From: Tushar Sugandhi <tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com> To: zohar@linux.ibm.com, stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com, casey@schaufler-ca.com, agk@redhat.com, snitzer@redhat.com, gmazyland@gmail.com, paul@paul-moore.com Cc: tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com, sashal@kernel.org, jmorris@namei.org, nramas@linux.microsoft.com, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, dm-devel@redhat.com Subject: [PATCH v7 4/8] IMA: add policy rule to measure critical data Date: Wed, 9 Dec 2020 11:42:08 -0800 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20201209194212.5131-5-tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20201209194212.5131-1-tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com> A new IMA policy rule is needed for the IMA hook ima_measure_critical_data() and the corresponding func CRITICAL_DATA for measuring the input buffer. The policy rule should ensure the buffer would get measured only when the policy rule allows the action. The policy rule should also support the necessary constraints (flags etc.) for integrity critical buffer data measurements. Add a policy rule to define the constraints for restricting integrity critical data measurements. Signed-off-by: Tushar Sugandhi <tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com> --- security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 31 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c index 2a0c0603626e..9a8ee80a3128 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c @@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ #define IMA_PCR 0x0100 #define IMA_FSNAME 0x0200 #define IMA_KEYRINGS 0x0400 +#define IMA_DATA_SOURCE 0x0800 #define UNKNOWN 0 #define MEASURE 0x0001 /* same as IMA_MEASURE */ @@ -85,6 +86,7 @@ struct ima_rule_entry { } lsm[MAX_LSM_RULES]; char *fsname; struct ima_rule_opt_list *keyrings; /* Measure keys added to these keyrings */ + struct ima_rule_opt_list *data_source; /* Measure data from this source */ struct ima_template_desc *template; }; @@ -479,6 +481,12 @@ static bool ima_match_rule_data(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, else opt_list = rule->keyrings; break; + case CRITICAL_DATA: + if (!rule->data_source) + return true; + else + opt_list = rule->data_source; + break; default: break; } @@ -518,13 +526,19 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode, { int i; - if (func == KEY_CHECK) { - return (rule->flags & IMA_FUNC) && (rule->func == func) && - ima_match_rule_data(rule, func_data, cred); - } if ((rule->flags & IMA_FUNC) && (rule->func != func && func != POST_SETATTR)) return false; + + switch (func) { + case KEY_CHECK: + case CRITICAL_DATA: + return ((rule->func == func) && + ima_match_rule_data(rule, func_data, cred)); + default: + break; + } + if ((rule->flags & IMA_MASK) && (rule->mask != mask && func != POST_SETATTR)) return false; @@ -1119,6 +1133,19 @@ static bool ima_validate_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry) if (ima_rule_contains_lsm_cond(entry)) return false; + break; + case CRITICAL_DATA: + if (entry->action & ~(MEASURE | DONT_MEASURE)) + return false; + + if (!(entry->flags & IMA_DATA_SOURCE) || + (entry->flags & ~(IMA_FUNC | IMA_UID | IMA_PCR | + IMA_DATA_SOURCE))) + return false; + + if (ima_rule_contains_lsm_cond(entry)) + return false; + break; default: return false; -- 2.17.1
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Tushar Sugandhi <tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com> To: zohar@linux.ibm.com, stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com, casey@schaufler-ca.com, agk@redhat.com, snitzer@redhat.com, gmazyland@gmail.com, paul@paul-moore.com Cc: sashal@kernel.org, dm-devel@redhat.com, selinux@vger.kernel.org, jmorris@namei.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, nramas@linux.microsoft.com, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Subject: [dm-devel] [PATCH v7 4/8] IMA: add policy rule to measure critical data Date: Wed, 9 Dec 2020 11:42:08 -0800 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20201209194212.5131-5-tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20201209194212.5131-1-tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com> A new IMA policy rule is needed for the IMA hook ima_measure_critical_data() and the corresponding func CRITICAL_DATA for measuring the input buffer. The policy rule should ensure the buffer would get measured only when the policy rule allows the action. The policy rule should also support the necessary constraints (flags etc.) for integrity critical buffer data measurements. Add a policy rule to define the constraints for restricting integrity critical data measurements. Signed-off-by: Tushar Sugandhi <tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com> --- security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 31 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c index 2a0c0603626e..9a8ee80a3128 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c @@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ #define IMA_PCR 0x0100 #define IMA_FSNAME 0x0200 #define IMA_KEYRINGS 0x0400 +#define IMA_DATA_SOURCE 0x0800 #define UNKNOWN 0 #define MEASURE 0x0001 /* same as IMA_MEASURE */ @@ -85,6 +86,7 @@ struct ima_rule_entry { } lsm[MAX_LSM_RULES]; char *fsname; struct ima_rule_opt_list *keyrings; /* Measure keys added to these keyrings */ + struct ima_rule_opt_list *data_source; /* Measure data from this source */ struct ima_template_desc *template; }; @@ -479,6 +481,12 @@ static bool ima_match_rule_data(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, else opt_list = rule->keyrings; break; + case CRITICAL_DATA: + if (!rule->data_source) + return true; + else + opt_list = rule->data_source; + break; default: break; } @@ -518,13 +526,19 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode, { int i; - if (func == KEY_CHECK) { - return (rule->flags & IMA_FUNC) && (rule->func == func) && - ima_match_rule_data(rule, func_data, cred); - } if ((rule->flags & IMA_FUNC) && (rule->func != func && func != POST_SETATTR)) return false; + + switch (func) { + case KEY_CHECK: + case CRITICAL_DATA: + return ((rule->func == func) && + ima_match_rule_data(rule, func_data, cred)); + default: + break; + } + if ((rule->flags & IMA_MASK) && (rule->mask != mask && func != POST_SETATTR)) return false; @@ -1119,6 +1133,19 @@ static bool ima_validate_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry) if (ima_rule_contains_lsm_cond(entry)) return false; + break; + case CRITICAL_DATA: + if (entry->action & ~(MEASURE | DONT_MEASURE)) + return false; + + if (!(entry->flags & IMA_DATA_SOURCE) || + (entry->flags & ~(IMA_FUNC | IMA_UID | IMA_PCR | + IMA_DATA_SOURCE))) + return false; + + if (ima_rule_contains_lsm_cond(entry)) + return false; + break; default: return false; -- 2.17.1 -- dm-devel mailing list dm-devel@redhat.com https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/dm-devel
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-12-09 19:47 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 56+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2020-12-09 19:42 [PATCH v7 0/8] IMA: support for measuring kernel integrity critical data Tushar Sugandhi 2020-12-09 19:42 ` [dm-devel] " Tushar Sugandhi 2020-12-09 19:42 ` [PATCH v7 1/8] IMA: generalize keyring specific measurement constructs Tushar Sugandhi 2020-12-09 19:42 ` [dm-devel] " Tushar Sugandhi 2020-12-10 22:14 ` Tyler Hicks 2020-12-10 22:14 ` [dm-devel] " Tyler Hicks 2020-12-11 1:14 ` Tushar Sugandhi 2020-12-11 1:14 ` [dm-devel] " Tushar Sugandhi 2020-12-09 19:42 ` [PATCH v7 2/8] IMA: add support to measure buffer data hash Tushar Sugandhi 2020-12-09 19:42 ` [dm-devel] " Tushar Sugandhi 2020-12-10 22:38 ` Tyler Hicks 2020-12-10 22:38 ` [dm-devel] " Tyler Hicks 2020-12-11 1:21 ` Tushar Sugandhi 2020-12-11 1:21 ` [dm-devel] " Tushar Sugandhi 2020-12-11 2:08 ` Tyler Hicks 2020-12-11 2:08 ` [dm-devel] " Tyler Hicks 2020-12-09 19:42 ` [PATCH v7 3/8] IMA: define a hook to measure kernel integrity critical data Tushar Sugandhi 2020-12-09 19:42 ` [dm-devel] " Tushar Sugandhi 2020-12-10 23:02 ` Tyler Hicks 2020-12-10 23:02 ` [dm-devel] " Tyler Hicks 2020-12-11 3:26 ` Tushar Sugandhi 2020-12-11 3:26 ` [dm-devel] " Tushar Sugandhi 2020-12-11 17:28 ` Tushar Sugandhi 2020-12-11 17:28 ` [dm-devel] " Tushar Sugandhi 2020-12-09 19:42 ` Tushar Sugandhi [this message] 2020-12-09 19:42 ` [dm-devel] [PATCH v7 4/8] IMA: add policy rule to measure " Tushar Sugandhi 2020-12-10 23:10 ` Tyler Hicks 2020-12-10 23:10 ` [dm-devel] " Tyler Hicks 2020-12-11 3:28 ` Tushar Sugandhi 2020-12-11 3:28 ` [dm-devel] " Tushar Sugandhi 2020-12-09 19:42 ` [PATCH v7 5/8] IMA: limit critical data measurement based on a label Tushar Sugandhi 2020-12-09 19:42 ` [dm-devel] " Tushar Sugandhi 2020-12-10 23:15 ` Tyler Hicks 2020-12-10 23:15 ` [dm-devel] " Tyler Hicks 2020-12-11 3:28 ` Tushar Sugandhi 2020-12-11 3:28 ` [dm-devel] " Tushar Sugandhi 2020-12-09 19:42 ` [PATCH v7 6/8] IMA: extend critical data hook to limit the " Tushar Sugandhi 2020-12-09 19:42 ` [dm-devel] " Tushar Sugandhi 2020-12-10 23:19 ` Tyler Hicks 2020-12-10 23:19 ` [dm-devel] " Tyler Hicks 2020-12-11 1:29 ` Tushar Sugandhi 2020-12-11 1:29 ` [dm-devel] " Tushar Sugandhi 2020-12-09 19:42 ` [PATCH v7 7/8] IMA: define a builtin critical data measurement policy Tushar Sugandhi 2020-12-09 19:42 ` [dm-devel] " Tushar Sugandhi 2020-12-10 23:22 ` Tyler Hicks 2020-12-10 23:22 ` [dm-devel] " Tyler Hicks 2020-12-11 1:30 ` Tushar Sugandhi 2020-12-11 1:30 ` [dm-devel] " Tushar Sugandhi 2020-12-09 19:42 ` [PATCH v7 8/8] selinux: include a consumer of the new IMA critical data hook Tushar Sugandhi 2020-12-09 19:42 ` [dm-devel] " Tushar Sugandhi 2020-12-11 15:36 ` Tyler Hicks 2020-12-11 15:36 ` [dm-devel] " Tyler Hicks 2020-12-11 15:41 ` Tyler Hicks 2020-12-11 15:41 ` [dm-devel] " Tyler Hicks 2020-12-11 16:27 ` Lakshmi Ramasubramanian 2020-12-11 16:27 ` [dm-devel] " Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
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