All of lore.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
To: <simon.guinot@sequanux.org>, <linux-efi@vger.kernel.org>,
	<brijesh.singh@amd.com>, <kvm@vger.kernel.org>,
	<rkrcmar@redhat.com>, <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>,
	<linus.walleij@linaro.org>, <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
	<paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>, <hpa@zytor.com>,
	<dan.j.williams@intel.com>, <aarcange@redhat.com>,
	<sfr@canb.auug.org.au>, <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>,
	<herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>, <bhe@redhat.com>,
	<xemul@parallels.com>, <joro@8bytes.org>, <x86@kernel.org>,
	<mingo@redhat.com>, <msalter@redhat.com>,
	<ross.zwisler@linux.intel.com>, <bp@suse.de>, <dyoung@redhat.com>,
	<thomas.lendacky@amd.com>, <jroedel@suse.de>,
	<keescook@chromium.org>, <toshi.kani@hpe.com>,
	<mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>, <devel@linuxdriverproject.org>,
	<tglx@linutronix.de>, <mchehab@kernel.org>,
	<iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>, <labbott@fedoraproject.org>,
	<tony.luck@intel.com>, <alexandre.bounine@idt.com>,
	<kuleshovmail@gmail.com>, <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	<mcgrof@kernel.org>, <linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org>,
	<pbonzini@redhat.com>, <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	<davem@davemloft.net>
Subject: [RFC PATCH v1 04/28] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) support
Date: Mon, 22 Aug 2016 19:24:19 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <147190825949.9523.11406635622434950066.stgit@brijesh-build-machine> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <147190820782.9523.4967724730957229273.stgit@brijesh-build-machine>

From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>

Provide support for Secure Encyrpted Virtualization (SEV). This initial
support defines the SEV active flag in order for the kernel to determine
if it is running with SEV active or not.

Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h |    3 +++
 arch/x86/kernel/mem_encrypt.S      |    8 ++++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/x8664_ksyms_64.c   |    1 +
 3 files changed, 12 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
index e395729..9c592d1 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
 #ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
 
 extern unsigned long sme_me_mask;
+extern unsigned int sev_active;
 
 u8 sme_get_me_loss(void);
 
@@ -50,6 +51,8 @@ void swiotlb_set_mem_dec(void *vaddr, unsigned long size);
 
 #define sme_me_mask		0UL
 
+#define sev_active		0
+
 static inline u8 sme_get_me_loss(void)
 {
 	return 0;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/mem_encrypt.S b/arch/x86/kernel/mem_encrypt.S
index bf9f6a9..6a8cd18 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/mem_encrypt.S
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/mem_encrypt.S
@@ -96,6 +96,10 @@ ENDPROC(sme_enable)
 
 ENTRY(sme_encrypt_kernel)
 #ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
+	/* If SEV is active then the kernel is already encrypted */
+	cmpl	$0, sev_active(%rip)
+	jnz	.Lencrypt_exit
+
 	/* If SME is not active then no need to encrypt the kernel */
 	cmpq	$0, sme_me_mask(%rip)
 	jz	.Lencrypt_exit
@@ -334,6 +338,10 @@ sme_me_loss:
 	.byte	0x00
 	.align	8
 
+ENTRY(sev_active)
+	.word	0x00000000
+	.align	8
+
 mem_encrypt_enable_option:
 	.asciz "mem_encrypt=on"
 	.align	8
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/x8664_ksyms_64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/x8664_ksyms_64.c
index 651c4c8..14bfc0b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/x8664_ksyms_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/x8664_ksyms_64.c
@@ -88,4 +88,5 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(___preempt_schedule_notrace);
 #ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sme_me_mask);
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sme_get_me_loss);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sev_active);
 #endif

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
To: simon.guinot@sequanux.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
	brijesh.singh@amd.com, kvm@vger.kernel.org, rkrcmar@redhat.com,
	matt@codeblueprint.co.uk, linus.walleij@linaro.org,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, paul.gortmaker@windriver.com, hpa@zytor.com,
	dan.j.williams@intel.com, aarcange@redhat.com,
	sfr@canb.auug.org.au, andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com,
	herbert@gondor.apana.org.au, bhe@redhat.com, xemul@parallels.com,
	joro@8bytes.org, x86@kernel.org, mingo@redhat.com,
	msalter@redhat.com, ross.zwisler@linux.intel.com, bp@suse.de,
	dyoung@redhat.com, thomas.lendacky@amd.com, jroedel@suse.de,
	keescook@chromium.org, toshi.kani@hpe.com,
	mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com, devel@linuxdriverproject.org,
	tglx@linutronix.de, mchehab@kernel.org, iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com,
	labbott@fedoraproject.org, tony.luck@intel.com, alexandre.bounin
Subject: [RFC PATCH v1 04/28] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) support
Date: Mon, 22 Aug 2016 19:24:19 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <147190825949.9523.11406635622434950066.stgit@brijesh-build-machine> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <147190820782.9523.4967724730957229273.stgit@brijesh-build-machine>

From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>

Provide support for Secure Encyrpted Virtualization (SEV). This initial
support defines the SEV active flag in order for the kernel to determine
if it is running with SEV active or not.

Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h |    3 +++
 arch/x86/kernel/mem_encrypt.S      |    8 ++++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/x8664_ksyms_64.c   |    1 +
 3 files changed, 12 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
index e395729..9c592d1 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
 #ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
 
 extern unsigned long sme_me_mask;
+extern unsigned int sev_active;
 
 u8 sme_get_me_loss(void);
 
@@ -50,6 +51,8 @@ void swiotlb_set_mem_dec(void *vaddr, unsigned long size);
 
 #define sme_me_mask		0UL
 
+#define sev_active		0
+
 static inline u8 sme_get_me_loss(void)
 {
 	return 0;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/mem_encrypt.S b/arch/x86/kernel/mem_encrypt.S
index bf9f6a9..6a8cd18 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/mem_encrypt.S
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/mem_encrypt.S
@@ -96,6 +96,10 @@ ENDPROC(sme_enable)
 
 ENTRY(sme_encrypt_kernel)
 #ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
+	/* If SEV is active then the kernel is already encrypted */
+	cmpl	$0, sev_active(%rip)
+	jnz	.Lencrypt_exit
+
 	/* If SME is not active then no need to encrypt the kernel */
 	cmpq	$0, sme_me_mask(%rip)
 	jz	.Lencrypt_exit
@@ -334,6 +338,10 @@ sme_me_loss:
 	.byte	0x00
 	.align	8
 
+ENTRY(sev_active)
+	.word	0x00000000
+	.align	8
+
 mem_encrypt_enable_option:
 	.asciz "mem_encrypt=on"
 	.align	8
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/x8664_ksyms_64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/x8664_ksyms_64.c
index 651c4c8..14bfc0b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/x8664_ksyms_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/x8664_ksyms_64.c
@@ -88,4 +88,5 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(___preempt_schedule_notrace);
 #ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sme_me_mask);
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sme_get_me_loss);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sev_active);
 #endif

--
To unsubscribe, send a message with 'unsubscribe linux-mm' in
the body to majordomo@kvack.org.  For more info on Linux MM,
see: http://www.linux-mm.org/ .
Don't email: <a href=mailto:"dont@kvack.org"> email@kvack.org </a>

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
To: <simon.guinot@sequanux.org>, <linux-efi@vger.kernel.org>,
	<brijesh.singh@amd.com>, <kvm@vger.kernel.org>,
	<rkrcmar@redhat.com>, <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>,
	<linus.walleij@linaro.org>, <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
	<paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>, <hpa@zytor.com>,
	<dan.j.williams@intel.com>, <aarcange@redhat.com>,
	<sfr@canb.auug.org.au>, <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>,
	<herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>, <bhe@redhat.com>,
	<xemul@parallels.com>, <joro@8bytes.org>, <x86@kernel.org>,
	<mingo@redhat.com>, <msalter@redhat.com>,
	<ross.zwisler@linux.intel.com>, <bp@suse.de>, <dyoung@redhat.com>,
	<thomas.lendacky@amd.com>, <jroedel@suse.de>,
	<keescook@chromium.org>, <toshi.kani@hpe.com>,
	<mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>, <devel@linuxdriverproject.org>,
	<tglx@linutronix.de>, <mchehab@kernel.org>,
	<iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>, <labbott@fedoraproject.org>,
	<tony.luck@intel.com>,
	<alexandre.bounin
Subject: [RFC PATCH v1 04/28] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) support
Date: Mon, 22 Aug 2016 19:24:19 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <147190825949.9523.11406635622434950066.stgit@brijesh-build-machine> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <147190820782.9523.4967724730957229273.stgit@brijesh-build-machine>

From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>

Provide support for Secure Encyrpted Virtualization (SEV). This initial
support defines the SEV active flag in order for the kernel to determine
if it is running with SEV active or not.

Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h |    3 +++
 arch/x86/kernel/mem_encrypt.S      |    8 ++++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/x8664_ksyms_64.c   |    1 +
 3 files changed, 12 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
index e395729..9c592d1 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
 #ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
 
 extern unsigned long sme_me_mask;
+extern unsigned int sev_active;
 
 u8 sme_get_me_loss(void);
 
@@ -50,6 +51,8 @@ void swiotlb_set_mem_dec(void *vaddr, unsigned long size);
 
 #define sme_me_mask		0UL
 
+#define sev_active		0
+
 static inline u8 sme_get_me_loss(void)
 {
 	return 0;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/mem_encrypt.S b/arch/x86/kernel/mem_encrypt.S
index bf9f6a9..6a8cd18 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/mem_encrypt.S
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/mem_encrypt.S
@@ -96,6 +96,10 @@ ENDPROC(sme_enable)
 
 ENTRY(sme_encrypt_kernel)
 #ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
+	/* If SEV is active then the kernel is already encrypted */
+	cmpl	$0, sev_active(%rip)
+	jnz	.Lencrypt_exit
+
 	/* If SME is not active then no need to encrypt the kernel */
 	cmpq	$0, sme_me_mask(%rip)
 	jz	.Lencrypt_exit
@@ -334,6 +338,10 @@ sme_me_loss:
 	.byte	0x00
 	.align	8
 
+ENTRY(sev_active)
+	.word	0x00000000
+	.align	8
+
 mem_encrypt_enable_option:
 	.asciz "mem_encrypt=on"
 	.align	8
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/x8664_ksyms_64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/x8664_ksyms_64.c
index 651c4c8..14bfc0b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/x8664_ksyms_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/x8664_ksyms_64.c
@@ -88,4 +88,5 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(___preempt_schedule_notrace);
 #ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sme_me_mask);
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sme_get_me_loss);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sev_active);
 #endif

--
To unsubscribe, send a message with 'unsubscribe linux-mm' in
the body to majordomo@kvack.org.  For more info on Linux MM,
see: http://www.linux-mm.org/ .
Don't email: <a href=mailto:"dont@kvack.org"> email@kvack.org </a>

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
To: simon.guinot@sequanux.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
	brijesh.singh@amd.com, kvm@vger.kernel.org, rkrcmar@redhat.com,
	matt@codeblueprint.co.uk, linus.walleij@linaro.org,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, paul.gortmaker@windriver.com, hpa@zytor.com,
	dan.j.williams@intel.com, aarcange@redhat.com,
	sfr@canb.auug.org.au, andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com,
	herbert@gondor.apana.org.au, bhe@redhat.com, xemul@parallels.com,
	joro@8bytes.org, x86@kernel.org, mingo@redhat.com,
	msalter@redhat.com, ross.zwisler@linux.intel.com, bp@suse.de,
	dyoung@redhat.com, thomas.lendacky@amd.com, jroedel@suse.de,
	keescook@chromium.org, toshi.kani@hpe.com,
	mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com, devel@linuxdriverproject.org,
	tglx@linutronix.de, mchehab@kernel.org, iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com,
	labbott@fedoraproject.org, tony.luck@intel.com,
	alexandre.bounine@idt.com, kuleshovmail@gmail.com,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, mcgrof@kernel.org,
	linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, pbonzini@redhat.com,
	akpm@linux-foundation.org, davem@davemloft.net
Subject: [RFC PATCH v1 04/28] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) support
Date: Mon, 22 Aug 2016 19:24:19 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <147190825949.9523.11406635622434950066.stgit@brijesh-build-machine> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <147190820782.9523.4967724730957229273.stgit@brijesh-build-machine>

From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>

Provide support for Secure Encyrpted Virtualization (SEV). This initial
support defines the SEV active flag in order for the kernel to determine
if it is running with SEV active or not.

Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h |    3 +++
 arch/x86/kernel/mem_encrypt.S      |    8 ++++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/x8664_ksyms_64.c   |    1 +
 3 files changed, 12 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
index e395729..9c592d1 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
 #ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
 
 extern unsigned long sme_me_mask;
+extern unsigned int sev_active;
 
 u8 sme_get_me_loss(void);
 
@@ -50,6 +51,8 @@ void swiotlb_set_mem_dec(void *vaddr, unsigned long size);
 
 #define sme_me_mask		0UL
 
+#define sev_active		0
+
 static inline u8 sme_get_me_loss(void)
 {
 	return 0;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/mem_encrypt.S b/arch/x86/kernel/mem_encrypt.S
index bf9f6a9..6a8cd18 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/mem_encrypt.S
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/mem_encrypt.S
@@ -96,6 +96,10 @@ ENDPROC(sme_enable)
 
 ENTRY(sme_encrypt_kernel)
 #ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
+	/* If SEV is active then the kernel is already encrypted */
+	cmpl	$0, sev_active(%rip)
+	jnz	.Lencrypt_exit
+
 	/* If SME is not active then no need to encrypt the kernel */
 	cmpq	$0, sme_me_mask(%rip)
 	jz	.Lencrypt_exit
@@ -334,6 +338,10 @@ sme_me_loss:
 	.byte	0x00
 	.align	8
 
+ENTRY(sev_active)
+	.word	0x00000000
+	.align	8
+
 mem_encrypt_enable_option:
 	.asciz "mem_encrypt=on"
 	.align	8
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/x8664_ksyms_64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/x8664_ksyms_64.c
index 651c4c8..14bfc0b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/x8664_ksyms_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/x8664_ksyms_64.c
@@ -88,4 +88,5 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(___preempt_schedule_notrace);
 #ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sme_me_mask);
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sme_get_me_loss);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sev_active);
 #endif

--
To unsubscribe, send a message with 'unsubscribe linux-mm' in
the body to majordomo@kvack.org.  For more info on Linux MM,
see: http://www.linux-mm.org/ .
Don't email: <a href=mailto:"dont@kvack.org"> email@kvack.org </a>

  parent reply	other threads:[~2016-08-22 23:49 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 255+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2016-08-22 23:23 [RFC PATCH v1 00/28] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD) Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:23 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:23 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:23 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:23 ` [RFC PATCH v1 01/28] kvm: svm: Add support for additional SVM NPF error codes Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:23   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:23   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:23   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-09-13  9:56   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-13  9:56     ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-13  9:56     ` Borislav Petkov
2016-08-22 23:23 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:23 ` [RFC PATCH v1 02/28] kvm: svm: Add kvm_fast_pio_in support Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:23   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:23   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:23   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-09-21 10:58   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-21 10:58     ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-21 10:58     ` Borislav Petkov
2016-08-22 23:23 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:24 ` [RFC PATCH v1 03/28] kvm: svm: Use the hardware provided GPA instead of page walk Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:24   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:24   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:24   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-09-21 17:16   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-21 17:16     ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-21 17:16     ` Borislav Petkov
2016-08-22 23:24 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:24 ` [RFC PATCH v1 04/28] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) support Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:24 ` Brijesh Singh [this message]
2016-08-22 23:24   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:24   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:24   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-09-22 15:00   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-22 15:00     ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-22 15:00     ` Borislav Petkov
2016-08-22 23:24 ` [RFC PATCH v1 05/28] KVM: SVM: prepare for new bit definition in nested_ctl Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:24   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:24   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:24   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-09-22 14:17   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-22 14:17     ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-22 14:17     ` Borislav Petkov
2016-08-22 23:24 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:24 ` [RFC PATCH v1 06/28] KVM: SVM: Add SEV feature definitions to KVM Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:24 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:24   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:24   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:24   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:24 ` [RFC PATCH v1 07/28] x86: Do not encrypt memory areas if SEV is enabled Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:24   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:24   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:24   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:24 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:25 ` [RFC PATCH v1 08/28] Access BOOT related data encrypted with SEV active Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:25   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:25   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:25   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:25 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:25 ` [RFC PATCH v1 09/28] x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:25   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:25   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:25   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-09-22 14:35   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-22 14:35     ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-22 14:35     ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-22 14:35     ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-22 14:45     ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-09-22 14:45       ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-09-22 14:45       ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-09-22 14:59       ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-22 14:59         ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-22 14:59         ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-22 14:59         ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-22 15:05         ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-09-22 15:05           ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-09-22 15:05           ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-09-22 17:07           ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-22 17:07             ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-22 17:07             ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-22 17:07             ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-22 17:08             ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-09-22 17:08               ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-09-22 17:08               ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-09-22 17:08               ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-09-22 17:27               ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-22 17:27                 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-22 17:27                 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-22 19:04             ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-22 19:04               ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-22 19:04               ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-22 19:04               ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-22 19:11               ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-22 19:11                 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-22 19:11                 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-22 19:49                 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-22 19:49                   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-22 19:49                   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-22 19:49                   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-22 20:10                   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-22 20:10                     ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-22 20:10                     ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-22 18:59         ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-22 18:59           ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-22 18:59           ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-22 18:59           ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-22 18:47       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-22 18:47         ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-22 18:47         ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-22 18:47         ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-22 18:50         ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-09-22 18:50           ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-09-22 18:50           ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-09-22 17:46     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-22 17:46       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-22 17:46       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-22 17:46       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-22 18:23       ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-09-22 18:23         ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-09-22 18:23         ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-09-22 18:37         ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-22 18:37           ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-22 18:37           ` Borislav Petkov
     [not found]           ` <20160922183759.7ahw2kbxit3epnzk-fF5Pk5pvG8Y@public.gmane.org>
2016-09-22 18:44             ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-09-22 18:44               ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-09-23  9:33           ` Kai Huang
2016-09-23  9:33             ` Kai Huang
2016-09-23  9:33             ` Kai Huang
2016-09-23  9:50             ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-23  9:50               ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-23  9:50               ` Borislav Petkov
2016-08-22 23:25 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:25 ` [RFC PATCH v1 10/28] x86: Change early_ioremap to early_memremap for BOOT data Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:25   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:25   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:25   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:25 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:25 ` [RFC PATCH v1 11/28] x86: Don't decrypt trampoline area if SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:25 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:25   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:25   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:25   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 12/28] x86: DMA support for SEV memory encryption Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:26   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:26   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:26   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:26 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 13/28] iommu/amd: AMD IOMMU support for SEV Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:26   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:26   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:26   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:26 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 14/28] x86: Don't set the SME MSR bit when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:26 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:26   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:26   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:26   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 15/28] x86: Unroll string I/O " Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:26 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:26   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:26   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:26   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 16/28] x86: Add support to determine if running with SEV enabled Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:26 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:26   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:26   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:26   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:27 ` [RFC PATCH v1 17/28] KVM: SVM: Enable SEV by setting the SEV_ENABLE cpu feature Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:27 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:27   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:27   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:27   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:27 ` [RFC PATCH v1 18/28] crypto: add AMD Platform Security Processor driver Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:27 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:27   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:27   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:27   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-23  7:14   ` Herbert Xu
2016-08-23  7:14     ` Herbert Xu
2016-08-23  7:14     ` Herbert Xu
2016-08-24 12:02     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-24 12:02       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-24 12:02       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-24 12:02       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 23:27 ` [RFC PATCH v1 19/28] KVM: SVM: prepare to reserve asid for SEV guest Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:27 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:27   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:27   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:27   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-10-13 10:17   ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-10-13 10:17     ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-08-22 23:28 ` [RFC PATCH v1 20/28] KVM: SVM: prepare for SEV guest management API support Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:28 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:28   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:28   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:28   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-10-13 10:41   ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-08-22 23:28 ` [RFC PATCH v1 21/28] KVM: introduce KVM_SEV_ISSUE_CMD ioctl Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:28   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:28   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:28   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-10-13 10:45   ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-10-13 10:45     ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-10-17 17:57     ` Brijesh Singh
2016-10-17 17:57       ` Brijesh Singh
2016-10-17 17:57       ` Brijesh Singh
2016-10-17 20:14       ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-10-17 20:14         ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-10-17 20:14         ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-10-18 19:32         ` Brijesh Singh
2016-10-18 19:32           ` Brijesh Singh
2016-10-18 19:32           ` Brijesh Singh
2016-10-18 21:44           ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-10-18 21:44             ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-10-18 21:44             ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-08-22 23:28 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:28 ` [RFC PATCH v1 22/28] KVM: SVM: add SEV launch start command Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:28   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:28   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:28   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-10-13 11:12   ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-08-22 23:28 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:28 ` [RFC PATCH v1 23/28] KVM: SVM: add SEV launch update command Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:28   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:28   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:28   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:28 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:28 ` [RFC PATCH v1 24/28] KVM: SVM: add SEV_LAUNCH_FINISH command Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:28 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:28   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:28   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:28   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-10-13 11:16   ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-08-22 23:29 ` [RFC PATCH v1 25/28] KVM: SVM: add KVM_SEV_GUEST_STATUS command Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:29 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:29   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:29   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:29   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:29 ` [RFC PATCH v1 26/28] KVM: SVM: add KVM_SEV_DEBUG_DECRYPT command Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:29 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:29   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:29   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:29   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:29 ` [RFC PATCH v1 27/28] KVM: SVM: add KVM_SEV_DEBUG_ENCRYPT command Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:29   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:29   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:29   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:29 ` [RFC PATCH v1 28/28] KVM: SVM: add command to query SEV API version Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:29   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:29   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:29   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:29 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-10-13 11:19 ` [RFC PATCH v1 00/28] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD) Paolo Bonzini
2016-10-17 13:51   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-10-17 13:51     ` Brijesh Singh

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=147190825949.9523.11406635622434950066.stgit@brijesh-build-machine \
    --to=brijesh.singh@amd.com \
    --cc=aarcange@redhat.com \
    --cc=akpm@linux-foundation.org \
    --cc=alexandre.bounine@idt.com \
    --cc=andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com \
    --cc=bhe@redhat.com \
    --cc=bp@suse.de \
    --cc=dan.j.williams@intel.com \
    --cc=davem@davemloft.net \
    --cc=devel@linuxdriverproject.org \
    --cc=dyoung@redhat.com \
    --cc=herbert@gondor.apana.org.au \
    --cc=hpa@zytor.com \
    --cc=iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com \
    --cc=joro@8bytes.org \
    --cc=jroedel@suse.de \
    --cc=keescook@chromium.org \
    --cc=kuleshovmail@gmail.com \
    --cc=kvm@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=labbott@fedoraproject.org \
    --cc=linus.walleij@linaro.org \
    --cc=linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-efi@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-mm@kvack.org \
    --cc=mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com \
    --cc=matt@codeblueprint.co.uk \
    --cc=mcgrof@kernel.org \
    --cc=mchehab@kernel.org \
    --cc=mingo@redhat.com \
    --cc=msalter@redhat.com \
    --cc=paul.gortmaker@windriver.com \
    --cc=pbonzini@redhat.com \
    --cc=rkrcmar@redhat.com \
    --cc=ross.zwisler@linux.intel.com \
    --cc=sfr@canb.auug.org.au \
    --cc=simon.guinot@sequanux.org \
    --cc=tglx@linutronix.de \
    --cc=thomas.lendacky@amd.com \
    --cc=tony.luck@intel.com \
    --cc=toshi.kani@hpe.com \
    --cc=x86@kernel.org \
    --cc=xemul@parallels.com \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.