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* [PATCH net] cls_u32: fix use after free in u32_destroy_key()
@ 2018-02-02 13:20 Paolo Abeni
  2018-02-02 13:35 ` Paolo Abeni
  2018-02-02 14:30 ` [PATCH net v2] " Paolo Abeni
  0 siblings, 2 replies; 7+ messages in thread
From: Paolo Abeni @ 2018-02-02 13:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: netdev; +Cc: David S. Miller, Jamal Hadi Salim, Cong Wang, Jiri Pirko

Li Shuang reported an Oops with cls_u32 due to an use-after-free
in u32_destroy_key(). The use-after-free can be triggered with:

dev=lo
tc qdisc add dev $dev root handle 1: htb default 10
tc filter add dev $dev parent 1: prio 5 handle 1: protocol ip u32 divisor 256
tc filter add dev $dev protocol ip parent 1: prio 5 u32 ht 800:: match ip dst\
 10.0.0.0/8 hashkey mask 0x0000ff00 at 16 link 1:
tc qdisc del dev $dev root

Which causes the following kasan splat:

 ==================================================================
 BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in u32_destroy_key.constprop.21+0x117/0x140 [cls_u32]
 Read of size 4 at addr ffff881b83dae618 by task kworker/u48:5/571

 CPU: 17 PID: 571 Comm: kworker/u48:5 Not tainted 4.15.0+ #87
 Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R730/072T6D, BIOS 2.1.7 06/16/2016
 Workqueue: tc_filter_workqueue u32_delete_key_freepf_work [cls_u32]
 Call Trace:
  dump_stack+0xd6/0x182
  ? dma_virt_map_sg+0x22e/0x22e
  print_address_description+0x73/0x290
  kasan_report+0x277/0x360
  ? u32_destroy_key.constprop.21+0x117/0x140 [cls_u32]
  u32_destroy_key.constprop.21+0x117/0x140 [cls_u32]
  u32_delete_key_freepf_work+0x1c/0x30 [cls_u32]
  process_one_work+0xae0/0x1c80
  ? sched_clock+0x5/0x10
  ? pwq_dec_nr_in_flight+0x3c0/0x3c0
  ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x29/0x40
  ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0x381/0x570
  ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x29/0x40
  ? finish_task_switch+0x1e5/0x760
  ? finish_task_switch+0x208/0x760
  ? preempt_notifier_dec+0x20/0x20
  ? __schedule+0x839/0x1ee0
  ? check_noncircular+0x20/0x20
  ? firmware_map_remove+0x73/0x73
  ? find_held_lock+0x39/0x1c0
  ? worker_thread+0x434/0x1820
  ? lock_contended+0xee0/0xee0
  ? lock_release+0x1100/0x1100
  ? init_rescuer.part.16+0x150/0x150
  ? retint_kernel+0x10/0x10
  worker_thread+0x216/0x1820
  ? process_one_work+0x1c80/0x1c80
  ? lock_acquire+0x1a5/0x540
  ? lock_downgrade+0x6b0/0x6b0
  ? sched_clock+0x5/0x10
  ? lock_release+0x1100/0x1100
  ? compat_start_thread+0x80/0x80
  ? do_raw_spin_trylock+0x190/0x190
  ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x29/0x40
  ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0x381/0x570
  ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x29/0x40
  ? finish_task_switch+0x1e5/0x760
  ? finish_task_switch+0x208/0x760
  ? preempt_notifier_dec+0x20/0x20
  ? __schedule+0x839/0x1ee0
  ? kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x143/0x320
  ? firmware_map_remove+0x73/0x73
  ? sched_clock+0x5/0x10
  ? sched_clock_cpu+0x18/0x170
  ? find_held_lock+0x39/0x1c0
  ? schedule+0xf3/0x3b0
  ? lock_downgrade+0x6b0/0x6b0
  ? __schedule+0x1ee0/0x1ee0
  ? do_wait_intr_irq+0x340/0x340
  ? do_raw_spin_trylock+0x190/0x190
  ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x32/0x60
  ? process_one_work+0x1c80/0x1c80
  ? process_one_work+0x1c80/0x1c80
  kthread+0x312/0x3d0
  ? kthread_create_worker_on_cpu+0xc0/0xc0
  ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50

 Allocated by task 1688:
  kasan_kmalloc+0xa0/0xd0
  __kmalloc+0x162/0x380
  u32_change+0x1220/0x3c9e [cls_u32]
  tc_ctl_tfilter+0x1ba6/0x2f80
  rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x4f0/0x9d0
  netlink_rcv_skb+0x124/0x320
  netlink_unicast+0x430/0x600
  netlink_sendmsg+0x8fa/0xd60
  sock_sendmsg+0xb1/0xe0
  ___sys_sendmsg+0x678/0x980
  __sys_sendmsg+0xc4/0x210
  do_syscall_64+0x232/0x7f0
  return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x0/0x75

 Freed by task 112:
  kasan_slab_free+0x71/0xc0
  kfree+0x114/0x320
  rcu_process_callbacks+0xc3f/0x1600
  __do_softirq+0x2bf/0xc06

 The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff881b83dae600
  which belongs to the cache kmalloc-4096 of size 4096
 The buggy address is located 24 bytes inside of
  4096-byte region [ffff881b83dae600, ffff881b83daf600)
 The buggy address belongs to the page:
 page:ffffea006e0f6a00 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping:          (null) index:0x0 compound_mapcount: 0
 flags: 0x17ffffc0008100(slab|head)
 raw: 0017ffffc0008100 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000100070007
 raw: dead000000000100 dead000000000200 ffff880187c0e600 0000000000000000
 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

 Memory state around the buggy address:
  ffff881b83dae500: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
  ffff881b83dae580: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
 >ffff881b83dae600: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
                             ^
  ffff881b83dae680: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
  ffff881b83dae700: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
 ==================================================================

The problem is that the htnode is freed before the linked knodes and the
latter will try to access the first at u32_destroy_key() time.
This change addresses the issue using the htnode refcnt to guarantee
the correct free order. While at it also add a pedantic and possibly
unneeded RCU annotation, to keep sparse happy.

Reported-by: Li Shuang <shuali@redhat.com>
Fixes: c0d378ef1266 ("net_sched: use tcf_queue_work() in u32 filter")
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
---
 net/sched/cls_u32.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++++----
 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/sched/cls_u32.c b/net/sched/cls_u32.c
index 60c892c36a60..0e3fbcf343e2 100644
--- a/net/sched/cls_u32.c
+++ b/net/sched/cls_u32.c
@@ -398,10 +398,16 @@ static int u32_init(struct tcf_proto *tp)
 static int u32_destroy_key(struct tcf_proto *tp, struct tc_u_knode *n,
 			   bool free_pf)
 {
+	struct tc_u_hnode *ht;
+
 	tcf_exts_destroy(&n->exts);
 	tcf_exts_put_net(&n->exts);
-	if (n->ht_down)
-		n->ht_down->refcnt--;
+
+	rcu_read_lock_bh();
+	ht = rcu_dereference_bh(n->ht_down);
+	if (ht && ht->refcnt-- == 0)
+		kfree(ht);
+	rcu_read_unlock_bh();
 #ifdef CONFIG_CLS_U32_PERF
 	if (free_pf)
 		free_percpu(n->pf);
@@ -624,7 +630,12 @@ static int u32_destroy_hnode(struct tcf_proto *tp, struct tc_u_hnode *ht,
 			idr_destroy(&ht->handle_idr);
 			idr_remove_ext(&tp_c->handle_idr, ht->handle);
 			RCU_INIT_POINTER(*hn, ht->next);
-			kfree_rcu(ht, rcu);
+
+			/* u32_destroy_key() will will later free ht for us, if
+			 * it's still referenced by some knode
+			 */
+			if (ht->refcnt == 0)
+				kfree_rcu(ht, rcu);
 			return 0;
 		}
 	}
@@ -667,7 +678,11 @@ static void u32_destroy(struct tcf_proto *tp, struct netlink_ext_ack *extack)
 
 		while ((ht = rtnl_dereference(tp_c->hlist)) != NULL) {
 			RCU_INIT_POINTER(tp_c->hlist, ht->next);
-			kfree_rcu(ht, rcu);
+			/* u32_destroy_key() will will later free ht for us, if
+			 * it's still referenced by some knode
+			 */
+			if (ht->refcnt == 0)
+				kfree_rcu(ht, rcu);
 		}
 
 		idr_destroy(&tp_c->handle_idr);
-- 
2.14.3

^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH net] cls_u32: fix use after free in u32_destroy_key()
  2018-02-02 13:20 [PATCH net] cls_u32: fix use after free in u32_destroy_key() Paolo Abeni
@ 2018-02-02 13:35 ` Paolo Abeni
  2018-02-02 14:30 ` [PATCH net v2] " Paolo Abeni
  1 sibling, 0 replies; 7+ messages in thread
From: Paolo Abeni @ 2018-02-02 13:35 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: netdev; +Cc: David S. Miller, Jamal Hadi Salim, Cong Wang, Jiri Pirko

On Fri, 2018-02-02 at 14:20 +0100, Paolo Abeni wrote:
> Li Shuang reported an Oops with cls_u32 due to an use-after-free
> in u32_destroy_key(). The use-after-free can be triggered with:
> 
> dev=lo
> tc qdisc add dev $dev root handle 1: htb default 10
> tc filter add dev $dev parent 1: prio 5 handle 1: protocol ip u32 divisor 256
> tc filter add dev $dev protocol ip parent 1: prio 5 u32 ht 800:: match ip dst\
>  10.0.0.0/8 hashkey mask 0x0000ff00 at 16 link 1:
> tc qdisc del dev $dev root
> 
> Which causes the following kasan splat:
> 
>  ==================================================================
>  BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in u32_destroy_key.constprop.21+0x117/0x140 [cls_u32]
>  Read of size 4 at addr ffff881b83dae618 by task kworker/u48:5/571
> 
>  CPU: 17 PID: 571 Comm: kworker/u48:5 Not tainted 4.15.0+ #87
>  Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R730/072T6D, BIOS 2.1.7 06/16/2016
>  Workqueue: tc_filter_workqueue u32_delete_key_freepf_work [cls_u32]
>  Call Trace:
>   dump_stack+0xd6/0x182
>   ? dma_virt_map_sg+0x22e/0x22e
>   print_address_description+0x73/0x290
>   kasan_report+0x277/0x360
>   ? u32_destroy_key.constprop.21+0x117/0x140 [cls_u32]
>   u32_destroy_key.constprop.21+0x117/0x140 [cls_u32]
>   u32_delete_key_freepf_work+0x1c/0x30 [cls_u32]
>   process_one_work+0xae0/0x1c80
>   ? sched_clock+0x5/0x10
>   ? pwq_dec_nr_in_flight+0x3c0/0x3c0
>   ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x29/0x40
>   ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0x381/0x570
>   ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x29/0x40
>   ? finish_task_switch+0x1e5/0x760
>   ? finish_task_switch+0x208/0x760
>   ? preempt_notifier_dec+0x20/0x20
>   ? __schedule+0x839/0x1ee0
>   ? check_noncircular+0x20/0x20
>   ? firmware_map_remove+0x73/0x73
>   ? find_held_lock+0x39/0x1c0
>   ? worker_thread+0x434/0x1820
>   ? lock_contended+0xee0/0xee0
>   ? lock_release+0x1100/0x1100
>   ? init_rescuer.part.16+0x150/0x150
>   ? retint_kernel+0x10/0x10
>   worker_thread+0x216/0x1820
>   ? process_one_work+0x1c80/0x1c80
>   ? lock_acquire+0x1a5/0x540
>   ? lock_downgrade+0x6b0/0x6b0
>   ? sched_clock+0x5/0x10
>   ? lock_release+0x1100/0x1100
>   ? compat_start_thread+0x80/0x80
>   ? do_raw_spin_trylock+0x190/0x190
>   ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x29/0x40
>   ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0x381/0x570
>   ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x29/0x40
>   ? finish_task_switch+0x1e5/0x760
>   ? finish_task_switch+0x208/0x760
>   ? preempt_notifier_dec+0x20/0x20
>   ? __schedule+0x839/0x1ee0
>   ? kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x143/0x320
>   ? firmware_map_remove+0x73/0x73
>   ? sched_clock+0x5/0x10
>   ? sched_clock_cpu+0x18/0x170
>   ? find_held_lock+0x39/0x1c0
>   ? schedule+0xf3/0x3b0
>   ? lock_downgrade+0x6b0/0x6b0
>   ? __schedule+0x1ee0/0x1ee0
>   ? do_wait_intr_irq+0x340/0x340
>   ? do_raw_spin_trylock+0x190/0x190
>   ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x32/0x60
>   ? process_one_work+0x1c80/0x1c80
>   ? process_one_work+0x1c80/0x1c80
>   kthread+0x312/0x3d0
>   ? kthread_create_worker_on_cpu+0xc0/0xc0
>   ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50
> 
>  Allocated by task 1688:
>   kasan_kmalloc+0xa0/0xd0
>   __kmalloc+0x162/0x380
>   u32_change+0x1220/0x3c9e [cls_u32]
>   tc_ctl_tfilter+0x1ba6/0x2f80
>   rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x4f0/0x9d0
>   netlink_rcv_skb+0x124/0x320
>   netlink_unicast+0x430/0x600
>   netlink_sendmsg+0x8fa/0xd60
>   sock_sendmsg+0xb1/0xe0
>   ___sys_sendmsg+0x678/0x980
>   __sys_sendmsg+0xc4/0x210
>   do_syscall_64+0x232/0x7f0
>   return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x0/0x75
> 
>  Freed by task 112:
>   kasan_slab_free+0x71/0xc0
>   kfree+0x114/0x320
>   rcu_process_callbacks+0xc3f/0x1600
>   __do_softirq+0x2bf/0xc06
> 
>  The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff881b83dae600
>   which belongs to the cache kmalloc-4096 of size 4096
>  The buggy address is located 24 bytes inside of
>   4096-byte region [ffff881b83dae600, ffff881b83daf600)
>  The buggy address belongs to the page:
>  page:ffffea006e0f6a00 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping:          (null) index:0x0 compound_mapcount: 0
>  flags: 0x17ffffc0008100(slab|head)
>  raw: 0017ffffc0008100 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000100070007
>  raw: dead000000000100 dead000000000200 ffff880187c0e600 0000000000000000
>  page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
> 
>  Memory state around the buggy address:
>   ffff881b83dae500: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
>   ffff881b83dae580: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
>  >ffff881b83dae600: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
>                              ^
>   ffff881b83dae680: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
>   ffff881b83dae700: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
>  ==================================================================
> 
> The problem is that the htnode is freed before the linked knodes and the
> latter will try to access the first at u32_destroy_key() time.
> This change addresses the issue using the htnode refcnt to guarantee
> the correct free order. While at it also add a pedantic and possibly
> unneeded RCU annotation, to keep sparse happy.
> 
> Reported-by: Li Shuang <shuali@redhat.com>
> Fixes: c0d378ef1266 ("net_sched: use tcf_queue_work() in u32 filter")
> Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
> ---
>  net/sched/cls_u32.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++++----
>  1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/net/sched/cls_u32.c b/net/sched/cls_u32.c
> index 60c892c36a60..0e3fbcf343e2 100644
> --- a/net/sched/cls_u32.c
> +++ b/net/sched/cls_u32.c
> @@ -398,10 +398,16 @@ static int u32_init(struct tcf_proto *tp)
>  static int u32_destroy_key(struct tcf_proto *tp, struct tc_u_knode *n,
>  			   bool free_pf)
>  {
> +	struct tc_u_hnode *ht;
> +
>  	tcf_exts_destroy(&n->exts);
>  	tcf_exts_put_net(&n->exts);
> -	if (n->ht_down)
> -		n->ht_down->refcnt--;
> +
> +	rcu_read_lock_bh();
> +	ht = rcu_dereference_bh(n->ht_down);
> +	if (ht && ht->refcnt-- == 0)
> +		kfree(ht);
> +	rcu_read_unlock_bh();

I think I can simply use rtnl_dereference() here. I will double check
and ev. send a v2.

Sorry for the noise,

Paolo

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread

* [PATCH net v2] cls_u32: fix use after free in u32_destroy_key()
  2018-02-02 13:20 [PATCH net] cls_u32: fix use after free in u32_destroy_key() Paolo Abeni
  2018-02-02 13:35 ` Paolo Abeni
@ 2018-02-02 14:30 ` Paolo Abeni
  2018-02-02 17:54   ` Ivan Vecera
                     ` (2 more replies)
  1 sibling, 3 replies; 7+ messages in thread
From: Paolo Abeni @ 2018-02-02 14:30 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: netdev
  Cc: David S. Miller, Jamal Hadi Salim, Cong Wang, Jiri Pirko, Li Shuang

Li Shuang reported an Oops with cls_u32 due to an use-after-free
in u32_destroy_key(). The use-after-free can be triggered with:

dev=lo
tc qdisc add dev $dev root handle 1: htb default 10
tc filter add dev $dev parent 1: prio 5 handle 1: protocol ip u32 divisor 256
tc filter add dev $dev protocol ip parent 1: prio 5 u32 ht 800:: match ip dst\
 10.0.0.0/8 hashkey mask 0x0000ff00 at 16 link 1:
tc qdisc del dev $dev root

Which causes the following kasan splat:

 ==================================================================
 BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in u32_destroy_key.constprop.21+0x117/0x140 [cls_u32]
 Read of size 4 at addr ffff881b83dae618 by task kworker/u48:5/571

 CPU: 17 PID: 571 Comm: kworker/u48:5 Not tainted 4.15.0+ #87
 Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R730/072T6D, BIOS 2.1.7 06/16/2016
 Workqueue: tc_filter_workqueue u32_delete_key_freepf_work [cls_u32]
 Call Trace:
  dump_stack+0xd6/0x182
  ? dma_virt_map_sg+0x22e/0x22e
  print_address_description+0x73/0x290
  kasan_report+0x277/0x360
  ? u32_destroy_key.constprop.21+0x117/0x140 [cls_u32]
  u32_destroy_key.constprop.21+0x117/0x140 [cls_u32]
  u32_delete_key_freepf_work+0x1c/0x30 [cls_u32]
  process_one_work+0xae0/0x1c80
  ? sched_clock+0x5/0x10
  ? pwq_dec_nr_in_flight+0x3c0/0x3c0
  ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x29/0x40
  ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0x381/0x570
  ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x29/0x40
  ? finish_task_switch+0x1e5/0x760
  ? finish_task_switch+0x208/0x760
  ? preempt_notifier_dec+0x20/0x20
  ? __schedule+0x839/0x1ee0
  ? check_noncircular+0x20/0x20
  ? firmware_map_remove+0x73/0x73
  ? find_held_lock+0x39/0x1c0
  ? worker_thread+0x434/0x1820
  ? lock_contended+0xee0/0xee0
  ? lock_release+0x1100/0x1100
  ? init_rescuer.part.16+0x150/0x150
  ? retint_kernel+0x10/0x10
  worker_thread+0x216/0x1820
  ? process_one_work+0x1c80/0x1c80
  ? lock_acquire+0x1a5/0x540
  ? lock_downgrade+0x6b0/0x6b0
  ? sched_clock+0x5/0x10
  ? lock_release+0x1100/0x1100
  ? compat_start_thread+0x80/0x80
  ? do_raw_spin_trylock+0x190/0x190
  ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x29/0x40
  ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0x381/0x570
  ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x29/0x40
  ? finish_task_switch+0x1e5/0x760
  ? finish_task_switch+0x208/0x760
  ? preempt_notifier_dec+0x20/0x20
  ? __schedule+0x839/0x1ee0
  ? kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x143/0x320
  ? firmware_map_remove+0x73/0x73
  ? sched_clock+0x5/0x10
  ? sched_clock_cpu+0x18/0x170
  ? find_held_lock+0x39/0x1c0
  ? schedule+0xf3/0x3b0
  ? lock_downgrade+0x6b0/0x6b0
  ? __schedule+0x1ee0/0x1ee0
  ? do_wait_intr_irq+0x340/0x340
  ? do_raw_spin_trylock+0x190/0x190
  ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x32/0x60
  ? process_one_work+0x1c80/0x1c80
  ? process_one_work+0x1c80/0x1c80
  kthread+0x312/0x3d0
  ? kthread_create_worker_on_cpu+0xc0/0xc0
  ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50

 Allocated by task 1688:
  kasan_kmalloc+0xa0/0xd0
  __kmalloc+0x162/0x380
  u32_change+0x1220/0x3c9e [cls_u32]
  tc_ctl_tfilter+0x1ba6/0x2f80
  rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x4f0/0x9d0
  netlink_rcv_skb+0x124/0x320
  netlink_unicast+0x430/0x600
  netlink_sendmsg+0x8fa/0xd60
  sock_sendmsg+0xb1/0xe0
  ___sys_sendmsg+0x678/0x980
  __sys_sendmsg+0xc4/0x210
  do_syscall_64+0x232/0x7f0
  return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x0/0x75

 Freed by task 112:
  kasan_slab_free+0x71/0xc0
  kfree+0x114/0x320
  rcu_process_callbacks+0xc3f/0x1600
  __do_softirq+0x2bf/0xc06

 The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff881b83dae600
  which belongs to the cache kmalloc-4096 of size 4096
 The buggy address is located 24 bytes inside of
  4096-byte region [ffff881b83dae600, ffff881b83daf600)
 The buggy address belongs to the page:
 page:ffffea006e0f6a00 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping:          (null) index:0x0 compound_mapcount: 0
 flags: 0x17ffffc0008100(slab|head)
 raw: 0017ffffc0008100 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000100070007
 raw: dead000000000100 dead000000000200 ffff880187c0e600 0000000000000000
 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

 Memory state around the buggy address:
  ffff881b83dae500: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
  ffff881b83dae580: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
 >ffff881b83dae600: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
                             ^
  ffff881b83dae680: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
  ffff881b83dae700: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
 ==================================================================

The problem is that the htnode is freed before the linked knodes and the
latter will try to access the first at u32_destroy_key() time.
This change addresses the issue using the htnode refcnt to guarantee
the correct free order. While at it also add a RCU annotation,
to keep sparse happy.

v1 -> v2: use rtnl_derefence() instead of RCU read locks

Reported-by: Li Shuang <shuali@redhat.com>
Fixes: c0d378ef1266 ("net_sched: use tcf_queue_work() in u32 filter")
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
---
 net/sched/cls_u32.c | 19 +++++++++++++++----
 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/sched/cls_u32.c b/net/sched/cls_u32.c
index 60c892c36a60..10440fbf3c68 100644
--- a/net/sched/cls_u32.c
+++ b/net/sched/cls_u32.c
@@ -398,10 +398,12 @@ static int u32_init(struct tcf_proto *tp)
 static int u32_destroy_key(struct tcf_proto *tp, struct tc_u_knode *n,
 			   bool free_pf)
 {
+	struct tc_u_hnode *ht = rtnl_dereference(n->ht_down);
+
 	tcf_exts_destroy(&n->exts);
 	tcf_exts_put_net(&n->exts);
-	if (n->ht_down)
-		n->ht_down->refcnt--;
+	if (ht && ht->refcnt-- == 0)
+		kfree(ht);
 #ifdef CONFIG_CLS_U32_PERF
 	if (free_pf)
 		free_percpu(n->pf);
@@ -624,7 +626,12 @@ static int u32_destroy_hnode(struct tcf_proto *tp, struct tc_u_hnode *ht,
 			idr_destroy(&ht->handle_idr);
 			idr_remove_ext(&tp_c->handle_idr, ht->handle);
 			RCU_INIT_POINTER(*hn, ht->next);
-			kfree_rcu(ht, rcu);
+
+			/* u32_destroy_key() will will later free ht for us, if
+			 * it's still referenced by some knode
+			 */
+			if (ht->refcnt == 0)
+				kfree_rcu(ht, rcu);
 			return 0;
 		}
 	}
@@ -667,7 +674,11 @@ static void u32_destroy(struct tcf_proto *tp, struct netlink_ext_ack *extack)
 
 		while ((ht = rtnl_dereference(tp_c->hlist)) != NULL) {
 			RCU_INIT_POINTER(tp_c->hlist, ht->next);
-			kfree_rcu(ht, rcu);
+			/* u32_destroy_key() will will later free ht for us, if
+			 * it's still referenced by some knode
+			 */
+			if (ht->refcnt == 0)
+				kfree_rcu(ht, rcu);
 		}
 
 		idr_destroy(&tp_c->handle_idr);
-- 
2.14.3

^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH net v2] cls_u32: fix use after free in u32_destroy_key()
  2018-02-02 14:30 ` [PATCH net v2] " Paolo Abeni
@ 2018-02-02 17:54   ` Ivan Vecera
  2018-02-02 21:52   ` Cong Wang
  2018-02-03 18:49   ` Paolo Abeni
  2 siblings, 0 replies; 7+ messages in thread
From: Ivan Vecera @ 2018-02-02 17:54 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Paolo Abeni, netdev
  Cc: David S. Miller, Jamal Hadi Salim, Cong Wang, Jiri Pirko, Li Shuang

On 2.2.2018 15:30, Paolo Abeni wrote:
> Li Shuang reported an Oops with cls_u32 due to an use-after-free
> in u32_destroy_key(). The use-after-free can be triggered with:
> 
> dev=lo
> tc qdisc add dev $dev root handle 1: htb default 10
> tc filter add dev $dev parent 1: prio 5 handle 1: protocol ip u32 divisor 256
> tc filter add dev $dev protocol ip parent 1: prio 5 u32 ht 800:: match ip dst\
>  10.0.0.0/8 hashkey mask 0x0000ff00 at 16 link 1:
> tc qdisc del dev $dev root
> 
> Which causes the following kasan splat:
> 
>  ==================================================================
>  BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in u32_destroy_key.constprop.21+0x117/0x140 [cls_u32]
>  Read of size 4 at addr ffff881b83dae618 by task kworker/u48:5/571
> 
>  CPU: 17 PID: 571 Comm: kworker/u48:5 Not tainted 4.15.0+ #87
>  Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R730/072T6D, BIOS 2.1.7 06/16/2016
>  Workqueue: tc_filter_workqueue u32_delete_key_freepf_work [cls_u32]
>  Call Trace:
>   dump_stack+0xd6/0x182
>   ? dma_virt_map_sg+0x22e/0x22e
>   print_address_description+0x73/0x290
>   kasan_report+0x277/0x360
>   ? u32_destroy_key.constprop.21+0x117/0x140 [cls_u32]
>   u32_destroy_key.constprop.21+0x117/0x140 [cls_u32]
>   u32_delete_key_freepf_work+0x1c/0x30 [cls_u32]
>   process_one_work+0xae0/0x1c80
>   ? sched_clock+0x5/0x10
>   ? pwq_dec_nr_in_flight+0x3c0/0x3c0
>   ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x29/0x40
>   ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0x381/0x570
>   ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x29/0x40
>   ? finish_task_switch+0x1e5/0x760
>   ? finish_task_switch+0x208/0x760
>   ? preempt_notifier_dec+0x20/0x20
>   ? __schedule+0x839/0x1ee0
>   ? check_noncircular+0x20/0x20
>   ? firmware_map_remove+0x73/0x73
>   ? find_held_lock+0x39/0x1c0
>   ? worker_thread+0x434/0x1820
>   ? lock_contended+0xee0/0xee0
>   ? lock_release+0x1100/0x1100
>   ? init_rescuer.part.16+0x150/0x150
>   ? retint_kernel+0x10/0x10
>   worker_thread+0x216/0x1820
>   ? process_one_work+0x1c80/0x1c80
>   ? lock_acquire+0x1a5/0x540
>   ? lock_downgrade+0x6b0/0x6b0
>   ? sched_clock+0x5/0x10
>   ? lock_release+0x1100/0x1100
>   ? compat_start_thread+0x80/0x80
>   ? do_raw_spin_trylock+0x190/0x190
>   ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x29/0x40
>   ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0x381/0x570
>   ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x29/0x40
>   ? finish_task_switch+0x1e5/0x760
>   ? finish_task_switch+0x208/0x760
>   ? preempt_notifier_dec+0x20/0x20
>   ? __schedule+0x839/0x1ee0
>   ? kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x143/0x320
>   ? firmware_map_remove+0x73/0x73
>   ? sched_clock+0x5/0x10
>   ? sched_clock_cpu+0x18/0x170
>   ? find_held_lock+0x39/0x1c0
>   ? schedule+0xf3/0x3b0
>   ? lock_downgrade+0x6b0/0x6b0
>   ? __schedule+0x1ee0/0x1ee0
>   ? do_wait_intr_irq+0x340/0x340
>   ? do_raw_spin_trylock+0x190/0x190
>   ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x32/0x60
>   ? process_one_work+0x1c80/0x1c80
>   ? process_one_work+0x1c80/0x1c80
>   kthread+0x312/0x3d0
>   ? kthread_create_worker_on_cpu+0xc0/0xc0
>   ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50
> 
>  Allocated by task 1688:
>   kasan_kmalloc+0xa0/0xd0
>   __kmalloc+0x162/0x380
>   u32_change+0x1220/0x3c9e [cls_u32]
>   tc_ctl_tfilter+0x1ba6/0x2f80
>   rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x4f0/0x9d0
>   netlink_rcv_skb+0x124/0x320
>   netlink_unicast+0x430/0x600
>   netlink_sendmsg+0x8fa/0xd60
>   sock_sendmsg+0xb1/0xe0
>   ___sys_sendmsg+0x678/0x980
>   __sys_sendmsg+0xc4/0x210
>   do_syscall_64+0x232/0x7f0
>   return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x0/0x75
> 
>  Freed by task 112:
>   kasan_slab_free+0x71/0xc0
>   kfree+0x114/0x320
>   rcu_process_callbacks+0xc3f/0x1600
>   __do_softirq+0x2bf/0xc06
> 
>  The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff881b83dae600
>   which belongs to the cache kmalloc-4096 of size 4096
>  The buggy address is located 24 bytes inside of
>   4096-byte region [ffff881b83dae600, ffff881b83daf600)
>  The buggy address belongs to the page:
>  page:ffffea006e0f6a00 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping:          (null) index:0x0 compound_mapcount: 0
>  flags: 0x17ffffc0008100(slab|head)
>  raw: 0017ffffc0008100 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000100070007
>  raw: dead000000000100 dead000000000200 ffff880187c0e600 0000000000000000
>  page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
> 
>  Memory state around the buggy address:
>   ffff881b83dae500: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
>   ffff881b83dae580: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
>  >ffff881b83dae600: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
>                              ^
>   ffff881b83dae680: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
>   ffff881b83dae700: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
>  ==================================================================
> 
> The problem is that the htnode is freed before the linked knodes and the
> latter will try to access the first at u32_destroy_key() time.
> This change addresses the issue using the htnode refcnt to guarantee
> the correct free order. While at it also add a RCU annotation,
> to keep sparse happy.
> 
> v1 -> v2: use rtnl_derefence() instead of RCU read locks
> 
> Reported-by: Li Shuang <shuali@redhat.com>
> Fixes: c0d378ef1266 ("net_sched: use tcf_queue_work() in u32 filter")
> Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
> ---
>  net/sched/cls_u32.c | 19 +++++++++++++++----
>  1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/net/sched/cls_u32.c b/net/sched/cls_u32.c
> index 60c892c36a60..10440fbf3c68 100644
> --- a/net/sched/cls_u32.c
> +++ b/net/sched/cls_u32.c
> @@ -398,10 +398,12 @@ static int u32_init(struct tcf_proto *tp)
>  static int u32_destroy_key(struct tcf_proto *tp, struct tc_u_knode *n,
>  			   bool free_pf)
>  {
> +	struct tc_u_hnode *ht = rtnl_dereference(n->ht_down);
> +
>  	tcf_exts_destroy(&n->exts);
>  	tcf_exts_put_net(&n->exts);
> -	if (n->ht_down)
> -		n->ht_down->refcnt--;
> +	if (ht && ht->refcnt-- == 0)
> +		kfree(ht);
>  #ifdef CONFIG_CLS_U32_PERF
>  	if (free_pf)
>  		free_percpu(n->pf);
> @@ -624,7 +626,12 @@ static int u32_destroy_hnode(struct tcf_proto *tp, struct tc_u_hnode *ht,
>  			idr_destroy(&ht->handle_idr);
>  			idr_remove_ext(&tp_c->handle_idr, ht->handle);
>  			RCU_INIT_POINTER(*hn, ht->next);
> -			kfree_rcu(ht, rcu);
> +
> +			/* u32_destroy_key() will will later free ht for us, if
> +			 * it's still referenced by some knode
> +			 */
> +			if (ht->refcnt == 0)
> +				kfree_rcu(ht, rcu);
>  			return 0;
>  		}
>  	}
> @@ -667,7 +674,11 @@ static void u32_destroy(struct tcf_proto *tp, struct netlink_ext_ack *extack)
>  
>  		while ((ht = rtnl_dereference(tp_c->hlist)) != NULL) {
>  			RCU_INIT_POINTER(tp_c->hlist, ht->next);
> -			kfree_rcu(ht, rcu);
> +			/* u32_destroy_key() will will later free ht for us, if
> +			 * it's still referenced by some knode
> +			 */
> +			if (ht->refcnt == 0)
> +				kfree_rcu(ht, rcu);
>  		}
>  
>  		idr_destroy(&tp_c->handle_idr);
> 
Good catch, Paolo.

Tested-by: Ivan Vecera <ivecera@redhat.com>

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH net v2] cls_u32: fix use after free in u32_destroy_key()
  2018-02-02 14:30 ` [PATCH net v2] " Paolo Abeni
  2018-02-02 17:54   ` Ivan Vecera
@ 2018-02-02 21:52   ` Cong Wang
  2018-02-03 17:46     ` Paolo Abeni
  2018-02-03 18:49   ` Paolo Abeni
  2 siblings, 1 reply; 7+ messages in thread
From: Cong Wang @ 2018-02-02 21:52 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Paolo Abeni
  Cc: Linux Kernel Network Developers, David S. Miller,
	Jamal Hadi Salim, Jiri Pirko, Li Shuang

On Fri, Feb 2, 2018 at 6:30 AM, Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> wrote:
> The problem is that the htnode is freed before the linked knodes and the
> latter will try to access the first at u32_destroy_key() time.
> This change addresses the issue using the htnode refcnt to guarantee
> the correct free order. While at it also add a RCU annotation,
> to keep sparse happy.
>
> v1 -> v2: use rtnl_derefence() instead of RCU read locks
>
> Reported-by: Li Shuang <shuali@redhat.com>
> Fixes: c0d378ef1266 ("net_sched: use tcf_queue_work() in u32 filter")
> Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
> ---
>  net/sched/cls_u32.c | 19 +++++++++++++++----
>  1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/net/sched/cls_u32.c b/net/sched/cls_u32.c
> index 60c892c36a60..10440fbf3c68 100644
> --- a/net/sched/cls_u32.c
> +++ b/net/sched/cls_u32.c
> @@ -398,10 +398,12 @@ static int u32_init(struct tcf_proto *tp)
>  static int u32_destroy_key(struct tcf_proto *tp, struct tc_u_knode *n,
>                            bool free_pf)
>  {
> +       struct tc_u_hnode *ht = rtnl_dereference(n->ht_down);
> +
>         tcf_exts_destroy(&n->exts);
>         tcf_exts_put_net(&n->exts);
> -       if (n->ht_down)
> -               n->ht_down->refcnt--;
> +       if (ht && ht->refcnt-- == 0)
> +               kfree(ht);
>  #ifdef CONFIG_CLS_U32_PERF
>         if (free_pf)
>                 free_percpu(n->pf);
> @@ -624,7 +626,12 @@ static int u32_destroy_hnode(struct tcf_proto *tp, struct tc_u_hnode *ht,
>                         idr_destroy(&ht->handle_idr);
>                         idr_remove_ext(&tp_c->handle_idr, ht->handle);
>                         RCU_INIT_POINTER(*hn, ht->next);
> -                       kfree_rcu(ht, rcu);
> +
> +                       /* u32_destroy_key() will will later free ht for us, if
> +                        * it's still referenced by some knode
> +                        */
> +                       if (ht->refcnt == 0)
> +                               kfree_rcu(ht, rcu);


Isn't u32_destroy_hnode() always called with ht->refcnt==0 ?
So no need this check at all?


>                         return 0;
>                 }
>         }
> @@ -667,7 +674,11 @@ static void u32_destroy(struct tcf_proto *tp, struct netlink_ext_ack *extack)
>
>                 while ((ht = rtnl_dereference(tp_c->hlist)) != NULL) {
>                         RCU_INIT_POINTER(tp_c->hlist, ht->next);
> -                       kfree_rcu(ht, rcu);
> +                       /* u32_destroy_key() will will later free ht for us, if


Nit: double "will"


> +                        * it's still referenced by some knode
> +                        */
> +                       if (ht->refcnt == 0)
> +                               kfree_rcu(ht, rcu);


This part looks fine.

Thanks!

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH net v2] cls_u32: fix use after free in u32_destroy_key()
  2018-02-02 21:52   ` Cong Wang
@ 2018-02-03 17:46     ` Paolo Abeni
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 7+ messages in thread
From: Paolo Abeni @ 2018-02-03 17:46 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Cong Wang
  Cc: Linux Kernel Network Developers, David S. Miller,
	Jamal Hadi Salim, Jiri Pirko, Li Shuang, Ivan Vecera

Hi,
On Fri, 2018-02-02 at 13:52 -0800, Cong Wang wrote:
> On Fri, Feb 2, 2018 at 6:30 AM, Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> wrote:
> > The problem is that the htnode is freed before the linked knodes and the
> > latter will try to access the first at u32_destroy_key() time.
> > This change addresses the issue using the htnode refcnt to guarantee
> > the correct free order. While at it also add a RCU annotation,
> > to keep sparse happy.
> > 
> > v1 -> v2: use rtnl_derefence() instead of RCU read locks
> > 
> > Reported-by: Li Shuang <shuali@redhat.com>
> > Fixes: c0d378ef1266 ("net_sched: use tcf_queue_work() in u32 filter")
> > Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
> > ---
> >  net/sched/cls_u32.c | 19 +++++++++++++++----
> >  1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
> > 
> > diff --git a/net/sched/cls_u32.c b/net/sched/cls_u32.c
> > index 60c892c36a60..10440fbf3c68 100644
> > --- a/net/sched/cls_u32.c
> > +++ b/net/sched/cls_u32.c
> > @@ -398,10 +398,12 @@ static int u32_init(struct tcf_proto *tp)
> >  static int u32_destroy_key(struct tcf_proto *tp, struct tc_u_knode *n,
> >                            bool free_pf)
> >  {
> > +       struct tc_u_hnode *ht = rtnl_dereference(n->ht_down);
> > +
> >         tcf_exts_destroy(&n->exts);
> >         tcf_exts_put_net(&n->exts);
> > -       if (n->ht_down)
> > -               n->ht_down->refcnt--;
> > +       if (ht && ht->refcnt-- == 0)
> > +               kfree(ht);
> >  #ifdef CONFIG_CLS_U32_PERF
> >         if (free_pf)
> >                 free_percpu(n->pf);
> > @@ -624,7 +626,12 @@ static int u32_destroy_hnode(struct tcf_proto *tp, struct tc_u_hnode *ht,
> >                         idr_destroy(&ht->handle_idr);
> >                         idr_remove_ext(&tp_c->handle_idr, ht->handle);
> >                         RCU_INIT_POINTER(*hn, ht->next);
> > -                       kfree_rcu(ht, rcu);
> > +
> > +                       /* u32_destroy_key() will will later free ht for us, if
> > +                        * it's still referenced by some knode
> > +                        */
> > +                       if (ht->refcnt == 0)
> > +                               kfree_rcu(ht, rcu);
> 
> 
> Isn't u32_destroy_hnode() always called with ht->refcnt==0 ?
> So no need this check at all?
> 
> 
> >                         return 0;
> >                 }
> >         }
> > @@ -667,7 +674,11 @@ static void u32_destroy(struct tcf_proto *tp, struct netlink_ext_ack *extack)
> > 
> >                 while ((ht = rtnl_dereference(tp_c->hlist)) != NULL) {
> >                         RCU_INIT_POINTER(tp_c->hlist, ht->next);
> > -                       kfree_rcu(ht, rcu);
> > +                       /* u32_destroy_key() will will later free ht for us, if
> 
> 
> Nit: double "will"
> 
> 
> > +                        * it's still referenced by some knode
> > +                        */
> > +                       if (ht->refcnt == 0)
> > +                               kfree_rcu(ht, rcu);
> 
> 
> This part looks fine.
> 
> Thanks!

Thank you for the feedback!

I will send a v3 soon, after some testing.

Cheers,

Paolo

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH net v2] cls_u32: fix use after free in u32_destroy_key()
  2018-02-02 14:30 ` [PATCH net v2] " Paolo Abeni
  2018-02-02 17:54   ` Ivan Vecera
  2018-02-02 21:52   ` Cong Wang
@ 2018-02-03 18:49   ` Paolo Abeni
  2 siblings, 0 replies; 7+ messages in thread
From: Paolo Abeni @ 2018-02-03 18:49 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: netdev
  Cc: David S. Miller, Jamal Hadi Salim, Cong Wang, Jiri Pirko, Li Shuang

On Fri, 2018-02-02 at 15:30 +0100, Paolo Abeni wrote:
> Li Shuang reported an Oops with cls_u32 due to an use-after-free
> in u32_destroy_key(). The use-after-free can be triggered with:
> 
> dev=lo
> tc qdisc add dev $dev root handle 1: htb default 10
> tc filter add dev $dev parent 1: prio 5 handle 1: protocol ip u32 divisor 256
> tc filter add dev $dev protocol ip parent 1: prio 5 u32 ht 800:: match ip dst\
>  10.0.0.0/8 hashkey mask 0x0000ff00 at 16 link 1:
> tc qdisc del dev $dev root
> 
> Which causes the following kasan splat:
> 
>  ==================================================================
>  BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in u32_destroy_key.constprop.21+0x117/0x140 [cls_u32]
>  Read of size 4 at addr ffff881b83dae618 by task kworker/u48:5/571
> 
>  CPU: 17 PID: 571 Comm: kworker/u48:5 Not tainted 4.15.0+ #87
>  Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R730/072T6D, BIOS 2.1.7 06/16/2016
>  Workqueue: tc_filter_workqueue u32_delete_key_freepf_work [cls_u32]
>  Call Trace:
>   dump_stack+0xd6/0x182
>   ? dma_virt_map_sg+0x22e/0x22e
>   print_address_description+0x73/0x290
>   kasan_report+0x277/0x360
>   ? u32_destroy_key.constprop.21+0x117/0x140 [cls_u32]
>   u32_destroy_key.constprop.21+0x117/0x140 [cls_u32]
>   u32_delete_key_freepf_work+0x1c/0x30 [cls_u32]
>   process_one_work+0xae0/0x1c80
>   ? sched_clock+0x5/0x10
>   ? pwq_dec_nr_in_flight+0x3c0/0x3c0
>   ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x29/0x40
>   ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0x381/0x570
>   ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x29/0x40
>   ? finish_task_switch+0x1e5/0x760
>   ? finish_task_switch+0x208/0x760
>   ? preempt_notifier_dec+0x20/0x20
>   ? __schedule+0x839/0x1ee0
>   ? check_noncircular+0x20/0x20
>   ? firmware_map_remove+0x73/0x73
>   ? find_held_lock+0x39/0x1c0
>   ? worker_thread+0x434/0x1820
>   ? lock_contended+0xee0/0xee0
>   ? lock_release+0x1100/0x1100
>   ? init_rescuer.part.16+0x150/0x150
>   ? retint_kernel+0x10/0x10
>   worker_thread+0x216/0x1820
>   ? process_one_work+0x1c80/0x1c80
>   ? lock_acquire+0x1a5/0x540
>   ? lock_downgrade+0x6b0/0x6b0
>   ? sched_clock+0x5/0x10
>   ? lock_release+0x1100/0x1100
>   ? compat_start_thread+0x80/0x80
>   ? do_raw_spin_trylock+0x190/0x190
>   ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x29/0x40
>   ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0x381/0x570
>   ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x29/0x40
>   ? finish_task_switch+0x1e5/0x760
>   ? finish_task_switch+0x208/0x760
>   ? preempt_notifier_dec+0x20/0x20
>   ? __schedule+0x839/0x1ee0
>   ? kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x143/0x320
>   ? firmware_map_remove+0x73/0x73
>   ? sched_clock+0x5/0x10
>   ? sched_clock_cpu+0x18/0x170
>   ? find_held_lock+0x39/0x1c0
>   ? schedule+0xf3/0x3b0
>   ? lock_downgrade+0x6b0/0x6b0
>   ? __schedule+0x1ee0/0x1ee0
>   ? do_wait_intr_irq+0x340/0x340
>   ? do_raw_spin_trylock+0x190/0x190
>   ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x32/0x60
>   ? process_one_work+0x1c80/0x1c80
>   ? process_one_work+0x1c80/0x1c80
>   kthread+0x312/0x3d0
>   ? kthread_create_worker_on_cpu+0xc0/0xc0
>   ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50
> 
>  Allocated by task 1688:
>   kasan_kmalloc+0xa0/0xd0
>   __kmalloc+0x162/0x380
>   u32_change+0x1220/0x3c9e [cls_u32]
>   tc_ctl_tfilter+0x1ba6/0x2f80
>   rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x4f0/0x9d0
>   netlink_rcv_skb+0x124/0x320
>   netlink_unicast+0x430/0x600
>   netlink_sendmsg+0x8fa/0xd60
>   sock_sendmsg+0xb1/0xe0
>   ___sys_sendmsg+0x678/0x980
>   __sys_sendmsg+0xc4/0x210
>   do_syscall_64+0x232/0x7f0
>   return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x0/0x75
> 
>  Freed by task 112:
>   kasan_slab_free+0x71/0xc0
>   kfree+0x114/0x320
>   rcu_process_callbacks+0xc3f/0x1600
>   __do_softirq+0x2bf/0xc06
> 
>  The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff881b83dae600
>   which belongs to the cache kmalloc-4096 of size 4096
>  The buggy address is located 24 bytes inside of
>   4096-byte region [ffff881b83dae600, ffff881b83daf600)
>  The buggy address belongs to the page:
>  page:ffffea006e0f6a00 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping:          (null) index:0x0 compound_mapcount: 0
>  flags: 0x17ffffc0008100(slab|head)
>  raw: 0017ffffc0008100 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000100070007
>  raw: dead000000000100 dead000000000200 ffff880187c0e600 0000000000000000
>  page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
> 
>  Memory state around the buggy address:
>   ffff881b83dae500: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
>   ffff881b83dae580: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
>  >ffff881b83dae600: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
>                              ^
>   ffff881b83dae680: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
>   ffff881b83dae700: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
>  ==================================================================
> 
> The problem is that the htnode is freed before the linked knodes and the
> latter will try to access the first at u32_destroy_key() time.
> This change addresses the issue using the htnode refcnt to guarantee
> the correct free order. While at it also add a RCU annotation,
> to keep sparse happy.
> 
> v1 -> v2: use rtnl_derefence() instead of RCU read locks
> 
> Reported-by: Li Shuang <shuali@redhat.com>
> Fixes: c0d378ef1266 ("net_sched: use tcf_queue_work() in u32 filter")
> Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
> ---
>  net/sched/cls_u32.c | 19 +++++++++++++++----
>  1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/net/sched/cls_u32.c b/net/sched/cls_u32.c
> index 60c892c36a60..10440fbf3c68 100644
> --- a/net/sched/cls_u32.c
> +++ b/net/sched/cls_u32.c
> @@ -398,10 +398,12 @@ static int u32_init(struct tcf_proto *tp)
>  static int u32_destroy_key(struct tcf_proto *tp, struct tc_u_knode *n,
>  			   bool free_pf)
>  {
> +	struct tc_u_hnode *ht = rtnl_dereference(n->ht_down);
> +
>  	tcf_exts_destroy(&n->exts);
>  	tcf_exts_put_net(&n->exts);
> -	if (n->ht_down)
> -		n->ht_down->refcnt--;
> +	if (ht && ht->refcnt-- == 0)
oops...   this    ^^^^^^^^^^^^ should be: '--th->refcnt' ...

> 
> +		kfree(ht);

 #ifdef CONFIG_CLS_U32_PERF
>  	if (free_pf)
>  		free_percpu(n->pf);
> @@ -624,7 +626,12 @@ static int u32_destroy_hnode(struct tcf_proto *tp, struct tc_u_hnode *ht,
>  			idr_destroy(&ht->handle_idr);
>  			idr_remove_ext(&tp_c->handle_idr, ht->handle);
>  			RCU_INIT_POINTER(*hn, ht->next);
> -			kfree_rcu(ht, rcu);
> +
> +			/* u32_destroy_key() will will later free ht for us, if
> +			 * it's still referenced by some knode
> +			 */
> +			if (ht->refcnt == 0)
> +				kfree_rcu(ht, rcu);
>  			return 0;
>  		}
>  	}
> @@ -667,7 +674,11 @@ static void u32_destroy(struct tcf_proto *tp, struct netlink_ext_ack *extack)
>  
>  		while ((ht = rtnl_dereference(tp_c->hlist)) != NULL) {
>  			RCU_INIT_POINTER(tp_c->hlist, ht->next);
> -			kfree_rcu(ht, rcu);
> +			/* u32_destroy_key() will will later free ht for us, if
> +			 * it's still referenced by some knode
> +			 */
> +			if (ht->refcnt == 0)
> +				kfree_rcu(ht, rcu);

And it's probably better merge the previous loop with this one.

I'll include the above changes in v3

Paolo

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread

end of thread, other threads:[~2018-02-03 18:49 UTC | newest]

Thread overview: 7+ messages (download: mbox.gz / follow: Atom feed)
-- links below jump to the message on this page --
2018-02-02 13:20 [PATCH net] cls_u32: fix use after free in u32_destroy_key() Paolo Abeni
2018-02-02 13:35 ` Paolo Abeni
2018-02-02 14:30 ` [PATCH net v2] " Paolo Abeni
2018-02-02 17:54   ` Ivan Vecera
2018-02-02 21:52   ` Cong Wang
2018-02-03 17:46     ` Paolo Abeni
2018-02-03 18:49   ` Paolo Abeni

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