From: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>
To: linux-cxl@vger.kernel.org
Cc: nvdimm@lists.linux.dev, dan.j.williams@intel.com,
bwidawsk@kernel.org, ira.weiny@intel.com,
vishal.l.verma@intel.com, alison.schofield@intel.com,
dave@stgolabs.net, Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com
Subject: [PATCH v2 10/19] cxl/pmem: Add "Unlock" security command support
Date: Wed, 21 Sep 2022 08:32:28 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <166377434821.430546.18100037354899710663.stgit@djiang5-desk3.ch.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <166377414787.430546.3863229455285366312.stgit@djiang5-desk3.ch.intel.com>
Create callback function to support the nvdimm_security_ops() ->unlock()
callback. Translate the operation to send "Unlock" security command for CXL
mem device.
When the mem device is unlocked, arch_invalidate_nvdimm_cache() is called
in order to invalidate all CPU caches before attempting to access the mem
device.
See CXL 2.0 spec section 8.2.9.5.6.4 for reference.
Signed-off-by: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>
---
drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c | 1 +
drivers/cxl/cxlmem.h | 1 +
drivers/cxl/security.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
include/uapi/linux/cxl_mem.h | 1 +
4 files changed, 28 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c b/drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c
index 6b8f118b2604..243b01e2de85 100644
--- a/drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c
+++ b/drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c
@@ -69,6 +69,7 @@ static struct cxl_mem_command cxl_mem_commands[CXL_MEM_COMMAND_ID_MAX] = {
CXL_CMD(SET_PASSPHRASE, 0x60, 0, 0),
CXL_CMD(DISABLE_PASSPHRASE, 0x40, 0, 0),
CXL_CMD(FREEZE_SECURITY, 0, 0, 0),
+ CXL_CMD(UNLOCK, 0x20, 0, 0),
};
/*
diff --git a/drivers/cxl/cxlmem.h b/drivers/cxl/cxlmem.h
index 9007158969fe..4e6897e8eb7d 100644
--- a/drivers/cxl/cxlmem.h
+++ b/drivers/cxl/cxlmem.h
@@ -276,6 +276,7 @@ enum cxl_opcode {
CXL_MBOX_OP_GET_SECURITY_STATE = 0x4500,
CXL_MBOX_OP_SET_PASSPHRASE = 0x4501,
CXL_MBOX_OP_DISABLE_PASSPHRASE = 0x4502,
+ CXL_MBOX_OP_UNLOCK = 0x4503,
CXL_MBOX_OP_FREEZE_SECURITY = 0x4504,
CXL_MBOX_OP_MAX = 0x10000
};
diff --git a/drivers/cxl/security.c b/drivers/cxl/security.c
index d991cbee3531..8bfdcb58d381 100644
--- a/drivers/cxl/security.c
+++ b/drivers/cxl/security.c
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/async.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/memregion.h>
#include "cxlmem.h"
#include "cxl.h"
@@ -104,11 +105,35 @@ static int cxl_pmem_security_freeze(struct nvdimm *nvdimm)
return cxl_mbox_send_cmd(cxlds, CXL_MBOX_OP_FREEZE_SECURITY, NULL, 0, NULL, 0);
}
+static int cxl_pmem_security_unlock(struct nvdimm *nvdimm,
+ const struct nvdimm_key_data *key_data)
+{
+ struct cxl_nvdimm *cxl_nvd = nvdimm_provider_data(nvdimm);
+ struct cxl_memdev *cxlmd = cxl_nvd->cxlmd;
+ struct cxl_dev_state *cxlds = cxlmd->cxlds;
+ u8 pass[NVDIMM_PASSPHRASE_LEN];
+ int rc;
+
+ if (!cpu_cache_has_invalidate_memregion())
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+ memcpy(pass, key_data->data, NVDIMM_PASSPHRASE_LEN);
+ rc = cxl_mbox_send_cmd(cxlds, CXL_MBOX_OP_UNLOCK,
+ pass, NVDIMM_PASSPHRASE_LEN, NULL, 0);
+ if (rc < 0)
+ return rc;
+
+ /* DIMM unlocked, invalidate all CPU caches before we read it */
+ cpu_cache_invalidate_memregion(IORES_DESC_PERSISTENT_MEMORY);
+ return 0;
+}
+
static const struct nvdimm_security_ops __cxl_security_ops = {
.get_flags = cxl_pmem_get_security_flags,
.change_key = cxl_pmem_security_change_key,
.disable = cxl_pmem_security_disable,
.freeze = cxl_pmem_security_freeze,
+ .unlock = cxl_pmem_security_unlock,
};
const struct nvdimm_security_ops *cxl_security_ops = &__cxl_security_ops;
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/cxl_mem.h b/include/uapi/linux/cxl_mem.h
index 7c0adcd68f4c..95dca8d4584f 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/cxl_mem.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/cxl_mem.h
@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@
___C(SET_PASSPHRASE, "Set Passphrase"), \
___C(DISABLE_PASSPHRASE, "Disable Passphrase"), \
___C(FREEZE_SECURITY, "Freeze Security"), \
+ ___C(UNLOCK, "Unlock"), \
___C(MAX, "invalid / last command")
#define ___C(a, b) CXL_MEM_COMMAND_ID_##a
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-09-21 15:32 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 51+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-09-21 15:31 [PATCH v2 00/19] Introduce security commands for CXL pmem device Dave Jiang
2022-09-21 15:31 ` [PATCH v2 01/19] memregion: Add cpu_cache_invalidate_memregion() interface Dave Jiang
2022-10-13 0:14 ` [PATCH v3] " Davidlohr Bueso
2022-09-21 15:31 ` [PATCH v2 02/19] cxl/pmem: Introduce nvdimm_security_ops with ->get_flags() operation Dave Jiang
2022-09-21 21:07 ` Davidlohr Bueso
2022-09-21 15:31 ` [PATCH v2 03/19] tools/testing/cxl: Add "Get Security State" opcode support Dave Jiang
2022-11-04 12:28 ` Jonathan Cameron
2022-09-21 15:31 ` [PATCH v2 04/19] cxl/pmem: Add "Set Passphrase" security command support Dave Jiang
2022-09-21 20:06 ` Davidlohr Bueso
2022-09-21 15:31 ` [PATCH v2 05/19] tools/testing/cxl: Add "Set Passphrase" opcode support Dave Jiang
2022-11-04 13:56 ` Jonathan Cameron
2022-09-21 15:32 ` [PATCH v2 06/19] cxl/pmem: Add Disable Passphrase security command support Dave Jiang
2022-09-21 20:09 ` Davidlohr Bueso
2022-09-21 15:32 ` [PATCH v2 07/19] tools/testing/cxl: Add "Disable" security opcode support Dave Jiang
2022-11-07 14:36 ` Jonathan Cameron
2022-09-21 15:32 ` [PATCH v2 08/19] cxl/pmem: Add "Freeze Security State" security command support Dave Jiang
2022-09-21 20:25 ` Davidlohr Bueso
2022-09-21 15:32 ` [PATCH v2 09/19] tools/testing/cxl: Add "Freeze Security State" security opcode support Dave Jiang
2022-11-07 14:44 ` Jonathan Cameron
2022-11-07 19:01 ` Dave Jiang
2022-11-11 10:27 ` Jonathan Cameron
2022-09-21 15:32 ` Dave Jiang [this message]
2022-09-21 21:49 ` [PATCH v2 10/19] cxl/pmem: Add "Unlock" security command support Davidlohr Bueso
2022-11-07 14:55 ` Jonathan Cameron
2022-09-21 15:32 ` [PATCH v2 11/19] tools/testing/cxl: Add "Unlock" security opcode support Dave Jiang
2022-11-07 15:00 ` Jonathan Cameron
2022-09-21 15:32 ` [PATCH v2 12/19] cxl/pmem: Add "Passphrase Secure Erase" security command support Dave Jiang
2022-09-21 20:15 ` Davidlohr Bueso
2022-09-21 21:23 ` Dave Jiang
2022-11-07 15:25 ` Jonathan Cameron
2022-11-07 20:19 ` Dave Jiang
2022-09-21 15:32 ` [PATCH v2 13/19] tools/testing/cxl: Add "passphrase secure erase" opcode support Dave Jiang
2022-11-07 15:35 ` Jonathan Cameron
2022-11-07 21:58 ` Dave Jiang
2022-09-21 15:32 ` [PATCH v2 14/19] nvdimm/cxl/pmem: Add support for master passphrase disable security command Dave Jiang
2022-11-07 15:38 ` Jonathan Cameron
2022-09-21 15:32 ` [PATCH v2 15/19] cxl/pmem: add id attribute to CXL based nvdimm Dave Jiang
2022-11-07 15:41 ` Jonathan Cameron
2022-09-21 15:33 ` [PATCH v2 16/19] tools/testing/cxl: add mechanism to lock mem device for testing Dave Jiang
2022-11-07 15:56 ` Jonathan Cameron
2022-11-07 22:33 ` Dave Jiang
2022-09-21 15:33 ` [PATCH v2 17/19] cxl/pmem: add provider name to cxl pmem dimm attribute group Dave Jiang
2022-11-07 15:58 ` Jonathan Cameron
2022-11-07 23:46 ` Dave Jiang
2022-09-21 15:33 ` [PATCH v2 18/19] libnvdimm: Introduce CONFIG_NVDIMM_SECURITY_TEST flag Dave Jiang
2022-11-07 16:01 ` Jonathan Cameron
2022-11-07 23:46 ` Dave Jiang
2022-09-21 15:33 ` [PATCH v2 19/19] cxl: add dimm_id support for __nvdimm_create() Dave Jiang
2022-09-23 10:31 ` Davidlohr Bueso
2022-09-23 16:18 ` Dave Jiang
2022-11-07 16:05 ` Jonathan Cameron
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