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From: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
To: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Cc: arnd@arndb.de, catalin.marinas@arm.com,
	christoffer.dall@linaro.org, Dave.Martin@arm.com,
	jiong.wang@arm.com, kvmarm@lists.cs.columbia.edu,
	linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, marc.zyngier@arm.com,
	mark.rutland@arm.com, suzuki.poulose@arm.com,
	will.deacon@arm.com, yao.qi@arm.com,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Subject: [PATCH 06/11] arm64: Don't trap host pointer auth use to EL2
Date: Wed, 19 Jul 2017 17:01:27 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1500480092-28480-7-git-send-email-mark.rutland@arm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1500480092-28480-1-git-send-email-mark.rutland@arm.com>

To allow EL0 (and/or EL1) to use pointer authentication functionality,
we must ensure that pointer authentication instructions and accesses to
pointer authentication keys are not trapped to EL2 (where we will not be
able to handle them).

This patch ensures that HCR_EL2 is configured appropriately when the
kernel is booted at EL2. For non-VHE kernels we set HCR_EL2.{API,APK},
ensuring that EL1 can access keys and permit EL0 use of instructions.
For VHE kernels, EL2 access is controlled by EL3, and we need not set
anything.

This does not enable support for KVM guests, since KVM manages HCR_EL2
itself.

Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org>
Cc: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: kvmarm@lists.cs.columbia.edu
---
 arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_arm.h |  2 ++
 arch/arm64/kernel/head.S         | 19 +++++++++++++++++--
 2 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_arm.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_arm.h
index 61d694c..c1267e8 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_arm.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_arm.h
@@ -23,6 +23,8 @@
 #include <asm/types.h>
 
 /* Hyp Configuration Register (HCR) bits */
+#define HCR_API		(UL(1) << 41)
+#define HCR_APK		(UL(1) << 40)
 #define HCR_E2H		(UL(1) << 34)
 #define HCR_ID		(UL(1) << 33)
 #define HCR_CD		(UL(1) << 32)
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/head.S b/arch/arm64/kernel/head.S
index 973df7d..8b8e8d7 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/head.S
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/head.S
@@ -412,10 +412,25 @@ CPU_LE(	bic	x0, x0, #(1 << 25)	)	// Clear the EE bit for EL2
 
 	/* Hyp configuration. */
 	mov	x0, #HCR_RW			// 64-bit EL1
-	cbz	x2, set_hcr
+	cbz	x2, 1f
 	orr	x0, x0, #HCR_TGE		// Enable Host Extensions
 	orr	x0, x0, #HCR_E2H
-set_hcr:
+1:
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_POINTER_AUTHENTICATION
+	/*
+	 * Disable pointer authentication traps to EL2. The HCR_EL2.{APK,API}
+	 * bits exist iff at least one authentication mechanism is implemented.
+	 */
+	mrs	x1, id_aa64isar1_el1
+	mov_q	x3, ((0xf << ID_AA64ISAR1_GPI_SHIFT) | \
+		     (0xf << ID_AA64ISAR1_GPA_SHIFT) | \
+		     (0xf << ID_AA64ISAR1_API_SHIFT) | \
+		     (0xf << ID_AA64ISAR1_APA_SHIFT))
+	and	x1, x1, x3
+	cbz	x1, 1f
+	orr	x0, x0, #(HCR_APK | HCR_API)
+1:
+#endif
 	msr	hcr_el2, x0
 	isb
 
-- 
1.9.1

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: mark.rutland@arm.com (Mark Rutland)
To: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Subject: [PATCH 06/11] arm64: Don't trap host pointer auth use to EL2
Date: Wed, 19 Jul 2017 17:01:27 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1500480092-28480-7-git-send-email-mark.rutland@arm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1500480092-28480-1-git-send-email-mark.rutland@arm.com>

To allow EL0 (and/or EL1) to use pointer authentication functionality,
we must ensure that pointer authentication instructions and accesses to
pointer authentication keys are not trapped to EL2 (where we will not be
able to handle them).

This patch ensures that HCR_EL2 is configured appropriately when the
kernel is booted at EL2. For non-VHE kernels we set HCR_EL2.{API,APK},
ensuring that EL1 can access keys and permit EL0 use of instructions.
For VHE kernels, EL2 access is controlled by EL3, and we need not set
anything.

This does not enable support for KVM guests, since KVM manages HCR_EL2
itself.

Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org>
Cc: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: kvmarm at lists.cs.columbia.edu
---
 arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_arm.h |  2 ++
 arch/arm64/kernel/head.S         | 19 +++++++++++++++++--
 2 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_arm.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_arm.h
index 61d694c..c1267e8 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_arm.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_arm.h
@@ -23,6 +23,8 @@
 #include <asm/types.h>
 
 /* Hyp Configuration Register (HCR) bits */
+#define HCR_API		(UL(1) << 41)
+#define HCR_APK		(UL(1) << 40)
 #define HCR_E2H		(UL(1) << 34)
 #define HCR_ID		(UL(1) << 33)
 #define HCR_CD		(UL(1) << 32)
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/head.S b/arch/arm64/kernel/head.S
index 973df7d..8b8e8d7 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/head.S
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/head.S
@@ -412,10 +412,25 @@ CPU_LE(	bic	x0, x0, #(1 << 25)	)	// Clear the EE bit for EL2
 
 	/* Hyp configuration. */
 	mov	x0, #HCR_RW			// 64-bit EL1
-	cbz	x2, set_hcr
+	cbz	x2, 1f
 	orr	x0, x0, #HCR_TGE		// Enable Host Extensions
 	orr	x0, x0, #HCR_E2H
-set_hcr:
+1:
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_POINTER_AUTHENTICATION
+	/*
+	 * Disable pointer authentication traps to EL2. The HCR_EL2.{APK,API}
+	 * bits exist iff@least one authentication mechanism is implemented.
+	 */
+	mrs	x1, id_aa64isar1_el1
+	mov_q	x3, ((0xf << ID_AA64ISAR1_GPI_SHIFT) | \
+		     (0xf << ID_AA64ISAR1_GPA_SHIFT) | \
+		     (0xf << ID_AA64ISAR1_API_SHIFT) | \
+		     (0xf << ID_AA64ISAR1_APA_SHIFT))
+	and	x1, x1, x3
+	cbz	x1, 1f
+	orr	x0, x0, #(HCR_APK | HCR_API)
+1:
+#endif
 	msr	hcr_el2, x0
 	isb
 
-- 
1.9.1

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
To: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Cc: arnd@arndb.de, catalin.marinas@arm.com,
	christoffer.dall@linaro.org, Dave.Martin@arm.com,
	jiong.wang@arm.com, kvmarm@lists.cs.columbia.edu,
	linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, marc.zyngier@arm.com,
	mark.rutland@arm.com, suzuki.poulose@arm.com,
	will.deacon@arm.com, yao.qi@arm.com,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Subject: [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 06/11] arm64: Don't trap host pointer auth use to EL2
Date: Wed, 19 Jul 2017 17:01:27 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1500480092-28480-7-git-send-email-mark.rutland@arm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1500480092-28480-1-git-send-email-mark.rutland@arm.com>

To allow EL0 (and/or EL1) to use pointer authentication functionality,
we must ensure that pointer authentication instructions and accesses to
pointer authentication keys are not trapped to EL2 (where we will not be
able to handle them).

This patch ensures that HCR_EL2 is configured appropriately when the
kernel is booted at EL2. For non-VHE kernels we set HCR_EL2.{API,APK},
ensuring that EL1 can access keys and permit EL0 use of instructions.
For VHE kernels, EL2 access is controlled by EL3, and we need not set
anything.

This does not enable support for KVM guests, since KVM manages HCR_EL2
itself.

Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org>
Cc: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: kvmarm@lists.cs.columbia.edu
---
 arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_arm.h |  2 ++
 arch/arm64/kernel/head.S         | 19 +++++++++++++++++--
 2 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_arm.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_arm.h
index 61d694c..c1267e8 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_arm.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_arm.h
@@ -23,6 +23,8 @@
 #include <asm/types.h>
 
 /* Hyp Configuration Register (HCR) bits */
+#define HCR_API		(UL(1) << 41)
+#define HCR_APK		(UL(1) << 40)
 #define HCR_E2H		(UL(1) << 34)
 #define HCR_ID		(UL(1) << 33)
 #define HCR_CD		(UL(1) << 32)
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/head.S b/arch/arm64/kernel/head.S
index 973df7d..8b8e8d7 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/head.S
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/head.S
@@ -412,10 +412,25 @@ CPU_LE(	bic	x0, x0, #(1 << 25)	)	// Clear the EE bit for EL2
 
 	/* Hyp configuration. */
 	mov	x0, #HCR_RW			// 64-bit EL1
-	cbz	x2, set_hcr
+	cbz	x2, 1f
 	orr	x0, x0, #HCR_TGE		// Enable Host Extensions
 	orr	x0, x0, #HCR_E2H
-set_hcr:
+1:
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_POINTER_AUTHENTICATION
+	/*
+	 * Disable pointer authentication traps to EL2. The HCR_EL2.{APK,API}
+	 * bits exist iff at least one authentication mechanism is implemented.
+	 */
+	mrs	x1, id_aa64isar1_el1
+	mov_q	x3, ((0xf << ID_AA64ISAR1_GPI_SHIFT) | \
+		     (0xf << ID_AA64ISAR1_GPA_SHIFT) | \
+		     (0xf << ID_AA64ISAR1_API_SHIFT) | \
+		     (0xf << ID_AA64ISAR1_APA_SHIFT))
+	and	x1, x1, x3
+	cbz	x1, 1f
+	orr	x0, x0, #(HCR_APK | HCR_API)
+1:
+#endif
 	msr	hcr_el2, x0
 	isb
 
-- 
1.9.1

  parent reply	other threads:[~2017-07-19 16:03 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 124+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-07-19 16:01 [PATCH 00/11] ARMv8.3 pointer authentication userspace support Mark Rutland
2017-07-19 16:01 ` [kernel-hardening] " Mark Rutland
2017-07-19 16:01 ` Mark Rutland
2017-07-19 16:01 ` [PATCH 01/11] arm64: docs: describe ELF hwcaps Mark Rutland
2017-07-19 16:01   ` [kernel-hardening] " Mark Rutland
2017-07-19 16:01   ` Mark Rutland
2017-07-19 16:01   ` Mark Rutland
2017-07-21 17:05   ` Dave Martin
2017-07-21 17:05     ` [kernel-hardening] " Dave Martin
2017-07-21 17:05     ` Dave Martin
2017-07-21 17:05     ` Dave Martin
2017-07-24 10:47     ` Suzuki K Poulose
2017-07-24 10:47       ` [kernel-hardening] " Suzuki K Poulose
2017-07-24 10:47       ` Suzuki K Poulose
2017-08-03 14:49   ` Catalin Marinas
2017-08-03 14:49     ` [kernel-hardening] " Catalin Marinas
2017-08-03 14:49     ` Catalin Marinas
2017-08-03 17:57   ` Kees Cook
2017-08-03 17:57     ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2017-08-03 17:57     ` Kees Cook
2017-08-03 17:57     ` Kees Cook
2017-07-19 16:01 ` [PATCH 02/11] asm-generic: mm_hooks: allow hooks to be overridden individually Mark Rutland
2017-07-19 16:01   ` [kernel-hardening] " Mark Rutland
2017-07-19 16:01   ` Mark Rutland
2017-07-19 16:01   ` Mark Rutland
2017-07-19 16:01 ` [PATCH 03/11] arm64: add pointer authentication register bits Mark Rutland
2017-07-19 16:01   ` [kernel-hardening] " Mark Rutland
2017-07-19 16:01   ` Mark Rutland
2017-07-19 16:01 ` [PATCH 04/11] arm64/cpufeature: add ARMv8.3 id_aa64isar1 bits Mark Rutland
2017-07-19 16:01   ` [kernel-hardening] " Mark Rutland
2017-07-19 16:01   ` Mark Rutland
2017-07-19 16:01   ` Mark Rutland
2017-07-19 16:01   ` Mark Rutland
2017-07-19 16:01   ` Mark Rutland
2017-07-24 10:54   ` Suzuki K Poulose
2017-07-24 10:54     ` [kernel-hardening] " Suzuki K Poulose
2017-07-24 10:54     ` Suzuki K Poulose
2017-07-19 16:01 ` [PATCH 05/11] arm64/cpufeature: detect pointer authentication Mark Rutland
2017-07-19 16:01   ` [kernel-hardening] " Mark Rutland
2017-07-19 16:01   ` Mark Rutland
2017-07-19 16:01 ` Mark Rutland [this message]
2017-07-19 16:01   ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 06/11] arm64: Don't trap host pointer auth use to EL2 Mark Rutland
2017-07-19 16:01   ` Mark Rutland
2017-07-24 10:37   ` Dave Martin
2017-07-24 10:37     ` [kernel-hardening] " Dave Martin
2017-07-24 10:37     ` Dave Martin
2017-07-19 16:01 ` [PATCH 07/11] arm64: add basic pointer authentication support Mark Rutland
2017-07-19 16:01   ` [kernel-hardening] " Mark Rutland
2017-07-19 16:01   ` Mark Rutland
2017-07-25 15:26   ` Dave Martin
2017-07-25 15:26     ` [kernel-hardening] " Dave Martin
2017-07-25 15:26     ` Dave Martin
2017-07-25 15:26     ` Dave Martin
2017-08-11  7:46   ` Yao Qi
2017-08-11  7:46     ` [kernel-hardening] " Yao Qi
2017-08-11  7:46     ` Yao Qi
2017-08-11  8:45     ` Dave Martin
2017-08-11  8:45       ` [kernel-hardening] " Dave Martin
2017-08-11  8:45       ` Dave Martin
2017-08-11  8:45       ` Dave Martin
2017-07-19 16:01 ` [PATCH 08/11] arm64: expose user PAC bit positions via ptrace Mark Rutland
2017-07-19 16:01   ` [kernel-hardening] " Mark Rutland
2017-07-19 16:01   ` Mark Rutland
2017-07-19 16:01   ` Mark Rutland
2017-07-19 16:01 ` [PATCH 09/11] arm64/kvm: preserve host HCR_EL2 value Mark Rutland
2017-07-19 16:01   ` [kernel-hardening] " Mark Rutland
2017-07-19 16:01   ` Mark Rutland
2017-07-19 16:01   ` Mark Rutland
2017-08-01 11:00   ` Christoffer Dall
2017-08-01 11:00     ` [kernel-hardening] " Christoffer Dall
2017-08-01 11:00     ` Christoffer Dall
2017-08-01 11:00     ` Christoffer Dall
2017-07-19 16:01 ` [PATCH 10/11] arm64/kvm: context-switch ptrauth registers Mark Rutland
2017-07-19 16:01   ` [kernel-hardening] " Mark Rutland
2017-07-19 16:01   ` Mark Rutland
2017-07-19 16:01   ` Mark Rutland
2017-08-01 11:00   ` Christoffer Dall
2017-08-01 11:00     ` [kernel-hardening] " Christoffer Dall
2017-08-01 11:00     ` Christoffer Dall
2017-08-01 11:00     ` Christoffer Dall
2017-08-01 14:26     ` Mark Rutland
2017-08-01 14:26       ` [kernel-hardening] " Mark Rutland
2017-08-01 14:26       ` Mark Rutland
2017-08-01 14:32       ` Will Deacon
2017-08-01 14:32         ` [kernel-hardening] " Will Deacon
2017-08-01 14:32         ` Will Deacon
2017-08-01 17:02       ` Christoffer Dall
2017-08-01 17:02         ` [kernel-hardening] " Christoffer Dall
2017-08-01 17:02         ` Christoffer Dall
2017-07-19 16:01 ` [PATCH 11/11] arm64: docs: document pointer authentication Mark Rutland
2017-07-19 16:01   ` [kernel-hardening] " Mark Rutland
2017-07-19 16:01   ` Mark Rutland
2017-07-19 16:01   ` Mark Rutland
2017-07-21 17:05 ` [PATCH 00/11] ARMv8.3 pointer authentication userspace support Dave Martin
2017-07-21 17:05   ` [kernel-hardening] " Dave Martin
2017-07-21 17:05   ` Dave Martin
2017-07-21 17:05   ` Dave Martin
2017-07-25 12:06   ` Mark Rutland
2017-07-25 12:06     ` [kernel-hardening] " Mark Rutland
2017-07-25 12:06     ` Mark Rutland
2017-07-25 14:00     ` Jiong Wang
2017-07-25 14:00       ` [kernel-hardening] " Jiong Wang
2017-07-25 14:00       ` Jiong Wang
2017-07-25 14:00       ` Jiong Wang
2017-08-11 11:29     ` Mark Rutland
2017-08-11 11:29       ` [kernel-hardening] " Mark Rutland
2017-08-11 11:29       ` Mark Rutland
2017-07-24 11:52 ` Yao Qi
2017-07-24 11:52   ` [kernel-hardening] " Yao Qi
2017-07-24 11:52   ` Yao Qi
2017-07-25 11:32 ` Yao Qi
2017-07-25 11:32   ` [kernel-hardening] " Yao Qi
2017-07-25 11:32   ` Yao Qi
2017-07-25 16:01   ` Mark Rutland
2017-07-25 16:01     ` [kernel-hardening] " Mark Rutland
2017-07-25 16:01     ` Mark Rutland
2017-07-25 14:12 ` [kernel-hardening] " Li Kun
2017-07-25 14:12   ` Li Kun
2017-07-25 14:12   ` Li Kun
2017-07-25 14:12   ` Li Kun
2017-07-25 15:12   ` Mark Rutland
2017-07-25 15:12     ` Mark Rutland
2017-07-25 15:12     ` Mark Rutland
2017-07-25 15:12     ` Mark Rutland

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