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From: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>
To: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	"benh@kernel.crashing.org" <benh@kernel.crashing.org>,
	Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>,
	Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>,
	"james.bottomley@hansenpartnership.com" 
	<james.bottomley@hansenpartnership.com>,
	Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>, Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
	Robert Richter <rric@kernel.org>,
	Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: "intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org"
	<intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org>, Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>,
	Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
	Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>,
	Igor Lubashev <ilubashe@akamai.com>,
	Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>,
	Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>,
	Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>,
	Lionel Landwerlin <lionel.g.landwerlin@intel.com>,
	linux-kernel <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	"linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org" 
	<linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
	"selinux@vger.kernel.org" <selinux@vger.kernel.org>,
	linux-arm-kernel <linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>,
	"linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org" <linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org>,
	"linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org" <linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org>,
	"linux-perf-users@vger.kernel.org"
	<linux-perf-users@vger.kernel.org>,
	oprofile-list@lists.sf.net
Subject: [PATCH v6 08/10] parisc/perf: open access for CAP_PERFMON privileged process
Date: Tue, 28 Jan 2020 09:12:59 +0300	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <17be72ff-dc52-72ef-fbcc-0e9ec8b61604@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <74d524ab-ac11-a7b8-1052-eba10f117e09@linux.intel.com>


Open access to monitoring for CAP_PERFMON privileged process.
Providing the access under CAP_PERFMON capability singly, without the
rest of CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials, excludes chances to misuse the
credentials and makes operation more secure.

CAP_PERFMON implements the principal of least privilege for performance
monitoring and observability operations (POSIX IEEE 1003.1e 2.2.2.39 principle
of least privilege: A security design principle that states that a process
or program be granted only those privileges (e.g., capabilities) necessary
to accomplish its legitimate function, and only for the time that such
privileges are actually required)

For backward compatibility reasons access to the monitoring remains open
for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN usage for secure
monitoring is discouraged with respect to CAP_PERFMON capability.

Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>
---
 arch/parisc/kernel/perf.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/parisc/kernel/perf.c b/arch/parisc/kernel/perf.c
index 676683641d00..c4208d027794 100644
--- a/arch/parisc/kernel/perf.c
+++ b/arch/parisc/kernel/perf.c
@@ -300,7 +300,7 @@ static ssize_t perf_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 	else
 		return -EFAULT;
 
-	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+	if (!perfmon_capable())
 		return -EACCES;
 
 	if (count != sizeof(uint32_t))
-- 
2.20.1



WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>
To: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	"benh@kernel.crashing.org" <benh@kernel.crashing.org>,
	Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>,
	Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>,
	"james.bottomley@hansenpartnership.com"
	<james.bottomley@hansenpartnership.com>,
	Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>, Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
	Robert Richter <rric@kernel.org>,
	Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: "intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org"
	<intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org>, Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>,
	Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
	Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>,
	Igor Lubashev <ilubashe@akamai.com>,
	Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>,
	Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>,
	Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>,
	Lionel Landwerlin <lionel.g.landwerlin@intel.com>,
	linux-kernel <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	"linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org"
	<linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
	"selinux@vger.kernel.org" <selinux@vger.kernel.org>,
	linux-arm-kernel <linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>,
	"linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org" <linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org>,
	"linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org" <linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org>,
	linux-perf-users@vger.ke
Subject: [PATCH v6 08/10] parisc/perf: open access for CAP_PERFMON privileged process
Date: Tue, 28 Jan 2020 09:12:59 +0300	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <17be72ff-dc52-72ef-fbcc-0e9ec8b61604@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <74d524ab-ac11-a7b8-1052-eba10f117e09@linux.intel.com>


Open access to monitoring for CAP_PERFMON privileged process.
Providing the access under CAP_PERFMON capability singly, without the
rest of CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials, excludes chances to misuse the
credentials and makes operation more secure.

CAP_PERFMON implements the principal of least privilege for performance
monitoring and observability operations (POSIX IEEE 1003.1e 2.2.2.39 principle
of least privilege: A security design principle that states that a process
or program be granted only those privileges (e.g., capabilities) necessary
to accomplish its legitimate function, and only for the time that such
privileges are actually required)

For backward compatibility reasons access to the monitoring remains open
for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN usage for secure
monitoring is discouraged with respect to CAP_PERFMON capability.

Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>
---
 arch/parisc/kernel/perf.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/parisc/kernel/perf.c b/arch/parisc/kernel/perf.c
index 676683641d00..c4208d027794 100644
--- a/arch/parisc/kernel/perf.c
+++ b/arch/parisc/kernel/perf.c
@@ -300,7 +300,7 @@ static ssize_t perf_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 	else
 		return -EFAULT;
 
-	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+	if (!perfmon_capable())
 		return -EACCES;
 
 	if (count != sizeof(uint32_t))
-- 
2.20.1

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>
To: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	"benh@kernel.crashing.org" <benh@kernel.crashing.org>,
	Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>,
	Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>,
	"james.bottomley@hansenpartnership.com"
	<james.bottomley@hansenpartnership.com>,
	Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>, Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
	Robert Richter <rric@kernel.org>,
	Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>, Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
	"linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org" <linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org>,
	Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>,
	"linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org" <linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org>,
	"intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org"
	<intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org>,
	Igor Lubashev <ilubashe@akamai.com>,
	linux-kernel <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>,
	"linux-perf-users@vger.kernel.org"
	<linux-perf-users@vger.kernel.org>,
	"selinux@vger.kernel.org" <selinux@vger.kernel.org>,
	"linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org"
	<linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
	oprofile-list@lists.sf.net,
	Lionel Landwerlin <lionel.g.landwerlin@intel.com>,
	Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>, Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>,
	linux-arm-kernel <linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>
Subject: [PATCH v6 08/10] parisc/perf: open access for CAP_PERFMON privileged process
Date: Tue, 28 Jan 2020 09:12:59 +0300	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <17be72ff-dc52-72ef-fbcc-0e9ec8b61604@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <74d524ab-ac11-a7b8-1052-eba10f117e09@linux.intel.com>


Open access to monitoring for CAP_PERFMON privileged process.
Providing the access under CAP_PERFMON capability singly, without the
rest of CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials, excludes chances to misuse the
credentials and makes operation more secure.

CAP_PERFMON implements the principal of least privilege for performance
monitoring and observability operations (POSIX IEEE 1003.1e 2.2.2.39 principle
of least privilege: A security design principle that states that a process
or program be granted only those privileges (e.g., capabilities) necessary
to accomplish its legitimate function, and only for the time that such
privileges are actually required)

For backward compatibility reasons access to the monitoring remains open
for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN usage for secure
monitoring is discouraged with respect to CAP_PERFMON capability.

Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>
---
 arch/parisc/kernel/perf.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/parisc/kernel/perf.c b/arch/parisc/kernel/perf.c
index 676683641d00..c4208d027794 100644
--- a/arch/parisc/kernel/perf.c
+++ b/arch/parisc/kernel/perf.c
@@ -300,7 +300,7 @@ static ssize_t perf_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 	else
 		return -EFAULT;
 
-	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+	if (!perfmon_capable())
 		return -EACCES;
 
 	if (count != sizeof(uint32_t))
-- 
2.20.1



WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>
To: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	"benh@kernel.crashing.org" <benh@kernel.crashing.org>,
	Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>,
	Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>,
	"james.bottomley@hansenpartnership.com"
	<james.bottomley@hansenpartnership.com>,
	Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>, Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
	Robert Richter <rric@kernel.org>,
	Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>, Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
	"linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org" <linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org>,
	Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>,
	"linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org" <linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org>,
	"intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org"
	<intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org>,
	Igor Lubashev <ilubashe@akamai.com>,
	linux-kernel <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>,
	"linux-perf-users@vger.kernel.org"
	<linux-perf-users@vger.kernel.org>,
	"selinux@vger.kernel.org" <selinux@vger.kernel.org>,
	"linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org"
	<linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
	oprofile-list@lists.sf.net,
	Lionel Landwerlin <lionel.g.landwerlin@intel.com>,
	Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>, Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>,
	linux-arm-kernel <linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>
Subject: [PATCH v6 08/10] parisc/perf: open access for CAP_PERFMON privileged process
Date: Tue, 28 Jan 2020 09:12:59 +0300	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <17be72ff-dc52-72ef-fbcc-0e9ec8b61604@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <74d524ab-ac11-a7b8-1052-eba10f117e09@linux.intel.com>


Open access to monitoring for CAP_PERFMON privileged process.
Providing the access under CAP_PERFMON capability singly, without the
rest of CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials, excludes chances to misuse the
credentials and makes operation more secure.

CAP_PERFMON implements the principal of least privilege for performance
monitoring and observability operations (POSIX IEEE 1003.1e 2.2.2.39 principle
of least privilege: A security design principle that states that a process
or program be granted only those privileges (e.g., capabilities) necessary
to accomplish its legitimate function, and only for the time that such
privileges are actually required)

For backward compatibility reasons access to the monitoring remains open
for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN usage for secure
monitoring is discouraged with respect to CAP_PERFMON capability.

Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>
---
 arch/parisc/kernel/perf.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/parisc/kernel/perf.c b/arch/parisc/kernel/perf.c
index 676683641d00..c4208d027794 100644
--- a/arch/parisc/kernel/perf.c
+++ b/arch/parisc/kernel/perf.c
@@ -300,7 +300,7 @@ static ssize_t perf_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 	else
 		return -EFAULT;
 
-	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+	if (!perfmon_capable())
 		return -EACCES;
 
 	if (count != sizeof(uint32_t))
-- 
2.20.1



_______________________________________________
linux-arm-kernel mailing list
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>
To: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	"benh@kernel.crashing.org" <benh@kernel.crashing.org>,
	Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>,
	Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>,
	"james.bottomley@hansenpartnership.com"
	<james.bottomley@hansenpartnership.com>,
	Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>, Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
	Robert Richter <rric@kernel.org>,
	Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>, Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
	"linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org" <linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org>,
	Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>,
	"linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org" <linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org>,
	"intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org"
	<intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org>,
	Igor Lubashev <ilubashe@akamai.com>,
	linux-kernel <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>,
	"linux-perf-users@vger.kernel.org"
	<linux-perf-users@vger.kernel.org>,
	"selinux@vger.kernel.org" <selinux@vger.kernel.org>,
	"linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org"
	<linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
	oprofile-list@lists.sf.net, Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>,
	Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>,
	linux-arm-kernel <linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>
Subject: [Intel-gfx] [PATCH v6 08/10] parisc/perf: open access for CAP_PERFMON privileged process
Date: Tue, 28 Jan 2020 09:12:59 +0300	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <17be72ff-dc52-72ef-fbcc-0e9ec8b61604@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <74d524ab-ac11-a7b8-1052-eba10f117e09@linux.intel.com>


Open access to monitoring for CAP_PERFMON privileged process.
Providing the access under CAP_PERFMON capability singly, without the
rest of CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials, excludes chances to misuse the
credentials and makes operation more secure.

CAP_PERFMON implements the principal of least privilege for performance
monitoring and observability operations (POSIX IEEE 1003.1e 2.2.2.39 principle
of least privilege: A security design principle that states that a process
or program be granted only those privileges (e.g., capabilities) necessary
to accomplish its legitimate function, and only for the time that such
privileges are actually required)

For backward compatibility reasons access to the monitoring remains open
for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN usage for secure
monitoring is discouraged with respect to CAP_PERFMON capability.

Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>
---
 arch/parisc/kernel/perf.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/parisc/kernel/perf.c b/arch/parisc/kernel/perf.c
index 676683641d00..c4208d027794 100644
--- a/arch/parisc/kernel/perf.c
+++ b/arch/parisc/kernel/perf.c
@@ -300,7 +300,7 @@ static ssize_t perf_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 	else
 		return -EFAULT;
 
-	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+	if (!perfmon_capable())
 		return -EACCES;
 
 	if (count != sizeof(uint32_t))
-- 
2.20.1


_______________________________________________
Intel-gfx mailing list
Intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org
https://lists.freedesktop.org/mailman/listinfo/intel-gfx

  parent reply	other threads:[~2020-01-28  6:13 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 97+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-01-28  5:52 [PATCH v6 00/10] Introduce CAP_PERFMON to secure system performance monitoring and observability Alexey Budankov
2020-01-28  5:52 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-01-28  5:52 ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-28  5:52 ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-28  5:52 ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-28  6:07 ` [PATCH v6 01/10] capabilities: introduce CAP_PERFMON to kernel and user space Alexey Budankov
2020-01-28  6:07   ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-01-28  6:07   ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-28  6:07   ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-28  6:07   ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-28 21:16   ` James Morris
2020-01-28 21:16     ` [Intel-gfx] " James Morris
2020-01-28 21:16     ` James Morris
2020-01-28 21:16     ` James Morris
2020-01-28 21:16     ` James Morris
2020-01-28  6:08 ` [PATCH v6 02/10] perf/core: open access to the core for CAP_PERFMON privileged process Alexey Budankov
2020-01-28  6:08   ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-01-28  6:08   ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-28  6:08   ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-28  6:08   ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-28  6:09 ` [PATCH v6 03/10] perf/core: open access to probes " Alexey Budankov
2020-01-28  6:09   ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-01-28  6:09   ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-28  6:09   ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-28  6:09   ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-28 21:16   ` James Morris
2020-01-28 21:16     ` [Intel-gfx] " James Morris
2020-01-28 21:16     ` James Morris
2020-01-28 21:16     ` James Morris
2020-01-28 21:16     ` James Morris
2020-01-28  6:09 ` [PATCH v6 04/10] perf tool: extend Perf tool with CAP_PERFMON capability support Alexey Budankov
2020-01-28  6:09   ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-01-28  6:09   ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-28  6:09   ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-28  6:09   ` Alexey Budankov
2020-04-01 20:50   ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-28  6:10 ` [PATCH v6 05/10] drm/i915/perf: open access for CAP_PERFMON privileged process Alexey Budankov
2020-01-28  6:10   ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-01-28  6:10   ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-28  6:10   ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-28  6:10   ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-28  6:11 ` [PATCH v6 06/10] trace/bpf_trace: " Alexey Budankov
2020-01-28  6:11   ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-01-28  6:11   ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-28  6:11   ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-28  6:11   ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-28 21:17   ` James Morris
2020-01-28 21:17     ` [Intel-gfx] " James Morris
2020-01-28 21:17     ` James Morris
2020-01-28 21:17     ` James Morris
2020-01-28 21:17     ` James Morris
2020-01-28  6:12 ` [PATCH v6 07/10] powerpc/perf: " Alexey Budankov
2020-01-28  6:12   ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-01-28  6:12   ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-28  6:12   ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-28  6:12   ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-28 21:17   ` James Morris
2020-01-28 21:17     ` [Intel-gfx] " James Morris
2020-01-28 21:17     ` James Morris
2020-01-28 21:17     ` James Morris
2020-01-28 21:17     ` James Morris
2020-01-28  6:12 ` Alexey Budankov [this message]
2020-01-28  6:12   ` [Intel-gfx] [PATCH v6 08/10] parisc/perf: " Alexey Budankov
2020-01-28  6:12   ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-28  6:12   ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-28  6:12   ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-28 21:17   ` James Morris
2020-01-28 21:17     ` [Intel-gfx] " James Morris
2020-01-28 21:17     ` James Morris
2020-01-28 21:17     ` James Morris
2020-01-28 21:17     ` James Morris
2020-01-28  6:13 ` [PATCH v6 09/10] drivers/perf: " Alexey Budankov
2020-01-28  6:13   ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-01-28  6:13   ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-28  6:13   ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-28  6:13   ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-28 21:18   ` James Morris
2020-01-28 21:18     ` [Intel-gfx] " James Morris
2020-01-28 21:18     ` James Morris
2020-01-28 21:18     ` James Morris
2020-01-28 21:18     ` James Morris
2020-01-28  6:14 ` [PATCH v6 10/10] drivers/oprofile: " Alexey Budankov
2020-01-28  6:14   ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-01-28  6:14   ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-28  6:14   ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-28  6:14   ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-28 21:18   ` James Morris
2020-01-28 21:18     ` [Intel-gfx] " James Morris
2020-01-28 21:18     ` James Morris
2020-01-28 21:18     ` James Morris
2020-01-28 21:18     ` James Morris
2020-01-28  6:42 ` [Intel-gfx] ✗ Fi.CI.CHECKPATCH: warning for Introduce CAP_PERFMON to secure system performance monitoring and observability (rev2) Patchwork
2020-01-28  7:35 ` [Intel-gfx] ✓ Fi.CI.BAT: success " Patchwork
2020-01-29  6:03 ` [Intel-gfx] ✓ Fi.CI.IGT: " Patchwork
2020-02-05 17:25 [PATCH v6 00/10] Introduce CAP_PERFMON to secure system performance monitoring and observability Alexey Budankov
2020-02-05 17:35 ` [PATCH v6 08/10] parisc/perf: open access for CAP_PERFMON privileged process Alexey Budankov
2020-02-05 17:35   ` Alexey Budankov
2020-02-05 17:35   ` Alexey Budankov

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