[PATCH net 0/8] net: tls: fix scatter-gather list issues

[PATCH net 0/8] net: tls: fix scatter-gather list issues

[Jakub Kicinski]

Hi!

This series kicked of by a syzbot report fixes three issues around
scatter gather handling in the TLS code. First patch fixes a use-
-after-free situation which may occur if record was freed on error.
This could have already happened in BPF paths, and patch 2 now makes
the same condition occur in non-BPF code.

Patch 2 fixes the problem spotted by syzbot. If encryption failed
we have to clean the end markings from scatter gather list. As
suggested by John the patch frees the record entirely and caller
may retry copying data from user space buffer again.

Third patch fixes a bug in the TLS 1.3 code spotted while working
on patch 2. TLS 1.3 may effectively overflow the SG list which
leads to the BUG() in sg_page() being triggered.

Patch 4 adds a test case which triggers this bug reliably.

Next two patches are small cleanups of dead code and code which
makes dangerous assumptions.

Last but not least two minor improvements to the sockmap tests.

Tested:
 - bpf/test_sockmap
 - net/tls
 - syzbot repro (which used error injection, hence no direct
   selftest is added to preserve it).

Jakub Kicinski (8):
  net/tls: take into account that bpf_exec_tx_verdict() may free the
    record
  net/tls: free the record on encryption error
  net: skmsg: fix TLS 1.3 crash with full sk_msg
  selftests/tls: add a test for fragmented messages
  net/tls: remove the dead inplace_crypto code
  net/tls: use sg_next() to walk sg entries
  selftests: bpf: test_sockmap: handle file creation failures gracefully
  selftests: bpf: correct perror strings

 include/linux/skmsg.h                      | 28 +++++-----
 include/net/tls.h                          |  3 +-
 net/core/filter.c                          |  8 +--
 net/core/skmsg.c                           |  2 +-
 net/ipv4/tcp_bpf.c                         |  2 +-
 net/tls/tls_main.c                         | 13 +----
 net/tls/tls_sw.c                           | 32 +++++++-----
 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_sockmap.c | 47 ++++++++++-------
 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/xdping.c       |  2 +-
 tools/testing/selftests/net/tls.c          | 60 ++++++++++++++++++++++
 10 files changed, 131 insertions(+), 66 deletions(-)

-- 
2.23.0

[PATCH net 1/8] net/tls: take into account that bpf_exec_tx_verdict() may free the record

[Jakub Kicinski]

bpf_exec_tx_verdict() may free the record if tls_push_record()
fails, or if the entire record got consumed by BPF. Re-check
ctx->open_rec before touching the data.

Fixes: d3b18ad31f93 ("tls: add bpf support to sk_msg handling")
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com>
---
 net/tls/tls_sw.c | 13 ++++++++-----
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/tls/tls_sw.c b/net/tls/tls_sw.c
index da9f9ce51e7b..70e3c0c1af50 100644
--- a/net/tls/tls_sw.c
+++ b/net/tls/tls_sw.c
@@ -984,7 +984,7 @@ int tls_sw_sendmsg(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t size)
 					num_async++;
 				else if (ret == -ENOMEM)
 					goto wait_for_memory;
-				else if (ret == -ENOSPC)
+				else if (ctx->open_rec && ret == -ENOSPC)
 					goto rollback_iter;
 				else if (ret != -EAGAIN)
 					goto send_end;
@@ -1053,11 +1053,12 @@ int tls_sw_sendmsg(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t size)
 		ret = sk_stream_wait_memory(sk, &timeo);
 		if (ret) {
 trim_sgl:
-			tls_trim_both_msgs(sk, orig_size);
+			if (ctx->open_rec)
+				tls_trim_both_msgs(sk, orig_size);
 			goto send_end;
 		}
 
-		if (msg_en->sg.size < required_size)
+		if (ctx->open_rec && msg_en->sg.size < required_size)
 			goto alloc_encrypted;
 	}
 
@@ -1190,11 +1191,13 @@ static int tls_sw_do_sendpage(struct sock *sk, struct page *page,
 wait_for_memory:
 		ret = sk_stream_wait_memory(sk, &timeo);
 		if (ret) {
-			tls_trim_both_msgs(sk, msg_pl->sg.size);
+			if (ctx->open_rec)
+				tls_trim_both_msgs(sk, msg_pl->sg.size);
 			goto sendpage_end;
 		}
 
-		goto alloc_payload;
+		if (ctx->open_rec)
+			goto alloc_payload;
 	}
 
 	if (num_async) {
-- 
2.23.0

RE: [PATCH net 1/8] net/tls: take into account that bpf_exec_tx_verdict() may free the record

[John Fastabend]

Jakub Kicinski wrote:
> bpf_exec_tx_verdict() may free the record if tls_push_record()
> fails, or if the entire record got consumed by BPF. Re-check
> ctx->open_rec before touching the data.
> 
> Fixes: d3b18ad31f93 ("tls: add bpf support to sk_msg handling")
> Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com>
> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com>
> ---
>  net/tls/tls_sw.c | 13 ++++++++-----
>  1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>

[PATCH net 2/8] net/tls: free the record on encryption error

[Jakub Kicinski]

When tls_do_encryption() fails the SG lists are left with the
SG_END and SG_CHAIN marks in place. One could hope that once
encryption fails we will never see the record again, but that
is in fact not true. Commit d3b18ad31f93 ("tls: add bpf support
to sk_msg handling") added special handling to ENOMEM and ENOSPC
errors which mean we may see the same record re-submitted.

As suggested by John free the record, the BPF code is already
doing just that.

Reported-by: syzbot+df0d4ec12332661dd1f9@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: d3b18ad31f93 ("tls: add bpf support to sk_msg handling")
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com>
---
 net/tls/tls_sw.c | 10 ++++++++--
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/tls/tls_sw.c b/net/tls/tls_sw.c
index 70e3c0c1af50..dbba51b69d21 100644
--- a/net/tls/tls_sw.c
+++ b/net/tls/tls_sw.c
@@ -771,8 +771,14 @@ static int bpf_exec_tx_verdict(struct sk_msg *msg, struct sock *sk,
 
 	policy = !(flags & MSG_SENDPAGE_NOPOLICY);
 	psock = sk_psock_get(sk);
-	if (!psock || !policy)
-		return tls_push_record(sk, flags, record_type);
+	if (!psock || !policy) {
+		err = tls_push_record(sk, flags, record_type);
+		if (err) {
+			*copied -= sk_msg_free(sk, msg);
+			tls_free_open_rec(sk);
+		}
+		return err;
+	}
 more_data:
 	enospc = sk_msg_full(msg);
 	if (psock->eval == __SK_NONE) {
-- 
2.23.0

RE: [PATCH net 2/8] net/tls: free the record on encryption error

[John Fastabend]

Jakub Kicinski wrote:
> When tls_do_encryption() fails the SG lists are left with the
> SG_END and SG_CHAIN marks in place. One could hope that once
> encryption fails we will never see the record again, but that
> is in fact not true. Commit d3b18ad31f93 ("tls: add bpf support
> to sk_msg handling") added special handling to ENOMEM and ENOSPC
> errors which mean we may see the same record re-submitted.
> 
> As suggested by John free the record, the BPF code is already
> doing just that.
> 
> Reported-by: syzbot+df0d4ec12332661dd1f9@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
> Fixes: d3b18ad31f93 ("tls: add bpf support to sk_msg handling")
> Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com>
> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com>
> ---
>  net/tls/tls_sw.c | 10 ++++++++--
>  1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)


Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>

[PATCH net 3/8] net: skmsg: fix TLS 1.3 crash with full sk_msg

[Jakub Kicinski]

TLS 1.3 started using the entry at the end of the SG array
for chaining-in the single byte content type entry. This mostly
works:

[ E E E E E E . . ]
  ^           ^
   start       end

                 E < content type
               /
[ E E E E E E C . ]
  ^           ^
   start       end

(Where E denotes a populated SG entry; C denotes a chaining entry.)

If the array is full, however, the end will point to the start:

[ E E E E E E E E ]
  ^
   start
   end

And we end up overwriting the start:

    E < content type
   /
[ C E E E E E E E ]
  ^
   start
   end

The sg array is supposed to be a circular buffer with start and
end markers pointing anywhere. In case where start > end
(i.e. the circular buffer has "wrapped") there is an extra entry
reserved at the end to chain the two halves together.

[ E E E E E E . . l ]

(Where l is the reserved entry for "looping" back to front.

As suggested by John, let's reserve another entry for chaining
SG entries after the main circular buffer. Note that this entry
has to be pointed to by the end entry so its position is not fixed.

Examples of full messages:

[ E E E E E E E E . l ]
  ^               ^
   start           end

   <---------------.
[ E E . E E E E E E l ]
      ^ ^
   end   start

Now the end will always point to an unused entry, so TLS 1.3
can always use it.

Fixes: 130b392c6cd6 ("net: tls: Add tls 1.3 support")
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com>
---
 include/linux/skmsg.h | 28 ++++++++++++++--------------
 net/core/filter.c     |  8 ++++----
 net/core/skmsg.c      |  2 +-
 net/ipv4/tcp_bpf.c    |  2 +-
 4 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/skmsg.h b/include/linux/skmsg.h
index 6cb077b646a5..ef7031f8a304 100644
--- a/include/linux/skmsg.h
+++ b/include/linux/skmsg.h
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
 #include <net/strparser.h>
 
 #define MAX_MSG_FRAGS			MAX_SKB_FRAGS
+#define NR_MSG_FRAG_IDS			(MAX_MSG_FRAGS + 1)
 
 enum __sk_action {
 	__SK_DROP = 0,
@@ -29,13 +30,15 @@ struct sk_msg_sg {
 	u32				size;
 	u32				copybreak;
 	unsigned long			copy;
-	/* The extra element is used for chaining the front and sections when
-	 * the list becomes partitioned (e.g. end < start). The crypto APIs
-	 * require the chaining.
+	/* The extra two elements:
+	 * 1) used for chaining the front and sections when the list becomes
+	 *    partitioned (e.g. end < start). The crypto APIs require the
+	 *    chaining;
+	 * 2) to chain tailer SG entries after the message.
 	 */
-	struct scatterlist		data[MAX_MSG_FRAGS + 1];
+	struct scatterlist		data[MAX_MSG_FRAGS + 2];
 };
-static_assert(BITS_PER_LONG >= MAX_MSG_FRAGS);
+static_assert(BITS_PER_LONG >= NR_MSG_FRAG_IDS);
 
 /* UAPI in filter.c depends on struct sk_msg_sg being first element. */
 struct sk_msg {
@@ -142,13 +145,13 @@ static inline void sk_msg_apply_bytes(struct sk_psock *psock, u32 bytes)
 
 static inline u32 sk_msg_iter_dist(u32 start, u32 end)
 {
-	return end >= start ? end - start : end + (MAX_MSG_FRAGS - start);
+	return end >= start ? end - start : end + (NR_MSG_FRAG_IDS - start);
 }
 
 #define sk_msg_iter_var_prev(var)			\
 	do {						\
 		if (var == 0)				\
-			var = MAX_MSG_FRAGS - 1;	\
+			var = NR_MSG_FRAG_IDS - 1;	\
 		else					\
 			var--;				\
 	} while (0)
@@ -156,7 +159,7 @@ static inline u32 sk_msg_iter_dist(u32 start, u32 end)
 #define sk_msg_iter_var_next(var)			\
 	do {						\
 		var++;					\
-		if (var == MAX_MSG_FRAGS)		\
+		if (var == NR_MSG_FRAG_IDS)		\
 			var = 0;			\
 	} while (0)
 
@@ -173,9 +176,9 @@ static inline void sk_msg_clear_meta(struct sk_msg *msg)
 
 static inline void sk_msg_init(struct sk_msg *msg)
 {
-	BUILD_BUG_ON(ARRAY_SIZE(msg->sg.data) - 1 != MAX_MSG_FRAGS);
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(ARRAY_SIZE(msg->sg.data) - 1 != NR_MSG_FRAG_IDS);
 	memset(msg, 0, sizeof(*msg));
-	sg_init_marker(msg->sg.data, MAX_MSG_FRAGS);
+	sg_init_marker(msg->sg.data, NR_MSG_FRAG_IDS);
 }
 
 static inline void sk_msg_xfer(struct sk_msg *dst, struct sk_msg *src,
@@ -196,14 +199,11 @@ static inline void sk_msg_xfer_full(struct sk_msg *dst, struct sk_msg *src)
 
 static inline bool sk_msg_full(const struct sk_msg *msg)
 {
-	return (msg->sg.end == msg->sg.start) && msg->sg.size;
+	return sk_msg_iter_dist(msg->sg.start, msg->sg.end) == MAX_MSG_FRAGS;
 }
 
 static inline u32 sk_msg_elem_used(const struct sk_msg *msg)
 {
-	if (sk_msg_full(msg))
-		return MAX_MSG_FRAGS;
-
 	return sk_msg_iter_dist(msg->sg.start, msg->sg.end);
 }
 
diff --git a/net/core/filter.c b/net/core/filter.c
index b0ed048585ba..f1e703eed3d2 100644
--- a/net/core/filter.c
+++ b/net/core/filter.c
@@ -2299,7 +2299,7 @@ BPF_CALL_4(bpf_msg_pull_data, struct sk_msg *, msg, u32, start,
 	WARN_ON_ONCE(last_sge == first_sge);
 	shift = last_sge > first_sge ?
 		last_sge - first_sge - 1 :
-		MAX_SKB_FRAGS - first_sge + last_sge - 1;
+		NR_MSG_FRAG_IDS - first_sge + last_sge - 1;
 	if (!shift)
 		goto out;
 
@@ -2308,8 +2308,8 @@ BPF_CALL_4(bpf_msg_pull_data, struct sk_msg *, msg, u32, start,
 	do {
 		u32 move_from;
 
-		if (i + shift >= MAX_MSG_FRAGS)
-			move_from = i + shift - MAX_MSG_FRAGS;
+		if (i + shift >= NR_MSG_FRAG_IDS)
+			move_from = i + shift - NR_MSG_FRAG_IDS;
 		else
 			move_from = i + shift;
 		if (move_from == msg->sg.end)
@@ -2323,7 +2323,7 @@ BPF_CALL_4(bpf_msg_pull_data, struct sk_msg *, msg, u32, start,
 	} while (1);
 
 	msg->sg.end = msg->sg.end - shift > msg->sg.end ?
-		      msg->sg.end - shift + MAX_MSG_FRAGS :
+		      msg->sg.end - shift + NR_MSG_FRAG_IDS :
 		      msg->sg.end - shift;
 out:
 	msg->data = sg_virt(&msg->sg.data[first_sge]) + start - offset;
diff --git a/net/core/skmsg.c b/net/core/skmsg.c
index a469d2124f3f..ded2d5227678 100644
--- a/net/core/skmsg.c
+++ b/net/core/skmsg.c
@@ -421,7 +421,7 @@ static int sk_psock_skb_ingress(struct sk_psock *psock, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	copied = skb->len;
 	msg->sg.start = 0;
 	msg->sg.size = copied;
-	msg->sg.end = num_sge == MAX_MSG_FRAGS ? 0 : num_sge;
+	msg->sg.end = num_sge;
 	msg->skb = skb;
 
 	sk_psock_queue_msg(psock, msg);
diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_bpf.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_bpf.c
index 8a56e09cfb0e..e38705165ac9 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_bpf.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_bpf.c
@@ -301,7 +301,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tcp_bpf_sendmsg_redir);
 static int tcp_bpf_send_verdict(struct sock *sk, struct sk_psock *psock,
 				struct sk_msg *msg, int *copied, int flags)
 {
-	bool cork = false, enospc = msg->sg.start == msg->sg.end;
+	bool cork = false, enospc = sk_msg_full(msg);
 	struct sock *sk_redir;
 	u32 tosend, delta = 0;
 	int ret;
-- 
2.23.0

[PATCH net 4/8] selftests/tls: add a test for fragmented messages

[Jakub Kicinski]

Add a sendmsg test with very fragmented messages. This should
fill up sk_msg and test the boundary conditions.

Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com>
---
 tools/testing/selftests/net/tls.c | 60 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 60 insertions(+)

diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/net/tls.c b/tools/testing/selftests/net/tls.c
index 1c8f194d6556..46abcae47dee 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/net/tls.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/net/tls.c
@@ -268,6 +268,38 @@ TEST_F(tls, sendmsg_single)
 	EXPECT_EQ(memcmp(buf, test_str, send_len), 0);
 }
 
+#define MAX_FRAGS	64
+#define SEND_LEN	13
+TEST_F(tls, sendmsg_fragmented)
+{
+	char const *test_str = "test_sendmsg";
+	char buf[SEND_LEN * MAX_FRAGS];
+	struct iovec vec[MAX_FRAGS];
+	struct msghdr msg;
+	int i, frags;
+
+	for (frags = 1; frags <= MAX_FRAGS; frags++) {
+		for (i = 0; i < frags; i++) {
+			vec[i].iov_base = (char *)test_str;
+			vec[i].iov_len = SEND_LEN;
+		}
+
+		memset(&msg, 0, sizeof(struct msghdr));
+		msg.msg_iov = vec;
+		msg.msg_iovlen = frags;
+
+		EXPECT_EQ(sendmsg(self->fd, &msg, 0), SEND_LEN * frags);
+		EXPECT_EQ(recv(self->cfd, buf, SEND_LEN * frags, MSG_WAITALL),
+			  SEND_LEN * frags);
+
+		for (i = 0; i < frags; i++)
+			EXPECT_EQ(memcmp(buf + SEND_LEN * i,
+					 test_str, SEND_LEN), 0);
+	}
+}
+#undef MAX_FRAGS
+#undef SEND_LEN
+
 TEST_F(tls, sendmsg_large)
 {
 	void *mem = malloc(16384);
@@ -694,6 +726,34 @@ TEST_F(tls, recv_lowat)
 	EXPECT_EQ(memcmp(send_mem, recv_mem + 10, 5), 0);
 }
 
+TEST_F(tls, recv_rcvbuf)
+{
+	char send_mem[4096];
+	char recv_mem[4096];
+	int rcv_buf = 1024;
+
+	memset(send_mem, 0x1c, sizeof(send_mem));
+
+	EXPECT_EQ(setsockopt(self->cfd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVBUF,
+			     &rcv_buf, sizeof(rcv_buf)), 0);
+
+	EXPECT_EQ(send(self->fd, send_mem, 512, 0), 512);
+	memset(recv_mem, 0, sizeof(recv_mem));
+	EXPECT_EQ(recv(self->cfd, recv_mem, sizeof(recv_mem), 0), 512);
+	EXPECT_EQ(memcmp(send_mem, recv_mem, 512), 0);
+
+	if (self->notls)
+		return;
+
+	EXPECT_EQ(send(self->fd, send_mem, 4096, 0), 4096);
+	memset(recv_mem, 0, sizeof(recv_mem));
+	EXPECT_EQ(recv(self->cfd, recv_mem, sizeof(recv_mem), 0), -1);
+	EXPECT_EQ(errno, EMSGSIZE);
+
+	EXPECT_EQ(recv(self->cfd, recv_mem, sizeof(recv_mem), 0), -1);
+	EXPECT_EQ(errno, EMSGSIZE);
+}
+
 TEST_F(tls, bidir)
 {
 	char const *test_str = "test_read";
-- 
2.23.0

[PATCH net 5/8] net/tls: remove the dead inplace_crypto code

[Jakub Kicinski]

Looks like when BPF support was added by commit d3b18ad31f93
("tls: add bpf support to sk_msg handling") and
commit d829e9c4112b ("tls: convert to generic sk_msg interface")
it broke/removed the support for in-place crypto as added by
commit 4e6d47206c32 ("tls: Add support for inplace records
encryption").

The inplace_crypto member of struct tls_rec is dead, inited
to zero, and sometimes set to zero again. It used to be
set to 1 when record was allocated, but the skmsg code doesn't
seem to have been written with the idea of in-place crypto
in mind.

Since non trivial effort is required to bring the feature back
and we don't really have the HW to measure the benefit just
remove the left over support for now to avoid confusing readers.

Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com>
---
 include/net/tls.h | 1 -
 net/tls/tls_sw.c  | 6 +-----
 2 files changed, 1 insertion(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/net/tls.h b/include/net/tls.h
index 6ed91e82edd0..9d32f7ce6b31 100644
--- a/include/net/tls.h
+++ b/include/net/tls.h
@@ -100,7 +100,6 @@ struct tls_rec {
 	struct list_head list;
 	int tx_ready;
 	int tx_flags;
-	int inplace_crypto;
 
 	struct sk_msg msg_plaintext;
 	struct sk_msg msg_encrypted;
diff --git a/net/tls/tls_sw.c b/net/tls/tls_sw.c
index dbba51b69d21..5989dfe5c443 100644
--- a/net/tls/tls_sw.c
+++ b/net/tls/tls_sw.c
@@ -710,8 +710,7 @@ static int tls_push_record(struct sock *sk, int flags,
 	}
 
 	i = msg_pl->sg.start;
-	sg_chain(rec->sg_aead_in, 2, rec->inplace_crypto ?
-		 &msg_en->sg.data[i] : &msg_pl->sg.data[i]);
+	sg_chain(rec->sg_aead_in, 2, &msg_pl->sg.data[i]);
 
 	i = msg_en->sg.end;
 	sk_msg_iter_var_prev(i);
@@ -976,8 +975,6 @@ int tls_sw_sendmsg(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t size)
 			if (ret)
 				goto fallback_to_reg_send;
 
-			rec->inplace_crypto = 0;
-
 			num_zc++;
 			copied += try_to_copy;
 
@@ -1176,7 +1173,6 @@ static int tls_sw_do_sendpage(struct sock *sk, struct page *page,
 
 		tls_ctx->pending_open_record_frags = true;
 		if (full_record || eor || sk_msg_full(msg_pl)) {
-			rec->inplace_crypto = 0;
 			ret = bpf_exec_tx_verdict(msg_pl, sk, full_record,
 						  record_type, &copied, flags);
 			if (ret) {
-- 
2.23.0

[PATCH net 6/8] net/tls: use sg_next() to walk sg entries

[Jakub Kicinski]

Partially sent record cleanup path increments an SG entry
directly instead of using sg_next(). This should not be a
problem today, as encrypted messages should be always
allocated as arrays. But given this is a cleanup path it's
easy to miss was this ever to change. Use sg_next(), and
simplify the code.

Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com>
---
 include/net/tls.h  |  2 +-
 net/tls/tls_main.c | 13 ++-----------
 net/tls/tls_sw.c   |  3 ++-
 3 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/net/tls.h b/include/net/tls.h
index 9d32f7ce6b31..df630f5fc723 100644
--- a/include/net/tls.h
+++ b/include/net/tls.h
@@ -376,7 +376,7 @@ int tls_push_sg(struct sock *sk, struct tls_context *ctx,
 		int flags);
 int tls_push_partial_record(struct sock *sk, struct tls_context *ctx,
 			    int flags);
-bool tls_free_partial_record(struct sock *sk, struct tls_context *ctx);
+void tls_free_partial_record(struct sock *sk, struct tls_context *ctx);
 
 static inline struct tls_msg *tls_msg(struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
diff --git a/net/tls/tls_main.c b/net/tls/tls_main.c
index bdca31ffe6da..b3da6c5ab999 100644
--- a/net/tls/tls_main.c
+++ b/net/tls/tls_main.c
@@ -209,24 +209,15 @@ int tls_push_partial_record(struct sock *sk, struct tls_context *ctx,
 	return tls_push_sg(sk, ctx, sg, offset, flags);
 }
 
-bool tls_free_partial_record(struct sock *sk, struct tls_context *ctx)
+void tls_free_partial_record(struct sock *sk, struct tls_context *ctx)
 {
 	struct scatterlist *sg;
 
-	sg = ctx->partially_sent_record;
-	if (!sg)
-		return false;
-
-	while (1) {
+	for (sg = ctx->partially_sent_record; sg; sg = sg_next(sg)) {
 		put_page(sg_page(sg));
 		sk_mem_uncharge(sk, sg->length);
-
-		if (sg_is_last(sg))
-			break;
-		sg++;
 	}
 	ctx->partially_sent_record = NULL;
-	return true;
 }
 
 static void tls_write_space(struct sock *sk)
diff --git a/net/tls/tls_sw.c b/net/tls/tls_sw.c
index 5989dfe5c443..2b2d0bae14a9 100644
--- a/net/tls/tls_sw.c
+++ b/net/tls/tls_sw.c
@@ -2089,7 +2089,8 @@ void tls_sw_release_resources_tx(struct sock *sk)
 	/* Free up un-sent records in tx_list. First, free
 	 * the partially sent record if any at head of tx_list.
 	 */
-	if (tls_free_partial_record(sk, tls_ctx)) {
+	if (tls_ctx->partially_sent_record) {
+		tls_free_partial_record(sk, tls_ctx);
 		rec = list_first_entry(&ctx->tx_list,
 				       struct tls_rec, list);
 		list_del(&rec->list);
-- 
2.23.0

[PATCH net 7/8] selftests: bpf: test_sockmap: handle file creation failures gracefully

[Jakub Kicinski]

test_sockmap creates a temporary file to use for sendpage.
this may fail for various reasons. Handle the error rather
than segfault.

Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com>
---
 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_sockmap.c | 9 +++++++++
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)

diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_sockmap.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_sockmap.c
index 3845144e2c91..8b838e91cfe5 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_sockmap.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_sockmap.c
@@ -332,6 +332,10 @@ static int msg_loop_sendpage(int fd, int iov_length, int cnt,
 	int i, fp;
 
 	file = fopen(".sendpage_tst.tmp", "w+");
+	if (!file) {
+		perror("create file for sendpage");
+		return 1;
+	}
 	for (i = 0; i < iov_length * cnt; i++, k++)
 		fwrite(&k, sizeof(char), 1, file);
 	fflush(file);
@@ -339,6 +343,11 @@ static int msg_loop_sendpage(int fd, int iov_length, int cnt,
 	fclose(file);
 
 	fp = open(".sendpage_tst.tmp", O_RDONLY);
+	if (fp < 0) {
+		perror("reopen file for sendpage");
+		return 1;
+	}
+
 	clock_gettime(CLOCK_MONOTONIC, &s->start);
 	for (i = 0; i < cnt; i++) {
 		int sent = sendfile(fd, fp, NULL, iov_length);
-- 
2.23.0

[PATCH net 8/8] selftests: bpf: correct perror strings

[Jakub Kicinski]

perror(str) is basically equivalent to
print("%s: %s\n", str, strerror(errno)).
New line or colon at the end of str is
a mistake/breaks formatting.

Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com>
---
 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_sockmap.c | 38 +++++++++++-----------
 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/xdping.c       |  2 +-
 2 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)

diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_sockmap.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_sockmap.c
index 8b838e91cfe5..4a851513c842 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_sockmap.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_sockmap.c
@@ -240,14 +240,14 @@ static int sockmap_init_sockets(int verbose)
 	addr.sin_port = htons(S1_PORT);
 	err = bind(s1, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, sizeof(addr));
 	if (err < 0) {
-		perror("bind s1 failed()\n");
+		perror("bind s1 failed()");
 		return errno;
 	}
 
 	addr.sin_port = htons(S2_PORT);
 	err = bind(s2, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, sizeof(addr));
 	if (err < 0) {
-		perror("bind s2 failed()\n");
+		perror("bind s2 failed()");
 		return errno;
 	}
 
@@ -255,14 +255,14 @@ static int sockmap_init_sockets(int verbose)
 	addr.sin_port = htons(S1_PORT);
 	err = listen(s1, 32);
 	if (err < 0) {
-		perror("listen s1 failed()\n");
+		perror("listen s1 failed()");
 		return errno;
 	}
 
 	addr.sin_port = htons(S2_PORT);
 	err = listen(s2, 32);
 	if (err < 0) {
-		perror("listen s1 failed()\n");
+		perror("listen s1 failed()");
 		return errno;
 	}
 
@@ -270,14 +270,14 @@ static int sockmap_init_sockets(int verbose)
 	addr.sin_port = htons(S1_PORT);
 	err = connect(c1, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, sizeof(addr));
 	if (err < 0 && errno != EINPROGRESS) {
-		perror("connect c1 failed()\n");
+		perror("connect c1 failed()");
 		return errno;
 	}
 
 	addr.sin_port = htons(S2_PORT);
 	err = connect(c2, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, sizeof(addr));
 	if (err < 0 && errno != EINPROGRESS) {
-		perror("connect c2 failed()\n");
+		perror("connect c2 failed()");
 		return errno;
 	} else if (err < 0) {
 		err = 0;
@@ -286,13 +286,13 @@ static int sockmap_init_sockets(int verbose)
 	/* Accept Connecrtions */
 	p1 = accept(s1, NULL, NULL);
 	if (p1 < 0) {
-		perror("accept s1 failed()\n");
+		perror("accept s1 failed()");
 		return errno;
 	}
 
 	p2 = accept(s2, NULL, NULL);
 	if (p2 < 0) {
-		perror("accept s1 failed()\n");
+		perror("accept s1 failed()");
 		return errno;
 	}
 
@@ -353,7 +353,7 @@ static int msg_loop_sendpage(int fd, int iov_length, int cnt,
 		int sent = sendfile(fd, fp, NULL, iov_length);
 
 		if (!drop && sent < 0) {
-			perror("send loop error:");
+			perror("send loop error");
 			close(fp);
 			return sent;
 		} else if (drop && sent >= 0) {
@@ -472,7 +472,7 @@ static int msg_loop(int fd, int iov_count, int iov_length, int cnt,
 			int sent = sendmsg(fd, &msg, flags);
 
 			if (!drop && sent < 0) {
-				perror("send loop error:");
+				perror("send loop error");
 				goto out_errno;
 			} else if (drop && sent >= 0) {
 				printf("send loop error expected: %i\n", sent);
@@ -508,7 +508,7 @@ static int msg_loop(int fd, int iov_count, int iov_length, int cnt,
 		total_bytes -= txmsg_pop_total;
 		err = clock_gettime(CLOCK_MONOTONIC, &s->start);
 		if (err < 0)
-			perror("recv start time: ");
+			perror("recv start time");
 		while (s->bytes_recvd < total_bytes) {
 			if (txmsg_cork) {
 				timeout.tv_sec = 0;
@@ -552,7 +552,7 @@ static int msg_loop(int fd, int iov_count, int iov_length, int cnt,
 			if (recv < 0) {
 				if (errno != EWOULDBLOCK) {
 					clock_gettime(CLOCK_MONOTONIC, &s->end);
-					perror("recv failed()\n");
+					perror("recv failed()");
 					goto out_errno;
 				}
 			}
@@ -566,7 +566,7 @@ static int msg_loop(int fd, int iov_count, int iov_length, int cnt,
 
 				errno = msg_verify_data(&msg, recv, chunk_sz);
 				if (errno) {
-					perror("data verify msg failed\n");
+					perror("data verify msg failed");
 					goto out_errno;
 				}
 				if (recvp) {
@@ -574,7 +574,7 @@ static int msg_loop(int fd, int iov_count, int iov_length, int cnt,
 								recvp,
 								chunk_sz);
 					if (errno) {
-						perror("data verify msg_peek failed\n");
+						perror("data verify msg_peek failed");
 						goto out_errno;
 					}
 				}
@@ -663,7 +663,7 @@ static int sendmsg_test(struct sockmap_options *opt)
 			err = 0;
 		exit(err ? 1 : 0);
 	} else if (rxpid == -1) {
-		perror("msg_loop_rx: ");
+		perror("msg_loop_rx");
 		return errno;
 	}
 
@@ -690,7 +690,7 @@ static int sendmsg_test(struct sockmap_options *opt)
 				s.bytes_recvd, recvd_Bps, recvd_Bps/giga);
 		exit(err ? 1 : 0);
 	} else if (txpid == -1) {
-		perror("msg_loop_tx: ");
+		perror("msg_loop_tx");
 		return errno;
 	}
 
@@ -724,7 +724,7 @@ static int forever_ping_pong(int rate, struct sockmap_options *opt)
 	/* Ping/Pong data from client to server */
 	sc = send(c1, buf, sizeof(buf), 0);
 	if (sc < 0) {
-		perror("send failed()\n");
+		perror("send failed()");
 		return sc;
 	}
 
@@ -757,7 +757,7 @@ static int forever_ping_pong(int rate, struct sockmap_options *opt)
 			rc = recv(i, buf, sizeof(buf), 0);
 			if (rc < 0) {
 				if (errno != EWOULDBLOCK) {
-					perror("recv failed()\n");
+					perror("recv failed()");
 					return rc;
 				}
 			}
@@ -769,7 +769,7 @@ static int forever_ping_pong(int rate, struct sockmap_options *opt)
 
 			sc = send(i, buf, rc, 0);
 			if (sc < 0) {
-				perror("send failed()\n");
+				perror("send failed()");
 				return sc;
 			}
 		}
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/xdping.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/xdping.c
index d60a343b1371..842d9155d36c 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/xdping.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/xdping.c
@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ static int get_stats(int fd, __u16 count, __u32 raddr)
 	printf("\nXDP RTT data:\n");
 
 	if (bpf_map_lookup_elem(fd, &raddr, &pinginfo)) {
-		perror("bpf_map_lookup elem: ");
+		perror("bpf_map_lookup elem");
 		return 1;
 	}
 
-- 
2.23.0

Re: [PATCH net 0/8] net: tls: fix scatter-gather list issues

[David Miller]

From: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com>
Date: Wed, 27 Nov 2019 12:16:38 -0800

> This series kicked of by a syzbot report fixes three issues around
> scatter gather handling in the TLS code. First patch fixes a use-
> -after-free situation which may occur if record was freed on error.
> This could have already happened in BPF paths, and patch 2 now makes
> the same condition occur in non-BPF code.
> 
> Patch 2 fixes the problem spotted by syzbot. If encryption failed
> we have to clean the end markings from scatter gather list. As
> suggested by John the patch frees the record entirely and caller
> may retry copying data from user space buffer again.
> 
> Third patch fixes a bug in the TLS 1.3 code spotted while working
> on patch 2. TLS 1.3 may effectively overflow the SG list which
> leads to the BUG() in sg_page() being triggered.
> 
> Patch 4 adds a test case which triggers this bug reliably.
> 
> Next two patches are small cleanups of dead code and code which
> makes dangerous assumptions.
> 
> Last but not least two minor improvements to the sockmap tests.
 ...

Series applied and queued up for -stable, thanks Jakub.