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From: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
To: casey@schaufler-ca.com, paul@paul-moore.com,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Cc: jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com, keescook@chromium.org,
	john.johansen@canonical.com, penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp,
	stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-api@vger.kernel.org, mic@digikod.net,
	linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v15 03/11] proc: Use lsmids instead of lsm names for attrs
Date: Tue, 12 Sep 2023 13:56:48 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20230912205658.3432-4-casey@schaufler-ca.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230912205658.3432-1-casey@schaufler-ca.com>

Use the LSM ID number instead of the LSM name to identify which
security module's attibute data should be shown in /proc/self/attr.
The security_[gs]etprocattr() functions have been changed to expect
the LSM ID. The change from a string comparison to an integer comparison
in these functions will provide a minor performance improvement.

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Reviewed-by: Mickael Salaun <mic@digikod.net>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
---
 fs/proc/base.c           | 29 +++++++++++++++--------------
 fs/proc/internal.h       |  2 +-
 include/linux/security.h | 11 +++++------
 security/security.c      | 15 +++++++--------
 4 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
index ffd54617c354..97ce30528f75 100644
--- a/fs/proc/base.c
+++ b/fs/proc/base.c
@@ -97,6 +97,7 @@
 #include <linux/resctrl.h>
 #include <linux/cn_proc.h>
 #include <linux/ksm.h>
+#include <uapi/linux/lsm.h>
 #include <trace/events/oom.h>
 #include "internal.h"
 #include "fd.h"
@@ -146,10 +147,10 @@ struct pid_entry {
 	NOD(NAME, (S_IFREG|(MODE)),			\
 		NULL, &proc_single_file_operations,	\
 		{ .proc_show = show } )
-#define ATTR(LSM, NAME, MODE)				\
+#define ATTR(LSMID, NAME, MODE)				\
 	NOD(NAME, (S_IFREG|(MODE)),			\
 		NULL, &proc_pid_attr_operations,	\
-		{ .lsm = LSM })
+		{ .lsmid = LSMID })
 
 /*
  * Count the number of hardlinks for the pid_entry table, excluding the .
@@ -2730,7 +2731,7 @@ static ssize_t proc_pid_attr_read(struct file * file, char __user * buf,
 	if (!task)
 		return -ESRCH;
 
-	length = security_getprocattr(task, PROC_I(inode)->op.lsm,
+	length = security_getprocattr(task, PROC_I(inode)->op.lsmid,
 				      file->f_path.dentry->d_name.name,
 				      &p);
 	put_task_struct(task);
@@ -2788,7 +2789,7 @@ static ssize_t proc_pid_attr_write(struct file * file, const char __user * buf,
 	if (rv < 0)
 		goto out_free;
 
-	rv = security_setprocattr(PROC_I(inode)->op.lsm,
+	rv = security_setprocattr(PROC_I(inode)->op.lsmid,
 				  file->f_path.dentry->d_name.name, page,
 				  count);
 	mutex_unlock(&current->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
@@ -2837,27 +2838,27 @@ static const struct inode_operations proc_##LSM##_attr_dir_inode_ops = { \
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK
 static const struct pid_entry smack_attr_dir_stuff[] = {
-	ATTR("smack", "current",	0666),
+	ATTR(LSM_ID_SMACK, "current",	0666),
 };
 LSM_DIR_OPS(smack);
 #endif
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR
 static const struct pid_entry apparmor_attr_dir_stuff[] = {
-	ATTR("apparmor", "current",	0666),
-	ATTR("apparmor", "prev",	0444),
-	ATTR("apparmor", "exec",	0666),
+	ATTR(LSM_ID_APPARMOR, "current",	0666),
+	ATTR(LSM_ID_APPARMOR, "prev",		0444),
+	ATTR(LSM_ID_APPARMOR, "exec",		0666),
 };
 LSM_DIR_OPS(apparmor);
 #endif
 
 static const struct pid_entry attr_dir_stuff[] = {
-	ATTR(NULL, "current",		0666),
-	ATTR(NULL, "prev",		0444),
-	ATTR(NULL, "exec",		0666),
-	ATTR(NULL, "fscreate",		0666),
-	ATTR(NULL, "keycreate",		0666),
-	ATTR(NULL, "sockcreate",	0666),
+	ATTR(LSM_ID_UNDEF, "current",	0666),
+	ATTR(LSM_ID_UNDEF, "prev",		0444),
+	ATTR(LSM_ID_UNDEF, "exec",		0666),
+	ATTR(LSM_ID_UNDEF, "fscreate",	0666),
+	ATTR(LSM_ID_UNDEF, "keycreate",	0666),
+	ATTR(LSM_ID_UNDEF, "sockcreate",	0666),
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK
 	DIR("smack",			0555,
 	    proc_smack_attr_dir_inode_ops, proc_smack_attr_dir_ops),
diff --git a/fs/proc/internal.h b/fs/proc/internal.h
index 9dda7e54b2d0..a889d9ef9584 100644
--- a/fs/proc/internal.h
+++ b/fs/proc/internal.h
@@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ union proc_op {
 	int (*proc_show)(struct seq_file *m,
 		struct pid_namespace *ns, struct pid *pid,
 		struct task_struct *task);
-	const char *lsm;
+	int lsmid;
 };
 
 struct proc_inode {
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index c1a6af37a538..3f79bc191a7c 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -472,10 +472,9 @@ int security_sem_semctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma, int cmd);
 int security_sem_semop(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma, struct sembuf *sops,
 			unsigned nsops, int alter);
 void security_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode);
-int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, const char *lsm, const char *name,
+int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, int lsmid, const char *name,
 			 char **value);
-int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value,
-			 size_t size);
+int security_setprocattr(int lsmid, const char *name, void *value, size_t size);
 int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
 int security_ismaclabel(const char *name);
 int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen);
@@ -1339,14 +1338,14 @@ static inline void security_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry,
 					  struct inode *inode)
 { }
 
-static inline int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, const char *lsm,
+static inline int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, int lsmid,
 				       const char *name, char **value)
 {
 	return -EINVAL;
 }
 
-static inline int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, char *name,
-				       void *value, size_t size)
+static inline int security_setprocattr(int lsmid, char *name, void *value,
+				       size_t size)
 {
 	return -EINVAL;
 }
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index f71715a6f5dd..a3489c04b783 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -3840,7 +3840,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_d_instantiate);
 /**
  * security_getprocattr() - Read an attribute for a task
  * @p: the task
- * @lsm: LSM name
+ * @lsmid: LSM identification
  * @name: attribute name
  * @value: attribute value
  *
@@ -3848,13 +3848,13 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_d_instantiate);
  *
  * Return: Returns the length of @value on success, a negative value otherwise.
  */
-int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, const char *lsm,
-			 const char *name, char **value)
+int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, int lsmid, const char *name,
+			 char **value)
 {
 	struct security_hook_list *hp;
 
 	hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.getprocattr, list) {
-		if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsmid->name))
+		if (lsmid != 0 && lsmid != hp->lsmid->id)
 			continue;
 		return hp->hook.getprocattr(p, name, value);
 	}
@@ -3863,7 +3863,7 @@ int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, const char *lsm,
 
 /**
  * security_setprocattr() - Set an attribute for a task
- * @lsm: LSM name
+ * @lsmid: LSM identification
  * @name: attribute name
  * @value: attribute value
  * @size: attribute value size
@@ -3873,13 +3873,12 @@ int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, const char *lsm,
  *
  * Return: Returns bytes written on success, a negative value otherwise.
  */
-int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value,
-			 size_t size)
+int security_setprocattr(int lsmid, const char *name, void *value, size_t size)
 {
 	struct security_hook_list *hp;
 
 	hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.setprocattr, list) {
-		if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsmid->name))
+		if (lsmid != 0 && lsmid != hp->lsmid->id)
 			continue;
 		return hp->hook.setprocattr(name, value, size);
 	}
-- 
2.41.0


  parent reply	other threads:[~2023-09-12 20:58 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 70+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
     [not found] <20230912205658.3432-1-casey.ref@schaufler-ca.com>
2023-09-12 20:56 ` [PATCH v15 00/11] LSM: Three basic syscalls Casey Schaufler
2023-09-12 20:56   ` [PATCH v15 01/11] LSM: Identify modules by more than name Casey Schaufler
2023-09-15 11:32     ` Tetsuo Handa
2023-09-15 17:53       ` Casey Schaufler
2023-09-16  6:32         ` Tetsuo Handa
2023-09-17 16:38           ` Casey Schaufler
2023-09-20 10:20             ` Tetsuo Handa
2023-09-20 15:08               ` Kees Cook
2023-09-23  4:46                 ` Tetsuo Handa
2023-09-24  1:58                   ` Kees Cook
2023-09-24 11:06                     ` Tetsuo Handa
2023-09-24 19:48                       ` Kees Cook
2023-10-05 12:58     ` Tetsuo Handa
2023-10-20 19:52       ` Casey Schaufler
2023-10-21 12:20         ` Tetsuo Handa
2023-10-21 14:11           ` Casey Schaufler
2023-10-29 10:57             ` Tetsuo Handa
2023-10-29 18:00               ` Casey Schaufler
2023-09-12 20:56   ` [PATCH v15 02/11] LSM: Maintain a table of LSM attribute data Casey Schaufler
2023-09-12 20:56   ` Casey Schaufler [this message]
2023-09-12 20:56   ` [PATCH v15 04/11] LSM: syscalls for current process attributes Casey Schaufler
2023-10-03 14:09     ` Mickaël Salaün
2023-10-06  1:04       ` Paul Moore
2023-10-09 15:36         ` Mickaël Salaün
2023-10-09 16:04           ` Paul Moore
2023-10-10  9:14             ` Mickaël Salaün
2023-10-10 13:10               ` Paul Moore
2023-09-12 20:56   ` [PATCH v15 05/11] LSM: Create lsm_list_modules system call Casey Schaufler
2023-10-03 14:27     ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-03-12 10:16     ` Dmitry V. Levin
2024-03-12 13:25       ` Paul Moore
2024-03-12 15:27         ` Casey Schaufler
2024-03-12 17:06           ` Paul Moore
2024-03-12 17:44             ` Casey Schaufler
2024-03-12 18:09               ` Paul Moore
2024-03-12 18:28               ` Dmitry V. Levin
2024-03-12 21:50                 ` Kees Cook
2024-03-12 22:06                   ` Casey Schaufler
2024-03-12 22:06                 ` Paul Moore
2024-03-12 22:17                   ` Casey Schaufler
2024-03-12 23:17                     ` Paul Moore
2023-09-12 20:56   ` [PATCH v15 06/11] LSM: wireup Linux Security Module syscalls Casey Schaufler
2023-10-03 14:27     ` Mickaël Salaün
2023-09-12 20:56   ` [PATCH v15 07/11] LSM: Helpers for attribute names and filling lsm_ctx Casey Schaufler
2023-10-03 14:28     ` Mickaël Salaün
2023-09-12 20:56   ` [PATCH v15 08/11] Smack: implement setselfattr and getselfattr hooks Casey Schaufler
2023-10-03 14:28     ` Mickaël Salaün
2023-10-20 19:40       ` Casey Schaufler
2023-10-20 19:42       ` Casey Schaufler
2023-09-12 20:56   ` [PATCH v15 09/11] AppArmor: Add selfattr hooks Casey Schaufler
2023-09-12 20:56   ` [PATCH v15 10/11] SELinux: " Casey Schaufler
2023-09-12 20:56   ` [PATCH v15 11/11] LSM: selftests for Linux Security Module syscalls Casey Schaufler
2023-10-03 14:28     ` Mickaël Salaün
2023-10-12 22:07   ` [PATCH v15 00/11] LSM: Three basic syscalls Paul Moore
2023-10-13 21:55     ` Paul Moore
2023-10-16 12:04       ` Roberto Sassu
2023-10-16 15:06         ` Paul Moore
2023-10-17  7:01           ` Roberto Sassu
2023-10-17 15:58             ` Paul Moore
2023-10-17 16:07               ` Roberto Sassu
2023-10-18  9:31                 ` Roberto Sassu
2023-10-18 13:09                   ` Mimi Zohar
2023-10-18 14:14                     ` Roberto Sassu
2023-10-18 16:35                       ` Paul Moore
2023-10-18 20:10                         ` Mimi Zohar
2023-10-18 20:40                           ` Paul Moore
2023-10-19  7:45                             ` Roberto Sassu
2023-10-20 16:36                               ` Casey Schaufler
2023-10-19  8:49                       ` Roberto Sassu
2023-11-13  4:03   ` Paul Moore

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