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From: Igor Russkikh <irusskikh@marvell.com>
To: <netdev@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: "David S . Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
	Antoine Tenart <antoine.tenart@bootlin.com>,
	Mark Starovoytov <mstarovoitov@marvell.com>,
	Dmitry Bogdanov <dbogdanov@marvell.com>,
	Igor Russkikh <irusskikh@marvell.com>
Subject: [RFC 05/18] net: macsec: init secy pointer in macsec_context
Date: Fri, 14 Feb 2020 18:02:45 +0300	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200214150258.390-6-irusskikh@marvell.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200214150258.390-1-irusskikh@marvell.com>

From: Dmitry Bogdanov <dbogdanov@marvell.com>

This patch adds secy pointer initialization in the macsec_context.
It will be used by MAC drivers in offloading operations.

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Bogdanov <dbogdanov@marvell.com>
Signed-off-by: Mark Starovoytov <mstarovoitov@marvell.com>
Signed-off-by: Igor Russkikh <irusskikh@marvell.com>
---
 drivers/net/macsec.c | 16 +++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/net/macsec.c b/drivers/net/macsec.c
index a88b41a79103..af41887d9a1e 100644
--- a/drivers/net/macsec.c
+++ b/drivers/net/macsec.c
@@ -1692,6 +1692,7 @@ static int macsec_add_rxsa(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
 
 		ctx.sa.assoc_num = assoc_num;
 		ctx.sa.rx_sa = rx_sa;
+		ctx.secy = secy;
 		memcpy(ctx.sa.key, nla_data(tb_sa[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_KEY]),
 		       MACSEC_KEYID_LEN);
 
@@ -1733,6 +1734,7 @@ static int macsec_add_rxsc(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
 	struct nlattr **attrs = info->attrs;
 	struct macsec_rx_sc *rx_sc;
 	struct nlattr *tb_rxsc[MACSEC_RXSC_ATTR_MAX + 1];
+	struct macsec_secy *secy;
 	bool was_active;
 	int ret;
 
@@ -1752,6 +1754,7 @@ static int macsec_add_rxsc(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
 		return PTR_ERR(dev);
 	}
 
+	secy = &macsec_priv(dev)->secy;
 	sci = nla_get_sci(tb_rxsc[MACSEC_RXSC_ATTR_SCI]);
 
 	rx_sc = create_rx_sc(dev, sci);
@@ -1775,6 +1778,7 @@ static int macsec_add_rxsc(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
 		}
 
 		ctx.rx_sc = rx_sc;
+		ctx.secy = secy;
 
 		ret = macsec_offload(ops->mdo_add_rxsc, &ctx);
 		if (ret)
@@ -1900,6 +1904,7 @@ static int macsec_add_txsa(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
 
 		ctx.sa.assoc_num = assoc_num;
 		ctx.sa.tx_sa = tx_sa;
+		ctx.secy = secy;
 		memcpy(ctx.sa.key, nla_data(tb_sa[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_KEY]),
 		       MACSEC_KEYID_LEN);
 
@@ -1969,6 +1974,7 @@ static int macsec_del_rxsa(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
 
 		ctx.sa.assoc_num = assoc_num;
 		ctx.sa.rx_sa = rx_sa;
+		ctx.secy = secy;
 
 		ret = macsec_offload(ops->mdo_del_rxsa, &ctx);
 		if (ret)
@@ -2034,6 +2040,7 @@ static int macsec_del_rxsc(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
 		}
 
 		ctx.rx_sc = rx_sc;
+		ctx.secy = secy;
 		ret = macsec_offload(ops->mdo_del_rxsc, &ctx);
 		if (ret)
 			goto cleanup;
@@ -2092,6 +2099,7 @@ static int macsec_del_txsa(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
 
 		ctx.sa.assoc_num = assoc_num;
 		ctx.sa.tx_sa = tx_sa;
+		ctx.secy = secy;
 
 		ret = macsec_offload(ops->mdo_del_txsa, &ctx);
 		if (ret)
@@ -2189,6 +2197,7 @@ static int macsec_upd_txsa(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
 
 		ctx.sa.assoc_num = assoc_num;
 		ctx.sa.tx_sa = tx_sa;
+		ctx.secy = secy;
 
 		ret = macsec_offload(ops->mdo_upd_txsa, &ctx);
 		if (ret)
@@ -2269,6 +2278,7 @@ static int macsec_upd_rxsa(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
 
 		ctx.sa.assoc_num = assoc_num;
 		ctx.sa.rx_sa = rx_sa;
+		ctx.secy = secy;
 
 		ret = macsec_offload(ops->mdo_upd_rxsa, &ctx);
 		if (ret)
@@ -2339,6 +2349,7 @@ static int macsec_upd_rxsc(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
 		}
 
 		ctx.rx_sc = rx_sc;
+		ctx.secy = secy;
 
 		ret = macsec_offload(ops->mdo_upd_rxsc, &ctx);
 		if (ret)
@@ -3184,6 +3195,7 @@ static int macsec_dev_open(struct net_device *dev)
 			goto clear_allmulti;
 		}
 
+		ctx.secy = &macsec->secy;
 		err = macsec_offload(ops->mdo_dev_open, &ctx);
 		if (err)
 			goto clear_allmulti;
@@ -3215,8 +3227,10 @@ static int macsec_dev_stop(struct net_device *dev)
 		struct macsec_context ctx;
 
 		ops = macsec_get_ops(macsec, &ctx);
-		if (ops)
+		if (ops) {
+			ctx.secy = &macsec->secy;
 			macsec_offload(ops->mdo_dev_stop, &ctx);
+		}
 	}
 
 	dev_mc_unsync(real_dev, dev);
-- 
2.17.1


  parent reply	other threads:[~2020-02-14 15:03 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 27+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-02-14 15:02 [RFC 00/18] net: atlantic: MACSec support for AQC devices Igor Russkikh
2020-02-14 15:02 ` [RFC 01/18] net: introduce the MACSEC netdev feature Igor Russkikh
2020-02-14 15:02 ` [RFC 02/18] net: add a reference to MACsec ops in net_device Igor Russkikh
2020-02-14 15:02 ` [RFC 03/18] net: macsec: allow to reference a netdev from a MACsec context Igor Russkikh
2020-02-14 15:02 ` [RFC 04/18] net: macsec: add support for offloading to the MAC Igor Russkikh
2020-02-14 15:02 ` Igor Russkikh [this message]
2020-02-21 15:09   ` [RFC 05/18] net: macsec: init secy pointer in macsec_context Antoine Tenart
2020-02-14 15:02 ` [RFC 06/18] net: macsec: invoke mdo_upd_secy callback when mac address changed Igor Russkikh
2020-02-21 15:07   ` Antoine Tenart
2020-02-14 15:02 ` [RFC 07/18] net: macsec: allow multiple macsec devices with offload Igor Russkikh
2020-02-14 15:02 ` [RFC 08/18] net: macsec: support multicast/broadcast when offloading Igor Russkikh
2020-02-14 15:02 ` [RFC 09/18] net: macsec: add support for getting offloaded stats Igor Russkikh
2020-02-21 17:48   ` Antoine Tenart
2020-02-14 15:02 ` [RFC 10/18] net: macsec: enable HW offloading by default (when available) Igor Russkikh
2020-02-21 18:04   ` Antoine Tenart
2020-02-14 15:02 ` [RFC 11/18] net: macsec: report real_dev features when HW offloading is enabled Igor Russkikh
2020-02-14 15:02 ` [RFC 12/18] net: atlantic: MACSec offload skeleton Igor Russkikh
2020-02-21 18:21   ` Antoine Tenart
2020-02-14 15:02 ` [RFC 13/18] net: atlantic: MACSec egress offload HW bindings Igor Russkikh
2020-02-14 15:02 ` [RFC 14/18] net: atlantic: MACSec egress offload implementation Igor Russkikh
2020-02-14 15:02 ` [RFC 15/18] net: atlantic: MACSec ingress offload HW bindings Igor Russkikh
2020-02-14 15:02 ` [RFC 16/18] net: atlantic: MACSec ingress offload implementation Igor Russkikh
2020-02-14 15:02 ` [RFC 17/18] net: atlantic: MACSec offload statistics HW bindings Igor Russkikh
2020-02-14 15:02 ` [RFC 18/18] net: atlantic: MACSec offload statistics implementation Igor Russkikh
2020-02-21 14:57 ` [RFC 00/18] net: atlantic: MACSec support for AQC devices Antoine Tenart
2020-02-26  8:12   ` [EXT] " Igor Russkikh
2020-02-26 15:50     ` Antoine Tenart

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