From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> To: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>, John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>, Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>, Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>, Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>, "Schaufler, Casey" <casey.schaufler@intel.com>, LSM <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>, Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH security-next v3 28/29] LSM: Separate idea of "major" LSM from "exclusive" LSM Date: Mon, 24 Sep 2018 17:18:31 -0700 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20180925001832.18322-29-keescook@chromium.org> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20180925001832.18322-1-keescook@chromium.org> In order to both support old "security=" Legacy Major LSM selection, and handling real exclusivity, this creates LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE and updates the selection logic to handle them. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> --- include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 1 + security/apparmor/lsm.c | 2 +- security/security.c | 12 ++++++++++++ security/selinux/hooks.c | 2 +- security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 2 +- security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c | 2 +- 6 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h index 950042fb2385..0f5d44d0a9cc 100644 --- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h @@ -2040,6 +2040,7 @@ extern void security_add_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks, int count, char *lsm); #define LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR BIT(0) +#define LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE BIT(1) enum lsm_order { LSM_ORDER_FIRST = -1, /* This is only for capabilities. */ diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c index 5399c2f03536..d68bc931d388 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c +++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c @@ -1601,7 +1601,7 @@ static int __init apparmor_init(void) } DEFINE_LSM(apparmor) - .flags = LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR, + .flags = LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR | LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE, .enabled = &apparmor_enabled, .init = apparmor_init, END_LSM; diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index ade74b90b73c..5a3e19f1fe48 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -52,6 +52,7 @@ static __initconst const char * const builtin_lsm_order = CONFIG_LSM_ORDER; /* Ordered list of LSMs to initialize. */ static __initdata struct lsm_info **ordered_lsms; +static __initdata struct lsm_info *exclusive; static bool debug __initdata; #define init_debug(...) \ @@ -204,6 +205,12 @@ static bool __init lsm_allowed(struct lsm_info *lsm) if (!is_enabled(lsm)) return false; + /* Not allowed if another exclusive LSM already initialized. */ + if ((lsm->flags & LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE) && exclusive) { + init_debug("exclusive disabled: %s\n", lsm->name); + return false; + } + return true; } @@ -219,6 +226,11 @@ static void __init maybe_initialize_lsm(struct lsm_info *lsm) if (enabled) { int ret; + if ((lsm->flags & LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE) && !exclusive) { + exclusive = lsm; + init_debug("exclusive: %s\n", lsm->name); + } + init_debug("initializing %s\n", lsm->name); ret = lsm->init(); WARN(ret, "%s failed to initialize: %d\n", lsm->name, ret); diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index 409a9252aeb6..5461d54fcd99 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -7193,7 +7193,7 @@ void selinux_complete_init(void) /* SELinux requires early initialization in order to label all processes and objects when they are created. */ DEFINE_LSM(selinux) - .flags = LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR, + .flags = LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR | LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE, .enabled = &selinux_enabled, .init = selinux_init, END_LSM; diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c index e79fad43a8e3..e46c1ea8cf84 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c @@ -4880,6 +4880,6 @@ static __init int smack_init(void) * all processes and objects when they are created. */ DEFINE_LSM(smack) - .flags = LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR, + .flags = LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR | LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE, .init = smack_init, END_LSM; diff --git a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c index 39bb994ebe09..cc39eb8df61a 100644 --- a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c +++ b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c @@ -549,6 +549,6 @@ static int __init tomoyo_init(void) } DEFINE_LSM(tomoyo) - .flags = LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR, + .flags = LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR | LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE, .init = tomoyo_init, END_LSM; -- 2.17.1
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: keescook@chromium.org (Kees Cook) To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH security-next v3 28/29] LSM: Separate idea of "major" LSM from "exclusive" LSM Date: Mon, 24 Sep 2018 17:18:31 -0700 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20180925001832.18322-29-keescook@chromium.org> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20180925001832.18322-1-keescook@chromium.org> In order to both support old "security=" Legacy Major LSM selection, and handling real exclusivity, this creates LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE and updates the selection logic to handle them. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> --- include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 1 + security/apparmor/lsm.c | 2 +- security/security.c | 12 ++++++++++++ security/selinux/hooks.c | 2 +- security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 2 +- security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c | 2 +- 6 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h index 950042fb2385..0f5d44d0a9cc 100644 --- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h @@ -2040,6 +2040,7 @@ extern void security_add_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks, int count, char *lsm); #define LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR BIT(0) +#define LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE BIT(1) enum lsm_order { LSM_ORDER_FIRST = -1, /* This is only for capabilities. */ diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c index 5399c2f03536..d68bc931d388 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c +++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c @@ -1601,7 +1601,7 @@ static int __init apparmor_init(void) } DEFINE_LSM(apparmor) - .flags = LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR, + .flags = LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR | LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE, .enabled = &apparmor_enabled, .init = apparmor_init, END_LSM; diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index ade74b90b73c..5a3e19f1fe48 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -52,6 +52,7 @@ static __initconst const char * const builtin_lsm_order = CONFIG_LSM_ORDER; /* Ordered list of LSMs to initialize. */ static __initdata struct lsm_info **ordered_lsms; +static __initdata struct lsm_info *exclusive; static bool debug __initdata; #define init_debug(...) \ @@ -204,6 +205,12 @@ static bool __init lsm_allowed(struct lsm_info *lsm) if (!is_enabled(lsm)) return false; + /* Not allowed if another exclusive LSM already initialized. */ + if ((lsm->flags & LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE) && exclusive) { + init_debug("exclusive disabled: %s\n", lsm->name); + return false; + } + return true; } @@ -219,6 +226,11 @@ static void __init maybe_initialize_lsm(struct lsm_info *lsm) if (enabled) { int ret; + if ((lsm->flags & LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE) && !exclusive) { + exclusive = lsm; + init_debug("exclusive: %s\n", lsm->name); + } + init_debug("initializing %s\n", lsm->name); ret = lsm->init(); WARN(ret, "%s failed to initialize: %d\n", lsm->name, ret); diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index 409a9252aeb6..5461d54fcd99 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -7193,7 +7193,7 @@ void selinux_complete_init(void) /* SELinux requires early initialization in order to label all processes and objects when they are created. */ DEFINE_LSM(selinux) - .flags = LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR, + .flags = LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR | LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE, .enabled = &selinux_enabled, .init = selinux_init, END_LSM; diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c index e79fad43a8e3..e46c1ea8cf84 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c @@ -4880,6 +4880,6 @@ static __init int smack_init(void) * all processes and objects when they are created. */ DEFINE_LSM(smack) - .flags = LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR, + .flags = LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR | LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE, .init = smack_init, END_LSM; diff --git a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c index 39bb994ebe09..cc39eb8df61a 100644 --- a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c +++ b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c @@ -549,6 +549,6 @@ static int __init tomoyo_init(void) } DEFINE_LSM(tomoyo) - .flags = LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR, + .flags = LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR | LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE, .init = tomoyo_init, END_LSM; -- 2.17.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-09-25 0:19 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 126+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2018-09-25 0:18 [PATCH security-next v3 00/29] LSM: Explict LSM ordering Kees Cook 2018-09-25 0:18 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 01/29] LSM: Correctly announce start of LSM initialization Kees Cook 2018-09-25 0:18 ` Kees Cook 2018-10-01 19:53 ` James Morris 2018-10-01 21:05 ` John Johansen 2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 02/29] vmlinux.lds.h: Avoid copy/paste of security_init section Kees Cook 2018-09-25 0:18 ` Kees Cook 2018-10-01 19:56 ` James Morris 2018-10-01 21:05 ` John Johansen 2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 03/29] LSM: Rename .security_initcall section to .lsm_info Kees Cook 2018-09-25 0:18 ` Kees Cook 2018-10-01 19:57 ` James Morris 2018-10-01 21:06 ` John Johansen 2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 04/29] LSM: Remove initcall tracing Kees Cook 2018-09-25 0:18 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-26 16:35 ` Steven Rostedt 2018-09-26 16:35 ` Steven Rostedt 2018-09-26 18:35 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-26 18:35 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-30 23:25 ` Steven Rostedt 2018-09-30 23:25 ` Steven Rostedt 2018-10-01 1:01 ` Kees Cook 2018-10-01 1:01 ` Kees Cook 2018-10-01 21:07 ` John Johansen 2018-10-01 21:23 ` Steven Rostedt 2018-10-01 22:38 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 05/29] LSM: Convert from initcall to struct lsm_info Kees Cook 2018-09-25 0:18 ` Kees Cook 2018-10-01 19:59 ` James Morris 2018-10-01 21:08 ` John Johansen 2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 06/29] vmlinux.lds.h: Move LSM_TABLE into INIT_DATA Kees Cook 2018-09-25 0:18 ` Kees Cook 2018-10-01 21:10 ` John Johansen 2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 07/29] LSM: Convert security_initcall() into DEFINE_LSM() Kees Cook 2018-09-25 0:18 ` Kees Cook 2018-10-01 21:12 ` John Johansen 2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 08/29] LSM: Record LSM name in struct lsm_info Kees Cook 2018-09-25 0:18 ` Kees Cook 2018-10-01 21:13 ` John Johansen 2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 09/29] LSM: Provide init debugging infrastructure Kees Cook 2018-09-25 0:18 ` Kees Cook 2018-10-01 21:14 ` John Johansen 2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 10/29] LSM: Don't ignore initialization failures Kees Cook 2018-09-25 0:18 ` Kees Cook 2018-10-01 21:14 ` John Johansen 2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 11/29] LSM: Introduce LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR Kees Cook 2018-09-25 0:18 ` Kees Cook 2018-10-01 21:15 ` John Johansen 2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 12/29] LSM: Provide separate ordered initialization Kees Cook 2018-09-25 0:18 ` Kees Cook 2018-10-01 21:17 ` John Johansen 2018-10-01 22:03 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 13/29] LoadPin: Rename "enable" to "enforce" Kees Cook 2018-09-25 0:18 ` Kees Cook 2018-10-01 21:17 ` John Johansen 2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 14/29] LSM: Plumb visibility into optional "enabled" state Kees Cook 2018-09-25 0:18 ` Kees Cook 2018-10-01 21:18 ` John Johansen 2018-10-01 21:47 ` James Morris 2018-10-01 21:56 ` Kees Cook 2018-10-01 22:20 ` John Johansen 2018-10-01 22:29 ` Kees Cook 2018-10-01 22:53 ` John Johansen 2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 15/29] LSM: Lift LSM selection out of individual LSMs Kees Cook 2018-09-25 0:18 ` Kees Cook 2018-10-01 21:18 ` John Johansen 2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 16/29] LSM: Prepare for arbitrary LSM enabling Kees Cook 2018-09-25 0:18 ` Kees Cook 2018-10-01 21:22 ` John Johansen 2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 17/29] LSM: Introduce CONFIG_LSM_ENABLE Kees Cook 2018-09-25 0:18 ` Kees Cook 2018-10-01 21:34 ` John Johansen 2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 18/29] LSM: Introduce lsm.enable= and lsm.disable= Kees Cook 2018-09-25 0:18 ` Kees Cook 2018-10-01 21:46 ` John Johansen 2018-10-01 22:27 ` Kees Cook 2018-10-01 22:48 ` John Johansen 2018-10-01 23:30 ` Kees Cook 2018-10-01 23:38 ` Kees Cook 2018-10-01 23:57 ` John Johansen 2018-10-01 23:44 ` John Johansen 2018-10-01 23:49 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 19/29] LSM: Prepare for reorganizing "security=" logic Kees Cook 2018-09-25 0:18 ` Kees Cook 2018-10-01 21:47 ` John Johansen 2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 20/29] LSM: Refactor "security=" in terms of enable/disable Kees Cook 2018-09-25 0:18 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 21/29] LSM: Build ordered list of ordered LSMs for init Kees Cook 2018-09-25 0:18 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 22/29] LSM: Introduce CONFIG_LSM_ORDER Kees Cook 2018-09-25 0:18 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 23/29] LSM: Introduce "lsm.order=" for boottime ordering Kees Cook 2018-09-25 0:18 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 24/29] LoadPin: Initialize as ordered LSM Kees Cook 2018-09-25 0:18 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 25/29] Yama: " Kees Cook 2018-09-25 0:18 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 26/29] LSM: Introduce enum lsm_order Kees Cook 2018-09-25 0:18 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 27/29] capability: Initialize as LSM_ORDER_FIRST Kees Cook 2018-09-25 0:18 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-25 0:18 ` Kees Cook [this message] 2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 28/29] LSM: Separate idea of "major" LSM from "exclusive" LSM Kees Cook 2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 29/29] LSM: Add all exclusive LSMs to ordered initialization Kees Cook 2018-09-25 0:18 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-28 15:55 ` [PATCH security-next v3 00/29] LSM: Explict LSM ordering Casey Schaufler 2018-09-28 15:55 ` Casey Schaufler 2018-09-28 20:01 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-28 20:01 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-28 20:25 ` Stephen Smalley 2018-09-28 20:25 ` Stephen Smalley 2018-09-28 20:33 ` Stephen Smalley 2018-09-28 20:33 ` Stephen Smalley 2018-09-28 20:54 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-28 20:54 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-29 10:48 ` Tetsuo Handa 2018-09-29 10:48 ` Tetsuo Handa 2018-09-29 18:18 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-29 18:18 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-30 2:36 ` Tetsuo Handa 2018-09-30 2:36 ` Tetsuo Handa 2018-09-30 16:57 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-30 16:57 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-29 18:19 ` John Johansen 2018-09-29 18:19 ` John Johansen
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