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From: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
To: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
	Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>,
	James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
	Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
	Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org>,
	Jerry Snitselaar <jsnitsel@redhat.com>,
	Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>,
	Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>,
	Chris von Recklinghausen <crecklin@redhat.com>,
	Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
Subject: [PATCH v2 2/2] KEYS: Avoid false positive ENOMEM error on key read
Date: Sun, 08 Mar 2020 17:04:10 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200308170410.14166-3-longman@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200308170410.14166-1-longman@redhat.com>

By allocating a kernel buffer with an user-supplied buffer length, it
is possible that a false positive ENOMEM error may be returned because
the user-supplied length is just too large even if the system do have
enough memory to hold the actual key data.

To reduce this possibility, we set a threshold (1024) over which we
do check the actual key length first before allocating a buffer of the
right size to hold it.

Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
---
 security/keys/keyctl.c | 46 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------
 1 file changed, 35 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/keys/keyctl.c b/security/keys/keyctl.c
index 89a14e71eb0a..662a638a680d 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyctl.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyctl.c
@@ -855,28 +855,52 @@ long keyctl_read_key(key_serial_t keyid, char __user *buffer, size_t buflen)
 		 * deadlock involving page fault and mmap_sem.
 		 */
 		char *tmpbuf = NULL;
+		size_t tbuflen = buflen;
 
-		if (buffer && buflen) {
-			tmpbuf = kmalloc(buflen, GFP_KERNEL);
+		/*
+		 * We don't want an erronous -ENOMEM error due to an
+		 * arbitrary large user-supplied buflen. So if buflen
+		 * exceeds a threshold (1024 bytes in this case), we call
+		 * the read method twice. The first time to get the buffer
+		 * length and the second time to read out the key data.
+		 *
+		 * N.B. All the read methods will return the required
+		 *      buffer length with a NULL input buffer or when
+		 *      the input buffer length isn't large enough.
+		 */
+		if (buflen && buffer && (buflen <= 0x400)) {
+allocbuf:
+			tmpbuf = kmalloc(tbuflen, GFP_KERNEL);
 			if (!tmpbuf) {
 				ret = -ENOMEM;
 				goto error2;
 			}
 		}
+
 		down_read(&key->sem);
 		ret = key_validate(key);
 		if (ret = 0)
-			ret = key->type->read(key, tmpbuf, buflen);
+			ret = key->type->read(key, tmpbuf, tbuflen);
 		up_read(&key->sem);
 
-		/*
-		 * Read methods will just return the required length
-		 * without any copying if the provided length isn't big
-		 * enough.
-		 */
-		if ((ret > 0) && (ret <= buflen) && buffer &&
-		    copy_to_user(buffer, tmpbuf, ret))
-			ret = -EFAULT;
+		if ((ret > 0) && (ret <= buflen) && buffer) {
+			/*
+			 * It is possible, though unlikely, that the key
+			 * changes in between the up_read->down_read period.
+			 * If the key becomes longer, we will have to
+			 * allocate a larger buffer and redo the key read
+			 * again.
+			 */
+			if (!tmpbuf || unlikely(ret > tbuflen)) {
+				tbuflen = ret;
+				if (unlikely(tmpbuf))
+					kzfree(tmpbuf);
+				goto allocbuf;
+			}
+
+			if (copy_to_user(buffer, tmpbuf, ret))
+				ret = -EFAULT;
+		}
 
 		if (tmpbuf)
 			kzfree(tmpbuf);
-- 
2.18.1

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
To: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
	Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>,
	James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
	Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
	Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org>,
	Jerry Snitselaar <jsnitsel@redhat.com>,
	Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>,
	Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>,
	Chris von Recklinghausen <crecklin@redhat.com>,
	Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
Subject: [PATCH v2 2/2] KEYS: Avoid false positive ENOMEM error on key read
Date: Sun,  8 Mar 2020 13:04:10 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200308170410.14166-3-longman@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200308170410.14166-1-longman@redhat.com>

By allocating a kernel buffer with an user-supplied buffer length, it
is possible that a false positive ENOMEM error may be returned because
the user-supplied length is just too large even if the system do have
enough memory to hold the actual key data.

To reduce this possibility, we set a threshold (1024) over which we
do check the actual key length first before allocating a buffer of the
right size to hold it.

Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
---
 security/keys/keyctl.c | 46 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------
 1 file changed, 35 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/keys/keyctl.c b/security/keys/keyctl.c
index 89a14e71eb0a..662a638a680d 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyctl.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyctl.c
@@ -855,28 +855,52 @@ long keyctl_read_key(key_serial_t keyid, char __user *buffer, size_t buflen)
 		 * deadlock involving page fault and mmap_sem.
 		 */
 		char *tmpbuf = NULL;
+		size_t tbuflen = buflen;
 
-		if (buffer && buflen) {
-			tmpbuf = kmalloc(buflen, GFP_KERNEL);
+		/*
+		 * We don't want an erronous -ENOMEM error due to an
+		 * arbitrary large user-supplied buflen. So if buflen
+		 * exceeds a threshold (1024 bytes in this case), we call
+		 * the read method twice. The first time to get the buffer
+		 * length and the second time to read out the key data.
+		 *
+		 * N.B. All the read methods will return the required
+		 *      buffer length with a NULL input buffer or when
+		 *      the input buffer length isn't large enough.
+		 */
+		if (buflen && buffer && (buflen <= 0x400)) {
+allocbuf:
+			tmpbuf = kmalloc(tbuflen, GFP_KERNEL);
 			if (!tmpbuf) {
 				ret = -ENOMEM;
 				goto error2;
 			}
 		}
+
 		down_read(&key->sem);
 		ret = key_validate(key);
 		if (ret == 0)
-			ret = key->type->read(key, tmpbuf, buflen);
+			ret = key->type->read(key, tmpbuf, tbuflen);
 		up_read(&key->sem);
 
-		/*
-		 * Read methods will just return the required length
-		 * without any copying if the provided length isn't big
-		 * enough.
-		 */
-		if ((ret > 0) && (ret <= buflen) && buffer &&
-		    copy_to_user(buffer, tmpbuf, ret))
-			ret = -EFAULT;
+		if ((ret > 0) && (ret <= buflen) && buffer) {
+			/*
+			 * It is possible, though unlikely, that the key
+			 * changes in between the up_read->down_read period.
+			 * If the key becomes longer, we will have to
+			 * allocate a larger buffer and redo the key read
+			 * again.
+			 */
+			if (!tmpbuf || unlikely(ret > tbuflen)) {
+				tbuflen = ret;
+				if (unlikely(tmpbuf))
+					kzfree(tmpbuf);
+				goto allocbuf;
+			}
+
+			if (copy_to_user(buffer, tmpbuf, ret))
+				ret = -EFAULT;
+		}
 
 		if (tmpbuf)
 			kzfree(tmpbuf);
-- 
2.18.1


  parent reply	other threads:[~2020-03-08 17:04 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 23+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-03-08 17:04 [PATCH v2 0/2] KEYS: Read keys to internal buffer & then copy to userspace Waiman Long
2020-03-08 17:04 ` Waiman Long
2020-03-08 17:04 ` [PATCH v2 1/2] KEYS: Don't write out to userspace while holding key semaphore Waiman Long
2020-03-08 17:04   ` Waiman Long
2020-03-13  1:04   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-03-13  1:04     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-03-13 13:29     ` Waiman Long
2020-03-13 13:29       ` Waiman Long
2020-03-13 15:28       ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-03-13 15:28         ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-03-13 16:57         ` Waiman Long
2020-03-13 16:57           ` Waiman Long
2020-03-08 17:04 ` Waiman Long [this message]
2020-03-08 17:04   ` [PATCH v2 2/2] KEYS: Avoid false positive ENOMEM error on key read Waiman Long
2020-03-09 16:32 ` David Howells
2020-03-10 15:45   ` Waiman Long
2020-03-10 15:45     ` Waiman Long
2020-03-10 15:58     ` Waiman Long
2020-03-10 15:58       ` Waiman Long
2020-03-10 17:12     ` David Howells
2020-03-11 15:33       ` Waiman Long
2020-03-11 15:33         ` Waiman Long
2020-03-11 15:33         ` Waiman Long

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