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From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Michael Leibowitz <michael.leibowitz@intel.com>
Subject: [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 06/18] NFS: Avoid cross-structure casting
Date: Thu,  6 Apr 2017 14:18:21 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1491513513-84351-7-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1491513513-84351-1-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org>

When the call to nfs_devname() fails, the error path attempts to retain
the error via the mnt variable, but this requires a cast across very
different types (char * to struct vfsmount *), which the upcoming
structure layout randomization plugin flags as being potentially
dangerous in the face of randomization. This is a false positive, but
what this code actually wants to do is retain the error value, so this
patch explicitly sets it, instead of using what seems to be an
unexpected cast.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
 fs/nfs/namespace.c | 5 +++--
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/nfs/namespace.c b/fs/nfs/namespace.c
index 786f17580582..8ca5d147124d 100644
--- a/fs/nfs/namespace.c
+++ b/fs/nfs/namespace.c
@@ -259,9 +259,10 @@ struct vfsmount *nfs_do_submount(struct dentry *dentry, struct nfs_fh *fh,
 	if (page == NULL)
 		goto out;
 	devname = nfs_devname(dentry, page, PAGE_SIZE);
-	mnt = (struct vfsmount *)devname;
-	if (IS_ERR(devname))
+	if (IS_ERR(devname)) {
+		mnt = ERR_CAST(devname);
 		goto free_page;
+	}
 	mnt = nfs_do_clone_mount(NFS_SB(dentry->d_sb), devname, &mountdata);
 free_page:
 	free_page((unsigned long)page);
-- 
2.7.4

  parent reply	other threads:[~2017-04-06 21:18 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 34+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-04-06 21:18 [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 00/18] Introduce struct layout randomization plugin Kees Cook
2017-04-06 21:18 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 01/18] gcc-plugins: Add the randstruct plugin Kees Cook
2017-04-12 22:12   ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2017-04-17  5:30     ` Jessica Yu
2017-04-17 15:23       ` Kees Cook
2017-05-12  6:37         ` Loganaden Velvindron
2017-05-12 19:36           ` Kees Cook
2017-04-06 21:18 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 02/18] compiler: Add __designated_init annotation Kees Cook
2017-04-06 21:18 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 03/18] randstruct: Set designated_init attribute Kees Cook
2017-04-06 21:18 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 04/18] randstruct: Differentiate bad cast warnings Kees Cook
2017-04-06 21:18 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 05/18] af_unix: Use designated initializers Kees Cook
2017-04-06 21:18 ` Kees Cook [this message]
2017-04-06 21:18 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 07/18] randstruct: Whitelist struct security_hook_heads cast Kees Cook
2017-04-06 21:18 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 08/18] randstruct: Whitelist UNIXCB cast Kees Cook
2017-04-06 21:18 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 09/18] randstruct: Mark various structs for randomization Kees Cook
2017-04-06 21:18 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 10/18] scsi/bfa: use designated initializers Kees Cook
2017-04-06 21:18 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 11/18] scsi: qedi,qedf: Use " Kees Cook
2017-04-06 21:18 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 12/18] ovl: " Kees Cook
2017-04-06 21:18 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 13/18] randstruct: opt-out externally exposed function pointer structs Kees Cook
2017-04-06 21:18 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 14/18] randstruct: Disable randomization of ACPICA structs Kees Cook
2017-04-06 21:18 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 15/18] randstruct: Enable function pointer struct detection Kees Cook
2017-04-06 21:18 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 16/18] task_struct: Allow randomized layout Kees Cook
2017-04-07 16:25   ` Rik van Riel
2017-04-07 20:43     ` Kees Cook
2017-04-06 21:18 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 17/18] sgi-xp: Use designated initializers Kees Cook
2017-04-06 21:18 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 18/18] ACPICA: " Kees Cook
2017-04-06 21:54 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 00/18] Introduce struct layout randomization plugin James Morris
2017-04-06 22:32   ` Rik van Riel
2017-04-06 22:51     ` Kees Cook
2017-04-13 23:39 ` Laura Abbott
2017-04-15 18:50   ` Kees Cook
2017-04-18 17:15     ` Laura Abbott
2017-04-18 17:20       ` Kees Cook
2017-04-18 16:54 ` Laura Abbott

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