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From: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
To: casey.schaufler@intel.com, jmorris@namei.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org
Cc: casey@schaufler-ca.com, keescook@chromium.org,
	john.johansen@canonical.com, penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp,
	paul@paul-moore.com, sds@tycho.nsa.gov
Subject: [PATCH v3 05/24] Use lsmblob in security_audit_rule_match
Date: Fri, 21 Jun 2019 11:52:14 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190621185233.6766-6-casey@schaufler-ca.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190621185233.6766-1-casey@schaufler-ca.com>

Change the secid parameter of security_audit_rule_match
to a lsmblob structure pointer. Pass the entry from the
lsmblob structure for the approprite slot to the LSM hook.

Change the users of security_audit_rule_match to use the
lsmblob instead of a u32. In some cases this requires a
temporary conversion using lsmblob_init() that will go
away when other interfaces get converted.

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
 include/linux/security.h            |  7 ++++---
 kernel/auditfilter.c                |  4 +++-
 kernel/auditsc.c                    | 14 ++++++++++----
 security/integrity/ima/ima.h        |  4 ++--
 security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c |  7 +++++--
 security/security.c                 | 14 ++++++++++++--
 6 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 0aa9417a5762..52d89c4a9594 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -1757,7 +1757,8 @@ static inline int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
 int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule);
 int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule);
-int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule);
+int security_audit_rule_match(struct lsmblob *blob, u32 field, u32 op,
+			      void *lsmrule);
 void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule);
 
 #else
@@ -1773,8 +1774,8 @@ static inline int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static inline int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
-					    void *lsmrule)
+static inline int security_audit_rule_match(struct lsmblob *blob, u32 field,
+					    u32 op, void *lsmrule)
 {
 	return 0;
 }
diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c
index 63f8b3f26fab..da211065160f 100644
--- a/kernel/auditfilter.c
+++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c
@@ -1324,6 +1324,7 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)
 			struct audit_field *f = &e->rule.fields[i];
 			pid_t pid;
 			u32 sid;
+			struct lsmblob blob;
 
 			switch (f->type) {
 			case AUDIT_PID:
@@ -1354,7 +1355,8 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)
 			case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
 				if (f->lsm_rule) {
 					security_task_getsecid(current, &sid);
-					result = security_audit_rule_match(sid,
+					lsmblob_init(&blob, sid);
+					result = security_audit_rule_match(&blob,
 						   f->type, f->op, f->lsm_rule);
 				}
 				break;
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index d1eab1d4a930..18ee5556c086 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -445,6 +445,7 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
 	const struct cred *cred;
 	int i, need_sid = 1;
 	u32 sid;
+	struct lsmblob blob;
 	unsigned int sessionid;
 
 	cred = rcu_dereference_check(tsk->cred, tsk == current || task_creation);
@@ -630,7 +631,9 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
 					security_task_getsecid(tsk, &sid);
 					need_sid = 0;
 				}
-				result = security_audit_rule_match(sid, f->type,
+				lsmblob_init(&blob, sid);
+				result = security_audit_rule_match(&blob,
+								   f->type,
 								   f->op,
 								   f->lsm_rule);
 			}
@@ -645,15 +648,17 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
 			if (f->lsm_rule) {
 				/* Find files that match */
 				if (name) {
+					lsmblob_init(&blob, name->osid);
 					result = security_audit_rule_match(
-								name->osid,
+								&blob,
 								f->type,
 								f->op,
 								f->lsm_rule);
 				} else if (ctx) {
 					list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
+						lsmblob_init(&blob, n->osid);
 						if (security_audit_rule_match(
-								n->osid,
+								&blob,
 								f->type,
 								f->op,
 								f->lsm_rule)) {
@@ -665,7 +670,8 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
 				/* Find ipc objects that match */
 				if (!ctx || ctx->type != AUDIT_IPC)
 					break;
-				if (security_audit_rule_match(ctx->ipc.osid,
+				lsmblob_init(&blob, ctx->ipc.osid);
+				if (security_audit_rule_match(&blob,
 							      f->type, f->op,
 							      f->lsm_rule))
 					++result;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index d213e835c498..5a337239d9e4 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -307,8 +307,8 @@ static inline int security_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
 	return -EINVAL;
 }
 
-static inline int security_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
-					     void *lsmrule)
+static inline int security_filter_rule_match(struct lsmblob *blob, u32 field,
+					     u32 op, void *lsmrule)
 {
 	return -EINVAL;
 }
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index e0cc323f948f..e7b8ce942950 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -327,6 +327,7 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,
 	for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) {
 		int rc = 0;
 		u32 osid;
+		struct lsmblob blob;
 		int retried = 0;
 
 		if (!rule->lsm[i].rule)
@@ -337,7 +338,8 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,
 		case LSM_OBJ_ROLE:
 		case LSM_OBJ_TYPE:
 			security_inode_getsecid(inode, &osid);
-			rc = security_filter_rule_match(osid,
+			lsmblob_init(&blob, osid);
+			rc = security_filter_rule_match(&blob,
 							rule->lsm[i].type,
 							Audit_equal,
 							rule->lsm[i].rule);
@@ -345,7 +347,8 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,
 		case LSM_SUBJ_USER:
 		case LSM_SUBJ_ROLE:
 		case LSM_SUBJ_TYPE:
-			rc = security_filter_rule_match(secid,
+			lsmblob_init(&blob, secid);
+			rc = security_filter_rule_match(&blob,
 							rule->lsm[i].type,
 							Audit_equal,
 							rule->lsm[i].rule);
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 7618c761060d..4692f44718c6 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -2452,9 +2452,19 @@ void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
 	call_void_hook(audit_rule_free, lsmrule);
 }
 
-int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule)
+int security_audit_rule_match(struct lsmblob *blob, u32 field, u32 op,
+			      void *lsmrule)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(audit_rule_match, 0, secid, field, op, lsmrule);
+	struct security_hook_list *hp;
+	int rc;
+
+	hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.audit_rule_match, list) {
+		rc = hp->hook.audit_rule_match(blob->secid[hp->slot], field,
+					       op, lsmrule);
+		if (rc != 0)
+			return rc;
+	}
+	return 0;
 }
 #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
 
-- 
2.20.1


  parent reply	other threads:[~2019-06-21 18:52 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 85+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-06-21 18:52 [PATCH v3 00/24] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Casey Schaufler
2019-06-21 18:52 ` [PATCH v3 01/24] LSM: Infrastructure management of the superblock Casey Schaufler
2019-06-24 18:31   ` John Johansen
2019-06-21 18:52 ` [PATCH v3 02/24] LSM: Infrastructure management of the sock security Casey Schaufler
2019-06-24 18:33   ` John Johansen
2019-06-21 18:52 ` [PATCH v3 03/24] LSM: Infrastructure management of the key blob Casey Schaufler
2019-06-24 18:33   ` John Johansen
2019-06-21 18:52 ` [PATCH v3 04/24] LSM: Create and manage the lsmblob data structure Casey Schaufler
2019-06-22 22:42   ` Kees Cook
2019-06-24 18:38   ` John Johansen
2019-06-21 18:52 ` Casey Schaufler [this message]
2019-06-22 22:43   ` [PATCH v3 05/24] Use lsmblob in security_audit_rule_match Kees Cook
2019-06-24 18:39   ` John Johansen
2019-06-21 18:52 ` [PATCH v3 06/24] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_kernel_act_as Casey Schaufler
2019-06-22 22:43   ` Kees Cook
2019-06-24 18:38   ` John Johansen
2019-06-21 18:52 ` [PATCH v3 07/24] net: Prepare UDS for secuirty module stacking Casey Schaufler
2019-06-22 22:43   ` Kees Cook
2019-06-24 18:39   ` John Johansen
2019-06-21 18:52 ` [PATCH v3 08/24] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secctx_to_secid Casey Schaufler
2019-06-22 22:44   ` Kees Cook
2019-06-24 18:38   ` John Johansen
2019-06-21 18:52 ` [PATCH v3 09/24] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secid_to_secctx Casey Schaufler
2019-06-22 22:44   ` Kees Cook
2019-06-24 18:39   ` John Johansen
2019-06-21 18:52 ` [PATCH v3 10/24] Use lsmblob in security_ipc_getsecid Casey Schaufler
2019-06-22 22:48   ` Kees Cook
2019-06-24 16:39     ` Casey Schaufler
2019-06-24 17:20       ` Casey Schaufler
2019-06-24 21:09       ` Kees Cook
2019-06-24 18:39   ` John Johansen
2019-06-21 18:52 ` [PATCH v3 11/24] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_task_getsecid Casey Schaufler
2019-06-22 22:49   ` Kees Cook
2019-06-24 18:40   ` John Johansen
2019-06-21 18:52 ` [PATCH v3 12/24] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_inode_getsecid Casey Schaufler
2019-06-22 22:49   ` Kees Cook
2019-06-24 18:40   ` John Johansen
2019-06-21 18:52 ` [PATCH v3 13/24] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_cred_getsecid Casey Schaufler
2019-06-22 22:50   ` Kees Cook
2019-06-24 18:40   ` John Johansen
2019-06-21 18:52 ` [PATCH v3 14/24] IMA: Change internal interfaces to use lsmblobs Casey Schaufler
2019-06-22 22:51   ` Kees Cook
2019-06-24 18:40   ` John Johansen
2019-06-21 18:52 ` [PATCH v3 15/24] LSM: Specify which LSM to display Casey Schaufler
2019-06-22 22:51   ` Kees Cook
2019-06-24 18:48   ` John Johansen
2019-06-21 18:52 ` [PATCH v3 16/24] LSM: Ensure the correct LSM context releaser Casey Schaufler
2019-06-22 22:52   ` Kees Cook
2019-06-24 21:46   ` John Johansen
2019-06-21 18:52 ` [PATCH v3 17/24] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_secid_to_secctx Casey Schaufler
2019-06-22 22:52   ` Kees Cook
2019-06-24 21:46   ` John Johansen
2019-06-21 18:52 ` [PATCH v3 18/24] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_dentry_init_security Casey Schaufler
2019-06-22 22:54   ` Kees Cook
2019-06-24 21:46   ` John Johansen
2019-06-21 18:52 ` [PATCH v3 19/24] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_inode_getsecctx Casey Schaufler
2019-06-22 22:56   ` Kees Cook
2019-06-24 21:46   ` John Johansen
2019-06-21 18:52 ` [PATCH v3 20/24] LSM: security_secid_to_secctx in netlink netfilter Casey Schaufler
2019-06-22 22:57   ` Kees Cook
2019-06-24 21:47   ` John Johansen
2019-06-21 18:52 ` [PATCH v3 21/24] Audit: Store LSM audit information in an lsmblob Casey Schaufler
2019-06-22 23:12   ` Kees Cook
2019-06-24 21:33   ` John Johansen
2019-06-25  1:01     ` Casey Schaufler
2019-06-25  1:46       ` Paul Moore
2019-06-25  1:46         ` Paul Moore
2019-06-25  2:14         ` John Johansen
2019-06-25  2:14           ` John Johansen
2019-06-25  2:42           ` Paul Moore
2019-06-25  2:42             ` Paul Moore
2019-06-25 15:30             ` Casey Schaufler
2019-06-25 15:30               ` Casey Schaufler
2019-06-21 18:52 ` [PATCH v3 22/24] LSM: Return the lsmblob slot on initialization Casey Schaufler
2019-06-22 23:13   ` Kees Cook
2019-06-24 21:39     ` John Johansen
2019-06-24 21:50       ` Kees Cook
2019-06-24 21:53       ` Casey Schaufler
2019-06-24 21:47   ` John Johansen
2019-06-21 18:52 ` [PATCH v3 23/24] NET: Store LSM netlabel data in a lsmblob Casey Schaufler
2019-06-22 23:15   ` Kees Cook
2019-06-24 21:44   ` John Johansen
2019-06-21 18:52 ` [PATCH v3 24/24] AppArmor: Remove the exclusive flag Casey Schaufler
2019-06-22 23:15   ` Kees Cook
2019-06-24 21:45   ` John Johansen

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