Re: [PATCHv2 3/4] pci: Determine actual VPD size on first access

Re: [PATCHv2 3/4] pci: Determine actual VPD size on first access

[Alexander Duyck]

On Tue, Aug 9, 2016 at 5:54 AM, Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@ozlabs.ru> wrote:
> On 10/02/16 08:04, Bjorn Helgaas wrote:
>> On Wed, Jan 13, 2016 at 12:25:34PM +0100, Hannes Reinecke wrote:
>>> PCI-2.2 VPD entries have a maximum size of 32k, but might actually
>>> be smaller than that. To figure out the actual size one has to read
>>> the VPD area until the 'end marker' is reached.
>>> Trying to read VPD data beyond that marker results in 'interesting'
>>> effects, from simple read errors to crashing the card. And to make
>>> matters worse not every PCI card implements this properly, leaving
>>> us with no 'end' marker or even completely invalid data.
>>> This path tries to determine the size of the VPD data.
>>> If no valid data can be read an I/O error will be returned when
>>> reading the sysfs attribute.
>
>
> I have a problem with this particular feature as today VFIO uses this
> pci_vpd_xxxx API to virtualize access to VPD and the existing code assumes
> there is just one VPD block with 0x2 start and 0xf end. However I have at
> least one device where this is not true - "10 Gigabit Ethernet-SR PCI
> Express Adapter" - it has 2 blocks (made a script to read/parse it as
> /sys/bus/pci/devices/0001\:03\:00.0/vpd shows it wrong):

The PCI spec is what essentially assumes that there is only one block.
If I am not mistaken in the case of this device the second block here
actually contains device configuration data, not actual VPD data.  The
issue here is that the second block is being accessed as VPD when it
isn't.

> #0000 Large item 42 bytes; name 0x2 Identifier String
> #002d Large item 74 bytes; name 0x10
> #007a Small item 1 bytes; name 0xf End Tag
> ---
> #0c00 Large item 16 bytes; name 0x2 Identifier String
> #0c13 Large item 234 bytes; name 0x10
> #0d00 Large item 252 bytes; name 0x11
> #0dff Small item 0 bytes; name 0xf End Tag

The second block here is driver proprietary setup bits.

> The cxgb3 driver is reading the second bit starting from 0xc00 but since
> the size is wrongly detected as 0x7c, VFIO blocks access beyond it and the
> guest driver fails to probe.
>
> I also cannot find a clause in the PCI 3.0 spec saying that there must be
> just a single block, is it there?

The problem is we need to be able to parse it.  The spec defines a
series of tags that can be used starting at offset 0.  That is how we
are supposed to get around through the VPD data.  The problem is we
can't have more than one end tag and what appears to be happening here
is that we are defining a second block of data which uses the same
formatting as VPD but is not VPD.

> What would the correct fix be? Scanning all 32k of VPD is not an option I
> suppose as this is what this patch is trying to avoid. Thanks.

I adding the current cxgb3 maintainer and netdev list to the Cc.  This
is something that can probably be addressed via a PCI quirk as what
needs to happen is that we need to extend the VPD in the case of this
part in order to include this second block.  As long as we can read
the VPD data all the way out to 0xdff odds are we could probably just
have the size arbitrarily increased to 0xe00 via the quirk and then
you would be able to access all of the VPD for the device.  We already
have code making other modifications to drivers/pci/quirks.c for
several Broadcom devices and probably just need something similar to
allow extended access in the case of these devices.

>
>
>
> This is the device:
>
> [aik@p81-p9 ~]$ sudo lspci -vvnns 0001:03:00.0
> 0001:03:00.0 Ethernet controller [0200]: Chelsio Communications Inc T310
> 10GbE Single Port Adapter [1425:0030]
>         Subsystem: IBM Device [1014:038c]
>         Control: I/O- Mem+ BusMaster+ SpecCycle- MemWINV- VGASnoop- ParErr-
> Stepping- SERR- FastB2B- DisINTx+
>         Status: Cap+ 66MHz- UDF- FastB2B- ParErr- DEVSEL=fast >TAbort- <TAbort-
> <MAbort- >SERR- <PERR- INTx-
>         Latency: 0
>         Interrupt: pin A routed to IRQ 494
>         Region 0: Memory at 3fe080880000 (64-bit, non-prefetchable) [size=4K]
>         Region 2: Memory at 3fe080000000 (64-bit, non-prefetchable) [size=8M]
>         Region 4: Memory at 3fe080881000 (64-bit, non-prefetchable) [size=4K]
>         [virtual] Expansion ROM at 3fe080800000 [disabled] [size=512K]
>         Capabilities: [40] Power Management version 3
>                 Flags: PMEClk- DSI- D1- D2- AuxCurrent=0mA PME(D0+,D1-,D2-,D3hot+,D3cold-)
>                 Status: D0 NoSoftRst- PME-Enable- DSel=0 DScale=0 PME-
>         Capabilities: [48] MSI: Enable- Count=1/32 Maskable- 64bit+
>                 Address: 0000000000000000  Data: 0000
>         Capabilities: [58] Express (v2) Endpoint, MSI 00
>                 DevCap: MaxPayload 4096 bytes, PhantFunc 0, Latency L0s <64ns, L1 <1us
>                         ExtTag+ AttnBtn- AttnInd- PwrInd- RBE+ FLReset-
>                 DevCtl: Report errors: Correctable- Non-Fatal+ Fatal+ Unsupported+
>                         RlxdOrd+ ExtTag- PhantFunc- AuxPwr- NoSnoop+
>                         MaxPayload 256 bytes, MaxReadReq 512 bytes
>                 DevSta: CorrErr- UncorrErr- FatalErr- UnsuppReq- AuxPwr- TransPend-
>                 LnkCap: Port #0, Speed 2.5GT/s, Width x8, ASPM L0s L1, Exit Latency L0s
> unlimited, L1 unlimited
>                         ClockPM- Surprise- LLActRep- BwNot- ASPMOptComp-
>                 LnkCtl: ASPM Disabled; RCB 64 bytes Disabled- CommClk-
>                         ExtSynch- ClockPM- AutWidDis- BWInt- AutBWInt-
>                 LnkSta: Speed 2.5GT/s, Width x8, TrErr- Train- SlotClk+ DLActive- BWMgmt-
> ABWMgmt-
>                 DevCap2: Completion Timeout: Range ABC, TimeoutDis-, LTR-, OBFF Not Supported
>                 DevCtl2: Completion Timeout: 50us to 50ms, TimeoutDis-, LTR-, OBFF Disabled
>                 LnkCtl2: Target Link Speed: 2.5GT/s, EnterCompliance- SpeedDis-
>                          Transmit Margin: Normal Operating Range, EnterModifiedCompliance-
> ComplianceSOS-
>                          Compliance De-emphasis: -6dB
>                 LnkSta2: Current De-emphasis Level: -6dB, EqualizationComplete-,
> EqualizationPhase1-
>                          EqualizationPhase2-, EqualizationPhase3-, LinkEqualizationRequest-
>         Capabilities: [94] Vital Product Data
>                 Product Name: 10 Gigabit Ethernet-SR PCI Express Adapter
>                 Read-only fields:
>                         [EC] Engineering changes: D76809
>                         [FN] Unknown: 34 36 4b 37 38 39 37
>                         [PN] Part number: 46K7897
>                         [MN] Manufacture ID: 31 30 33 37
>                         [FC] Unknown: 35 37 36 39
>                         [SN] Serial number: YL102035603V
>                         [NA] Unknown: 30 30 31 34 35 45 39 39 32 45 44 31
>                 End
>         Capabilities: [9c] MSI-X: Enable+ Count=32 Masked-
>                 Vector table: BAR=4 offset=00000000
>                 PBA: BAR=4 offset=00000800
>         Capabilities: [100 v1] Device Serial Number 00-00-00-01-00-00-00-01
>         Capabilities: [300 v1] Advanced Error Reporting
>                 UESta:  DLP- SDES- TLP- FCP- CmpltTO- CmpltAbrt- UnxCmplt- RxOF- MalfTLP-
> ECRC- UnsupReq- ACSViol-
>                 UEMsk:  DLP- SDES- TLP- FCP- CmpltTO- CmpltAbrt- UnxCmplt- RxOF- MalfTLP-
> ECRC- UnsupReq- ACSViol-
>                 UESvrt: DLP+ SDES+ TLP- FCP+ CmpltTO- CmpltAbrt- UnxCmplt- RxOF+ MalfTLP+
> ECRC- UnsupReq- ACSViol-
>                 CESta:  RxErr- BadTLP- BadDLLP- Rollover- Timeout- NonFatalErr-
>                 CEMsk:  RxErr- BadTLP- BadDLLP- Rollover- Timeout- NonFatalErr+
>                 AERCap: First Error Pointer: 00, GenCap+ CGenEn- ChkCap+ ChkEn-
>         Kernel driver in use: cxgb3
>         Kernel modules: cxgb3
>
>

Re: [PATCHv2 3/4] pci: Determine actual VPD size on first access

[Benjamin Herrenschmidt]

On Tue, 2016-08-09 at 11:12 -0700, Alexander Duyck wrote:
> 
> The PCI spec is what essentially assumes that there is only one block.
> If I am not mistaken in the case of this device the second block here
> actually contains device configuration data, not actual VPD data.  The
> issue here is that the second block is being accessed as VPD when it
> isn't.

Devices do funny things with config space, film at 11. VFIO trying to
be the middle man and intercept/interpret things is broken, cannot work,
will never work, will just results in lots and lots of useless code, but
I've been singing that song for too long and nobody seems to care...

> > > #0000 Large item 42 bytes; name 0x2 Identifier String
> > #002d Large item 74 bytes; name 0x10
> > #007a Small item 1 bytes; name 0xf End Tag
> > ---
> > #0c00 Large item 16 bytes; name 0x2 Identifier String
> > #0c13 Large item 234 bytes; name 0x10
> > #0d00 Large item 252 bytes; name 0x11
> > #0dff Small item 0 bytes; name 0xf End Tag
> 
> The second block here is driver proprietary setup bits.

Right. They happen to be in VPD on this device. They an be elsewhere on
other devices. In between capabilities on some, in vendor caps on others...

> > > The cxgb3 driver is reading the second bit starting from 0xc00 but since
> > the size is wrongly detected as 0x7c, VFIO blocks access beyond it and the
> > guest driver fails to probe.
> >
> > I also cannot find a clause in the PCI 3.0 spec saying that there must be
> > just a single block, is it there?
> 
> > The problem is we need to be able to parse it.

We can parse the standard part for generic stuff like inventory tools
or lsvpd, but we shouldn't get in the way of the driver poking at its
device.

>   The spec defines a
> series of tags that can be used starting at offset 0.  That is how we
> are supposed to get around through the VPD data.  The problem is we
> can't have more than one end tag and what appears to be happening here
> is that we are defining a second block of data which uses the same
> formatting as VPD but is not VPD.
> 
> > What would the correct fix be? Scanning all 32k of VPD is not an option I
> > suppose as this is what this patch is trying to avoid. Thanks.
> 
> I adding the current cxgb3 maintainer and netdev list to the Cc.  This
> is something that can probably be addressed via a PCI quirk as what
> needs to happen is that we need to extend the VPD in the case of this
> part in order to include this second block.  As long as we can read
> the VPD data all the way out to 0xdff odds are we could probably just
> have the size arbitrarily increased to 0xe00 via the quirk and then
> you would be able to access all of the VPD for the device.  We already
> have code making other modifications to drivers/pci/quirks.c for
> several Broadcom devices and probably just need something similar to
> allow extended access in the case of these devices.


> > >
> >
> >
> > This is the device:
> >
> > > [aik@p81-p9 ~]$ sudo lspci -vvnns 0001:03:00.0
> > 0001:03:00.0 Ethernet controller [0200]: Chelsio Communications Inc T310
> > 10GbE Single Port Adapter [1425:0030]
> >         Subsystem: IBM Device [1014:038c]
> >         Control: I/O- Mem+ BusMaster+ SpecCycle- MemWINV- VGASnoop- ParErr-
> > Stepping- SERR- FastB2B- DisINTx+
> >         Status: Cap+ 66MHz- UDF- FastB2B- ParErr- DEVSEL=fast >TAbort- <TAbort-
> > <MAbort- >SERR- <PERR- INTx-
> >         Latency: 0
> >         Interrupt: pin A routed to IRQ 494
> >         Region 0: Memory at 3fe080880000 (64-bit, non-prefetchable) [size=4K]
> >         Region 2: Memory at 3fe080000000 (64-bit, non-prefetchable) [size=8M]
> >         Region 4: Memory at 3fe080881000 (64-bit, non-prefetchable) [size=4K]
> >         [virtual] Expansion ROM at 3fe080800000 [disabled] [size=512K]
> >         Capabilities: [40] Power Management version 3
> >                 Flags: PMEClk- DSI- D1- D2- AuxCurrent=0mA PME(D0+,D1-,D2-,D3hot+,D3cold-)
> >                 Status: D0 NoSoftRst- PME-Enable- DSel=0 DScale=0 PME-
> >         Capabilities: [48] MSI: Enable- Count=1/32 Maskable- 64bit+
> >                 Address: 0000000000000000  Data: 0000
> >         Capabilities: [58] Express (v2) Endpoint, MSI 00
> >                 DevCap: MaxPayload 4096 bytes, PhantFunc 0, Latency L0s <64ns, L1 <1us
> >                         ExtTag+ AttnBtn- AttnInd- PwrInd- RBE+ FLReset-
> >                 DevCtl: Report errors: Correctable- Non-Fatal+ Fatal+ Unsupported+
> >                         RlxdOrd+ ExtTag- PhantFunc- AuxPwr- NoSnoop+
> >                         MaxPayload 256 bytes, MaxReadReq 512 bytes
> >                 DevSta: CorrErr- UncorrErr- FatalErr- UnsuppReq- AuxPwr- TransPend-
> >                 LnkCap: Port #0, Speed 2.5GT/s, Width x8, ASPM L0s L1, Exit Latency L0s
> > unlimited, L1 unlimited
> >                         ClockPM- Surprise- LLActRep- BwNot- ASPMOptComp-
> >                 LnkCtl: ASPM Disabled; RCB 64 bytes Disabled- CommClk-
> >                         ExtSynch- ClockPM- AutWidDis- BWInt- AutBWInt-
> >                 LnkSta: Speed 2.5GT/s, Width x8, TrErr- Train- SlotClk+ DLActive- BWMgmt-
> > ABWMgmt-
> >                 DevCap2: Completion Timeout: Range ABC, TimeoutDis-, LTR-, OBFF Not Supported
> >                 DevCtl2: Completion Timeout: 50us to 50ms, TimeoutDis-, LTR-, OBFF Disabled
> >                 LnkCtl2: Target Link Speed: 2.5GT/s, EnterCompliance- SpeedDis-
> >                          Transmit Margin: Normal Operating Range, EnterModifiedCompliance-
> > ComplianceSOS-
> >                          Compliance De-emphasis: -6dB
> >                 LnkSta2: Current De-emphasis Level: -6dB, EqualizationComplete-,
> > EqualizationPhase1-
> >                          EqualizationPhase2-, EqualizationPhase3-, LinkEqualizationRequest-
> >         Capabilities: [94] Vital Product Data
> >                 Product Name: 10 Gigabit Ethernet-SR PCI Express Adapter
> >                 Read-only fields:
> >                         [EC] Engineering changes: D76809
> >                         [FN] Unknown: 34 36 4b 37 38 39 37
> >                         [PN] Part number: 46K7897
> >                         [MN] Manufacture ID: 31 30 33 37
> >                         [FC] Unknown: 35 37 36 39
> >                         [SN] Serial number: YL102035603V
> >                         [NA] Unknown: 30 30 31 34 35 45 39 39 32 45 44 31
> >                 End
> >         Capabilities: [9c] MSI-X: Enable+ Count=32 Masked-
> >                 Vector table: BAR=4 offset=00000000
> >                 PBA: BAR=4 offset=00000800
> >         Capabilities: [100 v1] Device Serial Number 00-00-00-01-00-00-00-01
> >         Capabilities: [300 v1] Advanced Error Reporting
> >                 UESta:  DLP- SDES- TLP- FCP- CmpltTO- CmpltAbrt- UnxCmplt- RxOF- MalfTLP-
> > ECRC- UnsupReq- ACSViol-
> >                 UEMsk:  DLP- SDES- TLP- FCP- CmpltTO- CmpltAbrt- UnxCmplt- RxOF- MalfTLP-
> > ECRC- UnsupReq- ACSViol-
> >                 UESvrt: DLP+ SDES+ TLP- FCP+ CmpltTO- CmpltAbrt- UnxCmplt- RxOF+ MalfTLP+
> > ECRC- UnsupReq- ACSViol-
> >                 CESta:  RxErr- BadTLP- BadDLLP- Rollover- Timeout- NonFatalErr-
> >                 CEMsk:  RxErr- BadTLP- BadDLLP- Rollover- Timeout- NonFatalErr+
> >                 AERCap: First Error Pointer: 00, GenCap+ CGenEn- ChkCap+ ChkEn-
> >         Kernel driver in use: cxgb3
> >         Kernel modules: cxgb3
> >
> >

Re: [PATCHv2 3/4] pci: Determine actual VPD size on first access

[Hannes Reinecke]

On 08/09/2016 08:12 PM, Alexander Duyck wrote:
> On Tue, Aug 9, 2016 at 5:54 AM, Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@ozlabs.ru> wrote:
>> On 10/02/16 08:04, Bjorn Helgaas wrote:
>>> On Wed, Jan 13, 2016 at 12:25:34PM +0100, Hannes Reinecke wrote:
>>>> PCI-2.2 VPD entries have a maximum size of 32k, but might actually
>>>> be smaller than that. To figure out the actual size one has to read
>>>> the VPD area until the 'end marker' is reached.
>>>> Trying to read VPD data beyond that marker results in 'interesting'
>>>> effects, from simple read errors to crashing the card. And to make
>>>> matters worse not every PCI card implements this properly, leaving
>>>> us with no 'end' marker or even completely invalid data.
>>>> This path tries to determine the size of the VPD data.
>>>> If no valid data can be read an I/O error will be returned when
>>>> reading the sysfs attribute.
>>
>>
>> I have a problem with this particular feature as today VFIO uses this
>> pci_vpd_xxxx API to virtualize access to VPD and the existing code assumes
>> there is just one VPD block with 0x2 start and 0xf end. However I have at
>> least one device where this is not true - "10 Gigabit Ethernet-SR PCI
>> Express Adapter" - it has 2 blocks (made a script to read/parse it as
>> /sys/bus/pci/devices/0001\:03\:00.0/vpd shows it wrong):
> 
> The PCI spec is what essentially assumes that there is only one block.
> If I am not mistaken in the case of this device the second block here
> actually contains device configuration data, not actual VPD data.  The
> issue here is that the second block is being accessed as VPD when it
> isn't.
> 
>> #0000 Large item 42 bytes; name 0x2 Identifier String
>> #002d Large item 74 bytes; name 0x10
>> #007a Small item 1 bytes; name 0xf End Tag
>> ---
>> #0c00 Large item 16 bytes; name 0x2 Identifier String
>> #0c13 Large item 234 bytes; name 0x10
>> #0d00 Large item 252 bytes; name 0x11
>> #0dff Small item 0 bytes; name 0xf End Tag
> 
> The second block here is driver proprietary setup bits.
> 
>> The cxgb3 driver is reading the second bit starting from 0xc00 but since
>> the size is wrongly detected as 0x7c, VFIO blocks access beyond it and the
>> guest driver fails to probe.
>>
>> I also cannot find a clause in the PCI 3.0 spec saying that there must be
>> just a single block, is it there?
> 
> The problem is we need to be able to parse it.  The spec defines a
> series of tags that can be used starting at offset 0.  That is how we
> are supposed to get around through the VPD data.  The problem is we
> can't have more than one end tag and what appears to be happening here
> is that we are defining a second block of data which uses the same
> formatting as VPD but is not VPD.
> 
>> What would the correct fix be? Scanning all 32k of VPD is not an option I
>> suppose as this is what this patch is trying to avoid. Thanks.
> 
> I adding the current cxgb3 maintainer and netdev list to the Cc.  This
> is something that can probably be addressed via a PCI quirk as what
> needs to happen is that we need to extend the VPD in the case of this
> part in order to include this second block.  As long as we can read
> the VPD data all the way out to 0xdff odds are we could probably just
> have the size arbitrarily increased to 0xe00 via the quirk and then
> you would be able to access all of the VPD for the device.  We already
> have code making other modifications to drivers/pci/quirks.c for
> several Broadcom devices and probably just need something similar to
> allow extended access in the case of these devices.
> 
Yes, that's what I think, too.
The Broadcom quirk should work here, too.
(Didn't we do that already?)

Cheers,

Hannes
-- 
Dr. Hannes Reinecke		   Teamlead Storage & Networking
hare@suse.de			               +49 911 74053 688
SUSE LINUX GmbH, Maxfeldstr. 5, 90409 Nürnberg
GF: F. Imendörffer, J. Smithard, J. Guild, D. Upmanyu, G. Norton
HRB 21284 (AG Nürnberg)

Re: [PATCHv2 3/4] pci: Determine actual VPD size on first access

[Alexander Duyck]

On Tue, Aug 9, 2016 at 5:03 PM, Benjamin Herrenschmidt
<benh@kernel.crashing.org> wrote:
> On Tue, 2016-08-09 at 11:12 -0700, Alexander Duyck wrote:
>>
>> The PCI spec is what essentially assumes that there is only one block.
>> If I am not mistaken in the case of this device the second block here
>> actually contains device configuration data, not actual VPD data.  The
>> issue here is that the second block is being accessed as VPD when it
>> isn't.
>
> Devices do funny things with config space, film at 11. VFIO trying to
> be the middle man and intercept/interpret things is broken, cannot work,
> will never work, will just results in lots and lots of useless code, but
> I've been singing that song for too long and nobody seems to care...
>
>> > > #0000 Large item 42 bytes; name 0x2 Identifier String
>> > #002d Large item 74 bytes; name 0x10
>> > #007a Small item 1 bytes; name 0xf End Tag
>> > ---
>> > #0c00 Large item 16 bytes; name 0x2 Identifier String
>> > #0c13 Large item 234 bytes; name 0x10
>> > #0d00 Large item 252 bytes; name 0x11
>> > #0dff Small item 0 bytes; name 0xf End Tag
>>
>> The second block here is driver proprietary setup bits.
>
> Right. They happen to be in VPD on this device. They an be elsewhere on
> other devices. In between capabilities on some, in vendor caps on others...
>
>> > > The cxgb3 driver is reading the second bit starting from 0xc00 but since
>> > the size is wrongly detected as 0x7c, VFIO blocks access beyond it and the
>> > guest driver fails to probe.
>> >
>> > I also cannot find a clause in the PCI 3.0 spec saying that there must be
>> > just a single block, is it there?
>>
>> > The problem is we need to be able to parse it.
>
> We can parse the standard part for generic stuff like inventory tools
> or lsvpd, but we shouldn't get in the way of the driver poking at its
> device.

If we add the quirk to the kernel that reports the VPD for this device
is the actual size of both blocks then we wouldn't be blocking the VPD
access like we currently are.

The problem is if we don't do this it becomes possible for a guest to
essentially cripple a device on the host by just accessing VPD regions
that aren't actually viable on many devices.  We are much better off
in terms of security and stability if we restrict access to what
should be accessible.  In this case what has happened is that the
vendor threw in an extra out-of-spec block and just expected it to
work.  In order to work around it we just need to add a small function
to drivers/pci/quirks.c that would update the VPD size reported so
that it matches what the hardware is actually providing instead of
what we can determine based on the VPD layout.

Really working around something like this is not much different than
what we would have to do if the vendor had stuffed the data in some
reserved section of their PCI configuration space.  We end up needing
to add special quirks any time a vendor goes out-of-spec for some
one-off configuration interface that only they are ever going to use.

- Alex

Re: [PATCHv2 3/4] pci: Determine actual VPD size on first access

[Benjamin Herrenschmidt]

On Wed, 2016-08-10 at 08:47 -0700, Alexander Duyck wrote:
> 
> The problem is if we don't do this it becomes possible for a guest to
> essentially cripple a device on the host by just accessing VPD
> regions that aren't actually viable on many devices. 

And ? We already can cripple the device in so many different ways
simpy because we have pretty much full BAR access to it...

>  We are much better off
> in terms of security and stability if we restrict access to what
> should be accessible. 

Bollox. I've heard that argument over and over again, it never stood
and still doesn't.

We have full BAR access for god sake. We can already destroy the device
in many cases (think: reflashing microcode, internal debug bus access
with a route to the config space, voltage/freq control ....).

We aren't protecting anything more here, we are just adding layers of
bloat, complication and bugs.

>  In this case what has happened is that the
> vendor threw in an extra out-of-spec block and just expected it to
> work.

Like vendors do all the time in all sort of places

I still completely fail to see the point in acting as a filtering
middle man.

> In order to work around it we just need to add a small function
> to drivers/pci/quirks.c that would update the VPD size reported so
> that it matches what the hardware is actually providing instead of
> what we can determine based on the VPD layout.
> 
> Really working around something like this is not much different than
> what we would have to do if the vendor had stuffed the data in some
> reserved section of their PCI configuration space.

It is, in both cases we shouldn't have VFIO or the host involved. We
should just let the guest config space accesses go through.

>   We end up needing
> to add special quirks any time a vendor goes out-of-spec for some
> one-off configuration interface that only they are ever going to use.

Cheers,
Ben.

[RFC PATCH kernel] PCI: Enable access to custom VPD for Chelsio devices (cxgb3)

[Alexey Kardashevskiy]

There is at least one Chelsio 10Gb card which uses VPD area to store
some custom blocks (example below). However pci_vpd_size() returns
the length of the first block only assuming that there can be only
one VPD "End Tag" and VFIO blocks access beyond that offset
(since 4e1a63555) which leads to the situation when the guest "cxgb3"
driver fails to probe the device. The host system does not have this
problem as the drives accesses the config space directly without
pci_read_vpd()/...

This adds a quirk to override the VPD size to a bigger value.

This is the controller:
Ethernet controller [0200]: Chelsio Communications Inc T310 10GbE Single Port Adapter [1425:0030]

This is its VPD:
#0000 Large item 42 bytes; name 0x2 Identifier String
	b'10 Gigabit Ethernet-SR PCI Express Adapter'
#002d Large item 74 bytes; name 0x10
	#00 [EC] len=7: b'D76809 '
	#0a [FN] len=7: b'46K7897'
	#14 [PN] len=7: b'46K7897'
	#1e [MN] len=4: b'1037'
	#25 [FC] len=4: b'5769'
	#2c [SN] len=12: b'YL102035603V'
	#3b [NA] len=12: b'00145E992ED1'
#007a Small item 1 bytes; name 0xf End Tag
---
#0c00 Large item 16 bytes; name 0x2 Identifier String
	b'S310E-SR-X      '
#0c13 Large item 234 bytes; name 0x10
	#00 [PN] len=16: b'TBD             '
	#13 [EC] len=16: b'110107730D2     '
	#26 [SN] len=16: b'97YL102035603V  '
	#39 [NA] len=12: b'00145E992ED1'
	#48 [V0] len=6: b'175000'
	#51 [V1] len=6: b'266666'
	#5a [V2] len=6: b'266666'
	#63 [V3] len=6: b'2000  '
	#6c [V4] len=2: b'1 '
	#71 [V5] len=6: b'c2    '
	#7a [V6] len=6: b'0     '
	#83 [V7] len=2: b'1 '
	#88 [V8] len=2: b'0 '
	#8d [V9] len=2: b'0 '
	#92 [VA] len=2: b'0 '
	#97 [RV] len=80: b's\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00'...
#0d00 Large item 252 bytes; name 0x11
	#00 [VC] len=16: b'122310_1222 dp  '
	#13 [VD] len=16: b'610-0001-00 H1\x00\x00'
	#26 [VE] len=16: b'122310_1353 fp  '
	#39 [VF] len=16: b'610-0001-00 H1\x00\x00'
	#4c [RW] len=173: b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00'...
#0dff Small item 0 bytes; name 0xf End Tag

Signed-off-by: Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@ozlabs.ru>
---
 drivers/pci/quirks.c | 12 ++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)

diff --git a/drivers/pci/quirks.c b/drivers/pci/quirks.c
index ee72ebe1..94d3fb5 100644
--- a/drivers/pci/quirks.c
+++ b/drivers/pci/quirks.c
@@ -3241,6 +3241,18 @@ DECLARE_PCI_FIXUP_FINAL(PCI_VENDOR_ID_INTEL, PCI_DEVICE_ID_INTEL_CACTUS_RIDGE_4C
 DECLARE_PCI_FIXUP_FINAL(PCI_VENDOR_ID_INTEL, PCI_DEVICE_ID_INTEL_PORT_RIDGE,
 			quirk_thunderbolt_hotplug_msi);
 
+static void quirk_chelsio_extend_vpd(struct pci_dev *dev)
+{
+	if (!dev->vpd || !dev->vpd->ops || !dev->vpd->ops->set_size)
+		return;
+
+	dev->vpd->ops->set_size(dev, max_t(unsigned int, dev->vpd->len, 0xe00));
+}
+
+DECLARE_PCI_FIXUP_FINAL(PCI_VENDOR_ID_CHELSIO,
+			PCI_ANY_ID,
+			quirk_chelsio_extend_vpd);
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_ACPI
 /*
  * Apple: Shutdown Cactus Ridge Thunderbolt controller.
-- 
2.5.0.rc3

Re: [PATCHv2 3/4] pci: Determine actual VPD size on first access

[Alexander Duyck]

On Wed, Aug 10, 2016 at 4:54 PM, Benjamin Herrenschmidt
<benh@kernel.crashing.org> wrote:
> On Wed, 2016-08-10 at 08:47 -0700, Alexander Duyck wrote:
>>
>> The problem is if we don't do this it becomes possible for a guest to
>> essentially cripple a device on the host by just accessing VPD
>> regions that aren't actually viable on many devices.
>
> And ? We already can cripple the device in so many different ways
> simpy because we have pretty much full BAR access to it...
>
>>  We are much better off
>> in terms of security and stability if we restrict access to what
>> should be accessible.
>
> Bollox. I've heard that argument over and over again, it never stood
> and still doesn't.
>
> We have full BAR access for god sake. We can already destroy the device
> in many cases (think: reflashing microcode, internal debug bus access
> with a route to the config space, voltage/freq control ....).
>
> We aren't protecting anything more here, we are just adding layers of
> bloat, complication and bugs.

To some extent I can agree with you.  I don't know if we should be
restricting the VFIO based interface the same way we restrict systemd
from accessing this region.  In the case of VFIO maybe we need to look
at a different approach for accessing this.  Perhaps we need a
privileged version of the VPD accessors that could be used by things
like VFIO and the cxgb3 driver since they are assumed to be a bit
smarter than those interfaces that were just trying to slurp up
something like 4K of VPD data.

>>  In this case what has happened is that the
>> vendor threw in an extra out-of-spec block and just expected it to
>> work.
>
> Like vendors do all the time in all sort of places
>
> I still completely fail to see the point in acting as a filtering
> middle man.

The problem is we are having to do some filtering because things like
systemd were using dumb accessors that were trying to suck down 4K of
VPD data instead of trying to parse through and read it a field at a
time.

>> In order to work around it we just need to add a small function
>> to drivers/pci/quirks.c that would update the VPD size reported so
>> that it matches what the hardware is actually providing instead of
>> what we can determine based on the VPD layout.
>>
>> Really working around something like this is not much different than
>> what we would have to do if the vendor had stuffed the data in some
>> reserved section of their PCI configuration space.
>
> It is, in both cases we shouldn't have VFIO or the host involved. We
> should just let the guest config space accesses go through.
>
>>   We end up needing
>> to add special quirks any time a vendor goes out-of-spec for some
>> one-off configuration interface that only they are ever going to use.
>
> Cheers,
> Ben.

If you have a suggestion on how to resolve this patches are always
welcome.  Otherwise I think the simpler approach to fixing this
without re-introducing the existing bugs is to just add the quirk.  I
will try to get to it sometime this weekend if nobody else does.  It
should be pretty straight foward, but I just don't have the time to
pull up a kernel and generate a patch right now.

- Alex

Re: [PATCHv2 3/4] pci: Determine actual VPD size on first access

[Alex Williamson]

On Thu, 11 Aug 2016 11:52:02 -0700
Alexander Duyck <alexander.duyck@gmail.com> wrote:

> On Wed, Aug 10, 2016 at 4:54 PM, Benjamin Herrenschmidt
> <benh@kernel.crashing.org> wrote:
> > On Wed, 2016-08-10 at 08:47 -0700, Alexander Duyck wrote:  
> >>
> >> The problem is if we don't do this it becomes possible for a guest to
> >> essentially cripple a device on the host by just accessing VPD
> >> regions that aren't actually viable on many devices.  
> >
> > And ? We already can cripple the device in so many different ways
> > simpy because we have pretty much full BAR access to it...
> >  
> >>  We are much better off
> >> in terms of security and stability if we restrict access to what
> >> should be accessible.  
> >
> > Bollox. I've heard that argument over and over again, it never stood
> > and still doesn't.
> >
> > We have full BAR access for god sake. We can already destroy the device
> > in many cases (think: reflashing microcode, internal debug bus access
> > with a route to the config space, voltage/freq control ....).
> >
> > We aren't protecting anything more here, we are just adding layers of
> > bloat, complication and bugs.  
> 
> To some extent I can agree with you.  I don't know if we should be
> restricting the VFIO based interface the same way we restrict systemd
> from accessing this region.  In the case of VFIO maybe we need to look
> at a different approach for accessing this.  Perhaps we need a
> privileged version of the VPD accessors that could be used by things
> like VFIO and the cxgb3 driver since they are assumed to be a bit
> smarter than those interfaces that were just trying to slurp up
> something like 4K of VPD data.
> 
> >>  In this case what has happened is that the
> >> vendor threw in an extra out-of-spec block and just expected it to
> >> work.  
> >
> > Like vendors do all the time in all sort of places
> >
> > I still completely fail to see the point in acting as a filtering
> > middle man.  
> 
> The problem is we are having to do some filtering because things like
> systemd were using dumb accessors that were trying to suck down 4K of
> VPD data instead of trying to parse through and read it a field at a
> time.

vfio isn't playing nanny here for the fun of it, part of the reason we
have vpd access functions is because folks have discovered that vpd
registers between PCI functions on multi-function devices may be
shared.  So pounding on vpd registers for function 1 may adversely
affect someone else reading from a different function.  This is a case
where I feel vfio needs to step in because if that's a user competing
with the host or two users stepping on each other, well that's exactly
what vfio tries to prevent.  A driver in userspace or a VM driver can't
very well determine these sorts of interactions when it only has
visibility to a subset of the functions and users and hardware folks
would throw a fit if I extended iommu groups to encompass all the
related devices rather than take the relatively simple step of
virtualizing these accesses and occasionally quirking devices that are
extra broken, as seems to be required here.  Thanks,

Alex

Re: [PATCHv2 3/4] pci: Determine actual VPD size on first access

[Benjamin Herrenschmidt]

On Thu, 2016-08-11 at 14:17 -0600, Alex Williamson wrote:
> 
> vfio isn't playing nanny here for the fun of it, part of the reason we
> have vpd access functions is because folks have discovered that vpd
> registers between PCI functions on multi-function devices may be
> shared.  So pounding on vpd registers for function 1 may adversely
> > affect someone else reading from a different function.

A lot more than that may be shared... the bus for example. lots of
devices have backdoors into their own BARs, one partition can make its
BARs overlap the neighbour function, ... dang !

In the end, PCI assignment at a granularity smaller than a bus cannot
be done in a fully air tight way and shouldn't be relied upon in
environemnt where the isolation between partitions matters.

The only exception here is SR-IOV of course since it's designed
specifically so that the VFs can't be messed with.

>   This is a case
> where I feel vfio needs to step in because if that's a user competing
> with the host or two users stepping on each other, well that's exactly
> what vfio tries to prevent.  A driver in userspace or a VM driver can't
> very well determine these sorts of interactions when it only has
> visibility to a subset of the functions and users and hardware folks
> would throw a fit if I extended iommu groups to encompass all the
> related devices rather than take the relatively simple step of
> virtualizing these accesses and occasionally quirking devices that are
> extra broken, as seems to be required here.  Thanks,

We may want some kind of "strict" vs. "relaxed" model here to
differenciate the desktop user wanting to give a function to his/her
windows partition and doesn't care about strict isolation vs. the cloud
data center.

Cheers,
Ben.

Re: [PATCHv2 3/4] pci: Determine actual VPD size on first access

[Rustad, Mark D]

[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 498 bytes --]

Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> wrote:

> We may want some kind of "strict" vs. "relaxed" model here to
> differenciate the desktop user wanting to give a function to his/her
> windows partition and doesn't care about strict isolation vs. the cloud
> data center.

I don't think desktop users appreciate hangs any more than anyone else, and  
that is one of the symptoms that can arise here without the vfio  
coordination.

--
Mark Rustad, Networking Division, Intel Corporation

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[-- Type: application/pgp-signature, Size: 841 bytes --]

Re: [PATCHv2 3/4] pci: Determine actual VPD size on first access

[Benjamin Herrenschmidt]

On Mon, 2016-08-15 at 17:59 +0000, Rustad, Mark D wrote:
> > Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> wrote:
> 
> > 
> > We may want some kind of "strict" vs. "relaxed" model here to
> > differenciate the desktop user wanting to give a function to his/her
> > windows partition and doesn't care about strict isolation vs. the cloud
> > data center.
> 
> I don't think desktop users appreciate hangs any more than anyone else, and  
> that is one of the symptoms that can arise here without the vfio  
> coordination.

And can happen with it as well.... 

Put it this way, we have a hole the size of a football field and we are
spending all that time "plugging" it by putting a 3 foot gate in the
middle of it... ugh.

VFIO shouldn't try to get between the device driver and the HW, it doesn't
work. It cannot work.

Cheers,
Ben.

Re: [PATCHv2 3/4] pci: Determine actual VPD size on first access

[Benjamin Herrenschmidt]

On Tue, 2016-08-16 at 08:23 +1000, Benjamin Herrenschmidt wrote:
> > I don't think desktop users appreciate hangs any more than anyone else, and  
> > that is one of the symptoms that can arise here without the vfio  
> > coordination.
> 
> And can happen with it as well.... 

Oh and your response was completely besides the point I was trying
to make, just some passive aggressive noise, thank you.

The point was that if you want the sort of safety that we are trying
to aim for, without additional HW support, you basically have to do
the isolation on a granularity no smaller than a bridge/bus (with the
notable exception of SR-IOV of course).

Otherwise guest *will* be able to harm each other (or the host) in
all sorts of ways if anything because devices will have MMIO backdoors
into their own BAR space, or can be made to DMA to a neighbour, etc...

This is the only safe thing to do (and we are enforcing that on POWER
with our IOMMU groups).

Now that being said, if you want to keep the ability to assign 2 functions
of a device to different guests for your average non-critical desktop user,
that's where you may want to consider two models.

Generally speaking, filtering things for "safety" won't work.

Filtering things to work around bugs in existing guests to avoid crashes
is a different kettle of fish and could be justified but keep in mind that
in most cases a malicious guest will be able to exploit those HW flaws.

Assuming that a device coming back from a guest is functional and not
completely broken and can be re-used without a full PERST or power cycle
is a wrong assumption. It may or may not work, no amount of "filtering"
will fix the fundamental issue. If your HW won't give you access to PERST
well ... blame Intel for not specifying a standard way to generate it in
the first place :-)

Cheers,
Ben.

Re: [PATCHv2 3/4] pci: Determine actual VPD size on first access

[Rustad, Mark D]

[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 2688 bytes --]

Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> wrote:

> Filtering things to work around bugs in existing guests to avoid crashes
> is a different kettle of fish and could be justified but keep in mind that
> in most cases a malicious guest will be able to exploit those HW flaws.

Bugs in existing guests is an interesting case, but I have been focused on  
getting acceptable behavior from a properly functioning guest, in the face  
of hardware issues that can only be resolved in a single place.

I agree that a malicious guest can cause all kinds of havoc with  
directly-assigned devices. Consider a 4-port PHY chip on a shared MDIO bus,  
for instance. There is really nothing to be done about the potential for  
mischief with that kind of thing.

The VPD problem that I had been concerned about arises from a bad design in  
the PCI spec together with implementations that share the registers across  
functions. The hardware isn't going to change and I really doubt that the  
spec will either, so we address it the only place we can.

I am certain that we agree that not everything can or should be addressed  
in vfio. I did not mean to suggest it should try to address everything, but  
I think it should make it possible for correctly behaving guests to work. I  
think that is not unreasonable.

Perhaps the VPD range check should really just have been implemented for  
the sysfs interface, and left the vfio case unchecked. I don't know because  
I was not involved in that issue. Perhaps someone more intimately involved  
can comment on that notion.

> Assuming that a device coming back from a guest is functional and not
> completely broken and can be re-used without a full PERST or power cycle
> is a wrong assumption. It may or may not work, no amount of "filtering"
> will fix the fundamental issue. If your HW won't give you access to PERST
> well ... blame Intel for not specifying a standard way to generate it in
> the first place :-)

Yeah, I worry about the state that a malicious guest could leave a device  
in, but I consider direct assignment always risky anyway. I would just like  
it to at least work in the non-malicious guest cases.

I guess my previous response was really just too terse, I was just focused  
on unavoidable hangs and data corruption, which even were happening without  
any guest involvement. For me, guests were just an additional exposure of  
the same underlying issue.

With hindsight, it is easy to see that a standard reset would now be a  
pretty useful thing. I am sure that even if it existed, we would now have  
lots and lots of quirks around it as well! :-)

--
Mark Rustad, Networking Division, Intel Corporation

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Re: [PATCHv2 3/4] pci: Determine actual VPD size on first access

[Benjamin Herrenschmidt]

On Mon, 2016-08-15 at 23:16 +0000, Rustad, Mark D wrote:
> 
> Bugs in existing guests is an interesting case, but I have been focused on  
> getting acceptable behavior from a properly functioning guest, in the face  
> of hardware issues that can only be resolved in a single place.
> 
> I agree that a malicious guest can cause all kinds of havoc with  
> directly-assigned devices. Consider a 4-port PHY chip on a shared MDIO bus,  
> for instance. There is really nothing to be done about the potential for  
> mischief with that kind of thing.
> 
> The VPD problem that I had been concerned about arises from a bad design in  
> the PCI spec together with implementations that share the registers across  
> functions. The hardware isn't going to change and I really doubt that the  
> spec will either, so we address it the only place we can.

Right but as I mentioned, there are plenty of holes when it comes to
having multi function devices assigned to different guests, this is just
one of them.

Now, that being said, "working around" the bug to make the "non fully secure"
case work (in my example case the "desktop user") is probably an ok workaround
as long as we fully agree that this is all it is, it by no means provide
actual isolation or security.
 
> >   >   rtain that we agree that not everything can or should be addressed  
> in vfio. I did not mean to suggest it should try to address everything, but  
> I think it should make it possible for correctly behaving guests to work. I  
> think that is not unreasonable.

Again as long as there is no expectation of security here, such as a data
center giving PCI access to some devices.

> > Perhaps the VPD range check should really just have been implemented for  
> the sysfs interface, and left the vfio case unchecked. I don't know because  
> I was not involved in that issue. Perhaps someone more intimately involved  
> can comment on that notion.

That would have been my preferred approach... I think VFIO tries to do too much
which complicates things, causes other bugs, without briging actual safety. I
don't think it should stand in between a guest driver and its device unless
absolutely necessary to provide the functionality due to broken HW or design,
but with the full understanding that doing so remains unsafe from an isolation
standpoint.

> > > Assuming that a device coming back from a guest is functional and not
> > completely broken and can be re-used without a full PERST or power cycle
> > is a wrong assumption. It may or may not work, no amount of "filtering"
> > will fix the fundamental issue. If your HW won't give you access to PERST
> > well ... blame Intel for not specifying a standard way to generate it in
> > the first place :-)
> 
> Yeah, I worry about the state that a malicious guest could leave a device  
> in, but I consider direct assignment always risky anyway. I would just like  
> it to at least work in the non-malicious guest cases.

Right. Only SR-IOV which is somewhat designed for assignment is reasonably safe
in the general case.

On server POWER boxes, we have isolation at the bus level with usual per-slot
PERST control so we are in a much better situation but we also for all the
above reasons, only allow a slot granularity for pass-through.

> > I guess my previous response was really just too terse, I was just focused  
> on unavoidable hangs and data corruption, which even were happening without  
> any guest involvement. For me, guests were just an additional exposure of  
> the same underlying issue.
> 
> With hindsight, it is easy to see that a standard reset would now be a  
> pretty useful thing. I am sure that even if it existed, we would now have  
> lots and lots of quirks around it as well! :-)

Hehe yes, well, HW for you ...

Cheers,
Ben.

> > --
> Mark Rustad, Networking Division, Intel Corporation

Re: [PATCHv2 3/4] pci: Determine actual VPD size on first access

[Alexey Kardashevskiy]

On 12/08/16 04:52, Alexander Duyck wrote:
> On Wed, Aug 10, 2016 at 4:54 PM, Benjamin Herrenschmidt
> <benh@kernel.crashing.org> wrote:
>> On Wed, 2016-08-10 at 08:47 -0700, Alexander Duyck wrote:
>>>
>>> The problem is if we don't do this it becomes possible for a guest to
>>> essentially cripple a device on the host by just accessing VPD
>>> regions that aren't actually viable on many devices.
>>
>> And ? We already can cripple the device in so many different ways
>> simpy because we have pretty much full BAR access to it...
>>
>>>  We are much better off
>>> in terms of security and stability if we restrict access to what
>>> should be accessible.
>>
>> Bollox. I've heard that argument over and over again, it never stood
>> and still doesn't.
>>
>> We have full BAR access for god sake. We can already destroy the device
>> in many cases (think: reflashing microcode, internal debug bus access
>> with a route to the config space, voltage/freq control ....).
>>
>> We aren't protecting anything more here, we are just adding layers of
>> bloat, complication and bugs.
> 
> To some extent I can agree with you.  I don't know if we should be
> restricting the VFIO based interface the same way we restrict systemd
> from accessing this region.  In the case of VFIO maybe we need to look
> at a different approach for accessing this.  Perhaps we need a
> privileged version of the VPD accessors that could be used by things
> like VFIO and the cxgb3 driver since they are assumed to be a bit
> smarter than those interfaces that were just trying to slurp up
> something like 4K of VPD data.
> 
>>>  In this case what has happened is that the
>>> vendor threw in an extra out-of-spec block and just expected it to
>>> work.
>>
>> Like vendors do all the time in all sort of places
>>
>> I still completely fail to see the point in acting as a filtering
>> middle man.
> 
> The problem is we are having to do some filtering because things like
> systemd were using dumb accessors that were trying to suck down 4K of
> VPD data instead of trying to parse through and read it a field at a
> time.
> 
>>> In order to work around it we just need to add a small function
>>> to drivers/pci/quirks.c that would update the VPD size reported so
>>> that it matches what the hardware is actually providing instead of
>>> what we can determine based on the VPD layout.
>>>
>>> Really working around something like this is not much different than
>>> what we would have to do if the vendor had stuffed the data in some
>>> reserved section of their PCI configuration space.
>>
>> It is, in both cases we shouldn't have VFIO or the host involved. We
>> should just let the guest config space accesses go through.
>>
>>>   We end up needing
>>> to add special quirks any time a vendor goes out-of-spec for some
>>> one-off configuration interface that only they are ever going to use.
>>
>> Cheers,
>> Ben.
> 
> If you have a suggestion on how to resolve this patches are always
> welcome.  Otherwise I think the simpler approach to fixing this
> without re-introducing the existing bugs is to just add the quirk.  I
> will try to get to it sometime this weekend if nobody else does.  It
> should be pretty straight foward, but I just don't have the time to
> pull up a kernel and generate a patch right now.


How exactly is mine - https://lkml.org/lkml/2016/8/11/200 - bad (except
missing rb/ab from Chelsio folks)? Thanks.


-- 
Alexey

Re: [RFC PATCH kernel] PCI: Enable access to custom VPD for Chelsio devices (cxgb3)

[Bjorn Helgaas]

Hi Alexey,

On Thu, Aug 11, 2016 at 08:03:29PM +1000, Alexey Kardashevskiy wrote:
> There is at least one Chelsio 10Gb card which uses VPD area to store
> some custom blocks (example below). However pci_vpd_size() returns
> the length of the first block only assuming that there can be only
> one VPD "End Tag" and VFIO blocks access beyond that offset
> (since 4e1a63555) which leads to the situation when the guest "cxgb3"
> driver fails to probe the device. The host system does not have this
> problem as the drives accesses the config space directly without
> pci_read_vpd()/...
> 
> This adds a quirk to override the VPD size to a bigger value.
> 
> This is the controller:
> Ethernet controller [0200]: Chelsio Communications Inc T310 10GbE Single Port Adapter [1425:0030]
> 
> This is its VPD:
> #0000 Large item 42 bytes; name 0x2 Identifier String
> 	b'10 Gigabit Ethernet-SR PCI Express Adapter'
> #002d Large item 74 bytes; name 0x10
> 	#00 [EC] len=7: b'D76809 '
> 	#0a [FN] len=7: b'46K7897'
> 	#14 [PN] len=7: b'46K7897'
> 	#1e [MN] len=4: b'1037'
> 	#25 [FC] len=4: b'5769'
> 	#2c [SN] len=12: b'YL102035603V'
> 	#3b [NA] len=12: b'00145E992ED1'
> #007a Small item 1 bytes; name 0xf End Tag
> ---
> #0c00 Large item 16 bytes; name 0x2 Identifier String
> 	b'S310E-SR-X      '
> #0c13 Large item 234 bytes; name 0x10
> 	#00 [PN] len=16: b'TBD             '
> 	#13 [EC] len=16: b'110107730D2     '
> 	#26 [SN] len=16: b'97YL102035603V  '
> 	#39 [NA] len=12: b'00145E992ED1'
> 	#48 [V0] len=6: b'175000'
> 	#51 [V1] len=6: b'266666'
> 	#5a [V2] len=6: b'266666'
> 	#63 [V3] len=6: b'2000  '
> 	#6c [V4] len=2: b'1 '
> 	#71 [V5] len=6: b'c2    '
> 	#7a [V6] len=6: b'0     '
> 	#83 [V7] len=2: b'1 '
> 	#88 [V8] len=2: b'0 '
> 	#8d [V9] len=2: b'0 '
> 	#92 [VA] len=2: b'0 '
> 	#97 [RV] len=80: b's\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00'...
> #0d00 Large item 252 bytes; name 0x11
> 	#00 [VC] len=16: b'122310_1222 dp  '
> 	#13 [VD] len=16: b'610-0001-00 H1\x00\x00'
> 	#26 [VE] len=16: b'122310_1353 fp  '
> 	#39 [VF] len=16: b'610-0001-00 H1\x00\x00'
> 	#4c [RW] len=173: b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00'...
> #0dff Small item 0 bytes; name 0xf End Tag
> 
> Signed-off-by: Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@ozlabs.ru>
> ---
>  drivers/pci/quirks.c | 12 ++++++++++++
>  1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/drivers/pci/quirks.c b/drivers/pci/quirks.c
> index ee72ebe1..94d3fb5 100644
> --- a/drivers/pci/quirks.c
> +++ b/drivers/pci/quirks.c
> @@ -3241,6 +3241,18 @@ DECLARE_PCI_FIXUP_FINAL(PCI_VENDOR_ID_INTEL, PCI_DEVICE_ID_INTEL_CACTUS_RIDGE_4C
>  DECLARE_PCI_FIXUP_FINAL(PCI_VENDOR_ID_INTEL, PCI_DEVICE_ID_INTEL_PORT_RIDGE,
>  			quirk_thunderbolt_hotplug_msi);
>  
> +static void quirk_chelsio_extend_vpd(struct pci_dev *dev)
> +{
> +	if (!dev->vpd || !dev->vpd->ops || !dev->vpd->ops->set_size)
> +		return;
> +
> +	dev->vpd->ops->set_size(dev, max_t(unsigned int, dev->vpd->len, 0xe00));
> +}
> +
> +DECLARE_PCI_FIXUP_FINAL(PCI_VENDOR_ID_CHELSIO,
> +			PCI_ANY_ID,
> +			quirk_chelsio_extend_vpd);

Do you really want this for *all* Chelsio devices?  If you only need
it for certain devices, the quirk could probably go in the driver.

Can you use pci_set_vpd_size() instead?  There's already a use of that
in cxgb4.

> +
>  #ifdef CONFIG_ACPI
>  /*
>   * Apple: Shutdown Cactus Ridge Thunderbolt controller.
> -- 
> 2.5.0.rc3
> 
> --
> To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-pci" in
> the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org
> More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html

Re: [RFC PATCH kernel] PCI: Enable access to custom VPD for Chelsio devices (cxgb3)

[Alexander Duyck]

On Tue, Sep 6, 2016 at 8:48 AM, Bjorn Helgaas <helgaas@kernel.org> wrote:
> Hi Alexey,
>
> On Thu, Aug 11, 2016 at 08:03:29PM +1000, Alexey Kardashevskiy wrote:
>> There is at least one Chelsio 10Gb card which uses VPD area to store
>> some custom blocks (example below). However pci_vpd_size() returns
>> the length of the first block only assuming that there can be only
>> one VPD "End Tag" and VFIO blocks access beyond that offset
>> (since 4e1a63555) which leads to the situation when the guest "cxgb3"
>> driver fails to probe the device. The host system does not have this
>> problem as the drives accesses the config space directly without
>> pci_read_vpd()/...
>>
>> This adds a quirk to override the VPD size to a bigger value.
>>
>> This is the controller:
>> Ethernet controller [0200]: Chelsio Communications Inc T310 10GbE Single Port Adapter [1425:0030]
>>
>> This is its VPD:
>> #0000 Large item 42 bytes; name 0x2 Identifier String
>>       b'10 Gigabit Ethernet-SR PCI Express Adapter'
>> #002d Large item 74 bytes; name 0x10
>>       #00 [EC] len=7: b'D76809 '
>>       #0a [FN] len=7: b'46K7897'
>>       #14 [PN] len=7: b'46K7897'
>>       #1e [MN] len=4: b'1037'
>>       #25 [FC] len=4: b'5769'
>>       #2c [SN] len=12: b'YL102035603V'
>>       #3b [NA] len=12: b'00145E992ED1'
>> #007a Small item 1 bytes; name 0xf End Tag
>> ---
>> #0c00 Large item 16 bytes; name 0x2 Identifier String
>>       b'S310E-SR-X      '
>> #0c13 Large item 234 bytes; name 0x10
>>       #00 [PN] len=16: b'TBD             '
>>       #13 [EC] len=16: b'110107730D2     '
>>       #26 [SN] len=16: b'97YL102035603V  '
>>       #39 [NA] len=12: b'00145E992ED1'
>>       #48 [V0] len=6: b'175000'
>>       #51 [V1] len=6: b'266666'
>>       #5a [V2] len=6: b'266666'
>>       #63 [V3] len=6: b'2000  '
>>       #6c [V4] len=2: b'1 '
>>       #71 [V5] len=6: b'c2    '
>>       #7a [V6] len=6: b'0     '
>>       #83 [V7] len=2: b'1 '
>>       #88 [V8] len=2: b'0 '
>>       #8d [V9] len=2: b'0 '
>>       #92 [VA] len=2: b'0 '
>>       #97 [RV] len=80: b's\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00'...
>> #0d00 Large item 252 bytes; name 0x11
>>       #00 [VC] len=16: b'122310_1222 dp  '
>>       #13 [VD] len=16: b'610-0001-00 H1\x00\x00'
>>       #26 [VE] len=16: b'122310_1353 fp  '
>>       #39 [VF] len=16: b'610-0001-00 H1\x00\x00'
>>       #4c [RW] len=173: b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00'...
>> #0dff Small item 0 bytes; name 0xf End Tag
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@ozlabs.ru>
>> ---
>>  drivers/pci/quirks.c | 12 ++++++++++++
>>  1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)
>>
>> diff --git a/drivers/pci/quirks.c b/drivers/pci/quirks.c
>> index ee72ebe1..94d3fb5 100644
>> --- a/drivers/pci/quirks.c
>> +++ b/drivers/pci/quirks.c
>> @@ -3241,6 +3241,18 @@ DECLARE_PCI_FIXUP_FINAL(PCI_VENDOR_ID_INTEL, PCI_DEVICE_ID_INTEL_CACTUS_RIDGE_4C
>>  DECLARE_PCI_FIXUP_FINAL(PCI_VENDOR_ID_INTEL, PCI_DEVICE_ID_INTEL_PORT_RIDGE,
>>                       quirk_thunderbolt_hotplug_msi);
>>
>> +static void quirk_chelsio_extend_vpd(struct pci_dev *dev)
>> +{
>> +     if (!dev->vpd || !dev->vpd->ops || !dev->vpd->ops->set_size)
>> +             return;
>> +
>> +     dev->vpd->ops->set_size(dev, max_t(unsigned int, dev->vpd->len, 0xe00));
>> +}
>> +

So one thing you might want to look at doing is actually validating
there is something there before increasing the size.  If you look at
the get_vpd_params function from the cxgb3 driver you will see what
they do is verify the first tag located at 0xC00 is 0x82 before they
do any further reads.  You might do something similar just to verify
there is something there before you open it up to access by anyone.

One option would be to modify pci_vpd_size so that you can use it
outside of access.c and can pass it an offset.  Then you could update
your quirk so that you call pci_vpd_size and pass it the offset of
0xC00.  It should then be able to walk from that starting point and
reach the end of the list.  If you do then pci_vpd_size will return
the total size, else it returns 0.  So if size comes back as a
non-zero value then you could pass that into pci_set_vpd_size,
otherwise we can assume the starting offset is 0 and let the existing
code run its course.

>> +DECLARE_PCI_FIXUP_FINAL(PCI_VENDOR_ID_CHELSIO,
>> +                     PCI_ANY_ID,
>> +                     quirk_chelsio_extend_vpd);
>
> Do you really want this for *all* Chelsio devices?  If you only need
> it for certain devices, the quirk could probably go in the driver.
>
> Can you use pci_set_vpd_size() instead?  There's already a use of that
> in cxgb4.
>

I would assume this quirk needs to support the same device IDs as
supported by the cxgb3 driver.  If so you might just clone the ID list
from cxgb3_pci_tbl for this quirk.

Also from the looks of it the cxgb3 driver probably needs to be
updated to use the VPD accessor functions instead of just open coding
it themselves.  Otherwise we run the risk of the driver having issues
if it attempts to access the EEPROM at the same time as other
applications attempting to access the VPD for the device.

Re: [RFC PATCH kernel] PCI: Enable access to custom VPD for Chelsio devices (cxgb3)

[Alexey Kardashevskiy]

On 07/09/16 04:30, Alexander Duyck wrote:
> On Tue, Sep 6, 2016 at 8:48 AM, Bjorn Helgaas <helgaas@kernel.org> wrote:
>> Hi Alexey,
>>
>> On Thu, Aug 11, 2016 at 08:03:29PM +1000, Alexey Kardashevskiy wrote:
>>> There is at least one Chelsio 10Gb card which uses VPD area to store
>>> some custom blocks (example below). However pci_vpd_size() returns
>>> the length of the first block only assuming that there can be only
>>> one VPD "End Tag" and VFIO blocks access beyond that offset
>>> (since 4e1a63555) which leads to the situation when the guest "cxgb3"
>>> driver fails to probe the device. The host system does not have this
>>> problem as the drives accesses the config space directly without
>>> pci_read_vpd()/...
>>>
>>> This adds a quirk to override the VPD size to a bigger value.
>>>
>>> This is the controller:
>>> Ethernet controller [0200]: Chelsio Communications Inc T310 10GbE Single Port Adapter [1425:0030]
>>>
>>> This is its VPD:
>>> #0000 Large item 42 bytes; name 0x2 Identifier String
>>>       b'10 Gigabit Ethernet-SR PCI Express Adapter'
>>> #002d Large item 74 bytes; name 0x10
>>>       #00 [EC] len=7: b'D76809 '
>>>       #0a [FN] len=7: b'46K7897'
>>>       #14 [PN] len=7: b'46K7897'
>>>       #1e [MN] len=4: b'1037'
>>>       #25 [FC] len=4: b'5769'
>>>       #2c [SN] len=12: b'YL102035603V'
>>>       #3b [NA] len=12: b'00145E992ED1'
>>> #007a Small item 1 bytes; name 0xf End Tag
>>> ---
>>> #0c00 Large item 16 bytes; name 0x2 Identifier String
>>>       b'S310E-SR-X      '
>>> #0c13 Large item 234 bytes; name 0x10
>>>       #00 [PN] len=16: b'TBD             '
>>>       #13 [EC] len=16: b'110107730D2     '
>>>       #26 [SN] len=16: b'97YL102035603V  '
>>>       #39 [NA] len=12: b'00145E992ED1'
>>>       #48 [V0] len=6: b'175000'
>>>       #51 [V1] len=6: b'266666'
>>>       #5a [V2] len=6: b'266666'
>>>       #63 [V3] len=6: b'2000  '
>>>       #6c [V4] len=2: b'1 '
>>>       #71 [V5] len=6: b'c2    '
>>>       #7a [V6] len=6: b'0     '
>>>       #83 [V7] len=2: b'1 '
>>>       #88 [V8] len=2: b'0 '
>>>       #8d [V9] len=2: b'0 '
>>>       #92 [VA] len=2: b'0 '
>>>       #97 [RV] len=80: b's\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00'...
>>> #0d00 Large item 252 bytes; name 0x11
>>>       #00 [VC] len=16: b'122310_1222 dp  '
>>>       #13 [VD] len=16: b'610-0001-00 H1\x00\x00'
>>>       #26 [VE] len=16: b'122310_1353 fp  '
>>>       #39 [VF] len=16: b'610-0001-00 H1\x00\x00'
>>>       #4c [RW] len=173: b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00'...
>>> #0dff Small item 0 bytes; name 0xf End Tag
>>>
>>> Signed-off-by: Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@ozlabs.ru>
>>> ---
>>>  drivers/pci/quirks.c | 12 ++++++++++++
>>>  1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)
>>>
>>> diff --git a/drivers/pci/quirks.c b/drivers/pci/quirks.c
>>> index ee72ebe1..94d3fb5 100644
>>> --- a/drivers/pci/quirks.c
>>> +++ b/drivers/pci/quirks.c
>>> @@ -3241,6 +3241,18 @@ DECLARE_PCI_FIXUP_FINAL(PCI_VENDOR_ID_INTEL, PCI_DEVICE_ID_INTEL_CACTUS_RIDGE_4C
>>>  DECLARE_PCI_FIXUP_FINAL(PCI_VENDOR_ID_INTEL, PCI_DEVICE_ID_INTEL_PORT_RIDGE,
>>>                       quirk_thunderbolt_hotplug_msi);
>>>
>>> +static void quirk_chelsio_extend_vpd(struct pci_dev *dev)
>>> +{
>>> +     if (!dev->vpd || !dev->vpd->ops || !dev->vpd->ops->set_size)
>>> +             return;
>>> +
>>> +     dev->vpd->ops->set_size(dev, max_t(unsigned int, dev->vpd->len, 0xe00));
>>> +}
>>> +
> 
> So one thing you might want to look at doing is actually validating
> there is something there before increasing the size.  If you look at
> the get_vpd_params function from the cxgb3 driver you will see what
> they do is verify the first tag located at 0xC00 is 0x82 before they
> do any further reads.  You might do something similar just to verify
> there is something there before you open it up to access by anyone.
> 
> One option would be to modify pci_vpd_size so that you can use it
> outside of access.c and can pass it an offset.  Then you could update
> your quirk so that you call pci_vpd_size and pass it the offset of
> 0xC00.  It should then be able to walk from that starting point and
> reach the end of the list.  If you do then pci_vpd_size will return
> the total size, else it returns 0.  So if size comes back as a
> non-zero value then you could pass that into pci_set_vpd_size,
> otherwise we can assume the starting offset is 0 and let the existing
> code run its course.


I could do this but I can predict endless argument whether a generic
pci_vpd_size() should scan for something which looks like VPD but it is
not, etc. I'd read at 0xc00, if it is 0x82, then pci_set_vpd_size(0xe00)
and that's it.


> 
>>> +DECLARE_PCI_FIXUP_FINAL(PCI_VENDOR_ID_CHELSIO,
>>> +                     PCI_ANY_ID,
>>> +                     quirk_chelsio_extend_vpd);
>>
>> Do you really want this for *all* Chelsio devices?  

Well, no. When I did this, I just wanted opinions :) I'll have a list here
in next revision.


> If you only need it for certain devices, the quirk could probably go in the driver.

It cannot, the cxgb3 driver is not running on the host, vfio-pci controls it
.

>
>>
>> Can you use pci_set_vpd_size() instead?  There's already a use of that
>> in cxgb4.
>>
> 
> I would assume this quirk needs to support the same device IDs as
> supported by the cxgb3 driver.  If so you might just clone the ID list
> from cxgb3_pci_tbl for this quirk.
> 
> Also from the looks of it the cxgb3 driver probably needs to be
> updated to use the VPD accessor functions instead of just open coding
> it themselves.  Otherwise we run the risk of the driver having issues
> if it attempts to access the EEPROM at the same time as other
> applications attempting to access the VPD for the device.


In this particular case cxgb3 driver is not running, vfio-pci controls the
device on the host side and does all the filtering so I have to add a quirk
to  drivers/pci/quirks.c with all 13 PCI IDs of cxgb3 hardware OOOOOR
implement quirks in vfio-pci (it has one already but I seriously doubt we
should extend it).

Fixing cxgb3 in the guest won't make any difference.

So where should I put the quirks? Thanks.


-- 
Alexey