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* [Bug 1136477] Re: qemu doesn't sanitize command line options carrying plaintext passwords
       [not found] <20130228222749.31447.62008.malonedeb@chaenomeles.canonical.com>
@ 2021-04-22  4:30 ` Thomas Huth
  2021-06-22  4:17 ` Launchpad Bug Tracker
  1 sibling, 0 replies; 2+ messages in thread
From: Thomas Huth @ 2021-04-22  4:30 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: qemu-devel

The QEMU project is currently considering to move its bug tracking to another system. For this we need to know which bugs are still valid and which could be closed already. Thus we are setting older bugs to "Incomplete" now.
If you still think this bug report here is valid, then please switch the state back to "New" within the next 60 days, otherwise this report will be marked as "Expired". Or mark it as "Fix Released" if the problem has been solved with a newer version of QEMU already. Thank you and sorry for the inconvenience.

** Changed in: qemu
       Status: New => Incomplete

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https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1136477

Title:
  qemu doesn't sanitize command line options carrying plaintext
  passwords

Status in QEMU:
  Incomplete

Bug description:
  A slight security problem exists with qemu's lack of sanitization of
  argv[], for cases where the user may have specified a plaintext
  password for spice/vnc authorization.  (Yes, it's not great to use
  this facility, but it's convenient and not grotesquely unsafe, were it
  not for this bug.)  It would be nice if those plaintext passwords were
  nuked from the command line, so a subsequent "ps awux" didn't show
  them for all to see.

  See also https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=916279

To manage notifications about this bug go to:
https://bugs.launchpad.net/qemu/+bug/1136477/+subscriptions


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 2+ messages in thread

* [Bug 1136477] Re: qemu doesn't sanitize command line options carrying plaintext passwords
       [not found] <20130228222749.31447.62008.malonedeb@chaenomeles.canonical.com>
  2021-04-22  4:30 ` [Bug 1136477] Re: qemu doesn't sanitize command line options carrying plaintext passwords Thomas Huth
@ 2021-06-22  4:17 ` Launchpad Bug Tracker
  1 sibling, 0 replies; 2+ messages in thread
From: Launchpad Bug Tracker @ 2021-06-22  4:17 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: qemu-devel

[Expired for QEMU because there has been no activity for 60 days.]

** Changed in: qemu
       Status: Incomplete => Expired

-- 
You received this bug notification because you are a member of qemu-
devel-ml, which is subscribed to QEMU.
https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1136477

Title:
  qemu doesn't sanitize command line options carrying plaintext
  passwords

Status in QEMU:
  Expired

Bug description:
  A slight security problem exists with qemu's lack of sanitization of
  argv[], for cases where the user may have specified a plaintext
  password for spice/vnc authorization.  (Yes, it's not great to use
  this facility, but it's convenient and not grotesquely unsafe, were it
  not for this bug.)  It would be nice if those plaintext passwords were
  nuked from the command line, so a subsequent "ps awux" didn't show
  them for all to see.

  See also https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=916279

To manage notifications about this bug go to:
https://bugs.launchpad.net/qemu/+bug/1136477/+subscriptions


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 2+ messages in thread

end of thread, other threads:[~2021-06-22  5:14 UTC | newest]

Thread overview: 2+ messages (download: mbox.gz / follow: Atom feed)
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     [not found] <20130228222749.31447.62008.malonedeb@chaenomeles.canonical.com>
2021-04-22  4:30 ` [Bug 1136477] Re: qemu doesn't sanitize command line options carrying plaintext passwords Thomas Huth
2021-06-22  4:17 ` Launchpad Bug Tracker

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