From: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
To: casey.schaufler@intel.com, jmorris@namei.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org
Cc: casey@schaufler-ca.com
Subject: [PATCH 14/59] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_audit_rule_match
Date: Tue, 9 Apr 2019 14:39:01 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190409213946.1667-15-casey@schaufler-ca.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190409213946.1667-1-casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Convert security_audit_rule_match to use the lsm_export structure
instead of a u32 secid. There is some scaffolding involved that
will be removed when the related data is updated.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
include/linux/security.h | 46 +++++++++++++++++++++++++--
kernel/auditfilter.c | 4 ++-
kernel/auditsc.c | 13 +++++---
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 7 +++--
security/security.c | 48 ++---------------------------
5 files changed, 63 insertions(+), 55 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index fb19f41d630b..ea2c6c4e88db 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -93,6 +93,45 @@ static inline void lsm_export_init(struct lsm_export *l)
memset(l, 0, sizeof(*l));
}
+/**
+ * lsm_export_secid - pull the useful secid out of a lsm_export
+ * @data: the containing data structure
+ * @secid: where to put the one that matters.
+ *
+ * Shim that will disappear when all lsm_export conversions are done.
+ */
+static inline void lsm_export_secid(struct lsm_export *data, u32 *secid)
+{
+ switch (data->flags) {
+ case LSM_EXPORT_NONE:
+ *secid = 0;
+ break;
+ case LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX:
+ *secid = data->selinux;
+ break;
+ case LSM_EXPORT_SMACK:
+ *secid = data->smack;
+ break;
+ case LSM_EXPORT_APPARMOR:
+ *secid = data->apparmor;
+ break;
+ default:
+ pr_warn("%s flags=0x%u - not a valid set\n", __func__,
+ data->flags);
+ *secid = 0;
+ break;
+ }
+}
+
+static inline void lsm_export_to_all(struct lsm_export *data, u32 secid)
+{
+ data->selinux = secid;
+ data->smack = secid;
+ data->apparmor = secid;
+ data->flags = LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX | LSM_EXPORT_SMACK |
+ LSM_EXPORT_APPARMOR;
+}
+
/* These functions are in security/commoncap.c */
extern int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
int cap, unsigned int opts);
@@ -1712,7 +1751,8 @@ static inline int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule);
int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule);
-int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule);
+int security_audit_rule_match(struct lsm_export *l, u32 field, u32 op,
+ void *lsmrule);
void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule);
#else
@@ -1728,8 +1768,8 @@ static inline int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule)
return 0;
}
-static inline int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
- void *lsmrule)
+static inline int security_audit_rule_match(struct lsm_export *l, u32 field,
+ u32 op, void *lsmrule)
{
return 0;
}
diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c
index 63f8b3f26fab..15771102919d 100644
--- a/kernel/auditfilter.c
+++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c
@@ -1324,6 +1324,7 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)
struct audit_field *f = &e->rule.fields[i];
pid_t pid;
u32 sid;
+ struct lsm_export le;
switch (f->type) {
case AUDIT_PID:
@@ -1354,7 +1355,8 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)
case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
if (f->lsm_rule) {
security_task_getsecid(current, &sid);
- result = security_audit_rule_match(sid,
+ lsm_export_to_all(&le, sid);
+ result = security_audit_rule_match(&le,
f->type, f->op, f->lsm_rule);
}
break;
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index d1eab1d4a930..822ba35e4e64 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -445,6 +445,7 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
const struct cred *cred;
int i, need_sid = 1;
u32 sid;
+ struct lsm_export le;
unsigned int sessionid;
cred = rcu_dereference_check(tsk->cred, tsk == current || task_creation);
@@ -630,7 +631,8 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
security_task_getsecid(tsk, &sid);
need_sid = 0;
}
- result = security_audit_rule_match(sid, f->type,
+ lsm_export_to_all(&le, sid);
+ result = security_audit_rule_match(&le, f->type,
f->op,
f->lsm_rule);
}
@@ -645,15 +647,17 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
if (f->lsm_rule) {
/* Find files that match */
if (name) {
+ lsm_export_to_all(&le, name->osid);
result = security_audit_rule_match(
- name->osid,
+ &le,
f->type,
f->op,
f->lsm_rule);
} else if (ctx) {
list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
+ lsm_export_to_all(&le, n->osid);
if (security_audit_rule_match(
- n->osid,
+ &le,
f->type,
f->op,
f->lsm_rule)) {
@@ -665,7 +669,8 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
/* Find ipc objects that match */
if (!ctx || ctx->type != AUDIT_IPC)
break;
- if (security_audit_rule_match(ctx->ipc.osid,
+ lsm_export_to_all(&le, ctx->ipc.osid);
+ if (security_audit_rule_match(&le,
f->type, f->op,
f->lsm_rule))
++result;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index e0cc323f948f..090ef8ceb116 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -327,6 +327,7 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,
for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) {
int rc = 0;
u32 osid;
+ struct lsm_export le;
int retried = 0;
if (!rule->lsm[i].rule)
@@ -337,7 +338,8 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,
case LSM_OBJ_ROLE:
case LSM_OBJ_TYPE:
security_inode_getsecid(inode, &osid);
- rc = security_filter_rule_match(osid,
+ lsm_export_to_all(&le, osid);
+ rc = security_filter_rule_match(&le,
rule->lsm[i].type,
Audit_equal,
rule->lsm[i].rule);
@@ -345,7 +347,8 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,
case LSM_SUBJ_USER:
case LSM_SUBJ_ROLE:
case LSM_SUBJ_TYPE:
- rc = security_filter_rule_match(secid,
+ lsm_export_to_all(&le, secid);
+ rc = security_filter_rule_match(&le,
rule->lsm[i].type,
Audit_equal,
rule->lsm[i].rule);
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 1645ebe06715..1e819ecf26ff 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -712,45 +712,6 @@ int lsm_superblock_alloc(struct super_block *sb)
RC; \
})
-/**
- * lsm_export_secid - pull the useful secid out of a lsm_export
- * @data: the containing data structure
- * @secid: where to put the one that matters.
- *
- * Shim that will disappear when all lsm_export conversions are done.
- */
-static inline void lsm_export_secid(struct lsm_export *data, u32 *secid)
-{
- switch (data->flags) {
- case LSM_EXPORT_NONE:
- *secid = 0;
- break;
- case LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX:
- *secid = data->selinux;
- break;
- case LSM_EXPORT_SMACK:
- *secid = data->smack;
- break;
- case LSM_EXPORT_APPARMOR:
- *secid = data->apparmor;
- break;
- default:
- pr_warn("%s flags=0x%u - not a valid set\n", __func__,
- data->flags);
- *secid = 0;
- break;
- }
-}
-
-static inline void lsm_export_to_all(struct lsm_export *data, u32 secid)
-{
- data->selinux = secid;
- data->smack = secid;
- data->apparmor = secid;
- data->flags = LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX | LSM_EXPORT_SMACK |
- LSM_EXPORT_APPARMOR;
-}
-
/* Security operations */
int security_binder_set_context_mgr(struct task_struct *mgr)
@@ -2482,14 +2443,11 @@ void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
call_void_hook(audit_rule_free, lsmrule);
}
-int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule)
+int security_audit_rule_match(struct lsm_export *l, u32 field, u32 op,
+ void *lsmrule)
{
- int rc;
- struct lsm_export data = { .flags = LSM_EXPORT_NONE };
- rc = call_int_hook(audit_rule_match, 0, &data, field, op, lsmrule);
- lsm_export_secid(&data, &secid);
- return rc;
+ return call_int_hook(audit_rule_match, 0, l, field, op, lsmrule);
}
#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
--
2.19.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-04-09 21:41 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 68+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-04-09 21:38 [PATCH 00/59] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 21:38 ` [PATCH 01/59] LSM: Infrastructure management of the superblock Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 21:38 ` [PATCH 02/59] LSM: Infrastructure management of the sock security Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 21:38 ` [PATCH 03/59] LSM: Infrastructure management of the key security blob Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 21:38 ` [PATCH 04/59] LSM: Create an lsm_export data structure Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 21:38 ` [PATCH 05/59] LSM: Use lsm_export in the inode_getsecid hooks Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 21:38 ` [PATCH 06/59] LSM: Use lsm_export in the cred_getsecid hooks Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 21:38 ` [PATCH 07/59] LSM: Use lsm_export in the ipc_getsecid and task_getsecid hooks Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 21:38 ` [PATCH 08/59] LSM: Use lsm_export in the kernel_ask_as hooks Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 21:38 ` [PATCH 09/59] LSM: Use lsm_export in the getpeersec_dgram hooks Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 21:38 ` [PATCH 10/59] LSM: Use lsm_export in the audit_rule_match hooks Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 21:38 ` [PATCH 11/59] LSM: Fix logical operation in lsm_export checks Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 21:38 ` [PATCH 12/59] LSM: Use lsm_export in the secid_to_secctx hooks Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 21:39 ` [PATCH 13/59] LSM: Use lsm_export in the secctx_to_secid hooks Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 21:39 ` Casey Schaufler [this message]
2019-04-09 21:39 ` [PATCH 15/59] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_kernel_act_as Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 21:39 ` [PATCH 16/59] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_socket_getpeersec_dgram Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 21:39 ` [PATCH 17/59] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_secctx_to_secid Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 21:39 ` [PATCH 18/59] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_secid_to_secctx Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 21:39 ` [PATCH 19/59] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_ipc_getsecid Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 21:39 ` [PATCH 20/59] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_task_getsecid Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 21:39 ` [PATCH 21/59] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_inode_getsecid Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 21:39 ` [PATCH 22/59] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_cred_getsecid Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 21:39 ` [PATCH 23/59] Audit: Change audit_sig_sid to audit_sig_lsm Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 21:39 ` [PATCH 24/59] Audit: Convert target_sid to an lsm_export structure Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 21:39 ` [PATCH 25/59] Audit: Convert osid " Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 21:39 ` [PATCH 26/59] IMA: Clean out lsm_export scaffolding Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 21:39 ` [PATCH 27/59] NET: Store LSM access information in the socket blob for UDS Casey Schaufler
2019-04-10 12:28 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-04-09 21:39 ` [PATCH 28/59] NET: Remove scaffolding on secmarks Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 21:39 ` [PATCH 29/59] NET: Remove scaffolding on new secmarks Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 21:39 ` [PATCH 30/59] NET: Remove netfilter scaffolding for lsm_export Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 21:39 ` [PATCH 31/59] Netlabel: Replace secids with lsm_export Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 21:39 ` [PATCH 32/59] LSM: Remove lsm_export scaffolding functions Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 21:39 ` [PATCH 33/59] IMA: FIXUP prototype using lsm_export Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 21:39 ` [PATCH 34/59] Smack: Restore the release_secctx hook Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 21:39 ` [PATCH 35/59] AppArmor: Remove unnecessary hook stub Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 21:39 ` [PATCH 36/59] LSM: Limit calls to certain module hooks Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 21:39 ` [PATCH 37/59] LSM: Create a data structure for a security context Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 21:39 ` [PATCH 38/59] LSM: Use lsm_context in secid_to_secctx hooks Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 21:39 ` [PATCH 39/59] LSM: Use lsm_context in secctx_to_secid hooks Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 21:39 ` [PATCH 40/59] LSM: Use lsm_context in inode_getsecctx hooks Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 21:39 ` [PATCH 41/59] LSM: Use lsm_context in inode_notifysecctx hooks Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 21:39 ` [PATCH 42/59] LSM: Use lsm_context in dentry_init_security hooks Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 21:39 ` [PATCH 43/59] LSM: Use lsm_context in security_dentry_init_security Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 21:39 ` [PATCH 44/59] LSM: Use lsm_context in security_inode_notifysecctx Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 21:39 ` [PATCH 45/59] LSM: Use lsm_context in security_inode_getsecctx Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 21:39 ` [PATCH 46/59] LSM: Use lsm_context in security_secctx_to_secid Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 21:39 ` [PATCH 47/59] LSM: Use lsm_context in release_secctx hooks Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 21:39 ` [PATCH 48/59] LSM: Use lsm_context in security_release_secctx Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 21:39 ` [PATCH 49/59] LSM: Use lsm_context in security_secid_to_secctx Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 21:39 ` [PATCH 50/59] fs: remove lsm_context scaffolding Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 21:39 ` [PATCH 51/59] LSM: Add the release function to the lsm_context Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 21:39 ` [PATCH 52/59] LSM: Use lsm_context in inode_setsecctx hooks Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 21:39 ` [PATCH 53/59] LSM: Use lsm_context in security_inode_setsecctx Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 21:39 ` [PATCH 54/59] kernfs: remove lsm_context scaffolding Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 21:39 ` [PATCH 55/59] LSM: Remove unused macro Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 21:39 ` [PATCH 56/59] LSM: Special handling for secctx lsm hooks Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 21:39 ` [PATCH 57/59] SELinux: Use blob offset in current_sid Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 21:39 ` [PATCH 58/59] LSM: Specify which LSM to display with /proc/self/attr/display Casey Schaufler
2019-04-10 12:43 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-04-10 14:09 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-04-10 17:18 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 21:39 ` [PATCH 59/59] AppArmor: Remove the exclusive flag Casey Schaufler
2019-04-10 12:52 ` [PATCH 00/59] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Stephen Smalley
2019-04-10 15:36 ` Casey Schaufler
-- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2019-04-09 19:58 Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 19:58 ` [PATCH 14/59] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_audit_rule_match Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 19:17 [PATCH 00/59] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 19:18 ` [PATCH 14/59] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_audit_rule_match Casey Schaufler
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