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From: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley@gmail.com>
To: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: "Schaufler, Casey" <casey.schaufler@intel.com>,
	James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 27/59] NET: Store LSM access information in the socket blob for UDS
Date: Wed, 10 Apr 2019 08:28:27 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAB9W1A3hMkcKa5RokzBag7yyW2WwcDceaZyQWDoYOF6steEjJQ@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190409213946.1667-28-casey@schaufler-ca.com>

On Tue, Apr 9, 2019 at 5:42 PM Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> wrote:
>
> UNIX domain socket connections don't have sufficient
> space in the socket buffer (skb) secmark for more than
> one Linux security module (LSM) to pass data. Expanding
> the secmark has been ruled out as an option. Store the
> necessary data in the socket security blob pointed to
> by the skb socket.

I don't believe this is correct.  The secid in the unix_skb_parms is
not the same as the secmark in the sk_buff, and I don't know if we are
necessarily prohibited from expanding it.  Also, I don't think you can
just store it in the socket security blob, especially without any form
of locking, as that can be shared across multiple sk_buffs.

>
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
> ---
>  include/linux/security.h | 20 +++++++++++++++++++-
>  net/unix/af_unix.c       | 14 ++++++++------
>  security/security.c      | 17 ++++++++++++++++-
>  3 files changed, 43 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> index e76d7a9dbe50..c413dcc1905a 100644
> --- a/include/linux/security.h
> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> @@ -71,6 +71,7 @@ struct ctl_table;
>  struct audit_krule;
>  struct user_namespace;
>  struct timezone;
> +struct sk_buff;
>
>  enum lsm_event {
>         LSM_POLICY_CHANGE,
> @@ -100,6 +101,22 @@ static inline bool lsm_export_any(struct lsm_export *l)
>                 ((l->flags & LSM_EXPORT_APPARMOR) && l->apparmor));
>  }
>
> +static inline bool lsm_export_equal(struct lsm_export *l, struct lsm_export *m)
> +{
> +       if (l->flags != m->flags || l->flags == LSM_EXPORT_NONE)
> +               return false;
> +       if (l->flags & LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX &&
> +           (l->selinux != m->selinux || l->selinux == 0))
> +               return false;
> +       if (l->flags & LSM_EXPORT_SMACK &&
> +           (l->smack != m->smack || l->smack == 0))
> +               return false;
> +       if (l->flags & LSM_EXPORT_APPARMOR &&
> +           (l->apparmor != m->apparmor || l->apparmor == 0))
> +               return false;
> +       return true;
> +}
> +
>  /**
>   * lsm_export_secid - pull the useful secid out of a lsm_export
>   * @data: the containing data structure
> @@ -143,6 +160,8 @@ static inline void lsm_export_to_all(struct lsm_export *data, u32 secid)
>                       LSM_EXPORT_APPARMOR;
>  }
>
> +extern struct lsm_export *lsm_export_skb(struct sk_buff *skb);
> +
>  /* These functions are in security/commoncap.c */
>  extern int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
>                        int cap, unsigned int opts);
> @@ -174,7 +193,6 @@ extern int cap_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice);
>  extern int cap_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages);
>
>  struct msghdr;
> -struct sk_buff;
>  struct sock;
>  struct sockaddr;
>  struct socket;
> diff --git a/net/unix/af_unix.c b/net/unix/af_unix.c
> index 4d4107927ba2..afe9c9f1adeb 100644
> --- a/net/unix/af_unix.c
> +++ b/net/unix/af_unix.c
> @@ -143,21 +143,23 @@ static struct hlist_head *unix_sockets_unbound(void *addr)
>  #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
>  static void unix_get_secdata(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb)
>  {
> -       lsm_export_secid(&scm->le, &(UNIXCB(skb).secid));
> +       struct lsm_export *ble = lsm_export_skb(skb);
> +
> +       *ble = scm->le;
>  }
>
>  static inline void unix_set_secdata(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb)
>  {
> -       lsm_export_to_all(&scm->le, UNIXCB(skb).secid);
> +       struct lsm_export *ble = lsm_export_skb(skb);
> +
> +       scm->le = *ble;
>  }
>
>  static inline bool unix_secdata_eq(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb)
>  {
> -       u32 best_secid;
> -
> -       lsm_export_secid(&scm->le, &best_secid);
> -       return (best_secid == UNIXCB(skb).secid);
> +       return lsm_export_equal(&scm->le, lsm_export_skb(skb));
>  }
> +
>  #else
>  static inline void unix_get_secdata(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb)
>  { }
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index 69983ad68233..015c38c882ba 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -46,7 +46,22 @@ static struct kmem_cache *lsm_file_cache;
>  static struct kmem_cache *lsm_inode_cache;
>
>  char *lsm_names;
> -static struct lsm_blob_sizes blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init;
> +
> +/* Socket blobs include infrastructure managed data */
> +static struct lsm_blob_sizes blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> +       .lbs_sock = sizeof(struct lsm_export),
> +};
> +
> +/**
> + * lsm_export_skb - pointer to the lsm_export associated with the skb
> + * @skb: the socket buffer
> + *
> + * Returns a pointer to the LSM managed data.
> + */
> +struct lsm_export *lsm_export_skb(struct sk_buff *skb)
> +{
> +       return skb->sk->sk_security;
> +}
>
>  /* Boot-time LSM user choice */
>  static __initdata const char *chosen_lsm_order;
> --
> 2.19.1
>

  reply	other threads:[~2019-04-10 12:28 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 68+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-04-09 21:38 [PATCH 00/59] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 21:38 ` [PATCH 01/59] LSM: Infrastructure management of the superblock Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 21:38 ` [PATCH 02/59] LSM: Infrastructure management of the sock security Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 21:38 ` [PATCH 03/59] LSM: Infrastructure management of the key security blob Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 21:38 ` [PATCH 04/59] LSM: Create an lsm_export data structure Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 21:38 ` [PATCH 05/59] LSM: Use lsm_export in the inode_getsecid hooks Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 21:38 ` [PATCH 06/59] LSM: Use lsm_export in the cred_getsecid hooks Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 21:38 ` [PATCH 07/59] LSM: Use lsm_export in the ipc_getsecid and task_getsecid hooks Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 21:38 ` [PATCH 08/59] LSM: Use lsm_export in the kernel_ask_as hooks Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 21:38 ` [PATCH 09/59] LSM: Use lsm_export in the getpeersec_dgram hooks Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 21:38 ` [PATCH 10/59] LSM: Use lsm_export in the audit_rule_match hooks Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 21:38 ` [PATCH 11/59] LSM: Fix logical operation in lsm_export checks Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 21:38 ` [PATCH 12/59] LSM: Use lsm_export in the secid_to_secctx hooks Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 21:39 ` [PATCH 13/59] LSM: Use lsm_export in the secctx_to_secid hooks Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 21:39 ` [PATCH 14/59] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_audit_rule_match Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 21:39 ` [PATCH 15/59] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_kernel_act_as Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 21:39 ` [PATCH 16/59] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_socket_getpeersec_dgram Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 21:39 ` [PATCH 17/59] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_secctx_to_secid Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 21:39 ` [PATCH 18/59] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_secid_to_secctx Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 21:39 ` [PATCH 19/59] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_ipc_getsecid Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 21:39 ` [PATCH 20/59] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_task_getsecid Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 21:39 ` [PATCH 21/59] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_inode_getsecid Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 21:39 ` [PATCH 22/59] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_cred_getsecid Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 21:39 ` [PATCH 23/59] Audit: Change audit_sig_sid to audit_sig_lsm Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 21:39 ` [PATCH 24/59] Audit: Convert target_sid to an lsm_export structure Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 21:39 ` [PATCH 25/59] Audit: Convert osid " Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 21:39 ` [PATCH 26/59] IMA: Clean out lsm_export scaffolding Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 21:39 ` [PATCH 27/59] NET: Store LSM access information in the socket blob for UDS Casey Schaufler
2019-04-10 12:28   ` Stephen Smalley [this message]
2019-04-09 21:39 ` [PATCH 28/59] NET: Remove scaffolding on secmarks Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 21:39 ` [PATCH 29/59] NET: Remove scaffolding on new secmarks Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 21:39 ` [PATCH 30/59] NET: Remove netfilter scaffolding for lsm_export Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 21:39 ` [PATCH 31/59] Netlabel: Replace secids with lsm_export Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 21:39 ` [PATCH 32/59] LSM: Remove lsm_export scaffolding functions Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 21:39 ` [PATCH 33/59] IMA: FIXUP prototype using lsm_export Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 21:39 ` [PATCH 34/59] Smack: Restore the release_secctx hook Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 21:39 ` [PATCH 35/59] AppArmor: Remove unnecessary hook stub Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 21:39 ` [PATCH 36/59] LSM: Limit calls to certain module hooks Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 21:39 ` [PATCH 37/59] LSM: Create a data structure for a security context Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 21:39 ` [PATCH 38/59] LSM: Use lsm_context in secid_to_secctx hooks Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 21:39 ` [PATCH 39/59] LSM: Use lsm_context in secctx_to_secid hooks Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 21:39 ` [PATCH 40/59] LSM: Use lsm_context in inode_getsecctx hooks Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 21:39 ` [PATCH 41/59] LSM: Use lsm_context in inode_notifysecctx hooks Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 21:39 ` [PATCH 42/59] LSM: Use lsm_context in dentry_init_security hooks Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 21:39 ` [PATCH 43/59] LSM: Use lsm_context in security_dentry_init_security Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 21:39 ` [PATCH 44/59] LSM: Use lsm_context in security_inode_notifysecctx Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 21:39 ` [PATCH 45/59] LSM: Use lsm_context in security_inode_getsecctx Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 21:39 ` [PATCH 46/59] LSM: Use lsm_context in security_secctx_to_secid Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 21:39 ` [PATCH 47/59] LSM: Use lsm_context in release_secctx hooks Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 21:39 ` [PATCH 48/59] LSM: Use lsm_context in security_release_secctx Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 21:39 ` [PATCH 49/59] LSM: Use lsm_context in security_secid_to_secctx Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 21:39 ` [PATCH 50/59] fs: remove lsm_context scaffolding Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 21:39 ` [PATCH 51/59] LSM: Add the release function to the lsm_context Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 21:39 ` [PATCH 52/59] LSM: Use lsm_context in inode_setsecctx hooks Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 21:39 ` [PATCH 53/59] LSM: Use lsm_context in security_inode_setsecctx Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 21:39 ` [PATCH 54/59] kernfs: remove lsm_context scaffolding Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 21:39 ` [PATCH 55/59] LSM: Remove unused macro Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 21:39 ` [PATCH 56/59] LSM: Special handling for secctx lsm hooks Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 21:39 ` [PATCH 57/59] SELinux: Use blob offset in current_sid Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 21:39 ` [PATCH 58/59] LSM: Specify which LSM to display with /proc/self/attr/display Casey Schaufler
2019-04-10 12:43   ` Stephen Smalley
2019-04-10 14:09     ` Stephen Smalley
2019-04-10 17:18       ` Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 21:39 ` [PATCH 59/59] AppArmor: Remove the exclusive flag Casey Schaufler
2019-04-10 12:52 ` [PATCH 00/59] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Stephen Smalley
2019-04-10 15:36   ` Casey Schaufler
  -- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2019-04-09 19:58 Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 19:58 ` [PATCH 27/59] NET: Store LSM access information in the socket blob for UDS Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 19:17 [PATCH 00/59] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 19:18 ` [PATCH 27/59] NET: Store LSM access information in the socket blob for UDS Casey Schaufler

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