* [PATCH 1/8] xfrm: make aead_len() return unsigned int
2017-10-30 8:39 pull request (net-next): ipsec-next 2017-10-30 Steffen Klassert
@ 2017-10-30 8:39 ` Steffen Klassert
2017-10-30 8:39 ` [PATCH 2/8] xfrm: make xfrm_alg_len() " Steffen Klassert
` (7 subsequent siblings)
8 siblings, 0 replies; 10+ messages in thread
From: Steffen Klassert @ 2017-10-30 8:39 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: David Miller; +Cc: Herbert Xu, Steffen Klassert, netdev
From: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Key lengths can't be negative.
Comparison with nla_len() is left signed just in case negative value
can sneak in there.
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
---
include/net/xfrm.h | 2 +-
net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c | 2 +-
2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/net/xfrm.h b/include/net/xfrm.h
index f002a2c..0be4c54 100644
--- a/include/net/xfrm.h
+++ b/include/net/xfrm.h
@@ -1764,7 +1764,7 @@ static inline int xfrm_acquire_is_on(struct net *net)
}
#endif
-static inline int aead_len(struct xfrm_algo_aead *alg)
+static inline unsigned int aead_len(struct xfrm_algo_aead *alg)
{
return sizeof(*alg) + ((alg->alg_key_len + 7) / 8);
}
diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
index 2bfbd91..32c67b8 100644
--- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
+++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ static int verify_aead(struct nlattr **attrs)
return 0;
algp = nla_data(rt);
- if (nla_len(rt) < aead_len(algp))
+ if (nla_len(rt) < (int)aead_len(algp))
return -EINVAL;
algp->alg_name[sizeof(algp->alg_name) - 1] = '\0';
--
2.7.4
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 10+ messages in thread* [PATCH 2/8] xfrm: make xfrm_alg_len() return unsigned int
2017-10-30 8:39 pull request (net-next): ipsec-next 2017-10-30 Steffen Klassert
2017-10-30 8:39 ` [PATCH 1/8] xfrm: make aead_len() return unsigned int Steffen Klassert
@ 2017-10-30 8:39 ` Steffen Klassert
2017-10-30 8:39 ` [PATCH 3/8] xfrm: make xfrm_alg_auth_len() " Steffen Klassert
` (6 subsequent siblings)
8 siblings, 0 replies; 10+ messages in thread
From: Steffen Klassert @ 2017-10-30 8:39 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: David Miller; +Cc: Herbert Xu, Steffen Klassert, netdev
From: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Key lengths can't be negative.
Comparison with nla_len() is left signed just in case negative value
can sneak in there.
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
---
include/net/xfrm.h | 2 +-
net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c | 2 +-
2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/net/xfrm.h b/include/net/xfrm.h
index 0be4c54..2abc0e1 100644
--- a/include/net/xfrm.h
+++ b/include/net/xfrm.h
@@ -1769,7 +1769,7 @@ static inline unsigned int aead_len(struct xfrm_algo_aead *alg)
return sizeof(*alg) + ((alg->alg_key_len + 7) / 8);
}
-static inline int xfrm_alg_len(const struct xfrm_algo *alg)
+static inline unsigned int xfrm_alg_len(const struct xfrm_algo *alg)
{
return sizeof(*alg) + ((alg->alg_key_len + 7) / 8);
}
diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
index 32c67b8..09512d9 100644
--- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
+++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ static int verify_one_alg(struct nlattr **attrs, enum xfrm_attr_type_t type)
return 0;
algp = nla_data(rt);
- if (nla_len(rt) < xfrm_alg_len(algp))
+ if (nla_len(rt) < (int)xfrm_alg_len(algp))
return -EINVAL;
switch (type) {
--
2.7.4
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 10+ messages in thread* [PATCH 3/8] xfrm: make xfrm_alg_auth_len() return unsigned int
2017-10-30 8:39 pull request (net-next): ipsec-next 2017-10-30 Steffen Klassert
2017-10-30 8:39 ` [PATCH 1/8] xfrm: make aead_len() return unsigned int Steffen Klassert
2017-10-30 8:39 ` [PATCH 2/8] xfrm: make xfrm_alg_len() " Steffen Klassert
@ 2017-10-30 8:39 ` Steffen Klassert
2017-10-30 8:39 ` [PATCH 4/8] xfrm: make xfrm_replay_state_esn_len() " Steffen Klassert
` (5 subsequent siblings)
8 siblings, 0 replies; 10+ messages in thread
From: Steffen Klassert @ 2017-10-30 8:39 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: David Miller; +Cc: Herbert Xu, Steffen Klassert, netdev
From: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Key lengths can't be negative.
Comparison with nla_len() is left signed just in case negative value
can sneak in there.
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
---
include/net/xfrm.h | 2 +-
net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c | 2 +-
2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/net/xfrm.h b/include/net/xfrm.h
index 2abc0e1..5d5e11b 100644
--- a/include/net/xfrm.h
+++ b/include/net/xfrm.h
@@ -1774,7 +1774,7 @@ static inline unsigned int xfrm_alg_len(const struct xfrm_algo *alg)
return sizeof(*alg) + ((alg->alg_key_len + 7) / 8);
}
-static inline int xfrm_alg_auth_len(const struct xfrm_algo_auth *alg)
+static inline unsigned int xfrm_alg_auth_len(const struct xfrm_algo_auth *alg)
{
return sizeof(*alg) + ((alg->alg_key_len + 7) / 8);
}
diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
index 09512d9..465c23d 100644
--- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
+++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ static int verify_auth_trunc(struct nlattr **attrs)
return 0;
algp = nla_data(rt);
- if (nla_len(rt) < xfrm_alg_auth_len(algp))
+ if (nla_len(rt) < (int)xfrm_alg_auth_len(algp))
return -EINVAL;
algp->alg_name[sizeof(algp->alg_name) - 1] = '\0';
--
2.7.4
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 10+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4/8] xfrm: make xfrm_replay_state_esn_len() return unsigned int
2017-10-30 8:39 pull request (net-next): ipsec-next 2017-10-30 Steffen Klassert
` (2 preceding siblings ...)
2017-10-30 8:39 ` [PATCH 3/8] xfrm: make xfrm_alg_auth_len() " Steffen Klassert
@ 2017-10-30 8:39 ` Steffen Klassert
2017-10-30 8:39 ` [PATCH 5/8] xfrm: eradicate size_t Steffen Klassert
` (4 subsequent siblings)
8 siblings, 0 replies; 10+ messages in thread
From: Steffen Klassert @ 2017-10-30 8:39 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: David Miller; +Cc: Herbert Xu, Steffen Klassert, netdev
From: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Replay detection bitmaps can't have negative length.
Comparisons with nla_len() are left signed just in case negative value
can sneak in there.
Propagate unsignedness for code size savings:
add/remove: 0/0 grow/shrink: 0/5 up/down: 0/-38 (-38)
function old new delta
xfrm_state_construct 1802 1800 -2
xfrm_update_ae_params 295 289 -6
xfrm_state_migrate 1345 1339 -6
xfrm_replay_notify_esn 349 337 -12
xfrm_replay_notify_bmp 345 333 -12
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
---
include/net/xfrm.h | 2 +-
net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c | 10 +++++-----
2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/net/xfrm.h b/include/net/xfrm.h
index 5d5e11b..3cb618b 100644
--- a/include/net/xfrm.h
+++ b/include/net/xfrm.h
@@ -1779,7 +1779,7 @@ static inline unsigned int xfrm_alg_auth_len(const struct xfrm_algo_auth *alg)
return sizeof(*alg) + ((alg->alg_key_len + 7) / 8);
}
-static inline int xfrm_replay_state_esn_len(struct xfrm_replay_state_esn *replay_esn)
+static inline unsigned int xfrm_replay_state_esn_len(struct xfrm_replay_state_esn *replay_esn)
{
return sizeof(*replay_esn) + replay_esn->bmp_len * sizeof(__u32);
}
diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
index 465c23d..83718db 100644
--- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
+++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
@@ -130,7 +130,7 @@ static inline int verify_replay(struct xfrm_usersa_info *p,
if (rs->bmp_len > XFRMA_REPLAY_ESN_MAX / sizeof(rs->bmp[0]) / 8)
return -EINVAL;
- if (nla_len(rt) < xfrm_replay_state_esn_len(rs) &&
+ if (nla_len(rt) < (int)xfrm_replay_state_esn_len(rs) &&
nla_len(rt) != sizeof(*rs))
return -EINVAL;
}
@@ -404,7 +404,7 @@ static inline int xfrm_replay_verify_len(struct xfrm_replay_state_esn *replay_es
struct nlattr *rp)
{
struct xfrm_replay_state_esn *up;
- int ulen;
+ unsigned int ulen;
if (!replay_esn || !rp)
return 0;
@@ -414,7 +414,7 @@ static inline int xfrm_replay_verify_len(struct xfrm_replay_state_esn *replay_es
/* Check the overall length and the internal bitmap length to avoid
* potential overflow. */
- if (nla_len(rp) < ulen ||
+ if (nla_len(rp) < (int)ulen ||
xfrm_replay_state_esn_len(replay_esn) != ulen ||
replay_esn->bmp_len != up->bmp_len)
return -EINVAL;
@@ -430,14 +430,14 @@ static int xfrm_alloc_replay_state_esn(struct xfrm_replay_state_esn **replay_esn
struct nlattr *rta)
{
struct xfrm_replay_state_esn *p, *pp, *up;
- int klen, ulen;
+ unsigned int klen, ulen;
if (!rta)
return 0;
up = nla_data(rta);
klen = xfrm_replay_state_esn_len(up);
- ulen = nla_len(rta) >= klen ? klen : sizeof(*up);
+ ulen = nla_len(rta) >= (int)klen ? klen : sizeof(*up);
p = kzalloc(klen, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!p)
--
2.7.4
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 10+ messages in thread* [PATCH 5/8] xfrm: eradicate size_t
2017-10-30 8:39 pull request (net-next): ipsec-next 2017-10-30 Steffen Klassert
` (3 preceding siblings ...)
2017-10-30 8:39 ` [PATCH 4/8] xfrm: make xfrm_replay_state_esn_len() " Steffen Klassert
@ 2017-10-30 8:39 ` Steffen Klassert
2017-10-30 8:39 ` [PATCH 6/8] esp6: remove redundant initialization of esph Steffen Klassert
` (3 subsequent siblings)
8 siblings, 0 replies; 10+ messages in thread
From: Steffen Klassert @ 2017-10-30 8:39 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: David Miller; +Cc: Herbert Xu, Steffen Klassert, netdev
From: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
All netlink message sizes are a) unsigned, b) can't be >= 4GB in size
because netlink doesn't support >= 64KB messages in the first place.
All those size_t across the code are a scam especially across networking
which likes to work with small numbers like 1500 or 65536.
Propagate unsignedness and flip some "int" to "unsigned int" as well.
This is preparation to switching nlmsg_new() to "unsigned int".
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
---
net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c | 44 +++++++++++++++++++++++---------------------
1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
index 83718db..f7a12aa 100644
--- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
+++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
@@ -458,9 +458,9 @@ static int xfrm_alloc_replay_state_esn(struct xfrm_replay_state_esn **replay_esn
return 0;
}
-static inline int xfrm_user_sec_ctx_size(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *xfrm_ctx)
+static inline unsigned int xfrm_user_sec_ctx_size(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *xfrm_ctx)
{
- int len = 0;
+ unsigned int len = 0;
if (xfrm_ctx) {
len += sizeof(struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx);
@@ -1031,7 +1031,7 @@ static inline int xfrm_nlmsg_multicast(struct net *net, struct sk_buff *skb,
return -1;
}
-static inline size_t xfrm_spdinfo_msgsize(void)
+static inline unsigned int xfrm_spdinfo_msgsize(void)
{
return NLMSG_ALIGN(4)
+ nla_total_size(sizeof(struct xfrmu_spdinfo))
@@ -1157,7 +1157,7 @@ static int xfrm_get_spdinfo(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh,
return nlmsg_unicast(net->xfrm.nlsk, r_skb, sportid);
}
-static inline size_t xfrm_sadinfo_msgsize(void)
+static inline unsigned int xfrm_sadinfo_msgsize(void)
{
return NLMSG_ALIGN(4)
+ nla_total_size(sizeof(struct xfrmu_sadhinfo))
@@ -1633,7 +1633,7 @@ static inline int copy_to_user_sec_ctx(struct xfrm_policy *xp, struct sk_buff *s
return copy_sec_ctx(xp->security, skb);
return 0;
}
-static inline size_t userpolicy_type_attrsize(void)
+static inline unsigned int userpolicy_type_attrsize(void)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_XFRM_SUB_POLICY
return nla_total_size(sizeof(struct xfrm_userpolicy_type));
@@ -1850,9 +1850,9 @@ static int xfrm_flush_sa(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh,
return 0;
}
-static inline size_t xfrm_aevent_msgsize(struct xfrm_state *x)
+static inline unsigned int xfrm_aevent_msgsize(struct xfrm_state *x)
{
- size_t replay_size = x->replay_esn ?
+ unsigned int replay_size = x->replay_esn ?
xfrm_replay_state_esn_len(x->replay_esn) :
sizeof(struct xfrm_replay_state);
@@ -2321,8 +2321,8 @@ static int copy_to_user_kmaddress(const struct xfrm_kmaddress *k, struct sk_buff
return nla_put(skb, XFRMA_KMADDRESS, sizeof(uk), &uk);
}
-static inline size_t xfrm_migrate_msgsize(int num_migrate, int with_kma,
- int with_encp)
+static inline unsigned int xfrm_migrate_msgsize(int num_migrate, int with_kma,
+ int with_encp)
{
return NLMSG_ALIGN(sizeof(struct xfrm_userpolicy_id))
+ (with_kma ? nla_total_size(sizeof(struct xfrm_kmaddress)) : 0)
@@ -2566,7 +2566,7 @@ static void xfrm_netlink_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb)
mutex_unlock(&net->xfrm.xfrm_cfg_mutex);
}
-static inline size_t xfrm_expire_msgsize(void)
+static inline unsigned int xfrm_expire_msgsize(void)
{
return NLMSG_ALIGN(sizeof(struct xfrm_user_expire))
+ nla_total_size(sizeof(struct xfrm_mark));
@@ -2654,9 +2654,9 @@ static int xfrm_notify_sa_flush(const struct km_event *c)
return xfrm_nlmsg_multicast(net, skb, 0, XFRMNLGRP_SA);
}
-static inline size_t xfrm_sa_len(struct xfrm_state *x)
+static inline unsigned int xfrm_sa_len(struct xfrm_state *x)
{
- size_t l = 0;
+ unsigned int l = 0;
if (x->aead)
l += nla_total_size(aead_len(x->aead));
if (x->aalg) {
@@ -2701,8 +2701,9 @@ static int xfrm_notify_sa(struct xfrm_state *x, const struct km_event *c)
struct xfrm_usersa_id *id;
struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
struct sk_buff *skb;
- int len = xfrm_sa_len(x);
- int headlen, err;
+ unsigned int len = xfrm_sa_len(x);
+ unsigned int headlen;
+ int err;
headlen = sizeof(*p);
if (c->event == XFRM_MSG_DELSA) {
@@ -2776,8 +2777,8 @@ static int xfrm_send_state_notify(struct xfrm_state *x, const struct km_event *c
}
-static inline size_t xfrm_acquire_msgsize(struct xfrm_state *x,
- struct xfrm_policy *xp)
+static inline unsigned int xfrm_acquire_msgsize(struct xfrm_state *x,
+ struct xfrm_policy *xp)
{
return NLMSG_ALIGN(sizeof(struct xfrm_user_acquire))
+ nla_total_size(sizeof(struct xfrm_user_tmpl) * xp->xfrm_nr)
@@ -2900,7 +2901,7 @@ static struct xfrm_policy *xfrm_compile_policy(struct sock *sk, int opt,
return xp;
}
-static inline size_t xfrm_polexpire_msgsize(struct xfrm_policy *xp)
+static inline unsigned int xfrm_polexpire_msgsize(struct xfrm_policy *xp)
{
return NLMSG_ALIGN(sizeof(struct xfrm_user_polexpire))
+ nla_total_size(sizeof(struct xfrm_user_tmpl) * xp->xfrm_nr)
@@ -2957,13 +2958,14 @@ static int xfrm_exp_policy_notify(struct xfrm_policy *xp, int dir, const struct
static int xfrm_notify_policy(struct xfrm_policy *xp, int dir, const struct km_event *c)
{
- int len = nla_total_size(sizeof(struct xfrm_user_tmpl) * xp->xfrm_nr);
+ unsigned int len = nla_total_size(sizeof(struct xfrm_user_tmpl) * xp->xfrm_nr);
struct net *net = xp_net(xp);
struct xfrm_userpolicy_info *p;
struct xfrm_userpolicy_id *id;
struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
struct sk_buff *skb;
- int headlen, err;
+ unsigned int headlen;
+ int err;
headlen = sizeof(*p);
if (c->event == XFRM_MSG_DELPOLICY) {
@@ -3070,7 +3072,7 @@ static int xfrm_send_policy_notify(struct xfrm_policy *xp, int dir, const struct
}
-static inline size_t xfrm_report_msgsize(void)
+static inline unsigned int xfrm_report_msgsize(void)
{
return NLMSG_ALIGN(sizeof(struct xfrm_user_report));
}
@@ -3115,7 +3117,7 @@ static int xfrm_send_report(struct net *net, u8 proto,
return xfrm_nlmsg_multicast(net, skb, 0, XFRMNLGRP_REPORT);
}
-static inline size_t xfrm_mapping_msgsize(void)
+static inline unsigned int xfrm_mapping_msgsize(void)
{
return NLMSG_ALIGN(sizeof(struct xfrm_user_mapping));
}
--
2.7.4
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 10+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6/8] esp6: remove redundant initialization of esph
2017-10-30 8:39 pull request (net-next): ipsec-next 2017-10-30 Steffen Klassert
` (4 preceding siblings ...)
2017-10-30 8:39 ` [PATCH 5/8] xfrm: eradicate size_t Steffen Klassert
@ 2017-10-30 8:39 ` Steffen Klassert
2017-10-30 8:39 ` [PATCH 7/8] net: xfrm_user: use BUG_ON instead of if condition followed by BUG Steffen Klassert
` (2 subsequent siblings)
8 siblings, 0 replies; 10+ messages in thread
From: Steffen Klassert @ 2017-10-30 8:39 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: David Miller; +Cc: Herbert Xu, Steffen Klassert, netdev
From: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
The pointer esph is being initialized with a value that is never
read and then being updated. Remove the redundant initialization
and move the declaration and initializtion of esph to the local
code block.
Cleans up clang warning:
net/ipv6/esp6.c:562:21: warning: Value stored to 'esph' during its
initialization is never read
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
---
net/ipv6/esp6.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/ipv6/esp6.c b/net/ipv6/esp6.c
index 89910e2..1696401 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/esp6.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/esp6.c
@@ -559,14 +559,14 @@ static void esp_input_restore_header(struct sk_buff *skb)
static void esp_input_set_header(struct sk_buff *skb, __be32 *seqhi)
{
struct xfrm_state *x = xfrm_input_state(skb);
- struct ip_esp_hdr *esph = (struct ip_esp_hdr *)skb->data;
/* For ESN we move the header forward by 4 bytes to
* accomodate the high bits. We will move it back after
* decryption.
*/
if ((x->props.flags & XFRM_STATE_ESN)) {
- esph = skb_push(skb, 4);
+ struct ip_esp_hdr *esph = skb_push(skb, 4);
+
*seqhi = esph->spi;
esph->spi = esph->seq_no;
esph->seq_no = XFRM_SKB_CB(skb)->seq.input.hi;
--
2.7.4
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 10+ messages in thread* [PATCH 7/8] net: xfrm_user: use BUG_ON instead of if condition followed by BUG
2017-10-30 8:39 pull request (net-next): ipsec-next 2017-10-30 Steffen Klassert
` (5 preceding siblings ...)
2017-10-30 8:39 ` [PATCH 6/8] esp6: remove redundant initialization of esph Steffen Klassert
@ 2017-10-30 8:39 ` Steffen Klassert
2017-10-30 8:39 ` [PATCH 8/8] ipv6: esp6: " Steffen Klassert
2017-11-01 3:17 ` pull request (net-next): ipsec-next 2017-10-30 David Miller
8 siblings, 0 replies; 10+ messages in thread
From: Steffen Klassert @ 2017-10-30 8:39 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: David Miller; +Cc: Herbert Xu, Steffen Klassert, netdev
From: "Gustavo A. R. Silva" <garsilva@embeddedor.com>
Use BUG_ON instead of if condition followed by BUG.
This issue was detected with the help of Coccinelle.
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <garsilva@embeddedor.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
---
net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c | 45 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------
1 file changed, 27 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
index f7a12aa..bbc390e 100644
--- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
+++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
@@ -1146,13 +1146,14 @@ static int xfrm_get_spdinfo(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh,
u32 *flags = nlmsg_data(nlh);
u32 sportid = NETLINK_CB(skb).portid;
u32 seq = nlh->nlmsg_seq;
+ int err;
r_skb = nlmsg_new(xfrm_spdinfo_msgsize(), GFP_ATOMIC);
if (r_skb == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
- if (build_spdinfo(r_skb, net, sportid, seq, *flags) < 0)
- BUG();
+ err = build_spdinfo(r_skb, net, sportid, seq, *flags);
+ BUG_ON(err < 0);
return nlmsg_unicast(net->xfrm.nlsk, r_skb, sportid);
}
@@ -1204,13 +1205,14 @@ static int xfrm_get_sadinfo(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh,
u32 *flags = nlmsg_data(nlh);
u32 sportid = NETLINK_CB(skb).portid;
u32 seq = nlh->nlmsg_seq;
+ int err;
r_skb = nlmsg_new(xfrm_sadinfo_msgsize(), GFP_ATOMIC);
if (r_skb == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
- if (build_sadinfo(r_skb, net, sportid, seq, *flags) < 0)
- BUG();
+ err = build_sadinfo(r_skb, net, sportid, seq, *flags);
+ BUG_ON(err < 0);
return nlmsg_unicast(net->xfrm.nlsk, r_skb, sportid);
}
@@ -1957,8 +1959,9 @@ static int xfrm_get_ae(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh,
c.seq = nlh->nlmsg_seq;
c.portid = nlh->nlmsg_pid;
- if (build_aevent(r_skb, x, &c) < 0)
- BUG();
+ err = build_aevent(r_skb, x, &c);
+ BUG_ON(err < 0);
+
err = nlmsg_unicast(net->xfrm.nlsk, r_skb, NETLINK_CB(skb).portid);
spin_unlock_bh(&x->lock);
xfrm_state_put(x);
@@ -2385,6 +2388,7 @@ static int xfrm_send_migrate(const struct xfrm_selector *sel, u8 dir, u8 type,
{
struct net *net = &init_net;
struct sk_buff *skb;
+ int err;
skb = nlmsg_new(xfrm_migrate_msgsize(num_migrate, !!k, !!encap),
GFP_ATOMIC);
@@ -2392,8 +2396,8 @@ static int xfrm_send_migrate(const struct xfrm_selector *sel, u8 dir, u8 type,
return -ENOMEM;
/* build migrate */
- if (build_migrate(skb, m, num_migrate, k, sel, encap, dir, type) < 0)
- BUG();
+ err = build_migrate(skb, m, num_migrate, k, sel, encap, dir, type);
+ BUG_ON(err < 0);
return xfrm_nlmsg_multicast(net, skb, 0, XFRMNLGRP_MIGRATE);
}
@@ -2617,13 +2621,14 @@ static int xfrm_aevent_state_notify(struct xfrm_state *x, const struct km_event
{
struct net *net = xs_net(x);
struct sk_buff *skb;
+ int err;
skb = nlmsg_new(xfrm_aevent_msgsize(x), GFP_ATOMIC);
if (skb == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
- if (build_aevent(skb, x, c) < 0)
- BUG();
+ err = build_aevent(skb, x, c);
+ BUG_ON(err < 0);
return xfrm_nlmsg_multicast(net, skb, 0, XFRMNLGRP_AEVENTS);
}
@@ -2830,13 +2835,14 @@ static int xfrm_send_acquire(struct xfrm_state *x, struct xfrm_tmpl *xt,
{
struct net *net = xs_net(x);
struct sk_buff *skb;
+ int err;
skb = nlmsg_new(xfrm_acquire_msgsize(x, xp), GFP_ATOMIC);
if (skb == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
- if (build_acquire(skb, x, xt, xp) < 0)
- BUG();
+ err = build_acquire(skb, x, xt, xp);
+ BUG_ON(err < 0);
return xfrm_nlmsg_multicast(net, skb, 0, XFRMNLGRP_ACQUIRE);
}
@@ -2945,13 +2951,14 @@ static int xfrm_exp_policy_notify(struct xfrm_policy *xp, int dir, const struct
{
struct net *net = xp_net(xp);
struct sk_buff *skb;
+ int err;
skb = nlmsg_new(xfrm_polexpire_msgsize(xp), GFP_ATOMIC);
if (skb == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
- if (build_polexpire(skb, xp, dir, c) < 0)
- BUG();
+ err = build_polexpire(skb, xp, dir, c);
+ BUG_ON(err < 0);
return xfrm_nlmsg_multicast(net, skb, 0, XFRMNLGRP_EXPIRE);
}
@@ -3106,13 +3113,14 @@ static int xfrm_send_report(struct net *net, u8 proto,
struct xfrm_selector *sel, xfrm_address_t *addr)
{
struct sk_buff *skb;
+ int err;
skb = nlmsg_new(xfrm_report_msgsize(), GFP_ATOMIC);
if (skb == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
- if (build_report(skb, proto, sel, addr) < 0)
- BUG();
+ err = build_report(skb, proto, sel, addr);
+ BUG_ON(err < 0);
return xfrm_nlmsg_multicast(net, skb, 0, XFRMNLGRP_REPORT);
}
@@ -3153,6 +3161,7 @@ static int xfrm_send_mapping(struct xfrm_state *x, xfrm_address_t *ipaddr,
{
struct net *net = xs_net(x);
struct sk_buff *skb;
+ int err;
if (x->id.proto != IPPROTO_ESP)
return -EINVAL;
@@ -3164,8 +3173,8 @@ static int xfrm_send_mapping(struct xfrm_state *x, xfrm_address_t *ipaddr,
if (skb == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
- if (build_mapping(skb, x, ipaddr, sport) < 0)
- BUG();
+ err = build_mapping(skb, x, ipaddr, sport);
+ BUG_ON(err < 0);
return xfrm_nlmsg_multicast(net, skb, 0, XFRMNLGRP_MAPPING);
}
--
2.7.4
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 10+ messages in thread* [PATCH 8/8] ipv6: esp6: use BUG_ON instead of if condition followed by BUG
2017-10-30 8:39 pull request (net-next): ipsec-next 2017-10-30 Steffen Klassert
` (6 preceding siblings ...)
2017-10-30 8:39 ` [PATCH 7/8] net: xfrm_user: use BUG_ON instead of if condition followed by BUG Steffen Klassert
@ 2017-10-30 8:39 ` Steffen Klassert
2017-11-01 3:17 ` pull request (net-next): ipsec-next 2017-10-30 David Miller
8 siblings, 0 replies; 10+ messages in thread
From: Steffen Klassert @ 2017-10-30 8:39 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: David Miller; +Cc: Herbert Xu, Steffen Klassert, netdev
From: "Gustavo A. R. Silva" <garsilva@embeddedor.com>
Use BUG_ON instead of if condition followed by BUG in esp_remove_trailer.
This issue was detected with the help of Coccinelle.
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <garsilva@embeddedor.com>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
---
net/ipv6/esp6.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/ipv6/esp6.c b/net/ipv6/esp6.c
index 1696401..4000b71 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/esp6.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/esp6.c
@@ -483,8 +483,8 @@ static inline int esp_remove_trailer(struct sk_buff *skb)
goto out;
}
- if (skb_copy_bits(skb, skb->len - alen - 2, nexthdr, 2))
- BUG();
+ ret = skb_copy_bits(skb, skb->len - alen - 2, nexthdr, 2);
+ BUG_ON(ret);
ret = -EINVAL;
padlen = nexthdr[0];
--
2.7.4
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 10+ messages in thread* Re: pull request (net-next): ipsec-next 2017-10-30
2017-10-30 8:39 pull request (net-next): ipsec-next 2017-10-30 Steffen Klassert
` (7 preceding siblings ...)
2017-10-30 8:39 ` [PATCH 8/8] ipv6: esp6: " Steffen Klassert
@ 2017-11-01 3:17 ` David Miller
8 siblings, 0 replies; 10+ messages in thread
From: David Miller @ 2017-11-01 3:17 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: steffen.klassert; +Cc: herbert, netdev
From: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Date: Mon, 30 Oct 2017 09:39:27 +0100
> 1) Change some variables that can't be negative
> from int to unsigned int. From Alexey Dobriyan.
>
> 2) Remove a redundant header initialization in esp6.
> From Colin Ian King.
>
> 3) Some BUG to BUG_ON conversions.
> From Gustavo A. R. Silva.
>
> Please pull or let me know if there are problems.
Pulled, thanks Steffen.
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 10+ messages in thread