From: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
To: keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
zohar@linux.ibm.com, dhowells@redhat.com, dwmw2@infradead.org,
herbert@gondor.apana.org.au, davem@davemloft.net,
jarkko@kernel.org, jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com
Cc: eric.snowberg@oracle.com, keescook@chromium.org,
gregkh@linuxfoundation.org, torvalds@linux-foundation.org,
scott.branden@broadcom.com, weiyongjun1@huawei.com,
nayna@linux.ibm.com, ebiggers@google.com, ardb@kernel.org,
nramas@linux.microsoft.com, lszubowi@redhat.com,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com, pjones@redhat.com,
konrad.wilk@oracle.com
Subject: [PATCH v6 02/13] integrity: Do not allow machine keyring updates following init
Date: Tue, 14 Sep 2021 17:14:05 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20210914211416.34096-3-eric.snowberg@oracle.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210914211416.34096-1-eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
The machine keyring is setup during init. No additional keys should be
allowed to be added afterwards. Leave the permission as read only.
Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
---
v2: Initial version
v4: Unmodified from v2
v5: Rename to machine keyring
v6: Add additional comment (suggested by Jarkko)
---
security/integrity/digsig.c | 8 +++++++-
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/security/integrity/digsig.c b/security/integrity/digsig.c
index 8c315be8ad99..910fe29a5037 100644
--- a/security/integrity/digsig.c
+++ b/security/integrity/digsig.c
@@ -140,7 +140,13 @@ int __init integrity_init_keyring(const unsigned int id)
return -ENOMEM;
restriction->check = restrict_link_to_ima;
- perm |= KEY_USR_WRITE;
+
+ /*
+ * No additional keys shall be allowed to load into the machine
+ * keyring following init
+ */
+ if (id != INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MACHINE)
+ perm |= KEY_USR_WRITE;
out:
return __integrity_init_keyring(id, perm, restriction);
--
2.18.4
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-09-14 21:15 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 34+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-09-14 21:14 [PATCH v6 00/13] Enroll kernel keys thru MOK Eric Snowberg
2021-09-14 21:14 ` [PATCH v6 01/13] integrity: Introduce a Linux keyring called machine Eric Snowberg
2021-09-14 21:14 ` Eric Snowberg [this message]
2021-09-14 21:14 ` [PATCH v6 03/13] KEYS: CA link restriction Eric Snowberg
2021-09-16 4:21 ` kernel test robot
2021-09-16 4:21 ` kernel test robot
2021-09-16 5:46 ` kernel test robot
2021-09-16 5:46 ` kernel test robot
2021-09-16 20:05 ` Nayna
2021-09-14 21:14 ` [PATCH v6 04/13] integrity: restrict INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MACHINE to restrict_link_by_ca Eric Snowberg
2021-09-14 21:14 ` [PATCH v6 05/13] integrity: add new keyring handler for mok keys Eric Snowberg
2021-09-16 3:16 ` kernel test robot
2021-09-16 3:16 ` kernel test robot
2021-09-14 21:14 ` [PATCH v6 06/13] KEYS: Rename get_builtin_and_secondary_restriction Eric Snowberg
2021-09-14 21:14 ` [PATCH v6 07/13] KEYS: add a reference to machine keyring Eric Snowberg
2021-09-14 21:14 ` [PATCH v6 08/13] KEYS: Introduce link restriction for machine keys Eric Snowberg
2021-09-14 21:14 ` [PATCH v6 09/13] KEYS: integrity: change link restriction to trust the machine keyring Eric Snowberg
2021-09-14 21:14 ` [PATCH v6 10/13] KEYS: link secondary_trusted_keys to machine trusted keys Eric Snowberg
2021-09-14 21:14 ` [PATCH v6 11/13] integrity: store reference to machine keyring Eric Snowberg
2021-09-14 21:14 ` [PATCH v6 12/13] integrity: Trust MOK keys if MokListTrustedRT found Eric Snowberg
2021-09-16 22:19 ` Peter Jones
2021-09-17 2:00 ` Eric Snowberg
2021-09-17 15:03 ` Peter Jones
2021-09-17 16:06 ` Eric Snowberg
2021-09-14 21:14 ` [PATCH v6 13/13] integrity: Only use machine keyring when uefi_check_trust_mok_keys is true Eric Snowberg
2021-09-15 17:57 ` [PATCH v6 00/13] Enroll kernel keys thru MOK Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-09-15 21:28 ` Eric Snowberg
2021-09-16 15:15 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-09-16 22:14 ` Peter Jones
2021-09-17 1:58 ` Eric Snowberg
2021-09-21 21:03 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-09-16 20:03 ` Nayna
2021-09-17 1:55 ` Eric Snowberg
2021-09-17 18:02 ` Mimi Zohar
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