctl_eventenable __user *uarg = (void __user *) arg;
struct mpt_ioctl_eventenable karg;
- MPT_ADAPTER *ioc;
- int iocnum;
if (copy_from_user(&karg, uarg, sizeof(struct mpt_ioctl_eventenable))) {
printk(KERN_ERR MYNAM "%s@%d::mptctl_eventenable - "
@@ -1628,13 +1572,6 @@ mptctl_eventenable (unsigned long arg)
return -EFAULT;
}
- if (((iocnum = mpt_verify_adapter(karg.hdr.iocnum, &ioc)) < 0) ||
- (ioc == NULL)) {
- printk(KERN_DEBUG MYNAM "%s::mptctl_eventenable() @%d - ioc%d not found!\n",
- __FILE__, __LINE__, iocnum);
- return -ENODEV;
- }
-
dctlprintk(ioc, printk(MYIOC_s_DEBUG_FMT "mptctl_eventenable called.\n",
ioc->name));
if (ioc->events == NULL) {
@@ -1662,12 +1599,10 @@ mptctl_eventenable (unsigned long arg)
/*=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=*/
static int
-mptctl_eventreport (unsigned long arg)
+mptctl_eventreport (MPT_ADAPTER *ioc, unsigned long arg)
{
struct mpt_ioctl_eventreport __user *uarg = (void __user *) arg;
struct mpt_ioctl_eventreport karg;
- MPT_ADAPTER *ioc;
- int iocnum;
int numBytes, maxEvents, max;
if (copy_from_user(&karg, uarg, sizeof(struct mpt_ioctl_eventreport))) {
@@ -1677,12 +1612,6 @@ mptctl_eventreport (unsigned long arg)
return -EFAULT;
}
- if (((iocnum = mpt_verify_adapter(karg.hdr.iocnum, &ioc)) < 0) ||
- (ioc == NULL)) {
- printk(KERN_DEBUG MYNAM "%s::mptctl_eventreport() @%d - ioc%d not found!\n",
- __FILE__, __LINE__, iocnum);
- return -ENODEV;
- }
dctlprintk(ioc, printk(MYIOC_s_DEBUG_FMT "mptctl_eventreport called.\n",
ioc->name));
@@ -1716,12 +1645,10 @@ mptctl_eventreport (unsigned long arg)
/*=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=*/
static int
-mptctl_replace_fw (unsigned long arg)
+mptctl_replace_fw (MPT_ADAPTER *ioc, unsigned long arg)
{
struct mpt_ioctl_replace_fw __user *uarg = (void __user *) arg;
struct mpt_ioctl_replace_fw karg;
- MPT_ADAPTER *ioc;
- int iocnum;
int newFwSize;
if (copy_from_user(&karg, uarg, sizeof(struct mpt_ioctl_replace_fw))) {
@@ -1731,13 +1658,6 @@ mptctl_replace_fw (unsigned long arg)
return -EFAULT;
}
- if (((iocnum = mpt_verify_adapter(karg.hdr.iocnum, &ioc)) < 0) ||
- (ioc == NULL)) {
- printk(KERN_DEBUG MYNAM "%s::mptctl_replace_fw() @%d - ioc%d not found!\n",
- __FILE__, __LINE__, iocnum);
- return -ENODEV;
- }
-
dctlprintk(ioc, printk(MYIOC_s_DEBUG_FMT "mptctl_replace_fw called.\n",
ioc->name));
/* If caching FW, Free the old FW image
@@ -1789,12 +1709,10 @@ mptctl_replace_fw (unsigned long arg)
* -ENOMEM if memory allocation error
*/
static int
-mptctl_mpt_command (unsigned long arg)
+mptctl_mpt_command (MPT_ADAPTER *ioc, unsigned long arg)
{
struct mpt_ioctl_command __user *uarg = (void __user *) arg;
struct mpt_ioctl_command karg;
- MPT_ADAPTER *ioc;
- int iocnum;
int rc;
@@ -1805,14 +1723,7 @@ mptctl_mpt_command (unsigned long arg)
return -EFAULT;
}
- if (((iocnum = mpt_verify_adapter(karg.hdr.iocnum, &ioc)) < 0) ||
- (ioc == NULL)) {
- printk(KERN_DEBUG MYNAM "%s::mptctl_mpt_command() @%d - ioc%d not found!\n",
- __FILE__, __LINE__, iocnum);
- return -ENODEV;
- }
-
- rc = mptctl_do_mpt_command (karg, &uarg->MF);
+ rc = mptctl_do_mpt_command (ioc, karg, &uarg->MF);
return rc;
}
@@ -1830,9 +1741,8 @@ mptctl_mpt_command (unsigned long arg)
* -EPERM if SCSI I/O and target is untagged
*/
static int
-mptctl_do_mpt_command (struct mpt_ioctl_command karg, void __user *mfPtr)
+mptctl_do_mpt_command (MPT_ADAPTER *ioc, struct mpt_ioctl_command karg, void __user *mfPtr)
{
- MPT_ADAPTER *ioc;
MPT_FRAME_HDR *mf = NULL;
MPIHeader_t *hdr;
char *psge;
@@ -1841,7 +1751,7 @@ mptctl_do_mpt_command (struct mpt_ioctl_
dma_addr_t dma_addr_in;
dma_addr_t dma_addr_out;
int sgSize = 0; /* Num SG elements */
- int iocnum, flagsLength;
+ int flagsLength;
int sz, rc = 0;
int msgContext;
u16 req_idx;
@@ -1856,13 +1766,6 @@ mptctl_do_mpt_command (struct mpt_ioctl_
bufIn.kptr = bufOut.kptr = NULL;
bufIn.len = bufOut.len = 0;
- if (((iocnum = mpt_verify_adapter(karg.hdr.iocnum, &ioc)) < 0) ||
- (ioc == NULL)) {
- printk(KERN_DEBUG MYNAM "%s::mptctl_do_mpt_command() @%d - ioc%d not found!\n",
- __FILE__, __LINE__, iocnum);
- return -ENODEV;
- }
-
spin_lock_irqsave(&ioc->taskmgmt_lock, flags);
if (ioc->ioc_reset_in_progress) {
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&ioc->taskmgmt_lock, flags);
@@ -2418,17 +2321,15 @@ done_free_mem:
* -ENOMEM if memory allocation error
*/
static int
-mptctl_hp_hostinfo(unsigned long arg, unsigned int data_size)
+mptctl_hp_hostinfo(MPT_ADAPTER *ioc, unsigned long arg, unsigned int data_size)
{
hp_host_info_t __user *uarg = (void __user *) arg;
- MPT_ADAPTER *ioc;
struct pci_dev *pdev;
char *pbuf=NULL;
dma_addr_t buf_dma;
hp_host_info_t karg;
CONFIGPARMS cfg;
ConfigPageHeader_t hdr;
- int iocnum;
int rc, cim_rev;
ToolboxIstwiReadWriteRequest_t *IstwiRWRequest;
MPT_FRAME_HDR *mf = NULL;
@@ -2452,12 +2353,6 @@ mptctl_hp_hostinfo(unsigned long arg, un
return -EFAULT;
}
- if (((iocnum = mpt_verify_adapter(karg.hdr.iocnum, &ioc)) < 0) ||
- (ioc == NULL)) {
- printk(KERN_DEBUG MYNAM "%s::mptctl_hp_hostinfo() @%d - ioc%d not found!\n",
- __FILE__, __LINE__, iocnum);
- return -ENODEV;
- }
dctlprintk(ioc, printk(MYIOC_s_DEBUG_FMT ": mptctl_hp_hostinfo called.\n",
ioc->name));
@@ -2670,15 +2565,13 @@ retry_wait:
* -ENOMEM if memory allocation error
*/
static int
-mptctl_hp_targetinfo(unsigned long arg)
+mptctl_hp_targetinfo(MPT_ADAPTER *ioc, unsigned long arg)
{
hp_target_info_t __user *uarg = (void __user *) arg;
SCSIDevicePage0_t *pg0_alloc;
SCSIDevicePage3_t *pg3_alloc;
- MPT_ADAPTER *ioc;
MPT_SCSI_HOST *hd = NULL;
hp_target_info_t karg;
- int iocnum;
int data_sz;
dma_addr_t page_dma;
CONFIGPARMS cfg;
@@ -2692,12 +2585,6 @@ mptctl_hp_targetinfo(unsigned long arg)
return -EFAULT;
}
- if (((iocnum = mpt_verify_adapter(karg.hdr.iocnum, &ioc)) < 0) ||
- (ioc == NULL)) {
- printk(KERN_DEBUG MYNAM "%s::mptctl_hp_targetinfo() @%d - ioc%d not found!\n",
- __FILE__, __LINE__, iocnum);
- return -ENODEV;
- }
if (karg.hdr.id >= MPT_MAX_FC_DEVICES)
return -EINVAL;
dctlprintk(ioc, printk(MYIOC_s_DEBUG_FMT "mptctl_hp_targetinfo called.\n",
@@ -2865,7 +2752,7 @@ compat_mptfwxfer_ioctl(struct file *filp
kfw.fwlen = kfw32.fwlen;
kfw.bufp = compat_ptr(kfw32.bufp);
- ret = mptctl_do_fw_download(kfw.iocnum, kfw.bufp, kfw.fwlen);
+ ret = mptctl_do_fw_download(iocp, kfw.bufp, kfw.fwlen);
mutex_unlock(&iocp->ioctl_cmds.mutex);
@@ -2919,7 +2806,7 @@ compat_mpt_command(struct file *filp, un
/* Pass new structure to do_mpt_command
*/
- ret = mptctl_do_mpt_command (karg, &uarg->MF);
+ ret = mptctl_do_mpt_command (iocp, karg, &uarg->MF);
mutex_unlock(&iocp->ioctl_cmds.mutex);
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 66+ messages in thread* [PATCH 3.16 21/61] mwifiex: Fix possible buffer overflows in mwifiex_cmd_append_vsie_tlv()
2020-06-09 18:03 [PATCH 3.16 00/61] 3.16.85-rc1 review Ben Hutchings
` (19 preceding siblings ...)
2020-06-09 18:04 ` [PATCH 3.16 20/61] scsi: mptfusion: Fix double fetch bug in ioctl Ben Hutchings
@ 2020-06-09 18:04 ` Ben Hutchings
2020-06-09 18:04 ` [PATCH 3.16 22/61] mwifiex: Fix possible buffer overflows in mwifiex_ret_wmm_get_status() Ben Hutchings
` (40 subsequent siblings)
61 siblings, 0 replies; 66+ messages in thread
From: Ben Hutchings @ 2020-06-09 18:04 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel, stable; +Cc: akpm, Denis Kirjanov, Kalle Valo, Qing Xu
3.16.85-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Qing Xu <m1s5p6688@gmail.com>
commit b70261a288ea4d2f4ac7cd04be08a9f0f2de4f4d upstream.
mwifiex_cmd_append_vsie_tlv() calls memcpy() without checking
the destination size may trigger a buffer overflower,
which a local user could use to cause denial of service
or the execution of arbitrary code.
Fix it by putting the length check before calling memcpy().
Signed-off-by: Qing Xu <m1s5p6688@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16:
- Use dev_info() instead of mwifiex_dbg()
- Adjust filename]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
---
drivers/net/wireless/mwifiex/scan.c | 7 +++++++
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
--- a/drivers/net/wireless/mwifiex/scan.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/mwifiex/scan.c
@@ -2267,6 +2267,13 @@ mwifiex_cmd_append_vsie_tlv(struct mwifi
vs_param_set->header.len =
cpu_to_le16((((u16) priv->vs_ie[id].ie[1])
& 0x00FF) + 2);
+ if (le16_to_cpu(vs_param_set->header.len) >
+ MWIFIEX_MAX_VSIE_LEN) {
+ dev_info(priv->adapter->dev,
+ "Invalid param length!\n");
+ break;
+ }
+
memcpy(vs_param_set->ie, priv->vs_ie[id].ie,
le16_to_cpu(vs_param_set->header.len));
*buffer += le16_to_cpu(vs_param_set->header.len) +
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 66+ messages in thread* [PATCH 3.16 22/61] mwifiex: Fix possible buffer overflows in mwifiex_ret_wmm_get_status()
2020-06-09 18:03 [PATCH 3.16 00/61] 3.16.85-rc1 review Ben Hutchings
` (20 preceding siblings ...)
2020-06-09 18:04 ` [PATCH 3.16 21/61] mwifiex: Fix possible buffer overflows in mwifiex_cmd_append_vsie_tlv() Ben Hutchings
@ 2020-06-09 18:04 ` Ben Hutchings
2020-06-09 18:04 ` [PATCH 3.16 23/61] sg: O_EXCL and other lock handling Ben Hutchings
` (39 subsequent siblings)
61 siblings, 0 replies; 66+ messages in thread
From: Ben Hutchings @ 2020-06-09 18:04 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel, stable; +Cc: akpm, Denis Kirjanov, Kalle Valo, Qing Xu
3.16.85-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Qing Xu <m1s5p6688@gmail.com>
commit 3a9b153c5591548612c3955c9600a98150c81875 upstream.
mwifiex_ret_wmm_get_status() calls memcpy() without checking the
destination size.Since the source is given from remote AP which
contains illegal wmm elements , this may trigger a heap buffer
overflow.
Fix it by putting the length check before calling memcpy().
Signed-off-by: Qing Xu <m1s5p6688@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust filename]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
---
drivers/net/wireless/mwifiex/wmm.c | 4 ++++
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
--- a/drivers/net/wireless/mwifiex/wmm.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/mwifiex/wmm.c
@@ -791,6 +791,10 @@ int mwifiex_ret_wmm_get_status(struct mw
wmm_param_ie->qos_info_bitmap &
IEEE80211_WMM_IE_AP_QOSINFO_PARAM_SET_CNT_MASK);
+ if (wmm_param_ie->vend_hdr.len + 2 >
+ sizeof(struct ieee_types_wmm_parameter))
+ break;
+
memcpy((u8 *) &priv->curr_bss_params.bss_descriptor.
wmm_ie, wmm_param_ie,
wmm_param_ie->vend_hdr.len + 2);
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 66+ messages in thread* [PATCH 3.16 23/61] sg: O_EXCL and other lock handling
2020-06-09 18:03 [PATCH 3.16 00/61] 3.16.85-rc1 review Ben Hutchings
` (21 preceding siblings ...)
2020-06-09 18:04 ` [PATCH 3.16 22/61] mwifiex: Fix possible buffer overflows in mwifiex_ret_wmm_get_status() Ben Hutchings
@ 2020-06-09 18:04 ` Ben Hutchings
2020-06-09 18:04 ` [PATCH 3.16 24/61] sg: prevent integer overflow when converting from sectors to bytes Ben Hutchings
` (38 subsequent siblings)
61 siblings, 0 replies; 66+ messages in thread
From: Ben Hutchings @ 2020-06-09 18:04 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel, stable
Cc: akpm, Denis Kirjanov, Douglas Gilbert, Hannes Reinecke
3.16.85-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Douglas Gilbert <dgilbert@interlog.com>
commit cc833acbee9db5ca8c6162b015b4c93863c6f821 upstream.
This addresses a problem reported by Vaughan Cao concerning
the correctness of the O_EXCL logic in the sg driver. POSIX
doesn't defined O_EXCL semantics on devices but "allow only
one open file descriptor at a time per sg device" is a rough
definition. The sg driver's semantics have been to wait
on an open() when O_NONBLOCK is not given and there are
O_EXCL headwinds. Nasty things can happen during that wait
such as the device being detached (removed). So multiple
locks are reworked in this patch making it large and hard
to break down into digestible bits.
This patch is against Linus's current git repository which
doesn't include any sg patches sent in the last few weeks.
Hence this patch touches as little as possible that it
doesn't need to and strips out most SCSI_LOG_TIMEOUT()
changes in v3 because Hannes said he was going to rework all
that stuff.
The sg3_utils package has several test programs written to
test this patch. See examples/sg_tst_excl*.cpp .
Not all the locks and flags in sg have been re-worked in
this patch, notably sg_request::done . That can wait for
a follow-up patch if this one meets with approval.
Signed-off-by: Douglas Gilbert <dgilbert@interlog.com>
Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
---
drivers/scsi/sg.c | 424 +++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------------
1 file changed, 230 insertions(+), 194 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/scsi/sg.c
+++ b/drivers/scsi/sg.c
@@ -51,6 +51,7 @@ static int sg_version_num = 30534; /* 2
#include <linux/delay.h>
#include <linux/blktrace_api.h>
#include <linux/mutex.h>
+#include <linux/atomic.h>
#include <linux/ratelimit.h>
#include <linux/cred.h> /* for sg_check_file_access() */
@@ -103,18 +104,16 @@ static int scatter_elem_sz_prev = SG_SCA
#define SG_SECTOR_SZ 512
-static int sg_add(struct device *, struct class_interface *);
-static void sg_remove(struct device *, struct class_interface *);
-
-static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(sg_open_exclusive_lock);
+static int sg_add_device(struct device *, struct class_interface *);
+static void sg_remove_device(struct device *, struct class_interface *);
static DEFINE_IDR(sg_index_idr);
static DEFINE_RWLOCK(sg_index_lock); /* Also used to lock
file descriptor list for device */
static struct class_interface sg_interface = {
- .add_dev = sg_add,
- .remove_dev = sg_remove,
+ .add_dev = sg_add_device,
+ .remove_dev = sg_remove_device,
};
typedef struct sg_scatter_hold { /* holding area for scsi scatter gather info */
@@ -147,8 +146,7 @@ typedef struct sg_request { /* SG_MAX_QU
} Sg_request;
typedef struct sg_fd { /* holds the state of a file descriptor */
- /* sfd_siblings is protected by sg_index_lock */
- struct list_head sfd_siblings;
+ struct list_head sfd_siblings; /* protected by device's sfd_lock */
struct sg_device *parentdp; /* owning device */
wait_queue_head_t read_wait; /* queue read until command done */
rwlock_t rq_list_lock; /* protect access to list in req_arr */
@@ -171,14 +169,15 @@ typedef struct sg_fd { /* holds the sta
typedef struct sg_device { /* holds the state of each scsi generic device */
struct scsi_device *device;
- wait_queue_head_t o_excl_wait; /* queue open() when O_EXCL in use */
+ wait_queue_head_t open_wait; /* queue open() when O_EXCL present */
+ struct mutex open_rel_lock; /* held when in open() or release() */
int sg_tablesize; /* adapter's max scatter-gather table size */
u32 index; /* device index number */
- /* sfds is protected by sg_index_lock */
struct list_head sfds;
- volatile char detached; /* 0->attached, 1->detached pending removal */
- /* exclude protected by sg_open_exclusive_lock */
- char exclude; /* opened for exclusive access */
+ rwlock_t sfd_lock; /* protect access to sfd list */
+ atomic_t detaching; /* 0->device usable, 1->device detaching */
+ bool exclude; /* 1->open(O_EXCL) succeeded and is active */
+ int open_cnt; /* count of opens (perhaps < num(sfds) ) */
char sgdebug; /* 0->off, 1->sense, 9->dump dev, 10-> all devs */
struct gendisk *disk;
struct cdev * cdev; /* char_dev [sysfs: /sys/cdev/major/sg<n>] */
@@ -209,7 +208,7 @@ static Sg_request *sg_add_request(Sg_fd
static int sg_remove_request(Sg_fd * sfp, Sg_request * srp);
static int sg_res_in_use(Sg_fd * sfp);
static Sg_device *sg_get_dev(int dev);
-static void sg_put_dev(Sg_device *sdp);
+static void sg_device_destroy(struct kref *kref);
#define SZ_SG_HEADER sizeof(struct sg_header)
#define SZ_SG_IO_HDR sizeof(sg_io_hdr_t)
@@ -253,38 +252,43 @@ static int sg_allow_access(struct file *
return blk_verify_command(cmd, filp->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE);
}
-static int get_exclude(Sg_device *sdp)
-{
- unsigned long flags;
- int ret;
-
- spin_lock_irqsave(&sg_open_exclusive_lock, flags);
- ret = sdp->exclude;
- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&sg_open_exclusive_lock, flags);
- return ret;
-}
-
-static int set_exclude(Sg_device *sdp, char val)
+static int
+open_wait(Sg_device *sdp, int flags)
{
- unsigned long flags;
-
- spin_lock_irqsave(&sg_open_exclusive_lock, flags);
- sdp->exclude = val;
- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&sg_open_exclusive_lock, flags);
- return val;
-}
+ int retval = 0;
-static int sfds_list_empty(Sg_device *sdp)
-{
- unsigned long flags;
- int ret;
+ if (flags & O_EXCL) {
+ while (sdp->open_cnt > 0) {
+ mutex_unlock(&sdp->open_rel_lock);
+ retval = wait_event_interruptible(sdp->open_wait,
+ (atomic_read(&sdp->detaching) ||
+ !sdp->open_cnt));
+ mutex_lock(&sdp->open_rel_lock);
+
+ if (retval) /* -ERESTARTSYS */
+ return retval;
+ if (atomic_read(&sdp->detaching))
+ return -ENODEV;
+ }
+ } else {
+ while (sdp->exclude) {
+ mutex_unlock(&sdp->open_rel_lock);
+ retval = wait_event_interruptible(sdp->open_wait,
+ (atomic_read(&sdp->detaching) ||
+ !sdp->exclude));
+ mutex_lock(&sdp->open_rel_lock);
+
+ if (retval) /* -ERESTARTSYS */
+ return retval;
+ if (atomic_read(&sdp->detaching))
+ return -ENODEV;
+ }
+ }
- read_lock_irqsave(&sg_index_lock, flags);
- ret = list_empty(&sdp->sfds);
- read_unlock_irqrestore(&sg_index_lock, flags);
- return ret;
+ return retval;
}
+/* Returns 0 on success, else a negated errno value */
static int
sg_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
{
@@ -293,17 +297,15 @@ sg_open(struct inode *inode, struct file
struct request_queue *q;
Sg_device *sdp;
Sg_fd *sfp;
- int res;
int retval;
nonseekable_open(inode, filp);
SCSI_LOG_TIMEOUT(3, printk("sg_open: dev=%d, flags=0x%x\n", dev, flags));
+ if ((flags & O_EXCL) && (O_RDONLY == (flags & O_ACCMODE)))
+ return -EPERM; /* Can't lock it with read only access */
sdp = sg_get_dev(dev);
- if (IS_ERR(sdp)) {
- retval = PTR_ERR(sdp);
- sdp = NULL;
- goto sg_put;
- }
+ if (IS_ERR(sdp))
+ return PTR_ERR(sdp);
/* This driver's module count bumped by fops_get in <linux/fs.h> */
/* Prevent the device driver from vanishing while we sleep */
@@ -315,6 +317,9 @@ sg_open(struct inode *inode, struct file
if (retval)
goto sdp_put;
+ /* scsi_block_when_processing_errors() may block so bypass
+ * check if O_NONBLOCK. Permits SCSI commands to be issued
+ * during error recovery. Tread carefully. */
if (!((flags & O_NONBLOCK) ||
scsi_block_when_processing_errors(sdp->device))) {
retval = -ENXIO;
@@ -322,65 +327,65 @@ sg_open(struct inode *inode, struct file
goto error_out;
}
- if (flags & O_EXCL) {
- if (O_RDONLY == (flags & O_ACCMODE)) {
- retval = -EPERM; /* Can't lock it with read only access */
- goto error_out;
- }
- if (!sfds_list_empty(sdp) && (flags & O_NONBLOCK)) {
- retval = -EBUSY;
- goto error_out;
- }
- res = wait_event_interruptible(sdp->o_excl_wait,
- ((!sfds_list_empty(sdp) || get_exclude(sdp)) ? 0 : set_exclude(sdp, 1)));
- if (res) {
- retval = res; /* -ERESTARTSYS because signal hit process */
- goto error_out;
- }
- } else if (get_exclude(sdp)) { /* some other fd has an exclusive lock on dev */
- if (flags & O_NONBLOCK) {
- retval = -EBUSY;
- goto error_out;
- }
- res = wait_event_interruptible(sdp->o_excl_wait, !get_exclude(sdp));
- if (res) {
- retval = res; /* -ERESTARTSYS because signal hit process */
- goto error_out;
+ mutex_lock(&sdp->open_rel_lock);
+ if (flags & O_NONBLOCK) {
+ if (flags & O_EXCL) {
+ if (sdp->open_cnt > 0) {
+ retval = -EBUSY;
+ goto error_mutex_locked;
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (sdp->exclude) {
+ retval = -EBUSY;
+ goto error_mutex_locked;
+ }
}
+ } else {
+ retval = open_wait(sdp, flags);
+ if (retval) /* -ERESTARTSYS or -ENODEV */
+ goto error_mutex_locked;
}
- if (sdp->detached) {
- retval = -ENODEV;
- goto error_out;
- }
- if (sfds_list_empty(sdp)) { /* no existing opens on this device */
+
+ /* N.B. at this point we are holding the open_rel_lock */
+ if (flags & O_EXCL)
+ sdp->exclude = true;
+
+ if (sdp->open_cnt < 1) { /* no existing opens */
sdp->sgdebug = 0;
q = sdp->device->request_queue;
sdp->sg_tablesize = queue_max_segments(q);
}
- if ((sfp = sg_add_sfp(sdp, dev)))
- filp->private_data = sfp;
- else {
- if (flags & O_EXCL) {
- set_exclude(sdp, 0); /* undo if error */
- wake_up_interruptible(&sdp->o_excl_wait);
- }
- retval = -ENOMEM;
- goto error_out;
+ sfp = sg_add_sfp(sdp, dev);
+ if (IS_ERR(sfp)) {
+ retval = PTR_ERR(sfp);
+ goto out_undo;
}
+
+ filp->private_data = sfp;
+ sdp->open_cnt++;
+ mutex_unlock(&sdp->open_rel_lock);
+
retval = 0;
-error_out:
- if (retval) {
- scsi_autopm_put_device(sdp->device);
-sdp_put:
- scsi_device_put(sdp->device);
- }
sg_put:
- if (sdp)
- sg_put_dev(sdp);
+ kref_put(&sdp->d_ref, sg_device_destroy);
return retval;
+
+out_undo:
+ if (flags & O_EXCL) {
+ sdp->exclude = false; /* undo if error */
+ wake_up_interruptible(&sdp->open_wait);
+ }
+error_mutex_locked:
+ mutex_unlock(&sdp->open_rel_lock);
+error_out:
+ scsi_autopm_put_device(sdp->device);
+sdp_put:
+ scsi_device_put(sdp->device);
+ goto sg_put;
}
-/* Following function was formerly called 'sg_close' */
+/* Release resources associated with a successful sg_open()
+ * Returns 0 on success, else a negated errno value */
static int
sg_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
{
@@ -391,11 +396,20 @@ sg_release(struct inode *inode, struct f
return -ENXIO;
SCSI_LOG_TIMEOUT(3, printk("sg_release: %s\n", sdp->disk->disk_name));
- set_exclude(sdp, 0);
- wake_up_interruptible(&sdp->o_excl_wait);
-
+ mutex_lock(&sdp->open_rel_lock);
scsi_autopm_put_device(sdp->device);
kref_put(&sfp->f_ref, sg_remove_sfp);
+ sdp->open_cnt--;
+
+ /* possibly many open()s waiting on exlude clearing, start many;
+ * only open(O_EXCL)s wait on 0==open_cnt so only start one */
+ if (sdp->exclude) {
+ sdp->exclude = false;
+ wake_up_interruptible_all(&sdp->open_wait);
+ } else if (0 == sdp->open_cnt) {
+ wake_up_interruptible(&sdp->open_wait);
+ }
+ mutex_unlock(&sdp->open_rel_lock);
return 0;
}
@@ -455,7 +469,7 @@ sg_read(struct file *filp, char __user *
}
srp = sg_get_rq_mark(sfp, req_pack_id);
if (!srp) { /* now wait on packet to arrive */
- if (sdp->detached) {
+ if (atomic_read(&sdp->detaching)) {
retval = -ENODEV;
goto free_old_hdr;
}
@@ -464,9 +478,9 @@ sg_read(struct file *filp, char __user *
goto free_old_hdr;
}
retval = wait_event_interruptible(sfp->read_wait,
- (sdp->detached ||
+ (atomic_read(&sdp->detaching) ||
(srp = sg_get_rq_mark(sfp, req_pack_id))));
- if (sdp->detached) {
+ if (atomic_read(&sdp->detaching)) {
retval = -ENODEV;
goto free_old_hdr;
}
@@ -613,7 +627,7 @@ sg_write(struct file *filp, const char _
return -ENXIO;
SCSI_LOG_TIMEOUT(3, printk("sg_write: %s, count=%d\n",
sdp->disk->disk_name, (int) count));
- if (sdp->detached)
+ if (atomic_read(&sdp->detaching))
return -ENODEV;
if (!((filp->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK) ||
scsi_block_when_processing_errors(sdp->device)))
@@ -806,7 +820,7 @@ sg_common_write(Sg_fd * sfp, Sg_request
sg_finish_rem_req(srp);
return k; /* probably out of space --> ENOMEM */
}
- if (sdp->detached) {
+ if (atomic_read(&sdp->detaching)) {
if (srp->bio) {
blk_end_request_all(srp->rq, -EIO);
srp->rq = NULL;
@@ -871,7 +885,7 @@ sg_ioctl(struct file *filp, unsigned int
switch (cmd_in) {
case SG_IO:
- if (sdp->detached)
+ if (atomic_read(&sdp->detaching))
return -ENODEV;
if (!scsi_block_when_processing_errors(sdp->device))
return -ENXIO;
@@ -882,8 +896,8 @@ sg_ioctl(struct file *filp, unsigned int
if (result < 0)
return result;
result = wait_event_interruptible(sfp->read_wait,
- (srp_done(sfp, srp) || sdp->detached));
- if (sdp->detached)
+ (srp_done(sfp, srp) || atomic_read(&sdp->detaching)));
+ if (atomic_read(&sdp->detaching))
return -ENODEV;
write_lock_irq(&sfp->rq_list_lock);
if (srp->done) {
@@ -922,7 +936,7 @@ sg_ioctl(struct file *filp, unsigned int
sg_build_reserve(sfp, val);
}
} else {
- if (sdp->detached)
+ if (atomic_read(&sdp->detaching))
return -ENODEV;
sfp->low_dma = sdp->device->host->unchecked_isa_dma;
}
@@ -935,7 +949,7 @@ sg_ioctl(struct file *filp, unsigned int
else {
sg_scsi_id_t __user *sg_idp = p;
- if (sdp->detached)
+ if (atomic_read(&sdp->detaching))
return -ENODEV;
__put_user((int) sdp->device->host->host_no,
&sg_idp->host_no);
@@ -1077,11 +1091,11 @@ sg_ioctl(struct file *filp, unsigned int
return result;
}
case SG_EMULATED_HOST:
- if (sdp->detached)
+ if (atomic_read(&sdp->detaching))
return -ENODEV;
return put_user(sdp->device->host->hostt->emulated, ip);
case SG_SCSI_RESET:
- if (sdp->detached)
+ if (atomic_read(&sdp->detaching))
return -ENODEV;
if (filp->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK) {
if (scsi_host_in_recovery(sdp->device->host))
@@ -1114,7 +1128,7 @@ sg_ioctl(struct file *filp, unsigned int
return (scsi_reset_provider(sdp->device, val) ==
SUCCESS) ? 0 : -EIO;
case SCSI_IOCTL_SEND_COMMAND:
- if (sdp->detached)
+ if (atomic_read(&sdp->detaching))
return -ENODEV;
if (read_only) {
unsigned char opcode = WRITE_6;
@@ -1136,7 +1150,7 @@ sg_ioctl(struct file *filp, unsigned int
case SCSI_IOCTL_GET_BUS_NUMBER:
case SCSI_IOCTL_PROBE_HOST:
case SG_GET_TRANSFORM:
- if (sdp->detached)
+ if (atomic_read(&sdp->detaching))
return -ENODEV;
return scsi_ioctl(sdp->device, cmd_in, p);
case BLKSECTGET:
@@ -1210,7 +1224,7 @@ sg_poll(struct file *filp, poll_table *
}
read_unlock_irqrestore(&sfp->rq_list_lock, iflags);
- if (sdp->detached)
+ if (atomic_read(&sdp->detaching))
res |= POLLHUP;
else if (!sfp->cmd_q) {
if (0 == count)
@@ -1309,7 +1323,8 @@ sg_mmap(struct file *filp, struct vm_are
return 0;
}
-static void sg_rq_end_io_usercontext(struct work_struct *work)
+static void
+sg_rq_end_io_usercontext(struct work_struct *work)
{
struct sg_request *srp = container_of(work, struct sg_request, ew.work);
struct sg_fd *sfp = srp->parentfp;
@@ -1322,7 +1337,8 @@ static void sg_rq_end_io_usercontext(str
* This function is a "bottom half" handler that is called by the mid
* level when a command is completed (or has failed).
*/
-static void sg_rq_end_io(struct request *rq, int uptodate)
+static void
+sg_rq_end_io(struct request *rq, int uptodate)
{
struct sg_request *srp = rq->end_io_data;
Sg_device *sdp;
@@ -1340,8 +1356,8 @@ static void sg_rq_end_io(struct request
return;
sdp = sfp->parentdp;
- if (unlikely(sdp->detached))
- printk(KERN_INFO "sg_rq_end_io: device detached\n");
+ if (unlikely(atomic_read(&sdp->detaching)))
+ pr_info("%s: device detaching\n", __func__);
sense = rq->sense;
result = rq->errors;
@@ -1364,7 +1380,7 @@ static void sg_rq_end_io(struct request
if ((sdp->sgdebug > 0) &&
((CHECK_CONDITION == srp->header.masked_status) ||
(COMMAND_TERMINATED == srp->header.masked_status)))
- __scsi_print_sense("sg_cmd_done", sense,
+ __scsi_print_sense(__func__, sense,
SCSI_SENSE_BUFFERSIZE);
/* Following if statement is a patch supplied by Eric Youngdale */
@@ -1423,7 +1439,8 @@ static struct class *sg_sysfs_class;
static int sg_sysfs_valid = 0;
-static Sg_device *sg_alloc(struct gendisk *disk, struct scsi_device *scsidp)
+static Sg_device *
+sg_alloc(struct gendisk *disk, struct scsi_device *scsidp)
{
struct request_queue *q = scsidp->request_queue;
Sg_device *sdp;
@@ -1433,7 +1450,8 @@ static Sg_device *sg_alloc(struct gendis
sdp = kzalloc(sizeof(Sg_device), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!sdp) {
- printk(KERN_WARNING "kmalloc Sg_device failure\n");
+ sdev_printk(KERN_WARNING, scsidp, "%s: kmalloc Sg_device "
+ "failure\n", __func__);
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
}
@@ -1448,8 +1466,9 @@ static Sg_device *sg_alloc(struct gendis
scsidp->type, SG_MAX_DEVS - 1);
error = -ENODEV;
} else {
- printk(KERN_WARNING
- "idr allocation Sg_device failure: %d\n", error);
+ sdev_printk(KERN_WARNING, scsidp, "%s: idr "
+ "allocation Sg_device failure: %d\n",
+ __func__, error);
}
goto out_unlock;
}
@@ -1460,8 +1479,11 @@ static Sg_device *sg_alloc(struct gendis
disk->first_minor = k;
sdp->disk = disk;
sdp->device = scsidp;
+ mutex_init(&sdp->open_rel_lock);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sdp->sfds);
- init_waitqueue_head(&sdp->o_excl_wait);
+ init_waitqueue_head(&sdp->open_wait);
+ atomic_set(&sdp->detaching, 0);
+ rwlock_init(&sdp->sfd_lock);
sdp->sg_tablesize = queue_max_segments(q);
sdp->index = k;
kref_init(&sdp->d_ref);
@@ -1479,7 +1501,7 @@ out_unlock:
}
static int
-sg_add(struct device *cl_dev, struct class_interface *cl_intf)
+sg_add_device(struct device *cl_dev, struct class_interface *cl_intf)
{
struct scsi_device *scsidp = to_scsi_device(cl_dev->parent);
struct gendisk *disk;
@@ -1490,7 +1512,7 @@ sg_add(struct device *cl_dev, struct cla
disk = alloc_disk(1);
if (!disk) {
- printk(KERN_WARNING "alloc_disk failed\n");
+ pr_warn("%s: alloc_disk failed\n", __func__);
return -ENOMEM;
}
disk->major = SCSI_GENERIC_MAJOR;
@@ -1498,7 +1520,7 @@ sg_add(struct device *cl_dev, struct cla
error = -ENOMEM;
cdev = cdev_alloc();
if (!cdev) {
- printk(KERN_WARNING "cdev_alloc failed\n");
+ pr_warn("%s: cdev_alloc failed\n", __func__);
goto out;
}
cdev->owner = THIS_MODULE;
@@ -1506,7 +1528,7 @@ sg_add(struct device *cl_dev, struct cla
sdp = sg_alloc(disk, scsidp);
if (IS_ERR(sdp)) {
- printk(KERN_WARNING "sg_alloc failed\n");
+ pr_warn("%s: sg_alloc failed\n", __func__);
error = PTR_ERR(sdp);
goto out;
}
@@ -1524,22 +1546,20 @@ sg_add(struct device *cl_dev, struct cla
sdp->index),
sdp, "%s", disk->disk_name);
if (IS_ERR(sg_class_member)) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "sg_add: "
- "device_create failed\n");
+ pr_err("%s: device_create failed\n", __func__);
error = PTR_ERR(sg_class_member);
goto cdev_add_err;
}
error = sysfs_create_link(&scsidp->sdev_gendev.kobj,
&sg_class_member->kobj, "generic");
if (error)
- printk(KERN_ERR "sg_add: unable to make symlink "
- "'generic' back to sg%d\n", sdp->index);
+ pr_err("%s: unable to make symlink 'generic' back "
+ "to sg%d\n", __func__, sdp->index);
} else
- printk(KERN_WARNING "sg_add: sg_sys Invalid\n");
+ pr_warn("%s: sg_sys Invalid\n", __func__);
- sdev_printk(KERN_NOTICE, scsidp,
- "Attached scsi generic sg%d type %d\n", sdp->index,
- scsidp->type);
+ sdev_printk(KERN_NOTICE, scsidp, "Attached scsi generic sg%d "
+ "type %d\n", sdp->index, scsidp->type);
dev_set_drvdata(cl_dev, sdp);
@@ -1558,7 +1578,8 @@ out:
return error;
}
-static void sg_device_destroy(struct kref *kref)
+static void
+sg_device_destroy(struct kref *kref)
{
struct sg_device *sdp = container_of(kref, struct sg_device, d_ref);
unsigned long flags;
@@ -1580,33 +1601,39 @@ static void sg_device_destroy(struct kre
kfree(sdp);
}
-static void sg_remove(struct device *cl_dev, struct class_interface *cl_intf)
+static void
+sg_remove_device(struct device *cl_dev, struct class_interface *cl_intf)
{
struct scsi_device *scsidp = to_scsi_device(cl_dev->parent);
Sg_device *sdp = dev_get_drvdata(cl_dev);
unsigned long iflags;
Sg_fd *sfp;
+ int val;
- if (!sdp || sdp->detached)
+ if (!sdp)
return;
+ /* want sdp->detaching non-zero as soon as possible */
+ val = atomic_inc_return(&sdp->detaching);
+ if (val > 1)
+ return; /* only want to do following once per device */
- SCSI_LOG_TIMEOUT(3, printk("sg_remove: %s\n", sdp->disk->disk_name));
+ SCSI_LOG_TIMEOUT(3, printk("%s: %s\n", __func__,
+ sdp->disk->disk_name));
- /* Need a write lock to set sdp->detached. */
- write_lock_irqsave(&sg_index_lock, iflags);
- sdp->detached = 1;
+ read_lock_irqsave(&sdp->sfd_lock, iflags);
list_for_each_entry(sfp, &sdp->sfds, sfd_siblings) {
- wake_up_interruptible(&sfp->read_wait);
+ wake_up_interruptible_all(&sfp->read_wait);
kill_fasync(&sfp->async_qp, SIGPOLL, POLL_HUP);
}
- write_unlock_irqrestore(&sg_index_lock, iflags);
+ wake_up_interruptible_all(&sdp->open_wait);
+ read_unlock_irqrestore(&sdp->sfd_lock, iflags);
sysfs_remove_link(&scsidp->sdev_gendev.kobj, "generic");
device_destroy(sg_sysfs_class, MKDEV(SCSI_GENERIC_MAJOR, sdp->index));
cdev_del(sdp->cdev);
sdp->cdev = NULL;
- sg_put_dev(sdp);
+ kref_put(&sdp->d_ref, sg_device_destroy);
}
module_param_named(scatter_elem_sz, scatter_elem_sz, int, S_IRUGO | S_IWUSR);
@@ -1676,7 +1703,8 @@ exit_sg(void)
idr_destroy(&sg_index_idr);
}
-static int sg_start_req(Sg_request *srp, unsigned char *cmd)
+static int
+sg_start_req(Sg_request *srp, unsigned char *cmd)
{
int res;
struct request *rq;
@@ -1778,7 +1806,8 @@ static int sg_start_req(Sg_request *srp,
return res;
}
-static int sg_finish_rem_req(Sg_request * srp)
+static int
+sg_finish_rem_req(Sg_request *srp)
{
int ret = 0;
@@ -2115,7 +2144,7 @@ sg_add_sfp(Sg_device * sdp, int dev)
sfp = kzalloc(sizeof(*sfp), GFP_ATOMIC | __GFP_NOWARN);
if (!sfp)
- return NULL;
+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
init_waitqueue_head(&sfp->read_wait);
rwlock_init(&sfp->rq_list_lock);
@@ -2129,9 +2158,13 @@ sg_add_sfp(Sg_device * sdp, int dev)
sfp->cmd_q = SG_DEF_COMMAND_Q;
sfp->keep_orphan = SG_DEF_KEEP_ORPHAN;
sfp->parentdp = sdp;
- write_lock_irqsave(&sg_index_lock, iflags);
+ write_lock_irqsave(&sdp->sfd_lock, iflags);
+ if (atomic_read(&sdp->detaching)) {
+ write_unlock_irqrestore(&sdp->sfd_lock, iflags);
+ return ERR_PTR(-ENODEV);
+ }
list_add_tail(&sfp->sfd_siblings, &sdp->sfds);
- write_unlock_irqrestore(&sg_index_lock, iflags);
+ write_unlock_irqrestore(&sdp->sfd_lock, iflags);
SCSI_LOG_TIMEOUT(3, printk("sg_add_sfp: sfp=0x%p\n", sfp));
if (unlikely(sg_big_buff != def_reserved_size))
sg_big_buff = def_reserved_size;
@@ -2147,7 +2180,8 @@ sg_add_sfp(Sg_device * sdp, int dev)
return sfp;
}
-static void sg_remove_sfp_usercontext(struct work_struct *work)
+static void
+sg_remove_sfp_usercontext(struct work_struct *work)
{
struct sg_fd *sfp = container_of(work, struct sg_fd, ew.work);
struct sg_device *sdp = sfp->parentdp;
@@ -2171,20 +2205,20 @@ static void sg_remove_sfp_usercontext(st
kfree(sfp);
scsi_device_put(sdp->device);
- sg_put_dev(sdp);
+ kref_put(&sdp->d_ref, sg_device_destroy);
module_put(THIS_MODULE);
}
-static void sg_remove_sfp(struct kref *kref)
+static void
+sg_remove_sfp(struct kref *kref)
{
struct sg_fd *sfp = container_of(kref, struct sg_fd, f_ref);
struct sg_device *sdp = sfp->parentdp;
unsigned long iflags;
- write_lock_irqsave(&sg_index_lock, iflags);
+ write_lock_irqsave(&sdp->sfd_lock, iflags);
list_del(&sfp->sfd_siblings);
- write_unlock_irqrestore(&sg_index_lock, iflags);
- wake_up_interruptible(&sdp->o_excl_wait);
+ write_unlock_irqrestore(&sdp->sfd_lock, iflags);
INIT_WORK(&sfp->ew.work, sg_remove_sfp_usercontext);
schedule_work(&sfp->ew.work);
@@ -2235,7 +2269,8 @@ static Sg_device *sg_lookup_dev(int dev)
return idr_find(&sg_index_idr, dev);
}
-static Sg_device *sg_get_dev(int dev)
+static Sg_device *
+sg_get_dev(int dev)
{
struct sg_device *sdp;
unsigned long flags;
@@ -2244,8 +2279,8 @@ static Sg_device *sg_get_dev(int dev)
sdp = sg_lookup_dev(dev);
if (!sdp)
sdp = ERR_PTR(-ENXIO);
- else if (sdp->detached) {
- /* If sdp->detached, then the refcount may already be 0, in
+ else if (atomic_read(&sdp->detaching)) {
+ /* If sdp->detaching, then the refcount may already be 0, in
* which case it would be a bug to do kref_get().
*/
sdp = ERR_PTR(-ENODEV);
@@ -2256,11 +2291,6 @@ static Sg_device *sg_get_dev(int dev)
return sdp;
}
-static void sg_put_dev(struct sg_device *sdp)
-{
- kref_put(&sdp->d_ref, sg_device_destroy);
-}
-
#ifdef CONFIG_SCSI_PROC_FS
static struct proc_dir_entry *sg_proc_sgp = NULL;
@@ -2477,8 +2507,7 @@ static int sg_proc_single_open_version(s
static int sg_proc_seq_show_devhdr(struct seq_file *s, void *v)
{
- seq_printf(s, "host\tchan\tid\tlun\ttype\topens\tqdepth\tbusy\t"
- "online\n");
+ seq_puts(s, "host\tchan\tid\tlun\ttype\topens\tqdepth\tbusy\tonline\n");
return 0;
}
@@ -2534,7 +2563,11 @@ static int sg_proc_seq_show_dev(struct s
read_lock_irqsave(&sg_index_lock, iflags);
sdp = it ? sg_lookup_dev(it->index) : NULL;
- if (sdp && (scsidp = sdp->device) && (!sdp->detached))
+ if ((NULL == sdp) || (NULL == sdp->device) ||
+ (atomic_read(&sdp->detaching)))
+ seq_puts(s, "-1\t-1\t-1\t-1\t-1\t-1\t-1\t-1\t-1\n");
+ else {
+ scsidp = sdp->device;
seq_printf(s, "%d\t%d\t%d\t%d\t%d\t%d\t%d\t%d\t%d\n",
scsidp->host->host_no, scsidp->channel,
scsidp->id, scsidp->lun, (int) scsidp->type,
@@ -2542,8 +2575,7 @@ static int sg_proc_seq_show_dev(struct s
(int) scsidp->queue_depth,
(int) scsidp->device_busy,
(int) scsi_device_online(scsidp));
- else
- seq_printf(s, "-1\t-1\t-1\t-1\t-1\t-1\t-1\t-1\t-1\n");
+ }
read_unlock_irqrestore(&sg_index_lock, iflags);
return 0;
}
@@ -2562,11 +2594,12 @@ static int sg_proc_seq_show_devstrs(stru
read_lock_irqsave(&sg_index_lock, iflags);
sdp = it ? sg_lookup_dev(it->index) : NULL;
- if (sdp && (scsidp = sdp->device) && (!sdp->detached))
+ scsidp = sdp ? sdp->device : NULL;
+ if (sdp && scsidp && (!atomic_read(&sdp->detaching)))
seq_printf(s, "%8.8s\t%16.16s\t%4.4s\n",
scsidp->vendor, scsidp->model, scsidp->rev);
else
- seq_printf(s, "<no active device>\n");
+ seq_puts(s, "<no active device>\n");
read_unlock_irqrestore(&sg_index_lock, iflags);
return 0;
}
@@ -2611,12 +2644,12 @@ static void sg_proc_debug_helper(struct
else
cp = " ";
}
- seq_printf(s, cp);
+ seq_puts(s, cp);
blen = srp->data.bufflen;
usg = srp->data.k_use_sg;
- seq_printf(s, srp->done ?
- ((1 == srp->done) ? "rcv:" : "fin:")
- : "act:");
+ seq_puts(s, srp->done ?
+ ((1 == srp->done) ? "rcv:" : "fin:")
+ : "act:");
seq_printf(s, " id=%d blen=%d",
srp->header.pack_id, blen);
if (srp->done)
@@ -2632,7 +2665,7 @@ static void sg_proc_debug_helper(struct
(int) srp->data.cmd_opcode);
}
if (0 == m)
- seq_printf(s, " No requests active\n");
+ seq_puts(s, " No requests active\n");
read_unlock(&fp->rq_list_lock);
}
}
@@ -2648,31 +2681,34 @@ static int sg_proc_seq_show_debug(struct
Sg_device *sdp;
unsigned long iflags;
- if (it && (0 == it->index)) {
- seq_printf(s, "max_active_device=%d(origin 1)\n",
- (int)it->max);
- seq_printf(s, " def_reserved_size=%d\n", sg_big_buff);
- }
+ if (it && (0 == it->index))
+ seq_printf(s, "max_active_device=%d def_reserved_size=%d\n",
+ (int)it->max, sg_big_buff);
read_lock_irqsave(&sg_index_lock, iflags);
sdp = it ? sg_lookup_dev(it->index) : NULL;
- if (sdp && !list_empty(&sdp->sfds)) {
- struct scsi_device *scsidp = sdp->device;
-
+ if (NULL == sdp)
+ goto skip;
+ read_lock(&sdp->sfd_lock);
+ if (!list_empty(&sdp->sfds)) {
seq_printf(s, " >>> device=%s ", sdp->disk->disk_name);
- if (sdp->detached)
- seq_printf(s, "detached pending close ");
- else
- seq_printf
- (s, "scsi%d chan=%d id=%d lun=%d em=%d",
- scsidp->host->host_no,
- scsidp->channel, scsidp->id,
- scsidp->lun,
- scsidp->host->hostt->emulated);
- seq_printf(s, " sg_tablesize=%d excl=%d\n",
- sdp->sg_tablesize, get_exclude(sdp));
+ if (atomic_read(&sdp->detaching))
+ seq_puts(s, "detaching pending close ");
+ else if (sdp->device) {
+ struct scsi_device *scsidp = sdp->device;
+
+ seq_printf(s, "%d:%d:%d:%d em=%d",
+ scsidp->host->host_no,
+ scsidp->channel, scsidp->id,
+ scsidp->lun,
+ scsidp->host->hostt->emulated);
+ }
+ seq_printf(s, " sg_tablesize=%d excl=%d open_cnt=%d\n",
+ sdp->sg_tablesize, sdp->exclude, sdp->open_cnt);
sg_proc_debug_helper(s, sdp);
}
+ read_unlock(&sdp->sfd_lock);
+skip:
read_unlock_irqrestore(&sg_index_lock, iflags);
return 0;
}
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 66+ messages in thread* [PATCH 3.16 24/61] sg: prevent integer overflow when converting from sectors to bytes
2020-06-09 18:03 [PATCH 3.16 00/61] 3.16.85-rc1 review Ben Hutchings
` (22 preceding siblings ...)
2020-06-09 18:04 ` [PATCH 3.16 23/61] sg: O_EXCL and other lock handling Ben Hutchings
@ 2020-06-09 18:04 ` Ben Hutchings
2020-06-09 18:04 ` [PATCH 3.16 25/61] scsi: sg: Change next_cmd_len handling to mirror upstream Ben Hutchings
` (37 subsequent siblings)
61 siblings, 0 replies; 66+ messages in thread
From: Ben Hutchings @ 2020-06-09 18:04 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel, stable
Cc: akpm, Denis Kirjanov, Akinobu Mita, Christoph Hellwig
3.16.85-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Akinobu Mita <akinobu.mita@gmail.com>
commit 46f69e6a6bbbf3858617c8729e31895846c15a79 upstream.
This prevents integer overflow when converting the request queue's
max_sectors from sectors to bytes. However, this is a preparation for
extending the data type of max_sectors in struct Scsi_Host and
scsi_host_template. So, it is impossible to happen this integer
overflow for now, because SCSI low-level drivers can not specify
max_sectors greater than 0xffff due to the data type limitation.
Signed-off-by: Akinobu Mita <akinobu.mita@gmail.com>
Acked by: Douglas Gilbert <dgilbert@interlog.com>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
---
drivers/scsi/sg.c | 17 +++++++++++++----
1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/scsi/sg.c
+++ b/drivers/scsi/sg.c
@@ -865,6 +865,15 @@ static int srp_done(Sg_fd *sfp, Sg_reque
return ret;
}
+static int max_sectors_bytes(struct request_queue *q)
+{
+ unsigned int max_sectors = queue_max_sectors(q);
+
+ max_sectors = min_t(unsigned int, max_sectors, INT_MAX >> 9);
+
+ return max_sectors << 9;
+}
+
static long
sg_ioctl(struct file *filp, unsigned int cmd_in, unsigned long arg)
{
@@ -1004,7 +1013,7 @@ sg_ioctl(struct file *filp, unsigned int
if (val < 0)
return -EINVAL;
val = min_t(int, val,
- queue_max_sectors(sdp->device->request_queue) * 512);
+ max_sectors_bytes(sdp->device->request_queue));
if (val != sfp->reserve.bufflen) {
if (sg_res_in_use(sfp) || sfp->mmap_called)
return -EBUSY;
@@ -1014,7 +1023,7 @@ sg_ioctl(struct file *filp, unsigned int
return 0;
case SG_GET_RESERVED_SIZE:
val = min_t(int, sfp->reserve.bufflen,
- queue_max_sectors(sdp->device->request_queue) * 512);
+ max_sectors_bytes(sdp->device->request_queue));
return put_user(val, ip);
case SG_SET_COMMAND_Q:
result = get_user(val, ip);
@@ -1154,7 +1163,7 @@ sg_ioctl(struct file *filp, unsigned int
return -ENODEV;
return scsi_ioctl(sdp->device, cmd_in, p);
case BLKSECTGET:
- return put_user(queue_max_sectors(sdp->device->request_queue) * 512,
+ return put_user(max_sectors_bytes(sdp->device->request_queue),
ip);
case BLKTRACESETUP:
return blk_trace_setup(sdp->device->request_queue,
@@ -2170,7 +2179,7 @@ sg_add_sfp(Sg_device * sdp, int dev)
sg_big_buff = def_reserved_size;
bufflen = min_t(int, sg_big_buff,
- queue_max_sectors(sdp->device->request_queue) * 512);
+ max_sectors_bytes(sdp->device->request_queue));
sg_build_reserve(sfp, bufflen);
SCSI_LOG_TIMEOUT(3, printk("sg_add_sfp: bufflen=%d, k_use_sg=%d\n",
sfp->reserve.bufflen, sfp->reserve.k_use_sg));
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 66+ messages in thread* [PATCH 3.16 25/61] scsi: sg: Change next_cmd_len handling to mirror upstream
2020-06-09 18:03 [PATCH 3.16 00/61] 3.16.85-rc1 review Ben Hutchings
` (23 preceding siblings ...)
2020-06-09 18:04 ` [PATCH 3.16 24/61] sg: prevent integer overflow when converting from sectors to bytes Ben Hutchings
@ 2020-06-09 18:04 ` Ben Hutchings
2020-06-09 18:04 ` [PATCH 3.16 26/61] scsi: sg: protect accesses to 'reserved' page array Ben Hutchings
` (36 subsequent siblings)
61 siblings, 0 replies; 66+ messages in thread
From: Ben Hutchings @ 2020-06-09 18:04 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel, stable; +Cc: akpm, Denis Kirjanov
3.16.85-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Change the type of next_cmd_len to unsigned char, done in upstream
commit 65c26a0f3969 "sg: relax 16 byte cdb restriction".
Move the range check from sg_write() to sg_ioctl(), which was done by
that commit and commit bf33f87dd04c "scsi: sg: check length passed to
SG_NEXT_CMD_LEN". Continue limiting the command length to
MAX_COMMAND_SIZE (16).
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
---
--- a/drivers/scsi/sg.c
+++ b/drivers/scsi/sg.c
@@ -160,7 +160,7 @@ typedef struct sg_fd { /* holds the sta
char low_dma; /* as in parent but possibly overridden to 1 */
char force_packid; /* 1 -> pack_id input to read(), 0 -> ignored */
char cmd_q; /* 1 -> allow command queuing, 0 -> don't */
- char next_cmd_len; /* 0 -> automatic (def), >0 -> use on next write() */
+ unsigned char next_cmd_len; /* 0: automatic, >0: use on next write() */
char keep_orphan; /* 0 -> drop orphan (def), 1 -> keep for read() */
char mmap_called; /* 0 -> mmap() never called on this fd */
struct kref f_ref;
@@ -653,12 +653,6 @@ sg_write(struct file *filp, const char _
buf += SZ_SG_HEADER;
__get_user(opcode, buf);
if (sfp->next_cmd_len > 0) {
- if (sfp->next_cmd_len > MAX_COMMAND_SIZE) {
- SCSI_LOG_TIMEOUT(1, printk("sg_write: command length too long\n"));
- sfp->next_cmd_len = 0;
- sg_remove_request(sfp, srp);
- return -EIO;
- }
cmd_size = sfp->next_cmd_len;
sfp->next_cmd_len = 0; /* reset so only this write() effected */
} else {
@@ -1045,6 +1039,8 @@ sg_ioctl(struct file *filp, unsigned int
result = get_user(val, ip);
if (result)
return result;
+ if (val > MAX_COMMAND_SIZE)
+ return -ENOMEM;
sfp->next_cmd_len = (val > 0) ? val : 0;
return 0;
case SG_GET_VERSION_NUM:
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 66+ messages in thread* [PATCH 3.16 26/61] scsi: sg: protect accesses to 'reserved' page array
2020-06-09 18:03 [PATCH 3.16 00/61] 3.16.85-rc1 review Ben Hutchings
` (24 preceding siblings ...)
2020-06-09 18:04 ` [PATCH 3.16 25/61] scsi: sg: Change next_cmd_len handling to mirror upstream Ben Hutchings
@ 2020-06-09 18:04 ` Ben Hutchings
2020-06-09 18:04 ` [PATCH 3.16 27/61] scsi: sg: reset 'res_in_use' after unlinking reserved array Ben Hutchings
` (35 subsequent siblings)
61 siblings, 0 replies; 66+ messages in thread
From: Ben Hutchings @ 2020-06-09 18:04 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel, stable
Cc: akpm, Denis Kirjanov, Christoph Hellwig, Todd Poynor,
Martin K. Petersen, Johannes Thumshirn, Hannes Reinecke,
Greg Kroah-Hartman, Hannes Reinecke
3.16.85-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.de>
commit 1bc0eb0446158cc76562176b80623aa119afee5b upstream.
The 'reserved' page array is used as a short-cut for mapping data,
saving us to allocate pages per request. However, the 'reserved' array
is only capable of holding one request, so this patch introduces a mutex
for protect 'sg_fd' against concurrent accesses.
Signed-off-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de>
Tested-by: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[toddpoynor@google.com: backport to 3.18-4.9, fixup for bad ioctl
SG_SET_FORCE_LOW_DMA code removed in later versions and not modified by
the original patch.]
Signed-off-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de>
Tested-by: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Todd Poynor <toddpoynor@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
---
drivers/scsi/sg.c | 47 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------------
1 file changed, 26 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/scsi/sg.c
+++ b/drivers/scsi/sg.c
@@ -150,6 +150,7 @@ typedef struct sg_fd { /* holds the sta
struct sg_device *parentdp; /* owning device */
wait_queue_head_t read_wait; /* queue read until command done */
rwlock_t rq_list_lock; /* protect access to list in req_arr */
+ struct mutex f_mutex; /* protect against changes in this fd */
int timeout; /* defaults to SG_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT */
int timeout_user; /* defaults to SG_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_USER */
Sg_scatter_hold reserve; /* buffer held for this file descriptor */
@@ -163,6 +164,7 @@ typedef struct sg_fd { /* holds the sta
unsigned char next_cmd_len; /* 0: automatic, >0: use on next write() */
char keep_orphan; /* 0 -> drop orphan (def), 1 -> keep for read() */
char mmap_called; /* 0 -> mmap() never called on this fd */
+ char res_in_use; /* 1 -> 'reserve' array in use */
struct kref f_ref;
struct execute_work ew;
} Sg_fd;
@@ -206,7 +208,6 @@ static void sg_remove_sfp(struct kref *)
static Sg_request *sg_get_rq_mark(Sg_fd * sfp, int pack_id);
static Sg_request *sg_add_request(Sg_fd * sfp);
static int sg_remove_request(Sg_fd * sfp, Sg_request * srp);
-static int sg_res_in_use(Sg_fd * sfp);
static Sg_device *sg_get_dev(int dev);
static void sg_device_destroy(struct kref *kref);
@@ -652,6 +653,7 @@ sg_write(struct file *filp, const char _
}
buf += SZ_SG_HEADER;
__get_user(opcode, buf);
+ mutex_lock(&sfp->f_mutex);
if (sfp->next_cmd_len > 0) {
cmd_size = sfp->next_cmd_len;
sfp->next_cmd_len = 0; /* reset so only this write() effected */
@@ -660,6 +662,7 @@ sg_write(struct file *filp, const char _
if ((opcode >= 0xc0) && old_hdr.twelve_byte)
cmd_size = 12;
}
+ mutex_unlock(&sfp->f_mutex);
SCSI_LOG_TIMEOUT(4, printk(
"sg_write: scsi opcode=0x%02x, cmd_size=%d\n", (int) opcode, cmd_size));
/* Determine buffer size. */
@@ -758,7 +761,7 @@ sg_new_write(Sg_fd *sfp, struct file *fi
sg_remove_request(sfp, srp);
return -EINVAL; /* either MMAP_IO or DIRECT_IO (not both) */
}
- if (sg_res_in_use(sfp)) {
+ if (sfp->res_in_use) {
sg_remove_request(sfp, srp);
return -EBUSY; /* reserve buffer already being used */
}
@@ -933,7 +936,7 @@ sg_ioctl(struct file *filp, unsigned int
return result;
if (val) {
sfp->low_dma = 1;
- if ((0 == sfp->low_dma) && (0 == sg_res_in_use(sfp))) {
+ if ((0 == sfp->low_dma) && !sfp->res_in_use) {
val = (int) sfp->reserve.bufflen;
sg_remove_scat(&sfp->reserve);
sg_build_reserve(sfp, val);
@@ -1008,12 +1011,18 @@ sg_ioctl(struct file *filp, unsigned int
return -EINVAL;
val = min_t(int, val,
max_sectors_bytes(sdp->device->request_queue));
+ mutex_lock(&sfp->f_mutex);
if (val != sfp->reserve.bufflen) {
- if (sg_res_in_use(sfp) || sfp->mmap_called)
+ if (sfp->mmap_called ||
+ sfp->res_in_use) {
+ mutex_unlock(&sfp->f_mutex);
return -EBUSY;
+ }
+
sg_remove_scat(&sfp->reserve);
sg_build_reserve(sfp, val);
}
+ mutex_unlock(&sfp->f_mutex);
return 0;
case SG_GET_RESERVED_SIZE:
val = min_t(int, sfp->reserve.bufflen,
@@ -1752,13 +1761,22 @@ sg_start_req(Sg_request *srp, unsigned c
md = &map_data;
if (md) {
- if (!sg_res_in_use(sfp) && dxfer_len <= rsv_schp->bufflen)
+ mutex_lock(&sfp->f_mutex);
+ if (dxfer_len <= rsv_schp->bufflen &&
+ !sfp->res_in_use) {
+ sfp->res_in_use = 1;
sg_link_reserve(sfp, srp, dxfer_len);
- else {
+ } else if ((hp->flags & SG_FLAG_MMAP_IO) && sfp->res_in_use) {
+ mutex_unlock(&sfp->f_mutex);
+ return -EBUSY;
+ } else {
res = sg_build_indirect(req_schp, sfp, dxfer_len);
- if (res)
+ if (res) {
+ mutex_unlock(&sfp->f_mutex);
return res;
+ }
}
+ mutex_unlock(&sfp->f_mutex);
md->pages = req_schp->pages;
md->page_order = req_schp->page_order;
@@ -2155,6 +2173,7 @@ sg_add_sfp(Sg_device * sdp, int dev)
rwlock_init(&sfp->rq_list_lock);
kref_init(&sfp->f_ref);
+ mutex_init(&sfp->f_mutex);
sfp->timeout = SG_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT;
sfp->timeout_user = SG_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_USER;
sfp->force_packid = SG_DEF_FORCE_PACK_ID;
@@ -2229,20 +2248,6 @@ sg_remove_sfp(struct kref *kref)
schedule_work(&sfp->ew.work);
}
-static int
-sg_res_in_use(Sg_fd * sfp)
-{
- const Sg_request *srp;
- unsigned long iflags;
-
- read_lock_irqsave(&sfp->rq_list_lock, iflags);
- for (srp = sfp->headrp; srp; srp = srp->nextrp)
- if (srp->res_used)
- break;
- read_unlock_irqrestore(&sfp->rq_list_lock, iflags);
- return srp ? 1 : 0;
-}
-
#ifdef CONFIG_SCSI_PROC_FS
static int
sg_idr_max_id(int id, void *p, void *data)
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 66+ messages in thread* [PATCH 3.16 27/61] scsi: sg: reset 'res_in_use' after unlinking reserved array
2020-06-09 18:03 [PATCH 3.16 00/61] 3.16.85-rc1 review Ben Hutchings
` (25 preceding siblings ...)
2020-06-09 18:04 ` [PATCH 3.16 26/61] scsi: sg: protect accesses to 'reserved' page array Ben Hutchings
@ 2020-06-09 18:04 ` Ben Hutchings
2020-06-09 18:04 ` [PATCH 3.16 28/61] scsi: sg: protect against races between mmap() and SG_SET_RESERVED_SIZE Ben Hutchings
` (34 subsequent siblings)
61 siblings, 0 replies; 66+ messages in thread
From: Ben Hutchings @ 2020-06-09 18:04 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel, stable
Cc: akpm, Denis Kirjanov, Hannes Reinecke, Greg Kroah-Hartman,
Hannes Reinecke, Todd Poynor, Christoph Hellwig,
Martin K. Petersen, Johannes Thumshirn
3.16.85-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.de>
commit e791ce27c3f6a1d3c746fd6a8f8e36c9540ec6f9 upstream.
Once the reserved page array is unused we can reset the 'res_in_use'
state; here we can do a lazy update without holding the mutex as we only
need to check against concurrent access, not concurrent release.
[mkp: checkpatch]
Fixes: 1bc0eb044615 ("scsi: sg: protect accesses to 'reserved' page array")
Signed-off-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Cc: Todd Poynor <toddpoynor@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
---
drivers/scsi/sg.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
--- a/drivers/scsi/sg.c
+++ b/drivers/scsi/sg.c
@@ -2062,6 +2062,8 @@ sg_unlink_reserve(Sg_fd * sfp, Sg_reques
req_schp->sglist_len = 0;
sfp->save_scat_len = 0;
srp->res_used = 0;
+ /* Called without mutex lock to avoid deadlock */
+ sfp->res_in_use = 0;
}
static Sg_request *
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 66+ messages in thread* [PATCH 3.16 28/61] scsi: sg: protect against races between mmap() and SG_SET_RESERVED_SIZE
2020-06-09 18:03 [PATCH 3.16 00/61] 3.16.85-rc1 review Ben Hutchings
` (26 preceding siblings ...)
2020-06-09 18:04 ` [PATCH 3.16 27/61] scsi: sg: reset 'res_in_use' after unlinking reserved array Ben Hutchings
@ 2020-06-09 18:04 ` Ben Hutchings
2020-06-09 18:04 ` [PATCH 3.16 29/61] scsi: sg: recheck MMAP_IO request length with lock held Ben Hutchings
` (33 subsequent siblings)
61 siblings, 0 replies; 66+ messages in thread
From: Ben Hutchings @ 2020-06-09 18:04 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel, stable
Cc: akpm, Denis Kirjanov, Greg Kroah-Hartman, Douglas Gilbert,
Todd Poynor, Martin K. Petersen
3.16.85-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Todd Poynor <toddpoynor@google.com>
commit 6a8dadcca81fceff9976e8828cceb072873b7bd5 upstream.
Take f_mutex around mmap() processing to protect against races with the
SG_SET_RESERVED_SIZE ioctl. Ensure the reserve buffer length remains
consistent during the mapping operation, and set the "mmap called" flag
to prevent further changes to the reserved buffer size as an atomic
operation with the mapping.
[mkp: fixed whitespace]
Signed-off-by: Todd Poynor <toddpoynor@google.com>
Acked-by: Douglas Gilbert <dgilbert@interlog.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
---
drivers/scsi/sg.c | 12 +++++++++---
1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/scsi/sg.c
+++ b/drivers/scsi/sg.c
@@ -1310,6 +1310,7 @@ sg_mmap(struct file *filp, struct vm_are
unsigned long req_sz, len, sa;
Sg_scatter_hold *rsv_schp;
int k, length;
+ int ret = 0;
if ((!filp) || (!vma) || (!(sfp = (Sg_fd *) filp->private_data)))
return -ENXIO;
@@ -1319,8 +1320,11 @@ sg_mmap(struct file *filp, struct vm_are
if (vma->vm_pgoff)
return -EINVAL; /* want no offset */
rsv_schp = &sfp->reserve;
- if (req_sz > rsv_schp->bufflen)
- return -ENOMEM; /* cannot map more than reserved buffer */
+ mutex_lock(&sfp->f_mutex);
+ if (req_sz > rsv_schp->bufflen) {
+ ret = -ENOMEM; /* cannot map more than reserved buffer */
+ goto out;
+ }
sa = vma->vm_start;
length = 1 << (PAGE_SHIFT + rsv_schp->page_order);
@@ -1334,7 +1338,9 @@ sg_mmap(struct file *filp, struct vm_are
vma->vm_flags |= VM_IO | VM_DONTEXPAND | VM_DONTDUMP;
vma->vm_private_data = sfp;
vma->vm_ops = &sg_mmap_vm_ops;
- return 0;
+out:
+ mutex_unlock(&sfp->f_mutex);
+ return ret;
}
static void
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 66+ messages in thread* [PATCH 3.16 29/61] scsi: sg: recheck MMAP_IO request length with lock held
2020-06-09 18:03 [PATCH 3.16 00/61] 3.16.85-rc1 review Ben Hutchings
` (27 preceding siblings ...)
2020-06-09 18:04 ` [PATCH 3.16 28/61] scsi: sg: protect against races between mmap() and SG_SET_RESERVED_SIZE Ben Hutchings
@ 2020-06-09 18:04 ` Ben Hutchings
2020-06-09 18:04 ` [PATCH 3.16 30/61] scsi: sg: remove 'save_scat_len' Ben Hutchings
` (32 subsequent siblings)
61 siblings, 0 replies; 66+ messages in thread
From: Ben Hutchings @ 2020-06-09 18:04 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel, stable
Cc: akpm, Denis Kirjanov, Douglas Gilbert, Greg Kroah-Hartman,
Martin K. Petersen, Todd Poynor
3.16.85-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Todd Poynor <toddpoynor@google.com>
commit 8d26f491116feaa0b16de370b6a7ba40a40fa0b4 upstream.
Commit 1bc0eb044615 ("scsi: sg: protect accesses to 'reserved' page
array") adds needed concurrency protection for the "reserve" buffer.
Some checks that are initially made outside the lock are replicated once
the lock is taken to ensure the checks and resulting decisions are made
using consistent state.
The check that a request with flag SG_FLAG_MMAP_IO set fits in the
reserve buffer also needs to be performed again under the lock to ensure
the reserve buffer length compared against matches the value in effect
when the request is linked to the reserve buffer. An -ENOMEM should be
returned in this case, instead of switching over to an indirect buffer
as for non-MMAP_IO requests.
Signed-off-by: Todd Poynor <toddpoynor@google.com>
Acked-by: Douglas Gilbert <dgilbert@interlog.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
---
drivers/scsi/sg.c | 7 +++++--
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/scsi/sg.c
+++ b/drivers/scsi/sg.c
@@ -1772,9 +1772,12 @@ sg_start_req(Sg_request *srp, unsigned c
!sfp->res_in_use) {
sfp->res_in_use = 1;
sg_link_reserve(sfp, srp, dxfer_len);
- } else if ((hp->flags & SG_FLAG_MMAP_IO) && sfp->res_in_use) {
+ } else if (hp->flags & SG_FLAG_MMAP_IO) {
+ res = -EBUSY; /* sfp->res_in_use == 1 */
+ if (dxfer_len > rsv_schp->bufflen)
+ res = -ENOMEM;
mutex_unlock(&sfp->f_mutex);
- return -EBUSY;
+ return res;
} else {
res = sg_build_indirect(req_schp, sfp, dxfer_len);
if (res) {
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 66+ messages in thread* [PATCH 3.16 30/61] scsi: sg: remove 'save_scat_len'
2020-06-09 18:03 [PATCH 3.16 00/61] 3.16.85-rc1 review Ben Hutchings
` (28 preceding siblings ...)
2020-06-09 18:04 ` [PATCH 3.16 29/61] scsi: sg: recheck MMAP_IO request length with lock held Ben Hutchings
@ 2020-06-09 18:04 ` Ben Hutchings
2020-06-09 18:04 ` [PATCH 3.16 31/61] scsi: sg: use standard lists for sg_requests Ben Hutchings
` (31 subsequent siblings)
61 siblings, 0 replies; 66+ messages in thread
From: Ben Hutchings @ 2020-06-09 18:04 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel, stable
Cc: akpm, Denis Kirjanov, Hannes Reinecke, Greg Kroah-Hartman,
Hannes Reinecke, Johannes Thumshirn, Martin K. Petersen,
Christoph Hellwig
3.16.85-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.de>
commit 136e57bf43dc4babbfb8783abbf707d483cacbe3 upstream.
Unused.
Signed-off-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de>
Tested-by: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
---
drivers/scsi/sg.c | 2 --
1 file changed, 2 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/scsi/sg.c
+++ b/drivers/scsi/sg.c
@@ -154,7 +154,6 @@ typedef struct sg_fd { /* holds the sta
int timeout; /* defaults to SG_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT */
int timeout_user; /* defaults to SG_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_USER */
Sg_scatter_hold reserve; /* buffer held for this file descriptor */
- unsigned save_scat_len; /* original length of trunc. scat. element */
Sg_request *headrp; /* head of request slist, NULL->empty */
struct fasync_struct *async_qp; /* used by asynchronous notification */
Sg_request req_arr[SG_MAX_QUEUE]; /* used as singly-linked list */
@@ -2069,7 +2068,6 @@ sg_unlink_reserve(Sg_fd * sfp, Sg_reques
req_schp->pages = NULL;
req_schp->page_order = 0;
req_schp->sglist_len = 0;
- sfp->save_scat_len = 0;
srp->res_used = 0;
/* Called without mutex lock to avoid deadlock */
sfp->res_in_use = 0;
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 66+ messages in thread* [PATCH 3.16 31/61] scsi: sg: use standard lists for sg_requests
2020-06-09 18:03 [PATCH 3.16 00/61] 3.16.85-rc1 review Ben Hutchings
` (29 preceding siblings ...)
2020-06-09 18:04 ` [PATCH 3.16 30/61] scsi: sg: remove 'save_scat_len' Ben Hutchings
@ 2020-06-09 18:04 ` Ben Hutchings
2020-06-09 18:04 ` [PATCH 3.16 32/61] scsi: sg: off by one in sg_ioctl() Ben Hutchings
` (30 subsequent siblings)
61 siblings, 0 replies; 66+ messages in thread
From: Ben Hutchings @ 2020-06-09 18:04 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel, stable
Cc: akpm, Denis Kirjanov, Christoph Hellwig, Martin K. Petersen,
Johannes Thumshirn, Hannes Reinecke, Greg Kroah-Hartman,
Hannes Reinecke
3.16.85-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.de>
commit 109bade9c625c89bb5ea753aaa1a0a97e6fbb548 upstream.
'Sg_request' is using a private list implementation; convert it to
standard lists.
Signed-off-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de>
Tested-by: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
---
drivers/scsi/sg.c | 147 +++++++++++++++++++---------------------------
1 file changed, 61 insertions(+), 86 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/scsi/sg.c
+++ b/drivers/scsi/sg.c
@@ -130,7 +130,7 @@ struct sg_device; /* forward declaratio
struct sg_fd;
typedef struct sg_request { /* SG_MAX_QUEUE requests outstanding per file */
- struct sg_request *nextrp; /* NULL -> tail request (slist) */
+ struct list_head entry; /* list entry */
struct sg_fd *parentfp; /* NULL -> not in use */
Sg_scatter_hold data; /* hold buffer, perhaps scatter list */
sg_io_hdr_t header; /* scsi command+info, see <scsi/sg.h> */
@@ -154,7 +154,7 @@ typedef struct sg_fd { /* holds the sta
int timeout; /* defaults to SG_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT */
int timeout_user; /* defaults to SG_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_USER */
Sg_scatter_hold reserve; /* buffer held for this file descriptor */
- Sg_request *headrp; /* head of request slist, NULL->empty */
+ struct list_head rq_list; /* head of request list */
struct fasync_struct *async_qp; /* used by asynchronous notification */
Sg_request req_arr[SG_MAX_QUEUE]; /* used as singly-linked list */
char low_dma; /* as in parent but possibly overridden to 1 */
@@ -981,7 +981,7 @@ sg_ioctl(struct file *filp, unsigned int
if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, ip, sizeof (int)))
return -EFAULT;
read_lock_irqsave(&sfp->rq_list_lock, iflags);
- for (srp = sfp->headrp; srp; srp = srp->nextrp) {
+ list_for_each_entry(srp, &sfp->rq_list, entry) {
if ((1 == srp->done) && (!srp->sg_io_owned)) {
read_unlock_irqrestore(&sfp->rq_list_lock,
iflags);
@@ -994,7 +994,8 @@ sg_ioctl(struct file *filp, unsigned int
return 0;
case SG_GET_NUM_WAITING:
read_lock_irqsave(&sfp->rq_list_lock, iflags);
- for (val = 0, srp = sfp->headrp; srp; srp = srp->nextrp) {
+ val = 0;
+ list_for_each_entry(srp, &sfp->rq_list, entry) {
if ((1 == srp->done) && (!srp->sg_io_owned))
++val;
}
@@ -1069,35 +1070,33 @@ sg_ioctl(struct file *filp, unsigned int
if (!rinfo)
return -ENOMEM;
read_lock_irqsave(&sfp->rq_list_lock, iflags);
- for (srp = sfp->headrp, val = 0; val < SG_MAX_QUEUE;
- ++val, srp = srp ? srp->nextrp : srp) {
+ val = 0;
+ list_for_each_entry(srp, &sfp->rq_list, entry) {
+ if (val > SG_MAX_QUEUE)
+ break;
memset(&rinfo[val], 0, SZ_SG_REQ_INFO);
- if (srp) {
- rinfo[val].req_state = srp->done + 1;
- rinfo[val].problem =
- srp->header.masked_status &
- srp->header.host_status &
- srp->header.driver_status;
- if (srp->done)
- rinfo[val].duration =
- srp->header.duration;
- else {
- ms = jiffies_to_msecs(jiffies);
- rinfo[val].duration =
- (ms > srp->header.duration) ?
- (ms - srp->header.duration) : 0;
- }
- rinfo[val].orphan = srp->orphan;
- rinfo[val].sg_io_owned =
- srp->sg_io_owned;
- rinfo[val].pack_id =
- srp->header.pack_id;
- rinfo[val].usr_ptr =
- srp->header.usr_ptr;
+ rinfo[val].req_state = srp->done + 1;
+ rinfo[val].problem =
+ srp->header.masked_status &
+ srp->header.host_status &
+ srp->header.driver_status;
+ if (srp->done)
+ rinfo[val].duration =
+ srp->header.duration;
+ else {
+ ms = jiffies_to_msecs(jiffies);
+ rinfo[val].duration =
+ (ms > srp->header.duration) ?
+ (ms - srp->header.duration) : 0;
}
+ rinfo[val].orphan = srp->orphan;
+ rinfo[val].sg_io_owned = srp->sg_io_owned;
+ rinfo[val].pack_id = srp->header.pack_id;
+ rinfo[val].usr_ptr = srp->header.usr_ptr;
+ val++;
}
read_unlock_irqrestore(&sfp->rq_list_lock, iflags);
- result = __copy_to_user(p, rinfo,
+ result = __copy_to_user(p, rinfo,
SZ_SG_REQ_INFO * SG_MAX_QUEUE);
result = result ? -EFAULT : 0;
kfree(rinfo);
@@ -1229,7 +1228,7 @@ sg_poll(struct file *filp, poll_table *
return POLLERR;
poll_wait(filp, &sfp->read_wait, wait);
read_lock_irqsave(&sfp->rq_list_lock, iflags);
- for (srp = sfp->headrp; srp; srp = srp->nextrp) {
+ list_for_each_entry(srp, &sfp->rq_list, entry) {
/* if any read waiting, flag it */
if ((0 == res) && (1 == srp->done) && (!srp->sg_io_owned))
res = POLLIN | POLLRDNORM;
@@ -2080,7 +2079,7 @@ sg_get_rq_mark(Sg_fd * sfp, int pack_id)
unsigned long iflags;
write_lock_irqsave(&sfp->rq_list_lock, iflags);
- for (resp = sfp->headrp; resp; resp = resp->nextrp) {
+ list_for_each_entry(resp, &sfp->rq_list, entry) {
/* look for requests that are ready + not SG_IO owned */
if ((1 == resp->done) && (!resp->sg_io_owned) &&
((-1 == pack_id) || (resp->header.pack_id == pack_id))) {
@@ -2098,70 +2097,45 @@ sg_add_request(Sg_fd * sfp)
{
int k;
unsigned long iflags;
- Sg_request *resp;
Sg_request *rp = sfp->req_arr;
write_lock_irqsave(&sfp->rq_list_lock, iflags);
- resp = sfp->headrp;
- if (!resp) {
- memset(rp, 0, sizeof (Sg_request));
- rp->parentfp = sfp;
- resp = rp;
- sfp->headrp = resp;
- } else {
- if (0 == sfp->cmd_q)
- resp = NULL; /* command queuing disallowed */
- else {
- for (k = 0; k < SG_MAX_QUEUE; ++k, ++rp) {
- if (!rp->parentfp)
- break;
- }
- if (k < SG_MAX_QUEUE) {
- memset(rp, 0, sizeof (Sg_request));
- rp->parentfp = sfp;
- while (resp->nextrp)
- resp = resp->nextrp;
- resp->nextrp = rp;
- resp = rp;
- } else
- resp = NULL;
+ if (!list_empty(&sfp->rq_list)) {
+ if (!sfp->cmd_q)
+ goto out_unlock;
+
+ for (k = 0; k < SG_MAX_QUEUE; ++k, ++rp) {
+ if (!rp->parentfp)
+ break;
}
+ if (k >= SG_MAX_QUEUE)
+ goto out_unlock;
}
- if (resp) {
- resp->nextrp = NULL;
- resp->header.duration = jiffies_to_msecs(jiffies);
- }
+ memset(rp, 0, sizeof (Sg_request));
+ rp->parentfp = sfp;
+ rp->header.duration = jiffies_to_msecs(jiffies);
+ list_add_tail(&rp->entry, &sfp->rq_list);
write_unlock_irqrestore(&sfp->rq_list_lock, iflags);
- return resp;
+ return rp;
+out_unlock:
+ write_unlock_irqrestore(&sfp->rq_list_lock, iflags);
+ return NULL;
}
/* Return of 1 for found; 0 for not found */
static int
sg_remove_request(Sg_fd * sfp, Sg_request * srp)
{
- Sg_request *prev_rp;
- Sg_request *rp;
unsigned long iflags;
int res = 0;
- if ((!sfp) || (!srp) || (!sfp->headrp))
+ if (!sfp || !srp || list_empty(&sfp->rq_list))
return res;
write_lock_irqsave(&sfp->rq_list_lock, iflags);
- prev_rp = sfp->headrp;
- if (srp == prev_rp) {
- sfp->headrp = prev_rp->nextrp;
- prev_rp->parentfp = NULL;
+ if (!list_empty(&srp->entry)) {
+ list_del(&srp->entry);
+ srp->parentfp = NULL;
res = 1;
- } else {
- while ((rp = prev_rp->nextrp)) {
- if (srp == rp) {
- prev_rp->nextrp = rp->nextrp;
- rp->parentfp = NULL;
- res = 1;
- break;
- }
- prev_rp = rp;
- }
}
write_unlock_irqrestore(&sfp->rq_list_lock, iflags);
return res;
@@ -2180,7 +2154,7 @@ sg_add_sfp(Sg_device * sdp, int dev)
init_waitqueue_head(&sfp->read_wait);
rwlock_init(&sfp->rq_list_lock);
-
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sfp->rq_list);
kref_init(&sfp->f_ref);
mutex_init(&sfp->f_mutex);
sfp->timeout = SG_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT;
@@ -2218,10 +2192,13 @@ sg_remove_sfp_usercontext(struct work_st
{
struct sg_fd *sfp = container_of(work, struct sg_fd, ew.work);
struct sg_device *sdp = sfp->parentdp;
+ Sg_request *srp;
/* Cleanup any responses which were never read(). */
- while (sfp->headrp)
- sg_finish_rem_req(sfp->headrp);
+ while (!list_empty(&sfp->rq_list)) {
+ srp = list_first_entry(&sfp->rq_list, Sg_request, entry);
+ sg_finish_rem_req(srp);
+ }
if (sfp->reserve.bufflen > 0) {
SCSI_LOG_TIMEOUT(6,
@@ -2626,7 +2603,7 @@ static int sg_proc_seq_show_devstrs(stru
/* must be called while holding sg_index_lock */
static void sg_proc_debug_helper(struct seq_file *s, Sg_device * sdp)
{
- int k, m, new_interface, blen, usg;
+ int k, new_interface, blen, usg;
Sg_request *srp;
Sg_fd *fp;
const sg_io_hdr_t *hp;
@@ -2646,13 +2623,11 @@ static void sg_proc_debug_helper(struct
seq_printf(s, " cmd_q=%d f_packid=%d k_orphan=%d closed=0\n",
(int) fp->cmd_q, (int) fp->force_packid,
(int) fp->keep_orphan);
- for (m = 0, srp = fp->headrp;
- srp != NULL;
- ++m, srp = srp->nextrp) {
+ list_for_each_entry(srp, &fp->rq_list, entry) {
hp = &srp->header;
new_interface = (hp->interface_id == '\0') ? 0 : 1;
if (srp->res_used) {
- if (new_interface &&
+ if (new_interface &&
(SG_FLAG_MMAP_IO & hp->flags))
cp = " mmap>> ";
else
@@ -2683,7 +2658,7 @@ static void sg_proc_debug_helper(struct
seq_printf(s, "ms sgat=%d op=0x%02x\n", usg,
(int) srp->data.cmd_opcode);
}
- if (0 == m)
+ if (list_empty(&fp->rq_list))
seq_puts(s, " No requests active\n");
read_unlock(&fp->rq_list_lock);
}
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 66+ messages in thread* [PATCH 3.16 32/61] scsi: sg: off by one in sg_ioctl()
2020-06-09 18:03 [PATCH 3.16 00/61] 3.16.85-rc1 review Ben Hutchings
` (30 preceding siblings ...)
2020-06-09 18:04 ` [PATCH 3.16 31/61] scsi: sg: use standard lists for sg_requests Ben Hutchings
@ 2020-06-09 18:04 ` Ben Hutchings
2020-06-09 18:04 ` [PATCH 3.16 33/61] scsi: sg: factor out sg_fill_request_table() Ben Hutchings
` (29 subsequent siblings)
61 siblings, 0 replies; 66+ messages in thread
From: Ben Hutchings @ 2020-06-09 18:04 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel, stable
Cc: akpm, Denis Kirjanov, Douglas Gilbert, Greg Kroah-Hartman,
Martin K. Petersen, Dan Carpenter
3.16.85-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
commit bd46fc406b30d1db1aff8dabaff8d18bb423fdcf upstream.
If "val" is SG_MAX_QUEUE then we are one element beyond the end of the
"rinfo" array so the > should be >=.
Fixes: 109bade9c625 ("scsi: sg: use standard lists for sg_requests")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Douglas Gilbert <dgilbert@interlog.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
---
drivers/scsi/sg.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/drivers/scsi/sg.c
+++ b/drivers/scsi/sg.c
@@ -1072,7 +1072,7 @@ sg_ioctl(struct file *filp, unsigned int
read_lock_irqsave(&sfp->rq_list_lock, iflags);
val = 0;
list_for_each_entry(srp, &sfp->rq_list, entry) {
- if (val > SG_MAX_QUEUE)
+ if (val >= SG_MAX_QUEUE)
break;
memset(&rinfo[val], 0, SZ_SG_REQ_INFO);
rinfo[val].req_state = srp->done + 1;
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 66+ messages in thread* [PATCH 3.16 33/61] scsi: sg: factor out sg_fill_request_table()
2020-06-09 18:03 [PATCH 3.16 00/61] 3.16.85-rc1 review Ben Hutchings
` (31 preceding siblings ...)
2020-06-09 18:04 ` [PATCH 3.16 32/61] scsi: sg: off by one in sg_ioctl() Ben Hutchings
@ 2020-06-09 18:04 ` Ben Hutchings
2020-06-09 18:04 ` [PATCH 3.16 34/61] scsi: sg: fixup infoleak when using SG_GET_REQUEST_TABLE Ben Hutchings
` (28 subsequent siblings)
61 siblings, 0 replies; 66+ messages in thread
From: Ben Hutchings @ 2020-06-09 18:04 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel, stable
Cc: akpm, Denis Kirjanov, Hannes Reinecke, Bart Van Assche,
Greg Kroah-Hartman, Hannes Reinecke, Martin K. Petersen,
Christoph Hellwig
3.16.85-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.de>
commit 4759df905a474d245752c9dc94288e779b8734dd upstream.
Factor out sg_fill_request_table() for better readability.
[mkp: typos, applied by hand]
Signed-off-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Bart Van Assche <bart.vanassche@wdc.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
---
drivers/scsi/sg.c | 61 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------
1 file changed, 35 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/scsi/sg.c
+++ b/drivers/scsi/sg.c
@@ -870,6 +870,40 @@ static int max_sectors_bytes(struct requ
return max_sectors << 9;
}
+static void
+sg_fill_request_table(Sg_fd *sfp, sg_req_info_t *rinfo)
+{
+ Sg_request *srp;
+ int val;
+ unsigned int ms;
+
+ val = 0;
+ list_for_each_entry(srp, &sfp->rq_list, entry) {
+ if (val > SG_MAX_QUEUE)
+ break;
+ memset(&rinfo[val], 0, SZ_SG_REQ_INFO);
+ rinfo[val].req_state = srp->done + 1;
+ rinfo[val].problem =
+ srp->header.masked_status &
+ srp->header.host_status &
+ srp->header.driver_status;
+ if (srp->done)
+ rinfo[val].duration =
+ srp->header.duration;
+ else {
+ ms = jiffies_to_msecs(jiffies);
+ rinfo[val].duration =
+ (ms > srp->header.duration) ?
+ (ms - srp->header.duration) : 0;
+ }
+ rinfo[val].orphan = srp->orphan;
+ rinfo[val].sg_io_owned = srp->sg_io_owned;
+ rinfo[val].pack_id = srp->header.pack_id;
+ rinfo[val].usr_ptr = srp->header.usr_ptr;
+ val++;
+ }
+}
+
static long
sg_ioctl(struct file *filp, unsigned int cmd_in, unsigned long arg)
{
@@ -1063,38 +1097,13 @@ sg_ioctl(struct file *filp, unsigned int
return -EFAULT;
else {
sg_req_info_t *rinfo;
- unsigned int ms;
rinfo = kmalloc(SZ_SG_REQ_INFO * SG_MAX_QUEUE,
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!rinfo)
return -ENOMEM;
read_lock_irqsave(&sfp->rq_list_lock, iflags);
- val = 0;
- list_for_each_entry(srp, &sfp->rq_list, entry) {
- if (val >= SG_MAX_QUEUE)
- break;
- memset(&rinfo[val], 0, SZ_SG_REQ_INFO);
- rinfo[val].req_state = srp->done + 1;
- rinfo[val].problem =
- srp->header.masked_status &
- srp->header.host_status &
- srp->header.driver_status;
- if (srp->done)
- rinfo[val].duration =
- srp->header.duration;
- else {
- ms = jiffies_to_msecs(jiffies);
- rinfo[val].duration =
- (ms > srp->header.duration) ?
- (ms - srp->header.duration) : 0;
- }
- rinfo[val].orphan = srp->orphan;
- rinfo[val].sg_io_owned = srp->sg_io_owned;
- rinfo[val].pack_id = srp->header.pack_id;
- rinfo[val].usr_ptr = srp->header.usr_ptr;
- val++;
- }
+ sg_fill_request_table(sfp, rinfo);
read_unlock_irqrestore(&sfp->rq_list_lock, iflags);
result = __copy_to_user(p, rinfo,
SZ_SG_REQ_INFO * SG_MAX_QUEUE);
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 66+ messages in thread* [PATCH 3.16 34/61] scsi: sg: fixup infoleak when using SG_GET_REQUEST_TABLE
2020-06-09 18:03 [PATCH 3.16 00/61] 3.16.85-rc1 review Ben Hutchings
` (32 preceding siblings ...)
2020-06-09 18:04 ` [PATCH 3.16 33/61] scsi: sg: factor out sg_fill_request_table() Ben Hutchings
@ 2020-06-09 18:04 ` Ben Hutchings
2020-06-09 18:04 ` [PATCH 3.16 35/61] scsi: sg: Re-fix off by one in sg_fill_request_table() Ben Hutchings
` (27 subsequent siblings)
61 siblings, 0 replies; 66+ messages in thread
From: Ben Hutchings @ 2020-06-09 18:04 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel, stable
Cc: akpm, Denis Kirjanov, Christoph Hellwig, Eric Dumazet,
Martin K. Petersen, Greg Kroah-Hartman, Hannes Reinecke,
Hannes Reinecke, Bart Van Assche
3.16.85-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.de>
commit 3e0097499839e0fe3af380410eababe5a47c4cf9 upstream.
When calling SG_GET_REQUEST_TABLE ioctl only a half-filled table is
returned; the remaining part will then contain stale kernel memory
information. This patch zeroes out the entire table to avoid this
issue.
Signed-off-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Bart Van Assche <bart.vanassche@wdc.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
---
drivers/scsi/sg.c | 5 ++---
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/scsi/sg.c
+++ b/drivers/scsi/sg.c
@@ -881,7 +881,6 @@ sg_fill_request_table(Sg_fd *sfp, sg_req
list_for_each_entry(srp, &sfp->rq_list, entry) {
if (val > SG_MAX_QUEUE)
break;
- memset(&rinfo[val], 0, SZ_SG_REQ_INFO);
rinfo[val].req_state = srp->done + 1;
rinfo[val].problem =
srp->header.masked_status &
@@ -1098,8 +1097,8 @@ sg_ioctl(struct file *filp, unsigned int
else {
sg_req_info_t *rinfo;
- rinfo = kmalloc(SZ_SG_REQ_INFO * SG_MAX_QUEUE,
- GFP_KERNEL);
+ rinfo = kzalloc(SZ_SG_REQ_INFO * SG_MAX_QUEUE,
+ GFP_KERNEL);
if (!rinfo)
return -ENOMEM;
read_lock_irqsave(&sfp->rq_list_lock, iflags);
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 66+ messages in thread* [PATCH 3.16 35/61] scsi: sg: Re-fix off by one in sg_fill_request_table()
2020-06-09 18:03 [PATCH 3.16 00/61] 3.16.85-rc1 review Ben Hutchings
` (33 preceding siblings ...)
2020-06-09 18:04 ` [PATCH 3.16 34/61] scsi: sg: fixup infoleak when using SG_GET_REQUEST_TABLE Ben Hutchings
@ 2020-06-09 18:04 ` Ben Hutchings
2020-06-09 18:04 ` [PATCH 3.16 36/61] scsi: sg: disable SET_FORCE_LOW_DMA Ben Hutchings
` (26 subsequent siblings)
61 siblings, 0 replies; 66+ messages in thread
From: Ben Hutchings @ 2020-06-09 18:04 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel, stable
Cc: akpm, Denis Kirjanov, Ben Hutchings, Douglas Gilbert,
Greg Kroah-Hartman, Martin K. Petersen
3.16.85-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
commit 587c3c9f286cee5c9cac38d28c8ae1875f4ec85b upstream.
Commit 109bade9c625 ("scsi: sg: use standard lists for sg_requests")
introduced an off-by-one error in sg_ioctl(), which was fixed by commit
bd46fc406b30 ("scsi: sg: off by one in sg_ioctl()").
Unfortunately commit 4759df905a47 ("scsi: sg: factor out
sg_fill_request_table()") moved that code, and reintroduced the
bug (perhaps due to a botched rebase). Fix it again.
Fixes: 4759df905a47 ("scsi: sg: factor out sg_fill_request_table()")
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Acked-by: Douglas Gilbert <dgilbert@interlog.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
---
drivers/scsi/sg.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/drivers/scsi/sg.c
+++ b/drivers/scsi/sg.c
@@ -879,7 +879,7 @@ sg_fill_request_table(Sg_fd *sfp, sg_req
val = 0;
list_for_each_entry(srp, &sfp->rq_list, entry) {
- if (val > SG_MAX_QUEUE)
+ if (val >= SG_MAX_QUEUE)
break;
rinfo[val].req_state = srp->done + 1;
rinfo[val].problem =
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 66+ messages in thread* [PATCH 3.16 36/61] scsi: sg: disable SET_FORCE_LOW_DMA
2020-06-09 18:03 [PATCH 3.16 00/61] 3.16.85-rc1 review Ben Hutchings
` (34 preceding siblings ...)
2020-06-09 18:04 ` [PATCH 3.16 35/61] scsi: sg: Re-fix off by one in sg_fill_request_table() Ben Hutchings
@ 2020-06-09 18:04 ` Ben Hutchings
2020-06-09 18:04 ` [PATCH 3.16 37/61] scsi: sg: check for valid direction before starting the request Ben Hutchings
` (25 subsequent siblings)
61 siblings, 0 replies; 66+ messages in thread
From: Ben Hutchings @ 2020-06-09 18:04 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel, stable
Cc: akpm, Denis Kirjanov, Martin K. Petersen, Johannes Thumshirn,
Christoph Hellwig, Hannes Reinecke, Hannes Reinecke,
Greg Kroah-Hartman
3.16.85-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.de>
commit 745dfa0d8ec26b24f3304459ff6e9eacc5c8351b upstream.
The ioctl SET_FORCE_LOW_DMA has never worked since the initial git
check-in, and the respective setting is nowadays handled correctly. So
disable it entirely.
Signed-off-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de>
Tested-by: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
---
drivers/scsi/sg.c | 30 +++++++++---------------------
include/scsi/sg.h | 1 -
2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/scsi/sg.c
+++ b/drivers/scsi/sg.c
@@ -157,7 +157,6 @@ typedef struct sg_fd { /* holds the sta
struct list_head rq_list; /* head of request list */
struct fasync_struct *async_qp; /* used by asynchronous notification */
Sg_request req_arr[SG_MAX_QUEUE]; /* used as singly-linked list */
- char low_dma; /* as in parent but possibly overridden to 1 */
char force_packid; /* 1 -> pack_id input to read(), 0 -> ignored */
char cmd_q; /* 1 -> allow command queuing, 0 -> don't */
unsigned char next_cmd_len; /* 0: automatic, >0: use on next write() */
@@ -963,24 +962,14 @@ sg_ioctl(struct file *filp, unsigned int
/* strange ..., for backward compatibility */
return sfp->timeout_user;
case SG_SET_FORCE_LOW_DMA:
- result = get_user(val, ip);
- if (result)
- return result;
- if (val) {
- sfp->low_dma = 1;
- if ((0 == sfp->low_dma) && !sfp->res_in_use) {
- val = (int) sfp->reserve.bufflen;
- sg_remove_scat(&sfp->reserve);
- sg_build_reserve(sfp, val);
- }
- } else {
- if (atomic_read(&sdp->detaching))
- return -ENODEV;
- sfp->low_dma = sdp->device->host->unchecked_isa_dma;
- }
+ /*
+ * N.B. This ioctl never worked properly, but failed to
+ * return an error value. So returning '0' to keep compability
+ * with legacy applications.
+ */
return 0;
case SG_GET_LOW_DMA:
- return put_user((int) sfp->low_dma, ip);
+ return put_user((int) sdp->device->host->unchecked_isa_dma, ip);
case SG_GET_SCSI_ID:
if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, p, sizeof (sg_scsi_id_t)))
return -EFAULT;
@@ -1890,6 +1879,7 @@ sg_build_indirect(Sg_scatter_hold * schp
int sg_tablesize = sfp->parentdp->sg_tablesize;
int blk_size = buff_size, order;
gfp_t gfp_mask = GFP_ATOMIC | __GFP_COMP | __GFP_NOWARN;
+ struct sg_device *sdp = sfp->parentdp;
if (blk_size < 0)
return -EFAULT;
@@ -1914,7 +1904,7 @@ sg_build_indirect(Sg_scatter_hold * schp
scatter_elem_sz_prev = num;
}
- if (sfp->low_dma)
+ if (sdp->device->host->unchecked_isa_dma)
gfp_mask |= GFP_DMA;
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || !capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO))
@@ -2168,8 +2158,6 @@ sg_add_sfp(Sg_device * sdp, int dev)
sfp->timeout = SG_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT;
sfp->timeout_user = SG_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_USER;
sfp->force_packid = SG_DEF_FORCE_PACK_ID;
- sfp->low_dma = (SG_DEF_FORCE_LOW_DMA == 0) ?
- sdp->device->host->unchecked_isa_dma : 1;
sfp->cmd_q = SG_DEF_COMMAND_Q;
sfp->keep_orphan = SG_DEF_KEEP_ORPHAN;
sfp->parentdp = sdp;
@@ -2627,7 +2615,7 @@ static void sg_proc_debug_helper(struct
jiffies_to_msecs(fp->timeout),
fp->reserve.bufflen,
(int) fp->reserve.k_use_sg,
- (int) fp->low_dma);
+ (int) sdp->device->host->unchecked_isa_dma);
seq_printf(s, " cmd_q=%d f_packid=%d k_orphan=%d closed=0\n",
(int) fp->cmd_q, (int) fp->force_packid,
(int) fp->keep_orphan);
--- a/include/scsi/sg.h
+++ b/include/scsi/sg.h
@@ -234,7 +234,6 @@ typedef struct sg_req_info { /* used by
#define SG_DEFAULT_RETRIES 0
/* Defaults, commented if they differ from original sg driver */
-#define SG_DEF_FORCE_LOW_DMA 0 /* was 1 -> memory below 16MB on i386 */
#define SG_DEF_FORCE_PACK_ID 0
#define SG_DEF_KEEP_ORPHAN 0
#define SG_DEF_RESERVED_SIZE SG_SCATTER_SZ /* load time option */
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 66+ messages in thread* [PATCH 3.16 37/61] scsi: sg: check for valid direction before starting the request
2020-06-09 18:03 [PATCH 3.16 00/61] 3.16.85-rc1 review Ben Hutchings
` (35 preceding siblings ...)
2020-06-09 18:04 ` [PATCH 3.16 36/61] scsi: sg: disable SET_FORCE_LOW_DMA Ben Hutchings
@ 2020-06-09 18:04 ` Ben Hutchings
2020-06-09 18:04 ` [PATCH 3.16 38/61] scsi: sg: close race condition in sg_remove_sfp_usercontext() Ben Hutchings
` (24 subsequent siblings)
61 siblings, 0 replies; 66+ messages in thread
From: Ben Hutchings @ 2020-06-09 18:04 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel, stable
Cc: akpm, Denis Kirjanov, Hannes Reinecke, Greg Kroah-Hartman,
Sasha Levin, Martin K. Petersen, Dmitry Vyukov,
Johannes Thumshirn, Christoph Hellwig
3.16.85-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de>
commit 28676d869bbb5257b5f14c0c95ad3af3a7019dd5 upstream.
Check for a valid direction before starting the request, otherwise we
risk running into an assertion in the scsi midlayer checking for valid
requests.
[mkp: fixed typo]
Signed-off-by: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de>
Link: http://www.spinics.net/lists/linux-scsi/msg104400.html
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.com>
Tested-by: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
---
drivers/scsi/sg.c | 46 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------
1 file changed, 34 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/scsi/sg.c
+++ b/drivers/scsi/sg.c
@@ -701,18 +701,14 @@ sg_write(struct file *filp, const char _
* is a non-zero input_size, so emit a warning.
*/
if (hp->dxfer_direction == SG_DXFER_TO_FROM_DEV) {
- static char cmd[TASK_COMM_LEN];
- if (strcmp(current->comm, cmd)) {
- printk_ratelimited(KERN_WARNING
- "sg_write: data in/out %d/%d bytes "
- "for SCSI command 0x%x-- guessing "
- "data in;\n program %s not setting "
- "count and/or reply_len properly\n",
- old_hdr.reply_len - (int)SZ_SG_HEADER,
- input_size, (unsigned int) cmnd[0],
- current->comm);
- strcpy(cmd, current->comm);
- }
+ printk_ratelimited(KERN_WARNING
+ "sg_write: data in/out %d/%d bytes "
+ "for SCSI command 0x%x-- guessing "
+ "data in;\n program %s not setting "
+ "count and/or reply_len properly\n",
+ old_hdr.reply_len - (int)SZ_SG_HEADER,
+ input_size, (unsigned int) cmnd[0],
+ current->comm);
}
k = sg_common_write(sfp, srp, cmnd, sfp->timeout, blocking);
return (k < 0) ? k : count;
@@ -790,6 +786,29 @@ sg_new_write(Sg_fd *sfp, struct file *fi
return count;
}
+static bool sg_is_valid_dxfer(sg_io_hdr_t *hp)
+{
+ switch (hp->dxfer_direction) {
+ case SG_DXFER_NONE:
+ if (hp->dxferp || hp->dxfer_len > 0)
+ return false;
+ return true;
+ case SG_DXFER_TO_DEV:
+ case SG_DXFER_FROM_DEV:
+ case SG_DXFER_TO_FROM_DEV:
+ if (!hp->dxferp || hp->dxfer_len == 0)
+ return false;
+ return true;
+ case SG_DXFER_UNKNOWN:
+ if ((!hp->dxferp && hp->dxfer_len) ||
+ (hp->dxferp && hp->dxfer_len == 0))
+ return false;
+ return true;
+ default:
+ return false;
+ }
+}
+
static int
sg_common_write(Sg_fd * sfp, Sg_request * srp,
unsigned char *cmnd, int timeout, int blocking)
@@ -809,6 +828,9 @@ sg_common_write(Sg_fd * sfp, Sg_request
SCSI_LOG_TIMEOUT(4, printk("sg_common_write: scsi opcode=0x%02x, cmd_size=%d\n",
(int) cmnd[0], (int) hp->cmd_len));
+ if (!sg_is_valid_dxfer(hp))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
k = sg_start_req(srp, cmnd);
if (k) {
SCSI_LOG_TIMEOUT(1, printk("sg_common_write: start_req err=%d\n", k));
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 66+ messages in thread* [PATCH 3.16 38/61] scsi: sg: close race condition in sg_remove_sfp_usercontext()
2020-06-09 18:03 [PATCH 3.16 00/61] 3.16.85-rc1 review Ben Hutchings
` (36 preceding siblings ...)
2020-06-09 18:04 ` [PATCH 3.16 37/61] scsi: sg: check for valid direction before starting the request Ben Hutchings
@ 2020-06-09 18:04 ` Ben Hutchings
2020-06-09 18:04 ` [PATCH 3.16 39/61] scsi: sg: fix SG_DXFER_FROM_DEV transfers Ben Hutchings
` (23 subsequent siblings)
61 siblings, 0 replies; 66+ messages in thread
From: Ben Hutchings @ 2020-06-09 18:04 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel, stable
Cc: akpm, Denis Kirjanov, Christoph Hellwig, Johannes Thumshirn,
Martin K. Petersen, Greg Kroah-Hartman, Sasha Levin,
Hannes Reinecke, Hannes Reinecke
3.16.85-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.de>
commit 97d27b0dd015e980ade63fda111fd1353276e28b upstream.
sg_remove_sfp_usercontext() is clearing any sg requests, but needs to
take 'rq_list_lock' when modifying the list.
Reported-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de>
Tested-by: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
---
drivers/scsi/sg.c | 12 ++++++++++--
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/scsi/sg.c
+++ b/drivers/scsi/sg.c
@@ -561,6 +561,7 @@ sg_read(struct file *filp, char __user *
} else
count = (old_hdr->result == 0) ? 0 : -EIO;
sg_finish_rem_req(srp);
+ sg_remove_request(sfp, srp);
retval = count;
free_old_hdr:
kfree(old_hdr);
@@ -601,6 +602,7 @@ sg_new_read(Sg_fd * sfp, char __user *bu
}
err_out:
err2 = sg_finish_rem_req(srp);
+ sg_remove_request(sfp, srp);
return err ? : err2 ? : count;
}
@@ -835,6 +837,7 @@ sg_common_write(Sg_fd * sfp, Sg_request
if (k) {
SCSI_LOG_TIMEOUT(1, printk("sg_common_write: start_req err=%d\n", k));
sg_finish_rem_req(srp);
+ sg_remove_request(sfp, srp);
return k; /* probably out of space --> ENOMEM */
}
if (atomic_read(&sdp->detaching)) {
@@ -844,6 +847,7 @@ sg_common_write(Sg_fd * sfp, Sg_request
}
sg_finish_rem_req(srp);
+ sg_remove_request(sfp, srp);
return -ENODEV;
}
@@ -1367,6 +1371,7 @@ sg_rq_end_io_usercontext(struct work_str
struct sg_fd *sfp = srp->parentfp;
sg_finish_rem_req(srp);
+ sg_remove_request(sfp, srp);
kref_put(&sfp->f_ref, sg_remove_sfp);
}
@@ -1876,8 +1881,6 @@ sg_finish_rem_req(Sg_request *srp)
else
sg_remove_scat(req_schp);
- sg_remove_request(sfp, srp);
-
return ret;
}
@@ -2211,12 +2214,17 @@ sg_remove_sfp_usercontext(struct work_st
struct sg_fd *sfp = container_of(work, struct sg_fd, ew.work);
struct sg_device *sdp = sfp->parentdp;
Sg_request *srp;
+ unsigned long iflags;
/* Cleanup any responses which were never read(). */
+ write_lock_irqsave(&sfp->rq_list_lock, iflags);
while (!list_empty(&sfp->rq_list)) {
srp = list_first_entry(&sfp->rq_list, Sg_request, entry);
sg_finish_rem_req(srp);
+ list_del(&srp->entry);
+ srp->parentfp = NULL;
}
+ write_unlock_irqrestore(&sfp->rq_list_lock, iflags);
if (sfp->reserve.bufflen > 0) {
SCSI_LOG_TIMEOUT(6,
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 66+ messages in thread* [PATCH 3.16 39/61] scsi: sg: fix SG_DXFER_FROM_DEV transfers
2020-06-09 18:03 [PATCH 3.16 00/61] 3.16.85-rc1 review Ben Hutchings
` (37 preceding siblings ...)
2020-06-09 18:04 ` [PATCH 3.16 38/61] scsi: sg: close race condition in sg_remove_sfp_usercontext() Ben Hutchings
@ 2020-06-09 18:04 ` Ben Hutchings
2020-06-09 18:04 ` [PATCH 3.16 40/61] scsi: sg: fix static checker warning in sg_is_valid_dxfer Ben Hutchings
` (22 subsequent siblings)
61 siblings, 0 replies; 66+ messages in thread
From: Ben Hutchings @ 2020-06-09 18:04 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel, stable
Cc: akpm, Denis Kirjanov, Hannes Reinecke, Greg Kroah-Hartman,
Douglas Gilbert, Cristian Crinteanu, Chris Clayton,
Martin K. Petersen, Johannes Thumshirn
3.16.85-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de>
commit 68c59fcea1f2c6a54c62aa896cc623c1b5bc9b47 upstream.
SG_DXFER_FROM_DEV transfers do not necessarily have a dxferp as we set
it to NULL for the old sg_io read/write interface, but must have a
length bigger than 0. This fixes a regression introduced by commit
28676d869bbb ("scsi: sg: check for valid direction before starting the
request")
Signed-off-by: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de>
Fixes: 28676d869bbb ("scsi: sg: check for valid direction before starting the request")
Reported-by: Chris Clayton <chris2553@googlemail.com>
Tested-by: Chris Clayton <chris2553@googlemail.com>
Cc: Douglas Gilbert <dgilbert@interlog.com>
Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.com>
Tested-by: Chris Clayton <chris2553@googlemail.com>
Acked-by: Douglas Gilbert <dgilbert@interlog.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Cc: Cristian Crinteanu <crinteanu.cristian@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
---
drivers/scsi/sg.c | 5 ++++-
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/drivers/scsi/sg.c
+++ b/drivers/scsi/sg.c
@@ -795,8 +795,11 @@ static bool sg_is_valid_dxfer(sg_io_hdr_
if (hp->dxferp || hp->dxfer_len > 0)
return false;
return true;
- case SG_DXFER_TO_DEV:
case SG_DXFER_FROM_DEV:
+ if (hp->dxfer_len < 0)
+ return false;
+ return true;
+ case SG_DXFER_TO_DEV:
case SG_DXFER_TO_FROM_DEV:
if (!hp->dxferp || hp->dxfer_len == 0)
return false;
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 66+ messages in thread* [PATCH 3.16 40/61] scsi: sg: fix static checker warning in sg_is_valid_dxfer
2020-06-09 18:03 [PATCH 3.16 00/61] 3.16.85-rc1 review Ben Hutchings
` (38 preceding siblings ...)
2020-06-09 18:04 ` [PATCH 3.16 39/61] scsi: sg: fix SG_DXFER_FROM_DEV transfers Ben Hutchings
@ 2020-06-09 18:04 ` Ben Hutchings
2020-06-09 18:04 ` [PATCH 3.16 41/61] scsi: sg: only check for dxfer_len greater than 256M Ben Hutchings
` (21 subsequent siblings)
61 siblings, 0 replies; 66+ messages in thread
From: Ben Hutchings @ 2020-06-09 18:04 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel, stable
Cc: akpm, Denis Kirjanov, Johannes Thumshirn, Martin K. Petersen,
Dan Carpenter, Colin Ian King, Greg Kroah-Hartman,
Douglas Gilbert
3.16.85-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de>
commit 14074aba4bcda3764c9a702b276308b89901d5b6 upstream.
dxfer_len is an unsigned int and we always assign a value > 0 to it, so
it doesn't make any sense to check if it is < 0. We can't really check
dxferp as well as we have both NULL and not NULL cases in the possible
call paths.
So just return true for SG_DXFER_FROM_DEV transfer in
sg_is_valid_dxfer().
Signed-off-by: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de>
Reported-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Cc: Douglas Gilbert <dgilbert@interlog.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
---
drivers/scsi/sg.c | 7 +++++--
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/scsi/sg.c
+++ b/drivers/scsi/sg.c
@@ -796,8 +796,11 @@ static bool sg_is_valid_dxfer(sg_io_hdr_
return false;
return true;
case SG_DXFER_FROM_DEV:
- if (hp->dxfer_len < 0)
- return false;
+ /*
+ * for SG_DXFER_FROM_DEV we always set dxfer_len to > 0. dxferp
+ * can either be NULL or != NULL so there's no point in checking
+ * it either. So just return true.
+ */
return true;
case SG_DXFER_TO_DEV:
case SG_DXFER_TO_FROM_DEV:
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 66+ messages in thread* [PATCH 3.16 41/61] scsi: sg: only check for dxfer_len greater than 256M
2020-06-09 18:03 [PATCH 3.16 00/61] 3.16.85-rc1 review Ben Hutchings
` (39 preceding siblings ...)
2020-06-09 18:04 ` [PATCH 3.16 40/61] scsi: sg: fix static checker warning in sg_is_valid_dxfer Ben Hutchings
@ 2020-06-09 18:04 ` Ben Hutchings
2020-06-09 18:04 ` [PATCH 3.16 42/61] scsi: sg: don't return bogus Sg_requests Ben Hutchings
` (20 subsequent siblings)
61 siblings, 0 replies; 66+ messages in thread
From: Ben Hutchings @ 2020-06-09 18:04 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel, stable
Cc: akpm, Denis Kirjanov, Martin K. Petersen, stable,
Johannes Thumshirn, Jason L Tibbitts III, Hannes Reinecke,
Greg Kroah-Hartman, Doug Gilbert
3.16.85-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de>
commit f930c7043663188429cd9b254e9d761edfc101ce upstream.
Don't make any assumptions on the sg_io_hdr_t::dxfer_direction or the
sg_io_hdr_t::dxferp in order to determine if it is a valid request. The
only way we can check for bad requests is by checking if the length
exceeds 256M.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de>
Fixes: 28676d869bbb (scsi: sg: check for valid direction before starting the request)
Reported-by: Jason L Tibbitts III <tibbs@math.uh.edu>
Tested-by: Jason L Tibbitts III <tibbs@math.uh.edu>
Suggested-by: Doug Gilbert <dgilbert@interlog.com>
Cc: Doug Gilbert <dgilbert@interlog.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: Include <linux/sizes.h>]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
---
drivers/scsi/sg.c | 31 +------------------------------
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 30 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/scsi/sg.c
+++ b/drivers/scsi/sg.c
@@ -54,6 +54,7 @@ static int sg_version_num = 30534; /* 2
#include <linux/atomic.h>
#include <linux/ratelimit.h>
#include <linux/cred.h> /* for sg_check_file_access() */
+#include <linux/sizes.h>
#include "scsi.h"
#include <scsi/scsi_dbg.h>
@@ -788,35 +789,6 @@ sg_new_write(Sg_fd *sfp, struct file *fi
return count;
}
-static bool sg_is_valid_dxfer(sg_io_hdr_t *hp)
-{
- switch (hp->dxfer_direction) {
- case SG_DXFER_NONE:
- if (hp->dxferp || hp->dxfer_len > 0)
- return false;
- return true;
- case SG_DXFER_FROM_DEV:
- /*
- * for SG_DXFER_FROM_DEV we always set dxfer_len to > 0. dxferp
- * can either be NULL or != NULL so there's no point in checking
- * it either. So just return true.
- */
- return true;
- case SG_DXFER_TO_DEV:
- case SG_DXFER_TO_FROM_DEV:
- if (!hp->dxferp || hp->dxfer_len == 0)
- return false;
- return true;
- case SG_DXFER_UNKNOWN:
- if ((!hp->dxferp && hp->dxfer_len) ||
- (hp->dxferp && hp->dxfer_len == 0))
- return false;
- return true;
- default:
- return false;
- }
-}
-
static int
sg_common_write(Sg_fd * sfp, Sg_request * srp,
unsigned char *cmnd, int timeout, int blocking)
@@ -836,7 +808,7 @@ sg_common_write(Sg_fd * sfp, Sg_request
SCSI_LOG_TIMEOUT(4, printk("sg_common_write: scsi opcode=0x%02x, cmd_size=%d\n",
(int) cmnd[0], (int) hp->cmd_len));
- if (!sg_is_valid_dxfer(hp))
+ if (hp->dxfer_len >= SZ_256M)
return -EINVAL;
k = sg_start_req(srp, cmnd);
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 66+ messages in thread* [PATCH 3.16 42/61] scsi: sg: don't return bogus Sg_requests
2020-06-09 18:03 [PATCH 3.16 00/61] 3.16.85-rc1 review Ben Hutchings
` (40 preceding siblings ...)
2020-06-09 18:04 ` [PATCH 3.16 41/61] scsi: sg: only check for dxfer_len greater than 256M Ben Hutchings
@ 2020-06-09 18:04 ` Ben Hutchings
2020-06-09 18:28 ` Tony Battersby
2020-06-09 18:04 ` [PATCH 3.16 43/61] scsi: sg: fix minor memory leak in error path Ben Hutchings
` (19 subsequent siblings)
61 siblings, 1 reply; 66+ messages in thread
From: Ben Hutchings @ 2020-06-09 18:04 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel, stable
Cc: akpm, Denis Kirjanov, Martin K. Petersen, Johannes Thumshirn,
Andrey Konovalov, Christoph Hellwig, Tony Battersby,
Hannes Reinecke, Greg Kroah-Hartman, Doug Gilbert
3.16.85-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de>
commit 48ae8484e9fc324b4968d33c585e54bc98e44d61 upstream.
If the list search in sg_get_rq_mark() fails to find a valid request, we
return a bogus element. This then can later lead to a GPF in
sg_remove_scat().
So don't return bogus Sg_requests in sg_get_rq_mark() but NULL in case
the list search doesn't find a valid request.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de>
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.de>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Doug Gilbert <dgilbert@interlog.com>
Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.de>
Acked-by: Doug Gilbert <dgilbert@interlog.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Cc: Tony Battersby <tonyb@cybernetics.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
---
drivers/scsi/sg.c | 5 +++--
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/scsi/sg.c
+++ b/drivers/scsi/sg.c
@@ -2085,11 +2085,12 @@ sg_get_rq_mark(Sg_fd * sfp, int pack_id)
if ((1 == resp->done) && (!resp->sg_io_owned) &&
((-1 == pack_id) || (resp->header.pack_id == pack_id))) {
resp->done = 2; /* guard against other readers */
- break;
+ write_unlock_irqrestore(&sfp->rq_list_lock, iflags);
+ return resp;
}
}
write_unlock_irqrestore(&sfp->rq_list_lock, iflags);
- return resp;
+ return NULL;
}
/* always adds to end of list */
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 66+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH 3.16 42/61] scsi: sg: don't return bogus Sg_requests
2020-06-09 18:04 ` [PATCH 3.16 42/61] scsi: sg: don't return bogus Sg_requests Ben Hutchings
@ 2020-06-09 18:28 ` Tony Battersby
2020-06-09 19:03 ` Ben Hutchings
0 siblings, 1 reply; 66+ messages in thread
From: Tony Battersby @ 2020-06-09 18:28 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Ben Hutchings, linux-kernel, stable
Cc: akpm, Denis Kirjanov, Martin K. Petersen, Johannes Thumshirn,
Andrey Konovalov, Christoph Hellwig, Hannes Reinecke,
Greg Kroah-Hartman, Doug Gilbert
On 6/9/20 2:04 PM, Ben Hutchings wrote:
> 3.16.85-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
>
> ------------------
>
> From: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de>
>
> commit 48ae8484e9fc324b4968d33c585e54bc98e44d61 upstream.
>
> If the list search in sg_get_rq_mark() fails to find a valid request, we
> return a bogus element. This then can later lead to a GPF in
> sg_remove_scat().
>
> So don't return bogus Sg_requests in sg_get_rq_mark() but NULL in case
> the list search doesn't find a valid request.
>
> Signed-off-by: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de>
> Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
> Cc: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.de>
> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
> Cc: Doug Gilbert <dgilbert@interlog.com>
> Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.de>
> Acked-by: Doug Gilbert <dgilbert@interlog.com>
> Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
> Cc: Tony Battersby <tonyb@cybernetics.com>
> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
> ---
> drivers/scsi/sg.c | 5 +++--
> 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> --- a/drivers/scsi/sg.c
> +++ b/drivers/scsi/sg.c
> @@ -2085,11 +2085,12 @@ sg_get_rq_mark(Sg_fd * sfp, int pack_id)
> if ((1 == resp->done) && (!resp->sg_io_owned) &&
> ((-1 == pack_id) || (resp->header.pack_id == pack_id))) {
> resp->done = 2; /* guard against other readers */
> - break;
> + write_unlock_irqrestore(&sfp->rq_list_lock, iflags);
> + return resp;
> }
> }
> write_unlock_irqrestore(&sfp->rq_list_lock, iflags);
> - return resp;
> + return NULL;
> }
>
> /* always adds to end of list */
>
The following "cleanup" commit to the sg driver introduced a number of bugs:
109bade9c625 ("scsi: sg: use standard lists for sg_requests") (v4.12-rc1)
This one bad commit requires all of the following fixes:
48ae8484e9fc ("scsi: sg: don't return bogus Sg_requests") (v4.12-rc1)
bd46fc406b30 ("scsi: sg: off by one in sg_ioctl()") (v4.13-rc7)
4759df905a47 ("scsi: sg: factor out sg_fill_request_table()") (v4.14-rc1)
3e0097499839 ("scsi: sg: fixup infoleak when using SG_GET_REQUEST_TABLE") (v4.14-rc1)
587c3c9f286c ("scsi: sg: Re-fix off by one in sg_fill_request_table()") (v4.14-rc6)
AFAIK, there is no reason to backport any of these changes to -stable,
but if for some reason you do need to backport any one of these patches,
then make sure you get all of them.
My guess is that the initial buggy patch was backported to other -stable
trees because the fixes for it looked important, and of course the fixes
depended on the patch that introduced all of the problems to begin with.
Tony Battersby
Cybernetics
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 66+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH 3.16 42/61] scsi: sg: don't return bogus Sg_requests
2020-06-09 18:28 ` Tony Battersby
@ 2020-06-09 19:03 ` Ben Hutchings
0 siblings, 0 replies; 66+ messages in thread
From: Ben Hutchings @ 2020-06-09 19:03 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Tony Battersby, linux-kernel, stable
Cc: akpm, Denis Kirjanov, Martin K. Petersen, Johannes Thumshirn,
Andrey Konovalov, Christoph Hellwig, Hannes Reinecke,
Greg Kroah-Hartman, Doug Gilbert
[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 3373 bytes --]
On Tue, 2020-06-09 at 14:28 -0400, Tony Battersby wrote:
> On 6/9/20 2:04 PM, Ben Hutchings wrote:
> > 3.16.85-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
> >
> > ------------------
> >
> > From: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de>
> >
> > commit 48ae8484e9fc324b4968d33c585e54bc98e44d61 upstream.
> >
> > If the list search in sg_get_rq_mark() fails to find a valid request, we
> > return a bogus element. This then can later lead to a GPF in
> > sg_remove_scat().
> >
> > So don't return bogus Sg_requests in sg_get_rq_mark() but NULL in case
> > the list search doesn't find a valid request.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de>
> > Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
> > Cc: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.de>
> > Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
> > Cc: Doug Gilbert <dgilbert@interlog.com>
> > Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.de>
> > Acked-by: Doug Gilbert <dgilbert@interlog.com>
> > Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
> > Cc: Tony Battersby <tonyb@cybernetics.com>
> > Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
> > Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
> > ---
> > drivers/scsi/sg.c | 5 +++--
> > 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> >
> > --- a/drivers/scsi/sg.c
> > +++ b/drivers/scsi/sg.c
> > @@ -2085,11 +2085,12 @@ sg_get_rq_mark(Sg_fd * sfp, int pack_id)
> > if ((1 == resp->done) && (!resp->sg_io_owned) &&
> > ((-1 == pack_id) || (resp->header.pack_id == pack_id))) {
> > resp->done = 2; /* guard against other readers */
> > - break;
> > + write_unlock_irqrestore(&sfp->rq_list_lock, iflags);
> > + return resp;
> > }
> > }
> > write_unlock_irqrestore(&sfp->rq_list_lock, iflags);
> > - return resp;
> > + return NULL;
> > }
> >
> > /* always adds to end of list */
> >
> The following "cleanup" commit to the sg driver introduced a number of bugs:
>
> 109bade9c625 ("scsi: sg: use standard lists for sg_requests") (v4.12-rc1)
>
> This one bad commit requires all of the following fixes:
>
> 48ae8484e9fc ("scsi: sg: don't return bogus Sg_requests") (v4.12-rc1)
> bd46fc406b30 ("scsi: sg: off by one in sg_ioctl()") (v4.13-rc7)
> 4759df905a47 ("scsi: sg: factor out sg_fill_request_table()") (v4.14-rc1)
> 3e0097499839 ("scsi: sg: fixup infoleak when using SG_GET_REQUEST_TABLE") (v4.14-rc1)
> 587c3c9f286c ("scsi: sg: Re-fix off by one in sg_fill_request_table()") (v4.14-rc6)
>
> AFAIK, there is no reason to backport any of these changes to -stable,
> but if for some reason you do need to backport any one of these patches,
> then make sure you get all of them.
I couldn't see how to backport some of the more recent fixes without
applying this change first. For this review cycle I've picked all of
the bug fixes that were on the 4.4-stable and 4.9-stable branches and
not yet in 3.16-stable, so I do have all the fixes you identified
above.
Ben.
> My guess is that the initial buggy patch was backported to other -stable
> trees because the fixes for it looked important, and of course the fixes
> depended on the patch that introduced all of the problems to begin with.
--
Ben Hutchings
The two most common things in the universe are hydrogen and stupidity.
[-- Attachment #2: This is a digitally signed message part --]
[-- Type: application/pgp-signature, Size: 833 bytes --]
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 66+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 3.16 43/61] scsi: sg: fix minor memory leak in error path
2020-06-09 18:03 [PATCH 3.16 00/61] 3.16.85-rc1 review Ben Hutchings
` (41 preceding siblings ...)
2020-06-09 18:04 ` [PATCH 3.16 42/61] scsi: sg: don't return bogus Sg_requests Ben Hutchings
@ 2020-06-09 18:04 ` Ben Hutchings
2020-06-09 18:04 ` [PATCH 3.16 44/61] scsi: sg: add sg_remove_request in sg_common_write Ben Hutchings
` (18 subsequent siblings)
61 siblings, 0 replies; 66+ messages in thread
From: Ben Hutchings @ 2020-06-09 18:04 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel, stable
Cc: akpm, Denis Kirjanov, Greg Kroah-Hartman, Bart Van Assche,
Tony Battersby, Ewan D. Milne, Martin K. Petersen, stable
3.16.85-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Tony Battersby <tonyb@cybernetics.com>
commit c170e5a8d222537e98aa8d4fddb667ff7a2ee114 upstream.
Fix a minor memory leak when there is an error opening a /dev/sg device.
Fixes: cc833acbee9d ("sg: O_EXCL and other lock handling")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Ewan D. Milne <emilne@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Tony Battersby <tonyb@cybernetics.com>
Reviewed-by: Bart Van Assche <bart.vanassche@wdc.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
---
drivers/scsi/sg.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
--- a/drivers/scsi/sg.c
+++ b/drivers/scsi/sg.c
@@ -2168,6 +2168,7 @@ sg_add_sfp(Sg_device * sdp, int dev)
write_lock_irqsave(&sdp->sfd_lock, iflags);
if (atomic_read(&sdp->detaching)) {
write_unlock_irqrestore(&sdp->sfd_lock, iflags);
+ kfree(sfp);
return ERR_PTR(-ENODEV);
}
list_add_tail(&sfp->sfd_siblings, &sdp->sfds);
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 66+ messages in thread* [PATCH 3.16 44/61] scsi: sg: add sg_remove_request in sg_common_write
2020-06-09 18:03 [PATCH 3.16 00/61] 3.16.85-rc1 review Ben Hutchings
` (42 preceding siblings ...)
2020-06-09 18:04 ` [PATCH 3.16 43/61] scsi: sg: fix minor memory leak in error path Ben Hutchings
@ 2020-06-09 18:04 ` Ben Hutchings
2020-06-09 18:04 ` [PATCH 3.16 45/61] scsi: sg: add sg_remove_request in sg_write Ben Hutchings
` (17 subsequent siblings)
61 siblings, 0 replies; 66+ messages in thread
From: Ben Hutchings @ 2020-06-09 18:04 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel, stable
Cc: akpm, Denis Kirjanov, Greg Kroah-Hartman, Douglas Gilbert,
Li Bin, Martin K. Petersen
3.16.85-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Li Bin <huawei.libin@huawei.com>
commit 849f8583e955dbe3a1806e03ecacd5e71cce0a08 upstream.
If the dxfer_len is greater than 256M then the request is invalid and we
need to call sg_remove_request in sg_common_write.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1586777361-17339-1-git-send-email-huawei.libin@huawei.com
Fixes: f930c7043663 ("scsi: sg: only check for dxfer_len greater than 256M")
Acked-by: Douglas Gilbert <dgilbert@interlog.com>
Signed-off-by: Li Bin <huawei.libin@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
---
drivers/scsi/sg.c | 4 +++-
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/drivers/scsi/sg.c
+++ b/drivers/scsi/sg.c
@@ -808,8 +808,10 @@ sg_common_write(Sg_fd * sfp, Sg_request
SCSI_LOG_TIMEOUT(4, printk("sg_common_write: scsi opcode=0x%02x, cmd_size=%d\n",
(int) cmnd[0], (int) hp->cmd_len));
- if (hp->dxfer_len >= SZ_256M)
+ if (hp->dxfer_len >= SZ_256M) {
+ sg_remove_request(sfp, srp);
return -EINVAL;
+ }
k = sg_start_req(srp, cmnd);
if (k) {
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 66+ messages in thread* [PATCH 3.16 45/61] scsi: sg: add sg_remove_request in sg_write
2020-06-09 18:03 [PATCH 3.16 00/61] 3.16.85-rc1 review Ben Hutchings
` (43 preceding siblings ...)
2020-06-09 18:04 ` [PATCH 3.16 44/61] scsi: sg: add sg_remove_request in sg_common_write Ben Hutchings
@ 2020-06-09 18:04 ` Ben Hutchings
2020-06-09 18:04 ` [PATCH 3.16 46/61] signal: Extend exec_id to 64bits Ben Hutchings
` (16 subsequent siblings)
61 siblings, 0 replies; 66+ messages in thread
From: Ben Hutchings @ 2020-06-09 18:04 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel, stable
Cc: akpm, Denis Kirjanov, Martin K. Petersen, Wu Bo, Guenter Roeck,
Sasha Levin, Douglas Gilbert, Greg Kroah-Hartman
3.16.85-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Wu Bo <wubo40@huawei.com>
commit 83c6f2390040f188cc25b270b4befeb5628c1aee upstream.
If the __copy_from_user function failed we need to call sg_remove_request
in sg_write.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/610618d9-e983-fd56-ed0f-639428343af7@huawei.com
Acked-by: Douglas Gilbert <dgilbert@interlog.com>
Signed-off-by: Wu Bo <wubo40@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[groeck: Backport to v5.4.y and older kernels]
Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
---
drivers/scsi/sg.c | 4 +++-
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/drivers/scsi/sg.c
+++ b/drivers/scsi/sg.c
@@ -696,8 +696,10 @@ sg_write(struct file *filp, const char _
hp->flags = input_size; /* structure abuse ... */
hp->pack_id = old_hdr.pack_id;
hp->usr_ptr = NULL;
- if (__copy_from_user(cmnd, buf, cmd_size))
+ if (__copy_from_user(cmnd, buf, cmd_size)) {
+ sg_remove_request(sfp, srp);
return -EFAULT;
+ }
/*
* SG_DXFER_TO_FROM_DEV is functionally equivalent to SG_DXFER_FROM_DEV,
* but is is possible that the app intended SG_DXFER_TO_DEV, because there
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 66+ messages in thread* [PATCH 3.16 46/61] signal: Extend exec_id to 64bits
2020-06-09 18:03 [PATCH 3.16 00/61] 3.16.85-rc1 review Ben Hutchings
` (44 preceding siblings ...)
2020-06-09 18:04 ` [PATCH 3.16 45/61] scsi: sg: add sg_remove_request in sg_write Ben Hutchings
@ 2020-06-09 18:04 ` Ben Hutchings
2020-06-09 18:04 ` [PATCH 3.16 47/61] USB: gadget: fix illegal array access in binding with UDC Ben Hutchings
` (15 subsequent siblings)
61 siblings, 0 replies; 66+ messages in thread
From: Ben Hutchings @ 2020-06-09 18:04 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel, stable; +Cc: akpm, Denis Kirjanov, Eric W. Biederman, stable
3.16.85-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
commit d1e7fd6462ca9fc76650fbe6ca800e35b24267da upstream.
Replace the 32bit exec_id with a 64bit exec_id to make it impossible
to wrap the exec_id counter. With care an attacker can cause exec_id
wrap and send arbitrary signals to a newly exec'd parent. This
bypasses the signal sending checks if the parent changes their
credentials during exec.
The severity of this problem can been seen that in my limited testing
of a 32bit exec_id it can take as little as 19s to exec 65536 times.
Which means that it can take as little as 14 days to wrap a 32bit
exec_id. Adam Zabrocki has succeeded wrapping the self_exe_id in 7
days. Even my slower timing is in the uptime of a typical server.
Which means self_exec_id is simply a speed bump today, and if exec
gets noticably faster self_exec_id won't even be a speed bump.
Extending self_exec_id to 64bits introduces a problem on 32bit
architectures where reading self_exec_id is no longer atomic and can
take two read instructions. Which means that is is possible to hit
a window where the read value of exec_id does not match the written
value. So with very lucky timing after this change this still
remains expoiltable.
I have updated the update of exec_id on exec to use WRITE_ONCE
and the read of exec_id in do_notify_parent to use READ_ONCE
to make it clear that there is no locking between these two
locations.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/kernel-hardening/20200324215049.GA3710@pi3.com.pl
Fixes: 2.3.23pre2
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16:
- Use ACCESS_ONCE()
- Adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
---
fs/exec.c | 2 +-
include/linux/sched.h | 4 ++--
kernel/signal.c | 2 +-
3 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
--- a/fs/exec.c
+++ b/fs/exec.c
@@ -1182,7 +1182,7 @@ void setup_new_exec(struct linux_binprm
/* An exec changes our domain. We are no longer part of the thread
group */
- current->self_exec_id++;
+ ACCESS_ONCE(current->self_exec_id) = current->self_exec_id + 1;
flush_signal_handlers(current, 0);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(setup_new_exec);
--- a/include/linux/sched.h
+++ b/include/linux/sched.h
@@ -1427,8 +1427,8 @@ struct task_struct {
struct seccomp seccomp;
/* Thread group tracking */
- u32 parent_exec_id;
- u32 self_exec_id;
+ u64 parent_exec_id;
+ u64 self_exec_id;
/* Protection of (de-)allocation: mm, files, fs, tty, keyrings, mems_allowed,
* mempolicy */
spinlock_t alloc_lock;
--- a/kernel/signal.c
+++ b/kernel/signal.c
@@ -1679,7 +1679,7 @@ bool do_notify_parent(struct task_struct
* This is only possible if parent == real_parent.
* Check if it has changed security domain.
*/
- if (tsk->parent_exec_id != tsk->parent->self_exec_id)
+ if (tsk->parent_exec_id != ACCESS_ONCE(tsk->parent->self_exec_id))
sig = SIGCHLD;
}
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 66+ messages in thread* [PATCH 3.16 47/61] USB: gadget: fix illegal array access in binding with UDC
2020-06-09 18:03 [PATCH 3.16 00/61] 3.16.85-rc1 review Ben Hutchings
` (45 preceding siblings ...)
2020-06-09 18:04 ` [PATCH 3.16 46/61] signal: Extend exec_id to 64bits Ben Hutchings
@ 2020-06-09 18:04 ` Ben Hutchings
2020-06-09 18:04 ` [PATCH 3.16 48/61] ext4: Make checks for metadata_csum feature safer Ben Hutchings
` (14 subsequent siblings)
61 siblings, 0 replies; 66+ messages in thread
From: Ben Hutchings @ 2020-06-09 18:04 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel, stable
Cc: akpm, Denis Kirjanov, stable, Felipe Balbi, Kyungtae Kim,
Greg Kroah-Hartman
3.16.85-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Kyungtae Kim <kt0755@gmail.com>
commit 15753588bcd4bbffae1cca33c8ced5722477fe1f upstream.
FuzzUSB (a variant of syzkaller) found an illegal array access
using an incorrect index while binding a gadget with UDC.
Reference: https://www.spinics.net/lists/linux-usb/msg194331.html
This bug occurs when a size variable used for a buffer
is misused to access its strcpy-ed buffer.
Given a buffer along with its size variable (taken from user input),
from which, a new buffer is created using kstrdup().
Due to the original buffer containing 0 value in the middle,
the size of the kstrdup-ed buffer becomes smaller than that of the original.
So accessing the kstrdup-ed buffer with the same size variable
triggers memory access violation.
The fix makes sure no zero value in the buffer,
by comparing the strlen() of the orignal buffer with the size variable,
so that the access to the kstrdup-ed buffer is safe.
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in gadget_dev_desc_UDC_store+0x1ba/0x200
drivers/usb/gadget/configfs.c:266
Read of size 1 at addr ffff88806a55dd7e by task syz-executor.0/17208
CPU: 2 PID: 17208 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 5.6.8 #1
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0xce/0x128 lib/dump_stack.c:118
print_address_description.constprop.4+0x21/0x3c0 mm/kasan/report.c:374
__kasan_report+0x131/0x1b0 mm/kasan/report.c:506
kasan_report+0x12/0x20 mm/kasan/common.c:641
__asan_report_load1_noabort+0x14/0x20 mm/kasan/generic_report.c:132
gadget_dev_desc_UDC_store+0x1ba/0x200 drivers/usb/gadget/configfs.c:266
flush_write_buffer fs/configfs/file.c:251 [inline]
configfs_write_file+0x2f1/0x4c0 fs/configfs/file.c:283
__vfs_write+0x85/0x110 fs/read_write.c:494
vfs_write+0x1cd/0x510 fs/read_write.c:558
ksys_write+0x18a/0x220 fs/read_write.c:611
__do_sys_write fs/read_write.c:623 [inline]
__se_sys_write fs/read_write.c:620 [inline]
__x64_sys_write+0x73/0xb0 fs/read_write.c:620
do_syscall_64+0x9e/0x510 arch/x86/entry/common.c:294
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
Signed-off-by: Kyungtae Kim <kt0755@gmail.com>
Reported-and-tested-by: Kyungtae Kim <kt0755@gmail.com>
Cc: Felipe Balbi <balbi@kernel.org>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200510054326.GA19198@pizza01
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
---
drivers/usb/gadget/configfs.c | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
--- a/drivers/usb/gadget/configfs.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/gadget/configfs.c
@@ -254,6 +254,9 @@ static ssize_t gadget_dev_desc_UDC_store
char *name;
int ret;
+ if (strlen(page) < len)
+ return -EOVERFLOW;
+
name = kstrdup(page, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!name)
return -ENOMEM;
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 66+ messages in thread* [PATCH 3.16 48/61] ext4: Make checks for metadata_csum feature safer
2020-06-09 18:03 [PATCH 3.16 00/61] 3.16.85-rc1 review Ben Hutchings
` (46 preceding siblings ...)
2020-06-09 18:04 ` [PATCH 3.16 47/61] USB: gadget: fix illegal array access in binding with UDC Ben Hutchings
@ 2020-06-09 18:04 ` Ben Hutchings
2020-06-09 18:04 ` [PATCH 3.16 49/61] ext4: protect journal inode's blocks using block_validity Ben Hutchings
` (13 subsequent siblings)
61 siblings, 0 replies; 66+ messages in thread
From: Ben Hutchings @ 2020-06-09 18:04 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel, stable; +Cc: akpm, Denis Kirjanov, Tahsin Erdogan, Jan Kara
3.16.85-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Tahsin Erdogan <tahsin@google.com>
This is just a small part of commit dec214d00e0d7 "ext4: xattr inode
deduplication" that makes checks for metadata_csum feature safer and is
actually needed by following fixes.
Signed-off-by: Tahsin Erdogan <tahsin@google.com>
Acked-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
[bwh: Ported to 3.16: Use EXT4_HAS_RO_COMPAT_FEATURE()]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
---
--- a/fs/ext4/ext4.h
+++ b/fs/ext4/ext4.h
@@ -2411,21 +2411,24 @@ extern void ext4_group_desc_csum_set(str
extern int ext4_register_li_request(struct super_block *sb,
ext4_group_t first_not_zeroed);
-static inline int ext4_has_group_desc_csum(struct super_block *sb)
-{
- return EXT4_HAS_RO_COMPAT_FEATURE(sb,
- EXT4_FEATURE_RO_COMPAT_GDT_CSUM) ||
- (EXT4_SB(sb)->s_chksum_driver != NULL);
-}
-
static inline int ext4_has_metadata_csum(struct super_block *sb)
{
WARN_ON_ONCE(EXT4_HAS_RO_COMPAT_FEATURE(sb,
EXT4_FEATURE_RO_COMPAT_METADATA_CSUM) &&
!EXT4_SB(sb)->s_chksum_driver);
- return (EXT4_SB(sb)->s_chksum_driver != NULL);
+ return EXT4_HAS_RO_COMPAT_FEATURE(sb,
+ EXT4_FEATURE_RO_COMPAT_METADATA_CSUM) &&
+ (EXT4_SB(sb)->s_chksum_driver != NULL);
+}
+
+static inline int ext4_has_group_desc_csum(struct super_block *sb)
+{
+ return EXT4_HAS_RO_COMPAT_FEATURE(sb,
+ EXT4_FEATURE_RO_COMPAT_GDT_CSUM) ||
+ ext4_has_metadata_csum(sb);
}
+
static inline ext4_fsblk_t ext4_blocks_count(struct ext4_super_block *es)
{
return ((ext4_fsblk_t)le32_to_cpu(es->s_blocks_count_hi) << 32) |
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 66+ messages in thread* [PATCH 3.16 49/61] ext4: protect journal inode's blocks using block_validity
2020-06-09 18:03 [PATCH 3.16 00/61] 3.16.85-rc1 review Ben Hutchings
` (47 preceding siblings ...)
2020-06-09 18:04 ` [PATCH 3.16 48/61] ext4: Make checks for metadata_csum feature safer Ben Hutchings
@ 2020-06-09 18:04 ` Ben Hutchings
2020-06-09 18:04 ` [PATCH 3.16 50/61] ext4: unsigned int compared against zero Ben Hutchings
` (12 subsequent siblings)
61 siblings, 0 replies; 66+ messages in thread
From: Ben Hutchings @ 2020-06-09 18:04 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel, stable; +Cc: akpm, Denis Kirjanov, Theodore Ts'o, stable
3.16.85-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
commit 345c0dbf3a30872d9b204db96b5857cd00808cae upstream.
Add the blocks which belong to the journal inode to block_validity's
system zone so attempts to deallocate or overwrite the journal due a
corrupted file system where the journal blocks are also claimed by
another inode.
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=202879
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
[bwh: Backported to 3.16:
- Use EXT4_HAS_COMPAT_FEATURE()
- Use EIO instead of EFSCORRUPTED]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
---
--- a/fs/ext4/block_validity.c
+++ b/fs/ext4/block_validity.c
@@ -137,6 +137,48 @@ static void debug_print_tree(struct ext4
printk("\n");
}
+static int ext4_protect_reserved_inode(struct super_block *sb, u32 ino)
+{
+ struct inode *inode;
+ struct ext4_sb_info *sbi = EXT4_SB(sb);
+ struct ext4_map_blocks map;
+ u32 i = 0, err = 0, num, n;
+
+ if ((ino < EXT4_ROOT_INO) ||
+ (ino > le32_to_cpu(sbi->s_es->s_inodes_count)))
+ return -EINVAL;
+ inode = ext4_iget(sb, ino, EXT4_IGET_SPECIAL);
+ if (IS_ERR(inode))
+ return PTR_ERR(inode);
+ num = (inode->i_size + sb->s_blocksize - 1) >> sb->s_blocksize_bits;
+ while (i < num) {
+ map.m_lblk = i;
+ map.m_len = num - i;
+ n = ext4_map_blocks(NULL, inode, &map, 0);
+ if (n < 0) {
+ err = n;
+ break;
+ }
+ if (n == 0) {
+ i++;
+ } else {
+ if (!ext4_data_block_valid(sbi, map.m_pblk, n)) {
+ ext4_error(sb, "blocks %llu-%llu from inode %u "
+ "overlap system zone", map.m_pblk,
+ map.m_pblk + map.m_len - 1, ino);
+ err = -EIO;
+ break;
+ }
+ err = add_system_zone(sbi, map.m_pblk, n);
+ if (err < 0)
+ break;
+ i += n;
+ }
+ }
+ iput(inode);
+ return err;
+}
+
int ext4_setup_system_zone(struct super_block *sb)
{
ext4_group_t ngroups = ext4_get_groups_count(sb);
@@ -171,6 +213,13 @@ int ext4_setup_system_zone(struct super_
if (ret)
return ret;
}
+ if (EXT4_HAS_COMPAT_FEATURE(sb, EXT4_FEATURE_COMPAT_HAS_JOURNAL) &&
+ sbi->s_es->s_journal_inum) {
+ ret = ext4_protect_reserved_inode(sb,
+ le32_to_cpu(sbi->s_es->s_journal_inum));
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+ }
if (test_opt(sb, DEBUG))
debug_print_tree(EXT4_SB(sb));
--- a/fs/ext4/inode.c
+++ b/fs/ext4/inode.c
@@ -411,6 +411,11 @@ static int __check_block_validity(struct
unsigned int line,
struct ext4_map_blocks *map)
{
+ if (EXT4_HAS_COMPAT_FEATURE(inode->i_sb,
+ EXT4_FEATURE_COMPAT_HAS_JOURNAL) &&
+ (inode->i_ino ==
+ le32_to_cpu(EXT4_SB(inode->i_sb)->s_es->s_journal_inum)))
+ return 0;
if (!ext4_data_block_valid(EXT4_SB(inode->i_sb), map->m_pblk,
map->m_len)) {
ext4_error_inode(inode, func, line, map->m_pblk,
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 66+ messages in thread* [PATCH 3.16 50/61] ext4: unsigned int compared against zero
2020-06-09 18:03 [PATCH 3.16 00/61] 3.16.85-rc1 review Ben Hutchings
` (48 preceding siblings ...)
2020-06-09 18:04 ` [PATCH 3.16 49/61] ext4: protect journal inode's blocks using block_validity Ben Hutchings
@ 2020-06-09 18:04 ` Ben Hutchings
2020-06-09 18:04 ` [PATCH 3.16 51/61] ext4: fix block validity checks for journal inodes using indirect blocks Ben Hutchings
` (11 subsequent siblings)
61 siblings, 0 replies; 66+ messages in thread
From: Ben Hutchings @ 2020-06-09 18:04 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel, stable
Cc: akpm, Denis Kirjanov, Colin Ian King, Theodore Ts'o
3.16.85-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
commit fbbbbd2f28aec991f3fbc248df211550fbdfd58c upstream.
There are two cases where u32 variables n and err are being checked
for less than zero error values, the checks is always false because
the variables are not signed. Fix this by making the variables ints.
Addresses-Coverity: ("Unsigned compared against 0")
Fixes: 345c0dbf3a30 ("ext4: protect journal inode's blocks using block_validity")
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
---
fs/ext4/block_validity.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/fs/ext4/block_validity.c
+++ b/fs/ext4/block_validity.c
@@ -142,7 +142,8 @@ static int ext4_protect_reserved_inode(s
struct inode *inode;
struct ext4_sb_info *sbi = EXT4_SB(sb);
struct ext4_map_blocks map;
- u32 i = 0, err = 0, num, n;
+ u32 i = 0, num;
+ int err = 0, n;
if ((ino < EXT4_ROOT_INO) ||
(ino > le32_to_cpu(sbi->s_es->s_inodes_count)))
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 66+ messages in thread* [PATCH 3.16 51/61] ext4: fix block validity checks for journal inodes using indirect blocks
2020-06-09 18:03 [PATCH 3.16 00/61] 3.16.85-rc1 review Ben Hutchings
` (49 preceding siblings ...)
2020-06-09 18:04 ` [PATCH 3.16 50/61] ext4: unsigned int compared against zero Ben Hutchings
@ 2020-06-09 18:04 ` Ben Hutchings
2020-06-09 18:04 ` [PATCH 3.16 52/61] ext4: don't perform block validity checks on the journal inode Ben Hutchings
` (10 subsequent siblings)
61 siblings, 0 replies; 66+ messages in thread
From: Ben Hutchings @ 2020-06-09 18:04 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel, stable
Cc: akpm, Denis Kirjanov, Theodore Ts'o, Arthur Marsh
3.16.85-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
commit 170417c8c7bb2cbbdd949bf5c443c0c8f24a203b upstream.
Commit 345c0dbf3a30 ("ext4: protect journal inode's blocks using
block_validity") failed to add an exception for the journal inode in
ext4_check_blockref(), which is the function used by ext4_get_branch()
for indirect blocks. This caused attempts to read from the ext3-style
journals to fail with:
[ 848.968550] EXT4-fs error (device sdb7): ext4_get_branch:171: inode #8: block 30343695: comm jbd2/sdb7-8: invalid block
Fix this by adding the missing exception check.
Fixes: 345c0dbf3a30 ("ext4: protect journal inode's blocks using block_validity")
Reported-by: Arthur Marsh <arthur.marsh@internode.on.net>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: Use EXT4_HAS_COMPAT_FEATURE]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
---
--- a/fs/ext4/block_validity.c
+++ b/fs/ext4/block_validity.c
@@ -277,6 +277,12 @@ int ext4_check_blockref(const char *func
__le32 *bref = p;
unsigned int blk;
+ if (EXT4_HAS_COMPAT_FEATURE(inode->i_sb,
+ EXT4_FEATURE_COMPAT_HAS_JOURNAL) &&
+ (inode->i_ino ==
+ le32_to_cpu(EXT4_SB(inode->i_sb)->s_es->s_journal_inum)))
+ return 0;
+
while (bref < p+max) {
blk = le32_to_cpu(*bref++);
if (blk &&
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 66+ messages in thread* [PATCH 3.16 52/61] ext4: don't perform block validity checks on the journal inode
2020-06-09 18:03 [PATCH 3.16 00/61] 3.16.85-rc1 review Ben Hutchings
` (50 preceding siblings ...)
2020-06-09 18:04 ` [PATCH 3.16 51/61] ext4: fix block validity checks for journal inodes using indirect blocks Ben Hutchings
@ 2020-06-09 18:04 ` Ben Hutchings
2020-06-09 18:04 ` [PATCH 3.16 53/61] ext4: add cond_resched() to ext4_protect_reserved_inode Ben Hutchings
` (9 subsequent siblings)
61 siblings, 0 replies; 66+ messages in thread
From: Ben Hutchings @ 2020-06-09 18:04 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel, stable
Cc: akpm, Denis Kirjanov, Theodore Ts'o, Naresh Kamboju, Dan Rue
3.16.85-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
commit 0a944e8a6c66ca04c7afbaa17e22bf208a8b37f0 upstream.
Since the journal inode is already checked when we added it to the
block validity's system zone, if we check it again, we'll just trigger
a failure.
This was causing failures like this:
[ 53.897001] EXT4-fs error (device sda): ext4_find_extent:909: inode
#8: comm jbd2/sda-8: pblk 121667583 bad header/extent: invalid extent entries - magic f30a, entries 8, max 340(340), depth 0(0)
[ 53.931430] jbd2_journal_bmap: journal block not found at offset 49 on sda-8
[ 53.938480] Aborting journal on device sda-8.
... but only if the system was under enough memory pressure that
logical->physical mapping for the journal inode gets pushed out of the
extent cache. (This is why it wasn't noticed earlier.)
Fixes: 345c0dbf3a30 ("ext4: protect journal inode's blocks using block_validity")
Reported-by: Dan Rue <dan.rue@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Tested-by: Naresh Kamboju <naresh.kamboju@linaro.org>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: Use EXT4_HAS_COMPAT_FEATURE()]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
---
--- a/fs/ext4/extents.c
+++ b/fs/ext4/extents.c
@@ -503,10 +503,15 @@ __read_extent_tree_block(const char *fun
}
if (buffer_verified(bh) && !(flags & EXT4_EX_FORCE_CACHE))
return bh;
- err = __ext4_ext_check(function, line, inode,
- ext_block_hdr(bh), depth, pblk);
- if (err)
- goto errout;
+ if (!EXT4_HAS_COMPAT_FEATURE(inode->i_sb,
+ EXT4_FEATURE_COMPAT_HAS_JOURNAL) ||
+ (inode->i_ino !=
+ le32_to_cpu(EXT4_SB(inode->i_sb)->s_es->s_journal_inum))) {
+ err = __ext4_ext_check(function, line, inode,
+ ext_block_hdr(bh), depth, pblk);
+ if (err)
+ goto errout;
+ }
set_buffer_verified(bh);
/*
* If this is a leaf block, cache all of its entries
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 66+ messages in thread* [PATCH 3.16 53/61] ext4: add cond_resched() to ext4_protect_reserved_inode
2020-06-09 18:03 [PATCH 3.16 00/61] 3.16.85-rc1 review Ben Hutchings
` (51 preceding siblings ...)
2020-06-09 18:04 ` [PATCH 3.16 52/61] ext4: don't perform block validity checks on the journal inode Ben Hutchings
@ 2020-06-09 18:04 ` Ben Hutchings
2020-06-09 18:04 ` [PATCH 3.16 54/61] x86/cpu: Rename cpu_data.x86_mask to cpu_data.x86_stepping Ben Hutchings
` (8 subsequent siblings)
61 siblings, 0 replies; 66+ messages in thread
From: Ben Hutchings @ 2020-06-09 18:04 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel, stable
Cc: akpm, Denis Kirjanov, stable, Theodore Ts'o, Jan Kara, Shijie Luo
3.16.85-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Shijie Luo <luoshijie1@huawei.com>
commit af133ade9a40794a37104ecbcc2827c0ea373a3c upstream.
When journal size is set too big by "mkfs.ext4 -J size=", or when
we mount a crafted image to make journal inode->i_size too big,
the loop, "while (i < num)", holds cpu too long. This could cause
soft lockup.
[ 529.357541] Call trace:
[ 529.357551] dump_backtrace+0x0/0x198
[ 529.357555] show_stack+0x24/0x30
[ 529.357562] dump_stack+0xa4/0xcc
[ 529.357568] watchdog_timer_fn+0x300/0x3e8
[ 529.357574] __hrtimer_run_queues+0x114/0x358
[ 529.357576] hrtimer_interrupt+0x104/0x2d8
[ 529.357580] arch_timer_handler_virt+0x38/0x58
[ 529.357584] handle_percpu_devid_irq+0x90/0x248
[ 529.357588] generic_handle_irq+0x34/0x50
[ 529.357590] __handle_domain_irq+0x68/0xc0
[ 529.357593] gic_handle_irq+0x6c/0x150
[ 529.357595] el1_irq+0xb8/0x140
[ 529.357599] __ll_sc_atomic_add_return_acquire+0x14/0x20
[ 529.357668] ext4_map_blocks+0x64/0x5c0 [ext4]
[ 529.357693] ext4_setup_system_zone+0x330/0x458 [ext4]
[ 529.357717] ext4_fill_super+0x2170/0x2ba8 [ext4]
[ 529.357722] mount_bdev+0x1a8/0x1e8
[ 529.357746] ext4_mount+0x44/0x58 [ext4]
[ 529.357748] mount_fs+0x50/0x170
[ 529.357752] vfs_kern_mount.part.9+0x54/0x188
[ 529.357755] do_mount+0x5ac/0xd78
[ 529.357758] ksys_mount+0x9c/0x118
[ 529.357760] __arm64_sys_mount+0x28/0x38
[ 529.357764] el0_svc_common+0x78/0x130
[ 529.357766] el0_svc_handler+0x38/0x78
[ 529.357769] el0_svc+0x8/0xc
[ 541.356516] watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#0 stuck for 23s! [mount:18674]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200211011752.29242-1-luoshijie1@huawei.com
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Shijie Luo <luoshijie1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
---
fs/ext4/block_validity.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
--- a/fs/ext4/block_validity.c
+++ b/fs/ext4/block_validity.c
@@ -153,6 +153,7 @@ static int ext4_protect_reserved_inode(s
return PTR_ERR(inode);
num = (inode->i_size + sb->s_blocksize - 1) >> sb->s_blocksize_bits;
while (i < num) {
+ cond_resched();
map.m_lblk = i;
map.m_len = num - i;
n = ext4_map_blocks(NULL, inode, &map, 0);
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 66+ messages in thread* [PATCH 3.16 54/61] x86/cpu: Rename cpu_data.x86_mask to cpu_data.x86_stepping
2020-06-09 18:03 [PATCH 3.16 00/61] 3.16.85-rc1 review Ben Hutchings
` (52 preceding siblings ...)
2020-06-09 18:04 ` [PATCH 3.16 53/61] ext4: add cond_resched() to ext4_protect_reserved_inode Ben Hutchings
@ 2020-06-09 18:04 ` Ben Hutchings
2020-06-09 18:04 ` [PATCH 3.16 55/61] x86/cpu: Add a steppings field to struct x86_cpu_id Ben Hutchings
` (7 subsequent siblings)
61 siblings, 0 replies; 66+ messages in thread
From: Ben Hutchings @ 2020-06-09 18:04 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel, stable
Cc: akpm, Denis Kirjanov, tony.luck, bp, Linus Torvalds,
Greg Kroah-Hartman, Jia Zhang, Peter Zijlstra, Ingo Molnar,
Thomas Gleixner
3.16.85-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jia Zhang <qianyue.zj@alibaba-inc.com>
commit b399151cb48db30ad1e0e93dd40d68c6d007b637 upstream.
x86_mask is a confusing name which is hard to associate with the
processor's stepping.
Additionally, correct an indent issue in lib/cpu.c.
Signed-off-by: Jia Zhang <qianyue.zj@alibaba-inc.com>
[ Updated it to more recent kernels. ]
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: bp@alien8.de
Cc: tony.luck@intel.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1514771530-70829-1-git-send-email-qianyue.zj@alibaba-inc.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16:
- Drop changes in arch/x86/lib/cpu.c
- Adjust filenames, context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/acpi.h | 2 +-
arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h | 2 +-
arch/x86/kernel/amd_nb.c | 2 +-
arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets_32.c | 2 +-
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c | 28 +++++++++++-----------
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/centaur.c | 4 ++--
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 8 +++----
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cyrix.c | 2 +-
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c | 18 +++++++-------
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/intel.c | 4 ++--
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mtrr/generic.c | 2 +-
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mtrr/main.c | 4 ++--
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel.c | 2 +-
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel_lbr.c | 2 +-
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_p6.c | 2 +-
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/proc.c | 4 ++--
arch/x86/kernel/head_32.S | 4 ++--
arch/x86/kernel/mpparse.c | 2 +-
drivers/char/hw_random/via-rng.c | 2 +-
drivers/cpufreq/acpi-cpufreq.c | 2 +-
drivers/cpufreq/longhaul.c | 6 ++---
drivers/cpufreq/p4-clockmod.c | 2 +-
drivers/cpufreq/powernow-k7.c | 2 +-
drivers/cpufreq/speedstep-centrino.c | 4 ++--
drivers/cpufreq/speedstep-lib.c | 6 ++---
drivers/crypto/padlock-aes.c | 2 +-
drivers/edac/amd64_edac.c | 2 +-
drivers/edac/mce_amd.c | 2 +-
drivers/hwmon/coretemp.c | 6 ++---
drivers/hwmon/hwmon-vid.c | 2 +-
drivers/hwmon/k10temp.c | 2 +-
drivers/hwmon/k8temp.c | 2 +-
drivers/video/fbdev/geode/video_gx.c | 2 +-
33 files changed, 69 insertions(+), 69 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/acpi.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/acpi.h
@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ static inline unsigned int acpi_processo
if (boot_cpu_data.x86 == 0x0F &&
boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_AMD &&
boot_cpu_data.x86_model <= 0x05 &&
- boot_cpu_data.x86_mask < 0x0A)
+ boot_cpu_data.x86_stepping < 0x0A)
return 1;
else if (amd_e400_c1e_detected)
return 1;
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ struct cpuinfo_x86 {
__u8 x86; /* CPU family */
__u8 x86_vendor; /* CPU vendor */
__u8 x86_model;
- __u8 x86_mask;
+ __u8 x86_stepping;
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
char wp_works_ok; /* It doesn't on 386's */
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/amd_nb.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/amd_nb.c
@@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ int amd_cache_northbridges(void)
if (boot_cpu_data.x86 == 0x10 &&
boot_cpu_data.x86_model >= 0x8 &&
(boot_cpu_data.x86_model > 0x9 ||
- boot_cpu_data.x86_mask >= 0x1))
+ boot_cpu_data.x86_stepping >= 0x1))
amd_northbridges.flags |= AMD_NB_L3_INDEX_DISABLE;
if (boot_cpu_data.x86 == 0x15)
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets_32.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets_32.c
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ void foo(void)
OFFSET(CPUINFO_x86, cpuinfo_x86, x86);
OFFSET(CPUINFO_x86_vendor, cpuinfo_x86, x86_vendor);
OFFSET(CPUINFO_x86_model, cpuinfo_x86, x86_model);
- OFFSET(CPUINFO_x86_mask, cpuinfo_x86, x86_mask);
+ OFFSET(CPUINFO_x86_stepping, cpuinfo_x86, x86_stepping);
OFFSET(CPUINFO_cpuid_level, cpuinfo_x86, cpuid_level);
OFFSET(CPUINFO_x86_capability, cpuinfo_x86, x86_capability);
OFFSET(CPUINFO_x86_vendor_id, cpuinfo_x86, x86_vendor_id);
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
@@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ static void init_amd_k6(struct cpuinfo_x
return;
}
- if (c->x86_model == 6 && c->x86_mask == 1) {
+ if (c->x86_model == 6 && c->x86_stepping == 1) {
const int K6_BUG_LOOP = 1000000;
int n;
void (*f_vide)(void);
@@ -131,7 +131,7 @@ static void init_amd_k6(struct cpuinfo_x
/* K6 with old style WHCR */
if (c->x86_model < 8 ||
- (c->x86_model == 8 && c->x86_mask < 8)) {
+ (c->x86_model == 8 && c->x86_stepping < 8)) {
/* We can only write allocate on the low 508Mb */
if (mbytes > 508)
mbytes = 508;
@@ -150,7 +150,7 @@ static void init_amd_k6(struct cpuinfo_x
return;
}
- if ((c->x86_model == 8 && c->x86_mask > 7) ||
+ if ((c->x86_model == 8 && c->x86_stepping > 7) ||
c->x86_model == 9 || c->x86_model == 13) {
/* The more serious chips .. */
@@ -190,12 +190,12 @@ static void amd_k7_smp_check(struct cpui
* but they are not certified as MP capable.
*/
/* Athlon 660/661 is valid. */
- if ((c->x86_model == 6) && ((c->x86_mask == 0) ||
- (c->x86_mask == 1)))
+ if ((c->x86_model == 6) && ((c->x86_stepping == 0) ||
+ (c->x86_stepping == 1)))
return;
/* Duron 670 is valid */
- if ((c->x86_model == 7) && (c->x86_mask == 0))
+ if ((c->x86_model == 7) && (c->x86_stepping == 0))
return;
/*
@@ -205,8 +205,8 @@ static void amd_k7_smp_check(struct cpui
* See http://www.heise.de/newsticker/data/jow-18.10.01-000 for
* more.
*/
- if (((c->x86_model == 6) && (c->x86_mask >= 2)) ||
- ((c->x86_model == 7) && (c->x86_mask >= 1)) ||
+ if (((c->x86_model == 6) && (c->x86_stepping >= 2)) ||
+ ((c->x86_model == 7) && (c->x86_stepping >= 1)) ||
(c->x86_model > 7))
if (cpu_has_mp)
return;
@@ -244,7 +244,7 @@ static void init_amd_k7(struct cpuinfo_x
* are more robust with CLK_CTL set to 200xxxxx instead of 600xxxxx
* As per AMD technical note 27212 0.2
*/
- if ((c->x86_model == 8 && c->x86_mask >= 1) || (c->x86_model > 8)) {
+ if ((c->x86_model == 8 && c->x86_stepping >= 1) || (c->x86_model > 8)) {
rdmsr(MSR_K7_CLK_CTL, l, h);
if ((l & 0xfff00000) != 0x20000000) {
printk(KERN_INFO
@@ -514,7 +514,7 @@ static void early_init_amd(struct cpuinf
/* Set MTRR capability flag if appropriate */
if (c->x86 == 5)
if (c->x86_model == 13 || c->x86_model == 9 ||
- (c->x86_model == 8 && c->x86_mask >= 8))
+ (c->x86_model == 8 && c->x86_stepping >= 8))
set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_K6_MTRR);
#endif
#if defined(CONFIG_X86_LOCAL_APIC) && defined(CONFIG_PCI)
@@ -561,7 +561,7 @@ static void init_amd_zn(struct cpuinfo_x
* Fix erratum 1076: CPB feature bit not being set in CPUID. It affects
* all up to and including B1.
*/
- if (c->x86_model <= 1 && c->x86_mask <= 1)
+ if (c->x86_model <= 1 && c->x86_stepping <= 1)
set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_CPB);
}
@@ -810,11 +810,11 @@ static unsigned int amd_size_cache(struc
/* AMD errata T13 (order #21922) */
if ((c->x86 == 6)) {
/* Duron Rev A0 */
- if (c->x86_model == 3 && c->x86_mask == 0)
+ if (c->x86_model == 3 && c->x86_stepping == 0)
size = 64;
/* Tbird rev A1/A2 */
if (c->x86_model == 4 &&
- (c->x86_mask == 0 || c->x86_mask == 1))
+ (c->x86_stepping == 0 || c->x86_stepping == 1))
size = 256;
}
return size;
@@ -951,7 +951,7 @@ static bool cpu_has_amd_erratum(struct c
}
/* OSVW unavailable or ID unknown, match family-model-stepping range */
- ms = (cpu->x86_model << 4) | cpu->x86_mask;
+ ms = (cpu->x86_model << 4) | cpu->x86_stepping;
while ((range = *erratum++))
if ((cpu->x86 == AMD_MODEL_RANGE_FAMILY(range)) &&
(ms >= AMD_MODEL_RANGE_START(range)) &&
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/centaur.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/centaur.c
@@ -134,7 +134,7 @@ static void init_centaur(struct cpuinfo_
clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_TSC);
break;
case 8:
- switch (c->x86_mask) {
+ switch (c->x86_stepping) {
default:
name = "2";
break;
@@ -209,7 +209,7 @@ centaur_size_cache(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c
* - Note, it seems this may only be in engineering samples.
*/
if ((c->x86 == 6) && (c->x86_model == 9) &&
- (c->x86_mask == 1) && (size == 65))
+ (c->x86_stepping == 1) && (size == 65))
size -= 1;
return size;
}
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -659,7 +659,7 @@ void cpu_detect(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
cpuid(0x00000001, &tfms, &misc, &junk, &cap0);
c->x86 = (tfms >> 8) & 0xf;
c->x86_model = (tfms >> 4) & 0xf;
- c->x86_mask = tfms & 0xf;
+ c->x86_stepping = tfms & 0xf;
if (c->x86 == 0xf)
c->x86 += (tfms >> 20) & 0xff;
@@ -1095,7 +1095,7 @@ static void identify_cpu(struct cpuinfo_
c->loops_per_jiffy = loops_per_jiffy;
c->x86_cache_size = 0;
c->x86_vendor = X86_VENDOR_UNKNOWN;
- c->x86_model = c->x86_mask = 0; /* So far unknown... */
+ c->x86_model = c->x86_stepping = 0; /* So far unknown... */
c->x86_vendor_id[0] = '\0'; /* Unset */
c->x86_model_id[0] = '\0'; /* Unset */
c->x86_max_cores = 1;
@@ -1356,8 +1356,8 @@ void print_cpu_info(struct cpuinfo_x86 *
printk(KERN_CONT " (fam: %02x, model: %02x", c->x86, c->x86_model);
- if (c->x86_mask || c->cpuid_level >= 0)
- printk(KERN_CONT ", stepping: %02x)\n", c->x86_mask);
+ if (c->x86_stepping || c->cpuid_level >= 0)
+ printk(KERN_CONT ", stepping: %02x)\n", c->x86_stepping);
else
printk(KERN_CONT ")\n");
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cyrix.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cyrix.c
@@ -212,7 +212,7 @@ static void init_cyrix(struct cpuinfo_x8
/* common case step number/rev -- exceptions handled below */
c->x86_model = (dir1 >> 4) + 1;
- c->x86_mask = dir1 & 0xf;
+ c->x86_stepping = dir1 & 0xf;
/* Now cook; the original recipe is by Channing Corn, from Cyrix.
* We do the same thing for each generation: we work out
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c
@@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ static bool bad_spectre_microcode(struct
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(spectre_bad_microcodes); i++) {
if (c->x86_model == spectre_bad_microcodes[i].model &&
- c->x86_mask == spectre_bad_microcodes[i].stepping)
+ c->x86_stepping == spectre_bad_microcodes[i].stepping)
return (c->microcode <= spectre_bad_microcodes[i].microcode);
}
return false;
@@ -131,7 +131,7 @@ static void early_init_intel(struct cpui
* need the microcode to have already been loaded... so if it is
* not, recommend a BIOS update and disable large pages.
*/
- if (c->x86 == 6 && c->x86_model == 0x1c && c->x86_mask <= 2 &&
+ if (c->x86 == 6 && c->x86_model == 0x1c && c->x86_stepping <= 2 &&
c->microcode < 0x20e) {
printk(KERN_WARNING "Atom PSE erratum detected, BIOS microcode update recommended\n");
clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_PSE);
@@ -147,7 +147,7 @@ static void early_init_intel(struct cpui
/* CPUID workaround for 0F33/0F34 CPU */
if (c->x86 == 0xF && c->x86_model == 0x3
- && (c->x86_mask == 0x3 || c->x86_mask == 0x4))
+ && (c->x86_stepping == 0x3 || c->x86_stepping == 0x4))
c->x86_phys_bits = 36;
/*
@@ -246,7 +246,7 @@ int ppro_with_ram_bug(void)
if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_INTEL &&
boot_cpu_data.x86 == 6 &&
boot_cpu_data.x86_model == 1 &&
- boot_cpu_data.x86_mask < 8) {
+ boot_cpu_data.x86_stepping < 8) {
printk(KERN_INFO "Pentium Pro with Errata#50 detected. Taking evasive action.\n");
return 1;
}
@@ -263,7 +263,7 @@ static void intel_smp_check(struct cpuin
* Mask B, Pentium, but not Pentium MMX
*/
if (c->x86 == 5 &&
- c->x86_mask >= 1 && c->x86_mask <= 4 &&
+ c->x86_stepping >= 1 && c->x86_stepping <= 4 &&
c->x86_model <= 3) {
/*
* Remember we have B step Pentia with bugs
@@ -305,7 +305,7 @@ static void intel_workarounds(struct cpu
* SEP CPUID bug: Pentium Pro reports SEP but doesn't have it until
* model 3 mask 3
*/
- if ((c->x86<<8 | c->x86_model<<4 | c->x86_mask) < 0x633)
+ if ((c->x86<<8 | c->x86_model<<4 | c->x86_stepping) < 0x633)
clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_SEP);
/*
@@ -323,7 +323,7 @@ static void intel_workarounds(struct cpu
* P4 Xeon errata 037 workaround.
* Hardware prefetcher may cause stale data to be loaded into the cache.
*/
- if ((c->x86 == 15) && (c->x86_model == 1) && (c->x86_mask == 1)) {
+ if ((c->x86 == 15) && (c->x86_model == 1) && (c->x86_stepping == 1)) {
if (msr_set_bit(MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE,
MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE_PREFETCH_DISABLE_BIT)
> 0) {
@@ -339,7 +339,7 @@ static void intel_workarounds(struct cpu
* Specification Update").
*/
if (cpu_has_apic && (c->x86<<8 | c->x86_model<<4) == 0x520 &&
- (c->x86_mask < 0x6 || c->x86_mask == 0xb))
+ (c->x86_stepping < 0x6 || c->x86_stepping == 0xb))
set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_11AP);
@@ -523,7 +523,7 @@ static void init_intel(struct cpuinfo_x8
case 6:
if (l2 == 128)
p = "Celeron (Mendocino)";
- else if (c->x86_mask == 0 || c->x86_mask == 5)
+ else if (c->x86_stepping == 0 || c->x86_stepping == 5)
p = "Celeron-A";
break;
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/intel.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/intel.c
@@ -291,7 +291,7 @@ static bool is_blacklisted(unsigned int
*/
if (c->x86 == 6 &&
c->x86_model == 0x4F &&
- c->x86_mask == 0x01 &&
+ c->x86_stepping == 0x01 &&
llc_size_per_core > 2621440 &&
c->microcode < 0x0b000021) {
pr_err_once("Erratum BDF90: late loading with revision < 0x0b000021 (0x%x) disabled.\n", c->microcode);
@@ -314,7 +314,7 @@ static enum ucode_state request_microcod
return UCODE_NFOUND;
sprintf(name, "intel-ucode/%02x-%02x-%02x",
- c->x86, c->x86_model, c->x86_mask);
+ c->x86, c->x86_model, c->x86_stepping);
if (request_firmware_direct(&firmware, name, device)) {
pr_debug("data file %s load failed\n", name);
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mtrr/generic.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mtrr/generic.c
@@ -791,7 +791,7 @@ int generic_validate_add_page(unsigned l
*/
if (is_cpu(INTEL) && boot_cpu_data.x86 == 6 &&
boot_cpu_data.x86_model == 1 &&
- boot_cpu_data.x86_mask <= 7) {
+ boot_cpu_data.x86_stepping <= 7) {
if (base & ((1 << (22 - PAGE_SHIFT)) - 1)) {
pr_warning("mtrr: base(0x%lx000) is not 4 MiB aligned\n", base);
return -EINVAL;
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mtrr/main.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mtrr/main.c
@@ -688,8 +688,8 @@ void __init mtrr_bp_init(void)
if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_INTEL &&
boot_cpu_data.x86 == 0xF &&
boot_cpu_data.x86_model == 0x3 &&
- (boot_cpu_data.x86_mask == 0x3 ||
- boot_cpu_data.x86_mask == 0x4))
+ (boot_cpu_data.x86_stepping == 0x3 ||
+ boot_cpu_data.x86_stepping == 0x4))
phys_addr = 36;
size_or_mask = SIZE_OR_MASK_BITS(phys_addr);
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel.c
@@ -2192,7 +2192,7 @@ static int intel_snb_pebs_broken(int cpu
break;
case 45: /* SNB-EP */
- switch (cpu_data(cpu).x86_mask) {
+ switch (cpu_data(cpu).x86_stepping) {
case 6: rev = 0x618; break;
case 7: rev = 0x70c; break;
}
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel_lbr.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel_lbr.c
@@ -763,7 +763,7 @@ void intel_pmu_lbr_init_atom(void)
* on PMU interrupt
*/
if (boot_cpu_data.x86_model == 28
- && boot_cpu_data.x86_mask < 10) {
+ && boot_cpu_data.x86_stepping < 10) {
pr_cont("LBR disabled due to erratum");
return;
}
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_p6.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_p6.c
@@ -233,7 +233,7 @@ static __initconst const struct x86_pmu
static __init void p6_pmu_rdpmc_quirk(void)
{
- if (boot_cpu_data.x86_mask < 9) {
+ if (boot_cpu_data.x86_stepping < 9) {
/*
* PPro erratum 26; fixed in stepping 9 and above.
*/
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/proc.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/proc.c
@@ -69,8 +69,8 @@ static int show_cpuinfo(struct seq_file
c->x86_model,
c->x86_model_id[0] ? c->x86_model_id : "unknown");
- if (c->x86_mask || c->cpuid_level >= 0)
- seq_printf(m, "stepping\t: %d\n", c->x86_mask);
+ if (c->x86_stepping || c->cpuid_level >= 0)
+ seq_printf(m, "stepping\t: %d\n", c->x86_stepping);
else
seq_printf(m, "stepping\t: unknown\n");
if (c->microcode)
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/head_32.S
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/head_32.S
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@
#define X86 new_cpu_data+CPUINFO_x86
#define X86_VENDOR new_cpu_data+CPUINFO_x86_vendor
#define X86_MODEL new_cpu_data+CPUINFO_x86_model
-#define X86_MASK new_cpu_data+CPUINFO_x86_mask
+#define X86_STEPPING new_cpu_data+CPUINFO_x86_stepping
#define X86_HARD_MATH new_cpu_data+CPUINFO_hard_math
#define X86_CPUID new_cpu_data+CPUINFO_cpuid_level
#define X86_CAPABILITY new_cpu_data+CPUINFO_x86_capability
@@ -433,7 +433,7 @@ enable_paging:
shrb $4,%al
movb %al,X86_MODEL
andb $0x0f,%cl # mask mask revision
- movb %cl,X86_MASK
+ movb %cl,X86_STEPPING
movl %edx,X86_CAPABILITY
is486:
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/mpparse.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/mpparse.c
@@ -409,7 +409,7 @@ static inline void __init construct_defa
processor.apicver = mpc_default_type > 4 ? 0x10 : 0x01;
processor.cpuflag = CPU_ENABLED;
processor.cpufeature = (boot_cpu_data.x86 << 8) |
- (boot_cpu_data.x86_model << 4) | boot_cpu_data.x86_mask;
+ (boot_cpu_data.x86_model << 4) | boot_cpu_data.x86_stepping;
processor.featureflag = boot_cpu_data.x86_capability[0];
processor.reserved[0] = 0;
processor.reserved[1] = 0;
--- a/drivers/char/hw_random/via-rng.c
+++ b/drivers/char/hw_random/via-rng.c
@@ -166,7 +166,7 @@ static int via_rng_init(struct hwrng *rn
/* Enable secondary noise source on CPUs where it is present. */
/* Nehemiah stepping 8 and higher */
- if ((c->x86_model == 9) && (c->x86_mask > 7))
+ if ((c->x86_model == 9) && (c->x86_stepping > 7))
lo |= VIA_NOISESRC2;
/* Esther */
--- a/drivers/cpufreq/acpi-cpufreq.c
+++ b/drivers/cpufreq/acpi-cpufreq.c
@@ -628,7 +628,7 @@ static int acpi_cpufreq_blacklist(struct
if (c->x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_INTEL) {
if ((c->x86 == 15) &&
(c->x86_model == 6) &&
- (c->x86_mask == 8)) {
+ (c->x86_stepping == 8)) {
printk(KERN_INFO "acpi-cpufreq: Intel(R) "
"Xeon(R) 7100 Errata AL30, processors may "
"lock up on frequency changes: disabling "
--- a/drivers/cpufreq/longhaul.c
+++ b/drivers/cpufreq/longhaul.c
@@ -786,7 +786,7 @@ static int longhaul_cpu_init(struct cpuf
break;
case 7:
- switch (c->x86_mask) {
+ switch (c->x86_stepping) {
case 0:
longhaul_version = TYPE_LONGHAUL_V1;
cpu_model = CPU_SAMUEL2;
@@ -798,7 +798,7 @@ static int longhaul_cpu_init(struct cpuf
break;
case 1 ... 15:
longhaul_version = TYPE_LONGHAUL_V2;
- if (c->x86_mask < 8) {
+ if (c->x86_stepping < 8) {
cpu_model = CPU_SAMUEL2;
cpuname = "C3 'Samuel 2' [C5B]";
} else {
@@ -825,7 +825,7 @@ static int longhaul_cpu_init(struct cpuf
numscales = 32;
memcpy(mults, nehemiah_mults, sizeof(nehemiah_mults));
memcpy(eblcr, nehemiah_eblcr, sizeof(nehemiah_eblcr));
- switch (c->x86_mask) {
+ switch (c->x86_stepping) {
case 0 ... 1:
cpu_model = CPU_NEHEMIAH;
cpuname = "C3 'Nehemiah A' [C5XLOE]";
--- a/drivers/cpufreq/p4-clockmod.c
+++ b/drivers/cpufreq/p4-clockmod.c
@@ -176,7 +176,7 @@ static int cpufreq_p4_cpu_init(struct cp
#endif
/* Errata workaround */
- cpuid = (c->x86 << 8) | (c->x86_model << 4) | c->x86_mask;
+ cpuid = (c->x86 << 8) | (c->x86_model << 4) | c->x86_stepping;
switch (cpuid) {
case 0x0f07:
case 0x0f0a:
--- a/drivers/cpufreq/powernow-k7.c
+++ b/drivers/cpufreq/powernow-k7.c
@@ -133,7 +133,7 @@ static int check_powernow(void)
return 0;
}
- if ((c->x86_model == 6) && (c->x86_mask == 0)) {
+ if ((c->x86_model == 6) && (c->x86_stepping == 0)) {
printk(KERN_INFO PFX "K7 660[A0] core detected, "
"enabling errata workarounds\n");
have_a0 = 1;
--- a/drivers/cpufreq/speedstep-centrino.c
+++ b/drivers/cpufreq/speedstep-centrino.c
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ struct cpu_id
{
__u8 x86; /* CPU family */
__u8 x86_model; /* model */
- __u8 x86_mask; /* stepping */
+ __u8 x86_stepping; /* stepping */
};
enum {
@@ -276,7 +276,7 @@ static int centrino_verify_cpu_id(const
{
if ((c->x86 == x->x86) &&
(c->x86_model == x->x86_model) &&
- (c->x86_mask == x->x86_mask))
+ (c->x86_stepping == x->x86_stepping))
return 1;
return 0;
}
--- a/drivers/cpufreq/speedstep-lib.c
+++ b/drivers/cpufreq/speedstep-lib.c
@@ -270,9 +270,9 @@ unsigned int speedstep_detect_processor(
ebx = cpuid_ebx(0x00000001);
ebx &= 0x000000FF;
- pr_debug("ebx value is %x, x86_mask is %x\n", ebx, c->x86_mask);
+ pr_debug("ebx value is %x, x86_stepping is %x\n", ebx, c->x86_stepping);
- switch (c->x86_mask) {
+ switch (c->x86_stepping) {
case 4:
/*
* B-stepping [M-P4-M]
@@ -359,7 +359,7 @@ unsigned int speedstep_detect_processor(
msr_lo, msr_hi);
if ((msr_hi & (1<<18)) &&
(relaxed_check ? 1 : (msr_hi & (3<<24)))) {
- if (c->x86_mask == 0x01) {
+ if (c->x86_stepping == 0x01) {
pr_debug("early PIII version\n");
return SPEEDSTEP_CPU_PIII_C_EARLY;
} else
--- a/drivers/crypto/padlock-aes.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/padlock-aes.c
@@ -535,7 +535,7 @@ static int __init padlock_init(void)
printk(KERN_NOTICE PFX "Using VIA PadLock ACE for AES algorithm.\n");
- if (c->x86 == 6 && c->x86_model == 15 && c->x86_mask == 2) {
+ if (c->x86 == 6 && c->x86_model == 15 && c->x86_stepping == 2) {
ecb_fetch_blocks = MAX_ECB_FETCH_BLOCKS;
cbc_fetch_blocks = MAX_CBC_FETCH_BLOCKS;
printk(KERN_NOTICE PFX "VIA Nano stepping 2 detected: enabling workaround.\n");
--- a/drivers/edac/amd64_edac.c
+++ b/drivers/edac/amd64_edac.c
@@ -2576,7 +2576,7 @@ static struct amd64_family_type *per_fam
struct amd64_family_type *fam_type = NULL;
pvt->ext_model = boot_cpu_data.x86_model >> 4;
- pvt->stepping = boot_cpu_data.x86_mask;
+ pvt->stepping = boot_cpu_data.x86_stepping;
pvt->model = boot_cpu_data.x86_model;
pvt->fam = boot_cpu_data.x86;
--- a/drivers/edac/mce_amd.c
+++ b/drivers/edac/mce_amd.c
@@ -744,7 +744,7 @@ int amd_decode_mce(struct notifier_block
pr_emerg(HW_ERR "CPU:%d (%x:%x:%x) MC%d_STATUS[%s|%s|%s|%s|%s",
m->extcpu,
- c->x86, c->x86_model, c->x86_mask,
+ c->x86, c->x86_model, c->x86_stepping,
m->bank,
((m->status & MCI_STATUS_OVER) ? "Over" : "-"),
((m->status & MCI_STATUS_UC) ? "UE" : "CE"),
--- a/drivers/hwmon/coretemp.c
+++ b/drivers/hwmon/coretemp.c
@@ -268,13 +268,13 @@ static int adjust_tjmax(struct cpuinfo_x
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(tjmax_model_table); i++) {
const struct tjmax_model *tm = &tjmax_model_table[i];
if (c->x86_model == tm->model &&
- (tm->mask == ANY || c->x86_mask == tm->mask))
+ (tm->mask == ANY || c->x86_stepping == tm->mask))
return tm->tjmax;
}
/* Early chips have no MSR for TjMax */
- if (c->x86_model == 0xf && c->x86_mask < 4)
+ if (c->x86_model == 0xf && c->x86_stepping < 4)
usemsr_ee = 0;
if (c->x86_model > 0xe && usemsr_ee) {
@@ -426,7 +426,7 @@ static int chk_ucode_version(unsigned in
* Readings might stop update when processor visited too deep sleep,
* fixed for stepping D0 (6EC).
*/
- if (c->x86_model == 0xe && c->x86_mask < 0xc && c->microcode < 0x39) {
+ if (c->x86_model == 0xe && c->x86_stepping < 0xc && c->microcode < 0x39) {
pr_err("Errata AE18 not fixed, update BIOS or microcode of the CPU!\n");
return -ENODEV;
}
--- a/drivers/hwmon/hwmon-vid.c
+++ b/drivers/hwmon/hwmon-vid.c
@@ -293,7 +293,7 @@ u8 vid_which_vrm(void)
if (c->x86 < 6) /* Any CPU with family lower than 6 */
return 0; /* doesn't have VID */
- vrm_ret = find_vrm(c->x86, c->x86_model, c->x86_mask, c->x86_vendor);
+ vrm_ret = find_vrm(c->x86, c->x86_model, c->x86_stepping, c->x86_vendor);
if (vrm_ret == 134)
vrm_ret = get_via_model_d_vrm();
if (vrm_ret == 0)
--- a/drivers/hwmon/k10temp.c
+++ b/drivers/hwmon/k10temp.c
@@ -126,7 +126,7 @@ static bool has_erratum_319(struct pci_d
* and AM3 formats, but that's the best we can do.
*/
return boot_cpu_data.x86_model < 4 ||
- (boot_cpu_data.x86_model == 4 && boot_cpu_data.x86_mask <= 2);
+ (boot_cpu_data.x86_model == 4 && boot_cpu_data.x86_stepping <= 2);
}
static int k10temp_probe(struct pci_dev *pdev,
--- a/drivers/hwmon/k8temp.c
+++ b/drivers/hwmon/k8temp.c
@@ -187,7 +187,7 @@ static int k8temp_probe(struct pci_dev *
return -ENOMEM;
model = boot_cpu_data.x86_model;
- stepping = boot_cpu_data.x86_mask;
+ stepping = boot_cpu_data.x86_stepping;
/* feature available since SH-C0, exclude older revisions */
if ((model == 4 && stepping == 0) ||
--- a/drivers/video/fbdev/geode/video_gx.c
+++ b/drivers/video/fbdev/geode/video_gx.c
@@ -127,7 +127,7 @@ void gx_set_dclk_frequency(struct fb_inf
int timeout = 1000;
/* Rev. 1 Geode GXs use a 14 MHz reference clock instead of 48 MHz. */
- if (cpu_data(0).x86_mask == 1) {
+ if (cpu_data(0).x86_stepping == 1) {
pll_table = gx_pll_table_14MHz;
pll_table_len = ARRAY_SIZE(gx_pll_table_14MHz);
} else {
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 66+ messages in thread* [PATCH 3.16 55/61] x86/cpu: Add a steppings field to struct x86_cpu_id
2020-06-09 18:03 [PATCH 3.16 00/61] 3.16.85-rc1 review Ben Hutchings
` (53 preceding siblings ...)
2020-06-09 18:04 ` [PATCH 3.16 54/61] x86/cpu: Rename cpu_data.x86_mask to cpu_data.x86_stepping Ben Hutchings
@ 2020-06-09 18:04 ` Ben Hutchings
2020-06-09 18:04 ` [PATCH 3.16 56/61] x86/cpu: Add 'table' argument to cpu_matches() Ben Hutchings
` (6 subsequent siblings)
61 siblings, 0 replies; 66+ messages in thread
From: Ben Hutchings @ 2020-06-09 18:04 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel, stable
Cc: akpm, Denis Kirjanov, Thomas Gleixner, Josh Poimboeuf,
Borislav Petkov, Tony Luck, Mark Gross
3.16.85-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Mark Gross <mgross@linux.intel.com>
commit e9d7144597b10ff13ff2264c059f7d4a7fbc89ac upstream.
Intel uses the same family/model for several CPUs. Sometimes the
stepping must be checked to tell them apart.
On x86 there can be at most 16 steppings. Add a steppings bitmask to
x86_cpu_id and a X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAMILY_MODEL_STEPPING_FEATURE macro
and support for matching against family/model/stepping.
[ bp: Massage.
tglx: Lightweight variant for backporting ]
Signed-off-by: Mark Gross <mgross@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/cpu_device_id.h | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/match.c | 7 ++++++-
include/linux/mod_devicetable.h | 6 ++++++
3 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpu_device_id.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpu_device_id.h
@@ -8,6 +8,33 @@
#include <linux/mod_devicetable.h>
+#define X86_STEPPINGS(mins, maxs) GENMASK(maxs, mins)
+
+/**
+ * X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_MODEL_STEPPINGS_FEATURE - Base macro for CPU matching
+ * @_vendor: The vendor name, e.g. INTEL, AMD, HYGON, ..., ANY
+ * The name is expanded to X86_VENDOR_@_vendor
+ * @_family: The family number or X86_FAMILY_ANY
+ * @_model: The model number, model constant or X86_MODEL_ANY
+ * @_steppings: Bitmask for steppings, stepping constant or X86_STEPPING_ANY
+ * @_feature: A X86_FEATURE bit or X86_FEATURE_ANY
+ * @_data: Driver specific data or NULL. The internal storage
+ * format is unsigned long. The supplied value, pointer
+ * etc. is casted to unsigned long internally.
+ *
+ * Backport version to keep the SRBDS pile consistant. No shorter variants
+ * required for this.
+ */
+#define X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_MODEL_STEPPINGS_FEATURE(_vendor, _family, _model, \
+ _steppings, _feature, _data) { \
+ .vendor = X86_VENDOR_##_vendor, \
+ .family = _family, \
+ .model = _model, \
+ .steppings = _steppings, \
+ .feature = _feature, \
+ .driver_data = (unsigned long) _data \
+}
+
extern const struct x86_cpu_id *x86_match_cpu(const struct x86_cpu_id *match);
#endif
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/match.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/match.c
@@ -33,13 +33,18 @@ const struct x86_cpu_id *x86_match_cpu(c
const struct x86_cpu_id *m;
struct cpuinfo_x86 *c = &boot_cpu_data;
- for (m = match; m->vendor | m->family | m->model | m->feature; m++) {
+ for (m = match;
+ m->vendor | m->family | m->model | m->steppings | m->feature;
+ m++) {
if (m->vendor != X86_VENDOR_ANY && c->x86_vendor != m->vendor)
continue;
if (m->family != X86_FAMILY_ANY && c->x86 != m->family)
continue;
if (m->model != X86_MODEL_ANY && c->x86_model != m->model)
continue;
+ if (m->steppings != X86_STEPPING_ANY &&
+ !(BIT(c->x86_stepping) & m->steppings))
+ continue;
if (m->feature != X86_FEATURE_ANY && !cpu_has(c, m->feature))
continue;
return m;
--- a/include/linux/mod_devicetable.h
+++ b/include/linux/mod_devicetable.h
@@ -559,6 +559,10 @@ struct amba_id {
/*
* MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE expects this struct to be called x86cpu_device_id.
* Although gcc seems to ignore this error, clang fails without this define.
+ *
+ * Note: The ordering of the struct is different from upstream because the
+ * static initializers in kernels < 5.7 still use C89 style while upstream
+ * has been converted to proper C99 initializers.
*/
#define x86cpu_device_id x86_cpu_id
struct x86_cpu_id {
@@ -567,6 +571,7 @@ struct x86_cpu_id {
__u16 model;
__u16 feature; /* bit index */
kernel_ulong_t driver_data;
+ __u16 steppings;
};
#define X86_FEATURE_MATCH(x) \
@@ -575,6 +580,7 @@ struct x86_cpu_id {
#define X86_VENDOR_ANY 0xffff
#define X86_FAMILY_ANY 0
#define X86_MODEL_ANY 0
+#define X86_STEPPING_ANY 0
#define X86_FEATURE_ANY 0 /* Same as FPU, you can't test for that */
/*
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 66+ messages in thread* [PATCH 3.16 56/61] x86/cpu: Add 'table' argument to cpu_matches()
2020-06-09 18:03 [PATCH 3.16 00/61] 3.16.85-rc1 review Ben Hutchings
` (54 preceding siblings ...)
2020-06-09 18:04 ` [PATCH 3.16 55/61] x86/cpu: Add a steppings field to struct x86_cpu_id Ben Hutchings
@ 2020-06-09 18:04 ` Ben Hutchings
2020-06-09 18:04 ` [PATCH 3.16 57/61] x86/speculation: Add Special Register Buffer Data Sampling (SRBDS) mitigation Ben Hutchings
` (5 subsequent siblings)
61 siblings, 0 replies; 66+ messages in thread
From: Ben Hutchings @ 2020-06-09 18:04 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel, stable
Cc: akpm, Denis Kirjanov, Josh Poimboeuf, Thomas Gleixner,
Mark Gross, Borislav Petkov
3.16.85-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Mark Gross <mgross@linux.intel.com>
commit 93920f61c2ad7edb01e63323832585796af75fc9 upstream.
To make cpu_matches() reusable for other matching tables, have it take a
pointer to a x86_cpu_id table as an argument.
[ bp: Flip arguments order. ]
Signed-off-by: Mark Gross <mgross@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 23 +++++++++++++----------
1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -872,9 +872,9 @@ static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_
{}
};
-static bool __init cpu_matches(unsigned long which)
+static bool __init cpu_matches(const struct x86_cpu_id *table, unsigned long which)
{
- const struct x86_cpu_id *m = x86_match_cpu(cpu_vuln_whitelist);
+ const struct x86_cpu_id *m = x86_match_cpu(table);
return m && !!(m->driver_data & which);
}
@@ -894,29 +894,32 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(stru
u64 ia32_cap = x86_read_arch_cap_msr();
/* Set ITLB_MULTIHIT bug if cpu is not in the whitelist and not mitigated */
- if (!cpu_matches(NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT) && !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_PSCHANGE_MC_NO))
+ if (!cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT) &&
+ !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_PSCHANGE_MC_NO))
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_ITLB_MULTIHIT);
- if (cpu_matches(NO_SPECULATION))
+ if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_SPECULATION))
return;
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1);
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2);
- if (!cpu_matches(NO_SSB) && !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_SSB_NO) &&
+ if (!cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_SSB) &&
+ !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_SSB_NO) &&
!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSB_NO))
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS);
if (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_IBRS_ALL)
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED);
- if (!cpu_matches(NO_MDS) && !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO)) {
+ if (!cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_MDS) &&
+ !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO)) {
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_MDS);
- if (cpu_matches(MSBDS_ONLY))
+ if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, MSBDS_ONLY))
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_MSBDS_ONLY);
}
- if (!cpu_matches(NO_SWAPGS))
+ if (!cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_SWAPGS))
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SWAPGS);
/*
@@ -934,7 +937,7 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(stru
(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR)))
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_TAA);
- if (cpu_matches(NO_MELTDOWN))
+ if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_MELTDOWN))
return;
/* Rogue Data Cache Load? No! */
@@ -943,7 +946,7 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(stru
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN);
- if (cpu_matches(NO_L1TF))
+ if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_L1TF))
return;
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_L1TF);
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 66+ messages in thread* [PATCH 3.16 57/61] x86/speculation: Add Special Register Buffer Data Sampling (SRBDS) mitigation
2020-06-09 18:03 [PATCH 3.16 00/61] 3.16.85-rc1 review Ben Hutchings
` (55 preceding siblings ...)
2020-06-09 18:04 ` [PATCH 3.16 56/61] x86/cpu: Add 'table' argument to cpu_matches() Ben Hutchings
@ 2020-06-09 18:04 ` Ben Hutchings
2020-06-09 18:04 ` [PATCH 3.16 58/61] x86/speculation: Add SRBDS vulnerability and mitigation documentation Ben Hutchings
` (4 subsequent siblings)
61 siblings, 0 replies; 66+ messages in thread
From: Ben Hutchings @ 2020-06-09 18:04 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel, stable
Cc: akpm, Denis Kirjanov, Josh Poimboeuf, Neelima Krishnan,
Thomas Gleixner, Mark Gross, Pawan Gupta, Tony Luck,
Borislav Petkov
3.16.85-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Mark Gross <mgross@linux.intel.com>
commit 7e5b3c267d256822407a22fdce6afdf9cd13f9fb upstream.
SRBDS is an MDS-like speculative side channel that can leak bits from the
random number generator (RNG) across cores and threads. New microcode
serializes the processor access during the execution of RDRAND and
RDSEED. This ensures that the shared buffer is overwritten before it is
released for reuse.
While it is present on all affected CPU models, the microcode mitigation
is not needed on models that enumerate ARCH_CAPABILITIES[MDS_NO] in the
cases where TSX is not supported or has been disabled with TSX_CTRL.
The mitigation is activated by default on affected processors and it
increases latency for RDRAND and RDSEED instructions. Among other
effects this will reduce throughput from /dev/urandom.
* Enable administrator to configure the mitigation off when desired using
either mitigations=off or srbds=off.
* Export vulnerability status via sysfs
* Rename file-scoped macros to apply for non-whitelist table initializations.
[ bp: Massage,
- s/VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPING/VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS/g,
- do not read arch cap MSR a second time in tsx_fused_off() - just pass it in,
- flip check in cpu_set_bug_bits() to save an indentation level,
- reflow comments.
jpoimboe: s/Mitigated/Mitigation/ in user-visible strings
tglx: Dropped the fused off magic for now
]
Signed-off-by: Mark Gross <mgross@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Neelima Krishnan <neelima.krishnan@intel.com>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16:
- CPU feature words and bugs are numbered differently
- Adjust filename for <asm/msr-index.h>]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
---
.../ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu | 1 +
Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt | 20 ++++
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 2 +
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/msr-index.h | 4 +
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 106 ++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 31 +++++
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h | 1 +
drivers/base/cpu.c | 8 ++
8 files changed, 173 insertions(+)
--- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu
+++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu
@@ -232,6 +232,7 @@ What: /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabi
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spec_store_bypass
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/l1tf
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/mds
+ /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/srbds
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/tsx_async_abort
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/itlb_multihit
Date: January 2018
--- a/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -3356,6 +3356,26 @@ bytes respectively. Such letter suffixes
spia_pedr=
spia_peddr=
+ srbds= [X86,INTEL]
+ Control the Special Register Buffer Data Sampling
+ (SRBDS) mitigation.
+
+ Certain CPUs are vulnerable to an MDS-like
+ exploit which can leak bits from the random
+ number generator.
+
+ By default, this issue is mitigated by
+ microcode. However, the microcode fix can cause
+ the RDRAND and RDSEED instructions to become
+ much slower. Among other effects, this will
+ result in reduced throughput from /dev/urandom.
+
+ The microcode mitigation can be disabled with
+ the following option:
+
+ off: Disable mitigation and remove
+ performance impact to RDRAND and RDSEED
+
stack_guard_gap= [MM]
override the default stack gap protection. The value
is in page units and it defines how many pages prior
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
@@ -247,6 +247,7 @@
#define X86_FEATURE_AVX512CD ( 9*32+28) /* AVX-512 Conflict Detection */
/* Intel-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x00000007:0 (EDX), word 10 */
+#define X86_FEATURE_SRBDS_CTRL (10*32+ 9) /* "" SRBDS mitigation MSR available */
#define X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR (10*32+10) /* VERW clears CPU buffers */
#define X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL (10*32+26) /* "" Speculation Control (IBRS + IBPB) */
#define X86_FEATURE_INTEL_STIBP (10*32+27) /* "" Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors */
@@ -281,5 +282,6 @@
#define X86_BUG_SWAPGS X86_BUG(12) /* CPU is affected by speculation through SWAPGS */
#define X86_BUG_TAA X86_BUG(13) /* CPU is affected by TSX Async Abort(TAA) */
#define X86_BUG_ITLB_MULTIHIT X86_BUG(14) /* CPU may incur MCE during certain page attribute changes */
+#define X86_BUG_SRBDS X86_BUG(15) /* CPU may leak RNG bits if not mitigated */
#endif /* _ASM_X86_CPUFEATURES_H */
--- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/msr-index.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/msr-index.h
@@ -90,6 +90,10 @@
#define TSX_CTRL_RTM_DISABLE (1UL << 0) /* Disable RTM feature */
#define TSX_CTRL_CPUID_CLEAR (1UL << 1) /* Disable TSX enumeration */
+/* SRBDS support */
+#define MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL 0x00000123
+#define RNGDS_MITG_DIS BIT(0)
+
#define MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS 0x00000174
#define MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP 0x00000175
#define MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP 0x00000176
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ static void __init ssb_select_mitigation
static void __init l1tf_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init mds_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init taa_select_mitigation(void);
+static void __init srbds_select_mitigation(void);
/* The base value of the SPEC_CTRL MSR that always has to be preserved. */
u64 x86_spec_ctrl_base;
@@ -159,6 +160,7 @@ void __init check_bugs(void)
l1tf_select_mitigation();
mds_select_mitigation();
taa_select_mitigation();
+ srbds_select_mitigation();
arch_smt_update();
@@ -417,6 +419,97 @@ static int __init tsx_async_abort_parse_
early_param("tsx_async_abort", tsx_async_abort_parse_cmdline);
#undef pr_fmt
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "SRBDS: " fmt
+
+enum srbds_mitigations {
+ SRBDS_MITIGATION_OFF,
+ SRBDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED,
+ SRBDS_MITIGATION_FULL,
+ SRBDS_MITIGATION_TSX_OFF,
+ SRBDS_MITIGATION_HYPERVISOR,
+};
+
+static enum srbds_mitigations srbds_mitigation = SRBDS_MITIGATION_FULL;
+
+static const char * const srbds_strings[] = {
+ [SRBDS_MITIGATION_OFF] = "Vulnerable",
+ [SRBDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED] = "Vulnerable: No microcode",
+ [SRBDS_MITIGATION_FULL] = "Mitigation: Microcode",
+ [SRBDS_MITIGATION_TSX_OFF] = "Mitigation: TSX disabled",
+ [SRBDS_MITIGATION_HYPERVISOR] = "Unknown: Dependent on hypervisor status",
+};
+
+static bool srbds_off;
+
+void update_srbds_msr(void)
+{
+ u64 mcu_ctrl;
+
+ if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SRBDS))
+ return;
+
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR))
+ return;
+
+ if (srbds_mitigation == SRBDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED)
+ return;
+
+ rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL, mcu_ctrl);
+
+ switch (srbds_mitigation) {
+ case SRBDS_MITIGATION_OFF:
+ case SRBDS_MITIGATION_TSX_OFF:
+ mcu_ctrl |= RNGDS_MITG_DIS;
+ break;
+ case SRBDS_MITIGATION_FULL:
+ mcu_ctrl &= ~RNGDS_MITG_DIS;
+ break;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL, mcu_ctrl);
+}
+
+static void __init srbds_select_mitigation(void)
+{
+ u64 ia32_cap;
+
+ if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SRBDS))
+ return;
+
+ /*
+ * Check to see if this is one of the MDS_NO systems supporting
+ * TSX that are only exposed to SRBDS when TSX is enabled.
+ */
+ ia32_cap = x86_read_arch_cap_msr();
+ if ((ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO) && !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RTM))
+ srbds_mitigation = SRBDS_MITIGATION_TSX_OFF;
+ else if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR))
+ srbds_mitigation = SRBDS_MITIGATION_HYPERVISOR;
+ else if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SRBDS_CTRL))
+ srbds_mitigation = SRBDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED;
+ else if (cpu_mitigations_off() || srbds_off)
+ srbds_mitigation = SRBDS_MITIGATION_OFF;
+
+ update_srbds_msr();
+ pr_info("%s\n", srbds_strings[srbds_mitigation]);
+}
+
+static int __init srbds_parse_cmdline(char *str)
+{
+ if (!str)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SRBDS))
+ return 0;
+
+ srbds_off = !strcmp(str, "off");
+ return 0;
+}
+early_param("srbds", srbds_parse_cmdline);
+
+#undef pr_fmt
#define pr_fmt(fmt) "Spectre V1 : " fmt
enum spectre_v1_mitigation {
@@ -1422,6 +1515,11 @@ static char *ibpb_state(void)
return "";
}
+static ssize_t srbds_show_state(char *buf)
+{
+ return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", srbds_strings[srbds_mitigation]);
+}
+
static ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
char *buf, unsigned int bug)
{
@@ -1463,6 +1561,9 @@ static ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct de
case X86_BUG_ITLB_MULTIHIT:
return itlb_multihit_show_state(buf);
+ case X86_BUG_SRBDS:
+ return srbds_show_state(buf);
+
default:
break;
}
@@ -1509,4 +1610,9 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_itlb_multihit(struct de
{
return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_ITLB_MULTIHIT);
}
+
+ssize_t cpu_show_srbds(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+ return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_SRBDS);
+}
#endif
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -872,6 +872,27 @@ static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_
{}
};
+#define VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(model, steppings, issues) \
+ X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_MODEL_STEPPINGS_FEATURE(INTEL, 6, \
+ INTEL_FAM6_##model, steppings, \
+ X86_FEATURE_ANY, issues)
+
+#define SRBDS BIT(0)
+
+static const struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_blacklist[] __initconst = {
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(IVYBRIDGE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(HASWELL_CORE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(HASWELL_ULT, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(HASWELL_GT3E, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(BROADWELL_GT3E, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(BROADWELL_CORE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_MOBILE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_DESKTOP, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE_MOBILE, X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0xC), SRBDS),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE_DESKTOP,X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0xD), SRBDS),
+ {}
+};
+
static bool __init cpu_matches(const struct x86_cpu_id *table, unsigned long which)
{
const struct x86_cpu_id *m = x86_match_cpu(table);
@@ -937,6 +958,15 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(stru
(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR)))
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_TAA);
+ /*
+ * SRBDS affects CPUs which support RDRAND or RDSEED and are listed
+ * in the vulnerability blacklist.
+ */
+ if ((cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_RDRAND) ||
+ cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_RDSEED)) &&
+ cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, SRBDS))
+ setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SRBDS);
+
if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_MELTDOWN))
return;
@@ -1283,6 +1313,7 @@ void identify_secondary_cpu(struct cpuin
#endif
mtrr_ap_init();
x86_spec_ctrl_setup_ap();
+ update_srbds_msr();
}
struct msr_range {
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h
@@ -63,6 +63,7 @@ extern void get_cpu_cap(struct cpuinfo_x
extern void cpu_detect_cache_sizes(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c);
extern void x86_spec_ctrl_setup_ap(void);
+extern void update_srbds_msr(void);
extern u64 x86_read_arch_cap_msr(void);
--- a/drivers/base/cpu.c
+++ b/drivers/base/cpu.c
@@ -469,6 +469,12 @@ ssize_t __weak cpu_show_itlb_multihit(st
return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
}
+ssize_t __weak cpu_show_srbds(struct device *dev,
+ struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+ return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
+}
+
static DEVICE_ATTR(meltdown, 0444, cpu_show_meltdown, NULL);
static DEVICE_ATTR(spectre_v1, 0444, cpu_show_spectre_v1, NULL);
static DEVICE_ATTR(spectre_v2, 0444, cpu_show_spectre_v2, NULL);
@@ -477,6 +483,7 @@ static DEVICE_ATTR(l1tf, 0444, cpu_show_
static DEVICE_ATTR(mds, 0444, cpu_show_mds, NULL);
static DEVICE_ATTR(tsx_async_abort, 0444, cpu_show_tsx_async_abort, NULL);
static DEVICE_ATTR(itlb_multihit, 0444, cpu_show_itlb_multihit, NULL);
+static DEVICE_ATTR(srbds, 0444, cpu_show_srbds, NULL);
static struct attribute *cpu_root_vulnerabilities_attrs[] = {
&dev_attr_meltdown.attr,
@@ -487,6 +494,7 @@ static struct attribute *cpu_root_vulner
&dev_attr_mds.attr,
&dev_attr_tsx_async_abort.attr,
&dev_attr_itlb_multihit.attr,
+ &dev_attr_srbds.attr,
NULL
};
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 66+ messages in thread* [PATCH 3.16 58/61] x86/speculation: Add SRBDS vulnerability and mitigation documentation
2020-06-09 18:03 [PATCH 3.16 00/61] 3.16.85-rc1 review Ben Hutchings
` (56 preceding siblings ...)
2020-06-09 18:04 ` [PATCH 3.16 57/61] x86/speculation: Add Special Register Buffer Data Sampling (SRBDS) mitigation Ben Hutchings
@ 2020-06-09 18:04 ` Ben Hutchings
2020-06-09 18:04 ` [PATCH 3.16 59/61] x86/speculation: Add Ivy Bridge to affected list Ben Hutchings
` (3 subsequent siblings)
61 siblings, 0 replies; 66+ messages in thread
From: Ben Hutchings @ 2020-06-09 18:04 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel, stable
Cc: akpm, Denis Kirjanov, Mark Gross, Tony Luck, Borislav Petkov,
Josh Poimboeuf
3.16.85-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Mark Gross <mgross@linux.intel.com>
commit 7222a1b5b87417f22265c92deea76a6aecd0fb0f upstream.
Add documentation for the SRBDS vulnerability and its mitigation.
[ bp: Massage.
jpoimboe: sysfs table strings. ]
Signed-off-by: Mark Gross <mgross@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
---
.../special-register-buffer-data-sampling.rst | 148 ++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 148 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 Documentation/hw-vuln/special-register-buffer-data-sampling.rst
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/hw-vuln/special-register-buffer-data-sampling.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,148 @@
+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+SRBDS - Special Register Buffer Data Sampling
+=============================================
+
+SRBDS is a hardware vulnerability that allows MDS :doc:`mds` techniques to
+infer values returned from special register accesses. Special register
+accesses are accesses to off core registers. According to Intel's evaluation,
+the special register reads that have a security expectation of privacy are
+RDRAND, RDSEED and SGX EGETKEY.
+
+When RDRAND, RDSEED and EGETKEY instructions are used, the data is moved
+to the core through the special register mechanism that is susceptible
+to MDS attacks.
+
+Affected processors
+--------------------
+Core models (desktop, mobile, Xeon-E3) that implement RDRAND and/or RDSEED may
+be affected.
+
+A processor is affected by SRBDS if its Family_Model and stepping is
+in the following list, with the exception of the listed processors
+exporting MDS_NO while Intel TSX is available yet not enabled. The
+latter class of processors are only affected when Intel TSX is enabled
+by software using TSX_CTRL_MSR otherwise they are not affected.
+
+ ============= ============ ========
+ common name Family_Model Stepping
+ ============= ============ ========
+ Haswell 06_3CH All
+ Haswell_L 06_45H All
+ Haswell_G 06_46H All
+
+ Broadwell_G 06_47H All
+ Broadwell 06_3DH All
+
+ Skylake_L 06_4EH All
+ Skylake 06_5EH All
+
+ Kabylake_L 06_8EH <=0xC
+
+ Kabylake 06_9EH <=0xD
+ ============= ============ ========
+
+Related CVEs
+------------
+
+The following CVE entry is related to this SRBDS issue:
+
+ ============== ===== =====================================
+ CVE-2020-0543 SRBDS Special Register Buffer Data Sampling
+ ============== ===== =====================================
+
+Attack scenarios
+----------------
+An unprivileged user can extract values returned from RDRAND and RDSEED
+executed on another core or sibling thread using MDS techniques.
+
+
+Mitigation mechanism
+-------------------
+Intel will release microcode updates that modify the RDRAND, RDSEED, and
+EGETKEY instructions to overwrite secret special register data in the shared
+staging buffer before the secret data can be accessed by another logical
+processor.
+
+During execution of the RDRAND, RDSEED, or EGETKEY instructions, off-core
+accesses from other logical processors will be delayed until the special
+register read is complete and the secret data in the shared staging buffer is
+overwritten.
+
+This has three effects on performance:
+
+#. RDRAND, RDSEED, or EGETKEY instructions have higher latency.
+
+#. Executing RDRAND at the same time on multiple logical processors will be
+ serialized, resulting in an overall reduction in the maximum RDRAND
+ bandwidth.
+
+#. Executing RDRAND, RDSEED or EGETKEY will delay memory accesses from other
+ logical processors that miss their core caches, with an impact similar to
+ legacy locked cache-line-split accesses.
+
+The microcode updates provide an opt-out mechanism (RNGDS_MITG_DIS) to disable
+the mitigation for RDRAND and RDSEED instructions executed outside of Intel
+Software Guard Extensions (Intel SGX) enclaves. On logical processors that
+disable the mitigation using this opt-out mechanism, RDRAND and RDSEED do not
+take longer to execute and do not impact performance of sibling logical
+processors memory accesses. The opt-out mechanism does not affect Intel SGX
+enclaves (including execution of RDRAND or RDSEED inside an enclave, as well
+as EGETKEY execution).
+
+IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL MSR Definition
+--------------------------------
+Along with the mitigation for this issue, Intel added a new thread-scope
+IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL MSR, (address 0x123). The presence of this MSR and
+RNGDS_MITG_DIS (bit 0) is enumerated by CPUID.(EAX=07H,ECX=0).EDX[SRBDS_CTRL =
+9]==1. This MSR is introduced through the microcode update.
+
+Setting IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL[0] (RNGDS_MITG_DIS) to 1 for a logical processor
+disables the mitigation for RDRAND and RDSEED executed outside of an Intel SGX
+enclave on that logical processor. Opting out of the mitigation for a
+particular logical processor does not affect the RDRAND and RDSEED mitigations
+for other logical processors.
+
+Note that inside of an Intel SGX enclave, the mitigation is applied regardless
+of the value of RNGDS_MITG_DS.
+
+Mitigation control on the kernel command line
+---------------------------------------------
+The kernel command line allows control over the SRBDS mitigation at boot time
+with the option "srbds=". The option for this is:
+
+ ============= =============================================================
+ off This option disables SRBDS mitigation for RDRAND and RDSEED on
+ affected platforms.
+ ============= =============================================================
+
+SRBDS System Information
+-----------------------
+The Linux kernel provides vulnerability status information through sysfs. For
+SRBDS this can be accessed by the following sysfs file:
+/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/srbds
+
+The possible values contained in this file are:
+
+ ============================== =============================================
+ Not affected Processor not vulnerable
+ Vulnerable Processor vulnerable and mitigation disabled
+ Vulnerable: No microcode Processor vulnerable and microcode is missing
+ mitigation
+ Mitigation: Microcode Processor is vulnerable and mitigation is in
+ effect.
+ Mitigation: TSX disabled Processor is only vulnerable when TSX is
+ enabled while this system was booted with TSX
+ disabled.
+ Unknown: Dependent on
+ hypervisor status Running on virtual guest processor that is
+ affected but with no way to know if host
+ processor is mitigated or vulnerable.
+ ============================== =============================================
+
+SRBDS Default mitigation
+------------------------
+This new microcode serializes processor access during execution of RDRAND,
+RDSEED ensures that the shared buffer is overwritten before it is released for
+reuse. Use the "srbds=off" kernel command line to disable the mitigation for
+RDRAND and RDSEED.
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 66+ messages in thread* [PATCH 3.16 59/61] x86/speculation: Add Ivy Bridge to affected list
2020-06-09 18:03 [PATCH 3.16 00/61] 3.16.85-rc1 review Ben Hutchings
` (57 preceding siblings ...)
2020-06-09 18:04 ` [PATCH 3.16 58/61] x86/speculation: Add SRBDS vulnerability and mitigation documentation Ben Hutchings
@ 2020-06-09 18:04 ` Ben Hutchings
2020-06-09 18:04 ` [PATCH 3.16 60/61] random: always use batched entropy for get_random_u{32,64} Ben Hutchings
` (2 subsequent siblings)
61 siblings, 0 replies; 66+ messages in thread
From: Ben Hutchings @ 2020-06-09 18:04 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel, stable
Cc: akpm, Denis Kirjanov, Thomas Gleixner, Josh Poimboeuf
3.16.85-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
commit 3798cc4d106e91382bfe016caa2edada27c2bb3f upstream.
Make the docs match the code.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
---
.../hw-vuln/special-register-buffer-data-sampling.rst | 7 ++++---
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
--- a/Documentation/hw-vuln/special-register-buffer-data-sampling.rst
+++ b/Documentation/hw-vuln/special-register-buffer-data-sampling.rst
@@ -27,6 +27,8 @@ by software using TSX_CTRL_MSR otherwise
============= ============ ========
common name Family_Model Stepping
============= ============ ========
+ IvyBridge 06_3AH All
+
Haswell 06_3CH All
Haswell_L 06_45H All
Haswell_G 06_46H All
@@ -37,9 +39,8 @@ by software using TSX_CTRL_MSR otherwise
Skylake_L 06_4EH All
Skylake 06_5EH All
- Kabylake_L 06_8EH <=0xC
-
- Kabylake 06_9EH <=0xD
+ Kabylake_L 06_8EH <= 0xC
+ Kabylake 06_9EH <= 0xD
============= ============ ========
Related CVEs
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 66+ messages in thread* [PATCH 3.16 60/61] random: always use batched entropy for get_random_u{32,64}
2020-06-09 18:03 [PATCH 3.16 00/61] 3.16.85-rc1 review Ben Hutchings
` (58 preceding siblings ...)
2020-06-09 18:04 ` [PATCH 3.16 59/61] x86/speculation: Add Ivy Bridge to affected list Ben Hutchings
@ 2020-06-09 18:04 ` Ben Hutchings
2020-06-09 18:04 ` [PATCH 3.16 61/61] fs/binfmt_elf.c: allocate initialized memory in fill_thread_core_info() Ben Hutchings
2020-06-10 19:08 ` [PATCH 3.16 00/61] 3.16.85-rc1 review Guenter Roeck
61 siblings, 0 replies; 66+ messages in thread
From: Ben Hutchings @ 2020-06-09 18:04 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel, stable
Cc: akpm, Denis Kirjanov, Greg Kroah-Hartman, Theodore Ts'o,
Jason A. Donenfeld
3.16.85-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
commit 69efea712f5b0489e67d07565aad5c94e09a3e52 upstream.
It turns out that RDRAND is pretty slow. Comparing these two
constructions:
for (i = 0; i < CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE; i += sizeof(ret))
arch_get_random_long(&ret);
and
long buf[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE / sizeof(long)];
extract_crng((u8 *)buf);
it amortizes out to 352 cycles per long for the top one and 107 cycles
per long for the bottom one, on Coffee Lake Refresh, Intel Core i9-9880H.
And importantly, the top one has the drawback of not benefiting from the
real rng, whereas the bottom one has all the nice benefits of using our
own chacha rng. As get_random_u{32,64} gets used in more places (perhaps
beyond what it was originally intended for when it was introduced as
get_random_{int,long} back in the md5 monstrosity era), it seems like it
might be a good thing to strengthen its posture a tiny bit. Doing this
should only be stronger and not any weaker because that pool is already
initialized with a bunch of rdrand data (when available). This way, we
get the benefits of the hardware rng as well as our own rng.
Another benefit of this is that we no longer hit pitfalls of the recent
stream of AMD bugs in RDRAND. One often used code pattern for various
things is:
do {
val = get_random_u32();
} while (hash_table_contains_key(val));
That recent AMD bug rendered that pattern useless, whereas we're really
very certain that chacha20 output will give pretty distributed numbers,
no matter what.
So, this simplification seems better both from a security perspective
and from a performance perspective.
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200221201037.30231-1-Jason@zx2c4.com
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: Only get_random_int() exists here]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
---
drivers/char/random.c | 6 ------
1 file changed, 6 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -1700,9 +1700,6 @@ unsigned int get_random_int(void)
__u32 *hash;
unsigned int ret;
- if (arch_get_random_int(&ret))
- return ret;
-
hash = get_cpu_var(get_random_int_hash);
hash[0] += current->pid + jiffies + random_get_entropy();
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 66+ messages in thread* [PATCH 3.16 61/61] fs/binfmt_elf.c: allocate initialized memory in fill_thread_core_info()
2020-06-09 18:03 [PATCH 3.16 00/61] 3.16.85-rc1 review Ben Hutchings
` (59 preceding siblings ...)
2020-06-09 18:04 ` [PATCH 3.16 60/61] random: always use batched entropy for get_random_u{32,64} Ben Hutchings
@ 2020-06-09 18:04 ` Ben Hutchings
2020-06-10 19:08 ` [PATCH 3.16 00/61] 3.16.85-rc1 review Guenter Roeck
61 siblings, 0 replies; 66+ messages in thread
From: Ben Hutchings @ 2020-06-09 18:04 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel, stable
Cc: akpm, Denis Kirjanov, Al Viro, Linus Torvalds, Alexey Dobriyan,
Kees Cook, Alexander Potapenko, sam
3.16.85-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
commit 1d605416fb7175e1adf094251466caa52093b413 upstream.
KMSAN reported uninitialized data being written to disk when dumping
core. As a result, several kilobytes of kmalloc memory may be written
to the core file and then read by a non-privileged user.
Reported-by: sam <sunhaoyl@outlook.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200419100848.63472-1-glider@google.com
Link: https://github.com/google/kmsan/issues/76
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
---
fs/binfmt_elf.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/fs/binfmt_elf.c
+++ b/fs/binfmt_elf.c
@@ -1575,7 +1575,7 @@ static int fill_thread_core_info(struct
(!regset->active || regset->active(t->task, regset) > 0)) {
int ret;
size_t size = regset->n * regset->size;
- void *data = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
+ void *data = kzalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (unlikely(!data))
return 0;
ret = regset->get(t->task, regset,
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 66+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH 3.16 00/61] 3.16.85-rc1 review
2020-06-09 18:03 [PATCH 3.16 00/61] 3.16.85-rc1 review Ben Hutchings
` (60 preceding siblings ...)
2020-06-09 18:04 ` [PATCH 3.16 61/61] fs/binfmt_elf.c: allocate initialized memory in fill_thread_core_info() Ben Hutchings
@ 2020-06-10 19:08 ` Guenter Roeck
2020-06-10 21:25 ` Ben Hutchings
61 siblings, 1 reply; 66+ messages in thread
From: Guenter Roeck @ 2020-06-10 19:08 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Ben Hutchings; +Cc: linux-kernel, stable, torvalds, akpm, Denis Kirjanov
On Tue, Jun 09, 2020 at 07:03:51PM +0100, Ben Hutchings wrote:
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 3.16.85 release.
> There are 61 patches in this series, which will be posted as responses
> to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
>
> Responses should be made by Thu Jun 11 18:03:51 UTC 2020.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
>
Build results:
total: 135 pass: 135 fail: 0
Qemu test results:
total: 229 pass: 229 fail: 0
Guenter
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 66+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH 3.16 00/61] 3.16.85-rc1 review
2020-06-10 19:08 ` [PATCH 3.16 00/61] 3.16.85-rc1 review Guenter Roeck
@ 2020-06-10 21:25 ` Ben Hutchings
0 siblings, 0 replies; 66+ messages in thread
From: Ben Hutchings @ 2020-06-10 21:25 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Guenter Roeck; +Cc: linux-kernel, stable, torvalds, akpm, Denis Kirjanov
[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 736 bytes --]
On Wed, 2020-06-10 at 12:08 -0700, Guenter Roeck wrote:
> On Tue, Jun 09, 2020 at 07:03:51PM +0100, Ben Hutchings wrote:
> > This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 3.16.85 release.
> > There are 61 patches in this series, which will be posted as responses
> > to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> > let me know.
> >
> > Responses should be made by Thu Jun 11 18:03:51 UTC 2020.
> > Anything received after that time might be too late.
> >
>
> Build results:
> total: 135 pass: 135 fail: 0
> Qemu test results:
> total: 229 pass: 229 fail: 0
Thanks for testing,
Ben.
--
Ben Hutchings
Life would be so much easier if we could look at the source code.
[-- Attachment #2: This is a digitally signed message part --]
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^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 66+ messages in thread