From: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> To: pasic@linux.ibm.com, brijesh.singh@amd.com, pair@us.ibm.com, dgilbert@redhat.com, qemu-devel@nongnu.org Cc: andi.kleen@intel.com, qemu-ppc@nongnu.org, "Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>, "Marcelo Tosatti" <mtosatti@redhat.com>, "David Gibson" <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>, "Greg Kurz" <groug@kaod.org>, frankja@linux.ibm.com, thuth@redhat.com, "Christian Borntraeger" <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>, mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com, richard.henderson@linaro.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org, "Daniel P. Berrangé" <berrange@redhat.com>, "Marcel Apfelbaum" <marcel.apfelbaum@gmail.com>, "Eduardo Habkost" <ehabkost@redhat.com>, david@redhat.com, "Cornelia Huck" <cohuck@redhat.com>, mst@redhat.com, qemu-s390x@nongnu.org, pragyansri.pathi@intel.com, jun.nakajima@intel.com Subject: [PATCH v6 08/13] confidential guest support: Move SEV initialization into arch specific code Date: Tue, 12 Jan 2021 15:45:03 +1100 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20210112044508.427338-9-david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20210112044508.427338-1-david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> While we've abstracted some (potential) differences between mechanisms for securing guest memory, the initialization is still specific to SEV. Given that, move it into x86's kvm_arch_init() code, rather than the generic kvm_init() code. Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> --- accel/kvm/kvm-all.c | 14 -------------- accel/kvm/sev-stub.c | 4 ++-- target/i386/kvm/kvm.c | 12 ++++++++++++ target/i386/sev.c | 7 ++++++- 4 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-) diff --git a/accel/kvm/kvm-all.c b/accel/kvm/kvm-all.c index c5b0750fd0..adf27c1864 100644 --- a/accel/kvm/kvm-all.c +++ b/accel/kvm/kvm-all.c @@ -2177,20 +2177,6 @@ static int kvm_init(MachineState *ms) kvm_state = s; - /* - * if memory encryption object is specified then initialize the memory - * encryption context. - */ - if (ms->cgs) { - Error *local_err = NULL; - /* FIXME handle mechanisms other than SEV */ - ret = sev_kvm_init(ms->cgs, &local_err); - if (ret < 0) { - error_report_err(local_err); - goto err; - } - } - ret = kvm_arch_init(ms, s); if (ret < 0) { goto err; diff --git a/accel/kvm/sev-stub.c b/accel/kvm/sev-stub.c index 512e205f7f..9587d1b2a3 100644 --- a/accel/kvm/sev-stub.c +++ b/accel/kvm/sev-stub.c @@ -17,6 +17,6 @@ int sev_kvm_init(ConfidentialGuestSupport *cgs, Error **errp) { - /* SEV can't be selected if it's not compiled */ - g_assert_not_reached(); + /* If we get here, cgs must be some non-SEV thing */ + return 0; } diff --git a/target/i386/kvm/kvm.c b/target/i386/kvm/kvm.c index 6dc1ee052d..e8b9dc48a2 100644 --- a/target/i386/kvm/kvm.c +++ b/target/i386/kvm/kvm.c @@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ #include "hw/i386/intel_iommu.h" #include "hw/i386/x86-iommu.h" #include "hw/i386/e820_memory_layout.h" +#include "sysemu/sev.h" #include "hw/pci/pci.h" #include "hw/pci/msi.h" @@ -2135,6 +2136,17 @@ int kvm_arch_init(MachineState *ms, KVMState *s) uint64_t shadow_mem; int ret; struct utsname utsname; + Error *local_err = NULL; + + /* + * if memory encryption object is specified then initialize the + * memory encryption context (no-op otherwise) + */ + ret = sev_kvm_init(ms->cgs, &local_err); + if (ret < 0) { + error_report_err(local_err); + return ret; + } if (!kvm_check_extension(s, KVM_CAP_IRQ_ROUTING)) { error_report("kvm: KVM_CAP_IRQ_ROUTING not supported by KVM"); diff --git a/target/i386/sev.c b/target/i386/sev.c index 3d94635397..aa79cacabe 100644 --- a/target/i386/sev.c +++ b/target/i386/sev.c @@ -664,13 +664,18 @@ sev_vm_state_change(void *opaque, int running, RunState state) int sev_kvm_init(ConfidentialGuestSupport *cgs, Error **errp) { - SevGuestState *sev = SEV_GUEST(cgs); + SevGuestState *sev + = (SevGuestState *)object_dynamic_cast(OBJECT(cgs), TYPE_SEV_GUEST); char *devname; int ret, fw_error; uint32_t ebx; uint32_t host_cbitpos; struct sev_user_data_status status = {}; + if (!sev) { + return 0; + } + ret = ram_block_discard_disable(true); if (ret) { error_report("%s: cannot disable RAM discard", __func__); -- 2.29.2
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> To: pasic@linux.ibm.com, brijesh.singh@amd.com, pair@us.ibm.com, dgilbert@redhat.com, qemu-devel@nongnu.org Cc: thuth@redhat.com, "Cornelia Huck" <cohuck@redhat.com>, "Daniel P. Berrangé" <berrange@redhat.com>, frankja@linux.ibm.com, kvm@vger.kernel.org, david@redhat.com, jun.nakajima@intel.com, mst@redhat.com, "Marcelo Tosatti" <mtosatti@redhat.com>, richard.henderson@linaro.org, "Greg Kurz" <groug@kaod.org>, "Eduardo Habkost" <ehabkost@redhat.com>, mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com, "Christian Borntraeger" <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>, qemu-s390x@nongnu.org, qemu-ppc@nongnu.org, pragyansri.pathi@intel.com, andi.kleen@intel.com, "Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>, "David Gibson" <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> Subject: [PATCH v6 08/13] confidential guest support: Move SEV initialization into arch specific code Date: Tue, 12 Jan 2021 15:45:03 +1100 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20210112044508.427338-9-david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20210112044508.427338-1-david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> While we've abstracted some (potential) differences between mechanisms for securing guest memory, the initialization is still specific to SEV. Given that, move it into x86's kvm_arch_init() code, rather than the generic kvm_init() code. Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> --- accel/kvm/kvm-all.c | 14 -------------- accel/kvm/sev-stub.c | 4 ++-- target/i386/kvm/kvm.c | 12 ++++++++++++ target/i386/sev.c | 7 ++++++- 4 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-) diff --git a/accel/kvm/kvm-all.c b/accel/kvm/kvm-all.c index c5b0750fd0..adf27c1864 100644 --- a/accel/kvm/kvm-all.c +++ b/accel/kvm/kvm-all.c @@ -2177,20 +2177,6 @@ static int kvm_init(MachineState *ms) kvm_state = s; - /* - * if memory encryption object is specified then initialize the memory - * encryption context. - */ - if (ms->cgs) { - Error *local_err = NULL; - /* FIXME handle mechanisms other than SEV */ - ret = sev_kvm_init(ms->cgs, &local_err); - if (ret < 0) { - error_report_err(local_err); - goto err; - } - } - ret = kvm_arch_init(ms, s); if (ret < 0) { goto err; diff --git a/accel/kvm/sev-stub.c b/accel/kvm/sev-stub.c index 512e205f7f..9587d1b2a3 100644 --- a/accel/kvm/sev-stub.c +++ b/accel/kvm/sev-stub.c @@ -17,6 +17,6 @@ int sev_kvm_init(ConfidentialGuestSupport *cgs, Error **errp) { - /* SEV can't be selected if it's not compiled */ - g_assert_not_reached(); + /* If we get here, cgs must be some non-SEV thing */ + return 0; } diff --git a/target/i386/kvm/kvm.c b/target/i386/kvm/kvm.c index 6dc1ee052d..e8b9dc48a2 100644 --- a/target/i386/kvm/kvm.c +++ b/target/i386/kvm/kvm.c @@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ #include "hw/i386/intel_iommu.h" #include "hw/i386/x86-iommu.h" #include "hw/i386/e820_memory_layout.h" +#include "sysemu/sev.h" #include "hw/pci/pci.h" #include "hw/pci/msi.h" @@ -2135,6 +2136,17 @@ int kvm_arch_init(MachineState *ms, KVMState *s) uint64_t shadow_mem; int ret; struct utsname utsname; + Error *local_err = NULL; + + /* + * if memory encryption object is specified then initialize the + * memory encryption context (no-op otherwise) + */ + ret = sev_kvm_init(ms->cgs, &local_err); + if (ret < 0) { + error_report_err(local_err); + return ret; + } if (!kvm_check_extension(s, KVM_CAP_IRQ_ROUTING)) { error_report("kvm: KVM_CAP_IRQ_ROUTING not supported by KVM"); diff --git a/target/i386/sev.c b/target/i386/sev.c index 3d94635397..aa79cacabe 100644 --- a/target/i386/sev.c +++ b/target/i386/sev.c @@ -664,13 +664,18 @@ sev_vm_state_change(void *opaque, int running, RunState state) int sev_kvm_init(ConfidentialGuestSupport *cgs, Error **errp) { - SevGuestState *sev = SEV_GUEST(cgs); + SevGuestState *sev + = (SevGuestState *)object_dynamic_cast(OBJECT(cgs), TYPE_SEV_GUEST); char *devname; int ret, fw_error; uint32_t ebx; uint32_t host_cbitpos; struct sev_user_data_status status = {}; + if (!sev) { + return 0; + } + ret = ram_block_discard_disable(true); if (ret) { error_report("%s: cannot disable RAM discard", __func__); -- 2.29.2
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-01-12 4:46 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 69+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2021-01-12 4:44 [PATCH v6 00/13] Generalize memory encryption models David Gibson 2021-01-12 4:44 ` David Gibson 2021-01-12 4:44 ` [PATCH v6 01/13] qom: Allow optional sugar props David Gibson 2021-01-12 4:44 ` David Gibson 2021-01-12 4:44 ` [PATCH v6 02/13] confidential guest support: Introduce new confidential guest support class David Gibson 2021-01-12 4:44 ` David Gibson 2021-01-12 9:46 ` Daniel P. Berrangé 2021-01-12 9:46 ` Daniel P. Berrangé 2021-01-13 2:09 ` David Gibson 2021-01-13 2:09 ` David Gibson 2021-01-12 4:44 ` [PATCH v6 03/13] sev: Remove false abstraction of flash encryption David Gibson 2021-01-12 4:44 ` David Gibson 2021-01-12 4:44 ` [PATCH v6 04/13] confidential guest support: Move side effect out of machine_set_memory_encryption() David Gibson 2021-01-12 4:44 ` David Gibson 2021-01-12 10:39 ` Greg Kurz 2021-01-12 4:45 ` [PATCH v6 05/13] confidential guest support: Rework the "memory-encryption" property David Gibson 2021-01-12 4:45 ` David Gibson 2021-01-12 10:59 ` Greg Kurz 2021-01-13 0:50 ` David Gibson 2021-01-13 0:50 ` David Gibson 2021-01-13 12:03 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert 2021-01-13 12:03 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert 2021-01-12 4:45 ` [PATCH v6 06/13] sev: Add Error ** to sev_kvm_init() David Gibson 2021-01-12 4:45 ` David Gibson 2021-01-12 4:45 ` [PATCH v6 07/13] confidential guest support: Introduce cgs "ready" flag David Gibson 2021-01-12 4:45 ` David Gibson 2021-01-12 4:45 ` David Gibson [this message] 2021-01-12 4:45 ` [PATCH v6 08/13] confidential guest support: Move SEV initialization into arch specific code David Gibson 2021-01-12 4:45 ` [PATCH v6 09/13] confidential guest support: Update documentation David Gibson 2021-01-12 4:45 ` David Gibson 2021-01-12 4:45 ` [PATCH v6 10/13] spapr: Add PEF based confidential guest support David Gibson 2021-01-12 4:45 ` David Gibson 2021-01-12 7:56 ` Christian Borntraeger 2021-01-12 7:56 ` Christian Borntraeger 2021-01-12 8:36 ` David Gibson 2021-01-12 8:36 ` David Gibson 2021-01-12 9:52 ` Daniel P. Berrangé 2021-01-12 9:52 ` Daniel P. Berrangé 2021-01-12 9:56 ` Daniel P. Berrangé 2021-01-12 9:56 ` Daniel P. Berrangé 2021-01-13 0:52 ` David Gibson 2021-01-13 0:52 ` David Gibson 2021-01-12 11:27 ` Greg Kurz 2021-01-13 0:56 ` David Gibson 2021-01-13 0:56 ` David Gibson 2021-01-12 4:45 ` [PATCH v6 11/13] spapr: PEF: prevent migration David Gibson 2021-01-12 4:45 ` David Gibson 2021-01-12 11:37 ` Greg Kurz 2021-01-12 4:45 ` [PATCH v6 12/13] confidential guest support: Alter virtio default properties for protected guests David Gibson 2021-01-12 4:45 ` David Gibson 2021-01-12 11:38 ` Greg Kurz 2021-01-12 4:45 ` [PATCH v6 13/13] s390: Recognize confidential-guest-support option David Gibson 2021-01-12 4:45 ` David Gibson 2021-01-12 8:15 ` Christian Borntraeger 2021-01-12 8:15 ` Christian Borntraeger 2021-01-12 11:36 ` Cornelia Huck 2021-01-12 11:36 ` Cornelia Huck 2021-01-12 11:48 ` Christian Borntraeger 2021-01-12 11:48 ` Christian Borntraeger 2021-01-12 11:49 ` Daniel P. Berrangé 2021-01-12 11:49 ` Daniel P. Berrangé 2021-01-13 0:57 ` David Gibson 2021-01-13 0:57 ` David Gibson 2021-01-13 6:57 ` Christian Borntraeger 2021-01-13 6:57 ` Christian Borntraeger 2021-01-13 23:56 ` David Gibson 2021-01-13 23:56 ` David Gibson 2021-01-12 9:54 ` Daniel P. Berrangé 2021-01-12 9:54 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
Reply instructions: You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email using any one of the following methods: * Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client, and reply-to-all from there: mbox Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style * Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to switches of git-send-email(1): git send-email \ --in-reply-to=20210112044508.427338-9-david@gibson.dropbear.id.au \ --to=david@gibson.dropbear.id.au \ --cc=andi.kleen@intel.com \ --cc=berrange@redhat.com \ --cc=borntraeger@de.ibm.com \ --cc=brijesh.singh@amd.com \ --cc=cohuck@redhat.com \ --cc=david@redhat.com \ --cc=dgilbert@redhat.com \ --cc=ehabkost@redhat.com \ --cc=frankja@linux.ibm.com \ --cc=groug@kaod.org \ --cc=jun.nakajima@intel.com \ --cc=kvm@vger.kernel.org \ --cc=marcel.apfelbaum@gmail.com \ --cc=mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com \ --cc=mst@redhat.com \ --cc=mtosatti@redhat.com \ --cc=pair@us.ibm.com \ --cc=pasic@linux.ibm.com \ --cc=pbonzini@redhat.com \ --cc=pragyansri.pathi@intel.com \ --cc=qemu-devel@nongnu.org \ --cc=qemu-ppc@nongnu.org \ --cc=qemu-s390x@nongnu.org \ --cc=richard.henderson@linaro.org \ --cc=thuth@redhat.com \ /path/to/YOUR_REPLY https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html * If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header via mailto: links, try the mailto: linkBe sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes, see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror all data and code used by this external index.