From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> To: <linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org> Cc: <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>, <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>, <linux-doc@vger.kernel.org>, <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, <silviu.vlasceanu@huawei.com>, Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Subject: [PATCH v2 03/15] ima: generalize policy file operations Date: Tue, 7 Nov 2017 11:36:58 +0100 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20171107103710.10883-4-roberto.sassu@huawei.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20171107103710.10883-1-roberto.sassu@huawei.com> This patch renames ima_open_policy() and ima_release_policy() respectively to ima_open_data_upload() and ima_release_data_upload(). They will be used to implement file operations for interfaces allowing to upload and read provided data. Also, the new flag IMA_POLICY_BUSY has been defined specifically for the policy, as it might not be cleared at file release. This would prevent userspace applications from uploading files after a policy has been loaded. Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Changelog v1: - clear correct flag in ima_release_data_upload() --- security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c | 48 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------- 1 file changed, 33 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c index 864d34581081..a5b82e075ec8 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c @@ -384,6 +384,7 @@ static ssize_t ima_write_data(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, } enum ima_fs_flags { + IMA_POLICY_BUSY, IMA_FS_BUSY, }; @@ -399,22 +400,33 @@ static const struct seq_operations ima_policy_seqops = { #endif /* - * ima_open_policy: sequentialize access to the policy file + * ima_open_data_upload: sequentialize access to the data upload interface */ -static int ima_open_policy(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp) +static int ima_open_data_upload(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp) { + enum kernel_read_file_id file_id = ima_get_file_id(filp->f_path.dentry); + const struct seq_operations *seq_ops = NULL; + enum ima_fs_flags flag = IMA_FS_BUSY; + bool read_allowed = false; + + if (file_id == READING_POLICY) { + flag = IMA_POLICY_BUSY; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY + read_allowed = true; + seq_ops = &ima_policy_seqops; +#endif + } + if (!(filp->f_flags & O_WRONLY)) { -#ifndef CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY - return -EACCES; -#else + if (!read_allowed) + return -EACCES; if ((filp->f_flags & O_ACCMODE) != O_RDONLY) return -EACCES; if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) return -EPERM; - return seq_open(filp, &ima_policy_seqops); -#endif + return seq_open(filp, seq_ops); } - if (test_and_set_bit(IMA_FS_BUSY, &ima_fs_flags)) + if (test_and_set_bit(flag, &ima_fs_flags)) return -EBUSY; return 0; } @@ -426,13 +438,19 @@ static int ima_open_policy(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp) * point to the new policy rules, and remove the securityfs policy file, * assuming a valid policy. */ -static int ima_release_policy(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) +static int ima_release_data_upload(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) { + enum kernel_read_file_id file_id = ima_get_file_id(file->f_path.dentry); const char *cause = valid_policy ? "completed" : "failed"; if ((file->f_flags & O_ACCMODE) == O_RDONLY) return seq_release(inode, file); + if (file_id != READING_POLICY) { + clear_bit(IMA_FS_BUSY, &ima_fs_flags); + return 0; + } + if (valid_policy && ima_check_policy() < 0) { cause = "failed"; valid_policy = 0; @@ -445,7 +463,7 @@ static int ima_release_policy(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) if (!valid_policy) { ima_delete_rules(); valid_policy = 1; - clear_bit(IMA_FS_BUSY, &ima_fs_flags); + clear_bit(IMA_POLICY_BUSY, &ima_fs_flags); return 0; } @@ -454,16 +472,16 @@ static int ima_release_policy(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) securityfs_remove(ima_policy); ima_policy = NULL; #elif defined(CONFIG_IMA_WRITE_POLICY) - clear_bit(IMA_FS_BUSY, &ima_fs_flags); + clear_bit(IMA_POLICY_BUSY, &ima_fs_flags); #endif return 0; } -static const struct file_operations ima_measure_policy_ops = { - .open = ima_open_policy, +static const struct file_operations ima_data_upload_ops = { + .open = ima_open_data_upload, .write = ima_write_data, .read = seq_read, - .release = ima_release_policy, + .release = ima_release_data_upload, .llseek = generic_file_llseek, }; @@ -502,7 +520,7 @@ int __init ima_fs_init(void) ima_policy = securityfs_create_file("policy", POLICY_FILE_FLAGS, ima_dir, NULL, - &ima_measure_policy_ops); + &ima_data_upload_ops); if (IS_ERR(ima_policy)) goto out; -- 2.11.0
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: roberto.sassu@huawei.com (Roberto Sassu) To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v2 03/15] ima: generalize policy file operations Date: Tue, 7 Nov 2017 11:36:58 +0100 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20171107103710.10883-4-roberto.sassu@huawei.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20171107103710.10883-1-roberto.sassu@huawei.com> This patch renames ima_open_policy() and ima_release_policy() respectively to ima_open_data_upload() and ima_release_data_upload(). They will be used to implement file operations for interfaces allowing to upload and read provided data. Also, the new flag IMA_POLICY_BUSY has been defined specifically for the policy, as it might not be cleared at file release. This would prevent userspace applications from uploading files after a policy has been loaded. Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Changelog v1: - clear correct flag in ima_release_data_upload() --- security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c | 48 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------- 1 file changed, 33 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c index 864d34581081..a5b82e075ec8 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c @@ -384,6 +384,7 @@ static ssize_t ima_write_data(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, } enum ima_fs_flags { + IMA_POLICY_BUSY, IMA_FS_BUSY, }; @@ -399,22 +400,33 @@ static const struct seq_operations ima_policy_seqops = { #endif /* - * ima_open_policy: sequentialize access to the policy file + * ima_open_data_upload: sequentialize access to the data upload interface */ -static int ima_open_policy(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp) +static int ima_open_data_upload(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp) { + enum kernel_read_file_id file_id = ima_get_file_id(filp->f_path.dentry); + const struct seq_operations *seq_ops = NULL; + enum ima_fs_flags flag = IMA_FS_BUSY; + bool read_allowed = false; + + if (file_id == READING_POLICY) { + flag = IMA_POLICY_BUSY; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY + read_allowed = true; + seq_ops = &ima_policy_seqops; +#endif + } + if (!(filp->f_flags & O_WRONLY)) { -#ifndef CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY - return -EACCES; -#else + if (!read_allowed) + return -EACCES; if ((filp->f_flags & O_ACCMODE) != O_RDONLY) return -EACCES; if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) return -EPERM; - return seq_open(filp, &ima_policy_seqops); -#endif + return seq_open(filp, seq_ops); } - if (test_and_set_bit(IMA_FS_BUSY, &ima_fs_flags)) + if (test_and_set_bit(flag, &ima_fs_flags)) return -EBUSY; return 0; } @@ -426,13 +438,19 @@ static int ima_open_policy(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp) * point to the new policy rules, and remove the securityfs policy file, * assuming a valid policy. */ -static int ima_release_policy(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) +static int ima_release_data_upload(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) { + enum kernel_read_file_id file_id = ima_get_file_id(file->f_path.dentry); const char *cause = valid_policy ? "completed" : "failed"; if ((file->f_flags & O_ACCMODE) == O_RDONLY) return seq_release(inode, file); + if (file_id != READING_POLICY) { + clear_bit(IMA_FS_BUSY, &ima_fs_flags); + return 0; + } + if (valid_policy && ima_check_policy() < 0) { cause = "failed"; valid_policy = 0; @@ -445,7 +463,7 @@ static int ima_release_policy(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) if (!valid_policy) { ima_delete_rules(); valid_policy = 1; - clear_bit(IMA_FS_BUSY, &ima_fs_flags); + clear_bit(IMA_POLICY_BUSY, &ima_fs_flags); return 0; } @@ -454,16 +472,16 @@ static int ima_release_policy(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) securityfs_remove(ima_policy); ima_policy = NULL; #elif defined(CONFIG_IMA_WRITE_POLICY) - clear_bit(IMA_FS_BUSY, &ima_fs_flags); + clear_bit(IMA_POLICY_BUSY, &ima_fs_flags); #endif return 0; } -static const struct file_operations ima_measure_policy_ops = { - .open = ima_open_policy, +static const struct file_operations ima_data_upload_ops = { + .open = ima_open_data_upload, .write = ima_write_data, .read = seq_read, - .release = ima_release_policy, + .release = ima_release_data_upload, .llseek = generic_file_llseek, }; @@ -502,7 +520,7 @@ int __init ima_fs_init(void) ima_policy = securityfs_create_file("policy", POLICY_FILE_FLAGS, ima_dir, NULL, - &ima_measure_policy_ops); + &ima_data_upload_ops); if (IS_ERR(ima_policy)) goto out; -- 2.11.0 -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in the body of a message to majordomo at vger.kernel.org More majordomo info@ http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-11-07 10:42 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 96+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2017-11-07 10:36 [PATCH v2 00/15] ima: digest list feature Roberto Sassu 2017-11-07 10:36 ` Roberto Sassu 2017-11-07 10:36 ` [PATCH v2 01/15] ima: generalize ima_read_policy() Roberto Sassu 2017-11-07 10:36 ` Roberto Sassu 2017-11-07 10:36 ` [PATCH v2 02/15] ima: generalize ima_write_policy() Roberto Sassu 2017-11-07 10:36 ` Roberto Sassu 2017-11-07 10:36 ` Roberto Sassu [this message] 2017-11-07 10:36 ` [PATCH v2 03/15] ima: generalize policy file operations Roberto Sassu 2017-11-07 10:36 ` [PATCH v2 04/15] ima: use ima_show_htable_value to show hash table data Roberto Sassu 2017-11-07 10:36 ` Roberto Sassu 2017-11-07 10:37 ` [PATCH v2 05/15] ima: add functions to manage digest lists Roberto Sassu 2017-11-07 10:37 ` Roberto Sassu 2017-11-07 10:37 ` [PATCH v2 06/15] ima: add parser of digest lists metadata Roberto Sassu 2017-11-07 10:37 ` Roberto Sassu 2017-11-18 4:20 ` Serge E. Hallyn 2017-11-18 4:20 ` Serge E. Hallyn 2017-11-18 23:23 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-11-18 23:23 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-11-20 9:40 ` Roberto Sassu 2017-11-20 9:40 ` Roberto Sassu 2017-11-20 13:53 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-11-20 13:53 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-11-20 13:53 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-11-20 16:52 ` Serge E. Hallyn 2017-11-20 16:52 ` Serge E. Hallyn 2017-11-20 16:52 ` Serge E. Hallyn 2017-11-20 16:52 ` Serge E. Hallyn 2017-11-07 10:37 ` [PATCH v2 07/15] ima: add parser of compact digest list Roberto Sassu 2017-11-07 10:37 ` Roberto Sassu 2017-11-07 10:37 ` [PATCH v2 08/15] ima: add parser of RPM package headers Roberto Sassu 2017-11-07 10:37 ` Roberto Sassu 2017-11-07 10:37 ` [PATCH v2 09/15] ima: introduce securityfs interfaces for digest lists Roberto Sassu 2017-11-07 10:37 ` Roberto Sassu 2017-11-07 10:37 ` [PATCH v2 10/15] ima: disable digest lookup if digest lists are not checked Roberto Sassu 2017-11-07 10:37 ` Roberto Sassu 2017-11-07 10:37 ` [PATCH v2 11/15] ima: add policy action digest_list Roberto Sassu 2017-11-07 10:37 ` Roberto Sassu 2017-11-07 10:37 ` [PATCH v2 12/15] ima: do not update security.ima if appraisal status is not INTEGRITY_PASS Roberto Sassu 2017-11-07 10:37 ` Roberto Sassu 2017-11-18 4:25 ` Serge E. Hallyn 2017-11-18 4:25 ` Serge E. Hallyn 2017-11-07 10:37 ` [PATCH v2 13/15] evm: add kernel command line option to select protected xattrs Roberto Sassu 2017-11-07 10:37 ` Roberto Sassu 2017-11-07 10:37 ` [PATCH v2 14/15] ima: add support for appraisal with digest lists Roberto Sassu 2017-11-07 10:37 ` Roberto Sassu 2017-11-07 10:37 ` [PATCH v2 15/15] ima: add Documentation/security/IMA-digest-lists.txt Roberto Sassu 2017-11-07 10:37 ` Roberto Sassu 2017-11-07 13:37 ` [PATCH v2 00/15] ima: digest list feature Mimi Zohar 2017-11-07 13:37 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-11-07 13:37 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-11-07 16:45 ` Roberto Sassu 2017-11-07 16:45 ` Roberto Sassu 2017-11-07 16:45 ` Roberto Sassu 2017-11-17 1:08 ` Kees Cook 2017-11-17 1:08 ` Kees Cook 2017-11-17 8:55 ` Roberto Sassu 2017-11-17 8:55 ` Roberto Sassu 2017-11-17 12:21 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-11-17 12:21 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-11-17 12:21 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-11-07 14:49 ` Matthew Garrett 2017-11-07 14:49 ` Matthew Garrett 2017-11-07 17:53 ` Roberto Sassu 2017-11-07 17:53 ` Roberto Sassu 2017-11-07 18:06 ` Matthew Garrett 2017-11-07 18:06 ` Matthew Garrett 2017-11-08 12:00 ` Roberto Sassu 2017-11-08 12:00 ` Roberto Sassu 2017-11-08 15:48 ` Matthew Garrett 2017-11-08 15:48 ` Matthew Garrett 2017-11-09 9:51 ` Roberto Sassu 2017-11-09 9:51 ` Roberto Sassu 2017-11-09 14:47 ` Matthew Garrett 2017-11-09 14:47 ` Matthew Garrett 2017-11-09 16:13 ` Roberto Sassu 2017-11-09 16:13 ` Roberto Sassu 2017-11-09 16:46 ` Matthew Garrett 2017-11-09 16:46 ` Matthew Garrett 2017-11-09 17:23 ` Roberto Sassu 2017-11-09 17:23 ` Roberto Sassu 2017-11-09 16:17 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-11-09 16:17 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-11-09 16:17 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-11-07 18:03 ` Safford, David (GE Global Research, US) 2017-11-07 18:03 ` Safford, David (GE Global Research, US) 2017-11-07 18:03 ` Safford, David (GE Global Research, US) 2017-11-08 10:16 ` Roberto Sassu 2017-11-08 10:16 ` Roberto Sassu 2017-11-08 10:16 ` Roberto Sassu 2017-12-05 22:03 ` Ken Goldman 2017-12-05 22:03 ` Ken Goldman 2017-12-06 9:13 ` Roberto Sassu 2017-12-06 9:13 ` Roberto Sassu 2017-12-08 21:59 ` Ken Goldman 2017-12-11 8:26 ` Roberto Sassu 2017-12-22 15:56 ` Ken Goldman
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