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From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
To: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
	kexec@lists.infradead.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	kasan-dev@googlegroups.com, xen-devel@lists.xen.org,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org
Cc: "Brijesh Singh" <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
	"Toshimitsu Kani" <toshi.kani@hpe.com>,
	"Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>,
	"Matt Fleming" <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>,
	"Alexander Potapenko" <glider@google.com>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	"Larry Woodman" <lwoodman@redhat.com>,
	"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
	"Joerg Roedel" <joro@8bytes.org>,
	"Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>,
	"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>,
	"Andrey Ryabinin" <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>,
	"Dave Young" <dyoung@redhat.com>,
	"Rik van Riel" <riel@redhat.com>, "Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>,
	"Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk" <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>,
	"Borislav Petkov" <bp@alien8.de>,
	"Andy Lutomirski" <luto@kernel.org>,
	"Boris Ostrovsky" <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>,
	"Dmitry Vyukov" <dvyukov@google.com>,
	"Juergen Gross" <jgross@suse.com>,
	"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	"Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Subject: [PATCH v7 14/36] x86/mm: Insure that boot memory areas are mapped properly
Date: Fri, 16 Jun 2017 13:52:32 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170616185232.18967.61753.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170616184947.18967.84890.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net>

The boot data and command line data are present in memory in a decrypted
state and are copied early in the boot process.  The early page fault
support will map these areas as encrypted, so before attempting to copy
them, add decrypted mappings so the data is accessed properly when copied.

For the initrd, encrypt this data in place. Since the future mapping of
the initrd area will be mapped as encrypted the data will be accessed
properly.

Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h |    6 +++
 arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h     |    3 ++
 arch/x86/kernel/head64.c           |   30 +++++++++++++--
 arch/x86/kernel/setup.c            |    9 +++++
 arch/x86/mm/kasan_init_64.c        |    2 +
 arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c          |   70 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 6 files changed, 115 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
index 6508ec9..3ffa5fa 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
@@ -26,6 +26,9 @@ void __init sme_early_encrypt(resource_size_t paddr,
 void __init sme_early_decrypt(resource_size_t paddr,
 			      unsigned long size);
 
+void __init sme_map_bootdata(char *real_mode_data);
+void __init sme_unmap_bootdata(char *real_mode_data);
+
 void __init sme_early_init(void);
 
 void __init sme_enable(void);
@@ -39,6 +42,9 @@ static inline void __init sme_early_encrypt(resource_size_t paddr,
 static inline void __init sme_early_decrypt(resource_size_t paddr,
 					    unsigned long size) { }
 
+static inline void __init sme_map_bootdata(char *real_mode_data) { }
+static inline void __init sme_unmap_bootdata(char *real_mode_data) { }
+
 static inline void __init sme_early_init(void) { }
 
 static inline void __init sme_enable(void) { }
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h
index c6452cb..bbeae4a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h
@@ -23,6 +23,9 @@
 #ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
 #include <asm/x86_init.h>
 
+extern pgd_t early_top_pgt[PTRS_PER_PGD];
+int __init __early_make_pgtable(unsigned long address, pmdval_t pmd);
+
 void ptdump_walk_pgd_level(struct seq_file *m, pgd_t *pgd);
 void ptdump_walk_pgd_level_checkwx(void);
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c
index 5d7363a..9e94ed2 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c
@@ -34,7 +34,6 @@
 /*
  * Manage page tables very early on.
  */
-extern pgd_t early_top_pgt[PTRS_PER_PGD];
 extern pmd_t early_dynamic_pgts[EARLY_DYNAMIC_PAGE_TABLES][PTRS_PER_PMD];
 static unsigned int __initdata next_early_pgt;
 pmdval_t early_pmd_flags = __PAGE_KERNEL_LARGE & ~(_PAGE_GLOBAL | _PAGE_NX);
@@ -161,13 +160,13 @@ static void __init reset_early_page_tables(void)
 }
 
 /* Create a new PMD entry */
-int __init early_make_pgtable(unsigned long address)
+int __init __early_make_pgtable(unsigned long address, pmdval_t pmd)
 {
 	unsigned long physaddr = address - __PAGE_OFFSET;
 	pgdval_t pgd, *pgd_p;
 	p4dval_t p4d, *p4d_p;
 	pudval_t pud, *pud_p;
-	pmdval_t pmd, *pmd_p;
+	pmdval_t *pmd_p;
 
 	/* Invalid address or early pgt is done ?  */
 	if (physaddr >= MAXMEM || read_cr3_pa() != __pa_nodebug(early_top_pgt))
@@ -226,12 +225,21 @@ int __init early_make_pgtable(unsigned long address)
 		memset(pmd_p, 0, sizeof(*pmd_p) * PTRS_PER_PMD);
 		*pud_p = (pudval_t)pmd_p - __START_KERNEL_map + phys_base + _KERNPG_TABLE;
 	}
-	pmd = (physaddr & PMD_MASK) + early_pmd_flags;
 	pmd_p[pmd_index(address)] = pmd;
 
 	return 0;
 }
 
+int __init early_make_pgtable(unsigned long address)
+{
+	unsigned long physaddr = address - __PAGE_OFFSET;
+	pmdval_t pmd;
+
+	pmd = (physaddr & PMD_MASK) + early_pmd_flags;
+
+	return __early_make_pgtable(address, pmd);
+}
+
 /* Don't add a printk in there. printk relies on the PDA which is not initialized 
    yet. */
 static void __init clear_bss(void)
@@ -254,6 +262,12 @@ static void __init copy_bootdata(char *real_mode_data)
 	char * command_line;
 	unsigned long cmd_line_ptr;
 
+	/*
+	 * If SME is active, this will create decrypted mappings of the
+	 * boot data in advance of the copy operations.
+	 */
+	sme_map_bootdata(real_mode_data);
+
 	memcpy(&boot_params, real_mode_data, sizeof boot_params);
 	sanitize_boot_params(&boot_params);
 	cmd_line_ptr = get_cmd_line_ptr();
@@ -261,6 +275,14 @@ static void __init copy_bootdata(char *real_mode_data)
 		command_line = __va(cmd_line_ptr);
 		memcpy(boot_command_line, command_line, COMMAND_LINE_SIZE);
 	}
+
+	/*
+	 * The old boot data is no longer needed and won't be reserved,
+	 * freeing up that memory for use by the system. If SME is active,
+	 * we need to remove the mappings that were created so that the
+	 * memory doesn't remain mapped as decrypted.
+	 */
+	sme_unmap_bootdata(real_mode_data);
 }
 
 asmlinkage __visible void __init x86_64_start_kernel(char * real_mode_data)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
index f818236..6a2f0a8 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
@@ -69,6 +69,7 @@
 #include <linux/crash_dump.h>
 #include <linux/tboot.h>
 #include <linux/jiffies.h>
+#include <linux/mem_encrypt.h>
 
 #include <linux/usb/xhci-dbgp.h>
 #include <video/edid.h>
@@ -374,6 +375,14 @@ static void __init reserve_initrd(void)
 	    !ramdisk_image || !ramdisk_size)
 		return;		/* No initrd provided by bootloader */
 
+	/*
+	 * If SME is active, this memory will be marked encrypted by the
+	 * kernel when it is accessed (including relocation). However, the
+	 * ramdisk image was loaded decrypted by the bootloader, so make
+	 * sure that it is encrypted before accessing it.
+	 */
+	sme_early_encrypt(ramdisk_image, ramdisk_end - ramdisk_image);
+
 	initrd_start = 0;
 
 	mapped_size = memblock_mem_size(max_pfn_mapped);
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/kasan_init_64.c b/arch/x86/mm/kasan_init_64.c
index d7cc830..1b8791f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/kasan_init_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/kasan_init_64.c
@@ -11,8 +11,8 @@
 #include <asm/e820/types.h>
 #include <asm/tlbflush.h>
 #include <asm/sections.h>
+#include <asm/pgtable.h>
 
-extern pgd_t early_top_pgt[PTRS_PER_PGD];
 extern struct range pfn_mapped[E820_MAX_ENTRIES];
 
 static int __init map_range(struct range *range)
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
index b7671b9..ea5e3a6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
@@ -19,6 +19,8 @@
 
 #include <asm/tlbflush.h>
 #include <asm/fixmap.h>
+#include <asm/setup.h>
+#include <asm/bootparam.h>
 
 /*
  * Since SME related variables are set early in the boot process they must
@@ -101,6 +103,74 @@ void __init sme_early_decrypt(resource_size_t paddr, unsigned long size)
 	__sme_early_enc_dec(paddr, size, false);
 }
 
+static void __init __sme_early_map_unmap_mem(void *vaddr, unsigned long size,
+					     bool map)
+{
+	unsigned long paddr = (unsigned long)vaddr - __PAGE_OFFSET;
+	pmdval_t pmd_flags, pmd;
+
+	/* Use early_pmd_flags but remove the encryption mask */
+	pmd_flags = __sme_clr(early_pmd_flags);
+
+	do {
+		pmd = map ? (paddr & PMD_MASK) + pmd_flags : 0;
+		__early_make_pgtable((unsigned long)vaddr, pmd);
+
+		vaddr += PMD_SIZE;
+		paddr += PMD_SIZE;
+		size = (size <= PMD_SIZE) ? 0 : size - PMD_SIZE;
+	} while (size);
+
+	write_cr3(__read_cr3());
+}
+
+static void __init __sme_map_unmap_bootdata(char *real_mode_data, bool map)
+{
+	struct boot_params *boot_data;
+	unsigned long cmdline_paddr;
+
+	/* If SME is not active, the bootdata is in the correct state */
+	if (!sme_active())
+		return;
+
+	if (!map) {
+		/*
+		 * If unmapping, get the command line address before
+		 * unmapping the real_mode_data.
+		 */
+		boot_data = (struct boot_params *)real_mode_data;
+		cmdline_paddr = boot_data->hdr.cmd_line_ptr |
+				((u64)boot_data->ext_cmd_line_ptr << 32);
+	}
+
+	__sme_early_map_unmap_mem(real_mode_data, sizeof(boot_params), map);
+
+	if (map) {
+		/*
+		 * If mapping, get the command line address after mapping
+		 * the real_mode_data.
+		 */
+		boot_data = (struct boot_params *)real_mode_data;
+		cmdline_paddr = boot_data->hdr.cmd_line_ptr |
+				((u64)boot_data->ext_cmd_line_ptr << 32);
+	}
+
+	if (!cmdline_paddr)
+		return;
+
+	__sme_early_map_unmap_mem(__va(cmdline_paddr), COMMAND_LINE_SIZE, map);
+}
+
+void __init sme_unmap_bootdata(char *real_mode_data)
+{
+	__sme_map_unmap_bootdata(real_mode_data, false);
+}
+
+void __init sme_map_bootdata(char *real_mode_data)
+{
+	__sme_map_unmap_bootdata(real_mode_data, true);
+}
+
 void __init sme_early_init(void)
 {
 	unsigned int i;

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
To: linux-arch-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org,
	linux-efi-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org,
	kvm-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org,
	linux-doc-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org,
	x86-DgEjT+Ai2ygdnm+yROfE0A@public.gmane.org,
	kexec-IAPFreCvJWM7uuMidbF8XUB+6BGkLq7r@public.gmane.org,
	linux-kernel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org,
	kasan-dev-/JYPxA39Uh5TLH3MbocFFw@public.gmane.org,
	xen-devel-GuqFBffKawuEi8DpZVb4nw@public.gmane.org,
	linux-mm-Bw31MaZKKs3YtjvyW6yDsg@public.gmane.org,
	iommu-cunTk1MwBs9QetFLy7KEm3xJsTq8ys+cHZ5vskTnxNA@public.gmane.org
Cc: "Brijesh Singh" <brijesh.singh-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>,
	"Toshimitsu Kani" <toshi.kani-ZPxbGqLxI0U@public.gmane.org>,
	"Michael S. Tsirkin"
	<mst-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>,
	"Matt Fleming"
	<matt-mF/unelCI9GS6iBeEJttW/XRex20P6io@public.gmane.org>,
	"Alexander Potapenko"
	<glider-hpIqsD4AKlfQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa-YMNOUZJC4hwAvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org>,
	"Boris Ostrovsky"
	<boris.ostrovsky-QHcLZuEGTsvQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>,
	"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet-T1hC0tSOHrs@public.gmane.org>,
	"Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>,
	"Larry Woodman"
	<lwoodman-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>,
	"Ingo Molnar" <mingo-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>,
	"Andrey Ryabinin"
	<aryabinin-5HdwGun5lf+gSpxsJD1C4w@public.gmane.org>,
	"Dave Young" <dyoung-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>,
	"Rik van Riel" <riel-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>,
	"Arnd Bergmann" <arnd-r2nGTMty4D4@public.gmane.org>,
	"Borislav Petkov" <bp-Gina5bIWoIWzQB+pC5nmwQ@public.gmane.org>,
	"Andy Lutomirski" <luto-DgEjT+Ai2ygdnm+yROfE0A@public.gmane.org>,
	"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx-hfZtesqFncYOwBW4kG4KsQ@public.gmane.org>,
	"Dmitry Vyukov" <dvyukov-hpIqsD4AKlfQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>,
	"Juergen Gross" <jgross-IBi9RG/b67k@public.gmane.org>,
	"Paolo Bonzini"
	<pbonzini-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
Subject: [PATCH v7 14/36] x86/mm: Insure that boot memory areas are mapped properly
Date: Fri, 16 Jun 2017 13:52:32 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170616185232.18967.61753.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170616184947.18967.84890.stgit-qCXWGYdRb2BnqfbPTmsdiZQ+2ll4COg0XqFh9Ls21Oc@public.gmane.org>

The boot data and command line data are present in memory in a decrypted
state and are copied early in the boot process.  The early page fault
support will map these areas as encrypted, so before attempting to copy
them, add decrypted mappings so the data is accessed properly when copied.

For the initrd, encrypt this data in place. Since the future mapping of
the initrd area will be mapped as encrypted the data will be accessed
properly.

Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h |    6 +++
 arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h     |    3 ++
 arch/x86/kernel/head64.c           |   30 +++++++++++++--
 arch/x86/kernel/setup.c            |    9 +++++
 arch/x86/mm/kasan_init_64.c        |    2 +
 arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c          |   70 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 6 files changed, 115 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
index 6508ec9..3ffa5fa 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
@@ -26,6 +26,9 @@ void __init sme_early_encrypt(resource_size_t paddr,
 void __init sme_early_decrypt(resource_size_t paddr,
 			      unsigned long size);
 
+void __init sme_map_bootdata(char *real_mode_data);
+void __init sme_unmap_bootdata(char *real_mode_data);
+
 void __init sme_early_init(void);
 
 void __init sme_enable(void);
@@ -39,6 +42,9 @@ static inline void __init sme_early_encrypt(resource_size_t paddr,
 static inline void __init sme_early_decrypt(resource_size_t paddr,
 					    unsigned long size) { }
 
+static inline void __init sme_map_bootdata(char *real_mode_data) { }
+static inline void __init sme_unmap_bootdata(char *real_mode_data) { }
+
 static inline void __init sme_early_init(void) { }
 
 static inline void __init sme_enable(void) { }
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h
index c6452cb..bbeae4a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h
@@ -23,6 +23,9 @@
 #ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
 #include <asm/x86_init.h>
 
+extern pgd_t early_top_pgt[PTRS_PER_PGD];
+int __init __early_make_pgtable(unsigned long address, pmdval_t pmd);
+
 void ptdump_walk_pgd_level(struct seq_file *m, pgd_t *pgd);
 void ptdump_walk_pgd_level_checkwx(void);
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c
index 5d7363a..9e94ed2 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c
@@ -34,7 +34,6 @@
 /*
  * Manage page tables very early on.
  */
-extern pgd_t early_top_pgt[PTRS_PER_PGD];
 extern pmd_t early_dynamic_pgts[EARLY_DYNAMIC_PAGE_TABLES][PTRS_PER_PMD];
 static unsigned int __initdata next_early_pgt;
 pmdval_t early_pmd_flags = __PAGE_KERNEL_LARGE & ~(_PAGE_GLOBAL | _PAGE_NX);
@@ -161,13 +160,13 @@ static void __init reset_early_page_tables(void)
 }
 
 /* Create a new PMD entry */
-int __init early_make_pgtable(unsigned long address)
+int __init __early_make_pgtable(unsigned long address, pmdval_t pmd)
 {
 	unsigned long physaddr = address - __PAGE_OFFSET;
 	pgdval_t pgd, *pgd_p;
 	p4dval_t p4d, *p4d_p;
 	pudval_t pud, *pud_p;
-	pmdval_t pmd, *pmd_p;
+	pmdval_t *pmd_p;
 
 	/* Invalid address or early pgt is done ?  */
 	if (physaddr >= MAXMEM || read_cr3_pa() != __pa_nodebug(early_top_pgt))
@@ -226,12 +225,21 @@ int __init early_make_pgtable(unsigned long address)
 		memset(pmd_p, 0, sizeof(*pmd_p) * PTRS_PER_PMD);
 		*pud_p = (pudval_t)pmd_p - __START_KERNEL_map + phys_base + _KERNPG_TABLE;
 	}
-	pmd = (physaddr & PMD_MASK) + early_pmd_flags;
 	pmd_p[pmd_index(address)] = pmd;
 
 	return 0;
 }
 
+int __init early_make_pgtable(unsigned long address)
+{
+	unsigned long physaddr = address - __PAGE_OFFSET;
+	pmdval_t pmd;
+
+	pmd = (physaddr & PMD_MASK) + early_pmd_flags;
+
+	return __early_make_pgtable(address, pmd);
+}
+
 /* Don't add a printk in there. printk relies on the PDA which is not initialized 
    yet. */
 static void __init clear_bss(void)
@@ -254,6 +262,12 @@ static void __init copy_bootdata(char *real_mode_data)
 	char * command_line;
 	unsigned long cmd_line_ptr;
 
+	/*
+	 * If SME is active, this will create decrypted mappings of the
+	 * boot data in advance of the copy operations.
+	 */
+	sme_map_bootdata(real_mode_data);
+
 	memcpy(&boot_params, real_mode_data, sizeof boot_params);
 	sanitize_boot_params(&boot_params);
 	cmd_line_ptr = get_cmd_line_ptr();
@@ -261,6 +275,14 @@ static void __init copy_bootdata(char *real_mode_data)
 		command_line = __va(cmd_line_ptr);
 		memcpy(boot_command_line, command_line, COMMAND_LINE_SIZE);
 	}
+
+	/*
+	 * The old boot data is no longer needed and won't be reserved,
+	 * freeing up that memory for use by the system. If SME is active,
+	 * we need to remove the mappings that were created so that the
+	 * memory doesn't remain mapped as decrypted.
+	 */
+	sme_unmap_bootdata(real_mode_data);
 }
 
 asmlinkage __visible void __init x86_64_start_kernel(char * real_mode_data)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
index f818236..6a2f0a8 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
@@ -69,6 +69,7 @@
 #include <linux/crash_dump.h>
 #include <linux/tboot.h>
 #include <linux/jiffies.h>
+#include <linux/mem_encrypt.h>
 
 #include <linux/usb/xhci-dbgp.h>
 #include <video/edid.h>
@@ -374,6 +375,14 @@ static void __init reserve_initrd(void)
 	    !ramdisk_image || !ramdisk_size)
 		return;		/* No initrd provided by bootloader */
 
+	/*
+	 * If SME is active, this memory will be marked encrypted by the
+	 * kernel when it is accessed (including relocation). However, the
+	 * ramdisk image was loaded decrypted by the bootloader, so make
+	 * sure that it is encrypted before accessing it.
+	 */
+	sme_early_encrypt(ramdisk_image, ramdisk_end - ramdisk_image);
+
 	initrd_start = 0;
 
 	mapped_size = memblock_mem_size(max_pfn_mapped);
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/kasan_init_64.c b/arch/x86/mm/kasan_init_64.c
index d7cc830..1b8791f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/kasan_init_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/kasan_init_64.c
@@ -11,8 +11,8 @@
 #include <asm/e820/types.h>
 #include <asm/tlbflush.h>
 #include <asm/sections.h>
+#include <asm/pgtable.h>
 
-extern pgd_t early_top_pgt[PTRS_PER_PGD];
 extern struct range pfn_mapped[E820_MAX_ENTRIES];
 
 static int __init map_range(struct range *range)
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
index b7671b9..ea5e3a6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
@@ -19,6 +19,8 @@
 
 #include <asm/tlbflush.h>
 #include <asm/fixmap.h>
+#include <asm/setup.h>
+#include <asm/bootparam.h>
 
 /*
  * Since SME related variables are set early in the boot process they must
@@ -101,6 +103,74 @@ void __init sme_early_decrypt(resource_size_t paddr, unsigned long size)
 	__sme_early_enc_dec(paddr, size, false);
 }
 
+static void __init __sme_early_map_unmap_mem(void *vaddr, unsigned long size,
+					     bool map)
+{
+	unsigned long paddr = (unsigned long)vaddr - __PAGE_OFFSET;
+	pmdval_t pmd_flags, pmd;
+
+	/* Use early_pmd_flags but remove the encryption mask */
+	pmd_flags = __sme_clr(early_pmd_flags);
+
+	do {
+		pmd = map ? (paddr & PMD_MASK) + pmd_flags : 0;
+		__early_make_pgtable((unsigned long)vaddr, pmd);
+
+		vaddr += PMD_SIZE;
+		paddr += PMD_SIZE;
+		size = (size <= PMD_SIZE) ? 0 : size - PMD_SIZE;
+	} while (size);
+
+	write_cr3(__read_cr3());
+}
+
+static void __init __sme_map_unmap_bootdata(char *real_mode_data, bool map)
+{
+	struct boot_params *boot_data;
+	unsigned long cmdline_paddr;
+
+	/* If SME is not active, the bootdata is in the correct state */
+	if (!sme_active())
+		return;
+
+	if (!map) {
+		/*
+		 * If unmapping, get the command line address before
+		 * unmapping the real_mode_data.
+		 */
+		boot_data = (struct boot_params *)real_mode_data;
+		cmdline_paddr = boot_data->hdr.cmd_line_ptr |
+				((u64)boot_data->ext_cmd_line_ptr << 32);
+	}
+
+	__sme_early_map_unmap_mem(real_mode_data, sizeof(boot_params), map);
+
+	if (map) {
+		/*
+		 * If mapping, get the command line address after mapping
+		 * the real_mode_data.
+		 */
+		boot_data = (struct boot_params *)real_mode_data;
+		cmdline_paddr = boot_data->hdr.cmd_line_ptr |
+				((u64)boot_data->ext_cmd_line_ptr << 32);
+	}
+
+	if (!cmdline_paddr)
+		return;
+
+	__sme_early_map_unmap_mem(__va(cmdline_paddr), COMMAND_LINE_SIZE, map);
+}
+
+void __init sme_unmap_bootdata(char *real_mode_data)
+{
+	__sme_map_unmap_bootdata(real_mode_data, false);
+}
+
+void __init sme_map_bootdata(char *real_mode_data)
+{
+	__sme_map_unmap_bootdata(real_mode_data, true);
+}
+
 void __init sme_early_init(void)
 {
 	unsigned int i;

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
To: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
	kexec@lists.infradead.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	kasan-dev@googlegroups.com, xen-devel@lists.xen.org,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org
Cc: "Brijesh Singh" <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
	"Toshimitsu Kani" <toshi.kani@hpe.com>,
	"Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>,
	"Matt Fleming" <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>,
	"Alexander Potapenko" <glider@google.com>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	"Larry Woodman" <lwoodman@redhat.com>,
	"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
	"Joerg Roedel" <joro@8bytes.org>,
	"Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>,
	"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>,
	"Andrey Ryabinin" <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>,
	"Dave Young" <dyoung@redhat.com>,
	"Rik van Riel" <riel@redhat.com>, "Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>,
	"Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk" <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>,
	"Borislav Petkov" <bp@alien8.de>,
	"Andy Lutomirski" <luto@kernel.org>,
	"Boris Ostrovsky" <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>,
	"Dmitry Vyukov" <dvyukov@google.com>,
	"Juergen Gross" <jgross@suse.com>,
	"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	"Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Subject: [PATCH v7 14/36] x86/mm: Insure that boot memory areas are mapped properly
Date: Fri, 16 Jun 2017 13:52:32 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170616185232.18967.61753.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170616184947.18967.84890.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net>

The boot data and command line data are present in memory in a decrypted
state and are copied early in the boot process.  The early page fault
support will map these areas as encrypted, so before attempting to copy
them, add decrypted mappings so the data is accessed properly when copied.

For the initrd, encrypt this data in place. Since the future mapping of
the initrd area will be mapped as encrypted the data will be accessed
properly.

Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h |    6 +++
 arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h     |    3 ++
 arch/x86/kernel/head64.c           |   30 +++++++++++++--
 arch/x86/kernel/setup.c            |    9 +++++
 arch/x86/mm/kasan_init_64.c        |    2 +
 arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c          |   70 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 6 files changed, 115 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
index 6508ec9..3ffa5fa 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
@@ -26,6 +26,9 @@ void __init sme_early_encrypt(resource_size_t paddr,
 void __init sme_early_decrypt(resource_size_t paddr,
 			      unsigned long size);
 
+void __init sme_map_bootdata(char *real_mode_data);
+void __init sme_unmap_bootdata(char *real_mode_data);
+
 void __init sme_early_init(void);
 
 void __init sme_enable(void);
@@ -39,6 +42,9 @@ static inline void __init sme_early_encrypt(resource_size_t paddr,
 static inline void __init sme_early_decrypt(resource_size_t paddr,
 					    unsigned long size) { }
 
+static inline void __init sme_map_bootdata(char *real_mode_data) { }
+static inline void __init sme_unmap_bootdata(char *real_mode_data) { }
+
 static inline void __init sme_early_init(void) { }
 
 static inline void __init sme_enable(void) { }
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h
index c6452cb..bbeae4a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h
@@ -23,6 +23,9 @@
 #ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
 #include <asm/x86_init.h>
 
+extern pgd_t early_top_pgt[PTRS_PER_PGD];
+int __init __early_make_pgtable(unsigned long address, pmdval_t pmd);
+
 void ptdump_walk_pgd_level(struct seq_file *m, pgd_t *pgd);
 void ptdump_walk_pgd_level_checkwx(void);
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c
index 5d7363a..9e94ed2 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c
@@ -34,7 +34,6 @@
 /*
  * Manage page tables very early on.
  */
-extern pgd_t early_top_pgt[PTRS_PER_PGD];
 extern pmd_t early_dynamic_pgts[EARLY_DYNAMIC_PAGE_TABLES][PTRS_PER_PMD];
 static unsigned int __initdata next_early_pgt;
 pmdval_t early_pmd_flags = __PAGE_KERNEL_LARGE & ~(_PAGE_GLOBAL | _PAGE_NX);
@@ -161,13 +160,13 @@ static void __init reset_early_page_tables(void)
 }
 
 /* Create a new PMD entry */
-int __init early_make_pgtable(unsigned long address)
+int __init __early_make_pgtable(unsigned long address, pmdval_t pmd)
 {
 	unsigned long physaddr = address - __PAGE_OFFSET;
 	pgdval_t pgd, *pgd_p;
 	p4dval_t p4d, *p4d_p;
 	pudval_t pud, *pud_p;
-	pmdval_t pmd, *pmd_p;
+	pmdval_t *pmd_p;
 
 	/* Invalid address or early pgt is done ?  */
 	if (physaddr >= MAXMEM || read_cr3_pa() != __pa_nodebug(early_top_pgt))
@@ -226,12 +225,21 @@ int __init early_make_pgtable(unsigned long address)
 		memset(pmd_p, 0, sizeof(*pmd_p) * PTRS_PER_PMD);
 		*pud_p = (pudval_t)pmd_p - __START_KERNEL_map + phys_base + _KERNPG_TABLE;
 	}
-	pmd = (physaddr & PMD_MASK) + early_pmd_flags;
 	pmd_p[pmd_index(address)] = pmd;
 
 	return 0;
 }
 
+int __init early_make_pgtable(unsigned long address)
+{
+	unsigned long physaddr = address - __PAGE_OFFSET;
+	pmdval_t pmd;
+
+	pmd = (physaddr & PMD_MASK) + early_pmd_flags;
+
+	return __early_make_pgtable(address, pmd);
+}
+
 /* Don't add a printk in there. printk relies on the PDA which is not initialized 
    yet. */
 static void __init clear_bss(void)
@@ -254,6 +262,12 @@ static void __init copy_bootdata(char *real_mode_data)
 	char * command_line;
 	unsigned long cmd_line_ptr;
 
+	/*
+	 * If SME is active, this will create decrypted mappings of the
+	 * boot data in advance of the copy operations.
+	 */
+	sme_map_bootdata(real_mode_data);
+
 	memcpy(&boot_params, real_mode_data, sizeof boot_params);
 	sanitize_boot_params(&boot_params);
 	cmd_line_ptr = get_cmd_line_ptr();
@@ -261,6 +275,14 @@ static void __init copy_bootdata(char *real_mode_data)
 		command_line = __va(cmd_line_ptr);
 		memcpy(boot_command_line, command_line, COMMAND_LINE_SIZE);
 	}
+
+	/*
+	 * The old boot data is no longer needed and won't be reserved,
+	 * freeing up that memory for use by the system. If SME is active,
+	 * we need to remove the mappings that were created so that the
+	 * memory doesn't remain mapped as decrypted.
+	 */
+	sme_unmap_bootdata(real_mode_data);
 }
 
 asmlinkage __visible void __init x86_64_start_kernel(char * real_mode_data)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
index f818236..6a2f0a8 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
@@ -69,6 +69,7 @@
 #include <linux/crash_dump.h>
 #include <linux/tboot.h>
 #include <linux/jiffies.h>
+#include <linux/mem_encrypt.h>
 
 #include <linux/usb/xhci-dbgp.h>
 #include <video/edid.h>
@@ -374,6 +375,14 @@ static void __init reserve_initrd(void)
 	    !ramdisk_image || !ramdisk_size)
 		return;		/* No initrd provided by bootloader */
 
+	/*
+	 * If SME is active, this memory will be marked encrypted by the
+	 * kernel when it is accessed (including relocation). However, the
+	 * ramdisk image was loaded decrypted by the bootloader, so make
+	 * sure that it is encrypted before accessing it.
+	 */
+	sme_early_encrypt(ramdisk_image, ramdisk_end - ramdisk_image);
+
 	initrd_start = 0;
 
 	mapped_size = memblock_mem_size(max_pfn_mapped);
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/kasan_init_64.c b/arch/x86/mm/kasan_init_64.c
index d7cc830..1b8791f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/kasan_init_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/kasan_init_64.c
@@ -11,8 +11,8 @@
 #include <asm/e820/types.h>
 #include <asm/tlbflush.h>
 #include <asm/sections.h>
+#include <asm/pgtable.h>
 
-extern pgd_t early_top_pgt[PTRS_PER_PGD];
 extern struct range pfn_mapped[E820_MAX_ENTRIES];
 
 static int __init map_range(struct range *range)
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
index b7671b9..ea5e3a6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
@@ -19,6 +19,8 @@
 
 #include <asm/tlbflush.h>
 #include <asm/fixmap.h>
+#include <asm/setup.h>
+#include <asm/bootparam.h>
 
 /*
  * Since SME related variables are set early in the boot process they must
@@ -101,6 +103,74 @@ void __init sme_early_decrypt(resource_size_t paddr, unsigned long size)
 	__sme_early_enc_dec(paddr, size, false);
 }
 
+static void __init __sme_early_map_unmap_mem(void *vaddr, unsigned long size,
+					     bool map)
+{
+	unsigned long paddr = (unsigned long)vaddr - __PAGE_OFFSET;
+	pmdval_t pmd_flags, pmd;
+
+	/* Use early_pmd_flags but remove the encryption mask */
+	pmd_flags = __sme_clr(early_pmd_flags);
+
+	do {
+		pmd = map ? (paddr & PMD_MASK) + pmd_flags : 0;
+		__early_make_pgtable((unsigned long)vaddr, pmd);
+
+		vaddr += PMD_SIZE;
+		paddr += PMD_SIZE;
+		size = (size <= PMD_SIZE) ? 0 : size - PMD_SIZE;
+	} while (size);
+
+	write_cr3(__read_cr3());
+}
+
+static void __init __sme_map_unmap_bootdata(char *real_mode_data, bool map)
+{
+	struct boot_params *boot_data;
+	unsigned long cmdline_paddr;
+
+	/* If SME is not active, the bootdata is in the correct state */
+	if (!sme_active())
+		return;
+
+	if (!map) {
+		/*
+		 * If unmapping, get the command line address before
+		 * unmapping the real_mode_data.
+		 */
+		boot_data = (struct boot_params *)real_mode_data;
+		cmdline_paddr = boot_data->hdr.cmd_line_ptr |
+				((u64)boot_data->ext_cmd_line_ptr << 32);
+	}
+
+	__sme_early_map_unmap_mem(real_mode_data, sizeof(boot_params), map);
+
+	if (map) {
+		/*
+		 * If mapping, get the command line address after mapping
+		 * the real_mode_data.
+		 */
+		boot_data = (struct boot_params *)real_mode_data;
+		cmdline_paddr = boot_data->hdr.cmd_line_ptr |
+				((u64)boot_data->ext_cmd_line_ptr << 32);
+	}
+
+	if (!cmdline_paddr)
+		return;
+
+	__sme_early_map_unmap_mem(__va(cmdline_paddr), COMMAND_LINE_SIZE, map);
+}
+
+void __init sme_unmap_bootdata(char *real_mode_data)
+{
+	__sme_map_unmap_bootdata(real_mode_data, false);
+}
+
+void __init sme_map_bootdata(char *real_mode_data)
+{
+	__sme_map_unmap_bootdata(real_mode_data, true);
+}
+
 void __init sme_early_init(void)
 {
 	unsigned int i;

--
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WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
To: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
	kexec@lists.infradead.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	kasan-dev@googlegroups.com, xen-devel@lists.xen.org,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org
Cc: "Brijesh Singh" <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
	"Toshimitsu Kani" <toshi.kani@hpe.com>,
	"Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>,
	"Matt Fleming" <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>,
	"Alexander Potapenko" <glider@google.com>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	"Boris Ostrovsky" <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>,
	"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
	"Joerg Roedel" <joro@8bytes.org>,
	"Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>,
	"Larry Woodman" <lwoodman@redhat.com>,
	"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>,
	"Andrey Ryabinin" <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>,
	"Dave Young" <dyoung@redhat.com>,
	"Rik van Riel" <riel@redhat.com>, "Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>,
	"Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk" <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>,
	"Borislav Petkov" <bp@alien8.de>,
	"Andy Lutomirski" <luto@kernel.org>,
	"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	"Dmitry Vyukov" <dvyukov@google.com>,
	"Juergen Gross" <jgross@suse.com>,
	"Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Subject: [PATCH v7 14/36] x86/mm: Insure that boot memory areas are mapped properly
Date: Fri, 16 Jun 2017 13:52:32 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170616185232.18967.61753.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170616184947.18967.84890.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net>

The boot data and command line data are present in memory in a decrypted
state and are copied early in the boot process.  The early page fault
support will map these areas as encrypted, so before attempting to copy
them, add decrypted mappings so the data is accessed properly when copied.

For the initrd, encrypt this data in place. Since the future mapping of
the initrd area will be mapped as encrypted the data will be accessed
properly.

Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h |    6 +++
 arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h     |    3 ++
 arch/x86/kernel/head64.c           |   30 +++++++++++++--
 arch/x86/kernel/setup.c            |    9 +++++
 arch/x86/mm/kasan_init_64.c        |    2 +
 arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c          |   70 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 6 files changed, 115 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
index 6508ec9..3ffa5fa 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
@@ -26,6 +26,9 @@ void __init sme_early_encrypt(resource_size_t paddr,
 void __init sme_early_decrypt(resource_size_t paddr,
 			      unsigned long size);
 
+void __init sme_map_bootdata(char *real_mode_data);
+void __init sme_unmap_bootdata(char *real_mode_data);
+
 void __init sme_early_init(void);
 
 void __init sme_enable(void);
@@ -39,6 +42,9 @@ static inline void __init sme_early_encrypt(resource_size_t paddr,
 static inline void __init sme_early_decrypt(resource_size_t paddr,
 					    unsigned long size) { }
 
+static inline void __init sme_map_bootdata(char *real_mode_data) { }
+static inline void __init sme_unmap_bootdata(char *real_mode_data) { }
+
 static inline void __init sme_early_init(void) { }
 
 static inline void __init sme_enable(void) { }
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h
index c6452cb..bbeae4a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h
@@ -23,6 +23,9 @@
 #ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
 #include <asm/x86_init.h>
 
+extern pgd_t early_top_pgt[PTRS_PER_PGD];
+int __init __early_make_pgtable(unsigned long address, pmdval_t pmd);
+
 void ptdump_walk_pgd_level(struct seq_file *m, pgd_t *pgd);
 void ptdump_walk_pgd_level_checkwx(void);
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c
index 5d7363a..9e94ed2 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c
@@ -34,7 +34,6 @@
 /*
  * Manage page tables very early on.
  */
-extern pgd_t early_top_pgt[PTRS_PER_PGD];
 extern pmd_t early_dynamic_pgts[EARLY_DYNAMIC_PAGE_TABLES][PTRS_PER_PMD];
 static unsigned int __initdata next_early_pgt;
 pmdval_t early_pmd_flags = __PAGE_KERNEL_LARGE & ~(_PAGE_GLOBAL | _PAGE_NX);
@@ -161,13 +160,13 @@ static void __init reset_early_page_tables(void)
 }
 
 /* Create a new PMD entry */
-int __init early_make_pgtable(unsigned long address)
+int __init __early_make_pgtable(unsigned long address, pmdval_t pmd)
 {
 	unsigned long physaddr = address - __PAGE_OFFSET;
 	pgdval_t pgd, *pgd_p;
 	p4dval_t p4d, *p4d_p;
 	pudval_t pud, *pud_p;
-	pmdval_t pmd, *pmd_p;
+	pmdval_t *pmd_p;
 
 	/* Invalid address or early pgt is done ?  */
 	if (physaddr >= MAXMEM || read_cr3_pa() != __pa_nodebug(early_top_pgt))
@@ -226,12 +225,21 @@ int __init early_make_pgtable(unsigned long address)
 		memset(pmd_p, 0, sizeof(*pmd_p) * PTRS_PER_PMD);
 		*pud_p = (pudval_t)pmd_p - __START_KERNEL_map + phys_base + _KERNPG_TABLE;
 	}
-	pmd = (physaddr & PMD_MASK) + early_pmd_flags;
 	pmd_p[pmd_index(address)] = pmd;
 
 	return 0;
 }
 
+int __init early_make_pgtable(unsigned long address)
+{
+	unsigned long physaddr = address - __PAGE_OFFSET;
+	pmdval_t pmd;
+
+	pmd = (physaddr & PMD_MASK) + early_pmd_flags;
+
+	return __early_make_pgtable(address, pmd);
+}
+
 /* Don't add a printk in there. printk relies on the PDA which is not initialized 
    yet. */
 static void __init clear_bss(void)
@@ -254,6 +262,12 @@ static void __init copy_bootdata(char *real_mode_data)
 	char * command_line;
 	unsigned long cmd_line_ptr;
 
+	/*
+	 * If SME is active, this will create decrypted mappings of the
+	 * boot data in advance of the copy operations.
+	 */
+	sme_map_bootdata(real_mode_data);
+
 	memcpy(&boot_params, real_mode_data, sizeof boot_params);
 	sanitize_boot_params(&boot_params);
 	cmd_line_ptr = get_cmd_line_ptr();
@@ -261,6 +275,14 @@ static void __init copy_bootdata(char *real_mode_data)
 		command_line = __va(cmd_line_ptr);
 		memcpy(boot_command_line, command_line, COMMAND_LINE_SIZE);
 	}
+
+	/*
+	 * The old boot data is no longer needed and won't be reserved,
+	 * freeing up that memory for use by the system. If SME is active,
+	 * we need to remove the mappings that were created so that the
+	 * memory doesn't remain mapped as decrypted.
+	 */
+	sme_unmap_bootdata(real_mode_data);
 }
 
 asmlinkage __visible void __init x86_64_start_kernel(char * real_mode_data)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
index f818236..6a2f0a8 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
@@ -69,6 +69,7 @@
 #include <linux/crash_dump.h>
 #include <linux/tboot.h>
 #include <linux/jiffies.h>
+#include <linux/mem_encrypt.h>
 
 #include <linux/usb/xhci-dbgp.h>
 #include <video/edid.h>
@@ -374,6 +375,14 @@ static void __init reserve_initrd(void)
 	    !ramdisk_image || !ramdisk_size)
 		return;		/* No initrd provided by bootloader */
 
+	/*
+	 * If SME is active, this memory will be marked encrypted by the
+	 * kernel when it is accessed (including relocation). However, the
+	 * ramdisk image was loaded decrypted by the bootloader, so make
+	 * sure that it is encrypted before accessing it.
+	 */
+	sme_early_encrypt(ramdisk_image, ramdisk_end - ramdisk_image);
+
 	initrd_start = 0;
 
 	mapped_size = memblock_mem_size(max_pfn_mapped);
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/kasan_init_64.c b/arch/x86/mm/kasan_init_64.c
index d7cc830..1b8791f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/kasan_init_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/kasan_init_64.c
@@ -11,8 +11,8 @@
 #include <asm/e820/types.h>
 #include <asm/tlbflush.h>
 #include <asm/sections.h>
+#include <asm/pgtable.h>
 
-extern pgd_t early_top_pgt[PTRS_PER_PGD];
 extern struct range pfn_mapped[E820_MAX_ENTRIES];
 
 static int __init map_range(struct range *range)
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
index b7671b9..ea5e3a6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
@@ -19,6 +19,8 @@
 
 #include <asm/tlbflush.h>
 #include <asm/fixmap.h>
+#include <asm/setup.h>
+#include <asm/bootparam.h>
 
 /*
  * Since SME related variables are set early in the boot process they must
@@ -101,6 +103,74 @@ void __init sme_early_decrypt(resource_size_t paddr, unsigned long size)
 	__sme_early_enc_dec(paddr, size, false);
 }
 
+static void __init __sme_early_map_unmap_mem(void *vaddr, unsigned long size,
+					     bool map)
+{
+	unsigned long paddr = (unsigned long)vaddr - __PAGE_OFFSET;
+	pmdval_t pmd_flags, pmd;
+
+	/* Use early_pmd_flags but remove the encryption mask */
+	pmd_flags = __sme_clr(early_pmd_flags);
+
+	do {
+		pmd = map ? (paddr & PMD_MASK) + pmd_flags : 0;
+		__early_make_pgtable((unsigned long)vaddr, pmd);
+
+		vaddr += PMD_SIZE;
+		paddr += PMD_SIZE;
+		size = (size <= PMD_SIZE) ? 0 : size - PMD_SIZE;
+	} while (size);
+
+	write_cr3(__read_cr3());
+}
+
+static void __init __sme_map_unmap_bootdata(char *real_mode_data, bool map)
+{
+	struct boot_params *boot_data;
+	unsigned long cmdline_paddr;
+
+	/* If SME is not active, the bootdata is in the correct state */
+	if (!sme_active())
+		return;
+
+	if (!map) {
+		/*
+		 * If unmapping, get the command line address before
+		 * unmapping the real_mode_data.
+		 */
+		boot_data = (struct boot_params *)real_mode_data;
+		cmdline_paddr = boot_data->hdr.cmd_line_ptr |
+				((u64)boot_data->ext_cmd_line_ptr << 32);
+	}
+
+	__sme_early_map_unmap_mem(real_mode_data, sizeof(boot_params), map);
+
+	if (map) {
+		/*
+		 * If mapping, get the command line address after mapping
+		 * the real_mode_data.
+		 */
+		boot_data = (struct boot_params *)real_mode_data;
+		cmdline_paddr = boot_data->hdr.cmd_line_ptr |
+				((u64)boot_data->ext_cmd_line_ptr << 32);
+	}
+
+	if (!cmdline_paddr)
+		return;
+
+	__sme_early_map_unmap_mem(__va(cmdline_paddr), COMMAND_LINE_SIZE, map);
+}
+
+void __init sme_unmap_bootdata(char *real_mode_data)
+{
+	__sme_map_unmap_bootdata(real_mode_data, false);
+}
+
+void __init sme_map_bootdata(char *real_mode_data)
+{
+	__sme_map_unmap_bootdata(real_mode_data, true);
+}
+
 void __init sme_early_init(void)
 {
 	unsigned int i;


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  parent reply	other threads:[~2017-06-16 18:52 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 384+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-06-16 18:49 [PATCH v7 00/36] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD) Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:49 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:49 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:49 ` [PATCH v7 01/36] x86: Document AMD Secure Memory Encryption (SME) Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:49 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:49   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:49   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:50 ` [PATCH v7 02/36] x86/mm/pat: Set write-protect cache mode for full PAT support Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:50   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:50   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:50 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:50 ` [PATCH v7 03/36] x86, mpparse, x86/acpi, x86/PCI, x86/dmi, SFI: Use memremap for RAM mappings Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:50   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:50   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:50   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-20  7:21   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-20  7:21   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-20  7:21     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-20  7:21     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-20  7:21     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-16 18:50 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:50 ` [PATCH v7 04/36] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Memory Encryption CPU feature Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:50   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:50   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:50   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:50 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:50 ` [PATCH v7 05/36] x86/CPU/AMD: Handle SME reduction in physical address size Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:50   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:50   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:50 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:50 ` [PATCH v7 06/36] x86/mm: Add Secure Memory Encryption (SME) support Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:50 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:50   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:50   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:50   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-20 20:49   ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-20 20:49     ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-20 20:49     ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-20 20:49     ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-21 13:26     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-21 13:26       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-21 13:26       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-21 13:26       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-21 13:26     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-20 20:49   ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-16 18:51 ` [PATCH v7 07/36] x86/mm: Don't use phys_to_virt in ioremap() if SME is active Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:51   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:51   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-20 20:55   ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-20 20:55   ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-20 20:55     ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-20 20:55     ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-20 20:55     ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-21 13:52     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-21 13:52       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-21 13:52       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-21 13:52       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-21 13:52     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-21  7:37   ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-21  7:37     ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-21  7:37     ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-21  7:37     ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-21 13:54     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-21 13:54     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-21 13:54       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-21 13:54       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-21 13:54       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-21  7:37   ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-16 18:51 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:51 ` [PATCH v7 08/36] x86/mm: Add support to enable SME in early boot processing Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:51   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:51   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:51   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-20  7:38   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-20  7:38     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-20  7:38     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-20  7:38     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-20 15:52     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-20 15:52     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-20 15:52       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-20 15:52       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-20 15:52       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-20  7:38   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-21  7:16   ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-21  7:16   ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-21  7:16     ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-21  7:16     ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-21  7:16     ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-21 15:14     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-21 15:14       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-21 15:14       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-21 15:14       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-21 15:38       ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-21 15:38         ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-21 15:38         ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-21 15:38         ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-21 18:30         ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-21 18:30           ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-21 18:30           ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-21 18:30           ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-21 18:52           ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-21 18:52           ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-21 18:52             ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-21 18:52             ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-21 18:52             ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-21 18:30         ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-21 15:38       ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-21 15:14     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:51 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:51 ` [PATCH v7 09/36] x86/mm: Simplify p[gum]d_page() macros Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:51 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:51   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:51   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:51   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:51 ` [PATCH v7 10/36] x86/mm: Provide general kernel support for memory encryption Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:51   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:51   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:51   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-21  7:18   ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-21  7:18   ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-21  7:18     ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-21  7:18     ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-21  7:18     ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-21  8:23     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-21  8:23       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-21  8:23       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-21  8:23       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-21  8:23     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-16 18:51 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:51 ` [PATCH v7 11/36] x86/mm: Add SME support for read_cr3_pa() Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:51   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:51   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-20  8:25   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-20  8:25     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-20  8:25     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-20  8:25     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-20  8:25   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-20 16:17   ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-06-20 16:17   ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-06-20 16:17     ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-06-20 16:17     ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-06-20 16:17     ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-06-20 16:23     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-20 16:23       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-20 16:23       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-20 16:23       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-20 16:23     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:51 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:52 ` [PATCH v7 12/36] x86/mm: Extend early_memremap() support with additional attrs Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:52   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:52   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:52 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:52 ` [PATCH v7 13/36] x86/mm: Add support for early encrypt/decrypt of memory Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:52 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:52   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:52   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:52   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:52 ` [PATCH v7 14/36] x86/mm: Insure that boot memory areas are mapped properly Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:52 ` Tom Lendacky [this message]
2017-06-16 18:52   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:52   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:52   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-20 15:30   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-20 15:30   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-20 15:30     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-20 15:30     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-20 15:30     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-16 18:52 ` [PATCH v7 15/36] x86/boot/e820: Add support to determine the E820 type of an address Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:52 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:52   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:52   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:52 ` [PATCH v7 16/36] efi: Add an EFI table address match function Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:52   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:52   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-22 10:57   ` Matt Fleming
2017-06-22 10:57     ` Matt Fleming
2017-06-22 10:57     ` Matt Fleming
2017-06-22 10:57     ` Matt Fleming
2017-06-22 10:57   ` Matt Fleming
2017-06-16 18:52 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:53 ` [PATCH v7 17/36] efi: Update efi_mem_type() to return an error rather than 0 Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:53 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:53   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:53   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:53   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-22 10:03   ` Matt Fleming
2017-06-22 10:03     ` Matt Fleming
2017-06-22 10:03     ` Matt Fleming
2017-06-22 10:03     ` Matt Fleming
2017-06-22 10:03   ` Matt Fleming
2017-06-16 18:53 ` [PATCH v7 18/36] x86/efi: Update EFI pagetable creation to work with SME Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:53   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:53   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:53   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-22 10:58   ` Matt Fleming
2017-06-22 10:58   ` Matt Fleming
2017-06-22 10:58     ` Matt Fleming
2017-06-22 10:58     ` Matt Fleming
2017-06-22 10:58     ` Matt Fleming
2017-06-16 18:53 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:53 ` [PATCH v7 19/36] x86/mm: Add support to access boot related data in the clear Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:53 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:53   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:53   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:53   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-20 20:39   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-20 20:39   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-20 20:39     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-20 20:39     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-20 20:39     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-22 11:04   ` Matt Fleming
2017-06-22 11:04     ` Matt Fleming
2017-06-22 11:04     ` Matt Fleming
2017-06-22 11:04     ` Matt Fleming
2017-06-22 11:04   ` Matt Fleming
2017-06-16 18:53 ` [PATCH v7 20/36] x86, mpparse: Use memremap to map the mpf and mpc data Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:53   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:53   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-21  8:39   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-21  8:39     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-21  8:39     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-21  8:39     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-21  8:39   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-16 18:53 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:53 ` [PATCH v7 21/36] x86/mm: Add support to access persistent memory in the clear Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:53   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:53   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:53 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:54 ` [PATCH v7 22/36] x86/mm: Add support for changing the memory encryption attribute Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:54 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:54   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:54   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:54 ` [PATCH v7 23/36] x86, realmode: Decrypt trampoline area if memory encryption is active Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:54   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:54   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-21  9:43   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-21  9:43     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-21  9:43     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-21  9:43     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-21  9:43   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-16 18:54 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:54 ` [PATCH v7 24/36] x86, swiotlb: Add memory encryption support Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:54   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:54   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:54   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-21  9:54   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-21  9:54   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-21  9:54     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-21  9:54     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-21  9:54     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-16 18:54 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:54 ` [PATCH v7 25/36] swiotlb: Add warnings for use of bounce buffers with SME Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:54   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:54   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:54   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-21 10:50   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-21 10:50   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-21 10:50     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-21 10:50     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-21 10:50     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-21 15:37     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-21 15:37     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-21 15:37       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-21 15:37       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-21 15:37       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:54 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:54 ` [PATCH v7 26/36] x86/CPU/AMD: Make the microcode level available earlier in the boot Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:54   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:54   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-22  9:40   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-22  9:40   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-22  9:40     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-22  9:40     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-22  9:40     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-16 18:54 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:54 ` [PATCH v7 27/36] iommu/amd: Allow the AMD IOMMU to work with memory encryption Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:54 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:54   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:54   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-22 10:56   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-22 10:56   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-22 10:56     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-22 10:56     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-22 10:56     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-22 16:48     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-22 16:48     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-22 16:48       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-22 16:48       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-22 16:48       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:55 ` [PATCH v7 28/36] x86, realmode: Check for memory encryption on the APs Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:55 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:55   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:55   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:55 ` [PATCH v7 29/36] x86, drm, fbdev: Do not specify encrypted memory for video mappings Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:55   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:55   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-17 14:08   ` kbuild test robot
2017-06-17 14:08   ` kbuild test robot
2017-06-17 14:08     ` kbuild test robot
2017-06-17 14:08     ` kbuild test robot
2017-06-16 18:55 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:55 ` [PATCH v7 30/36] kvm: x86: svm: Support Secure Memory Encryption within KVM Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:55   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:55   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:55 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:55 ` [PATCH v7 31/36] x86/mm, kexec: Allow kexec to be used with SME Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:55 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:55   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:55   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:55   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-23  8:56   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-23  8:56   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-23  8:56     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-23  8:56     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-23  8:56     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-16 18:55 ` [PATCH v7 32/36] xen/x86: Remove SME feature in PV guests Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:55 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:55   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:55   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:55   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-17 10:40   ` Juergen Gross
2017-06-17 10:40     ` Juergen Gross
2017-06-17 10:40     ` Juergen Gross
2017-06-17 10:40     ` Juergen Gross
2017-06-17 10:40   ` Juergen Gross
2017-06-23  9:09   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-23  9:09   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-23  9:09     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-23  9:09     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-23  9:09     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-16 18:56 ` [PATCH v7 33/36] x86/mm: Use proper encryption attributes with /dev/mem Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:56 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:56   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:56   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:56   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-23  9:32   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-23  9:32   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-23  9:32     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-23  9:32     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-23  9:32     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-16 18:56 ` [PATCH v7 34/36] x86/mm: Add support to encrypt the kernel in-place Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:56   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:56   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:56   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-23 10:00   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-23 10:00     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-23 10:00     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-23 10:00     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-23 17:44     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-23 17:44     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-23 17:44       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-23 17:44       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-23 17:44       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-26 15:45       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-26 15:45       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-26 15:45         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-26 15:45         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-26 15:45         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-26 16:34         ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-26 16:34           ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-26 16:34           ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-26 16:34           ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-26 16:34         ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-23 10:00   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-16 18:56 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:56 ` [PATCH v7 35/36] x86/boot: Add early cmdline parsing for options with arguments Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:56   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:56   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-23 11:57   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-23 11:57   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-23 11:57     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-23 11:57     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-23 11:57     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-16 18:56 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:56 ` [PATCH v7 36/36] x86/mm: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:56 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:56   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:56   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:56   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-23 17:39   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-23 17:39     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-23 17:39     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-23 17:39     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-23 17:39   ` Borislav Petkov

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