From: tip-bot for Tony Luck <tipbot@zytor.com>
To: linux-tip-commits@vger.kernel.org
Cc: bp@alien8.de, dvlasenk@redhat.com, luto@kernel.org,
mingo@kernel.org, hpa@zytor.com, bp@suse.de,
peterz@infradead.org, brgerst@gmail.com, dave.hansen@intel.com,
torvalds@linux-foundation.org, elliott@hpe.com,
tglx@linutronix.de, akpm@linux-foundation.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, jpoimboe@redhat.com,
n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com, tony.luck@intel.com
Subject: [tip:x86/mm] x86/mm, mm/hwpoison: Clear PRESENT bit for kernel 1:1 mappings of poison pages
Date: Thu, 17 Aug 2017 03:19:49 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <tip-ce0fa3e56ad20f04d8252353dcd24e924abdafca@git.kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170816171803.28342-1-tony.luck@intel.com>
Commit-ID: ce0fa3e56ad20f04d8252353dcd24e924abdafca
Gitweb: http://git.kernel.org/tip/ce0fa3e56ad20f04d8252353dcd24e924abdafca
Author: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
AuthorDate: Wed, 16 Aug 2017 10:18:03 -0700
Committer: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CommitDate: Thu, 17 Aug 2017 10:30:49 +0200
x86/mm, mm/hwpoison: Clear PRESENT bit for kernel 1:1 mappings of poison pages
Speculative processor accesses may reference any memory that has a
valid page table entry. While a speculative access won't generate
a machine check, it will log the error in a machine check bank. That
could cause escalation of a subsequent error since the overflow bit
will be then set in the machine check bank status register.
Code has to be double-plus-tricky to avoid mentioning the 1:1 virtual
address of the page we want to map out otherwise we may trigger the
very problem we are trying to avoid. We use a non-canonical address
that passes through the usual Linux table walking code to get to the
same "pte".
Thanks to Dave Hansen for reviewing several iterations of this.
Also see:
http://marc.info/?l=linux-mm&m=149860136413338&w=2
Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Elliott, Robert (Persistent Memory) <elliott@hpe.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170816171803.28342-1-tony.luck@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/page_64.h | 4 ++++
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce.c | 43 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
include/linux/mm_inline.h | 6 ++++++
mm/memory-failure.c | 2 ++
4 files changed, 55 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/page_64.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/page_64.h
index b4a0d43..b50df06 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/page_64.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/page_64.h
@@ -51,6 +51,10 @@ static inline void clear_page(void *page)
void copy_page(void *to, void *from);
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_MCE
+#define arch_unmap_kpfn arch_unmap_kpfn
+#endif
+
#endif /* !__ASSEMBLY__ */
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_VSYSCALL_EMULATION
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce.c
index 6dde049..3b413065 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce.c
@@ -51,6 +51,7 @@
#include <asm/mce.h>
#include <asm/msr.h>
#include <asm/reboot.h>
+#include <asm/set_memory.h>
#include "mce-internal.h"
@@ -1051,6 +1052,48 @@ static int do_memory_failure(struct mce *m)
return ret;
}
+#if defined(arch_unmap_kpfn) && defined(CONFIG_MEMORY_FAILURE)
+
+void arch_unmap_kpfn(unsigned long pfn)
+{
+ unsigned long decoy_addr;
+
+ /*
+ * Unmap this page from the kernel 1:1 mappings to make sure
+ * we don't log more errors because of speculative access to
+ * the page.
+ * We would like to just call:
+ * set_memory_np((unsigned long)pfn_to_kaddr(pfn), 1);
+ * but doing that would radically increase the odds of a
+ * speculative access to the posion page because we'd have
+ * the virtual address of the kernel 1:1 mapping sitting
+ * around in registers.
+ * Instead we get tricky. We create a non-canonical address
+ * that looks just like the one we want, but has bit 63 flipped.
+ * This relies on set_memory_np() not checking whether we passed
+ * a legal address.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Build time check to see if we have a spare virtual bit. Don't want
+ * to leave this until run time because most developers don't have a
+ * system that can exercise this code path. This will only become a
+ * problem if/when we move beyond 5-level page tables.
+ *
+ * Hard code "9" here because cpp doesn't grok ilog2(PTRS_PER_PGD)
+ */
+#if PGDIR_SHIFT + 9 < 63
+ decoy_addr = (pfn << PAGE_SHIFT) + (PAGE_OFFSET ^ BIT(63));
+#else
+#error "no unused virtual bit available"
+#endif
+
+ if (set_memory_np(decoy_addr, 1))
+ pr_warn("Could not invalidate pfn=0x%lx from 1:1 map\n", pfn);
+
+}
+#endif
+
/*
* The actual machine check handler. This only handles real
* exceptions when something got corrupted coming in through int 18.
diff --git a/include/linux/mm_inline.h b/include/linux/mm_inline.h
index e030a68..25438b2 100644
--- a/include/linux/mm_inline.h
+++ b/include/linux/mm_inline.h
@@ -126,4 +126,10 @@ static __always_inline enum lru_list page_lru(struct page *page)
#define lru_to_page(head) (list_entry((head)->prev, struct page, lru))
+#ifdef arch_unmap_kpfn
+extern void arch_unmap_kpfn(unsigned long pfn);
+#else
+static __always_inline void arch_unmap_kpfn(unsigned long pfn) { }
+#endif
+
#endif
diff --git a/mm/memory-failure.c b/mm/memory-failure.c
index 1cd3b35..8836662 100644
--- a/mm/memory-failure.c
+++ b/mm/memory-failure.c
@@ -1146,6 +1146,8 @@ int memory_failure(unsigned long pfn, int trapno, int flags)
return 0;
}
+ arch_unmap_kpfn(pfn);
+
orig_head = hpage = compound_head(p);
num_poisoned_pages_inc();
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-08-17 10:25 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 22+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-06-16 19:02 [PATCH] mm/hwpoison: Clear PRESENT bit for kernel 1:1 mappings of poison pages Luck, Tony
2017-06-19 18:01 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-21 17:47 ` Luck, Tony
2017-06-21 19:59 ` Elliott, Robert (Persistent Memory)
2017-06-21 20:19 ` Luck, Tony
2017-06-22 9:39 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-29 22:11 ` git send-email (w/o Cc: stable) Luck, Tony
2017-06-30 7:08 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-23 22:19 ` [PATCH] mm/hwpoison: Clear PRESENT bit for kernel 1:1 mappings of poison pages Elliott, Robert (Persistent Memory)
2017-06-27 22:04 ` Luck, Tony
2017-06-27 22:09 ` Dan Williams
2017-08-16 17:18 ` [PATCH-resend] " Luck, Tony
2017-08-17 10:19 ` tip-bot for Tony Luck [this message]
2017-08-17 22:09 ` Andrew Morton
2017-08-17 22:29 ` Elliott, Robert (Persistent Memory)
2017-08-17 23:32 ` Luck, Tony
2017-06-21 2:12 ` [PATCH] " Naoya Horiguchi
2017-06-21 17:54 ` Luck, Tony
2017-06-21 19:47 ` Elliott, Robert (Persistent Memory)
2017-06-21 20:30 ` Luck, Tony
2017-06-23 5:07 ` Dan Williams
2017-06-23 20:59 ` Luck, Tony
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