* [PATCH net] net/x25: prevent a couple of overflows
[not found] <61d3e7e75f704996bf312ef5d271bcea@tencent.com>
@ 2020-11-30 10:04 ` Dan Carpenter
2020-12-01 6:50 ` Martin Schiller
0 siblings, 1 reply; 6+ messages in thread
From: Dan Carpenter @ 2020-11-30 10:04 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Andrew Hendry, kiyin(尹亮), Martin Schiller
Cc: security, linux-distros, huntchen(陈阳),
dannywang(王宇),
David S. Miller, Jakub Kicinski, linux-x25, netdev
From: "kiyin(尹亮)" <kiyin@tencent.com>
The .x25_addr[] address comes from the user and is not necessarily
NUL terminated. This leads to a couple problems. The first problem is
that the strlen() in x25_bind() can read beyond the end of the buffer.
The second problem is more subtle and could result in memory corruption.
The call tree is:
x25_connect()
--> x25_write_internal()
--> x25_addr_aton()
The .x25_addr[] buffers are copied to the "addresses" buffer from
x25_write_internal() so it will lead to stack corruption.
The x25 protocol only allows 15 character addresses so putting a NUL
terminator as the 16th character is safe and obviously preferable to
reading out of bounds.
Signed-off-by: "kiyin(尹亮)" <kiyin@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
---
net/x25/af_x25.c | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
diff --git a/net/x25/af_x25.c b/net/x25/af_x25.c
index 0bbb283f23c9..3180f15942fe 100644
--- a/net/x25/af_x25.c
+++ b/net/x25/af_x25.c
@@ -686,6 +686,8 @@ static int x25_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr, int addr_len)
goto out;
}
+ addr->sx25_addr.x25_addr[X25_ADDR_LEN - 1] = '\0';
+
/* check for the null_x25_address */
if (strcmp(addr->sx25_addr.x25_addr, null_x25_address.x25_addr)) {
@@ -779,6 +781,7 @@ static int x25_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr,
goto out;
rc = -ENETUNREACH;
+ addr->sx25_addr.x25_addr[X25_ADDR_LEN - 1] = '\0';
rt = x25_get_route(&addr->sx25_addr);
if (!rt)
goto out;
--
2.28.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH net] net/x25: prevent a couple of overflows
2020-11-30 10:04 ` [PATCH net] net/x25: prevent a couple of overflows Dan Carpenter
@ 2020-12-01 6:50 ` Martin Schiller
2020-12-01 15:15 ` [PATCH net v2] " Dan Carpenter
0 siblings, 1 reply; 6+ messages in thread
From: Martin Schiller @ 2020-12-01 6:50 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Dan Carpenter
Cc: Andrew Hendry, kiyin(尹亮),
security, linux-distros, huntchen(陈阳),
dannywang(王宇),
David S. Miller, Jakub Kicinski, linux-x25, netdev
On 2020-11-30 11:04, Dan Carpenter wrote:
> From: "kiyin(尹亮)" <kiyin@tencent.com>
>
> The .x25_addr[] address comes from the user and is not necessarily
> NUL terminated. This leads to a couple problems. The first problem is
> that the strlen() in x25_bind() can read beyond the end of the buffer.
>
> The second problem is more subtle and could result in memory
> corruption.
> The call tree is:
> x25_connect()
> --> x25_write_internal()
> --> x25_addr_aton()
>
> The .x25_addr[] buffers are copied to the "addresses" buffer from
> x25_write_internal() so it will lead to stack corruption.
>
> The x25 protocol only allows 15 character addresses so putting a NUL
> terminator as the 16th character is safe and obviously preferable to
> reading out of bounds.
>
OK, I see the potential danger. I'm just wondering what is the better
approach here to counteract it:
1. check if the string is terminated or exceeds the maximum allowed
length and report an error if necessary.
2. always terminate the string at byte 15 as you suggested.
> Signed-off-by: "kiyin(尹亮)" <kiyin@tencent.com>
> Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
> ---
>
> net/x25/af_x25.c | 3 +++
> 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/net/x25/af_x25.c b/net/x25/af_x25.c
> index 0bbb283f23c9..3180f15942fe 100644
> --- a/net/x25/af_x25.c
> +++ b/net/x25/af_x25.c
> @@ -686,6 +686,8 @@ static int x25_bind(struct socket *sock, struct
> sockaddr *uaddr, int addr_len)
> goto out;
> }
>
> + addr->sx25_addr.x25_addr[X25_ADDR_LEN - 1] = '\0';
> +
> /* check for the null_x25_address */
> if (strcmp(addr->sx25_addr.x25_addr, null_x25_address.x25_addr)) {
>
> @@ -779,6 +781,7 @@ static int x25_connect(struct socket *sock, struct
> sockaddr *uaddr,
> goto out;
>
> rc = -ENETUNREACH;
> + addr->sx25_addr.x25_addr[X25_ADDR_LEN - 1] = '\0';
> rt = x25_get_route(&addr->sx25_addr);
> if (!rt)
> goto out;
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
* [PATCH net v2] net/x25: prevent a couple of overflows
2020-12-01 6:50 ` Martin Schiller
@ 2020-12-01 15:15 ` Dan Carpenter
2020-12-02 7:43 ` [PATCH net v2] net/x25: prevent a couple of overflows(Internet mail) kiyin(尹亮)
2020-12-02 9:27 ` [PATCH net v2] net/x25: prevent a couple of overflows Martin Schiller
0 siblings, 2 replies; 6+ messages in thread
From: Dan Carpenter @ 2020-12-01 15:15 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Martin Schiller
Cc: David S. Miller, Jakub Kicinski, linux-x25, netdev,
Andrew Hendry, kiyin(尹亮),
security, linux-distros, huntchen(陈阳),
dannywang(王宇),
kernel-janitors
The .x25_addr[] address comes from the user and is not necessarily
NUL terminated. This leads to a couple problems. The first problem is
that the strlen() in x25_bind() can read beyond the end of the buffer.
The second problem is more subtle and could result in memory corruption.
The call tree is:
x25_connect()
--> x25_write_internal()
--> x25_addr_aton()
The .x25_addr[] buffers are copied to the "addresses" buffer from
x25_write_internal() so it will lead to stack corruption.
Verify that the strings are NUL terminated and return -EINVAL if they
are not.
Reported-by: "kiyin(尹亮)" <kiyin@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
---
The first patch put a NUL terminator on the end of the string and this
patch returns an error instead. I don't have a strong preference, which
patch to go with.
net/x25/af_x25.c | 6 ++++--
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/x25/af_x25.c b/net/x25/af_x25.c
index 9232cdb42ad9..d41fffb2507b 100644
--- a/net/x25/af_x25.c
+++ b/net/x25/af_x25.c
@@ -675,7 +675,8 @@ static int x25_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr, int addr_len)
int len, i, rc = 0;
if (addr_len != sizeof(struct sockaddr_x25) ||
- addr->sx25_family != AF_X25) {
+ addr->sx25_family != AF_X25 ||
+ strnlen(addr->sx25_addr.x25_addr, X25_ADDR_LEN) == X25_ADDR_LEN) {
rc = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
@@ -769,7 +770,8 @@ static int x25_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr,
rc = -EINVAL;
if (addr_len != sizeof(struct sockaddr_x25) ||
- addr->sx25_family != AF_X25)
+ addr->sx25_family != AF_X25 ||
+ strnlen(addr->sx25_addr.x25_addr, X25_ADDR_LEN) == X25_ADDR_LEN)
goto out;
rc = -ENETUNREACH;
--
2.29.2
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
* RE: [PATCH net v2] net/x25: prevent a couple of overflows(Internet mail)
2020-12-01 15:15 ` [PATCH net v2] " Dan Carpenter
@ 2020-12-02 7:43 ` kiyin(尹亮)
2020-12-02 9:27 ` [PATCH net v2] net/x25: prevent a couple of overflows Martin Schiller
1 sibling, 0 replies; 6+ messages in thread
From: kiyin(尹亮) @ 2020-12-02 7:43 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Dan Carpenter, Martin Schiller
Cc: David S. Miller, Jakub Kicinski, linux-x25, netdev,
Andrew Hendry, security, linux-distros,
huntchen(陈阳), dannywang(王宇),
kernel-janitors
Hi Dan,
I think the strnlen is better. the kernel doesn't need to adjust user land mistake by putting a NULL terminator. just return an error to let the user land program fix the wrong address.
Regards,
kiyin
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Dan Carpenter [mailto:dan.carpenter@oracle.com]
> Sent: Tuesday, December 1, 2020 11:15 PM
> To: Martin Schiller <ms@dev.tdt.de>
> Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>; Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>;
> linux-x25@vger.kernel.org; netdev@vger.kernel.org; Andrew Hendry
> <andrew.hendry@gmail.com>; kiyin(尹亮) <kiyin@tencent.com>;
> security@kernel.org; linux-distros@vs.openwall.org; huntchen(陈阳)
> <huntchen@tencent.com>; dannywang(王宇) <dannywang@tencent.com>;
> kernel-janitors@vger.kernel.org
> Subject: [PATCH net v2] net/x25: prevent a couple of overflows(Internet mail)
>
> The .x25_addr[] address comes from the user and is not necessarily NUL
> terminated. This leads to a couple problems. The first problem is that the
> strlen() in x25_bind() can read beyond the end of the buffer.
>
> The second problem is more subtle and could result in memory corruption.
> The call tree is:
> x25_connect()
> --> x25_write_internal()
> --> x25_addr_aton()
>
> The .x25_addr[] buffers are copied to the "addresses" buffer from
> x25_write_internal() so it will lead to stack corruption.
>
> Verify that the strings are NUL terminated and return -EINVAL if they are not.
>
> Reported-by: "kiyin(尹亮)" <kiyin@tencent.com>
> Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
> ---
> The first patch put a NUL terminator on the end of the string and this patch
> returns an error instead. I don't have a strong preference, which patch to go
> with.
>
> net/x25/af_x25.c | 6 ++++--
> 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/net/x25/af_x25.c b/net/x25/af_x25.c index
> 9232cdb42ad9..d41fffb2507b 100644
> --- a/net/x25/af_x25.c
> +++ b/net/x25/af_x25.c
> @@ -675,7 +675,8 @@ static int x25_bind(struct socket *sock, struct
> sockaddr *uaddr, int addr_len)
> int len, i, rc = 0;
>
> if (addr_len != sizeof(struct sockaddr_x25) ||
> - addr->sx25_family != AF_X25) {
> + addr->sx25_family != AF_X25 ||
> + strnlen(addr->sx25_addr.x25_addr, X25_ADDR_LEN) ==
> X25_ADDR_LEN) {
> rc = -EINVAL;
> goto out;
> }
> @@ -769,7 +770,8 @@ static int x25_connect(struct socket *sock, struct
> sockaddr *uaddr,
>
> rc = -EINVAL;
> if (addr_len != sizeof(struct sockaddr_x25) ||
> - addr->sx25_family != AF_X25)
> + addr->sx25_family != AF_X25 ||
> + strnlen(addr->sx25_addr.x25_addr, X25_ADDR_LEN) ==
> X25_ADDR_LEN)
> goto out;
>
> rc = -ENETUNREACH;
> --
> 2.29.2
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH net v2] net/x25: prevent a couple of overflows
2020-12-01 15:15 ` [PATCH net v2] " Dan Carpenter
2020-12-02 7:43 ` [PATCH net v2] net/x25: prevent a couple of overflows(Internet mail) kiyin(尹亮)
@ 2020-12-02 9:27 ` Martin Schiller
2020-12-03 1:27 ` Jakub Kicinski
1 sibling, 1 reply; 6+ messages in thread
From: Martin Schiller @ 2020-12-02 9:27 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Dan Carpenter
Cc: David S. Miller, Jakub Kicinski, linux-x25, netdev,
Andrew Hendry, kiyin(尹亮),
security, linux-distros, huntchen(陈阳),
dannywang(王宇),
kernel-janitors
On 2020-12-01 16:15, Dan Carpenter wrote:
> The .x25_addr[] address comes from the user and is not necessarily
> NUL terminated. This leads to a couple problems. The first problem is
> that the strlen() in x25_bind() can read beyond the end of the buffer.
>
> The second problem is more subtle and could result in memory
> corruption.
> The call tree is:
> x25_connect()
> --> x25_write_internal()
> --> x25_addr_aton()
>
> The .x25_addr[] buffers are copied to the "addresses" buffer from
> x25_write_internal() so it will lead to stack corruption.
>
> Verify that the strings are NUL terminated and return -EINVAL if they
> are not.
>
> Reported-by: "kiyin(尹亮)" <kiyin@tencent.com>
> Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
> ---
> The first patch put a NUL terminator on the end of the string and this
> patch returns an error instead. I don't have a strong preference,
> which
> patch to go with.
>
> net/x25/af_x25.c | 6 ++++--
> 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/net/x25/af_x25.c b/net/x25/af_x25.c
> index 9232cdb42ad9..d41fffb2507b 100644
> --- a/net/x25/af_x25.c
> +++ b/net/x25/af_x25.c
> @@ -675,7 +675,8 @@ static int x25_bind(struct socket *sock, struct
> sockaddr *uaddr, int addr_len)
> int len, i, rc = 0;
>
> if (addr_len != sizeof(struct sockaddr_x25) ||
> - addr->sx25_family != AF_X25) {
> + addr->sx25_family != AF_X25 ||
> + strnlen(addr->sx25_addr.x25_addr, X25_ADDR_LEN) == X25_ADDR_LEN)
> {
> rc = -EINVAL;
> goto out;
> }
> @@ -769,7 +770,8 @@ static int x25_connect(struct socket *sock, struct
> sockaddr *uaddr,
>
> rc = -EINVAL;
> if (addr_len != sizeof(struct sockaddr_x25) ||
> - addr->sx25_family != AF_X25)
> + addr->sx25_family != AF_X25 ||
> + strnlen(addr->sx25_addr.x25_addr, X25_ADDR_LEN) == X25_ADDR_LEN)
> goto out;
>
> rc = -ENETUNREACH;
Acked-by: Martin Schiller <ms@dev.tdt.de>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH net v2] net/x25: prevent a couple of overflows
2020-12-02 9:27 ` [PATCH net v2] net/x25: prevent a couple of overflows Martin Schiller
@ 2020-12-03 1:27 ` Jakub Kicinski
0 siblings, 0 replies; 6+ messages in thread
From: Jakub Kicinski @ 2020-12-03 1:27 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Martin Schiller
Cc: Dan Carpenter, David S. Miller, linux-x25, netdev, Andrew Hendry,
kiyin( 尹亮) ,
security, linux-distros, huntchen(陈阳) ,
dannywang(王宇) ,
kernel-janitors
On Wed, 02 Dec 2020 10:27:18 +0100 Martin Schiller wrote:
> On 2020-12-01 16:15, Dan Carpenter wrote:
> > The .x25_addr[] address comes from the user and is not necessarily
> > NUL terminated. This leads to a couple problems. The first problem is
> > that the strlen() in x25_bind() can read beyond the end of the buffer.
> >
> > The second problem is more subtle and could result in memory
> > corruption.
> > The call tree is:
> > x25_connect()
> > --> x25_write_internal()
> > --> x25_addr_aton()
> >
> > The .x25_addr[] buffers are copied to the "addresses" buffer from
> > x25_write_internal() so it will lead to stack corruption.
> >
> > Verify that the strings are NUL terminated and return -EINVAL if they
> > are not.
> >
> > Reported-by: "kiyin(尹亮)" <kiyin@tencent.com>
> > Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
>
> Acked-by: Martin Schiller <ms@dev.tdt.de>
Applied, thanks!
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
end of thread, other threads:[~2020-12-03 1:28 UTC | newest]
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2020-11-30 10:04 ` [PATCH net] net/x25: prevent a couple of overflows Dan Carpenter
2020-12-01 6:50 ` Martin Schiller
2020-12-01 15:15 ` [PATCH net v2] " Dan Carpenter
2020-12-02 7:43 ` [PATCH net v2] net/x25: prevent a couple of overflows(Internet mail) kiyin(尹亮)
2020-12-02 9:27 ` [PATCH net v2] net/x25: prevent a couple of overflows Martin Schiller
2020-12-03 1:27 ` Jakub Kicinski
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