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From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
To: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
	kexec@lists.infradead.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	kasan-dev@googlegroups.com, xen-devel@lists.xen.org,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org
Cc: "Brijesh Singh" <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
	"Toshimitsu Kani" <toshi.kani@hpe.com>,
	"Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>,
	"Matt Fleming" <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>,
	"Alexander Potapenko" <glider@google.com>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	"Larry Woodman" <lwoodman@redhat.com>,
	"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
	"Joerg Roedel" <joro@8bytes.org>,
	"Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>,
	"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>,
	"Andrey Ryabinin" <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>,
	"Dave Young" <dyoung@redhat.com>,
	"Rik van Riel" <riel@redhat.com>, "Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>,
	"Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk" <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>,
	"Borislav Petkov" <bp@alien8.de>,
	"Andy Lutomirski" <luto@kernel.org>,
	"Boris Ostrovsky" <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>,
	"Dmitry Vyukov" <dvyukov@google.com>,
	"Juergen Gross" <jgross@suse.com>,
	"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	"Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Subject: [PATCH v7 21/36] x86/mm: Add support to access persistent memory in the clear
Date: Fri, 16 Jun 2017 13:53:49 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170616185349.18967.38054.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170616184947.18967.84890.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net>

Persistent memory is expected to persist across reboots. The encryption
key used by SME will change across reboots which will result in corrupted
persistent memory.  Persistent memory is handed out by block devices
through memory remapping functions, so be sure not to map this memory as
encrypted.

Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
---
 arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c |   31 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 30 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c b/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
index f3fa007..0254b78 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
@@ -428,17 +428,46 @@ void unxlate_dev_mem_ptr(phys_addr_t phys, void *addr)
  * Examine the physical address to determine if it is an area of memory
  * that should be mapped decrypted.  If the memory is not part of the
  * kernel usable area it was accessed and created decrypted, so these
- * areas should be mapped decrypted.
+ * areas should be mapped decrypted. And since the encryption key can
+ * change across reboots, persistent memory should also be mapped
+ * decrypted.
  */
 static bool memremap_should_map_decrypted(resource_size_t phys_addr,
 					  unsigned long size)
 {
+	int is_pmem;
+
+	/*
+	 * Check if the address is part of a persistent memory region.
+	 * This check covers areas added by E820, EFI and ACPI.
+	 */
+	is_pmem = region_intersects(phys_addr, size, IORESOURCE_MEM,
+				    IORES_DESC_PERSISTENT_MEMORY);
+	if (is_pmem != REGION_DISJOINT)
+		return true;
+
+	/*
+	 * Check if the non-volatile attribute is set for an EFI
+	 * reserved area.
+	 */
+	if (efi_enabled(EFI_BOOT)) {
+		switch (efi_mem_type(phys_addr)) {
+		case EFI_RESERVED_TYPE:
+			if (efi_mem_attributes(phys_addr) & EFI_MEMORY_NV)
+				return true;
+			break;
+		default:
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+
 	/* Check if the address is outside kernel usable area */
 	switch (e820__get_entry_type(phys_addr, phys_addr + size - 1)) {
 	case E820_TYPE_RESERVED:
 	case E820_TYPE_ACPI:
 	case E820_TYPE_NVS:
 	case E820_TYPE_UNUSABLE:
+	case E820_TYPE_PRAM:
 		return true;
 	default:
 		break;

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
To: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
	kexec@lists.infradead.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	kasan-dev@googlegroups.com, xen-devel@lists.xen.org,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org
Cc: "Brijesh Singh" <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
	"Toshimitsu Kani" <toshi.kani@hpe.com>,
	"Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>,
	"Matt Fleming" <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>,
	"Alexander Potapenko" <glider@google.com>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	"Larry Woodman" <lwoodman@redhat.com>,
	"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
	"Joerg Roedel" <joro@8bytes.org>,
	"Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>,
	"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>,
	"Andrey Ryabinin" <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>,
	"Dave Young" <dyoung@redhat.com>,
	"Rik van Riel" <riel@redhat.com>, "Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>,
	"Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk" <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>,
	"Borislav Petkov" <bp@alien8.de>,
	"Andy Lutomirski" <luto@kernel.org>,
	"Boris Ostrovsky" <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>,
	"Dmitry Vyukov" <dvyukov@google.com>,
	"Juergen Gross" <jgross@suse.com>,
	"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	"Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Subject: [PATCH v7 21/36] x86/mm: Add support to access persistent memory in the clear
Date: Fri, 16 Jun 2017 13:53:49 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170616185349.18967.38054.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170616184947.18967.84890.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net>

Persistent memory is expected to persist across reboots. The encryption
key used by SME will change across reboots which will result in corrupted
persistent memory.  Persistent memory is handed out by block devices
through memory remapping functions, so be sure not to map this memory as
encrypted.

Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
---
 arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c |   31 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 30 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c b/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
index f3fa007..0254b78 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
@@ -428,17 +428,46 @@ void unxlate_dev_mem_ptr(phys_addr_t phys, void *addr)
  * Examine the physical address to determine if it is an area of memory
  * that should be mapped decrypted.  If the memory is not part of the
  * kernel usable area it was accessed and created decrypted, so these
- * areas should be mapped decrypted.
+ * areas should be mapped decrypted. And since the encryption key can
+ * change across reboots, persistent memory should also be mapped
+ * decrypted.
  */
 static bool memremap_should_map_decrypted(resource_size_t phys_addr,
 					  unsigned long size)
 {
+	int is_pmem;
+
+	/*
+	 * Check if the address is part of a persistent memory region.
+	 * This check covers areas added by E820, EFI and ACPI.
+	 */
+	is_pmem = region_intersects(phys_addr, size, IORESOURCE_MEM,
+				    IORES_DESC_PERSISTENT_MEMORY);
+	if (is_pmem != REGION_DISJOINT)
+		return true;
+
+	/*
+	 * Check if the non-volatile attribute is set for an EFI
+	 * reserved area.
+	 */
+	if (efi_enabled(EFI_BOOT)) {
+		switch (efi_mem_type(phys_addr)) {
+		case EFI_RESERVED_TYPE:
+			if (efi_mem_attributes(phys_addr) & EFI_MEMORY_NV)
+				return true;
+			break;
+		default:
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+
 	/* Check if the address is outside kernel usable area */
 	switch (e820__get_entry_type(phys_addr, phys_addr + size - 1)) {
 	case E820_TYPE_RESERVED:
 	case E820_TYPE_ACPI:
 	case E820_TYPE_NVS:
 	case E820_TYPE_UNUSABLE:
+	case E820_TYPE_PRAM:
 		return true;
 	default:
 		break;

--
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WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
To: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
	kexec@lists.infradead.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	kasan-dev@googlegroups.com, xen-devel@lists.xen.org,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org
Cc: "Brijesh Singh" <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
	"Toshimitsu Kani" <toshi.kani@hpe.com>,
	"Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>,
	"Matt Fleming" <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>,
	"Alexander Potapenko" <glider@google.com>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	"Boris Ostrovsky" <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>,
	"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
	"Joerg Roedel" <joro@8bytes.org>,
	"Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>,
	"Larry Woodman" <lwoodman@redhat.com>,
	"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>,
	"Andrey Ryabinin" <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>,
	"Dave Young" <dyoung@redhat.com>,
	"Rik van Riel" <riel@redhat.com>, "Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>,
	"Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk" <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>,
	"Borislav Petkov" <bp@alien8.de>,
	"Andy Lutomirski" <luto@kernel.org>,
	"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	"Dmitry Vyukov" <dvyukov@google.com>,
	"Juergen Gross" <jgross@suse.com>,
	"Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Subject: [PATCH v7 21/36] x86/mm: Add support to access persistent memory in the clear
Date: Fri, 16 Jun 2017 13:53:49 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170616185349.18967.38054.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170616184947.18967.84890.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net>

Persistent memory is expected to persist across reboots. The encryption
key used by SME will change across reboots which will result in corrupted
persistent memory.  Persistent memory is handed out by block devices
through memory remapping functions, so be sure not to map this memory as
encrypted.

Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
---
 arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c |   31 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 30 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c b/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
index f3fa007..0254b78 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
@@ -428,17 +428,46 @@ void unxlate_dev_mem_ptr(phys_addr_t phys, void *addr)
  * Examine the physical address to determine if it is an area of memory
  * that should be mapped decrypted.  If the memory is not part of the
  * kernel usable area it was accessed and created decrypted, so these
- * areas should be mapped decrypted.
+ * areas should be mapped decrypted. And since the encryption key can
+ * change across reboots, persistent memory should also be mapped
+ * decrypted.
  */
 static bool memremap_should_map_decrypted(resource_size_t phys_addr,
 					  unsigned long size)
 {
+	int is_pmem;
+
+	/*
+	 * Check if the address is part of a persistent memory region.
+	 * This check covers areas added by E820, EFI and ACPI.
+	 */
+	is_pmem = region_intersects(phys_addr, size, IORESOURCE_MEM,
+				    IORES_DESC_PERSISTENT_MEMORY);
+	if (is_pmem != REGION_DISJOINT)
+		return true;
+
+	/*
+	 * Check if the non-volatile attribute is set for an EFI
+	 * reserved area.
+	 */
+	if (efi_enabled(EFI_BOOT)) {
+		switch (efi_mem_type(phys_addr)) {
+		case EFI_RESERVED_TYPE:
+			if (efi_mem_attributes(phys_addr) & EFI_MEMORY_NV)
+				return true;
+			break;
+		default:
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+
 	/* Check if the address is outside kernel usable area */
 	switch (e820__get_entry_type(phys_addr, phys_addr + size - 1)) {
 	case E820_TYPE_RESERVED:
 	case E820_TYPE_ACPI:
 	case E820_TYPE_NVS:
 	case E820_TYPE_UNUSABLE:
+	case E820_TYPE_PRAM:
 		return true;
 	default:
 		break;


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  parent reply	other threads:[~2017-06-16 18:54 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 384+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-06-16 18:49 [PATCH v7 00/36] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD) Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:49 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:49 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:49 ` [PATCH v7 01/36] x86: Document AMD Secure Memory Encryption (SME) Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:49 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:49   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:49   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:50 ` [PATCH v7 02/36] x86/mm/pat: Set write-protect cache mode for full PAT support Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:50   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:50   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:50 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:50 ` [PATCH v7 03/36] x86, mpparse, x86/acpi, x86/PCI, x86/dmi, SFI: Use memremap for RAM mappings Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:50   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:50   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:50   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-20  7:21   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-20  7:21   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-20  7:21     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-20  7:21     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-20  7:21     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-16 18:50 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:50 ` [PATCH v7 04/36] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Memory Encryption CPU feature Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:50   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:50   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:50   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:50 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:50 ` [PATCH v7 05/36] x86/CPU/AMD: Handle SME reduction in physical address size Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:50   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:50   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:50 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:50 ` [PATCH v7 06/36] x86/mm: Add Secure Memory Encryption (SME) support Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:50 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:50   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:50   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:50   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-20 20:49   ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-20 20:49     ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-20 20:49     ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-20 20:49     ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-21 13:26     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-21 13:26       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-21 13:26       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-21 13:26       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-21 13:26     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-20 20:49   ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-16 18:51 ` [PATCH v7 07/36] x86/mm: Don't use phys_to_virt in ioremap() if SME is active Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:51   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:51   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-20 20:55   ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-20 20:55   ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-20 20:55     ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-20 20:55     ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-20 20:55     ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-21 13:52     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-21 13:52       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-21 13:52       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-21 13:52       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-21 13:52     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-21  7:37   ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-21  7:37     ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-21  7:37     ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-21  7:37     ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-21 13:54     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-21 13:54     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-21 13:54       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-21 13:54       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-21 13:54       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-21  7:37   ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-16 18:51 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:51 ` [PATCH v7 08/36] x86/mm: Add support to enable SME in early boot processing Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:51   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:51   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:51   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-20  7:38   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-20  7:38     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-20  7:38     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-20  7:38     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-20 15:52     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-20 15:52     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-20 15:52       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-20 15:52       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-20 15:52       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-20  7:38   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-21  7:16   ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-21  7:16   ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-21  7:16     ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-21  7:16     ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-21  7:16     ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-21 15:14     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-21 15:14       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-21 15:14       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-21 15:14       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-21 15:38       ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-21 15:38         ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-21 15:38         ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-21 15:38         ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-21 18:30         ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-21 18:30           ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-21 18:30           ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-21 18:30           ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-21 18:52           ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-21 18:52           ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-21 18:52             ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-21 18:52             ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-21 18:52             ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-21 18:30         ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-21 15:38       ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-21 15:14     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:51 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:51 ` [PATCH v7 09/36] x86/mm: Simplify p[gum]d_page() macros Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:51 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:51   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:51   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:51   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:51 ` [PATCH v7 10/36] x86/mm: Provide general kernel support for memory encryption Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:51   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:51   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:51   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-21  7:18   ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-21  7:18   ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-21  7:18     ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-21  7:18     ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-21  7:18     ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-21  8:23     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-21  8:23       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-21  8:23       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-21  8:23       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-21  8:23     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-16 18:51 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:51 ` [PATCH v7 11/36] x86/mm: Add SME support for read_cr3_pa() Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:51   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:51   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-20  8:25   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-20  8:25     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-20  8:25     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-20  8:25     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-20  8:25   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-20 16:17   ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-06-20 16:17   ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-06-20 16:17     ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-06-20 16:17     ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-06-20 16:17     ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-06-20 16:23     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-20 16:23       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-20 16:23       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-20 16:23       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-20 16:23     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:51 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:52 ` [PATCH v7 12/36] x86/mm: Extend early_memremap() support with additional attrs Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:52   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:52   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:52 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:52 ` [PATCH v7 13/36] x86/mm: Add support for early encrypt/decrypt of memory Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:52 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:52   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:52   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:52   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:52 ` [PATCH v7 14/36] x86/mm: Insure that boot memory areas are mapped properly Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:52 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:52   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:52   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:52   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-20 15:30   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-20 15:30   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-20 15:30     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-20 15:30     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-20 15:30     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-16 18:52 ` [PATCH v7 15/36] x86/boot/e820: Add support to determine the E820 type of an address Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:52 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:52   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:52   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:52 ` [PATCH v7 16/36] efi: Add an EFI table address match function Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:52   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:52   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-22 10:57   ` Matt Fleming
2017-06-22 10:57     ` Matt Fleming
2017-06-22 10:57     ` Matt Fleming
2017-06-22 10:57     ` Matt Fleming
2017-06-22 10:57   ` Matt Fleming
2017-06-16 18:52 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:53 ` [PATCH v7 17/36] efi: Update efi_mem_type() to return an error rather than 0 Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:53 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:53   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:53   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:53   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-22 10:03   ` Matt Fleming
2017-06-22 10:03     ` Matt Fleming
2017-06-22 10:03     ` Matt Fleming
2017-06-22 10:03     ` Matt Fleming
2017-06-22 10:03   ` Matt Fleming
2017-06-16 18:53 ` [PATCH v7 18/36] x86/efi: Update EFI pagetable creation to work with SME Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:53   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:53   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:53   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-22 10:58   ` Matt Fleming
2017-06-22 10:58   ` Matt Fleming
2017-06-22 10:58     ` Matt Fleming
2017-06-22 10:58     ` Matt Fleming
2017-06-22 10:58     ` Matt Fleming
2017-06-16 18:53 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:53 ` [PATCH v7 19/36] x86/mm: Add support to access boot related data in the clear Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:53 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:53   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:53   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:53   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-20 20:39   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-20 20:39   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-20 20:39     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-20 20:39     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-20 20:39     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-22 11:04   ` Matt Fleming
2017-06-22 11:04     ` Matt Fleming
2017-06-22 11:04     ` Matt Fleming
2017-06-22 11:04     ` Matt Fleming
2017-06-22 11:04   ` Matt Fleming
2017-06-16 18:53 ` [PATCH v7 20/36] x86, mpparse: Use memremap to map the mpf and mpc data Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:53   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:53   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-21  8:39   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-21  8:39     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-21  8:39     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-21  8:39     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-21  8:39   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-16 18:53 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:53 ` Tom Lendacky [this message]
2017-06-16 18:53   ` [PATCH v7 21/36] x86/mm: Add support to access persistent memory in the clear Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:53   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:53 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:54 ` [PATCH v7 22/36] x86/mm: Add support for changing the memory encryption attribute Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:54 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:54   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:54   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:54 ` [PATCH v7 23/36] x86, realmode: Decrypt trampoline area if memory encryption is active Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:54   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:54   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-21  9:43   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-21  9:43     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-21  9:43     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-21  9:43     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-21  9:43   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-16 18:54 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:54 ` [PATCH v7 24/36] x86, swiotlb: Add memory encryption support Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:54   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:54   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:54   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-21  9:54   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-21  9:54   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-21  9:54     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-21  9:54     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-21  9:54     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-16 18:54 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:54 ` [PATCH v7 25/36] swiotlb: Add warnings for use of bounce buffers with SME Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:54   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:54   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:54   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-21 10:50   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-21 10:50   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-21 10:50     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-21 10:50     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-21 10:50     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-21 15:37     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-21 15:37     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-21 15:37       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-21 15:37       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-21 15:37       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:54 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:54 ` [PATCH v7 26/36] x86/CPU/AMD: Make the microcode level available earlier in the boot Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:54   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:54   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-22  9:40   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-22  9:40   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-22  9:40     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-22  9:40     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-22  9:40     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-16 18:54 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:54 ` [PATCH v7 27/36] iommu/amd: Allow the AMD IOMMU to work with memory encryption Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:54 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:54   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:54   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-22 10:56   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-22 10:56   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-22 10:56     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-22 10:56     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-22 10:56     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-22 16:48     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-22 16:48     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-22 16:48       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-22 16:48       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-22 16:48       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:55 ` [PATCH v7 28/36] x86, realmode: Check for memory encryption on the APs Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:55 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:55   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:55   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:55 ` [PATCH v7 29/36] x86, drm, fbdev: Do not specify encrypted memory for video mappings Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:55   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:55   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-17 14:08   ` kbuild test robot
2017-06-17 14:08   ` kbuild test robot
2017-06-17 14:08     ` kbuild test robot
2017-06-17 14:08     ` kbuild test robot
2017-06-16 18:55 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:55 ` [PATCH v7 30/36] kvm: x86: svm: Support Secure Memory Encryption within KVM Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:55   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:55   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:55 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:55 ` [PATCH v7 31/36] x86/mm, kexec: Allow kexec to be used with SME Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:55 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:55   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:55   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:55   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-23  8:56   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-23  8:56   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-23  8:56     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-23  8:56     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-23  8:56     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-16 18:55 ` [PATCH v7 32/36] xen/x86: Remove SME feature in PV guests Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:55 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:55   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:55   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:55   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-17 10:40   ` Juergen Gross
2017-06-17 10:40     ` Juergen Gross
2017-06-17 10:40     ` Juergen Gross
2017-06-17 10:40     ` Juergen Gross
2017-06-17 10:40   ` Juergen Gross
2017-06-23  9:09   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-23  9:09   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-23  9:09     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-23  9:09     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-23  9:09     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-16 18:56 ` [PATCH v7 33/36] x86/mm: Use proper encryption attributes with /dev/mem Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:56 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:56   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:56   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:56   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-23  9:32   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-23  9:32   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-23  9:32     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-23  9:32     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-23  9:32     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-16 18:56 ` [PATCH v7 34/36] x86/mm: Add support to encrypt the kernel in-place Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:56   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:56   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:56   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-23 10:00   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-23 10:00     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-23 10:00     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-23 10:00     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-23 17:44     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-23 17:44     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-23 17:44       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-23 17:44       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-23 17:44       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-26 15:45       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-26 15:45       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-26 15:45         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-26 15:45         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-26 15:45         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-26 16:34         ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-26 16:34           ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-26 16:34           ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-26 16:34           ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-26 16:34         ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-23 10:00   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-16 18:56 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:56 ` [PATCH v7 35/36] x86/boot: Add early cmdline parsing for options with arguments Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:56   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:56   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-23 11:57   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-23 11:57   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-23 11:57     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-23 11:57     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-23 11:57     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-16 18:56 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:56 ` [PATCH v7 36/36] x86/mm: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:56 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:56   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:56   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:56   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-23 17:39   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-23 17:39     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-23 17:39     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-23 17:39     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-23 17:39   ` Borislav Petkov

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