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From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@kernel.org>
To: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>,
	linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
	linux-api@vger.kernel.org, arnd@arndb.de,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux@armlinux.org.uk, will@kernel.org, guoren@kernel.org,
	bcain@codeaurora.org, geert@linux-m68k.org, monstr@monstr.eu,
	tsbogend@alpha.franken.de, nickhu@andestech.com,
	green.hu@gmail.com, dinguyen@kernel.org, shorne@gmail.com,
	deller@gmx.de, mpe@ellerman.id.au, peterz@infradead.org,
	mingo@redhat.com, mark.rutland@arm.com, hca@linux.ibm.com,
	dalias@libc.org, davem@davemloft.net, richard@nod.at,
	x86@kernel.org, jcmvbkbc@gmail.com, ebiederm@xmission.com,
	akpm@linux-foundation.org, ardb@kernel.org,
	linux-alpha@vger.kernel.org, linux-snps-arc@lists.infradead.org,
	linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-csky@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-hexagon@vger.kernel.org, linux-ia64@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-m68k@lists.linux-m68k.org, linux-mips@vger.kernel.org,
	openrisc@lists.librecores.org, linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org,
	linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org,
	linux-s390@vger.kernel.org, linux-sh@vger.kernel.org,
	sparclinux@vger.kernel.org, linux-um@lists.infradead.org,
	linux-xtensa@linux-xtensa.org
Subject: [PATCH 08/14] arm64: simplify access_ok()
Date: Mon, 14 Feb 2022 17:34:46 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220214163452.1568807-9-arnd@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220214163452.1568807-1-arnd@kernel.org>

From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>

arm64 has an inline asm implementation of access_ok() that is derived from
the 32-bit arm version and optimized for the case that both the limit and
the size are variable. With set_fs() gone, the limit is always constant,
and the size usually is as well, so just using the default implementation
reduces the check into a comparison against a constant that can be
scheduled by the compiler.

On a defconfig build, this saves over 28KB of .text.

Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
---
 arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h | 28 +++++-----------------------
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h
index 357f7bd9c981..e8dce0cc5eaa 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h
@@ -26,6 +26,8 @@
 #include <asm/memory.h>
 #include <asm/extable.h>
 
+static inline int __access_ok(const void __user *ptr, unsigned long size);
+
 /*
  * Test whether a block of memory is a valid user space address.
  * Returns 1 if the range is valid, 0 otherwise.
@@ -33,10 +35,8 @@
  * This is equivalent to the following test:
  * (u65)addr + (u65)size <= (u65)TASK_SIZE_MAX
  */
-static inline unsigned long __access_ok(const void __user *addr, unsigned long size)
+static inline int access_ok(const void __user *addr, unsigned long size)
 {
-	unsigned long ret, limit = TASK_SIZE_MAX - 1;
-
 	/*
 	 * Asynchronous I/O running in a kernel thread does not have the
 	 * TIF_TAGGED_ADDR flag of the process owning the mm, so always untag
@@ -46,27 +46,9 @@ static inline unsigned long __access_ok(const void __user *addr, unsigned long s
 	    (current->flags & PF_KTHREAD || test_thread_flag(TIF_TAGGED_ADDR)))
 		addr = untagged_addr(addr);
 
-	__chk_user_ptr(addr);
-	asm volatile(
-	// A + B <= C + 1 for all A,B,C, in four easy steps:
-	// 1: X = A + B; X' = X % 2^64
-	"	adds	%0, %3, %2\n"
-	// 2: Set C = 0 if X > 2^64, to guarantee X' > C in step 4
-	"	csel	%1, xzr, %1, hi\n"
-	// 3: Set X' = ~0 if X >= 2^64. For X == 2^64, this decrements X'
-	//    to compensate for the carry flag being set in step 4. For
-	//    X > 2^64, X' merely has to remain nonzero, which it does.
-	"	csinv	%0, %0, xzr, cc\n"
-	// 4: For X < 2^64, this gives us X' - C - 1 <= 0, where the -1
-	//    comes from the carry in being clear. Otherwise, we are
-	//    testing X' - C == 0, subject to the previous adjustments.
-	"	sbcs	xzr, %0, %1\n"
-	"	cset	%0, ls\n"
-	: "=&r" (ret), "+r" (limit) : "Ir" (size), "0" (addr) : "cc");
-
-	return ret;
+	return likely(__access_ok(addr, size));
 }
-#define __access_ok __access_ok
+#define access_ok access_ok
 
 #include <asm-generic/access_ok.h>
 
-- 
2.29.2


WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@kernel.org>
To: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>,
	linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
	linux-api@vger.kernel.org, arnd@arndb.de,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: mark.rutland@arm.com, dalias@libc.org,
	linux-ia64@vger.kernel.org, linux-sh@vger.kernel.org,
	peterz@infradead.org, jcmvbkbc@gmail.com, guoren@kernel.org,
	sparclinux@vger.kernel.org, linux-hexagon@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, will@kernel.org,
	ardb@kernel.org, linux-s390@vger.kernel.org,
	bcain@codeaurora.org, deller@gmx.de, x86@kernel.org,
	linux@armlinux.org.uk, linux-csky@vger.kernel.org,
	mingo@redhat.com, geert@linux-m68k.org,
	linux-snps-arc@lists.infradead.org,
	linux-xtensa@linux-xtensa.org, hca@linux.ibm.com,
	linux-alpha@vger.kernel.org, linux-um@lists.infradead.org,
	linux-m68k@lists.linux-m68k.org, openrisc@lists.librecores.org,
	green.hu@gmail.com, shorne@gmail.com,
	linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, monstr@monstr.eu,
	tsbogend@alpha.franken.de, linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org,
	nickhu@andestech.com, linux-mips@vger.kernel.org,
	dinguyen@kernel.org, ebiederm@xmission.com, richard@nod.at,
	akpm@linux-foundation.org, linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org,
	davem@davemloft.net
Subject: [PATCH 08/14] arm64: simplify access_ok()
Date: Mon, 14 Feb 2022 17:34:46 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220214163452.1568807-9-arnd@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220214163452.1568807-1-arnd@kernel.org>

From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>

arm64 has an inline asm implementation of access_ok() that is derived from
the 32-bit arm version and optimized for the case that both the limit and
the size are variable. With set_fs() gone, the limit is always constant,
and the size usually is as well, so just using the default implementation
reduces the check into a comparison against a constant that can be
scheduled by the compiler.

On a defconfig build, this saves over 28KB of .text.

Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
---
 arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h | 28 +++++-----------------------
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h
index 357f7bd9c981..e8dce0cc5eaa 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h
@@ -26,6 +26,8 @@
 #include <asm/memory.h>
 #include <asm/extable.h>
 
+static inline int __access_ok(const void __user *ptr, unsigned long size);
+
 /*
  * Test whether a block of memory is a valid user space address.
  * Returns 1 if the range is valid, 0 otherwise.
@@ -33,10 +35,8 @@
  * This is equivalent to the following test:
  * (u65)addr + (u65)size <= (u65)TASK_SIZE_MAX
  */
-static inline unsigned long __access_ok(const void __user *addr, unsigned long size)
+static inline int access_ok(const void __user *addr, unsigned long size)
 {
-	unsigned long ret, limit = TASK_SIZE_MAX - 1;
-
 	/*
 	 * Asynchronous I/O running in a kernel thread does not have the
 	 * TIF_TAGGED_ADDR flag of the process owning the mm, so always untag
@@ -46,27 +46,9 @@ static inline unsigned long __access_ok(const void __user *addr, unsigned long s
 	    (current->flags & PF_KTHREAD || test_thread_flag(TIF_TAGGED_ADDR)))
 		addr = untagged_addr(addr);
 
-	__chk_user_ptr(addr);
-	asm volatile(
-	// A + B <= C + 1 for all A,B,C, in four easy steps:
-	// 1: X = A + B; X' = X % 2^64
-	"	adds	%0, %3, %2\n"
-	// 2: Set C = 0 if X > 2^64, to guarantee X' > C in step 4
-	"	csel	%1, xzr, %1, hi\n"
-	// 3: Set X' = ~0 if X >= 2^64. For X == 2^64, this decrements X'
-	//    to compensate for the carry flag being set in step 4. For
-	//    X > 2^64, X' merely has to remain nonzero, which it does.
-	"	csinv	%0, %0, xzr, cc\n"
-	// 4: For X < 2^64, this gives us X' - C - 1 <= 0, where the -1
-	//    comes from the carry in being clear. Otherwise, we are
-	//    testing X' - C == 0, subject to the previous adjustments.
-	"	sbcs	xzr, %0, %1\n"
-	"	cset	%0, ls\n"
-	: "=&r" (ret), "+r" (limit) : "Ir" (size), "0" (addr) : "cc");
-
-	return ret;
+	return likely(__access_ok(addr, size));
 }
-#define __access_ok __access_ok
+#define access_ok access_ok
 
 #include <asm-generic/access_ok.h>
 
-- 
2.29.2


WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@kernel.org>
To: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>,
	linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
	linux-api@vger.kernel.org, arnd@arndb.de,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux@armlinux.org.uk, will@kernel.org, guoren@kernel.org,
	bcain@codeaurora.org, geert@linux-m68k.org, monstr@monstr.eu,
	tsbogend@alpha.franken.de, nickhu@andestech.com,
	green.hu@gmail.com, dinguyen@kernel.org, shorne@gmail.com,
	deller@gmx.de, mpe@ellerman.id.au, peterz@infradead.org,
	mingo@redhat.com, mark.rutland@arm.com, hca@linux.ibm.com,
	dalias@libc.org, davem@davemloft.net, richard@nod.at,
	x86@kernel.org, jcmvbkbc@gmail.com, ebiederm@xmission.com,
	akpm@linux-foundation.org, ardb@kernel.org,
	linux-alpha@vger.kernel.org, linux-snps-arc@lists.infradead.org,
	linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-csky@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-hexagon@vger.kernel.org, linux-ia64@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-m68k@lists.linux-m68k.org, linux-mips@vger.kernel.org,
	openrisc@lists.librecores.org, linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org,
	linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org,
	linux-s390@vger.kernel.org, linux-sh@vger.kernel.org,
	sparclinux@vger.kernel.org, linux-um@lists.infradead.org,
	linux-xtensa@linux-xtensa.org
Subject: [PATCH 08/14] arm64: simplify access_ok()
Date: Mon, 14 Feb 2022 17:34:46 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220214163452.1568807-9-arnd@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220214163452.1568807-1-arnd@kernel.org>

From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>

arm64 has an inline asm implementation of access_ok() that is derived from
the 32-bit arm version and optimized for the case that both the limit and
the size are variable. With set_fs() gone, the limit is always constant,
and the size usually is as well, so just using the default implementation
reduces the check into a comparison against a constant that can be
scheduled by the compiler.

On a defconfig build, this saves over 28KB of .text.

Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
---
 arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h | 28 +++++-----------------------
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h
index 357f7bd9c981..e8dce0cc5eaa 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h
@@ -26,6 +26,8 @@
 #include <asm/memory.h>
 #include <asm/extable.h>
 
+static inline int __access_ok(const void __user *ptr, unsigned long size);
+
 /*
  * Test whether a block of memory is a valid user space address.
  * Returns 1 if the range is valid, 0 otherwise.
@@ -33,10 +35,8 @@
  * This is equivalent to the following test:
  * (u65)addr + (u65)size <= (u65)TASK_SIZE_MAX
  */
-static inline unsigned long __access_ok(const void __user *addr, unsigned long size)
+static inline int access_ok(const void __user *addr, unsigned long size)
 {
-	unsigned long ret, limit = TASK_SIZE_MAX - 1;
-
 	/*
 	 * Asynchronous I/O running in a kernel thread does not have the
 	 * TIF_TAGGED_ADDR flag of the process owning the mm, so always untag
@@ -46,27 +46,9 @@ static inline unsigned long __access_ok(const void __user *addr, unsigned long s
 	    (current->flags & PF_KTHREAD || test_thread_flag(TIF_TAGGED_ADDR)))
 		addr = untagged_addr(addr);
 
-	__chk_user_ptr(addr);
-	asm volatile(
-	// A + B <= C + 1 for all A,B,C, in four easy steps:
-	// 1: X = A + B; X' = X % 2^64
-	"	adds	%0, %3, %2\n"
-	// 2: Set C = 0 if X > 2^64, to guarantee X' > C in step 4
-	"	csel	%1, xzr, %1, hi\n"
-	// 3: Set X' = ~0 if X >= 2^64. For X == 2^64, this decrements X'
-	//    to compensate for the carry flag being set in step 4. For
-	//    X > 2^64, X' merely has to remain nonzero, which it does.
-	"	csinv	%0, %0, xzr, cc\n"
-	// 4: For X < 2^64, this gives us X' - C - 1 <= 0, where the -1
-	//    comes from the carry in being clear. Otherwise, we are
-	//    testing X' - C == 0, subject to the previous adjustments.
-	"	sbcs	xzr, %0, %1\n"
-	"	cset	%0, ls\n"
-	: "=&r" (ret), "+r" (limit) : "Ir" (size), "0" (addr) : "cc");
-
-	return ret;
+	return likely(__access_ok(addr, size));
 }
-#define __access_ok __access_ok
+#define access_ok access_ok
 
 #include <asm-generic/access_ok.h>
 
-- 
2.29.2


_______________________________________________
linux-riscv mailing list
linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-riscv

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@kernel.org>
To: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>,
	linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
	linux-api@vger.kernel.org, arnd@arndb.de,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux@armlinux.org.uk, will@kernel.org, guoren@kernel.org,
	bcain@codeaurora.org, geert@linux-m68k.org, monstr@monstr.eu,
	tsbogend@alpha.franken.de, nickhu@andestech.com,
	green.hu@gmail.com, dinguyen@kernel.org, shorne@gmail.com,
	deller@gmx.de, mpe@ellerman.id.au, peterz@infradead.org,
	mingo@redhat.com, mark.rutland@arm.com, hca@linux.ibm.com,
	dalias@libc.org, davem@davemloft.net, richard@nod.at,
	x86@kernel.org, jcmvbkbc@gmail.com, ebiederm@xmission.com,
	akpm@linux-foundation.org, ardb@kernel.org,
	linux-alpha@vger.kernel.org, linux-snps-arc@lists.infradead.org,
	linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-csky@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-hexagon@vger.kernel.org, linux-ia64@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-m68k@lists.linux-m68k.org, linux-mips@vger.kernel.org,
	openrisc@lists.librecores.org, linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org,
	linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org,
	linux-s390@vger.kernel.org, linux-sh@vger.kernel.org,
	sparclinux@vger.kernel.org, linux-um@lists.infradead.org,
	linux-xtensa@linux-xtensa.org
Subject: [PATCH 08/14] arm64: simplify access_ok()
Date: Mon, 14 Feb 2022 17:34:46 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220214163452.1568807-9-arnd@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220214163452.1568807-1-arnd@kernel.org>

From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>

arm64 has an inline asm implementation of access_ok() that is derived from
the 32-bit arm version and optimized for the case that both the limit and
the size are variable. With set_fs() gone, the limit is always constant,
and the size usually is as well, so just using the default implementation
reduces the check into a comparison against a constant that can be
scheduled by the compiler.

On a defconfig build, this saves over 28KB of .text.

Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
---
 arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h | 28 +++++-----------------------
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h
index 357f7bd9c981..e8dce0cc5eaa 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h
@@ -26,6 +26,8 @@
 #include <asm/memory.h>
 #include <asm/extable.h>
 
+static inline int __access_ok(const void __user *ptr, unsigned long size);
+
 /*
  * Test whether a block of memory is a valid user space address.
  * Returns 1 if the range is valid, 0 otherwise.
@@ -33,10 +35,8 @@
  * This is equivalent to the following test:
  * (u65)addr + (u65)size <= (u65)TASK_SIZE_MAX
  */
-static inline unsigned long __access_ok(const void __user *addr, unsigned long size)
+static inline int access_ok(const void __user *addr, unsigned long size)
 {
-	unsigned long ret, limit = TASK_SIZE_MAX - 1;
-
 	/*
 	 * Asynchronous I/O running in a kernel thread does not have the
 	 * TIF_TAGGED_ADDR flag of the process owning the mm, so always untag
@@ -46,27 +46,9 @@ static inline unsigned long __access_ok(const void __user *addr, unsigned long s
 	    (current->flags & PF_KTHREAD || test_thread_flag(TIF_TAGGED_ADDR)))
 		addr = untagged_addr(addr);
 
-	__chk_user_ptr(addr);
-	asm volatile(
-	// A + B <= C + 1 for all A,B,C, in four easy steps:
-	// 1: X = A + B; X' = X % 2^64
-	"	adds	%0, %3, %2\n"
-	// 2: Set C = 0 if X > 2^64, to guarantee X' > C in step 4
-	"	csel	%1, xzr, %1, hi\n"
-	// 3: Set X' = ~0 if X >= 2^64. For X == 2^64, this decrements X'
-	//    to compensate for the carry flag being set in step 4. For
-	//    X > 2^64, X' merely has to remain nonzero, which it does.
-	"	csinv	%0, %0, xzr, cc\n"
-	// 4: For X < 2^64, this gives us X' - C - 1 <= 0, where the -1
-	//    comes from the carry in being clear. Otherwise, we are
-	//    testing X' - C == 0, subject to the previous adjustments.
-	"	sbcs	xzr, %0, %1\n"
-	"	cset	%0, ls\n"
-	: "=&r" (ret), "+r" (limit) : "Ir" (size), "0" (addr) : "cc");
-
-	return ret;
+	return likely(__access_ok(addr, size));
 }
-#define __access_ok __access_ok
+#define access_ok access_ok
 
 #include <asm-generic/access_ok.h>
 
-- 
2.29.2


_______________________________________________
linux-snps-arc mailing list
linux-snps-arc@lists.infradead.org
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-snps-arc

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@kernel.org>
To: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>,
	linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
	linux-api@vger.kernel.org, arnd@arndb.de,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux@armlinux.org.uk, will@kernel.org, guoren@kernel.org,
	bcain@codeaurora.org, geert@linux-m68k.org, monstr@monstr.eu,
	tsbogend@alpha.franken.de, nickhu@andestech.com,
	green.hu@gmail.com, dinguyen@kernel.org, shorne@gmail.com,
	deller@gmx.de, mpe@ellerman.id.au, peterz@infradead.org,
	mingo@redhat.com, mark.rutland@arm.com, hca@linux.ibm.com,
	dalias@libc.org, davem@davemloft.net, richard@nod.at,
	x86@kernel.org, jcmvbkbc@gmail.com, ebiederm@xmission.com,
	akpm@linux-foundation.org, ardb@kernel.org,
	linux-alpha@vger.kernel.org, linux-snps-arc@lists.infradead.org,
	linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-csky@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-hexagon@vger.kernel.org, linux-ia64@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-m68k@lists.linux-m68k.org, linux-mips@vger.kernel.org,
	openrisc@lists.librecores.org, linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org,
	linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org,
	linux-s390@vger.kernel.org, linux-sh@vger.kernel.org,
	sparclinux@vger.kernel.org, linux-um@lists.infradead.org,
	linux-xtensa@linux-xtensa.org
Subject: [PATCH 08/14] arm64: simplify access_ok()
Date: Mon, 14 Feb 2022 17:34:46 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220214163452.1568807-9-arnd@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220214163452.1568807-1-arnd@kernel.org>

From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>

arm64 has an inline asm implementation of access_ok() that is derived from
the 32-bit arm version and optimized for the case that both the limit and
the size are variable. With set_fs() gone, the limit is always constant,
and the size usually is as well, so just using the default implementation
reduces the check into a comparison against a constant that can be
scheduled by the compiler.

On a defconfig build, this saves over 28KB of .text.

Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
---
 arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h | 28 +++++-----------------------
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h
index 357f7bd9c981..e8dce0cc5eaa 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h
@@ -26,6 +26,8 @@
 #include <asm/memory.h>
 #include <asm/extable.h>
 
+static inline int __access_ok(const void __user *ptr, unsigned long size);
+
 /*
  * Test whether a block of memory is a valid user space address.
  * Returns 1 if the range is valid, 0 otherwise.
@@ -33,10 +35,8 @@
  * This is equivalent to the following test:
  * (u65)addr + (u65)size <= (u65)TASK_SIZE_MAX
  */
-static inline unsigned long __access_ok(const void __user *addr, unsigned long size)
+static inline int access_ok(const void __user *addr, unsigned long size)
 {
-	unsigned long ret, limit = TASK_SIZE_MAX - 1;
-
 	/*
 	 * Asynchronous I/O running in a kernel thread does not have the
 	 * TIF_TAGGED_ADDR flag of the process owning the mm, so always untag
@@ -46,27 +46,9 @@ static inline unsigned long __access_ok(const void __user *addr, unsigned long s
 	    (current->flags & PF_KTHREAD || test_thread_flag(TIF_TAGGED_ADDR)))
 		addr = untagged_addr(addr);
 
-	__chk_user_ptr(addr);
-	asm volatile(
-	// A + B <= C + 1 for all A,B,C, in four easy steps:
-	// 1: X = A + B; X' = X % 2^64
-	"	adds	%0, %3, %2\n"
-	// 2: Set C = 0 if X > 2^64, to guarantee X' > C in step 4
-	"	csel	%1, xzr, %1, hi\n"
-	// 3: Set X' = ~0 if X >= 2^64. For X == 2^64, this decrements X'
-	//    to compensate for the carry flag being set in step 4. For
-	//    X > 2^64, X' merely has to remain nonzero, which it does.
-	"	csinv	%0, %0, xzr, cc\n"
-	// 4: For X < 2^64, this gives us X' - C - 1 <= 0, where the -1
-	//    comes from the carry in being clear. Otherwise, we are
-	//    testing X' - C == 0, subject to the previous adjustments.
-	"	sbcs	xzr, %0, %1\n"
-	"	cset	%0, ls\n"
-	: "=&r" (ret), "+r" (limit) : "Ir" (size), "0" (addr) : "cc");
-
-	return ret;
+	return likely(__access_ok(addr, size));
 }
-#define __access_ok __access_ok
+#define access_ok access_ok
 
 #include <asm-generic/access_ok.h>
 
-- 
2.29.2


_______________________________________________
linux-arm-kernel mailing list
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@kernel.org>
To: openrisc@lists.librecores.org
Subject: [OpenRISC] [PATCH 08/14] arm64: simplify access_ok()
Date: Mon, 14 Feb 2022 17:34:46 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220214163452.1568807-9-arnd@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220214163452.1568807-1-arnd@kernel.org>

From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>

arm64 has an inline asm implementation of access_ok() that is derived from
the 32-bit arm version and optimized for the case that both the limit and
the size are variable. With set_fs() gone, the limit is always constant,
and the size usually is as well, so just using the default implementation
reduces the check into a comparison against a constant that can be
scheduled by the compiler.

On a defconfig build, this saves over 28KB of .text.

Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
---
 arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h | 28 +++++-----------------------
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h
index 357f7bd9c981..e8dce0cc5eaa 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h
@@ -26,6 +26,8 @@
 #include <asm/memory.h>
 #include <asm/extable.h>
 
+static inline int __access_ok(const void __user *ptr, unsigned long size);
+
 /*
  * Test whether a block of memory is a valid user space address.
  * Returns 1 if the range is valid, 0 otherwise.
@@ -33,10 +35,8 @@
  * This is equivalent to the following test:
  * (u65)addr + (u65)size <= (u65)TASK_SIZE_MAX
  */
-static inline unsigned long __access_ok(const void __user *addr, unsigned long size)
+static inline int access_ok(const void __user *addr, unsigned long size)
 {
-	unsigned long ret, limit = TASK_SIZE_MAX - 1;
-
 	/*
 	 * Asynchronous I/O running in a kernel thread does not have the
 	 * TIF_TAGGED_ADDR flag of the process owning the mm, so always untag
@@ -46,27 +46,9 @@ static inline unsigned long __access_ok(const void __user *addr, unsigned long s
 	    (current->flags & PF_KTHREAD || test_thread_flag(TIF_TAGGED_ADDR)))
 		addr = untagged_addr(addr);
 
-	__chk_user_ptr(addr);
-	asm volatile(
-	// A + B <= C + 1 for all A,B,C, in four easy steps:
-	// 1: X = A + B; X' = X % 2^64
-	"	adds	%0, %3, %2\n"
-	// 2: Set C = 0 if X > 2^64, to guarantee X' > C in step 4
-	"	csel	%1, xzr, %1, hi\n"
-	// 3: Set X' = ~0 if X >= 2^64. For X == 2^64, this decrements X'
-	//    to compensate for the carry flag being set in step 4. For
-	//    X > 2^64, X' merely has to remain nonzero, which it does.
-	"	csinv	%0, %0, xzr, cc\n"
-	// 4: For X < 2^64, this gives us X' - C - 1 <= 0, where the -1
-	//    comes from the carry in being clear. Otherwise, we are
-	//    testing X' - C == 0, subject to the previous adjustments.
-	"	sbcs	xzr, %0, %1\n"
-	"	cset	%0, ls\n"
-	: "=&r" (ret), "+r" (limit) : "Ir" (size), "0" (addr) : "cc");
-
-	return ret;
+	return likely(__access_ok(addr, size));
 }
-#define __access_ok __access_ok
+#define access_ok access_ok
 
 #include <asm-generic/access_ok.h>
 
-- 
2.29.2


WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@kernel.org>
To: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>,
	linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
	linux-api@vger.kernel.org, arnd@arndb.de,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux@armlinux.org.uk, will@kernel.org, guoren@kernel.org,
	bcain@codeaurora.org, geert@linux-m68k.org, monstr@monstr.eu,
	tsbogend@alpha.franken.de, nickhu@andestech.com,
	green.hu@gmail.com, dinguyen@kernel.org, shorne@gmail.com,
	deller@gmx.de, mpe@ellerman.id.au, peterz@infradead.org,
	mingo@redhat.com, mark.rutland@arm.com, hca@linux.ibm.com,
	dalias@libc.org, davem@davemloft.net, richard@nod.at,
	x86@kernel.org, jcmvbkbc@gmail.com, ebiederm@xmission.com,
	akpm@linux-foundation.org, ardb@kernel.org,
	linux-alpha@vger.kernel.org, linux-snps-arc@lists.infradead.org,
	linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-csky@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-hexagon@vger.kernel.org, linux-ia64@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-m68k@lists.linux-m68k.org, linux-mips@vger.kernel.org,
	openrisc@lists.librecores.org, linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org,
	linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org,
	linux-s390@vger.kernel.org, linux-sh@vger.kernel.org,
	sparclinux@vger.kernel.org, linux-um@lists.infradead.org,
	linux-xtensa@linux-xtensa.org
Subject: [PATCH 08/14] arm64: simplify access_ok()
Date: Mon, 14 Feb 2022 16:34:46 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220214163452.1568807-9-arnd@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220214163452.1568807-1-arnd@kernel.org>

From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>

arm64 has an inline asm implementation of access_ok() that is derived from
the 32-bit arm version and optimized for the case that both the limit and
the size are variable. With set_fs() gone, the limit is always constant,
and the size usually is as well, so just using the default implementation
reduces the check into a comparison against a constant that can be
scheduled by the compiler.

On a defconfig build, this saves over 28KB of .text.

Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
---
 arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h | 28 +++++-----------------------
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h
index 357f7bd9c981..e8dce0cc5eaa 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h
@@ -26,6 +26,8 @@
 #include <asm/memory.h>
 #include <asm/extable.h>
 
+static inline int __access_ok(const void __user *ptr, unsigned long size);
+
 /*
  * Test whether a block of memory is a valid user space address.
  * Returns 1 if the range is valid, 0 otherwise.
@@ -33,10 +35,8 @@
  * This is equivalent to the following test:
  * (u65)addr + (u65)size <= (u65)TASK_SIZE_MAX
  */
-static inline unsigned long __access_ok(const void __user *addr, unsigned long size)
+static inline int access_ok(const void __user *addr, unsigned long size)
 {
-	unsigned long ret, limit = TASK_SIZE_MAX - 1;
-
 	/*
 	 * Asynchronous I/O running in a kernel thread does not have the
 	 * TIF_TAGGED_ADDR flag of the process owning the mm, so always untag
@@ -46,27 +46,9 @@ static inline unsigned long __access_ok(const void __user *addr, unsigned long s
 	    (current->flags & PF_KTHREAD || test_thread_flag(TIF_TAGGED_ADDR)))
 		addr = untagged_addr(addr);
 
-	__chk_user_ptr(addr);
-	asm volatile(
-	// A + B <= C + 1 for all A,B,C, in four easy steps:
-	// 1: X = A + B; X' = X % 2^64
-	"	adds	%0, %3, %2\n"
-	// 2: Set C = 0 if X > 2^64, to guarantee X' > C in step 4
-	"	csel	%1, xzr, %1, hi\n"
-	// 3: Set X' = ~0 if X >= 2^64. For X = 2^64, this decrements X'
-	//    to compensate for the carry flag being set in step 4. For
-	//    X > 2^64, X' merely has to remain nonzero, which it does.
-	"	csinv	%0, %0, xzr, cc\n"
-	// 4: For X < 2^64, this gives us X' - C - 1 <= 0, where the -1
-	//    comes from the carry in being clear. Otherwise, we are
-	//    testing X' - C = 0, subject to the previous adjustments.
-	"	sbcs	xzr, %0, %1\n"
-	"	cset	%0, ls\n"
-	: "=&r" (ret), "+r" (limit) : "Ir" (size), "0" (addr) : "cc");
-
-	return ret;
+	return likely(__access_ok(addr, size));
 }
-#define __access_ok __access_ok
+#define access_ok access_ok
 
 #include <asm-generic/access_ok.h>
 
-- 
2.29.2

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@kernel.org>
To: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>,
	linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
	linux-api@vger.kernel.org, arnd@arndb.de,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux@armlinux.org.uk, will@kernel.org, guoren@kernel.org,
	bcain@codeaurora.org, geert@linux-m68k.org, monstr@monstr.eu,
	tsbogend@alpha.franken.de, nickhu@andestech.com,
	green.hu@gmail.com, dinguyen@kernel.org, shorne@gmail.com,
	deller@gmx.de, mpe@ellerman.id.au, peterz@infradead.org,
	mingo@redhat.com, mark.rutland@arm.com, hca@linux.ibm.com,
	dalias@libc.org, davem@davemloft.net, richard@nod.at,
	x86@kernel.org, jcmvbkbc@gmail.com, ebiederm@xmission.com,
	akpm@linux-foundation.org, ardb@kernel.org,
	linux-alpha@vger.kernel.org, linux-snps-arc@lists.infradead.org,
	linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-csky@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-hexagon@vger.kernel.org, linux-ia64@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-m68k@lists.linux-m68k.org, linux-mips@vger.kernel.org,
	openrisc@lists.librecores.org, linux-pa
Subject: [PATCH 08/14] arm64: simplify access_ok()
Date: Mon, 14 Feb 2022 17:34:46 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220214163452.1568807-9-arnd@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220214163452.1568807-1-arnd@kernel.org>

From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>

arm64 has an inline asm implementation of access_ok() that is derived from
the 32-bit arm version and optimized for the case that both the limit and
the size are variable. With set_fs() gone, the limit is always constant,
and the size usually is as well, so just using the default implementation
reduces the check into a comparison against a constant that can be
scheduled by the compiler.

On a defconfig build, this saves over 28KB of .text.

Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
---
 arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h | 28 +++++-----------------------
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h
index 357f7bd9c981..e8dce0cc5eaa 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h
@@ -26,6 +26,8 @@
 #include <asm/memory.h>
 #include <asm/extable.h>
 
+static inline int __access_ok(const void __user *ptr, unsigned long size);
+
 /*
  * Test whether a block of memory is a valid user space address.
  * Returns 1 if the range is valid, 0 otherwise.
@@ -33,10 +35,8 @@
  * This is equivalent to the following test:
  * (u65)addr + (u65)size <= (u65)TASK_SIZE_MAX
  */
-static inline unsigned long __access_ok(const void __user *addr, unsigned long size)
+static inline int access_ok(const void __user *addr, unsigned long size)
 {
-	unsigned long ret, limit = TASK_SIZE_MAX - 1;
-
 	/*
 	 * Asynchronous I/O running in a kernel thread does not have the
 	 * TIF_TAGGED_ADDR flag of the process owning the mm, so always untag
@@ -46,27 +46,9 @@ static inline unsigned long __access_ok(const void __user *addr, unsigned long s
 	    (current->flags & PF_KTHREAD || test_thread_flag(TIF_TAGGED_ADDR)))
 		addr = untagged_addr(addr);
 
-	__chk_user_ptr(addr);
-	asm volatile(
-	// A + B <= C + 1 for all A,B,C, in four easy steps:
-	// 1: X = A + B; X' = X % 2^64
-	"	adds	%0, %3, %2\n"
-	// 2: Set C = 0 if X > 2^64, to guarantee X' > C in step 4
-	"	csel	%1, xzr, %1, hi\n"
-	// 3: Set X' = ~0 if X >= 2^64. For X == 2^64, this decrements X'
-	//    to compensate for the carry flag being set in step 4. For
-	//    X > 2^64, X' merely has to remain nonzero, which it does.
-	"	csinv	%0, %0, xzr, cc\n"
-	// 4: For X < 2^64, this gives us X' - C - 1 <= 0, where the -1
-	//    comes from the carry in being clear. Otherwise, we are
-	//    testing X' - C == 0, subject to the previous adjustments.
-	"	sbcs	xzr, %0, %1\n"
-	"	cset	%0, ls\n"
-	: "=&r" (ret), "+r" (limit) : "Ir" (size), "0" (addr) : "cc");
-
-	return ret;
+	return likely(__access_ok(addr, size));
 }
-#define __access_ok __access_ok
+#define access_ok access_ok
 
 #include <asm-generic/access_ok.h>
 
-- 
2.29.2


  parent reply	other threads:[~2022-02-14 16:37 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 450+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-02-14 16:34 [PATCH 00/14] clean up asm/uaccess.h, kill set_fs for good Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34 ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34 ` [PATCH 01/14] uaccess: fix integer overflow on access_ok() Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:58   ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 16:58     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 16:58     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 16:58     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 16:58     ` [OpenRISC] " Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 16:58     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 16:58     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 16:58     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 16:34 ` [PATCH 02/14] sparc64: add __{get,put}_kernel_nocheck() Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` [OpenRISC] [PATCH 02/14] sparc64: add __{get, put}_kernel_nocheck() Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` [PATCH 02/14] sparc64: add __{get,put}_kernel_nocheck() Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34 ` [PATCH 03/14] nds32: fix access_ok() checks in get/put_user Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 17:01   ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 17:01     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 17:01     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 17:01     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 17:01     ` [OpenRISC] " Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 17:01     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 17:01     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 17:01     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 17:10     ` David Laight
2022-02-14 17:10       ` David Laight
2022-02-14 17:10       ` [OpenRISC] " David Laight
2022-02-14 17:10       ` David Laight
2022-02-14 17:10       ` David Laight
2022-02-14 17:10       ` David Laight
2022-02-15  9:18     ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-15  9:18       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-15  9:18       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-15  9:18       ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-15  9:18       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-15  9:18       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-15  9:18       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-15 10:25       ` Greg KH
2022-02-15 10:25         ` Greg KH
2022-02-15 10:25         ` Greg KH
2022-02-15 10:25         ` [OpenRISC] " Greg KH
2022-02-15 10:25         ` Greg KH
2022-02-15 10:25         ` Greg KH
2022-02-15 10:25         ` Greg KH
2022-02-14 16:34 ` [PATCH 04/14] x86: use more conventional access_ok() definition Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 17:02   ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 17:02     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 17:02     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 17:02     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 17:02     ` [OpenRISC] " Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 17:02     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 17:02     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 17:02     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 17:02     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 19:45     ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 19:45       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 19:45       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 19:45       ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 19:45       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 19:45       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 19:45       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 20:00       ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 20:00         ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 20:00         ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 20:00         ` [OpenRISC] " Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 20:00         ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 20:00         ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 20:00         ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 20:01       ` Linus Torvalds
2022-02-14 20:01         ` Linus Torvalds
2022-02-14 20:01         ` Linus Torvalds
2022-02-14 20:01         ` [OpenRISC] " Linus Torvalds
2022-02-14 20:01         ` Linus Torvalds
2022-02-14 20:01         ` Linus Torvalds
2022-02-14 20:01         ` Linus Torvalds
2022-02-14 20:17         ` Al Viro
2022-02-14 20:17           ` Al Viro
2022-02-14 20:17           ` [OpenRISC] " Al Viro
2022-02-14 20:17           ` Al Viro
2022-02-14 20:17           ` Al Viro
2022-02-14 20:17           ` Al Viro
2022-02-15  2:47           ` Al Viro
2022-02-15  2:47             ` Al Viro
2022-02-15  2:47             ` [OpenRISC] " Al Viro
2022-02-15  2:47             ` Al Viro
2022-02-15  2:47             ` Al Viro
2022-02-15  2:47             ` Al Viro
2022-02-14 20:24         ` Linus Torvalds
2022-02-14 20:24           ` Linus Torvalds
2022-02-14 20:24           ` Linus Torvalds
2022-02-14 20:24           ` Linus Torvalds
2022-02-14 20:24           ` [OpenRISC] " Linus Torvalds
2022-02-14 20:24           ` Linus Torvalds
2022-02-14 20:24           ` Linus Torvalds
2022-02-14 20:24           ` Linus Torvalds
2022-02-14 22:13           ` David Laight
2022-02-14 22:13             ` David Laight
2022-02-14 22:13             ` David Laight
2022-02-14 22:13             ` David Laight
2022-02-14 22:13             ` [OpenRISC] " David Laight
2022-02-14 22:13             ` David Laight
2022-02-14 22:13             ` David Laight
2022-02-14 22:13             ` David Laight
2022-02-14 16:34 ` [PATCH 05/14] uaccess: add generic __{get,put}_kernel_nofault Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` [OpenRISC] [PATCH 05/14] uaccess: add generic __{get, put}_kernel_nofault Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` [PATCH 05/14] uaccess: add generic __{get,put}_kernel_nofault Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 17:02   ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 17:02     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 17:02     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 17:02     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 17:02     ` [OpenRISC] [PATCH 05/14] uaccess: add generic __{get, put}_kernel_nofault Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 17:02     ` [PATCH 05/14] uaccess: add generic __{get,put}_kernel_nofault Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 17:02     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 17:02     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 17:02     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-15  0:31   ` Al Viro
2022-02-15  0:31     ` Al Viro
2022-02-15  0:31     ` [OpenRISC] [PATCH 05/14] uaccess: add generic __{get, put}_kernel_nofault Al Viro
2022-02-15  0:31     ` [PATCH 05/14] uaccess: add generic __{get,put}_kernel_nofault Al Viro
2022-02-15  0:31     ` Al Viro
2022-02-15  0:31     ` Al Viro
2022-02-15 13:16     ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-15 13:16       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-15 13:16       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-15 13:16       ` [OpenRISC] [PATCH 05/14] uaccess: add generic __{get, put}_kernel_nofault Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-15 13:16       ` [PATCH 05/14] uaccess: add generic __{get,put}_kernel_nofault Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-15 13:16       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-15 13:16       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34 ` [PATCH 06/14] mips: use simpler access_ok() Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34 ` [PATCH 07/14] uaccess: generalize access_ok() Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 17:04   ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 17:04     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 17:04     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 17:04     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 17:04     ` [OpenRISC] " Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 17:04     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 17:04     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 17:04     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 17:04     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 17:15   ` Al Viro
2022-02-14 17:15     ` Al Viro
2022-02-14 17:15     ` [OpenRISC] " Al Viro
2022-02-14 17:15     ` Al Viro
2022-02-14 17:15     ` Al Viro
2022-02-14 17:15     ` Al Viro
2022-02-14 19:25     ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 19:25       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 19:25       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 19:25       ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 19:25       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 19:25       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 19:25       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-15 10:58   ` Mark Rutland
2022-02-15 10:58     ` Mark Rutland
2022-02-15 10:58     ` Mark Rutland
2022-02-15 10:58     ` [OpenRISC] " Mark Rutland
2022-02-15 10:58     ` Mark Rutland
2022-02-15 10:58     ` Mark Rutland
2022-02-15 10:58     ` Mark Rutland
2022-02-15 10:58     ` Mark Rutland
2022-02-14 16:34 ` Arnd Bergmann [this message]
2022-02-14 16:34   ` [PATCH 08/14] arm64: simplify access_ok() Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 21:06   ` Robin Murphy
2022-02-14 21:06     ` Robin Murphy
2022-02-14 21:06     ` Robin Murphy
2022-02-14 21:06     ` [OpenRISC] " Robin Murphy
2022-02-14 21:06     ` Robin Murphy
2022-02-14 21:06     ` Robin Murphy
2022-02-14 21:06     ` Robin Murphy
2022-02-15  8:17   ` Ard Biesheuvel
2022-02-15  8:17     ` Ard Biesheuvel
2022-02-15  8:17     ` Ard Biesheuvel
2022-02-15  8:17     ` [OpenRISC] " Ard Biesheuvel
2022-02-15  8:17     ` Ard Biesheuvel
2022-02-15  8:17     ` Ard Biesheuvel
2022-02-15  8:17     ` Ard Biesheuvel
2022-02-15  9:12     ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-15  9:12       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-15  9:12       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-15  9:12       ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-15  9:12       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-15  9:12       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-15  9:12       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-15  9:21       ` Ard Biesheuvel
2022-02-15  9:21         ` Ard Biesheuvel
2022-02-15  9:21         ` Ard Biesheuvel
2022-02-15  9:21         ` [OpenRISC] " Ard Biesheuvel
2022-02-15  9:21         ` Ard Biesheuvel
2022-02-15  9:21         ` Ard Biesheuvel
2022-02-15  9:21         ` Ard Biesheuvel
2022-02-15  9:39         ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-15  9:39           ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-15  9:39           ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-15  9:39           ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-15  9:39           ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-15  9:39           ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-15  9:39           ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-15 10:39           ` Mark Rutland
2022-02-15 10:39             ` Mark Rutland
2022-02-15 10:39             ` [OpenRISC] " Mark Rutland
2022-02-15 10:39             ` Mark Rutland
2022-02-15 10:39             ` Mark Rutland
2022-02-15 10:39             ` Mark Rutland
2022-02-15 10:37         ` Mark Rutland
2022-02-15 10:37           ` Mark Rutland
2022-02-15 10:37           ` [OpenRISC] " Mark Rutland
2022-02-15 10:37           ` Mark Rutland
2022-02-15 10:37           ` Mark Rutland
2022-02-15 10:37           ` Mark Rutland
2022-02-16 19:43       ` Christophe Leroy
2022-02-16 19:43         ` Christophe Leroy
2022-02-16 19:43         ` Christophe Leroy
2022-02-16 19:43         ` Christophe Leroy
2022-02-16 19:43         ` [OpenRISC] " Christophe Leroy
2022-02-16 19:43         ` Christophe Leroy
2022-02-16 19:43         ` Christophe Leroy
2022-02-16 19:43         ` Christophe Leroy
2022-02-15  9:30     ` David Laight
2022-02-15  9:30       ` David Laight
2022-02-15  9:30       ` David Laight
2022-02-15  9:30       ` David Laight
2022-02-15  9:30       ` [OpenRISC] " David Laight
2022-02-15  9:30       ` David Laight
2022-02-15  9:30       ` David Laight
2022-02-15  9:30       ` David Laight
2022-02-15 11:24       ` Mark Rutland
2022-02-15 11:24         ` Mark Rutland
2022-02-15 11:24         ` Mark Rutland
2022-02-15 11:24         ` [OpenRISC] " Mark Rutland
2022-02-15 11:24         ` Mark Rutland
2022-02-15 11:24         ` Mark Rutland
2022-02-15 11:24         ` Mark Rutland
2022-02-15 11:07   ` Mark Rutland
2022-02-15 11:07     ` Mark Rutland
2022-02-15 11:07     ` Mark Rutland
2022-02-15 11:07     ` [OpenRISC] " Mark Rutland
2022-02-15 11:07     ` Mark Rutland
2022-02-15 11:07     ` Mark Rutland
2022-02-15 11:07     ` Mark Rutland
2022-02-15 11:07     ` Mark Rutland
2022-02-14 16:34 ` [PATCH 09/14] m68k: drop custom __access_ok() Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-15  0:37   ` Al Viro
2022-02-15  0:37     ` Al Viro
2022-02-15  0:37     ` [OpenRISC] " Al Viro
2022-02-15  0:37     ` Al Viro
2022-02-15  0:37     ` Al Viro
2022-02-15  0:37     ` Al Viro
2022-02-15  6:29     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-15  6:29       ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-15  6:29       ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-15  6:29       ` [OpenRISC] " Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-15  6:29       ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-15  6:29       ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-15  6:29       ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-15  7:13       ` Al Viro
2022-02-15  7:13         ` Al Viro
2022-02-15  7:13         ` [OpenRISC] " Al Viro
2022-02-15  7:13         ` Al Viro
2022-02-15  7:13         ` Al Viro
2022-02-15  7:13         ` Al Viro
2022-02-15 10:02         ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-15 10:02           ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-15 10:02           ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-15 10:02           ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-15 10:02           ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-15 10:02           ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-15 10:02           ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-15 13:28           ` David Laight
2022-02-15 13:28             ` David Laight
2022-02-15 13:28             ` David Laight
2022-02-15 13:28             ` David Laight
2022-02-15 13:28             ` [OpenRISC] " David Laight
2022-02-15 13:28             ` David Laight
2022-02-15 13:28             ` David Laight
2022-02-15 13:28             ` David Laight
2022-02-14 16:34 ` [PATCH 10/14] uaccess: remove most CONFIG_SET_FS users Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 17:06   ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 17:06     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 17:06     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 17:06     ` [OpenRISC] " Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 17:06     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 17:06     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 17:06     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 17:06     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 19:40     ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 19:40       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 19:40       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 19:40       ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 19:40       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 19:40       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 19:40       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 19:40       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34 ` [PATCH 11/14] sparc64: remove CONFIG_SET_FS support Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 17:06   ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 17:06     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 17:06     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 17:06     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 17:06     ` [OpenRISC] " Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 17:06     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 17:06     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 17:06     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 17:06     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-16 13:06     ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:06       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:06       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:06       ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:06       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:06       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:06       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:06       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-15  0:48   ` Al Viro
2022-02-15  0:48     ` Al Viro
2022-02-15  0:48     ` [OpenRISC] " Al Viro
2022-02-15  0:48     ` Al Viro
2022-02-15  0:48     ` Al Viro
2022-02-15  0:48     ` Al Viro
2022-02-16 13:07     ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:07       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:07       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:07       ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:07       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:07       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:07       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34 ` [PATCH 12/14] sh: " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34 ` [PATCH 13/14] ia64: " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34 ` [PATCH 14/14] uaccess: drop set_fs leftovers Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-15  3:03   ` Al Viro
2022-02-15  3:03     ` Al Viro
2022-02-15  3:03     ` [OpenRISC] " Al Viro
2022-02-15  3:03     ` Al Viro
2022-02-15  3:03     ` Al Viro
2022-02-15  3:03     ` Al Viro
2022-02-15  7:46     ` Helge Deller
2022-02-15  7:46       ` Helge Deller
2022-02-15  7:46       ` Helge Deller
2022-02-15  7:46       ` [OpenRISC] " Helge Deller
2022-02-15  7:46       ` Helge Deller
2022-02-15  7:46       ` Helge Deller
2022-02-15  7:46       ` Helge Deller
2022-02-15  8:10       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-15  8:10         ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-15  8:10         ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-15  8:10         ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-15  8:10         ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-15  8:10         ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-15  8:10         ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 17:35 ` [PATCH 00/14] clean up asm/uaccess.h, kill set_fs for good Linus Torvalds
2022-02-14 17:35   ` Linus Torvalds
2022-02-14 17:35   ` Linus Torvalds
2022-02-14 17:35   ` [OpenRISC] " Linus Torvalds
2022-02-14 17:35   ` Linus Torvalds
2022-02-14 17:35   ` Linus Torvalds
2022-02-14 17:35   ` Linus Torvalds
2022-02-14 17:35   ` Linus Torvalds

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