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From: Matthew Garrett <matthewgarrett@google.com>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-pm@vger.kernel.org,
	keyrings@vger.kernel.org, zohar@linux.ibm.com,
	jejb@linux.ibm.com, jarkko@kernel.org, corbet@lwn.net,
	rjw@rjwysocki.net, Matthew Garrett <matthewgarrett@google.com>,
	Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Subject: [PATCH 5/9] security: keys: trusted: Allow storage of PCR values in creation data
Date: Sat, 20 Feb 2021 01:32:51 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20210220013255.1083202-6-matthewgarrett@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210220013255.1083202-1-matthewgarrett@google.com>

When TPMs generate keys, they can also generate some information
describing the state of the PCRs at creation time. This data can then
later be certified by the TPM, allowing verification of the PCR values.
This allows us to determine the state of the system at the time a key
was generated. Add an additional argument to the trusted key creation
options, allowing the user to provide the set of PCRs that should have
their values incorporated into the creation data.

Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
---
 .../security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst       |  4 +++
 include/keys/trusted-type.h                   |  1 +
 security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c     |  9 +++++++
 security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c     | 25 +++++++++++++++++--
 4 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst b/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst
index 1da879a68640..27bc43463ec8 100644
--- a/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst
+++ b/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst
@@ -72,6 +72,10 @@ Usage::
        policyhandle= handle to an authorization policy session that defines the
                      same policy and with the same hash algorithm as was used to
                      seal the key.
+       creationpcrs= hex integer representing the set of PCR values to be
+                     included in the PCR creation data. The bit corresponding
+		     to each PCR should be 1 to be included, 0 to be ignored.
+		     TPM2 only.
 
 "keyctl print" returns an ascii hex copy of the sealed key, which is in standard
 TPM_STORED_DATA format.  The key length for new keys are always in bytes.
diff --git a/include/keys/trusted-type.h b/include/keys/trusted-type.h
index 154d8a1769c3..875e05f33b84 100644
--- a/include/keys/trusted-type.h
+++ b/include/keys/trusted-type.h
@@ -47,6 +47,7 @@ struct trusted_key_options {
 	uint32_t policydigest_len;
 	unsigned char policydigest[MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];
 	uint32_t policyhandle;
+	uint32_t creation_pcrs;
 };
 
 extern struct key_type key_type_trusted;
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c
index 74d82093cbaa..3d371ab3441f 100644
--- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c
+++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c
@@ -709,6 +709,7 @@ enum {
 	Opt_hash,
 	Opt_policydigest,
 	Opt_policyhandle,
+	Opt_creationpcrs,
 };
 
 static const match_table_t key_tokens = {
@@ -724,6 +725,7 @@ static const match_table_t key_tokens = {
 	{Opt_hash, "hash=%s"},
 	{Opt_policydigest, "policydigest=%s"},
 	{Opt_policyhandle, "policyhandle=%s"},
+	{Opt_creationpcrs, "creationpcrs=%s"},
 	{Opt_err, NULL}
 };
 
@@ -834,6 +836,13 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay,
 				return -EINVAL;
 			opt->policyhandle = handle;
 			break;
+		case Opt_creationpcrs:
+			if (!tpm2)
+				return -EINVAL;
+			res = kstrtoint(args[0].from, 16, &opt->creation_pcrs);
+			if (res < 0)
+				return -EINVAL;
+			break;
 		default:
 			return -EINVAL;
 		}
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
index a3673fffd834..282f956ad610 100644
--- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
+++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
@@ -124,7 +124,7 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
 	unsigned int offset;
 	struct tpm_buf buf;
 	u32 hash;
-	int i;
+	int i, j;
 	int rc;
 
 	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(tpm2_hash_map); i++) {
@@ -181,7 +181,28 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
 	tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 0);
 
 	/* creation PCR */
-	tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, 0);
+	if (options->creation_pcrs) {
+		/* One bank */
+		tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, 1);
+		/* Which bank to use */
+		tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, hash);
+		/* Length of the PCR bitmask */
+		tpm_buf_append_u8(&buf, 3);
+		/* PCR bitmask */
+		for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) {
+			char tmp = 0;
+
+			for (j = 0; j < 8; j++) {
+				char bit = (i * 8) + j;
+
+				if (options->creation_pcrs & (1 << bit))
+					tmp |= (1 << j);
+			}
+			tpm_buf_append_u8(&buf, tmp);
+		}
+	} else {
+		tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, 0);
+	}
 
 	if (buf.flags & TPM_BUF_OVERFLOW) {
 		rc = -E2BIG;
-- 
2.30.0.617.g56c4b15f3c-goog


  parent reply	other threads:[~2021-02-20  1:35 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 29+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-02-20  1:32 [PATCH 0/9] Enable hibernation when Lockdown is enabled Matthew Garrett
2021-02-20  1:32 ` [PATCH 1/9] tpm: Add support for in-kernel resetting of PCRs Matthew Garrett
2021-02-20  2:52   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-02-20  1:32 ` [PATCH 2/9] tpm: Allow PCR 23 to be restricted to kernel-only use Matthew Garrett
2021-02-20  3:02   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-02-24 17:12   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-02-24 18:00   ` James Bottomley
2021-02-28  7:59     ` Matthew Garrett
2021-02-20  1:32 ` [PATCH 3/9] security: keys: trusted: Parse out individual components of the key blob Matthew Garrett
2021-02-20  3:05   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-02-22  7:36     ` Matthew Garrett
2021-02-24 17:22       ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-02-20  1:32 ` [PATCH 4/9] security: keys: trusted: Store the handle of a loaded key Matthew Garrett
2021-02-20  3:06   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-02-20  1:32 ` Matthew Garrett [this message]
2021-02-20  3:09   ` [PATCH 5/9] security: keys: trusted: Allow storage of PCR values in creation data Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-02-21 19:44     ` Ben Boeckel
2021-02-22  7:41     ` Matthew Garrett
2021-02-20  1:32 ` [PATCH 6/9] pm: hibernate: Optionally store and verify a hash of the image Matthew Garrett
2021-05-05 18:18   ` Evan Green
2021-02-20  1:32 ` [PATCH 7/9] pm: hibernate: Optionally use TPM-backed keys to protect image integrity Matthew Garrett
2021-02-20  2:20   ` Randy Dunlap
2021-02-22  7:41     ` Matthew Garrett
2021-02-20  1:32 ` [PATCH 8/9] pm: hibernate: Verify the digest encryption key Matthew Garrett
2021-02-20  1:32 ` [PATCH 9/9] pm: hibernate: seal the encryption key with a PCR policy Matthew Garrett
2021-05-04 21:56 ` [PATCH 0/9] Enable hibernation when Lockdown is enabled Evan Green
2021-05-05  3:18   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-05-05  3:19     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-05-05 18:02       ` Evan Green

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