[PATCH AUTOSEL 5.8 033/101] ipv6/icmp: l3mdev: Perform icmp error route lookup on source device routing table (v2)

[PATCH AUTOSEL 5.8 033/101] ipv6/icmp: l3mdev: Perform icmp error route lookup on source device routing table (v2)

[Sasha Levin]

From: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>

[ Upstream commit 272928d1cdacfc3b55f605cb0e9115832ecfb20c ]

As per RFC4443, the destination address field for ICMPv6 error messages
is copied from the source address field of the invoking packet.

In configurations with Virtual Routing and Forwarding tables, looking up
which routing table to use for sending ICMPv6 error messages is
currently done by using the destination net_device.

If the source and destination interfaces are within separate VRFs, or
one in the global routing table and the other in a VRF, looking up the
source address of the invoking packet in the destination interface's
routing table will fail if the destination interface's routing table
contains no route to the invoking packet's source address.

One observable effect of this issue is that traceroute6 does not work in
the following cases:

- Route leaking between global routing table and VRF
- Route leaking between VRFs

Use the source device routing table when sending ICMPv6 error
messages.

[ In the context of ipv4, it has been pointed out that a similar issue
  may exist with ICMP errors triggered when forwarding between network
  namespaces. It would be worthwhile to investigate whether ipv6 has
  similar issues, but is outside of the scope of this investigation. ]

[ Testing shows that similar issues exist with ipv6 unreachable /
  fragmentation needed messages.  However, investigation of this
  additional failure mode is beyond this investigation's scope. ]

Link: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4443
Signed-off-by: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 net/ipv6/icmp.c       | 7 +++++--
 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c | 2 --
 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/ipv6/icmp.c b/net/ipv6/icmp.c
index 9df8737ae0d32..e13affaa6c806 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/icmp.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/icmp.c
@@ -501,8 +501,11 @@ static void icmp6_send(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 type, u8 code, __u32 info,
 	if (__ipv6_addr_needs_scope_id(addr_type)) {
 		iif = icmp6_iif(skb);
 	} else {
-		dst = skb_dst(skb);
-		iif = l3mdev_master_ifindex(dst ? dst->dev : skb->dev);
+		/*
+		 * The source device is used for looking up which routing table
+		 * to use for sending an ICMP error.
+		 */
+		iif = l3mdev_master_ifindex(skb->dev);
 	}
 
 	/*
diff --git a/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c b/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c
index 8a8c2d0cfcc81..00243d7d276cc 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c
@@ -468,8 +468,6 @@ int ip6_forward(struct sk_buff *skb)
 	 *	check and decrement ttl
 	 */
 	if (hdr->hop_limit <= 1) {
-		/* Force OUTPUT device used as source address */
-		skb->dev = dst->dev;
 		icmpv6_send(skb, ICMPV6_TIME_EXCEED, ICMPV6_EXC_HOPLIMIT, 0);
 		__IP6_INC_STATS(net, idev, IPSTATS_MIB_INHDRERRORS);
 
-- 
2.25.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL 5.8 035/101] ip_gre: set dev->hard_header_len and dev->needed_headroom properly

[Sasha Levin]

From: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>

[ Upstream commit fdafed459998e2be0e877e6189b24cb7a0183224 ]

GRE tunnel has its own header_ops, ipgre_header_ops, and sets it
conditionally. When it is set, it assumes the outer IP header is
already created before ipgre_xmit().

This is not true when we send packets through a raw packet socket,
where L2 headers are supposed to be constructed by user. Packet
socket calls dev_validate_header() to validate the header. But
GRE tunnel does not set dev->hard_header_len, so that check can
be simply bypassed, therefore uninit memory could be passed down
to ipgre_xmit(). Similar for dev->needed_headroom.

dev->hard_header_len is supposed to be the length of the header
created by dev->header_ops->create(), so it should be used whenever
header_ops is set, and dev->needed_headroom should be used when it
is not set.

Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+4a2c52677a8a1aa283cb@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Cc: William Tu <u9012063@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Xie He <xie.he.0141@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 net/ipv4/ip_gre.c | 15 +++++++++++----
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/ipv4/ip_gre.c b/net/ipv4/ip_gre.c
index 4e31f23e4117e..e70291748889b 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/ip_gre.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/ip_gre.c
@@ -625,9 +625,7 @@ static netdev_tx_t ipgre_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb,
 	}
 
 	if (dev->header_ops) {
-		/* Need space for new headers */
-		if (skb_cow_head(skb, dev->needed_headroom -
-				      (tunnel->hlen + sizeof(struct iphdr))))
+		if (skb_cow_head(skb, 0))
 			goto free_skb;
 
 		tnl_params = (const struct iphdr *)skb->data;
@@ -748,7 +746,11 @@ static void ipgre_link_update(struct net_device *dev, bool set_mtu)
 	len = tunnel->tun_hlen - len;
 	tunnel->hlen = tunnel->hlen + len;
 
-	dev->needed_headroom = dev->needed_headroom + len;
+	if (dev->header_ops)
+		dev->hard_header_len += len;
+	else
+		dev->needed_headroom += len;
+
 	if (set_mtu)
 		dev->mtu = max_t(int, dev->mtu - len, 68);
 
@@ -944,6 +946,7 @@ static void __gre_tunnel_init(struct net_device *dev)
 	tunnel->parms.iph.protocol = IPPROTO_GRE;
 
 	tunnel->hlen = tunnel->tun_hlen + tunnel->encap_hlen;
+	dev->needed_headroom = tunnel->hlen + sizeof(tunnel->parms.iph);
 
 	dev->features		|= GRE_FEATURES;
 	dev->hw_features	|= GRE_FEATURES;
@@ -987,10 +990,14 @@ static int ipgre_tunnel_init(struct net_device *dev)
 				return -EINVAL;
 			dev->flags = IFF_BROADCAST;
 			dev->header_ops = &ipgre_header_ops;
+			dev->hard_header_len = tunnel->hlen + sizeof(*iph);
+			dev->needed_headroom = 0;
 		}
 #endif
 	} else if (!tunnel->collect_md) {
 		dev->header_ops = &ipgre_header_ops;
+		dev->hard_header_len = tunnel->hlen + sizeof(*iph);
+		dev->needed_headroom = 0;
 	}
 
 	return ip_tunnel_init(dev);
-- 
2.25.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL 5.8 036/101] mac80211: handle lack of sband->bitrates in rates

[Sasha Levin]

From: Thomas Pedersen <thomas@adapt-ip.com>

[ Upstream commit 8b783d104e7f40684333d2ec155fac39219beb2f ]

Even though a driver or mac80211 shouldn't produce a
legacy bitrate if sband->bitrates doesn't exist, don't
crash if that is the case either.

This fixes a kernel panic if station dump is run before
last_rate can be updated with a data frame when
sband->bitrates is missing (eg. in S1G bands).

Signed-off-by: Thomas Pedersen <thomas@adapt-ip.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201005164522.18069-1-thomas@adapt-ip.com
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 net/mac80211/cfg.c      | 3 ++-
 net/mac80211/sta_info.c | 4 ++++
 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/net/mac80211/cfg.c b/net/mac80211/cfg.c
index 1079a07e43e49..d74cfec685477 100644
--- a/net/mac80211/cfg.c
+++ b/net/mac80211/cfg.c
@@ -709,7 +709,8 @@ void sta_set_rate_info_tx(struct sta_info *sta,
 		u16 brate;
 
 		sband = ieee80211_get_sband(sta->sdata);
-		if (sband) {
+		WARN_ON_ONCE(sband && !sband->bitrates);
+		if (sband && sband->bitrates) {
 			brate = sband->bitrates[rate->idx].bitrate;
 			rinfo->legacy = DIV_ROUND_UP(brate, 1 << shift);
 		}
diff --git a/net/mac80211/sta_info.c b/net/mac80211/sta_info.c
index 05e966f1609e2..b93916c382cdb 100644
--- a/net/mac80211/sta_info.c
+++ b/net/mac80211/sta_info.c
@@ -2122,6 +2122,10 @@ static void sta_stats_decode_rate(struct ieee80211_local *local, u32 rate,
 		int rate_idx = STA_STATS_GET(LEGACY_IDX, rate);
 
 		sband = local->hw.wiphy->bands[band];
+
+		if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!sband->bitrates))
+			break;
+
 		brate = sband->bitrates[rate_idx].bitrate;
 		if (rinfo->bw == RATE_INFO_BW_5)
 			shift = 2;
-- 
2.25.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL 5.8 039/101] bpf: Use raw_spin_trylock() for pcpu_freelist_push/pop in NMI

[Sasha Levin]

From: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>

[ Upstream commit 39d8f0d1026a990604770a658708f5845f7dbec0 ]

Recent improvements in LOCKDEP highlighted a potential A-A deadlock with
pcpu_freelist in NMI:

./tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_progs -t stacktrace_build_id_nmi

[   18.984807] ================================
[   18.984807] WARNING: inconsistent lock state
[   18.984808] 5.9.0-rc6-01771-g1466de1330e1 #2967 Not tainted
[   18.984809] --------------------------------
[   18.984809] inconsistent {INITIAL USE} -> {IN-NMI} usage.
[   18.984810] test_progs/1990 [HC2[2]:SC0[0]:HE0:SE1] takes:
[   18.984810] ffffe8ffffc219c0 (&head->lock){....}-{2:2}, at: __pcpu_freelist_pop+0xe3/0x180
[   18.984813] {INITIAL USE} state was registered at:
[   18.984814]   lock_acquire+0x175/0x7c0
[   18.984814]   _raw_spin_lock+0x2c/0x40
[   18.984815]   __pcpu_freelist_pop+0xe3/0x180
[   18.984815]   pcpu_freelist_pop+0x31/0x40
[   18.984816]   htab_map_alloc+0xbbf/0xf40
[   18.984816]   __do_sys_bpf+0x5aa/0x3ed0
[   18.984817]   do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x40
[   18.984818]   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[   18.984818] irq event stamp: 12
[...]
[   18.984822] other info that might help us debug this:
[   18.984823]  Possible unsafe locking scenario:
[   18.984823]
[   18.984824]        CPU0
[   18.984824]        ----
[   18.984824]   lock(&head->lock);
[   18.984826]   <Interrupt>
[   18.984826]     lock(&head->lock);
[   18.984827]
[   18.984828]  *** DEADLOCK ***
[   18.984828]
[   18.984829] 2 locks held by test_progs/1990:
[...]
[   18.984838]  <NMI>
[   18.984838]  dump_stack+0x9a/0xd0
[   18.984839]  lock_acquire+0x5c9/0x7c0
[   18.984839]  ? lock_release+0x6f0/0x6f0
[   18.984840]  ? __pcpu_freelist_pop+0xe3/0x180
[   18.984840]  _raw_spin_lock+0x2c/0x40
[   18.984841]  ? __pcpu_freelist_pop+0xe3/0x180
[   18.984841]  __pcpu_freelist_pop+0xe3/0x180
[   18.984842]  pcpu_freelist_pop+0x17/0x40
[   18.984842]  ? lock_release+0x6f0/0x6f0
[   18.984843]  __bpf_get_stackid+0x534/0xaf0
[   18.984843]  bpf_prog_1fd9e30e1438d3c5_oncpu+0x73/0x350
[   18.984844]  bpf_overflow_handler+0x12f/0x3f0

This is because pcpu_freelist_head.lock is accessed in both NMI and
non-NMI context. Fix this issue by using raw_spin_trylock() in NMI.

Since NMI interrupts non-NMI context, when NMI context tries to lock the
raw_spinlock, non-NMI context of the same CPU may already have locked a
lock and is blocked from unlocking the lock. For a system with N CPUs,
there could be N NMIs at the same time, and they may block N non-NMI
raw_spinlocks. This is tricky for pcpu_freelist_push(), where unlike
_pop(), failing _push() means leaking memory. This issue is more likely to
trigger in non-SMP system.

Fix this issue with an extra list, pcpu_freelist.extralist. The extralist
is primarily used to take _push() when raw_spin_trylock() failed on all
the per CPU lists. It should be empty most of the time. The following
table summarizes the behavior of pcpu_freelist in NMI and non-NMI:

non-NMI pop(): 	use _lock(); check per CPU lists first;
                if all per CPU lists are empty, check extralist;
                if extralist is empty, return NULL.

non-NMI push(): use _lock(); only push to per CPU lists.

NMI pop():    use _trylock(); check per CPU lists first;
              if all per CPU lists are locked or empty, check extralist;
              if extralist is locked or empty, return NULL.

NMI push():   use _trylock(); check per CPU lists first;
              if all per CPU lists are locked; try push to extralist;
              if extralist is also locked, keep trying on per CPU lists.

Reported-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20201005165838.3735218-1-songliubraving@fb.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 kernel/bpf/percpu_freelist.c | 101 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
 kernel/bpf/percpu_freelist.h |   1 +
 2 files changed, 97 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/kernel/bpf/percpu_freelist.c b/kernel/bpf/percpu_freelist.c
index b367430e611c7..3d897de890612 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/percpu_freelist.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/percpu_freelist.c
@@ -17,6 +17,8 @@ int pcpu_freelist_init(struct pcpu_freelist *s)
 		raw_spin_lock_init(&head->lock);
 		head->first = NULL;
 	}
+	raw_spin_lock_init(&s->extralist.lock);
+	s->extralist.first = NULL;
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -40,12 +42,50 @@ static inline void ___pcpu_freelist_push(struct pcpu_freelist_head *head,
 	raw_spin_unlock(&head->lock);
 }
 
+static inline bool pcpu_freelist_try_push_extra(struct pcpu_freelist *s,
+						struct pcpu_freelist_node *node)
+{
+	if (!raw_spin_trylock(&s->extralist.lock))
+		return false;
+
+	pcpu_freelist_push_node(&s->extralist, node);
+	raw_spin_unlock(&s->extralist.lock);
+	return true;
+}
+
+static inline void ___pcpu_freelist_push_nmi(struct pcpu_freelist *s,
+					     struct pcpu_freelist_node *node)
+{
+	int cpu, orig_cpu;
+
+	orig_cpu = cpu = raw_smp_processor_id();
+	while (1) {
+		struct pcpu_freelist_head *head;
+
+		head = per_cpu_ptr(s->freelist, cpu);
+		if (raw_spin_trylock(&head->lock)) {
+			pcpu_freelist_push_node(head, node);
+			raw_spin_unlock(&head->lock);
+			return;
+		}
+		cpu = cpumask_next(cpu, cpu_possible_mask);
+		if (cpu >= nr_cpu_ids)
+			cpu = 0;
+
+		/* cannot lock any per cpu lock, try extralist */
+		if (cpu == orig_cpu &&
+		    pcpu_freelist_try_push_extra(s, node))
+			return;
+	}
+}
+
 void __pcpu_freelist_push(struct pcpu_freelist *s,
 			struct pcpu_freelist_node *node)
 {
-	struct pcpu_freelist_head *head = this_cpu_ptr(s->freelist);
-
-	___pcpu_freelist_push(head, node);
+	if (in_nmi())
+		___pcpu_freelist_push_nmi(s, node);
+	else
+		___pcpu_freelist_push(this_cpu_ptr(s->freelist), node);
 }
 
 void pcpu_freelist_push(struct pcpu_freelist *s,
@@ -81,7 +121,7 @@ void pcpu_freelist_populate(struct pcpu_freelist *s, void *buf, u32 elem_size,
 	}
 }
 
-struct pcpu_freelist_node *__pcpu_freelist_pop(struct pcpu_freelist *s)
+static struct pcpu_freelist_node *___pcpu_freelist_pop(struct pcpu_freelist *s)
 {
 	struct pcpu_freelist_head *head;
 	struct pcpu_freelist_node *node;
@@ -102,8 +142,59 @@ struct pcpu_freelist_node *__pcpu_freelist_pop(struct pcpu_freelist *s)
 		if (cpu >= nr_cpu_ids)
 			cpu = 0;
 		if (cpu == orig_cpu)
-			return NULL;
+			break;
+	}
+
+	/* per cpu lists are all empty, try extralist */
+	raw_spin_lock(&s->extralist.lock);
+	node = s->extralist.first;
+	if (node)
+		s->extralist.first = node->next;
+	raw_spin_unlock(&s->extralist.lock);
+	return node;
+}
+
+static struct pcpu_freelist_node *
+___pcpu_freelist_pop_nmi(struct pcpu_freelist *s)
+{
+	struct pcpu_freelist_head *head;
+	struct pcpu_freelist_node *node;
+	int orig_cpu, cpu;
+
+	orig_cpu = cpu = raw_smp_processor_id();
+	while (1) {
+		head = per_cpu_ptr(s->freelist, cpu);
+		if (raw_spin_trylock(&head->lock)) {
+			node = head->first;
+			if (node) {
+				head->first = node->next;
+				raw_spin_unlock(&head->lock);
+				return node;
+			}
+			raw_spin_unlock(&head->lock);
+		}
+		cpu = cpumask_next(cpu, cpu_possible_mask);
+		if (cpu >= nr_cpu_ids)
+			cpu = 0;
+		if (cpu == orig_cpu)
+			break;
 	}
+
+	/* cannot pop from per cpu lists, try extralist */
+	if (!raw_spin_trylock(&s->extralist.lock))
+		return NULL;
+	node = s->extralist.first;
+	if (node)
+		s->extralist.first = node->next;
+	raw_spin_unlock(&s->extralist.lock);
+	return node;
+}
+
+struct pcpu_freelist_node *__pcpu_freelist_pop(struct pcpu_freelist *s)
+{
+	if (in_nmi())
+		return ___pcpu_freelist_pop_nmi(s);
+	return ___pcpu_freelist_pop(s);
 }
 
 struct pcpu_freelist_node *pcpu_freelist_pop(struct pcpu_freelist *s)
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/percpu_freelist.h b/kernel/bpf/percpu_freelist.h
index fbf8a8a289791..3c76553cfe571 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/percpu_freelist.h
+++ b/kernel/bpf/percpu_freelist.h
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ struct pcpu_freelist_head {
 
 struct pcpu_freelist {
 	struct pcpu_freelist_head __percpu *freelist;
+	struct pcpu_freelist_head extralist;
 };
 
 struct pcpu_freelist_node {
-- 
2.25.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL 5.8 047/101] rtw88: pci: Power cycle device during shutdown

[Sasha Levin]

From: Kai-Heng Feng <kai.heng.feng@canonical.com>

[ Upstream commit 44492e70adc8086c42d3745d21d591657a427f04 ]

There are reports that 8822CE fails to work rtw88 with "failed to read DBI
register" error. Also I have a system with 8723DE which freezes the whole
system when the rtw88 is probing the device.

According to [1], platform firmware may not properly power manage the
device during shutdown. I did some expirements and putting the device to
D3 can workaround the issue.

So let's power cycle the device by putting the device to D3 at shutdown
to prevent the issue from happening.

[1] https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=206411#c9

BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1872984
Signed-off-by: Kai-Heng Feng <kai.heng.feng@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200928165508.20775-1-kai.heng.feng@canonical.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtw88/pci.c | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtw88/pci.c b/drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtw88/pci.c
index 3413973bc4750..7f1f5073b9f4d 100644
--- a/drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtw88/pci.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtw88/pci.c
@@ -1599,6 +1599,8 @@ void rtw_pci_shutdown(struct pci_dev *pdev)
 
 	if (chip->ops->shutdown)
 		chip->ops->shutdown(rtwdev);
+
+	pci_set_power_state(pdev, PCI_D3hot);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(rtw_pci_shutdown);
 
-- 
2.25.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL 5.8 050/101] rtw88: increse the size of rx buffer size

[Sasha Levin]

From: Tzu-En Huang <tehuang@realtek.com>

[ Upstream commit ee755732b7a16af018daa77d9562d2493fb7092f ]

The vht capability of MAX_MPDU_LENGTH is 11454 in rtw88; however, the rx
buffer size for each packet is 8192. When receiving packets that are
larger than rx buffer size, it will leads to rx buffer ring overflow.

Signed-off-by: Tzu-En Huang <tehuang@realtek.com>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200925061219.23754-2-tehuang@realtek.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtw88/pci.h | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtw88/pci.h b/drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtw88/pci.h
index 024c2bc275cbe..ca17aa9cf7dc7 100644
--- a/drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtw88/pci.h
+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtw88/pci.h
@@ -9,8 +9,8 @@
 #define RTK_BEQ_TX_DESC_NUM	256
 
 #define RTK_MAX_RX_DESC_NUM	512
-/* 8K + rx desc size */
-#define RTK_PCI_RX_BUF_SIZE	(8192 + 24)
+/* 11K + rx desc size */
+#define RTK_PCI_RX_BUF_SIZE	(11454 + 24)
 
 #define RTK_PCI_CTRL		0x300
 #define BIT_RST_TRXDMA_INTF	BIT(20)
-- 
2.25.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL 5.8 051/101] selftests/bpf: Fix overflow tests to reflect iter size increase

[Sasha Levin]

From: Alan Maguire <alan.maguire@oracle.com>

[ Upstream commit eb58bbf2e5c7917aa30bf8818761f26bbeeb2290 ]

bpf iter size increase to PAGE_SIZE << 3 means overflow tests assuming
page size need to be bumped also.

Signed-off-by: Alan Maguire <alan.maguire@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/1601292670-1616-7-git-send-email-alan.maguire@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/bpf_iter.c | 14 +++++++-------
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/bpf_iter.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/bpf_iter.c
index 87c29dde1cf96..669f195de2fa0 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/bpf_iter.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/bpf_iter.c
@@ -249,7 +249,7 @@ static void test_overflow(bool test_e2big_overflow, bool ret1)
 	struct bpf_map_info map_info = {};
 	struct bpf_iter_test_kern4 *skel;
 	struct bpf_link *link;
-	__u32 page_size;
+	__u32 iter_size;
 	char *buf;
 
 	skel = bpf_iter_test_kern4__open();
@@ -271,19 +271,19 @@ static void test_overflow(bool test_e2big_overflow, bool ret1)
 		  "map_creation failed: %s\n", strerror(errno)))
 		goto free_map1;
 
-	/* bpf_seq_printf kernel buffer is one page, so one map
+	/* bpf_seq_printf kernel buffer is 8 pages, so one map
 	 * bpf_seq_write will mostly fill it, and the other map
 	 * will partially fill and then trigger overflow and need
 	 * bpf_seq_read restart.
 	 */
-	page_size = sysconf(_SC_PAGE_SIZE);
+	iter_size = sysconf(_SC_PAGE_SIZE) << 3;
 
 	if (test_e2big_overflow) {
-		skel->rodata->print_len = (page_size + 8) / 8;
-		expected_read_len = 2 * (page_size + 8);
+		skel->rodata->print_len = (iter_size + 8) / 8;
+		expected_read_len = 2 * (iter_size + 8);
 	} else if (!ret1) {
-		skel->rodata->print_len = (page_size - 8) / 8;
-		expected_read_len = 2 * (page_size - 8);
+		skel->rodata->print_len = (iter_size - 8) / 8;
+		expected_read_len = 2 * (iter_size - 8);
 	} else {
 		skel->rodata->print_len = 1;
 		expected_read_len = 2 * 8;
-- 
2.25.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL 5.8 055/101] can: flexcan: flexcan_chip_stop(): add error handling and propagate error value

[Sasha Levin]

From: Joakim Zhang <qiangqing.zhang@nxp.com>

[ Upstream commit 9ad02c7f4f279504bdd38ab706fdc97d5f2b2a9c ]

This patch implements error handling and propagates the error value of
flexcan_chip_stop(). This function will be called from flexcan_suspend()
in an upcoming patch in some SoCs which support LPSR mode.

Add a new function flexcan_chip_stop_disable_on_error() that tries to
disable the chip even in case of errors.

Signed-off-by: Joakim Zhang <qiangqing.zhang@nxp.com>
[mkl: introduce flexcan_chip_stop_disable_on_error() and use it in flexcan_close()]
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200922144429.2613631-11-mkl@pengutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/net/can/flexcan.c | 34 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
 1 file changed, 28 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/net/can/flexcan.c b/drivers/net/can/flexcan.c
index 94d10ec954a05..2ac7a667bde35 100644
--- a/drivers/net/can/flexcan.c
+++ b/drivers/net/can/flexcan.c
@@ -1260,18 +1260,23 @@ static int flexcan_chip_start(struct net_device *dev)
 	return err;
 }
 
-/* flexcan_chip_stop
+/* __flexcan_chip_stop
  *
- * this functions is entered with clocks enabled
+ * this function is entered with clocks enabled
  */
-static void flexcan_chip_stop(struct net_device *dev)
+static int __flexcan_chip_stop(struct net_device *dev, bool disable_on_error)
 {
 	struct flexcan_priv *priv = netdev_priv(dev);
 	struct flexcan_regs __iomem *regs = priv->regs;
+	int err;
 
 	/* freeze + disable module */
-	flexcan_chip_freeze(priv);
-	flexcan_chip_disable(priv);
+	err = flexcan_chip_freeze(priv);
+	if (err && !disable_on_error)
+		return err;
+	err = flexcan_chip_disable(priv);
+	if (err && !disable_on_error)
+		goto out_chip_unfreeze;
 
 	/* Disable all interrupts */
 	priv->write(0, &regs->imask2);
@@ -1281,6 +1286,23 @@ static void flexcan_chip_stop(struct net_device *dev)
 
 	flexcan_transceiver_disable(priv);
 	priv->can.state = CAN_STATE_STOPPED;
+
+	return 0;
+
+ out_chip_unfreeze:
+	flexcan_chip_unfreeze(priv);
+
+	return err;
+}
+
+static inline int flexcan_chip_stop_disable_on_error(struct net_device *dev)
+{
+	return __flexcan_chip_stop(dev, true);
+}
+
+static inline int flexcan_chip_stop(struct net_device *dev)
+{
+	return __flexcan_chip_stop(dev, false);
 }
 
 static int flexcan_open(struct net_device *dev)
@@ -1362,7 +1384,7 @@ static int flexcan_close(struct net_device *dev)
 
 	netif_stop_queue(dev);
 	can_rx_offload_disable(&priv->offload);
-	flexcan_chip_stop(dev);
+	flexcan_chip_stop_disable_on_error(dev);
 
 	can_rx_offload_del(&priv->offload);
 	free_irq(dev->irq, dev);
-- 
2.25.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL 5.8 057/101] ath9k: hif_usb: fix race condition between usb_get_urb() and usb_kill_anchored_urbs()

[Sasha Levin]

From: Brooke Basile <brookebasile@gmail.com>

[ Upstream commit 03fb92a432ea5abe5909bca1455b7e44a9380480 ]

Calls to usb_kill_anchored_urbs() after usb_kill_urb() on multiprocessor
systems create a race condition in which usb_kill_anchored_urbs() deallocates
the URB before the completer callback is called in usb_kill_urb(), resulting
in a use-after-free.
To fix this, add proper lock protection to usb_kill_urb() calls that can
possibly run concurrently with usb_kill_anchored_urbs().

Reported-by: syzbot+89bd486af9427a9fc605@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=cabffad18eb74197f84871802fd2c5117b61febf
Signed-off-by: Brooke Basile <brookebasile@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200911071427.32354-1-brookebasile@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/hif_usb.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+)

diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/hif_usb.c b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/hif_usb.c
index 3f563e02d17da..2ed98aaed6fb5 100644
--- a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/hif_usb.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/hif_usb.c
@@ -449,10 +449,19 @@ static void hif_usb_stop(void *hif_handle)
 	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&hif_dev->tx.tx_lock, flags);
 
 	/* The pending URBs have to be canceled. */
+	spin_lock_irqsave(&hif_dev->tx.tx_lock, flags);
 	list_for_each_entry_safe(tx_buf, tx_buf_tmp,
 				 &hif_dev->tx.tx_pending, list) {
+		usb_get_urb(tx_buf->urb);
+		spin_unlock_irqrestore(&hif_dev->tx.tx_lock, flags);
 		usb_kill_urb(tx_buf->urb);
+		list_del(&tx_buf->list);
+		usb_free_urb(tx_buf->urb);
+		kfree(tx_buf->buf);
+		kfree(tx_buf);
+		spin_lock_irqsave(&hif_dev->tx.tx_lock, flags);
 	}
+	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&hif_dev->tx.tx_lock, flags);
 
 	usb_kill_anchored_urbs(&hif_dev->mgmt_submitted);
 }
@@ -762,27 +771,37 @@ static void ath9k_hif_usb_dealloc_tx_urbs(struct hif_device_usb *hif_dev)
 	struct tx_buf *tx_buf = NULL, *tx_buf_tmp = NULL;
 	unsigned long flags;
 
+	spin_lock_irqsave(&hif_dev->tx.tx_lock, flags);
 	list_for_each_entry_safe(tx_buf, tx_buf_tmp,
 				 &hif_dev->tx.tx_buf, list) {
+		usb_get_urb(tx_buf->urb);
+		spin_unlock_irqrestore(&hif_dev->tx.tx_lock, flags);
 		usb_kill_urb(tx_buf->urb);
 		list_del(&tx_buf->list);
 		usb_free_urb(tx_buf->urb);
 		kfree(tx_buf->buf);
 		kfree(tx_buf);
+		spin_lock_irqsave(&hif_dev->tx.tx_lock, flags);
 	}
+	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&hif_dev->tx.tx_lock, flags);
 
 	spin_lock_irqsave(&hif_dev->tx.tx_lock, flags);
 	hif_dev->tx.flags |= HIF_USB_TX_FLUSH;
 	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&hif_dev->tx.tx_lock, flags);
 
+	spin_lock_irqsave(&hif_dev->tx.tx_lock, flags);
 	list_for_each_entry_safe(tx_buf, tx_buf_tmp,
 				 &hif_dev->tx.tx_pending, list) {
+		usb_get_urb(tx_buf->urb);
+		spin_unlock_irqrestore(&hif_dev->tx.tx_lock, flags);
 		usb_kill_urb(tx_buf->urb);
 		list_del(&tx_buf->list);
 		usb_free_urb(tx_buf->urb);
 		kfree(tx_buf->buf);
 		kfree(tx_buf);
+		spin_lock_irqsave(&hif_dev->tx.tx_lock, flags);
 	}
+	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&hif_dev->tx.tx_lock, flags);
 
 	usb_kill_anchored_urbs(&hif_dev->mgmt_submitted);
 }
-- 
2.25.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL 5.8 061/101] bpf: Limit caller's stack depth 256 for subprogs with tailcalls

[Sasha Levin]

From: Maciej Fijalkowski <maciej.fijalkowski@intel.com>

[ Upstream commit 7f6e4312e15a5c370e84eaa685879b6bdcc717e4 ]

Protect against potential stack overflow that might happen when bpf2bpf
calls get combined with tailcalls. Limit the caller's stack depth for
such case down to 256 so that the worst case scenario would result in 8k
stack size (32 which is tailcall limit * 256 = 8k).

Suggested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Maciej Fijalkowski <maciej.fijalkowski@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 include/linux/bpf_verifier.h |  1 +
 kernel/bpf/verifier.c        | 29 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 30 insertions(+)

diff --git a/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h b/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h
index ca08db4ffb5f7..ce3f5231aa698 100644
--- a/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h
+++ b/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h
@@ -358,6 +358,7 @@ struct bpf_subprog_info {
 	u32 start; /* insn idx of function entry point */
 	u32 linfo_idx; /* The idx to the main_prog->aux->linfo */
 	u16 stack_depth; /* max. stack depth used by this function */
+	bool has_tail_call;
 };
 
 /* single container for all structs
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index 89b07db146763..17145f8f81979 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -1470,6 +1470,10 @@ static int check_subprogs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
 	for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++) {
 		u8 code = insn[i].code;
 
+		if (code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL) &&
+		    insn[i].imm == BPF_FUNC_tail_call &&
+		    insn[i].src_reg != BPF_PSEUDO_CALL)
+			subprog[cur_subprog].has_tail_call = true;
 		if (BPF_CLASS(code) != BPF_JMP && BPF_CLASS(code) != BPF_JMP32)
 			goto next;
 		if (BPF_OP(code) == BPF_EXIT || BPF_OP(code) == BPF_CALL)
@@ -2951,6 +2955,31 @@ static int check_max_stack_depth(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
 	int ret_prog[MAX_CALL_FRAMES];
 
 process_func:
+	/* protect against potential stack overflow that might happen when
+	 * bpf2bpf calls get combined with tailcalls. Limit the caller's stack
+	 * depth for such case down to 256 so that the worst case scenario
+	 * would result in 8k stack size (32 which is tailcall limit * 256 =
+	 * 8k).
+	 *
+	 * To get the idea what might happen, see an example:
+	 * func1 -> sub rsp, 128
+	 *  subfunc1 -> sub rsp, 256
+	 *  tailcall1 -> add rsp, 256
+	 *   func2 -> sub rsp, 192 (total stack size = 128 + 192 = 320)
+	 *   subfunc2 -> sub rsp, 64
+	 *   subfunc22 -> sub rsp, 128
+	 *   tailcall2 -> add rsp, 128
+	 *    func3 -> sub rsp, 32 (total stack size 128 + 192 + 64 + 32 = 416)
+	 *
+	 * tailcall will unwind the current stack frame but it will not get rid
+	 * of caller's stack as shown on the example above.
+	 */
+	if (idx && subprog[idx].has_tail_call && depth >= 256) {
+		verbose(env,
+			"tail_calls are not allowed when call stack of previous frames is %d bytes. Too large\n",
+			depth);
+		return -EACCES;
+	}
 	/* round up to 32-bytes, since this is granularity
 	 * of interpreter stack size
 	 */
-- 
2.25.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL 5.8 068/101] Bluetooth: Only mark socket zapped after unlocking

[Sasha Levin]

From: Abhishek Pandit-Subedi <abhishekpandit@chromium.org>

[ Upstream commit 20ae4089d0afeb24e9ceb026b996bfa55c983cc2 ]

Since l2cap_sock_teardown_cb doesn't acquire the channel lock before
setting the socket as zapped, it could potentially race with
l2cap_sock_release which frees the socket. Thus, wait until the cleanup
is complete before marking the socket as zapped.

This race was reproduced on a JBL GO speaker after the remote device
rejected L2CAP connection due to resource unavailability.

Here is a dmesg log with debug logs from a repro of this bug:
[ 3465.424086] Bluetooth: hci_core.c:hci_acldata_packet() hci0 len 16 handle 0x0003 flags 0x0002
[ 3465.424090] Bluetooth: hci_conn.c:hci_conn_enter_active_mode() hcon 00000000cfedd07d mode 0
[ 3465.424094] Bluetooth: l2cap_core.c:l2cap_recv_acldata() conn 000000007eae8952 len 16 flags 0x2
[ 3465.424098] Bluetooth: l2cap_core.c:l2cap_recv_frame() len 12, cid 0x0001
[ 3465.424102] Bluetooth: l2cap_core.c:l2cap_raw_recv() conn 000000007eae8952
[ 3465.424175] Bluetooth: l2cap_core.c:l2cap_sig_channel() code 0x03 len 8 id 0x0c
[ 3465.424180] Bluetooth: l2cap_core.c:l2cap_connect_create_rsp() dcid 0x0045 scid 0x0000 result 0x02 status 0x00
[ 3465.424189] Bluetooth: l2cap_core.c:l2cap_chan_put() chan 000000006acf9bff orig refcnt 4
[ 3465.424196] Bluetooth: l2cap_core.c:l2cap_chan_del() chan 000000006acf9bff, conn 000000007eae8952, err 111, state BT_CONNECT
[ 3465.424203] Bluetooth: l2cap_sock.c:l2cap_sock_teardown_cb() chan 000000006acf9bff state BT_CONNECT
[ 3465.424221] Bluetooth: l2cap_core.c:l2cap_chan_put() chan 000000006acf9bff orig refcnt 3
[ 3465.424226] Bluetooth: hci_core.h:hci_conn_drop() hcon 00000000cfedd07d orig refcnt 6
[ 3465.424234] BUG: spinlock bad magic on CPU#2, kworker/u17:0/159
[ 3465.425626] Bluetooth: hci_sock.c:hci_sock_sendmsg() sock 000000002bb0cb64 sk 00000000a7964053
[ 3465.430330]  lock: 0xffffff804410aac0, .magic: 00000000, .owner: <none>/-1, .owner_cpu: 0
[ 3465.430332] Causing a watchdog bite!

Signed-off-by: Abhishek Pandit-Subedi <abhishekpandit@chromium.org>
Reported-by: Balakrishna Godavarthi <bgodavar@codeaurora.org>
Reviewed-by: Manish Mandlik <mmandlik@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c | 7 ++++---
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c
index a995d2c51fa7f..2ea6bcbe6f559 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c
@@ -1521,8 +1521,6 @@ static void l2cap_sock_teardown_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan, int err)
 
 	parent = bt_sk(sk)->parent;
 
-	sock_set_flag(sk, SOCK_ZAPPED);
-
 	switch (chan->state) {
 	case BT_OPEN:
 	case BT_BOUND:
@@ -1549,8 +1547,11 @@ static void l2cap_sock_teardown_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan, int err)
 
 		break;
 	}
-
 	release_sock(sk);
+
+	/* Only zap after cleanup to avoid use after free race */
+	sock_set_flag(sk, SOCK_ZAPPED);
+
 }
 
 static void l2cap_sock_state_change_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan, int state,
-- 
2.25.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL 5.8 073/101] selftests/bpf: Fix test_sysctl_loop{1, 2} failure due to clang change

[Sasha Levin]

From: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>

[ Upstream commit 7fb5eefd76394cfefb380724a87ca40b47d44405 ]

Andrii reported that with latest clang, when building selftests, we have
error likes:
  error: progs/test_sysctl_loop1.c:23:16: in function sysctl_tcp_mem i32 (%struct.bpf_sysctl*):
  Looks like the BPF stack limit of 512 bytes is exceeded.
  Please move large on stack variables into BPF per-cpu array map.

The error is triggered by the following LLVM patch:
  https://reviews.llvm.org/D87134

For example, the following code is from test_sysctl_loop1.c:
  static __always_inline int is_tcp_mem(struct bpf_sysctl *ctx)
  {
    volatile char tcp_mem_name[] = "net/ipv4/tcp_mem/very_very_very_very_long_pointless_string";
    ...
  }
Without the above LLVM patch, the compiler did optimization to load the string
(59 bytes long) with 7 64bit loads, 1 8bit load and 1 16bit load,
occupying 64 byte stack size.

With the above LLVM patch, the compiler only uses 8bit loads, but subregister is 32bit.
So stack requirements become 4 * 59 = 236 bytes. Together with other stuff on
the stack, total stack size exceeds 512 bytes, hence compiler complains and quits.

To fix the issue, removing "volatile" key word or changing "volatile" to
"const"/"static const" does not work, the string is put in .rodata.str1.1 section,
which libbpf did not process it and errors out with
  libbpf: elf: skipping unrecognized data section(6) .rodata.str1.1
  libbpf: prog 'sysctl_tcp_mem': bad map relo against '.L__const.is_tcp_mem.tcp_mem_name'
          in section '.rodata.str1.1'

Defining the string const as global variable can fix the issue as it puts the string constant
in '.rodata' section which is recognized by libbpf. In the future, when libbpf can process
'.rodata.str*.*' properly, the global definition can be changed back to local definition.

Defining tcp_mem_name as a global, however, triggered a verifier failure.
   ./test_progs -n 7/21
  libbpf: load bpf program failed: Permission denied
  libbpf: -- BEGIN DUMP LOG ---
  libbpf:
  invalid stack off=0 size=1
  verification time 6975 usec
  stack depth 160+64
  processed 889 insns (limit 1000000) max_states_per_insn 4 total_states
  14 peak_states 14 mark_read 10

  libbpf: -- END LOG --
  libbpf: failed to load program 'sysctl_tcp_mem'
  libbpf: failed to load object 'test_sysctl_loop2.o'
  test_bpf_verif_scale:FAIL:114
  #7/21 test_sysctl_loop2.o:FAIL
This actually exposed a bpf program bug. In test_sysctl_loop{1,2}, we have code
like
  const char tcp_mem_name[] = "<...long string...>";
  ...
  char name[64];
  ...
  for (i = 0; i < sizeof(tcp_mem_name); ++i)
      if (name[i] != tcp_mem_name[i])
          return 0;
In the above code, if sizeof(tcp_mem_name) > 64, name[i] access may be
out of bound. The sizeof(tcp_mem_name) is 59 for test_sysctl_loop1.c and
79 for test_sysctl_loop2.c.

Without promotion-to-global change, old compiler generates code where
the overflowed stack access is actually filled with valid value, so hiding
the bpf program bug. With promotion-to-global change, the code is different,
more specifically, the previous loading constants to stack is gone, and
"name" occupies stack[-64:0] and overflow access triggers a verifier error.
To fix the issue, adjust "name" buffer size properly.

Reported-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200909171542.3673449-1-yhs@fb.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_sysctl_loop1.c | 4 ++--
 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_sysctl_loop2.c | 4 ++--
 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_sysctl_loop1.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_sysctl_loop1.c
index 458b0d69133e4..553a282d816ab 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_sysctl_loop1.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_sysctl_loop1.c
@@ -18,11 +18,11 @@
 #define MAX_ULONG_STR_LEN 7
 #define MAX_VALUE_STR_LEN (TCP_MEM_LOOPS * MAX_ULONG_STR_LEN)
 
+const char tcp_mem_name[] = "net/ipv4/tcp_mem/very_very_very_very_long_pointless_string";
 static __always_inline int is_tcp_mem(struct bpf_sysctl *ctx)
 {
-	volatile char tcp_mem_name[] = "net/ipv4/tcp_mem/very_very_very_very_long_pointless_string";
 	unsigned char i;
-	char name[64];
+	char name[sizeof(tcp_mem_name)];
 	int ret;
 
 	memset(name, 0, sizeof(name));
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_sysctl_loop2.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_sysctl_loop2.c
index b2e6f9b0894d8..2b64bc563a12e 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_sysctl_loop2.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_sysctl_loop2.c
@@ -18,11 +18,11 @@
 #define MAX_ULONG_STR_LEN 7
 #define MAX_VALUE_STR_LEN (TCP_MEM_LOOPS * MAX_ULONG_STR_LEN)
 
+const char tcp_mem_name[] = "net/ipv4/tcp_mem/very_very_very_very_long_pointless_string_to_stress_byte_loop";
 static __attribute__((noinline)) int is_tcp_mem(struct bpf_sysctl *ctx)
 {
-	volatile char tcp_mem_name[] = "net/ipv4/tcp_mem/very_very_very_very_long_pointless_string_to_stress_byte_loop";
 	unsigned char i;
-	char name[64];
+	char name[sizeof(tcp_mem_name)];
 	int ret;
 
 	memset(name, 0, sizeof(name));
-- 
2.25.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL 5.8 074/101] brcmsmac: fix memory leak in wlc_phy_attach_lcnphy

[Sasha Levin]

From: Keita Suzuki <keitasuzuki.park@sslab.ics.keio.ac.jp>

[ Upstream commit f4443293d741d1776b86ed1dd8c4e4285d0775fc ]

When wlc_phy_txpwr_srom_read_lcnphy fails in wlc_phy_attach_lcnphy,
the allocated pi->u.pi_lcnphy is leaked, since struct brcms_phy will be
freed in the caller function.

Fix this by calling wlc_phy_detach_lcnphy in the error handler of
wlc_phy_txpwr_srom_read_lcnphy before returning.

Signed-off-by: Keita Suzuki <keitasuzuki.park@sslab.ics.keio.ac.jp>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200908121743.23108-1-keitasuzuki.park@sslab.ics.keio.ac.jp
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 .../net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmsmac/phy/phy_lcn.c    | 4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmsmac/phy/phy_lcn.c b/drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmsmac/phy/phy_lcn.c
index 7ef36234a25dc..66797dc5e90d5 100644
--- a/drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmsmac/phy/phy_lcn.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmsmac/phy/phy_lcn.c
@@ -5065,8 +5065,10 @@ bool wlc_phy_attach_lcnphy(struct brcms_phy *pi)
 	pi->pi_fptr.radioloftget = wlc_lcnphy_get_radio_loft;
 	pi->pi_fptr.detach = wlc_phy_detach_lcnphy;
 
-	if (!wlc_phy_txpwr_srom_read_lcnphy(pi))
+	if (!wlc_phy_txpwr_srom_read_lcnphy(pi)) {
+		kfree(pi->u.pi_lcnphy);
 		return false;
+	}
 
 	if (LCNREV_IS(pi->pubpi.phy_rev, 1)) {
 		if (pi_lcn->lcnphy_tempsense_option == 3) {
-- 
2.25.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL 5.8 075/101] rtl8xxxu: prevent potential memory leak

[Sasha Levin]

From: Chris Chiu <chiu@endlessm.com>

[ Upstream commit 86279456a4d47782398d3cb8193f78f672e36cac ]

Free the skb if usb_submit_urb fails on rx_urb. And free the urb
no matter usb_submit_urb succeeds or not in rtl8xxxu_submit_int_urb.

Signed-off-by: Chris Chiu <chiu@endlessm.com>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200906040424.22022-1-chiu@endlessm.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtl8xxxu/rtl8xxxu_core.c | 10 +++++++++-
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtl8xxxu/rtl8xxxu_core.c b/drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtl8xxxu/rtl8xxxu_core.c
index 19efae462a242..5cd7ef3625c5e 100644
--- a/drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtl8xxxu/rtl8xxxu_core.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtl8xxxu/rtl8xxxu_core.c
@@ -5795,7 +5795,6 @@ static int rtl8xxxu_submit_int_urb(struct ieee80211_hw *hw)
 	ret = usb_submit_urb(urb, GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (ret) {
 		usb_unanchor_urb(urb);
-		usb_free_urb(urb);
 		goto error;
 	}
 
@@ -5804,6 +5803,7 @@ static int rtl8xxxu_submit_int_urb(struct ieee80211_hw *hw)
 	rtl8xxxu_write32(priv, REG_USB_HIMR, val32);
 
 error:
+	usb_free_urb(urb);
 	return ret;
 }
 
@@ -6318,6 +6318,7 @@ static int rtl8xxxu_start(struct ieee80211_hw *hw)
 	struct rtl8xxxu_priv *priv = hw->priv;
 	struct rtl8xxxu_rx_urb *rx_urb;
 	struct rtl8xxxu_tx_urb *tx_urb;
+	struct sk_buff *skb;
 	unsigned long flags;
 	int ret, i;
 
@@ -6368,6 +6369,13 @@ static int rtl8xxxu_start(struct ieee80211_hw *hw)
 		rx_urb->hw = hw;
 
 		ret = rtl8xxxu_submit_rx_urb(priv, rx_urb);
+		if (ret) {
+			if (ret != -ENOMEM) {
+				skb = (struct sk_buff *)rx_urb->urb.context;
+				dev_kfree_skb(skb);
+			}
+			rtl8xxxu_queue_rx_urb(priv, rx_urb);
+		}
 	}
 
 	schedule_delayed_work(&priv->ra_watchdog, 2 * HZ);
-- 
2.25.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL 5.8 086/101] ipvs: Fix uninit-value in do_ip_vs_set_ctl()

[Sasha Levin]

From: Peilin Ye <yepeilin.cs@gmail.com>

[ Upstream commit c5a8a8498eed1c164afc94f50a939c1a10abf8ad ]

do_ip_vs_set_ctl() is referencing uninitialized stack value when `len` is
zero. Fix it.

Reported-by: syzbot+23b5f9e7caf61d9a3898@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=46ebfb92a8a812621a001ef04d90dfa459520fe2
Suggested-by: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>
Signed-off-by: Peilin Ye <yepeilin.cs@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@verge.net.au>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c | 7 ++++---
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c b/net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c
index 412656c34f205..beeafa42aad76 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c
@@ -2471,6 +2471,10 @@ do_ip_vs_set_ctl(struct sock *sk, int cmd, void __user *user, unsigned int len)
 		/* Set timeout values for (tcp tcpfin udp) */
 		ret = ip_vs_set_timeout(ipvs, (struct ip_vs_timeout_user *)arg);
 		goto out_unlock;
+	} else if (!len) {
+		/* No more commands with len == 0 below */
+		ret = -EINVAL;
+		goto out_unlock;
 	}
 
 	usvc_compat = (struct ip_vs_service_user *)arg;
@@ -2547,9 +2551,6 @@ do_ip_vs_set_ctl(struct sock *sk, int cmd, void __user *user, unsigned int len)
 		break;
 	case IP_VS_SO_SET_DELDEST:
 		ret = ip_vs_del_dest(svc, &udest);
-		break;
-	default:
-		ret = -EINVAL;
 	}
 
   out_unlock:
-- 
2.25.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL 5.8 089/101] mwifiex: don't call del_timer_sync() on uninitialized timer

[Sasha Levin]

From: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>

[ Upstream commit 621a3a8b1c0ecf16e1e5667ea5756a76a082b738 ]

syzbot is reporting that del_timer_sync() is called from
mwifiex_usb_cleanup_tx_aggr() from mwifiex_unregister_dev() without
checking timer_setup() from mwifiex_usb_tx_init() was called [1].

Ganapathi Bhat proposed a possibly cleaner fix, but it seems that
that fix was forgotten [2].

"grep -FrB1 'del_timer' drivers/ | grep -FA1 '.function)'" says that
currently there are 28 locations which call del_timer[_sync]() only if
that timer's function field was initialized (because timer_setup() sets
that timer's function field). Therefore, let's use same approach here.

[1] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=26525f643f454dd7be0078423e3cdb0d57744959
[2] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/CA+ASDXMHt2gq9Hy+iP_BYkWXsSreWdp3_bAfMkNcuqJ3K+-jbQ@mail.gmail.com

Reported-by: syzbot <syzbot+dc4127f950da51639216@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
Cc: Ganapathi Bhat <ganapathi.bhat@nxp.com>
Cc: Brian Norris <briannorris@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Reviewed-by: Brian Norris <briannorris@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Ganapathi Bhat <ganapathi.bhat@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200821082720.7716-1-penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/usb.c | 3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/usb.c b/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/usb.c
index 6f3cfde4654cc..426e39d4ccf0f 100644
--- a/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/usb.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/usb.c
@@ -1353,7 +1353,8 @@ static void mwifiex_usb_cleanup_tx_aggr(struct mwifiex_adapter *adapter)
 				skb_dequeue(&port->tx_aggr.aggr_list)))
 				mwifiex_write_data_complete(adapter, skb_tmp,
 							    0, -1);
-		del_timer_sync(&port->tx_aggr.timer_cnxt.hold_timer);
+		if (port->tx_aggr.timer_cnxt.hold_timer.function)
+			del_timer_sync(&port->tx_aggr.timer_cnxt.hold_timer);
 		port->tx_aggr.timer_cnxt.is_hold_timer_set = false;
 		port->tx_aggr.timer_cnxt.hold_tmo_msecs = 0;
 	}
-- 
2.25.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL 5.8 095/101] brcm80211: fix possible memleak in brcmf_proto_msgbuf_attach

[Sasha Levin]

From: Wang Yufen <wangyufen@huawei.com>

[ Upstream commit 6c151410d5b57e6bb0d91a735ac511459539a7bf ]

When brcmf_proto_msgbuf_attach fail and msgbuf->txflow_wq != NULL,
we should destroy the workqueue.

Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Wang Yufen <wangyufen@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1595237765-66238-1-git-send-email-wangyufen@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/msgbuf.c | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/msgbuf.c b/drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/msgbuf.c
index 8bb4f1fa790e7..1bb270e782ff2 100644
--- a/drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/msgbuf.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/msgbuf.c
@@ -1619,6 +1619,8 @@ int brcmf_proto_msgbuf_attach(struct brcmf_pub *drvr)
 					  BRCMF_TX_IOCTL_MAX_MSG_SIZE,
 					  msgbuf->ioctbuf,
 					  msgbuf->ioctbuf_handle);
+		if (msgbuf->txflow_wq)
+			destroy_workqueue(msgbuf->txflow_wq);
 		kfree(msgbuf);
 	}
 	return -ENOMEM;
-- 
2.25.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL 5.8 101/101] ath10k: check idx validity in __ath10k_htt_rx_ring_fill_n()

[Sasha Levin]

From: Zekun Shen <bruceshenzk@gmail.com>

[ Upstream commit bad60b8d1a7194df38fd7fe4b22f3f4dcf775099 ]

The idx in __ath10k_htt_rx_ring_fill_n function lives in
consistent dma region writable by the device. Malfunctional
or malicious device could manipulate such idx to have a OOB
write. Either by
    htt->rx_ring.netbufs_ring[idx] = skb;
or by
    ath10k_htt_set_paddrs_ring(htt, paddr, idx);

The idx can also be negative as it's signed, giving a large
memory space to write to.

It's possibly exploitable by corruptting a legit pointer with
a skb pointer. And then fill skb with payload as rougue object.

Part of the log here. Sometimes it appears as UAF when writing
to a freed memory by chance.

 [   15.594376] BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffff887f5c1804f0
 [   15.595483] #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode
 [   15.596250] #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page
 [   15.597013] PGD 0 P4D 0
 [   15.597395] Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
 [   15.597967] CPU: 0 PID: 82 Comm: kworker/u2:2 Not tainted 5.6.0 #69
 [   15.598843] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996),
 BIOS rel-1.12.1-0-ga5cab58e9a3f-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
 [   15.600438] Workqueue: ath10k_wq ath10k_core_register_work [ath10k_core]
 [   15.601389] RIP: 0010:__ath10k_htt_rx_ring_fill_n
 (linux/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/htt_rx.c:173) ath10k_core

Signed-off-by: Zekun Shen <bruceshenzk@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200623221105.3486-1-bruceshenzk@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/htt_rx.c | 8 ++++++++
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)

diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/htt_rx.c b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/htt_rx.c
index d787cbead56ab..215ade6faf328 100644
--- a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/htt_rx.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/htt_rx.c
@@ -142,6 +142,14 @@ static int __ath10k_htt_rx_ring_fill_n(struct ath10k_htt *htt, int num)
 	BUILD_BUG_ON(HTT_RX_RING_FILL_LEVEL >= HTT_RX_RING_SIZE / 2);
 
 	idx = __le32_to_cpu(*htt->rx_ring.alloc_idx.vaddr);
+
+	if (idx < 0 || idx >= htt->rx_ring.size) {
+		ath10k_err(htt->ar, "rx ring index is not valid, firmware malfunctioning?\n");
+		idx &= htt->rx_ring.size_mask;
+		ret = -ENOMEM;
+		goto fail;
+	}
+
 	while (num > 0) {
 		skb = dev_alloc_skb(HTT_RX_BUF_SIZE + HTT_RX_DESC_ALIGN);
 		if (!skb) {
-- 
2.25.1