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From: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@Huawei.com>
To: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>
Cc: <linux-cxl@vger.kernel.org>, <nvdimm@lists.linux.dev>,
	<dan.j.williams@intel.com>, <bwidawsk@kernel.org>,
	<ira.weiny@intel.com>, <vishal.l.verma@intel.com>,
	<alison.schofield@intel.com>, <dave@stgolabs.net>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 13/19] tools/testing/cxl: Add "passphrase secure erase" opcode support
Date: Mon, 7 Nov 2022 15:35:37 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20221107153537.0000050e@Huawei.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <166377436599.430546.9691226328917294997.stgit@djiang5-desk3.ch.intel.com>

On Wed, 21 Sep 2022 08:32:46 -0700
Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com> wrote:

> Add support to emulate a CXL mem device support the "passphrase secure
> erase" operation.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>
> ---
>  tools/testing/cxl/test/mem.c |   56 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  1 file changed, 56 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/tools/testing/cxl/test/mem.c b/tools/testing/cxl/test/mem.c
> index 840378d239bf..a0a58156c15a 100644
> --- a/tools/testing/cxl/test/mem.c
> +++ b/tools/testing/cxl/test/mem.c
> @@ -356,6 +356,59 @@ static int mock_unlock_security(struct cxl_dev_state *cxlds, struct cxl_mbox_cmd
>  	return 0;
>  }
>  
> +static int mock_passphrase_erase(struct cxl_dev_state *cxlds, struct cxl_mbox_cmd *cmd)
> +{
> +	struct cxl_mock_mem_pdata *mdata = dev_get_platdata(cxlds->dev);
> +	struct cxl_pass_erase *erase;
> +
> +	if (cmd->size_in != sizeof(*erase))
> +		return -EINVAL;
> +
> +	if (cmd->size_out != 0)
> +		return -EINVAL;
> +
> +	if (mdata->security_state & CXL_PMEM_SEC_STATE_FROZEN) {
> +		cmd->return_code = CXL_MBOX_CMD_RC_SECURITY;
> +		return -ENXIO;
> +	}
> +

I think we need to check also that the passphrase supplied is not the
master one in which case the lockout on user passphrase shouldn't matter.

> +	if (mdata->security_state & CXL_PMEM_SEC_STATE_USER_PLIMIT) {
> +		cmd->return_code = CXL_MBOX_CMD_RC_SECURITY;
> +		return -ENXIO;
> +	}
> +
> +	erase = cmd->payload_in;
> +	if (erase->type == CXL_PMEM_SEC_PASS_MASTER &&
> +	    mdata->security_state & CXL_PMEM_SEC_STATE_MASTER_PASS_SET &&
> +	    memcmp(mdata->master_pass, erase->pass, NVDIMM_PASSPHRASE_LEN)) {
> +		if (++mdata->master_limit == PASS_TRY_LIMIT)

It's harmless, but I'm not sure I like the adding to this when we've already
hit the limit.  Maybe only increment if not?

> +			mdata->security_state |= CXL_PMEM_SEC_STATE_MASTER_PLIMIT;
> +		cmd->return_code = CXL_MBOX_CMD_RC_PASSPHRASE;
> +		return -ENXIO;
> +	}
> +
> +	if (erase->type == CXL_PMEM_SEC_PASS_USER &&
> +	    mdata->security_state & CXL_PMEM_SEC_STATE_USER_PASS_SET &&
> +	    memcmp(mdata->user_pass, erase->pass, NVDIMM_PASSPHRASE_LEN)) {
> +		if (++mdata->user_limit == PASS_TRY_LIMIT)
> +			mdata->security_state |= CXL_PMEM_SEC_STATE_USER_PLIMIT;
> +		cmd->return_code = CXL_MBOX_CMD_RC_PASSPHRASE;
> +		return -ENXIO;
> +	}
> +
> +	if (erase->type == CXL_PMEM_SEC_PASS_USER) {
> +		mdata->security_state &= ~CXL_PMEM_SEC_STATE_USER_PASS_SET;
> +		mdata->user_limit = 0;

I think it would be more logical to set this to zero as part of the password
testing block above rather than down here.

I also 'think' the user passphrase is wiped even if the secure erase was
done with the master key. 
"The user passphrase shall be disabled after secure erase, but the master passphrase, if set, shall 
be unchanged" doesn't say anything about only if the user passphrase was the one used to
perform the erase.

> +		memset(mdata->user_pass, 0, NVDIMM_PASSPHRASE_LEN);
> +	} else if (erase->type == CXL_PMEM_SEC_PASS_MASTER) {
> +		mdata->master_limit = 0;
> +	}
> +
> +	mdata->security_state &= ~CXL_PMEM_SEC_STATE_LOCKED;
> +
> +	return 0;
> +}
> +



  reply	other threads:[~2022-11-07 15:35 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 51+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-09-21 15:31 [PATCH v2 00/19] Introduce security commands for CXL pmem device Dave Jiang
2022-09-21 15:31 ` [PATCH v2 01/19] memregion: Add cpu_cache_invalidate_memregion() interface Dave Jiang
2022-10-13  0:14   ` [PATCH v3] " Davidlohr Bueso
2022-09-21 15:31 ` [PATCH v2 02/19] cxl/pmem: Introduce nvdimm_security_ops with ->get_flags() operation Dave Jiang
2022-09-21 21:07   ` Davidlohr Bueso
2022-09-21 15:31 ` [PATCH v2 03/19] tools/testing/cxl: Add "Get Security State" opcode support Dave Jiang
2022-11-04 12:28   ` Jonathan Cameron
2022-09-21 15:31 ` [PATCH v2 04/19] cxl/pmem: Add "Set Passphrase" security command support Dave Jiang
2022-09-21 20:06   ` Davidlohr Bueso
2022-09-21 15:31 ` [PATCH v2 05/19] tools/testing/cxl: Add "Set Passphrase" opcode support Dave Jiang
2022-11-04 13:56   ` Jonathan Cameron
2022-09-21 15:32 ` [PATCH v2 06/19] cxl/pmem: Add Disable Passphrase security command support Dave Jiang
2022-09-21 20:09   ` Davidlohr Bueso
2022-09-21 15:32 ` [PATCH v2 07/19] tools/testing/cxl: Add "Disable" security opcode support Dave Jiang
2022-11-07 14:36   ` Jonathan Cameron
2022-09-21 15:32 ` [PATCH v2 08/19] cxl/pmem: Add "Freeze Security State" security command support Dave Jiang
2022-09-21 20:25   ` Davidlohr Bueso
2022-09-21 15:32 ` [PATCH v2 09/19] tools/testing/cxl: Add "Freeze Security State" security opcode support Dave Jiang
2022-11-07 14:44   ` Jonathan Cameron
2022-11-07 19:01     ` Dave Jiang
2022-11-11 10:27       ` Jonathan Cameron
2022-09-21 15:32 ` [PATCH v2 10/19] cxl/pmem: Add "Unlock" security command support Dave Jiang
2022-09-21 21:49   ` Davidlohr Bueso
2022-11-07 14:55   ` Jonathan Cameron
2022-09-21 15:32 ` [PATCH v2 11/19] tools/testing/cxl: Add "Unlock" security opcode support Dave Jiang
2022-11-07 15:00   ` Jonathan Cameron
2022-09-21 15:32 ` [PATCH v2 12/19] cxl/pmem: Add "Passphrase Secure Erase" security command support Dave Jiang
2022-09-21 20:15   ` Davidlohr Bueso
2022-09-21 21:23     ` Dave Jiang
2022-11-07 15:25   ` Jonathan Cameron
2022-11-07 20:19     ` Dave Jiang
2022-09-21 15:32 ` [PATCH v2 13/19] tools/testing/cxl: Add "passphrase secure erase" opcode support Dave Jiang
2022-11-07 15:35   ` Jonathan Cameron [this message]
2022-11-07 21:58     ` Dave Jiang
2022-09-21 15:32 ` [PATCH v2 14/19] nvdimm/cxl/pmem: Add support for master passphrase disable security command Dave Jiang
2022-11-07 15:38   ` Jonathan Cameron
2022-09-21 15:32 ` [PATCH v2 15/19] cxl/pmem: add id attribute to CXL based nvdimm Dave Jiang
2022-11-07 15:41   ` Jonathan Cameron
2022-09-21 15:33 ` [PATCH v2 16/19] tools/testing/cxl: add mechanism to lock mem device for testing Dave Jiang
2022-11-07 15:56   ` Jonathan Cameron
2022-11-07 22:33     ` Dave Jiang
2022-09-21 15:33 ` [PATCH v2 17/19] cxl/pmem: add provider name to cxl pmem dimm attribute group Dave Jiang
2022-11-07 15:58   ` Jonathan Cameron
2022-11-07 23:46     ` Dave Jiang
2022-09-21 15:33 ` [PATCH v2 18/19] libnvdimm: Introduce CONFIG_NVDIMM_SECURITY_TEST flag Dave Jiang
2022-11-07 16:01   ` Jonathan Cameron
2022-11-07 23:46     ` Dave Jiang
2022-09-21 15:33 ` [PATCH v2 19/19] cxl: add dimm_id support for __nvdimm_create() Dave Jiang
2022-09-23 10:31   ` Davidlohr Bueso
2022-09-23 16:18     ` Dave Jiang
2022-11-07 16:05   ` Jonathan Cameron

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