* [merged] exec-move-s_isreg-check-earlier.patch removed from -mm tree
@ 2020-08-12 21:05 akpm
0 siblings, 0 replies; only message in thread
From: akpm @ 2020-08-12 21:05 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: christian.brauner, cyphar, dvyukov, ebiggers3, keescook,
mm-commits, penguin-kernel, viro
The patch titled
Subject: exec: move S_ISREG() check earlier
has been removed from the -mm tree. Its filename was
exec-move-s_isreg-check-earlier.patch
This patch was dropped because it was merged into mainline or a subsystem tree
------------------------------------------------------
From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Subject: exec: move S_ISREG() check earlier
The execve(2)/uselib(2) syscalls have always rejected non-regular files.
Recently, it was noticed that a deadlock was introduced when trying to
execute pipes, as the S_ISREG() test was happening too late. This was
fixed in commit 73601ea5b7b1 ("fs/open.c: allow opening only regular files
during execve()"), but it was added after inode_permission() had already
run, which meant LSMs could see bogus attempts to execute non-regular
files.
Move the test into the other inode type checks (which already look for
other pathological conditions[1]). Since there is no need to use
FMODE_EXEC while we still have access to "acc_mode", also switch the test
to MAY_EXEC.
Also include a comment with the redundant S_ISREG() checks at the end of
execve(2)/uselib(2) to note that they are present to avoid any mistakes.
My notes on the call path, and related arguments, checks, etc:
do_open_execat()
struct open_flags open_exec_flags = {
.open_flag = O_LARGEFILE | O_RDONLY | __FMODE_EXEC,
.acc_mode = MAY_EXEC,
...
do_filp_open(dfd, filename, open_flags)
path_openat(nameidata, open_flags, flags)
file = alloc_empty_file(open_flags, current_cred());
do_open(nameidata, file, open_flags)
may_open(path, acc_mode, open_flag)
/* new location of MAY_EXEC vs S_ISREG() test */
inode_permission(inode, MAY_OPEN | acc_mode)
security_inode_permission(inode, acc_mode)
vfs_open(path, file)
do_dentry_open(file, path->dentry->d_inode, open)
/* old location of FMODE_EXEC vs S_ISREG() test */
security_file_open(f)
open()
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/202006041910.9EF0C602@keescook/
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200605160013.3954297-3-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com>
Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
---
fs/exec.c | 14 ++++++++++++--
fs/namei.c | 6 ++++--
fs/open.c | 6 ------
3 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
--- a/fs/exec.c~exec-move-s_isreg-check-earlier
+++ a/fs/exec.c
@@ -141,8 +141,13 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(uselib, const char __use
if (IS_ERR(file))
goto out;
+ /*
+ * may_open() has already checked for this, so it should be
+ * impossible to trip now. But we need to be extra cautious
+ * and check again at the very end too.
+ */
error = -EACCES;
- if (!S_ISREG(file_inode(file)->i_mode))
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!S_ISREG(file_inode(file)->i_mode)))
goto exit;
if (path_noexec(&file->f_path))
@@ -908,8 +913,13 @@ static struct file *do_open_execat(int f
if (IS_ERR(file))
goto out;
+ /*
+ * may_open() has already checked for this, so it should be
+ * impossible to trip now. But we need to be extra cautious
+ * and check again at the very end too.
+ */
err = -EACCES;
- if (!S_ISREG(file_inode(file)->i_mode))
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!S_ISREG(file_inode(file)->i_mode)))
goto exit;
if (path_noexec(&file->f_path))
--- a/fs/namei.c~exec-move-s_isreg-check-earlier
+++ a/fs/namei.c
@@ -2849,16 +2849,18 @@ static int may_open(const struct path *p
case S_IFLNK:
return -ELOOP;
case S_IFDIR:
- if (acc_mode & MAY_WRITE)
+ if (acc_mode & (MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC))
return -EISDIR;
break;
case S_IFBLK:
case S_IFCHR:
if (!may_open_dev(path))
return -EACCES;
- /*FALLTHRU*/
+ fallthrough;
case S_IFIFO:
case S_IFSOCK:
+ if (acc_mode & MAY_EXEC)
+ return -EACCES;
flag &= ~O_TRUNC;
break;
}
--- a/fs/open.c~exec-move-s_isreg-check-earlier
+++ a/fs/open.c
@@ -779,12 +779,6 @@ static int do_dentry_open(struct file *f
return 0;
}
- /* Any file opened for execve()/uselib() has to be a regular file. */
- if (unlikely(f->f_flags & FMODE_EXEC && !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))) {
- error = -EACCES;
- goto cleanup_file;
- }
-
if (f->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE && !special_file(inode->i_mode)) {
error = get_write_access(inode);
if (unlikely(error))
_
Patches currently in -mm which might be from keescook@chromium.org are
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2020-08-12 21:05 [merged] exec-move-s_isreg-check-earlier.patch removed from -mm tree akpm
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