* [PATCH 00/58] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor
@ 2019-05-31 23:30 Casey Schaufler
2019-05-31 23:30 ` [PATCH 01/58] LSM: Infrastructure management of the superblock Casey Schaufler
` (16 more replies)
0 siblings, 17 replies; 20+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-05-31 23:30 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds
This patchset provides the changes required for
the AppArmor security module to stack safely with any other.
A new process attribute identifies which security module
information should be reported by SO_PEERSEC and the
/proc/.../attr/current interface. This is provided by
/proc/.../attr/display. Writing the name of the security
module desired to this interface will set which LSM hooks
will be called for this information. The first security
module providing the hooks will be used by default.
The use of integer based security tokens (secids) is
generally (but not completely) replaced by a structure
lsm_export. The lsm_export structure can contain information
for each of the security modules that export information
outside the LSM layer.
The LSM interfaces that provide "secctx" text strings
have been changed to use a structure "lsm_context"
instead of a pointer/length pair. In some cases the
interfaces used a "char *" pointer and in others a
"void *". This was necessary to ensure that the correct
release mechanism for the text is used. It also makes
many of the interfaces cleaner.
https://github.com/cschaufler/lsm-stacking.git#stack-5.2-v1-apparmor
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
drivers/android/binder.c | 25 ++-
fs/kernfs/dir.c | 6 +-
fs/kernfs/inode.c | 31 ++-
fs/kernfs/kernfs-internal.h | 3 +-
fs/nfs/inode.c | 13 +-
fs/nfs/internal.h | 8 +-
fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c | 17 +-
fs/nfs/nfs4xdr.c | 16 +-
fs/nfsd/nfs4proc.c | 8 +-
fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c | 14 +-
fs/nfsd/vfs.c | 7 +-
fs/proc/base.c | 1 +
include/linux/cred.h | 3 +-
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 91 +++++----
include/linux/nfs4.h | 8 +-
include/linux/security.h | 133 +++++++++----
include/net/af_unix.h | 2 +-
include/net/netlabel.h | 10 +-
include/net/scm.h | 14 +-
kernel/audit.c | 43 ++--
kernel/audit.h | 9 +-
kernel/auditfilter.c | 6 +-
kernel/auditsc.c | 77 ++++----
kernel/cred.c | 15 +-
net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c | 13 +-
net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c | 12 +-
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c | 29 ++-
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c | 16 +-
net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c | 38 ++--
net/netfilter/nft_meta.c | 13 +-
net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c | 14 +-
net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c | 5 +-
net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 101 +++++-----
net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.h | 2 +-
net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c | 13 +-
net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h | 2 +-
net/unix/af_unix.c | 6 +-
security/apparmor/audit.c | 4 +-
security/apparmor/include/audit.h | 2 +-
security/apparmor/include/net.h | 6 +-
security/apparmor/include/secid.h | 9 +-
security/apparmor/lsm.c | 64 +++---
security/apparmor/secid.c | 42 ++--
security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 14 +-
security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 9 +-
security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 6 +-
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 34 ++--
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 19 +-
security/security.c | 338 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
security/selinux/hooks.c | 259 ++++++++++++------------
security/selinux/include/audit.h | 5 +-
security/selinux/include/objsec.h | 42 +++-
security/selinux/netlabel.c | 25 +--
security/selinux/ss/services.c | 18 +-
security/smack/smack.h | 18 ++
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 238 +++++++++++-----------
security/smack/smack_netfilter.c | 8 +-
security/smack/smackfs.c | 12 +-
58 files changed, 1217 insertions(+), 779 deletions(-)
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 20+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 01/58] LSM: Infrastructure management of the superblock
2019-05-31 23:30 [PATCH 00/58] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-05-31 23:30 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-05-31 23:30 ` [PATCH 02/58] LSM: Infrastructure management of the sock security Casey Schaufler
` (15 subsequent siblings)
16 siblings, 0 replies; 20+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-05-31 23:30 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds
Move management of the superblock->sb_security blob out
of the individual security modules and into the security
infrastructure. Instead of allocating the blobs from within
the modules the modules tell the infrastructure how much
space is required, and the space is allocated there.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 1 +
security/security.c | 46 ++++++++++++++++++++----
security/selinux/hooks.c | 58 ++++++++++++-------------------
security/selinux/include/objsec.h | 6 ++++
security/selinux/ss/services.c | 3 +-
security/smack/smack.h | 6 ++++
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 35 +++++--------------
7 files changed, 85 insertions(+), 70 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index a240a3fc5fc4..f9222a04968d 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -2047,6 +2047,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes {
int lbs_cred;
int lbs_file;
int lbs_inode;
+ int lbs_superblock;
int lbs_ipc;
int lbs_msg_msg;
int lbs_task;
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 23cbb1a295a3..550988a0f024 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -172,6 +172,7 @@ static void __init lsm_set_blob_sizes(struct lsm_blob_sizes *needed)
lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_inode, &blob_sizes.lbs_inode);
lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_ipc, &blob_sizes.lbs_ipc);
lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_msg_msg, &blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg);
+ lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_superblock, &blob_sizes.lbs_superblock);
lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_task, &blob_sizes.lbs_task);
}
@@ -300,12 +301,13 @@ static void __init ordered_lsm_init(void)
for (lsm = ordered_lsms; *lsm; lsm++)
prepare_lsm(*lsm);
- init_debug("cred blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_cred);
- init_debug("file blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_file);
- init_debug("inode blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_inode);
- init_debug("ipc blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_ipc);
- init_debug("msg_msg blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg);
- init_debug("task blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_task);
+ init_debug("cred blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_cred);
+ init_debug("file blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_file);
+ init_debug("inode blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_inode);
+ init_debug("ipc blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_ipc);
+ init_debug("msg_msg blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg);
+ init_debug("superblock blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_superblock);
+ init_debug("task blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_task);
/*
* Create any kmem_caches needed for blobs
@@ -603,6 +605,27 @@ static void __init lsm_early_task(struct task_struct *task)
panic("%s: Early task alloc failed.\n", __func__);
}
+/**
+ * lsm_superblock_alloc - allocate a composite superblock blob
+ * @sb: the superblock that needs a blob
+ *
+ * Allocate the superblock blob for all the modules
+ *
+ * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated.
+ */
+int lsm_superblock_alloc(struct super_block *sb)
+{
+ if (blob_sizes.lbs_superblock == 0) {
+ sb->s_security = NULL;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ sb->s_security = kzalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_superblock, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (sb->s_security == NULL)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ return 0;
+}
+
/*
* Hook list operation macros.
*
@@ -776,12 +799,21 @@ int security_fs_context_parse_param(struct fs_context *fc, struct fs_parameter *
int security_sb_alloc(struct super_block *sb)
{
- return call_int_hook(sb_alloc_security, 0, sb);
+ int rc = lsm_superblock_alloc(sb);
+
+ if (unlikely(rc))
+ return rc;
+ rc = call_int_hook(sb_alloc_security, 0, sb);
+ if (unlikely(rc))
+ security_sb_free(sb);
+ return rc;
}
void security_sb_free(struct super_block *sb)
{
call_void_hook(sb_free_security, sb);
+ kfree(sb->s_security);
+ sb->s_security = NULL;
}
void security_free_mnt_opts(void **mnt_opts)
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 1d0b37af2444..7478d8eda00a 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -335,7 +335,7 @@ static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
if (!isec)
return;
- sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
+ sbsec = selinux_superblock(inode->i_sb);
/*
* As not all inode security structures are in a list, we check for
* empty list outside of the lock to make sure that we won't waste
@@ -366,11 +366,7 @@ static int file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
static int superblock_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
{
- struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
-
- sbsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!sbsec)
- return -ENOMEM;
+ struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
mutex_init(&sbsec->lock);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->isec_head);
@@ -379,18 +375,10 @@ static int superblock_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
sbsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
sbsec->def_sid = SECINITSID_FILE;
sbsec->mntpoint_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
- sb->s_security = sbsec;
return 0;
}
-static void superblock_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
-{
- struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
- sb->s_security = NULL;
- kfree(sbsec);
-}
-
struct selinux_mnt_opts {
const char *fscontext, *context, *rootcontext, *defcontext;
};
@@ -507,7 +495,7 @@ static int selinux_is_genfs_special_handling(struct super_block *sb)
static int selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(struct super_block *sb)
{
- struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
+ struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
/*
* IMPORTANT: Double-check logic in this function when adding a new
@@ -535,7 +523,7 @@ static int selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(struct super_block *sb)
static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
{
- struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
+ struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
struct inode *root_inode = d_backing_inode(root);
int rc = 0;
@@ -648,7 +636,7 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
unsigned long *set_kern_flags)
{
const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
- struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
+ struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
struct dentry *root = sbsec->sb->s_root;
struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts = mnt_opts;
struct inode_security_struct *root_isec;
@@ -881,8 +869,8 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
static int selinux_cmp_sb_context(const struct super_block *oldsb,
const struct super_block *newsb)
{
- struct superblock_security_struct *old = oldsb->s_security;
- struct superblock_security_struct *new = newsb->s_security;
+ struct superblock_security_struct *old = selinux_superblock(oldsb);
+ struct superblock_security_struct *new = selinux_superblock(newsb);
char oldflags = old->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
char newflags = new->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
@@ -914,8 +902,9 @@ static int selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
unsigned long *set_kern_flags)
{
int rc = 0;
- const struct superblock_security_struct *oldsbsec = oldsb->s_security;
- struct superblock_security_struct *newsbsec = newsb->s_security;
+ const struct superblock_security_struct *oldsbsec =
+ selinux_superblock(oldsb);
+ struct superblock_security_struct *newsbsec = selinux_superblock(newsb);
int set_fscontext = (oldsbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT);
int set_context = (oldsbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT);
@@ -1085,7 +1074,7 @@ static int show_sid(struct seq_file *m, u32 sid)
static int selinux_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb)
{
- struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
+ struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
int rc;
if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
@@ -1377,7 +1366,7 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dent
if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_FILE)
isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
- sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
+ sbsec = selinux_superblock(inode->i_sb);
if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)) {
/* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
after the initial policy is loaded and the security
@@ -1767,7 +1756,8 @@ selinux_determine_inode_label(const struct task_security_struct *tsec,
const struct qstr *name, u16 tclass,
u32 *_new_isid)
{
- const struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
+ const struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec =
+ selinux_superblock(dir->i_sb);
if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) &&
(sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)) {
@@ -1798,7 +1788,7 @@ static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
int rc;
dsec = inode_security(dir);
- sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
+ sbsec = selinux_superblock(dir->i_sb);
sid = tsec->sid;
@@ -1947,7 +1937,7 @@ static int superblock_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
- sbsec = sb->s_security;
+ sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, perms, ad);
}
@@ -2578,11 +2568,6 @@ static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
return superblock_alloc_security(sb);
}
-static void selinux_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
-{
- superblock_free_security(sb);
-}
-
static inline int opt_len(const char *s)
{
bool open_quote = false;
@@ -2653,7 +2638,7 @@ static int selinux_sb_eat_lsm_opts(char *options, void **mnt_opts)
static int selinux_sb_remount(struct super_block *sb, void *mnt_opts)
{
struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts = mnt_opts;
- struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
+ struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
u32 sid;
int rc;
@@ -2877,7 +2862,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
int rc;
char *context;
- sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
+ sbsec = selinux_superblock(dir->i_sb);
newsid = tsec->create_sid;
@@ -3115,7 +3100,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
return dentry_has_perm(current_cred(), dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
}
- sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
+ sbsec = selinux_superblock(inode->i_sb);
if (!(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
@@ -3296,13 +3281,14 @@ static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
{
struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security_novalidate(inode);
- struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
+ struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
u32 newsid;
int rc;
if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+ sbsec = selinux_superblock(inode->i_sb);
if (!(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
@@ -6647,6 +6633,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes selinux_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
.lbs_inode = sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
.lbs_ipc = sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct),
.lbs_msg_msg = sizeof(struct msg_security_struct),
+ .lbs_superblock = sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct),
};
static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
@@ -6675,7 +6662,6 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(fs_context_parse_param, selinux_fs_context_parse_param),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_alloc_security, selinux_sb_alloc_security),
- LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_security, selinux_sb_free_security),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_eat_lsm_opts, selinux_sb_eat_lsm_opts),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_mnt_opts, selinux_free_mnt_opts),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_remount, selinux_sb_remount),
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
index 231262d8eac9..d08d7e5d2f93 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
@@ -188,4 +188,10 @@ static inline struct ipc_security_struct *selinux_ipc(
return ipc->security + selinux_blob_sizes.lbs_ipc;
}
+static inline struct superblock_security_struct *selinux_superblock(
+ const struct super_block *superblock)
+{
+ return superblock->s_security + selinux_blob_sizes.lbs_superblock;
+}
+
#endif /* _SELINUX_OBJSEC_H_ */
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index ec62918521b1..e3f5d6aece66 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -50,6 +50,7 @@
#include <linux/audit.h>
#include <linux/mutex.h>
#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
+#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
#include <net/netlabel.h>
#include "flask.h"
@@ -2751,7 +2752,7 @@ int security_fs_use(struct selinux_state *state, struct super_block *sb)
struct sidtab *sidtab;
int rc = 0;
struct ocontext *c;
- struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
+ struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
const char *fstype = sb->s_type->name;
read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
diff --git a/security/smack/smack.h b/security/smack/smack.h
index cf52af77d15e..caecbcba9942 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack.h
+++ b/security/smack/smack.h
@@ -375,6 +375,12 @@ static inline struct smack_known **smack_ipc(const struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc)
return ipc->security + smack_blob_sizes.lbs_ipc;
}
+static inline struct superblock_smack *smack_superblock(
+ const struct super_block *superblock)
+{
+ return superblock->s_security + smack_blob_sizes.lbs_superblock;
+}
+
/*
* Is the directory transmuting?
*/
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 5c1613519d5a..807eff2ccce9 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -540,12 +540,7 @@ static int smack_syslog(int typefrom_file)
*/
static int smack_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
{
- struct superblock_smack *sbsp;
-
- sbsp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_smack), GFP_KERNEL);
-
- if (sbsp == NULL)
- return -ENOMEM;
+ struct superblock_smack *sbsp = smack_superblock(sb);
sbsp->smk_root = &smack_known_floor;
sbsp->smk_default = &smack_known_floor;
@@ -554,22 +549,10 @@ static int smack_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
/*
* SMK_SB_INITIALIZED will be zero from kzalloc.
*/
- sb->s_security = sbsp;
return 0;
}
-/**
- * smack_sb_free_security - free a superblock blob
- * @sb: the superblock getting the blob
- *
- */
-static void smack_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
-{
- kfree(sb->s_security);
- sb->s_security = NULL;
-}
-
struct smack_mnt_opts {
const char *fsdefault, *fsfloor, *fshat, *fsroot, *fstransmute;
};
@@ -781,7 +764,7 @@ static int smack_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
{
struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(root);
- struct superblock_smack *sp = sb->s_security;
+ struct superblock_smack *sp = smack_superblock(sb);
struct inode_smack *isp;
struct smack_known *skp;
struct smack_mnt_opts *opts = mnt_opts;
@@ -880,7 +863,7 @@ static int smack_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
*/
static int smack_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
{
- struct superblock_smack *sbp = dentry->d_sb->s_security;
+ struct superblock_smack *sbp = smack_superblock(dentry->d_sb);
int rc;
struct smk_audit_info ad;
@@ -917,7 +900,7 @@ static int smack_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
if (isp->smk_task == NULL || isp->smk_task == bsp->smk_task)
return 0;
- sbsp = inode->i_sb->s_security;
+ sbsp = smack_superblock(inode->i_sb);
if ((sbsp->smk_flags & SMK_SB_UNTRUSTED) &&
isp->smk_task != sbsp->smk_root)
return 0;
@@ -1168,7 +1151,7 @@ static int smack_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode,
*/
static int smack_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
{
- struct superblock_smack *sbsp = inode->i_sb->s_security;
+ struct superblock_smack *sbsp = smack_superblock(inode->i_sb);
struct smk_audit_info ad;
int no_block = mask & MAY_NOT_BLOCK;
int rc;
@@ -1410,7 +1393,7 @@ static int smack_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
*/
if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0) {
struct super_block *sbp = dentry->d_sb;
- struct superblock_smack *sbsp = sbp->s_security;
+ struct superblock_smack *sbsp = smack_superblock(sbp);
isp->smk_inode = sbsp->smk_default;
} else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0)
@@ -1680,7 +1663,7 @@ static int smack_mmap_file(struct file *file,
isp = smack_inode(file_inode(file));
if (isp->smk_mmap == NULL)
return 0;
- sbsp = file_inode(file)->i_sb->s_security;
+ sbsp = smack_superblock(file_inode(file)->i_sb);
if (sbsp->smk_flags & SMK_SB_UNTRUSTED &&
isp->smk_mmap != sbsp->smk_root)
return -EACCES;
@@ -3288,7 +3271,7 @@ static void smack_d_instantiate(struct dentry *opt_dentry, struct inode *inode)
goto unlockandout;
sbp = inode->i_sb;
- sbsp = sbp->s_security;
+ sbsp = smack_superblock(sbp);
/*
* We're going to use the superblock default label
* if there's no label on the file.
@@ -4575,6 +4558,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes smack_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
.lbs_inode = sizeof(struct inode_smack),
.lbs_ipc = sizeof(struct smack_known *),
.lbs_msg_msg = sizeof(struct smack_known *),
+ .lbs_superblock = sizeof(struct superblock_smack),
};
static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
@@ -4586,7 +4570,6 @@ static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(fs_context_parse_param, smack_fs_context_parse_param),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_alloc_security, smack_sb_alloc_security),
- LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_security, smack_sb_free_security),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_mnt_opts, smack_free_mnt_opts),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_eat_lsm_opts, smack_sb_eat_lsm_opts),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_statfs, smack_sb_statfs),
--
2.19.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 20+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 02/58] LSM: Infrastructure management of the sock security
2019-05-31 23:30 [PATCH 00/58] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Casey Schaufler
2019-05-31 23:30 ` [PATCH 01/58] LSM: Infrastructure management of the superblock Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-05-31 23:30 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-05-31 23:30 ` [PATCH 03/58] LSM: Infrastructure management of the key security blob Casey Schaufler
` (14 subsequent siblings)
16 siblings, 0 replies; 20+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-05-31 23:30 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds
Move management of the sock->sk_security blob out
of the individual security modules and into the security
infrastructure. Instead of allocating the blobs from within
the modules the modules tell the infrastructure how much
space is required, and the space is allocated there.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 1 +
security/apparmor/include/net.h | 6 ++-
security/apparmor/lsm.c | 38 ++++-----------
security/security.c | 36 +++++++++++++-
security/selinux/hooks.c | 78 +++++++++++++++----------------
security/selinux/include/objsec.h | 5 ++
security/selinux/netlabel.c | 23 ++++-----
security/smack/smack.h | 5 ++
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 64 ++++++++++++-------------
security/smack/smack_netfilter.c | 8 ++--
10 files changed, 144 insertions(+), 120 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index f9222a04968d..b353482ea348 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -2047,6 +2047,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes {
int lbs_cred;
int lbs_file;
int lbs_inode;
+ int lbs_sock;
int lbs_superblock;
int lbs_ipc;
int lbs_msg_msg;
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/net.h b/security/apparmor/include/net.h
index 7334ac966d01..adac04e3b3cc 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/net.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/net.h
@@ -55,7 +55,11 @@ struct aa_sk_ctx {
struct aa_label *peer;
};
-#define SK_CTX(X) ((X)->sk_security)
+static inline struct aa_sk_ctx *aa_sock(const struct sock *sk)
+{
+ return sk->sk_security + apparmor_blob_sizes.lbs_sock;
+}
+
#define SOCK_ctx(X) SOCK_INODE(X)->i_security
#define DEFINE_AUDIT_NET(NAME, OP, SK, F, T, P) \
struct lsm_network_audit NAME ## _net = { .sk = (SK), \
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index 49d664ddff44..2716e7731279 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -757,33 +757,15 @@ static int apparmor_task_kill(struct task_struct *target, struct kernel_siginfo
return error;
}
-/**
- * apparmor_sk_alloc_security - allocate and attach the sk_security field
- */
-static int apparmor_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t flags)
-{
- struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx;
-
- ctx = kzalloc(sizeof(*ctx), flags);
- if (!ctx)
- return -ENOMEM;
-
- SK_CTX(sk) = ctx;
-
- return 0;
-}
-
/**
* apparmor_sk_free_security - free the sk_security field
*/
static void apparmor_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
{
- struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
+ struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk);
- SK_CTX(sk) = NULL;
aa_put_label(ctx->label);
aa_put_label(ctx->peer);
- kfree(ctx);
}
/**
@@ -792,8 +774,8 @@ static void apparmor_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
static void apparmor_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk,
struct sock *newsk)
{
- struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
- struct aa_sk_ctx *new = SK_CTX(newsk);
+ struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk);
+ struct aa_sk_ctx *new = aa_sock(newsk);
new->label = aa_get_label(ctx->label);
new->peer = aa_get_label(ctx->peer);
@@ -844,7 +826,7 @@ static int apparmor_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
label = aa_get_current_label();
if (sock->sk) {
- struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sock->sk);
+ struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sock->sk);
aa_put_label(ctx->label);
ctx->label = aa_get_label(label);
@@ -1029,7 +1011,7 @@ static int apparmor_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
*/
static int apparmor_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
- struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
+ struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk);
if (!skb->secmark)
return 0;
@@ -1042,7 +1024,7 @@ static int apparmor_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
static struct aa_label *sk_peer_label(struct sock *sk)
{
- struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
+ struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk);
if (ctx->peer)
return ctx->peer;
@@ -1126,7 +1108,7 @@ static int apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
*/
static void apparmor_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
{
- struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
+ struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk);
if (!ctx->label)
ctx->label = aa_get_current_label();
@@ -1136,7 +1118,7 @@ static void apparmor_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
static int apparmor_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
struct request_sock *req)
{
- struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
+ struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk);
if (!skb->secmark)
return 0;
@@ -1153,6 +1135,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes apparmor_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
.lbs_cred = sizeof(struct aa_task_ctx *),
.lbs_file = sizeof(struct aa_file_ctx),
.lbs_task = sizeof(struct aa_task_ctx),
+ .lbs_sock = sizeof(struct aa_sk_ctx),
};
static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
@@ -1189,7 +1172,6 @@ static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(getprocattr, apparmor_getprocattr),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(setprocattr, apparmor_setprocattr),
- LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_alloc_security, apparmor_sk_alloc_security),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_free_security, apparmor_sk_free_security),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_clone_security, apparmor_sk_clone_security),
@@ -1581,7 +1563,7 @@ static unsigned int apparmor_ip_postroute(void *priv,
if (sk == NULL)
return NF_ACCEPT;
- ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
+ ctx = aa_sock(sk);
if (!apparmor_secmark_check(ctx->label, OP_SENDMSG, AA_MAY_SEND,
skb->secmark, sk))
return NF_ACCEPT;
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 550988a0f024..e32b7180282e 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@
#include <linux/string.h>
#include <linux/msg.h>
#include <net/flow.h>
+#include <net/sock.h>
#define MAX_LSM_EVM_XATTR 2
@@ -172,6 +173,7 @@ static void __init lsm_set_blob_sizes(struct lsm_blob_sizes *needed)
lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_inode, &blob_sizes.lbs_inode);
lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_ipc, &blob_sizes.lbs_ipc);
lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_msg_msg, &blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg);
+ lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_sock, &blob_sizes.lbs_sock);
lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_superblock, &blob_sizes.lbs_superblock);
lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_task, &blob_sizes.lbs_task);
}
@@ -306,6 +308,7 @@ static void __init ordered_lsm_init(void)
init_debug("inode blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_inode);
init_debug("ipc blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_ipc);
init_debug("msg_msg blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg);
+ init_debug("sock blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_sock);
init_debug("superblock blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_superblock);
init_debug("task blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_task);
@@ -605,6 +608,28 @@ static void __init lsm_early_task(struct task_struct *task)
panic("%s: Early task alloc failed.\n", __func__);
}
+/**
+ * lsm_sock_alloc - allocate a composite sock blob
+ * @sock: the sock that needs a blob
+ * @priority: allocation mode
+ *
+ * Allocate the sock blob for all the modules
+ *
+ * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated.
+ */
+int lsm_sock_alloc(struct sock *sock, gfp_t priority)
+{
+ if (blob_sizes.lbs_sock == 0) {
+ sock->sk_security = NULL;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ sock->sk_security = kzalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_sock, priority);
+ if (sock->sk_security == NULL)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ return 0;
+}
+
/**
* lsm_superblock_alloc - allocate a composite superblock blob
* @sb: the superblock that needs a blob
@@ -2048,12 +2073,21 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_socket_getpeersec_dgram);
int security_sk_alloc(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
{
- return call_int_hook(sk_alloc_security, 0, sk, family, priority);
+ int rc = lsm_sock_alloc(sk, priority);
+
+ if (unlikely(rc))
+ return rc;
+ rc = call_int_hook(sk_alloc_security, 0, sk, family, priority);
+ if (unlikely(rc))
+ security_sk_free(sk);
+ return rc;
}
void security_sk_free(struct sock *sk)
{
call_void_hook(sk_free_security, sk);
+ kfree(sk->sk_security);
+ sk->sk_security = NULL;
}
void security_sk_clone(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 7478d8eda00a..f38a6f484613 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -4319,7 +4319,7 @@ static int socket_sockcreate_sid(const struct task_security_struct *tsec,
static int sock_has_perm(struct sock *sk, u32 perms)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
struct common_audit_data ad;
struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
@@ -4376,7 +4376,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
if (sock->sk) {
- sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ sksec = selinux_sock(sock->sk);
sksec->sclass = sclass;
sksec->sid = sid;
/* Allows detection of the first association on this socket */
@@ -4392,8 +4392,8 @@ static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
static int selinux_socket_socketpair(struct socket *socka,
struct socket *sockb)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec_a = socka->sk->sk_security;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec_b = sockb->sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec_a = selinux_sock(socka->sk);
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec_b = selinux_sock(sockb->sk);
sksec_a->peer_sid = sksec_b->sid;
sksec_b->peer_sid = sksec_a->sid;
@@ -4408,7 +4408,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_socketpair(struct socket *socka,
static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
u16 family;
int err;
@@ -4540,7 +4540,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_connect_helper(struct socket *sock,
struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
int err;
err = sock_has_perm(sk, SOCKET__CONNECT);
@@ -4711,9 +4711,9 @@ static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
struct sock *other,
struct sock *newsk)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec_sock = sock->sk_security;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec_other = other->sk_security;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec_new = newsk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec_sock = selinux_sock(sock);
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec_other = selinux_sock(other);
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec_new = selinux_sock(newsk);
struct common_audit_data ad;
struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
int err;
@@ -4745,8 +4745,8 @@ static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
struct socket *other)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
- struct sk_security_struct *osec = other->sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *ssec = selinux_sock(sock->sk);
+ struct sk_security_struct *osec = selinux_sock(other->sk);
struct common_audit_data ad;
struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
@@ -4788,7 +4788,7 @@ static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
u16 family)
{
int err = 0;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
struct common_audit_data ad;
struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
@@ -4821,7 +4821,7 @@ static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
int err;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
u16 family = sk->sk_family;
u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
struct common_audit_data ad;
@@ -4889,13 +4889,15 @@ static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
return err;
}
-static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
- int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
+static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock,
+ __user char *optval,
+ __user int *optlen,
+ unsigned int len)
{
int err = 0;
char *scontext;
u32 scontext_len;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sock->sk);
u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET ||
@@ -4955,34 +4957,27 @@ static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *
static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
-
- sksec = kzalloc(sizeof(*sksec), priority);
- if (!sksec)
- return -ENOMEM;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
sksec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
sksec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
sksec->sclass = SECCLASS_SOCKET;
selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(sksec);
- sk->sk_security = sksec;
return 0;
}
static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
- sk->sk_security = NULL;
selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(sksec);
- kfree(sksec);
}
static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
- struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
+ struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = selinux_sock(newsk);
newsksec->sid = sksec->sid;
newsksec->peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid;
@@ -4996,7 +4991,7 @@ static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid)
if (!sk)
*secid = SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET;
else {
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
*secid = sksec->sid;
}
@@ -5006,7 +5001,7 @@ static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
{
struct inode_security_struct *isec =
inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(parent));
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET || sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 ||
sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
@@ -5021,7 +5016,7 @@ static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
static int selinux_sctp_assoc_request(struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
struct sk_buff *skb)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = ep->base.sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(ep->base.sk);
struct common_audit_data ad;
struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
u8 peerlbl_active;
@@ -5172,8 +5167,8 @@ static int selinux_sctp_bind_connect(struct sock *sk, int optname,
static void selinux_sctp_sk_clone(struct sctp_endpoint *ep, struct sock *sk,
struct sock *newsk)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
- struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
+ struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = selinux_sock(newsk);
/* If policy does not support SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET then call
* the non-sctp clone version.
@@ -5190,7 +5185,7 @@ static void selinux_sctp_sk_clone(struct sctp_endpoint *ep, struct sock *sk,
static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
struct request_sock *req)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
int err;
u16 family = req->rsk_ops->family;
u32 connsid;
@@ -5211,7 +5206,7 @@ static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
const struct request_sock *req)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = selinux_sock(newsk);
newsksec->sid = req->secid;
newsksec->peer_sid = req->peer_secid;
@@ -5228,7 +5223,7 @@ static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
u16 family = sk->sk_family;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
/* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
@@ -5312,7 +5307,7 @@ static int selinux_tun_dev_attach_queue(void *security)
static int selinux_tun_dev_attach(struct sock *sk, void *security)
{
struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
/* we don't currently perform any NetLabel based labeling here and it
* isn't clear that we would want to do so anyway; while we could apply
@@ -5353,7 +5348,7 @@ static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
int err = 0;
u32 perm;
struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
if (skb->len < NLMSG_HDRLEN) {
err = -EINVAL;
@@ -5494,7 +5489,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(struct sk_buff *skb,
return NF_ACCEPT;
/* standard practice, label using the parent socket */
- sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
sid = sksec->sid;
} else
sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
@@ -5533,7 +5528,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
if (sk == NULL)
return NF_ACCEPT;
- sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
ad.u.net = &net;
@@ -5625,7 +5620,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb,
u32 skb_sid;
struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
- sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &skb_sid))
return NF_DROP;
/* At this point, if the returned skb peerlbl is SECSID_NULL
@@ -5654,7 +5649,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb,
} else {
/* Locally generated packet, fetch the security label from the
* associated socket. */
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
peer_sid = sksec->sid;
secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
}
@@ -6633,6 +6628,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes selinux_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
.lbs_inode = sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
.lbs_ipc = sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct),
.lbs_msg_msg = sizeof(struct msg_security_struct),
+ .lbs_sock = sizeof(struct sk_security_struct),
.lbs_superblock = sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct),
};
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
index d08d7e5d2f93..29f02b8f8f31 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
@@ -194,4 +194,9 @@ static inline struct superblock_security_struct *selinux_superblock(
return superblock->s_security + selinux_blob_sizes.lbs_superblock;
}
+static inline struct sk_security_struct *selinux_sock(const struct sock *sock)
+{
+ return sock->sk_security + selinux_blob_sizes.lbs_sock;
+}
+
#endif /* _SELINUX_OBJSEC_H_ */
diff --git a/security/selinux/netlabel.c b/security/selinux/netlabel.c
index 186e727b737b..c40914a157b7 100644
--- a/security/selinux/netlabel.c
+++ b/security/selinux/netlabel.c
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
#include <linux/gfp.h>
#include <linux/ip.h>
#include <linux/ipv6.h>
+#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
#include <net/sock.h>
#include <net/netlabel.h>
#include <net/ip.h>
@@ -81,7 +82,7 @@ static int selinux_netlbl_sidlookup_cached(struct sk_buff *skb,
static struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *selinux_netlbl_sock_genattr(struct sock *sk)
{
int rc;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr;
if (sksec->nlbl_secattr != NULL)
@@ -114,7 +115,7 @@ static struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *selinux_netlbl_sock_getattr(
const struct sock *sk,
u32 sid)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr = sksec->nlbl_secattr;
if (secattr == NULL)
@@ -249,7 +250,7 @@ int selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(struct sk_buff *skb,
* being labeled by it's parent socket, if it is just exit */
sk = skb_to_full_sk(skb);
if (sk != NULL) {
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
if (sksec->nlbl_state != NLBL_REQSKB)
return 0;
@@ -287,7 +288,7 @@ int selinux_netlbl_sctp_assoc_request(struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
{
int rc;
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = ep->base.sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(ep->base.sk);
struct sockaddr *addr;
struct sockaddr_in addr4;
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
@@ -370,7 +371,7 @@ int selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(struct request_sock *req, u16 family)
*/
void selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *sk, u16 family)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
if (family == PF_INET)
sksec->nlbl_state = NLBL_LABELED;
@@ -388,8 +389,8 @@ void selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *sk, u16 family)
*/
void selinux_netlbl_sctp_sk_clone(struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
- struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
+ struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = selinux_sock(newsk);
newsksec->nlbl_state = sksec->nlbl_state;
}
@@ -407,7 +408,7 @@ void selinux_netlbl_sctp_sk_clone(struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
int selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(struct sock *sk, u16 family)
{
int rc;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr;
if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
@@ -522,7 +523,7 @@ int selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock,
{
int rc = 0;
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
if (selinux_netlbl_option(level, optname) &&
@@ -560,7 +561,7 @@ static int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_helper(struct sock *sk,
struct sockaddr *addr)
{
int rc;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr;
/* connected sockets are allowed to disconnect when the address family
@@ -599,7 +600,7 @@ static int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_helper(struct sock *sk,
int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_locked(struct sock *sk,
struct sockaddr *addr)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
if (sksec->nlbl_state != NLBL_REQSKB &&
sksec->nlbl_state != NLBL_CONNLABELED)
diff --git a/security/smack/smack.h b/security/smack/smack.h
index caecbcba9942..4ac4bf3310d7 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack.h
+++ b/security/smack/smack.h
@@ -375,6 +375,11 @@ static inline struct smack_known **smack_ipc(const struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc)
return ipc->security + smack_blob_sizes.lbs_ipc;
}
+static inline struct socket_smack *smack_sock(const struct sock *sock)
+{
+ return sock->sk_security + smack_blob_sizes.lbs_sock;
+}
+
static inline struct superblock_smack *smack_superblock(
const struct super_block *superblock)
{
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 807eff2ccce9..fd69e1bd841b 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -1439,7 +1439,7 @@ static int smack_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode,
if (sock == NULL || sock->sk == NULL)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
- ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPIN) == 0)
isp = ssp->smk_in;
@@ -1821,7 +1821,7 @@ static int smack_file_receive(struct file *file)
if (inode->i_sb->s_magic == SOCKFS_MAGIC) {
sock = SOCKET_I(inode);
- ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
tsp = smack_cred(current_cred());
/*
* If the receiving process can't write to the
@@ -2231,11 +2231,7 @@ static void smack_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode)
static int smack_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t gfp_flags)
{
struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
- struct socket_smack *ssp;
-
- ssp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct socket_smack), gfp_flags);
- if (ssp == NULL)
- return -ENOMEM;
+ struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sk);
/*
* Sockets created by kernel threads receive web label.
@@ -2249,11 +2245,10 @@ static int smack_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t gfp_flags)
}
ssp->smk_packet = NULL;
- sk->sk_security = ssp;
-
return 0;
}
+#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
/**
* smack_sk_free_security - Free a socket blob
* @sk: the socket
@@ -2262,7 +2257,6 @@ static int smack_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t gfp_flags)
*/
static void smack_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
{
-#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
struct smk_port_label *spp;
if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET6) {
@@ -2275,9 +2269,8 @@ static void smack_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
}
rcu_read_unlock();
}
-#endif
- kfree(sk->sk_security);
}
+#endif
/**
* smack_ipv4host_label - check host based restrictions
@@ -2395,7 +2388,7 @@ static struct smack_known *smack_ipv6host_label(struct sockaddr_in6 *sip)
static int smack_netlabel(struct sock *sk, int labeled)
{
struct smack_known *skp;
- struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
+ struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sk);
int rc = 0;
/*
@@ -2440,7 +2433,7 @@ static int smack_netlabel_send(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr_in *sap)
int rc;
int sk_lbl;
struct smack_known *hkp;
- struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
+ struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sk);
struct smk_audit_info ad;
rcu_read_lock();
@@ -2516,7 +2509,7 @@ static void smk_ipv6_port_label(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6;
- struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
struct smk_port_label *spp;
unsigned short port = 0;
@@ -2603,7 +2596,7 @@ static int smk_ipv6_port_check(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr_in6 *address,
int act)
{
struct smk_port_label *spp;
- struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
+ struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sk);
struct smack_known *skp = NULL;
unsigned short port;
struct smack_known *object;
@@ -2697,7 +2690,7 @@ static int smack_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
if (sock == NULL || sock->sk == NULL)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
- ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPIN) == 0)
ssp->smk_in = skp;
@@ -2745,7 +2738,7 @@ static int smack_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
* Sockets created by kernel threads receive web label.
*/
if (unlikely(current->flags & PF_KTHREAD)) {
- ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
ssp->smk_in = &smack_known_web;
ssp->smk_out = &smack_known_web;
}
@@ -2770,8 +2763,8 @@ static int smack_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
static int smack_socket_socketpair(struct socket *socka,
struct socket *sockb)
{
- struct socket_smack *asp = socka->sk->sk_security;
- struct socket_smack *bsp = sockb->sk->sk_security;
+ struct socket_smack *asp = smack_sock(socka->sk);
+ struct socket_smack *bsp = smack_sock(sockb->sk);
asp->smk_packet = bsp->smk_out;
bsp->smk_packet = asp->smk_out;
@@ -2825,7 +2818,7 @@ static int smack_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *sap,
return 0;
#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING
- ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
#endif
switch (sock->sk->sk_family) {
@@ -3566,9 +3559,9 @@ static int smack_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
{
struct smack_known *skp;
struct smack_known *okp;
- struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk_security;
- struct socket_smack *osp = other->sk_security;
- struct socket_smack *nsp = newsk->sk_security;
+ struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sock);
+ struct socket_smack *osp = smack_sock(other);
+ struct socket_smack *nsp = smack_sock(newsk);
struct smk_audit_info ad;
int rc = 0;
#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
@@ -3614,8 +3607,8 @@ static int smack_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
*/
static int smack_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock, struct socket *other)
{
- struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
- struct socket_smack *osp = other->sk->sk_security;
+ struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
+ struct socket_smack *osp = smack_sock(other->sk);
struct smk_audit_info ad;
int rc;
@@ -3652,7 +3645,7 @@ static int smack_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
struct sockaddr_in6 *sap = (struct sockaddr_in6 *) msg->msg_name;
#endif
#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING
- struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
struct smack_known *rsp;
#endif
int rc = 0;
@@ -3817,7 +3810,7 @@ static int smk_skb_to_addr_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sockaddr_in6 *sip)
static int smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
- struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
+ struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sk);
struct smack_known *skp = NULL;
int rc = 0;
struct smk_audit_info ad;
@@ -3934,7 +3927,7 @@ static int smack_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock,
int slen = 1;
int rc = 0;
- ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
if (ssp->smk_packet != NULL) {
rcp = ssp->smk_packet->smk_known;
slen = strlen(rcp) + 1;
@@ -3984,7 +3977,7 @@ static int smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
switch (family) {
case PF_UNIX:
- ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
s = ssp->smk_out->smk_secid;
break;
case PF_INET:
@@ -3997,7 +3990,7 @@ static int smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
* Translate what netlabel gave us.
*/
if (sock != NULL && sock->sk != NULL)
- ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
rc = netlbl_skbuff_getattr(skb, family, &secattr);
if (rc == 0) {
@@ -4035,7 +4028,7 @@ static void smack_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
(sk->sk_family != PF_INET && sk->sk_family != PF_INET6))
return;
- ssp = sk->sk_security;
+ ssp = smack_sock(sk);
ssp->smk_in = skp;
ssp->smk_out = skp;
/* cssp->smk_packet is already set in smack_inet_csk_clone() */
@@ -4055,7 +4048,7 @@ static int smack_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
{
u16 family = sk->sk_family;
struct smack_known *skp;
- struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
+ struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sk);
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
struct sockaddr_in addr;
struct iphdr *hdr;
@@ -4154,7 +4147,7 @@ static int smack_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
static void smack_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *sk,
const struct request_sock *req)
{
- struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
+ struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sk);
struct smack_known *skp;
if (req->peer_secid != 0) {
@@ -4558,6 +4551,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes smack_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
.lbs_inode = sizeof(struct inode_smack),
.lbs_ipc = sizeof(struct smack_known *),
.lbs_msg_msg = sizeof(struct smack_known *),
+ .lbs_sock = sizeof(struct socket_smack),
.lbs_superblock = sizeof(struct superblock_smack),
};
@@ -4667,7 +4661,9 @@ static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_stream, smack_socket_getpeersec_stream),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_dgram, smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_alloc_security, smack_sk_alloc_security),
+#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_free_security, smack_sk_free_security),
+#endif
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sock_graft, smack_sock_graft),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_request, smack_inet_conn_request),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_csk_clone, smack_inet_csk_clone),
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_netfilter.c b/security/smack/smack_netfilter.c
index e36d17835d4f..701a1cc1bdcc 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_netfilter.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_netfilter.c
@@ -31,8 +31,8 @@ static unsigned int smack_ipv6_output(void *priv,
struct socket_smack *ssp;
struct smack_known *skp;
- if (sk && sk->sk_security) {
- ssp = sk->sk_security;
+ if (sk && smack_sock(sk)) {
+ ssp = smack_sock(sk);
skp = ssp->smk_out;
skb->secmark = skp->smk_secid;
}
@@ -49,8 +49,8 @@ static unsigned int smack_ipv4_output(void *priv,
struct socket_smack *ssp;
struct smack_known *skp;
- if (sk && sk->sk_security) {
- ssp = sk->sk_security;
+ if (sk && smack_sock(sk)) {
+ ssp = smack_sock(sk);
skp = ssp->smk_out;
skb->secmark = skp->smk_secid;
}
--
2.19.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 20+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 03/58] LSM: Infrastructure management of the key security blob
2019-05-31 23:30 [PATCH 00/58] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Casey Schaufler
2019-05-31 23:30 ` [PATCH 01/58] LSM: Infrastructure management of the superblock Casey Schaufler
2019-05-31 23:30 ` [PATCH 02/58] LSM: Infrastructure management of the sock security Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-05-31 23:30 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-05-31 23:30 ` [PATCH 04/58] LSM: Create an lsm_export data structure Casey Schaufler
` (13 subsequent siblings)
16 siblings, 0 replies; 20+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-05-31 23:30 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds
From: Casey Schaufler <cschaufler@schaufler-ca.com>
Move management of the key->security blob out of the
individual security modules and into the security
infrastructure. Instead of allocating the blobs from within
the modules the modules tell the infrastructure how much
space is required, and the space is allocated there.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 1 +
security/security.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
security/selinux/hooks.c | 23 +++++-------------
security/selinux/include/objsec.h | 7 ++++++
security/smack/smack.h | 7 ++++++
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 33 ++++++++++++-------------
6 files changed, 75 insertions(+), 36 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index b353482ea348..3fe39abccc8f 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -2050,6 +2050,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes {
int lbs_sock;
int lbs_superblock;
int lbs_ipc;
+ int lbs_key;
int lbs_msg_msg;
int lbs_task;
};
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index e32b7180282e..d05f00a40e82 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -172,6 +172,9 @@ static void __init lsm_set_blob_sizes(struct lsm_blob_sizes *needed)
blob_sizes.lbs_inode = sizeof(struct rcu_head);
lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_inode, &blob_sizes.lbs_inode);
lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_ipc, &blob_sizes.lbs_ipc);
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
+ lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_key, &blob_sizes.lbs_key);
+#endif
lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_msg_msg, &blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg);
lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_sock, &blob_sizes.lbs_sock);
lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_superblock, &blob_sizes.lbs_superblock);
@@ -307,6 +310,9 @@ static void __init ordered_lsm_init(void)
init_debug("file blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_file);
init_debug("inode blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_inode);
init_debug("ipc blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_ipc);
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
+ init_debug("key blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_key);
+#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
init_debug("msg_msg blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg);
init_debug("sock blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_sock);
init_debug("superblock blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_superblock);
@@ -573,6 +579,29 @@ static int lsm_ipc_alloc(struct kern_ipc_perm *kip)
return 0;
}
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
+/**
+ * lsm_key_alloc - allocate a composite key blob
+ * @key: the key that needs a blob
+ *
+ * Allocate the key blob for all the modules
+ *
+ * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated.
+ */
+int lsm_key_alloc(struct key *key)
+{
+ if (blob_sizes.lbs_key == 0) {
+ key->security = NULL;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ key->security = kzalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_key, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (key->security == NULL)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
+
/**
* lsm_msg_msg_alloc - allocate a composite msg_msg blob
* @mp: the msg_msg that needs a blob
@@ -2339,12 +2368,21 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_skb_classify_flow);
int security_key_alloc(struct key *key, const struct cred *cred,
unsigned long flags)
{
- return call_int_hook(key_alloc, 0, key, cred, flags);
+ int rc = lsm_key_alloc(key);
+
+ if (unlikely(rc))
+ return rc;
+ rc = call_int_hook(key_alloc, 0, key, cred, flags);
+ if (unlikely(rc))
+ security_key_free(key);
+ return rc;
}
void security_key_free(struct key *key)
{
call_void_hook(key_free, key);
+ kfree(key->security);
+ key->security = NULL;
}
int security_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index f38a6f484613..ee840fecfebb 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -6353,11 +6353,7 @@ static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, const struct cred *cred,
unsigned long flags)
{
const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
- struct key_security_struct *ksec;
-
- ksec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!ksec)
- return -ENOMEM;
+ struct key_security_struct *ksec = selinux_key(k);
tsec = selinux_cred(cred);
if (tsec->keycreate_sid)
@@ -6365,18 +6361,9 @@ static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, const struct cred *cred,
else
ksec->sid = tsec->sid;
- k->security = ksec;
return 0;
}
-static void selinux_key_free(struct key *k)
-{
- struct key_security_struct *ksec = k->security;
-
- k->security = NULL;
- kfree(ksec);
-}
-
static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
const struct cred *cred,
unsigned perm)
@@ -6394,7 +6381,7 @@ static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
sid = cred_sid(cred);
key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
- ksec = key->security;
+ ksec = selinux_key(key);
return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
sid, ksec->sid, SECCLASS_KEY, perm, NULL);
@@ -6402,7 +6389,7 @@ static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
{
- struct key_security_struct *ksec = key->security;
+ struct key_security_struct *ksec = selinux_key(key);
char *context = NULL;
unsigned len;
int rc;
@@ -6627,6 +6614,9 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes selinux_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
.lbs_file = sizeof(struct file_security_struct),
.lbs_inode = sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
.lbs_ipc = sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct),
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
+ .lbs_key = sizeof(struct key_security_struct),
+#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
.lbs_msg_msg = sizeof(struct msg_security_struct),
.lbs_sock = sizeof(struct sk_security_struct),
.lbs_superblock = sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct),
@@ -6842,7 +6832,6 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_alloc, selinux_key_alloc),
- LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_free, selinux_key_free),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_permission, selinux_key_permission),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_getsecurity, selinux_key_getsecurity),
#endif
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
index 29f02b8f8f31..3b78aa4ee98f 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
@@ -194,6 +194,13 @@ static inline struct superblock_security_struct *selinux_superblock(
return superblock->s_security + selinux_blob_sizes.lbs_superblock;
}
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
+static inline struct key_security_struct *selinux_key(const struct key *key)
+{
+ return key->security + selinux_blob_sizes.lbs_key;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
+
static inline struct sk_security_struct *selinux_sock(const struct sock *sock)
{
return sock->sk_security + selinux_blob_sizes.lbs_sock;
diff --git a/security/smack/smack.h b/security/smack/smack.h
index 4ac4bf3310d7..7cc3a3382fee 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack.h
+++ b/security/smack/smack.h
@@ -386,6 +386,13 @@ static inline struct superblock_smack *smack_superblock(
return superblock->s_security + smack_blob_sizes.lbs_superblock;
}
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
+static inline struct smack_known **smack_key(const struct key *key)
+{
+ return key->security + smack_blob_sizes.lbs_key;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
+
/*
* Is the directory transmuting?
*/
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index fd69e1bd841b..e9560b078efe 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -4179,23 +4179,13 @@ static void smack_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *sk,
static int smack_key_alloc(struct key *key, const struct cred *cred,
unsigned long flags)
{
+ struct smack_known **blob = smack_key(key);
struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task(smack_cred(cred));
- key->security = skp;
+ *blob = skp;
return 0;
}
-/**
- * smack_key_free - Clear the key security blob
- * @key: the object
- *
- * Clear the blob pointer
- */
-static void smack_key_free(struct key *key)
-{
- key->security = NULL;
-}
-
/**
* smack_key_permission - Smack access on a key
* @key_ref: gets to the object
@@ -4208,6 +4198,8 @@ static void smack_key_free(struct key *key)
static int smack_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
const struct cred *cred, unsigned perm)
{
+ struct smack_known **blob;
+ struct smack_known *skp;
struct key *keyp;
struct smk_audit_info ad;
struct smack_known *tkp = smk_of_task(smack_cred(cred));
@@ -4227,7 +4219,9 @@ static int smack_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
* If the key hasn't been initialized give it access so that
* it may do so.
*/
- if (keyp->security == NULL)
+ blob = smack_key(keyp);
+ skp = *blob;
+ if (skp == NULL)
return 0;
/*
* This should not occur
@@ -4247,8 +4241,8 @@ static int smack_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
request |= MAY_READ;
if (perm & (KEY_NEED_WRITE | KEY_NEED_LINK | KEY_NEED_SETATTR))
request |= MAY_WRITE;
- rc = smk_access(tkp, keyp->security, request, &ad);
- rc = smk_bu_note("key access", tkp, keyp->security, request, rc);
+ rc = smk_access(tkp, skp, request, &ad);
+ rc = smk_bu_note("key access", tkp, skp, request, rc);
return rc;
}
@@ -4263,11 +4257,12 @@ static int smack_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
*/
static int smack_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
{
- struct smack_known *skp = key->security;
+ struct smack_known **blob = smack_key(key);
+ struct smack_known *skp = *blob;
size_t length;
char *copy;
- if (key->security == NULL) {
+ if (skp == NULL) {
*_buffer = NULL;
return 0;
}
@@ -4550,6 +4545,9 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes smack_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
.lbs_file = sizeof(struct smack_known *),
.lbs_inode = sizeof(struct inode_smack),
.lbs_ipc = sizeof(struct smack_known *),
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
+ .lbs_key = sizeof(struct smack_known *),
+#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
.lbs_msg_msg = sizeof(struct smack_known *),
.lbs_sock = sizeof(struct socket_smack),
.lbs_superblock = sizeof(struct superblock_smack),
@@ -4671,7 +4669,6 @@ static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
/* key management security hooks */
#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_alloc, smack_key_alloc),
- LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_free, smack_key_free),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_permission, smack_key_permission),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_getsecurity, smack_key_getsecurity),
#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
--
2.19.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 20+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 04/58] LSM: Create an lsm_export data structure.
2019-05-31 23:30 [PATCH 00/58] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Casey Schaufler
` (2 preceding siblings ...)
2019-05-31 23:30 ` [PATCH 03/58] LSM: Infrastructure management of the key security blob Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-05-31 23:30 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-05-31 23:30 ` [PATCH 05/58] LSM: Use lsm_export in the inode_getsecid hooks Casey Schaufler
` (12 subsequent siblings)
16 siblings, 0 replies; 20+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-05-31 23:30 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds
When more than one security module is exporting data to
audit and networking sub-systems a single 32 bit integer
is no longer sufficient to represent the data. Add a
structure to be used instead.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
include/linux/security.h | 12 ++++++++++++
1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 49f2685324b0..81f9f79f9a1e 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -76,6 +76,18 @@ enum lsm_event {
LSM_POLICY_CHANGE,
};
+/* Data exported by the security modules */
+struct lsm_export {
+ u32 selinux;
+ u32 smack;
+ u32 apparmor;
+ u32 flags;
+};
+#define LSM_EXPORT_NONE 0x00
+#define LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX 0x01
+#define LSM_EXPORT_SMACK 0x02
+#define LSM_EXPORT_APPARMOR 0x04
+
/* These functions are in security/commoncap.c */
extern int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
int cap, unsigned int opts);
--
2.19.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 20+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 05/58] LSM: Use lsm_export in the inode_getsecid hooks
2019-05-31 23:30 [PATCH 00/58] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Casey Schaufler
` (3 preceding siblings ...)
2019-05-31 23:30 ` [PATCH 04/58] LSM: Create an lsm_export data structure Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-05-31 23:30 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-05-31 23:30 ` [PATCH 06/58] LSM: Use lsm_export in the cred_getsecid hooks Casey Schaufler
` (11 subsequent siblings)
16 siblings, 0 replies; 20+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-05-31 23:30 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds
Convert the inode_getsecid hooks to use the lsm_export
structure instead of a u32 secid. There is some scaffolding
involved that will be removed when security_inode_getsecid()
is updated.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 4 ++--
include/linux/security.h | 5 +++++
security/security.c | 35 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
security/selinux/hooks.c | 21 ++++++++++++++++-----
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 13 +++++++++++--
5 files changed, 68 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index 3fe39abccc8f..09573c55e535 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -425,7 +425,7 @@
* @inode_getsecid:
* Get the secid associated with the node.
* @inode contains a pointer to the inode.
- * @secid contains a pointer to the location where result will be saved.
+ * @data contains a pointer to the location where result will be saved.
* In case of failure, @secid will be set to zero.
* @inode_copy_up:
* A file is about to be copied up from lower layer to upper layer of
@@ -1566,7 +1566,7 @@ union security_list_options {
int flags);
int (*inode_listsecurity)(struct inode *inode, char *buffer,
size_t buffer_size);
- void (*inode_getsecid)(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid);
+ void (*inode_getsecid)(struct inode *inode, struct lsm_export *data);
int (*inode_copy_up)(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new);
int (*inode_copy_up_xattr)(const char *name);
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 81f9f79f9a1e..fb19f41d630b 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -88,6 +88,11 @@ struct lsm_export {
#define LSM_EXPORT_SMACK 0x02
#define LSM_EXPORT_APPARMOR 0x04
+static inline void lsm_export_init(struct lsm_export *l)
+{
+ memset(l, 0, sizeof(*l));
+}
+
/* These functions are in security/commoncap.c */
extern int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
int cap, unsigned int opts);
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index d05f00a40e82..a1f28a5e582b 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -712,6 +712,36 @@ int lsm_superblock_alloc(struct super_block *sb)
RC; \
})
+/**
+ * lsm_export_secid - pull the useful secid out of a lsm_export
+ * @data: the containing data structure
+ * @secid: where to put the one that matters.
+ *
+ * Shim that will disappear when all lsm_export conversions are done.
+ */
+static inline void lsm_export_secid(struct lsm_export *data, u32 *secid)
+{
+ switch (data->flags) {
+ case LSM_EXPORT_NONE:
+ *secid = 0;
+ break;
+ case LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX:
+ *secid = data->selinux;
+ break;
+ case LSM_EXPORT_SMACK:
+ *secid = data->smack;
+ break;
+ case LSM_EXPORT_APPARMOR:
+ *secid = data->apparmor;
+ break;
+ default:
+ pr_warn("%s flags=0x%u - not a valid set\n", __func__,
+ data->flags);
+ *secid = 0;
+ break;
+ }
+}
+
/* Security operations */
int security_binder_set_context_mgr(struct task_struct *mgr)
@@ -1389,7 +1419,10 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_listsecurity);
void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
{
- call_void_hook(inode_getsecid, inode, secid);
+ struct lsm_export data = { .flags = LSM_EXPORT_NONE };
+
+ call_void_hook(inode_getsecid, inode, &data);
+ lsm_export_secid(&data, secid);
}
int security_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new)
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index ee840fecfebb..0e31be22d9bb 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -213,6 +213,15 @@ static void cred_init_security(void)
tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
}
+/*
+ * Set the SELinux secid in an lsm_export structure
+ */
+static inline void selinux_export_secid(struct lsm_export *l, u32 secid)
+{
+ l->selinux = secid;
+ l->flags |= LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX;
+}
+
/*
* get the security ID of a set of credentials
*/
@@ -3316,15 +3325,16 @@ static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t
return len;
}
-static void selinux_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
+static void selinux_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, struct lsm_export *l)
{
struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security_novalidate(inode);
- *secid = isec->sid;
+
+ selinux_export_secid(l, isec->sid);
}
static int selinux_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new)
{
- u32 sid;
+ struct lsm_export l;
struct task_security_struct *tsec;
struct cred *new_creds = *new;
@@ -3336,8 +3346,9 @@ static int selinux_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new)
tsec = selinux_cred(new_creds);
/* Get label from overlay inode and set it in create_sid */
- selinux_inode_getsecid(d_inode(src), &sid);
- tsec->create_sid = sid;
+ lsm_export_init(&l);
+ selinux_inode_getsecid(d_inode(src), &l);
+ tsec->create_sid = l.selinux;
*new = new_creds;
return 0;
}
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index e9560b078efe..5e345122ccb1 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -466,6 +466,15 @@ static int smk_ptrace_rule_check(struct task_struct *tracer,
return rc;
}
+/*
+ * Set the Smack secid in an lsm_export structure
+ */
+static inline void smack_export_secid(struct lsm_export *l, u32 secid)
+{
+ l->smack = secid;
+ l->flags |= LSM_EXPORT_SMACK;
+}
+
/*
* LSM hooks.
* We he, that is fun!
@@ -1481,11 +1490,11 @@ static int smack_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer,
* @inode: inode to extract the info from
* @secid: where result will be saved
*/
-static void smack_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
+static void smack_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, struct lsm_export *l)
{
struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_inode(inode);
- *secid = skp->smk_secid;
+ smack_export_secid(l, skp->smk_secid);
}
/*
--
2.19.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 20+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 06/58] LSM: Use lsm_export in the cred_getsecid hooks
2019-05-31 23:30 [PATCH 00/58] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Casey Schaufler
` (4 preceding siblings ...)
2019-05-31 23:30 ` [PATCH 05/58] LSM: Use lsm_export in the inode_getsecid hooks Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-05-31 23:30 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-05-31 23:30 ` [PATCH 07/58] LSM: Use lsm_export in the ipc_getsecid and task_getsecid hooks Casey Schaufler
` (10 subsequent siblings)
16 siblings, 0 replies; 20+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-05-31 23:30 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds
Convert the cred_getsecid hooks to use the lsm_export
structure instead of a u32 secid. There is some scaffolding
involved that will be removed when security_cred_getsecid()
is updated.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 5 +++--
security/security.c | 6 ++++--
security/selinux/hooks.c | 4 ++--
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 4 ++--
4 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index 09573c55e535..0f9d4174bb6e 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -572,7 +572,8 @@
* Transfer data from original creds to new creds
* @cred_getsecid:
* Retrieve the security identifier of the cred structure @c
- * @c contains the credentials, secid will be placed into @secid.
+ * @c contains the credentials
+ * @l contains a pointer to the location where result will be saved.
* In case of failure, @secid will be set to zero.
* @kernel_act_as:
* Set the credentials for a kernel service to act as (subjective context).
@@ -1596,7 +1597,7 @@ union security_list_options {
int (*cred_prepare)(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
gfp_t gfp);
void (*cred_transfer)(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old);
- void (*cred_getsecid)(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid);
+ void (*cred_getsecid)(const struct cred *c, struct lsm_export *l);
int (*kernel_act_as)(struct cred *new, u32 secid);
int (*kernel_create_files_as)(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode);
int (*kernel_module_request)(char *kmod_name);
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index a1f28a5e582b..ca485a777ca1 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1638,8 +1638,10 @@ void security_transfer_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid)
{
- *secid = 0;
- call_void_hook(cred_getsecid, c, secid);
+ struct lsm_export data = { .flags = LSM_EXPORT_NONE };
+
+ call_void_hook(cred_getsecid, c, &data);
+ lsm_export_secid(&data, secid);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_cred_getsecid);
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 0e31be22d9bb..f97dd414ac8d 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -3764,9 +3764,9 @@ static void selinux_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
*tsec = *old_tsec;
}
-static void selinux_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid)
+static void selinux_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, struct lsm_export *l)
{
- *secid = cred_sid(c);
+ selinux_export_secid(l, cred_sid(c));
}
/*
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 5e345122ccb1..15579bdd7244 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -1980,13 +1980,13 @@ static void smack_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
*
* Sets the secid to contain a u32 version of the smack label.
*/
-static void smack_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *cred, u32 *secid)
+static void smack_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *cred, struct lsm_export *l)
{
struct smack_known *skp;
rcu_read_lock();
skp = smk_of_task(smack_cred(cred));
- *secid = skp->smk_secid;
+ smack_export_secid(l, skp->smk_secid);
rcu_read_unlock();
}
--
2.19.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 20+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 07/58] LSM: Use lsm_export in the ipc_getsecid and task_getsecid hooks
2019-05-31 23:30 [PATCH 00/58] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Casey Schaufler
` (5 preceding siblings ...)
2019-05-31 23:30 ` [PATCH 06/58] LSM: Use lsm_export in the cred_getsecid hooks Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-05-31 23:30 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-05-31 23:30 ` [PATCH 08/58] LSM: Use lsm_export in the kernel_ask_as hooks Casey Schaufler
` (9 subsequent siblings)
16 siblings, 0 replies; 20+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-05-31 23:30 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds
Convert the cred_getsecid and task_getsecid hooks to use the
lsm_export structure instead of a u32 secid. There is some
scaffolding involved that will be removed when
security_ipc_getsecid() and security_task_getsecid() are
updated.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 8 ++++----
security/apparmor/lsm.c | 12 ++++++++++--
security/security.c | 12 ++++++++----
security/selinux/hooks.c | 10 ++++++----
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 8 ++++----
5 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index 0f9d4174bb6e..62783a923136 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -638,7 +638,7 @@
* Return 0 if permission is granted.
* @task_getsecid:
* Retrieve the security identifier of the process @p.
- * @p contains the task_struct for the process and place is into @secid.
+ * @p contains the task_struct for the process and place is into @l.
* In case of failure, @secid will be set to zero.
*
* @task_setnice:
@@ -1094,7 +1094,7 @@
* @ipc_getsecid:
* Get the secid associated with the ipc object.
* @ipcp contains the kernel IPC permission structure.
- * @secid contains a pointer to the location where result will be saved.
+ * @l contains a pointer to the location where result will be saved.
* In case of failure, @secid will be set to zero.
*
* Security hooks for individual messages held in System V IPC message queues
@@ -1610,7 +1610,7 @@ union security_list_options {
int (*task_setpgid)(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid);
int (*task_getpgid)(struct task_struct *p);
int (*task_getsid)(struct task_struct *p);
- void (*task_getsecid)(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid);
+ void (*task_getsecid)(struct task_struct *p, struct lsm_export *l);
int (*task_setnice)(struct task_struct *p, int nice);
int (*task_setioprio)(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio);
int (*task_getioprio)(struct task_struct *p);
@@ -1628,7 +1628,7 @@ union security_list_options {
void (*task_to_inode)(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode);
int (*ipc_permission)(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag);
- void (*ipc_getsecid)(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid);
+ void (*ipc_getsecid)(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, struct lsm_export *l);
int (*msg_msg_alloc_security)(struct msg_msg *msg);
void (*msg_msg_free_security)(struct msg_msg *msg);
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index 2716e7731279..706e5ae09170 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -49,6 +49,14 @@ int apparmor_initialized;
DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct aa_buffers, aa_buffers);
+/*
+ * Set the AppArmor secid in an lsm_export structure
+ */
+static inline void apparmor_export_secid(struct lsm_export *l, u32 secid)
+{
+ l->apparmor = secid;
+ l->flags |= LSM_EXPORT_APPARMOR;
+}
/*
* LSM hook functions
@@ -710,10 +718,10 @@ static void apparmor_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
return;
}
-static void apparmor_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
+static void apparmor_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, struct lsm_export *l)
{
struct aa_label *label = aa_get_task_label(p);
- *secid = label->secid;
+ apparmor_export_secid(l, label->secid);
aa_put_label(label);
}
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index ca485a777ca1..802557ff6f60 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1722,8 +1722,10 @@ int security_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
void security_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
{
- *secid = 0;
- call_void_hook(task_getsecid, p, secid);
+ struct lsm_export data = { .flags = LSM_EXPORT_NONE };
+
+ call_void_hook(task_getsecid, p, &data);
+ lsm_export_secid(&data, secid);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_task_getsecid);
@@ -1805,8 +1807,10 @@ int security_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
{
- *secid = 0;
- call_void_hook(ipc_getsecid, ipcp, secid);
+ struct lsm_export data = { .flags = LSM_EXPORT_NONE };
+
+ call_void_hook(ipc_getsecid, ipcp, &data);
+ lsm_export_secid(&data, secid);
}
int security_msg_msg_alloc(struct msg_msg *msg)
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index f97dd414ac8d..c82108793fb5 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -3911,9 +3911,9 @@ static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
PROCESS__GETSESSION, NULL);
}
-static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
+static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, struct lsm_export *l)
{
- *secid = task_sid(p);
+ selinux_export_secid(l, task_sid(p));
}
static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
@@ -6094,10 +6094,12 @@ static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av);
}
-static void selinux_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
+static void selinux_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp,
+ struct lsm_export *l)
{
struct ipc_security_struct *isec = selinux_ipc(ipcp);
- *secid = isec->sid;
+
+ selinux_export_secid(l, isec->sid);
}
static void selinux_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 15579bdd7244..13ac3045a388 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -2087,11 +2087,11 @@ static int smack_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
*
* Sets the secid to contain a u32 version of the smack label.
*/
-static void smack_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
+static void smack_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, struct lsm_export *l)
{
struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task_struct(p);
- *secid = skp->smk_secid;
+ smack_export_secid(l, skp->smk_secid);
}
/**
@@ -3231,12 +3231,12 @@ static int smack_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipp, short flag)
* @ipp: the object permissions
* @secid: where result will be saved
*/
-static void smack_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipp, u32 *secid)
+static void smack_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipp, struct lsm_export *l)
{
struct smack_known **blob = smack_ipc(ipp);
struct smack_known *iskp = *blob;
- *secid = iskp->smk_secid;
+ smack_export_secid(l, iskp->smk_secid);
}
/**
--
2.19.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 20+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 08/58] LSM: Use lsm_export in the kernel_ask_as hooks
2019-05-31 23:30 [PATCH 00/58] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Casey Schaufler
` (6 preceding siblings ...)
2019-05-31 23:30 ` [PATCH 07/58] LSM: Use lsm_export in the ipc_getsecid and task_getsecid hooks Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-05-31 23:30 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-05-31 23:31 ` [PATCH 09/58] LSM: Use lsm_export in the getpeersec_dgram hooks Casey Schaufler
` (8 subsequent siblings)
16 siblings, 0 replies; 20+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-05-31 23:30 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds
Convert the kernel_ask_as hooks to use the lsm_export
structure instead of a u32 secid. There is some scaffolding
involved that will be removed when security_kernel_ask_as()
is updated.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 4 ++--
security/security.c | 15 ++++++++++++++-
security/selinux/hooks.c | 17 ++++++++++++++---
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 12 +++++++++++-
4 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index 62783a923136..800040050032 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -578,7 +578,7 @@
* @kernel_act_as:
* Set the credentials for a kernel service to act as (subjective context).
* @new points to the credentials to be modified.
- * @secid specifies the security ID to be set
+ * @l specifies the security data to be set
* The current task must be the one that nominated @secid.
* Return 0 if successful.
* @kernel_create_files_as:
@@ -1598,7 +1598,7 @@ union security_list_options {
gfp_t gfp);
void (*cred_transfer)(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old);
void (*cred_getsecid)(const struct cred *c, struct lsm_export *l);
- int (*kernel_act_as)(struct cred *new, u32 secid);
+ int (*kernel_act_as)(struct cred *new, struct lsm_export *l);
int (*kernel_create_files_as)(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode);
int (*kernel_module_request)(char *kmod_name);
int (*kernel_load_data)(enum kernel_load_data_id id);
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 802557ff6f60..3a766755b722 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -742,6 +742,15 @@ static inline void lsm_export_secid(struct lsm_export *data, u32 *secid)
}
}
+static inline void lsm_export_to_all(struct lsm_export *data, u32 secid)
+{
+ data->selinux = secid;
+ data->smack = secid;
+ data->apparmor = secid;
+ data->flags = LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX | LSM_EXPORT_SMACK |
+ LSM_EXPORT_APPARMOR;
+}
+
/* Security operations */
int security_binder_set_context_mgr(struct task_struct *mgr)
@@ -1647,7 +1656,11 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_cred_getsecid);
int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
{
- return call_int_hook(kernel_act_as, 0, new, secid);
+ struct lsm_export data = { .flags = LSM_EXPORT_NONE };
+
+ lsm_export_to_all(&data, secid);
+
+ return call_int_hook(kernel_act_as, 0, new, &data);
}
int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index c82108793fb5..b88a51b6ca41 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -222,6 +222,14 @@ static inline void selinux_export_secid(struct lsm_export *l, u32 secid)
l->flags |= LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX;
}
+static inline void selinux_import_secid(struct lsm_export *l, u32 *secid)
+{
+ if (l->flags & LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX)
+ *secid = l->selinux;
+ else
+ *secid = SECSID_NULL;
+}
+
/*
* get the security ID of a set of credentials
*/
@@ -3773,19 +3781,22 @@ static void selinux_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, struct lsm_export *l)
* set the security data for a kernel service
* - all the creation contexts are set to unlabelled
*/
-static int selinux_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
+static int selinux_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, struct lsm_export *l)
{
struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(new);
+ u32 nsid;
u32 sid = current_sid();
int ret;
+ selinux_import_secid(l, &nsid);
+
ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
- sid, secid,
+ sid, nsid,
SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
KERNEL_SERVICE__USE_AS_OVERRIDE,
NULL);
if (ret == 0) {
- tsec->sid = secid;
+ tsec->sid = nsid;
tsec->create_sid = 0;
tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 13ac3045a388..3b77a0324c3d 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -475,6 +475,14 @@ static inline void smack_export_secid(struct lsm_export *l, u32 secid)
l->flags |= LSM_EXPORT_SMACK;
}
+static inline void smack_import_secid(struct lsm_export *l, u32 *secid)
+{
+ if (l->flags & LSM_EXPORT_SMACK)
+ *secid = l->smack;
+ else
+ *secid = 0;
+}
+
/*
* LSM hooks.
* We he, that is fun!
@@ -1997,10 +2005,12 @@ static void smack_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *cred, struct lsm_export *l)
*
* Set the security data for a kernel service.
*/
-static int smack_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
+static int smack_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, struct lsm_export *l)
{
+ u32 secid;
struct task_smack *new_tsp = smack_cred(new);
+ smack_import_secid(l, &secid);
new_tsp->smk_task = smack_from_secid(secid);
return 0;
}
--
2.19.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 20+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 09/58] LSM: Use lsm_export in the getpeersec_dgram hooks
2019-05-31 23:30 [PATCH 00/58] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Casey Schaufler
` (7 preceding siblings ...)
2019-05-31 23:30 ` [PATCH 08/58] LSM: Use lsm_export in the kernel_ask_as hooks Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-05-31 23:31 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-05-31 23:31 ` [PATCH 10/58] LSM: Use lsm_export in the audit_rule_match hooks Casey Schaufler
` (7 subsequent siblings)
16 siblings, 0 replies; 20+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-05-31 23:31 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds
Convert the getpeersec_dgram hooks to use the lsm_export
structure instead of a u32 secid. There is some scaffolding
involved that will be removed when security_getpeersec_dgram()
is updated.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 5 +++--
security/apparmor/lsm.c | 3 ++-
security/security.c | 13 ++++++++++---
security/selinux/hooks.c | 6 ++++--
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 5 +++--
5 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index 800040050032..bcc628cffe6a 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -881,7 +881,7 @@
* ancillary message type.
* @sock contains the peer socket. May be NULL.
* @skb is the sk_buff for the packet being queried. May be NULL.
- * @secid pointer to store the secid of the packet.
+ * @l is a pointer to a buffer in which to copy the security data
* Return 0 on success, error on failure.
* @sk_alloc_security:
* Allocate and attach a security structure to the sk->sk_security field,
@@ -1702,7 +1702,8 @@ union security_list_options {
char __user *optval,
int __user *optlen, unsigned len);
int (*socket_getpeersec_dgram)(struct socket *sock,
- struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid);
+ struct sk_buff *skb,
+ struct lsm_export *l);
int (*sk_alloc_security)(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority);
void (*sk_free_security)(struct sock *sk);
void (*sk_clone_security)(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk);
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index 706e5ae09170..24b638bd4305 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -1096,7 +1096,8 @@ static int apparmor_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock,
* Sets the netlabel socket state on sk from parent
*/
static int apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
- struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
+ struct sk_buff *skb,
+ struct lsm_export *l)
{
/* TODO: requires secid support */
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 3a766755b722..2f1355d10e0d 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -2145,10 +2145,17 @@ int security_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
optval, optlen, len);
}
-int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
+int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb,
+ u32 *secid)
{
- return call_int_hook(socket_getpeersec_dgram, -ENOPROTOOPT, sock,
- skb, secid);
+ int rc;
+ struct lsm_export data = { .flags = LSM_EXPORT_NONE };
+
+ rc = call_int_hook(socket_getpeersec_dgram, -ENOPROTOOPT, sock, skb,
+ &data);
+
+ lsm_export_secid(&data, secid);
+ return rc;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_socket_getpeersec_dgram);
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index b88a51b6ca41..9db12f6b1221 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -4949,7 +4949,9 @@ static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock,
return err;
}
-static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
+static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
+ struct sk_buff *skb,
+ struct lsm_export *l)
{
u32 peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
u16 family;
@@ -4971,7 +4973,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *
selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_secid);
out:
- *secid = peer_secid;
+ selinux_export_secid(l, peer_secid);
if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL)
return -EINVAL;
return 0;
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 3b77a0324c3d..3e3724bbd6ea 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -3973,7 +3973,8 @@ static int smack_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock,
* Sets the netlabel socket state on sk from parent
*/
static int smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
- struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
+ struct sk_buff *skb,
+ struct lsm_export *l)
{
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
@@ -4024,7 +4025,7 @@ static int smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
#endif
break;
}
- *secid = s;
+ smack_export_secid(l, s);
if (s == 0)
return -EINVAL;
return 0;
--
2.19.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 20+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 10/58] LSM: Use lsm_export in the audit_rule_match hooks
2019-05-31 23:30 [PATCH 00/58] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Casey Schaufler
` (8 preceding siblings ...)
2019-05-31 23:31 ` [PATCH 09/58] LSM: Use lsm_export in the getpeersec_dgram hooks Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-05-31 23:31 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-05-31 23:31 ` [PATCH 11/58] LSM: Use lsm_export in the secid_to_secctx hooks Casey Schaufler
` (6 subsequent siblings)
16 siblings, 0 replies; 20+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-05-31 23:31 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds
Convert the audit_rule_match hooks to use the lsm_export
structure instead of a u32 secid. There is quite a bit of scaffolding
involved that will be removed when security_audit_rule_match()
is updated.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 5 +++--
security/apparmor/audit.c | 4 ++--
security/apparmor/include/audit.h | 2 +-
security/apparmor/include/secid.h | 2 +-
security/apparmor/secid.c | 17 +++++++++++++++--
security/security.c | 7 ++++++-
security/selinux/hooks.c | 17 -----------------
security/selinux/include/audit.h | 5 +++--
security/selinux/include/objsec.h | 17 +++++++++++++++++
security/selinux/ss/services.c | 6 +++++-
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 7 +++++--
11 files changed, 58 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index bcc628cffe6a..01296e4ce474 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -1354,7 +1354,7 @@
* @audit_rule_match:
* Determine if given @secid matches a rule previously approved
* by @audit_rule_known.
- * @secid contains the security id in question.
+ * @l points to the security data in question.
* @field contains the field which relates to current LSM.
* @op contains the operator that will be used for matching.
* @lrule points to the audit rule that will be checked against.
@@ -1778,7 +1778,8 @@ union security_list_options {
int (*audit_rule_init)(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
void **lsmrule);
int (*audit_rule_known)(struct audit_krule *krule);
- int (*audit_rule_match)(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule);
+ int (*audit_rule_match)(struct lsm_export *l, u32 field, u32 op,
+ void *lsmrule);
void (*audit_rule_free)(void *lsmrule);
#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
diff --git a/security/apparmor/audit.c b/security/apparmor/audit.c
index 5a8b9cded4f2..bea59bfad332 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/audit.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/audit.c
@@ -225,13 +225,13 @@ int aa_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *rule)
return 0;
}
-int aa_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule)
+int aa_audit_rule_match(struct lsm_export *l, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule)
{
struct aa_audit_rule *rule = vrule;
struct aa_label *label;
int found = 0;
- label = aa_secid_to_label(sid);
+ label = aa_secid_to_label(l);
if (!label)
return -ENOENT;
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
index ee559bc2acb8..372ba4fada9c 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
@@ -192,6 +192,6 @@ static inline int complain_error(int error)
void aa_audit_rule_free(void *vrule);
int aa_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule);
int aa_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *rule);
-int aa_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule);
+int aa_audit_rule_match(struct lsm_export *l, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule);
#endif /* __AA_AUDIT_H */
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/secid.h b/security/apparmor/include/secid.h
index fa2062711b63..c283c620efe3 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/secid.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/secid.h
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ struct aa_label;
/* secid value that matches any other secid */
#define AA_SECID_WILDCARD 1
-struct aa_label *aa_secid_to_label(u32 secid);
+struct aa_label *aa_secid_to_label(struct lsm_export *l);
int apparmor_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen);
int apparmor_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid);
void apparmor_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen);
diff --git a/security/apparmor/secid.c b/security/apparmor/secid.c
index 05373d9a3d6a..1546c45a2a18 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/secid.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/secid.c
@@ -61,9 +61,12 @@ void aa_secid_update(u32 secid, struct aa_label *label)
*
* see label for inverse aa_label_to_secid
*/
-struct aa_label *aa_secid_to_label(u32 secid)
+struct aa_label *aa_secid_to_label(struct lsm_export *l)
{
struct aa_label *label;
+ u32 secid;
+
+ secid = (l->flags & LSM_EXPORT_APPARMOR) ? l->apparmor : 0;
rcu_read_lock();
label = idr_find(&aa_secids, secid);
@@ -72,12 +75,22 @@ struct aa_label *aa_secid_to_label(u32 secid)
return label;
}
+static inline void aa_import_secid(struct lsm_export *l, u32 secid)
+{
+ l->flags = LSM_EXPORT_APPARMOR;
+ l->apparmor = secid;
+}
+
int apparmor_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
{
/* TODO: cache secctx and ref count so we don't have to recreate */
- struct aa_label *label = aa_secid_to_label(secid);
+ struct lsm_export data;
+ struct aa_label *label;
int len;
+ aa_import_secid(&data, secid);
+ label = aa_secid_to_label(&data);
+
AA_BUG(!seclen);
if (!label)
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 2f1355d10e0d..60dd064c0531 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -2477,7 +2477,12 @@ void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule)
{
- return call_int_hook(audit_rule_match, 0, secid, field, op, lsmrule);
+ int rc;
+ struct lsm_export data = { .flags = LSM_EXPORT_NONE };
+
+ rc = call_int_hook(audit_rule_match, 0, &data, field, op, lsmrule);
+ lsm_export_secid(&data, &secid);
+ return rc;
}
#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 9db12f6b1221..bfd0f1f5979f 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -213,23 +213,6 @@ static void cred_init_security(void)
tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
}
-/*
- * Set the SELinux secid in an lsm_export structure
- */
-static inline void selinux_export_secid(struct lsm_export *l, u32 secid)
-{
- l->selinux = secid;
- l->flags |= LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX;
-}
-
-static inline void selinux_import_secid(struct lsm_export *l, u32 *secid)
-{
- if (l->flags & LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX)
- *secid = l->selinux;
- else
- *secid = SECSID_NULL;
-}
-
/*
* get the security ID of a set of credentials
*/
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/audit.h b/security/selinux/include/audit.h
index 682e2b5de2a4..92dd5ab15fb2 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/audit.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/audit.h
@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ void selinux_audit_rule_free(void *rule);
/**
* selinux_audit_rule_match - determine if a context ID matches a rule.
- * @sid: the context ID to check
+ * @l: points to the context ID to check
* @field: the field this rule refers to
* @op: the operater the rule uses
* @rule: pointer to the audit rule to check against
@@ -47,7 +47,8 @@ void selinux_audit_rule_free(void *rule);
* Returns 1 if the context id matches the rule, 0 if it does not, and
* -errno on failure.
*/
-int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *rule);
+int selinux_audit_rule_match(struct lsm_export *l, u32 field, u32 op,
+ void *rule);
/**
* selinux_audit_rule_known - check to see if rule contains selinux fields.
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
index 3b78aa4ee98f..59a3b1cd5ba9 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
@@ -50,6 +50,23 @@ static inline u32 current_sid(void)
return tsec->sid;
}
+/*
+ * Set the SELinux secid in an lsm_export structure
+ */
+static inline void selinux_export_secid(struct lsm_export *l, u32 secid)
+{
+ l->selinux = secid;
+ l->flags |= LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX;
+}
+
+static inline void selinux_import_secid(struct lsm_export *l, u32 *secid)
+{
+ if (l->flags & LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX)
+ *secid = l->selinux;
+ else
+ *secid = SECSID_NULL;
+}
+
enum label_initialized {
LABEL_INVALID, /* invalid or not initialized */
LABEL_INITIALIZED, /* initialized */
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index e3f5d6aece66..626b877363fb 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -3395,13 +3395,15 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *rule)
return 0;
}
-int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule)
+int selinux_audit_rule_match(struct lsm_export *l, u32 field, u32 op,
+ void *vrule)
{
struct selinux_state *state = &selinux_state;
struct context *ctxt;
struct mls_level *level;
struct selinux_audit_rule *rule = vrule;
int match = 0;
+ u32 sid;
if (unlikely(!rule)) {
WARN_ONCE(1, "selinux_audit_rule_match: missing rule\n");
@@ -3415,6 +3417,8 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule)
goto out;
}
+ selinux_import_secid(l, &sid);
+
ctxt = sidtab_search(state->ss->sidtab, sid);
if (unlikely(!ctxt)) {
WARN_ONCE(1, "selinux_audit_rule_match: unrecognized SID %d\n",
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 3e3724bbd6ea..a3776501965d 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -4369,7 +4369,7 @@ static int smack_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule)
/**
* smack_audit_rule_match - Audit given object ?
- * @secid: security id for identifying the object to test
+ * @l: security id for identifying the object to test
* @field: audit rule flags given from user-space
* @op: required testing operator
* @vrule: smack internal rule presentation
@@ -4377,10 +4377,12 @@ static int smack_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule)
* The core Audit hook. It's used to take the decision of
* whether to audit or not to audit a given object.
*/
-static int smack_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule)
+static int smack_audit_rule_match(struct lsm_export *l, u32 field, u32 op,
+ void *vrule)
{
struct smack_known *skp;
char *rule = vrule;
+ u32 secid;
if (unlikely(!rule)) {
WARN_ONCE(1, "Smack: missing rule\n");
@@ -4390,6 +4392,7 @@ static int smack_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule)
if (field != AUDIT_SUBJ_USER && field != AUDIT_OBJ_USER)
return 0;
+ smack_import_secid(l, &secid);
skp = smack_from_secid(secid);
/*
--
2.19.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 20+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 11/58] LSM: Use lsm_export in the secid_to_secctx hooks
2019-05-31 23:30 [PATCH 00/58] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Casey Schaufler
` (9 preceding siblings ...)
2019-05-31 23:31 ` [PATCH 10/58] LSM: Use lsm_export in the audit_rule_match hooks Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-05-31 23:31 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-05-31 23:31 ` [PATCH 12/58] LSM: Use lsm_export in the secctx_to_secid hooks Casey Schaufler
` (5 subsequent siblings)
16 siblings, 0 replies; 20+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-05-31 23:31 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds
Convert the secid_to_secctx hooks to use the lsm_export
structure instead of a u32 secid. There is some scaffolding
involved that will be removed when security_secid_to_secctx()
is updated.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 5 +++--
security/apparmor/include/secid.h | 2 +-
security/apparmor/secid.c | 6 ++----
security/security.c | 5 ++++-
security/selinux/hooks.c | 6 +++++-
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 9 +++++++--
6 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index 01296e4ce474..433d98dcb928 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -1319,7 +1319,7 @@
* This does mean that the length could change between calls to check the
* length and the next call which actually allocates and returns the
* secdata.
- * @secid contains the security ID.
+ * @l points to the security information.
* @secdata contains the pointer that stores the converted security
* context.
* @seclen pointer which contains the length of the data
@@ -1664,7 +1664,8 @@ union security_list_options {
int (*getprocattr)(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value);
int (*setprocattr)(const char *name, void *value, size_t size);
int (*ismaclabel)(const char *name);
- int (*secid_to_secctx)(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen);
+ int (*secid_to_secctx)(struct lsm_export *l, char **secdata,
+ u32 *seclen);
int (*secctx_to_secid)(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid);
void (*release_secctx)(char *secdata, u32 seclen);
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/secid.h b/security/apparmor/include/secid.h
index c283c620efe3..03369183f512 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/secid.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/secid.h
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ struct aa_label;
#define AA_SECID_WILDCARD 1
struct aa_label *aa_secid_to_label(struct lsm_export *l);
-int apparmor_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen);
+int apparmor_secid_to_secctx(struct lsm_export *l, char **secdata, u32 *seclen);
int apparmor_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid);
void apparmor_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen);
diff --git a/security/apparmor/secid.c b/security/apparmor/secid.c
index 1546c45a2a18..ab4dc165e43e 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/secid.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/secid.c
@@ -81,15 +81,13 @@ static inline void aa_import_secid(struct lsm_export *l, u32 secid)
l->apparmor = secid;
}
-int apparmor_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
+int apparmor_secid_to_secctx(struct lsm_export *l, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
{
/* TODO: cache secctx and ref count so we don't have to recreate */
- struct lsm_export data;
struct aa_label *label;
int len;
- aa_import_secid(&data, secid);
- label = aa_secid_to_label(&data);
+ label = aa_secid_to_label(l);
AA_BUG(!seclen);
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 60dd064c0531..adf4cb768665 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -2002,7 +2002,10 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ismaclabel);
int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
{
- return call_int_hook(secid_to_secctx, -EOPNOTSUPP, secid, secdata,
+ struct lsm_export data;
+
+ lsm_export_to_all(&data, secid);
+ return call_int_hook(secid_to_secctx, -EOPNOTSUPP, &data, secdata,
seclen);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secid_to_secctx);
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index bfd0f1f5979f..16d902158e8a 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -6301,8 +6301,12 @@ static int selinux_ismaclabel(const char *name)
return (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX) == 0);
}
-static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
+static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(struct lsm_export *l, char **secdata,
+ u32 *seclen)
{
+ u32 secid;
+
+ selinux_import_secid(l, &secid);
return security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, secid,
secdata, seclen);
}
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index a3776501965d..809af981f14c 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -4433,9 +4433,14 @@ static int smack_ismaclabel(const char *name)
*
* Exists for networking code.
*/
-static int smack_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
+static int smack_secid_to_secctx(struct lsm_export *l, char **secdata,
+ u32 *seclen)
{
- struct smack_known *skp = smack_from_secid(secid);
+ struct smack_known *skp;
+ u32 secid;
+
+ smack_import_secid(l, &secid);
+ skp = smack_from_secid(secid);
if (secdata)
*secdata = skp->smk_known;
--
2.19.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 20+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 12/58] LSM: Use lsm_export in the secctx_to_secid hooks
2019-05-31 23:30 [PATCH 00/58] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Casey Schaufler
` (10 preceding siblings ...)
2019-05-31 23:31 ` [PATCH 11/58] LSM: Use lsm_export in the secid_to_secctx hooks Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-05-31 23:31 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-05-31 23:31 ` [PATCH 13/58] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_audit_rule_match Casey Schaufler
` (4 subsequent siblings)
16 siblings, 0 replies; 20+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-05-31 23:31 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds
Convert the secctx_to_secid hooks to use the lsm_export
structure instead of a u32 secid. There is some scaffolding
involved that will be removed when security_secctx_to_secid()
is updated.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 7 ++++---
security/apparmor/include/secid.h | 3 ++-
security/apparmor/secid.c | 9 +++++----
security/security.c | 8 ++++++--
security/selinux/hooks.c | 12 +++++++++---
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 7 ++++---
6 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index 433d98dcb928..0837c214cc17 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -1324,8 +1324,8 @@
* context.
* @seclen pointer which contains the length of the data
* @secctx_to_secid:
- * Convert security context to secid.
- * @secid contains the pointer to the generated security ID.
+ * Convert security context to exported lsm data.
+ * @l contains the pointer to the generated security data.
* @secdata contains the security context.
*
* @release_secctx:
@@ -1666,7 +1666,8 @@ union security_list_options {
int (*ismaclabel)(const char *name);
int (*secid_to_secctx)(struct lsm_export *l, char **secdata,
u32 *seclen);
- int (*secctx_to_secid)(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid);
+ int (*secctx_to_secid)(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
+ struct lsm_export *l);
void (*release_secctx)(char *secdata, u32 seclen);
void (*inode_invalidate_secctx)(struct inode *inode);
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/secid.h b/security/apparmor/include/secid.h
index 03369183f512..5381eff03d4f 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/secid.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/secid.h
@@ -27,7 +27,8 @@ struct aa_label;
struct aa_label *aa_secid_to_label(struct lsm_export *l);
int apparmor_secid_to_secctx(struct lsm_export *l, char **secdata, u32 *seclen);
-int apparmor_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid);
+int apparmor_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
+ struct lsm_export *l);
void apparmor_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen);
diff --git a/security/apparmor/secid.c b/security/apparmor/secid.c
index ab4dc165e43e..69d98a89db75 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/secid.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/secid.c
@@ -75,9 +75,9 @@ struct aa_label *aa_secid_to_label(struct lsm_export *l)
return label;
}
-static inline void aa_import_secid(struct lsm_export *l, u32 secid)
+static inline void aa_export_secid(struct lsm_export *l, u32 secid)
{
- l->flags = LSM_EXPORT_APPARMOR;
+ l->flags |= LSM_EXPORT_APPARMOR;
l->apparmor = secid;
}
@@ -111,7 +111,8 @@ int apparmor_secid_to_secctx(struct lsm_export *l, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
return 0;
}
-int apparmor_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
+int apparmor_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
+ struct lsm_export *l)
{
struct aa_label *label;
@@ -119,7 +120,7 @@ int apparmor_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
seclen, GFP_KERNEL, false, false);
if (IS_ERR(label))
return PTR_ERR(label);
- *secid = label->secid;
+ aa_export_secid(l, label->secid);
return 0;
}
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index adf4cb768665..1645ebe06715 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -2012,8 +2012,12 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secid_to_secctx);
int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
{
- *secid = 0;
- return call_int_hook(secctx_to_secid, 0, secdata, seclen, secid);
+ struct lsm_export data = { .flags = LSM_EXPORT_NONE };
+ int rc;
+
+ rc = call_int_hook(secctx_to_secid, 0, secdata, seclen, &data);
+ lsm_export_secid(&data, secid);
+ return rc;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secctx_to_secid);
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 16d902158e8a..7dd333f133db 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -6311,10 +6311,16 @@ static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(struct lsm_export *l, char **secdata,
secdata, seclen);
}
-static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
+static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
+ struct lsm_export *l)
{
- return security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state, secdata, seclen,
- secid, GFP_KERNEL);
+ u32 secid;
+ int rc;
+
+ rc = security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state, secdata, seclen,
+ &secid, GFP_KERNEL);
+ selinux_export_secid(l, secid);
+ return rc;
}
static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 809af981f14c..ecd636e5c75c 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -4456,14 +4456,15 @@ static int smack_secid_to_secctx(struct lsm_export *l, char **secdata,
*
* Exists for audit and networking code.
*/
-static int smack_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
+static int smack_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
+ struct lsm_export *l)
{
struct smack_known *skp = smk_find_entry(secdata);
if (skp)
- *secid = skp->smk_secid;
+ smack_export_secid(l, skp->smk_secid);
else
- *secid = 0;
+ smack_export_secid(l, 0);
return 0;
}
--
2.19.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 20+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 13/58] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_audit_rule_match
2019-05-31 23:30 [PATCH 00/58] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Casey Schaufler
` (11 preceding siblings ...)
2019-05-31 23:31 ` [PATCH 12/58] LSM: Use lsm_export in the secctx_to_secid hooks Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-05-31 23:31 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-05-31 23:31 ` [PATCH 14/58] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_kernel_act_as Casey Schaufler
` (3 subsequent siblings)
16 siblings, 0 replies; 20+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-05-31 23:31 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds
Convert security_audit_rule_match to use the lsm_export structure
instead of a u32 secid. There is some scaffolding involved that
will be removed when the related data is updated.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
include/linux/security.h | 46 +++++++++++++++++++++++++--
kernel/auditfilter.c | 4 ++-
kernel/auditsc.c | 13 +++++---
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 7 +++--
security/security.c | 48 ++---------------------------
5 files changed, 63 insertions(+), 55 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index fb19f41d630b..ea2c6c4e88db 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -93,6 +93,45 @@ static inline void lsm_export_init(struct lsm_export *l)
memset(l, 0, sizeof(*l));
}
+/**
+ * lsm_export_secid - pull the useful secid out of a lsm_export
+ * @data: the containing data structure
+ * @secid: where to put the one that matters.
+ *
+ * Shim that will disappear when all lsm_export conversions are done.
+ */
+static inline void lsm_export_secid(struct lsm_export *data, u32 *secid)
+{
+ switch (data->flags) {
+ case LSM_EXPORT_NONE:
+ *secid = 0;
+ break;
+ case LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX:
+ *secid = data->selinux;
+ break;
+ case LSM_EXPORT_SMACK:
+ *secid = data->smack;
+ break;
+ case LSM_EXPORT_APPARMOR:
+ *secid = data->apparmor;
+ break;
+ default:
+ pr_warn("%s flags=0x%u - not a valid set\n", __func__,
+ data->flags);
+ *secid = 0;
+ break;
+ }
+}
+
+static inline void lsm_export_to_all(struct lsm_export *data, u32 secid)
+{
+ data->selinux = secid;
+ data->smack = secid;
+ data->apparmor = secid;
+ data->flags = LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX | LSM_EXPORT_SMACK |
+ LSM_EXPORT_APPARMOR;
+}
+
/* These functions are in security/commoncap.c */
extern int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
int cap, unsigned int opts);
@@ -1712,7 +1751,8 @@ static inline int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule);
int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule);
-int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule);
+int security_audit_rule_match(struct lsm_export *l, u32 field, u32 op,
+ void *lsmrule);
void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule);
#else
@@ -1728,8 +1768,8 @@ static inline int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule)
return 0;
}
-static inline int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
- void *lsmrule)
+static inline int security_audit_rule_match(struct lsm_export *l, u32 field,
+ u32 op, void *lsmrule)
{
return 0;
}
diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c
index 63f8b3f26fab..15771102919d 100644
--- a/kernel/auditfilter.c
+++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c
@@ -1324,6 +1324,7 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)
struct audit_field *f = &e->rule.fields[i];
pid_t pid;
u32 sid;
+ struct lsm_export le;
switch (f->type) {
case AUDIT_PID:
@@ -1354,7 +1355,8 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)
case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
if (f->lsm_rule) {
security_task_getsecid(current, &sid);
- result = security_audit_rule_match(sid,
+ lsm_export_to_all(&le, sid);
+ result = security_audit_rule_match(&le,
f->type, f->op, f->lsm_rule);
}
break;
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index d1eab1d4a930..822ba35e4e64 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -445,6 +445,7 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
const struct cred *cred;
int i, need_sid = 1;
u32 sid;
+ struct lsm_export le;
unsigned int sessionid;
cred = rcu_dereference_check(tsk->cred, tsk == current || task_creation);
@@ -630,7 +631,8 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
security_task_getsecid(tsk, &sid);
need_sid = 0;
}
- result = security_audit_rule_match(sid, f->type,
+ lsm_export_to_all(&le, sid);
+ result = security_audit_rule_match(&le, f->type,
f->op,
f->lsm_rule);
}
@@ -645,15 +647,17 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
if (f->lsm_rule) {
/* Find files that match */
if (name) {
+ lsm_export_to_all(&le, name->osid);
result = security_audit_rule_match(
- name->osid,
+ &le,
f->type,
f->op,
f->lsm_rule);
} else if (ctx) {
list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
+ lsm_export_to_all(&le, n->osid);
if (security_audit_rule_match(
- n->osid,
+ &le,
f->type,
f->op,
f->lsm_rule)) {
@@ -665,7 +669,8 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
/* Find ipc objects that match */
if (!ctx || ctx->type != AUDIT_IPC)
break;
- if (security_audit_rule_match(ctx->ipc.osid,
+ lsm_export_to_all(&le, ctx->ipc.osid);
+ if (security_audit_rule_match(&le,
f->type, f->op,
f->lsm_rule))
++result;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index e0cc323f948f..090ef8ceb116 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -327,6 +327,7 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,
for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) {
int rc = 0;
u32 osid;
+ struct lsm_export le;
int retried = 0;
if (!rule->lsm[i].rule)
@@ -337,7 +338,8 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,
case LSM_OBJ_ROLE:
case LSM_OBJ_TYPE:
security_inode_getsecid(inode, &osid);
- rc = security_filter_rule_match(osid,
+ lsm_export_to_all(&le, osid);
+ rc = security_filter_rule_match(&le,
rule->lsm[i].type,
Audit_equal,
rule->lsm[i].rule);
@@ -345,7 +347,8 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,
case LSM_SUBJ_USER:
case LSM_SUBJ_ROLE:
case LSM_SUBJ_TYPE:
- rc = security_filter_rule_match(secid,
+ lsm_export_to_all(&le, secid);
+ rc = security_filter_rule_match(&le,
rule->lsm[i].type,
Audit_equal,
rule->lsm[i].rule);
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 1645ebe06715..1e819ecf26ff 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -712,45 +712,6 @@ int lsm_superblock_alloc(struct super_block *sb)
RC; \
})
-/**
- * lsm_export_secid - pull the useful secid out of a lsm_export
- * @data: the containing data structure
- * @secid: where to put the one that matters.
- *
- * Shim that will disappear when all lsm_export conversions are done.
- */
-static inline void lsm_export_secid(struct lsm_export *data, u32 *secid)
-{
- switch (data->flags) {
- case LSM_EXPORT_NONE:
- *secid = 0;
- break;
- case LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX:
- *secid = data->selinux;
- break;
- case LSM_EXPORT_SMACK:
- *secid = data->smack;
- break;
- case LSM_EXPORT_APPARMOR:
- *secid = data->apparmor;
- break;
- default:
- pr_warn("%s flags=0x%u - not a valid set\n", __func__,
- data->flags);
- *secid = 0;
- break;
- }
-}
-
-static inline void lsm_export_to_all(struct lsm_export *data, u32 secid)
-{
- data->selinux = secid;
- data->smack = secid;
- data->apparmor = secid;
- data->flags = LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX | LSM_EXPORT_SMACK |
- LSM_EXPORT_APPARMOR;
-}
-
/* Security operations */
int security_binder_set_context_mgr(struct task_struct *mgr)
@@ -2482,14 +2443,11 @@ void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
call_void_hook(audit_rule_free, lsmrule);
}
-int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule)
+int security_audit_rule_match(struct lsm_export *l, u32 field, u32 op,
+ void *lsmrule)
{
- int rc;
- struct lsm_export data = { .flags = LSM_EXPORT_NONE };
- rc = call_int_hook(audit_rule_match, 0, &data, field, op, lsmrule);
- lsm_export_secid(&data, &secid);
- return rc;
+ return call_int_hook(audit_rule_match, 0, l, field, op, lsmrule);
}
#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
--
2.19.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 20+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 14/58] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_kernel_act_as
2019-05-31 23:30 [PATCH 00/58] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Casey Schaufler
` (12 preceding siblings ...)
2019-05-31 23:31 ` [PATCH 13/58] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_audit_rule_match Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-05-31 23:31 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-05-31 23:31 ` [PATCH 15/58] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_socket_getpeersec_dgram Casey Schaufler
` (2 subsequent siblings)
16 siblings, 0 replies; 20+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-05-31 23:31 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds
From: Casey Schaufler <cschaufler@schaufler-ca.com>
Convert security_kernel_act_as to use the lsm_export structure
instead of a u32 secid. There is some scaffolding involved
that will be removed when the related data is updated.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
include/linux/cred.h | 3 ++-
include/linux/security.h | 5 +++--
kernel/cred.c | 10 ++++++----
security/security.c | 8 ++------
4 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/cred.h b/include/linux/cred.h
index efb6edf32de7..9305298eca17 100644
--- a/include/linux/cred.h
+++ b/include/linux/cred.h
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
struct cred;
struct inode;
+struct lsm_export;
/*
* COW Supplementary groups list
@@ -165,7 +166,7 @@ extern const struct cred *override_creds(const struct cred *);
extern void revert_creds(const struct cred *);
extern struct cred *prepare_kernel_cred(struct task_struct *);
extern int change_create_files_as(struct cred *, struct inode *);
-extern int set_security_override(struct cred *, u32);
+extern int set_security_override(struct cred *, struct lsm_export *);
extern int set_security_override_from_ctx(struct cred *, const char *);
extern int set_create_files_as(struct cred *, struct inode *);
extern int cred_fscmp(const struct cred *, const struct cred *);
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index ea2c6c4e88db..7369cdc3a681 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -378,7 +378,7 @@ void security_cred_free(struct cred *cred);
int security_prepare_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, gfp_t gfp);
void security_transfer_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old);
void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid);
-int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid);
+int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, struct lsm_export *l);
int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode);
int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name);
int security_kernel_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id);
@@ -961,7 +961,8 @@ static inline void security_transfer_creds(struct cred *new,
{
}
-static inline int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *cred, u32 secid)
+static inline int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *cred,
+ struct lsm_export *l)
{
return 0;
}
diff --git a/kernel/cred.c b/kernel/cred.c
index 45d77284aed0..40a3fde22667 100644
--- a/kernel/cred.c
+++ b/kernel/cred.c
@@ -701,14 +701,14 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(prepare_kernel_cred);
/**
* set_security_override - Set the security ID in a set of credentials
* @new: The credentials to alter
- * @secid: The LSM security ID to set
+ * @l: The LSM security information to set
*
* Set the LSM security ID in a set of credentials so that the subjective
* security is overridden when an alternative set of credentials is used.
*/
-int set_security_override(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
+int set_security_override(struct cred *new, struct lsm_export *l)
{
- return security_kernel_act_as(new, secid);
+ return security_kernel_act_as(new, l);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_security_override);
@@ -724,6 +724,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_security_override);
*/
int set_security_override_from_ctx(struct cred *new, const char *secctx)
{
+ struct lsm_export le;
u32 secid;
int ret;
@@ -731,7 +732,8 @@ int set_security_override_from_ctx(struct cred *new, const char *secctx)
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
- return set_security_override(new, secid);
+ lsm_export_to_all(&le, secid);
+ return set_security_override(new, &le);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_security_override_from_ctx);
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 1e819ecf26ff..edaaaef54239 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1615,13 +1615,9 @@ void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_cred_getsecid);
-int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
+int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, struct lsm_export *l)
{
- struct lsm_export data = { .flags = LSM_EXPORT_NONE };
-
- lsm_export_to_all(&data, secid);
-
- return call_int_hook(kernel_act_as, 0, new, &data);
+ return call_int_hook(kernel_act_as, 0, new, l);
}
int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
--
2.19.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 20+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 15/58] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_socket_getpeersec_dgram
2019-05-31 23:30 [PATCH 00/58] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Casey Schaufler
` (13 preceding siblings ...)
2019-05-31 23:31 ` [PATCH 14/58] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_kernel_act_as Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-05-31 23:31 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-05-31 23:31 ` [PATCH 16/58] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_secctx_to_secid Casey Schaufler
2019-05-31 23:31 ` [PATCH 17/58] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_secid_to_secctx Casey Schaufler
16 siblings, 0 replies; 20+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-05-31 23:31 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds
Convert security_socket_getpeersec_dgram to use the lsm_export structure
instead of a u32 secid. There is some scaffolding involved
that will be removed when the related data is updated.
In particular, the le entry in scm_cookie includes the secid
data. The secid will go away.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
include/linux/security.h | 7 +++++--
include/net/scm.h | 4 +++-
net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c | 4 +++-
security/security.c | 13 ++++---------
4 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 7369cdc3a681..e3f5c61b9b2c 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -1270,7 +1270,8 @@ int security_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how);
int security_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
int security_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
int __user *optlen, unsigned len);
-int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid);
+int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb,
+ struct lsm_export *l);
int security_sk_alloc(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority);
void security_sk_free(struct sock *sk);
void security_sk_clone(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk);
@@ -1408,7 +1409,9 @@ static inline int security_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __
return -ENOPROTOOPT;
}
-static inline int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
+static inline int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
+ struct sk_buff *skb,
+ struct lsm_export *l)
{
return -ENOPROTOOPT;
}
diff --git a/include/net/scm.h b/include/net/scm.h
index 1ce365f4c256..13b8a369fd89 100644
--- a/include/net/scm.h
+++ b/include/net/scm.h
@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ struct scm_cookie {
struct scm_creds creds; /* Skb credentials */
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
u32 secid; /* Passed security ID */
+ struct lsm_export le; /* Passed LSM data */
#endif
};
@@ -46,7 +47,8 @@ struct scm_fp_list *scm_fp_dup(struct scm_fp_list *fpl);
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
static __inline__ void unix_get_peersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct scm_cookie *scm)
{
- security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(sock, NULL, &scm->secid);
+ security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(sock, NULL, &scm->le);
+ lsm_export_secid(&scm->le, &scm->secid);
}
#else
static __inline__ void unix_get_peersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct scm_cookie *scm)
diff --git a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
index 82f341e84fae..b8ef7677a7e5 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
@@ -130,14 +130,16 @@ static void ip_cmsg_recv_checksum(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb,
static void ip_cmsg_recv_security(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
+ struct lsm_export le;
char *secdata;
u32 seclen, secid;
int err;
- err = security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(NULL, skb, &secid);
+ err = security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(NULL, skb, &le);
if (err)
return;
+ lsm_export_secid(&le, &secid);
err = security_secid_to_secctx(secid, &secdata, &seclen);
if (err)
return;
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index edaaaef54239..d8300a6400c3 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -2110,16 +2110,11 @@ int security_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
}
int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb,
- u32 *secid)
+ struct lsm_export *l)
{
- int rc;
- struct lsm_export data = { .flags = LSM_EXPORT_NONE };
-
- rc = call_int_hook(socket_getpeersec_dgram, -ENOPROTOOPT, sock, skb,
- &data);
-
- lsm_export_secid(&data, secid);
- return rc;
+ lsm_export_init(l);
+ return call_int_hook(socket_getpeersec_dgram, -ENOPROTOOPT, sock, skb,
+ l);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_socket_getpeersec_dgram);
--
2.19.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 20+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 16/58] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_secctx_to_secid
2019-05-31 23:30 [PATCH 00/58] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Casey Schaufler
` (14 preceding siblings ...)
2019-05-31 23:31 ` [PATCH 15/58] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_socket_getpeersec_dgram Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-05-31 23:31 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-05-31 23:31 ` [PATCH 17/58] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_secid_to_secctx Casey Schaufler
16 siblings, 0 replies; 20+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-05-31 23:31 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds
Convert security_secctx_to_secid to use the lsm_export structure
instead of a u32 secid. There is some scaffolding involved
that will be removed when the related data is updated.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
include/linux/security.h | 5 +++--
kernel/cred.c | 4 +---
net/netfilter/nft_meta.c | 4 +++-
net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c | 5 +++--
net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 8 ++++++--
security/security.c | 11 ++++-------
6 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index e3f5c61b9b2c..991d2d2e290e 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -437,7 +437,8 @@ int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value,
int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
int security_ismaclabel(const char *name);
int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen);
-int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid);
+int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
+ struct lsm_export *l);
void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen);
void security_inode_invalidate_secctx(struct inode *inode);
@@ -1220,7 +1221,7 @@ static inline int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *secle
static inline int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata,
u32 seclen,
- u32 *secid)
+ struct lsm_export *l)
{
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
diff --git a/kernel/cred.c b/kernel/cred.c
index 40a3fde22667..7792538b1ca6 100644
--- a/kernel/cred.c
+++ b/kernel/cred.c
@@ -725,14 +725,12 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_security_override);
int set_security_override_from_ctx(struct cred *new, const char *secctx)
{
struct lsm_export le;
- u32 secid;
int ret;
- ret = security_secctx_to_secid(secctx, strlen(secctx), &secid);
+ ret = security_secctx_to_secid(secctx, strlen(secctx), &le);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
- lsm_export_to_all(&le, secid);
return set_security_override(new, &le);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_security_override_from_ctx);
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nft_meta.c b/net/netfilter/nft_meta.c
index 987d2d6ce624..598bea8e4799 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nft_meta.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nft_meta.c
@@ -576,13 +576,15 @@ static const struct nla_policy nft_secmark_policy[NFTA_SECMARK_MAX + 1] = {
static int nft_secmark_compute_secid(struct nft_secmark *priv)
{
+ struct lsm_export le;
u32 tmp_secid = 0;
int err;
- err = security_secctx_to_secid(priv->ctx, strlen(priv->ctx), &tmp_secid);
+ err = security_secctx_to_secid(priv->ctx, strlen(priv->ctx), &le);
if (err)
return err;
+ lsm_export_secid(&le, &tmp_secid);
if (!tmp_secid)
return -ENOENT;
diff --git a/net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c b/net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c
index f16202d26c20..2def8d8898e6 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c
@@ -49,13 +49,13 @@ secmark_tg(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct xt_action_param *par)
static int checkentry_lsm(struct xt_secmark_target_info *info)
{
+ struct lsm_export le;
int err;
info->secctx[SECMARK_SECCTX_MAX - 1] = '\0';
info->secid = 0;
- err = security_secctx_to_secid(info->secctx, strlen(info->secctx),
- &info->secid);
+ err = security_secctx_to_secid(info->secctx, strlen(info->secctx), &le);
if (err) {
if (err == -EINVAL)
pr_info_ratelimited("invalid security context \'%s\'\n",
@@ -63,6 +63,7 @@ static int checkentry_lsm(struct xt_secmark_target_info *info)
return err;
}
+ lsm_export_secid(&le, &info->secid);
if (!info->secid) {
pr_info_ratelimited("unable to map security context \'%s\'\n",
info->secctx);
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
index c92894c3e40a..fc38934ccb35 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
@@ -896,6 +896,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticadd(struct sk_buff *skb,
void *mask;
u32 addr_len;
u32 secid;
+ struct lsm_export le;
struct netlbl_audit audit_info;
/* Don't allow users to add both IPv4 and IPv6 addresses for a
@@ -919,10 +920,11 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticadd(struct sk_buff *skb,
ret_val = security_secctx_to_secid(
nla_data(info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX]),
nla_len(info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX]),
- &secid);
+ &le);
if (ret_val != 0)
return ret_val;
+ lsm_export_secid(&le, &secid);
return netlbl_unlhsh_add(&init_net,
dev_name, addr, mask, addr_len, secid,
&audit_info);
@@ -947,6 +949,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticadddef(struct sk_buff *skb,
void *mask;
u32 addr_len;
u32 secid;
+ struct lsm_export le;
struct netlbl_audit audit_info;
/* Don't allow users to add both IPv4 and IPv6 addresses for a
@@ -968,10 +971,11 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticadddef(struct sk_buff *skb,
ret_val = security_secctx_to_secid(
nla_data(info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX]),
nla_len(info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX]),
- &secid);
+ &le);
if (ret_val != 0)
return ret_val;
+ lsm_export_secid(&le, &secid);
return netlbl_unlhsh_add(&init_net,
NULL, addr, mask, addr_len, secid,
&audit_info);
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index d8300a6400c3..868e9ae6b48c 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1967,14 +1967,11 @@ int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secid_to_secctx);
-int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
+int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
+ struct lsm_export *l)
{
- struct lsm_export data = { .flags = LSM_EXPORT_NONE };
- int rc;
-
- rc = call_int_hook(secctx_to_secid, 0, secdata, seclen, &data);
- lsm_export_secid(&data, secid);
- return rc;
+ lsm_export_init(l);
+ return call_int_hook(secctx_to_secid, 0, secdata, seclen, l);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secctx_to_secid);
--
2.19.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 20+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 17/58] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_secid_to_secctx
2019-05-31 23:30 [PATCH 00/58] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Casey Schaufler
` (15 preceding siblings ...)
2019-05-31 23:31 ` [PATCH 16/58] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_secctx_to_secid Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-05-31 23:31 ` Casey Schaufler
16 siblings, 0 replies; 20+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-05-31 23:31 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds
Convert security_secid_to_secctx to use the lsm_export structure
instead of a u32 secid. There is some scaffolding involved
that will be removed when the related data is updated.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
drivers/android/binder.c | 4 +++-
include/linux/security.h | 9 +++++++--
include/net/scm.h | 4 +---
kernel/audit.c | 9 +++++++--
kernel/auditsc.c | 13 +++++++++----
net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c | 5 ++---
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c | 8 ++++++--
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c | 4 +++-
net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c | 8 ++++++--
net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 18 ++++++++++++++----
net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c | 6 +++---
net/unix/af_unix.c | 9 ++++++---
security/security.c | 8 ++------
13 files changed, 69 insertions(+), 36 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/android/binder.c b/drivers/android/binder.c
index 8685882da64c..9119333f794b 100644
--- a/drivers/android/binder.c
+++ b/drivers/android/binder.c
@@ -3120,9 +3120,11 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
if (target_node && target_node->txn_security_ctx) {
u32 secid;
+ struct lsm_export le;
security_task_getsecid(proc->tsk, &secid);
- ret = security_secid_to_secctx(secid, &secctx, &secctx_sz);
+ lsm_export_to_all(&le, secid);
+ ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&le, &secctx, &secctx_sz);
if (ret) {
return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY;
return_error_param = ret;
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 991d2d2e290e..5cea6260bbd9 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -115,6 +115,10 @@ static inline void lsm_export_secid(struct lsm_export *data, u32 *secid)
case LSM_EXPORT_APPARMOR:
*secid = data->apparmor;
break;
+ case LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX | LSM_EXPORT_SMACK | LSM_EXPORT_APPARMOR:
+ /* For scaffolding only */
+ *secid = data->selinux;
+ break;
default:
pr_warn("%s flags=0x%u - not a valid set\n", __func__,
data->flags);
@@ -436,7 +440,7 @@ int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value,
size_t size);
int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
int security_ismaclabel(const char *name);
-int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen);
+int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsm_export *l, char **secdata, u32 *seclen);
int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
struct lsm_export *l);
void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen);
@@ -1214,7 +1218,8 @@ static inline int security_ismaclabel(const char *name)
return 0;
}
-static inline int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
+static inline int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsm_export *l,
+ char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
{
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
diff --git a/include/net/scm.h b/include/net/scm.h
index 13b8a369fd89..b5d1c24318e3 100644
--- a/include/net/scm.h
+++ b/include/net/scm.h
@@ -33,7 +33,6 @@ struct scm_cookie {
struct scm_fp_list *fp; /* Passed files */
struct scm_creds creds; /* Skb credentials */
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
- u32 secid; /* Passed security ID */
struct lsm_export le; /* Passed LSM data */
#endif
};
@@ -48,7 +47,6 @@ struct scm_fp_list *scm_fp_dup(struct scm_fp_list *fpl);
static __inline__ void unix_get_peersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct scm_cookie *scm)
{
security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(sock, NULL, &scm->le);
- lsm_export_secid(&scm->le, &scm->secid);
}
#else
static __inline__ void unix_get_peersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct scm_cookie *scm)
@@ -99,7 +97,7 @@ static inline void scm_passec(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct sc
int err;
if (test_bit(SOCK_PASSSEC, &sock->flags)) {
- err = security_secid_to_secctx(scm->secid, &secdata, &seclen);
+ err = security_secid_to_secctx(&scm->le, &secdata, &seclen);
if (!err) {
put_cmsg(msg, SOL_SOCKET, SCM_SECURITY, seclen, secdata);
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index c89ea48c70a6..b5d96a0320fb 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -1430,7 +1430,10 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
case AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO:
len = 0;
if (audit_sig_sid) {
- err = security_secid_to_secctx(audit_sig_sid, &ctx, &len);
+ struct lsm_export le;
+
+ lsm_export_to_all(&le, audit_sig_sid);
+ err = security_secid_to_secctx(&le, &ctx, &len);
if (err)
return err;
}
@@ -2073,12 +2076,14 @@ int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
unsigned len;
int error;
u32 sid;
+ struct lsm_export le;
security_task_getsecid(current, &sid);
if (!sid)
return 0;
- error = security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len);
+ lsm_export_to_all(&le, sid);
+ error = security_secid_to_secctx(&le, &ctx, &len);
if (error) {
if (error != -EINVAL)
goto error_path;
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 822ba35e4e64..83aba0336eac 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -946,6 +946,7 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
char *ctx = NULL;
u32 len;
int rc = 0;
+ struct lsm_export le;
ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_OBJ_PID);
if (!ab)
@@ -955,7 +956,8 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, auid),
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid), sessionid);
if (sid) {
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len)) {
+ lsm_export_to_all(&le, sid);
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(&le, &ctx, &len)) {
audit_log_format(ab, " obj=(none)");
rc = 1;
} else {
@@ -1197,7 +1199,9 @@ static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
if (osid) {
char *ctx = NULL;
u32 len;
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(osid, &ctx, &len)) {
+ struct lsm_export le;
+ lsm_export_to_all(&le, osid);
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(&le, &ctx, &len)) {
audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", osid);
*call_panic = 1;
} else {
@@ -1348,9 +1352,10 @@ static void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n,
if (n->osid != 0) {
char *ctx = NULL;
u32 len;
+ struct lsm_export le;
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(
- n->osid, &ctx, &len)) {
+ lsm_export_to_all(&le, n->osid);
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(&le, &ctx, &len)) {
audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", n->osid);
if (call_panic)
*call_panic = 2;
diff --git a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
index b8ef7677a7e5..a4f37ba6dbe2 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
@@ -132,15 +132,14 @@ static void ip_cmsg_recv_security(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct lsm_export le;
char *secdata;
- u32 seclen, secid;
+ u32 seclen;
int err;
err = security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(NULL, skb, &le);
if (err)
return;
- lsm_export_secid(&le, &secid);
- err = security_secid_to_secctx(secid, &secdata, &seclen);
+ err = security_secid_to_secctx(&le, &secdata, &seclen);
if (err)
return;
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
index 66c596d287a5..b069277450c5 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
@@ -330,8 +330,10 @@ static int ctnetlink_dump_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_conn *ct)
struct nlattr *nest_secctx;
int len, ret;
char *secctx;
+ struct lsm_export le;
- ret = security_secid_to_secctx(ct->secmark, &secctx, &len);
+ lsm_export_to_all(&le, ct->secmark);
+ ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&le, &secctx, &len);
if (ret)
return 0;
@@ -615,8 +617,10 @@ static inline int ctnetlink_secctx_size(const struct nf_conn *ct)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK_SECMARK
int len, ret;
+ struct lsm_export le;
- ret = security_secid_to_secctx(ct->secmark, NULL, &len);
+ lsm_export_to_all(&le, ct->secmark);
+ ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&le, NULL, &len);
if (ret)
return 0;
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
index c2ae14c720b4..12318026d8d4 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
@@ -175,8 +175,10 @@ static void ct_show_secctx(struct seq_file *s, const struct nf_conn *ct)
int ret;
u32 len;
char *secctx;
+ struct lsm_export le;
- ret = security_secid_to_secctx(ct->secmark, &secctx, &len);
+ lsm_export_to_all(&le, ct->secmark);
+ ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&le, &secctx, &len);
if (ret)
return;
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
index 0dcc3592d053..4c74c383e26b 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
@@ -309,13 +309,17 @@ static u32 nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, char **secdata)
{
u32 seclen = 0;
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK)
+ struct lsm_export le;
+
if (!skb || !sk_fullsock(skb->sk))
return 0;
read_lock_bh(&skb->sk->sk_callback_lock);
- if (skb->secmark)
- security_secid_to_secctx(skb->secmark, secdata, &seclen);
+ if (skb->secmark) {
+ lsm_export_to_all(&le, skb->secmark);
+ security_secid_to_secctx(&le, secdata, &seclen);
+ }
read_unlock_bh(&skb->sk->sk_callback_lock);
#endif
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
index fc38934ccb35..00922f55dd9e 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
@@ -389,6 +389,7 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
struct audit_buffer *audit_buf = NULL;
char *secctx = NULL;
u32 secctx_len;
+ struct lsm_export le;
if (addr_len != sizeof(struct in_addr) &&
addr_len != sizeof(struct in6_addr))
@@ -451,7 +452,8 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
unlhsh_add_return:
rcu_read_unlock();
if (audit_buf != NULL) {
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(secid,
+ lsm_export_to_all(&le, secid);
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(&le,
&secctx,
&secctx_len) == 0) {
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s", secctx);
@@ -488,6 +490,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net,
struct net_device *dev;
char *secctx;
u32 secctx_len;
+ struct lsm_export le;
spin_lock(&netlbl_unlhsh_lock);
list_entry = netlbl_af4list_remove(addr->s_addr, mask->s_addr,
@@ -507,8 +510,10 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net,
addr->s_addr, mask->s_addr);
if (dev != NULL)
dev_put(dev);
+ if (entry != NULL)
+ lsm_export_to_all(&le, entry->secid);
if (entry != NULL &&
- security_secid_to_secctx(entry->secid,
+ security_secid_to_secctx(&le,
&secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s", secctx);
security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_len);
@@ -550,6 +555,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net,
struct net_device *dev;
char *secctx;
u32 secctx_len;
+ struct lsm_export le;
spin_lock(&netlbl_unlhsh_lock);
list_entry = netlbl_af6list_remove(addr, mask, &iface->addr6_list);
@@ -568,8 +574,10 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net,
addr, mask);
if (dev != NULL)
dev_put(dev);
+ if (entry != NULL)
+ lsm_export_to_all(&le, entry->secid);
if (entry != NULL &&
- security_secid_to_secctx(entry->secid,
+ security_secid_to_secctx(&le,
&secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s", secctx);
security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_len);
@@ -1092,6 +1100,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,
u32 secid;
char *secctx;
u32 secctx_len;
+ struct lsm_export le;
data = genlmsg_put(cb_arg->skb, NETLINK_CB(cb_arg->nl_cb->skb).portid,
cb_arg->seq, &netlbl_unlabel_gnl_family,
@@ -1146,7 +1155,8 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,
secid = addr6->secid;
}
- ret_val = security_secid_to_secctx(secid, &secctx, &secctx_len);
+ lsm_export_to_all(&le, secid);
+ ret_val = security_secid_to_secctx(&le, &secctx, &secctx_len);
if (ret_val != 0)
goto list_cb_failure;
ret_val = nla_put(cb_arg->skb,
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
index 4676f5bb16ae..1079cdea872c 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
@@ -100,6 +100,7 @@ struct audit_buffer *netlbl_audit_start_common(int type,
struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;
char *secctx;
u32 secctx_len;
+ struct lsm_export le;
if (audit_enabled == AUDIT_OFF)
return NULL;
@@ -112,10 +113,9 @@ struct audit_buffer *netlbl_audit_start_common(int type,
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_info->loginuid),
audit_info->sessionid);
+ lsm_export_to_all(&le, audit_info->secid);
if (audit_info->secid != 0 &&
- security_secid_to_secctx(audit_info->secid,
- &secctx,
- &secctx_len) == 0) {
+ security_secid_to_secctx(&le, &secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " subj=%s", secctx);
security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_len);
}
diff --git a/net/unix/af_unix.c b/net/unix/af_unix.c
index ddb838a1b74c..4d4107927ba2 100644
--- a/net/unix/af_unix.c
+++ b/net/unix/af_unix.c
@@ -143,17 +143,20 @@ static struct hlist_head *unix_sockets_unbound(void *addr)
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
static void unix_get_secdata(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
- UNIXCB(skb).secid = scm->secid;
+ lsm_export_secid(&scm->le, &(UNIXCB(skb).secid));
}
static inline void unix_set_secdata(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
- scm->secid = UNIXCB(skb).secid;
+ lsm_export_to_all(&scm->le, UNIXCB(skb).secid);
}
static inline bool unix_secdata_eq(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
- return (scm->secid == UNIXCB(skb).secid);
+ u32 best_secid;
+
+ lsm_export_secid(&scm->le, &best_secid);
+ return (best_secid == UNIXCB(skb).secid);
}
#else
static inline void unix_get_secdata(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb)
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 868e9ae6b48c..b6a096be95ac 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1957,13 +1957,9 @@ int security_ismaclabel(const char *name)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ismaclabel);
-int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
+int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsm_export *l, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
{
- struct lsm_export data;
-
- lsm_export_to_all(&data, secid);
- return call_int_hook(secid_to_secctx, -EOPNOTSUPP, &data, secdata,
- seclen);
+ return call_int_hook(secid_to_secctx, -EOPNOTSUPP, l, secdata, seclen);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secid_to_secctx);
--
2.19.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 20+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 08/58] LSM: Use lsm_export in the kernel_ask_as hooks
2019-06-02 16:50 [PATCH 00/58] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-06-02 16:50 ` Casey Schaufler
0 siblings, 0 replies; 20+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-06-02 16:50 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds
Convert the kernel_ask_as hooks to use the lsm_export
structure instead of a u32 secid. There is some scaffolding
involved that will be removed when security_kernel_ask_as()
is updated.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 4 ++--
security/security.c | 15 ++++++++++++++-
security/selinux/hooks.c | 17 ++++++++++++++---
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 12 +++++++++++-
4 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index 62783a923136..800040050032 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -578,7 +578,7 @@
* @kernel_act_as:
* Set the credentials for a kernel service to act as (subjective context).
* @new points to the credentials to be modified.
- * @secid specifies the security ID to be set
+ * @l specifies the security data to be set
* The current task must be the one that nominated @secid.
* Return 0 if successful.
* @kernel_create_files_as:
@@ -1598,7 +1598,7 @@ union security_list_options {
gfp_t gfp);
void (*cred_transfer)(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old);
void (*cred_getsecid)(const struct cred *c, struct lsm_export *l);
- int (*kernel_act_as)(struct cred *new, u32 secid);
+ int (*kernel_act_as)(struct cred *new, struct lsm_export *l);
int (*kernel_create_files_as)(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode);
int (*kernel_module_request)(char *kmod_name);
int (*kernel_load_data)(enum kernel_load_data_id id);
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 802557ff6f60..3a766755b722 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -742,6 +742,15 @@ static inline void lsm_export_secid(struct lsm_export *data, u32 *secid)
}
}
+static inline void lsm_export_to_all(struct lsm_export *data, u32 secid)
+{
+ data->selinux = secid;
+ data->smack = secid;
+ data->apparmor = secid;
+ data->flags = LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX | LSM_EXPORT_SMACK |
+ LSM_EXPORT_APPARMOR;
+}
+
/* Security operations */
int security_binder_set_context_mgr(struct task_struct *mgr)
@@ -1647,7 +1656,11 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_cred_getsecid);
int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
{
- return call_int_hook(kernel_act_as, 0, new, secid);
+ struct lsm_export data = { .flags = LSM_EXPORT_NONE };
+
+ lsm_export_to_all(&data, secid);
+
+ return call_int_hook(kernel_act_as, 0, new, &data);
}
int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index c82108793fb5..b88a51b6ca41 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -222,6 +222,14 @@ static inline void selinux_export_secid(struct lsm_export *l, u32 secid)
l->flags |= LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX;
}
+static inline void selinux_import_secid(struct lsm_export *l, u32 *secid)
+{
+ if (l->flags & LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX)
+ *secid = l->selinux;
+ else
+ *secid = SECSID_NULL;
+}
+
/*
* get the security ID of a set of credentials
*/
@@ -3773,19 +3781,22 @@ static void selinux_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, struct lsm_export *l)
* set the security data for a kernel service
* - all the creation contexts are set to unlabelled
*/
-static int selinux_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
+static int selinux_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, struct lsm_export *l)
{
struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(new);
+ u32 nsid;
u32 sid = current_sid();
int ret;
+ selinux_import_secid(l, &nsid);
+
ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
- sid, secid,
+ sid, nsid,
SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
KERNEL_SERVICE__USE_AS_OVERRIDE,
NULL);
if (ret == 0) {
- tsec->sid = secid;
+ tsec->sid = nsid;
tsec->create_sid = 0;
tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 13ac3045a388..3b77a0324c3d 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -475,6 +475,14 @@ static inline void smack_export_secid(struct lsm_export *l, u32 secid)
l->flags |= LSM_EXPORT_SMACK;
}
+static inline void smack_import_secid(struct lsm_export *l, u32 *secid)
+{
+ if (l->flags & LSM_EXPORT_SMACK)
+ *secid = l->smack;
+ else
+ *secid = 0;
+}
+
/*
* LSM hooks.
* We he, that is fun!
@@ -1997,10 +2005,12 @@ static void smack_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *cred, struct lsm_export *l)
*
* Set the security data for a kernel service.
*/
-static int smack_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
+static int smack_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, struct lsm_export *l)
{
+ u32 secid;
struct task_smack *new_tsp = smack_cred(new);
+ smack_import_secid(l, &secid);
new_tsp->smk_task = smack_from_secid(secid);
return 0;
}
--
2.19.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 20+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 08/58] LSM: Use lsm_export in the kernel_ask_as hooks
2019-05-31 23:09 [PATCH 00/58] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-05-31 23:09 ` Casey Schaufler
0 siblings, 0 replies; 20+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-05-31 23:09 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds
Convert the kernel_ask_as hooks to use the lsm_export
structure instead of a u32 secid. There is some scaffolding
involved that will be removed when security_kernel_ask_as()
is updated.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 4 ++--
security/security.c | 15 ++++++++++++++-
security/selinux/hooks.c | 17 ++++++++++++++---
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 12 +++++++++++-
4 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index 62783a923136..800040050032 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -578,7 +578,7 @@
* @kernel_act_as:
* Set the credentials for a kernel service to act as (subjective context).
* @new points to the credentials to be modified.
- * @secid specifies the security ID to be set
+ * @l specifies the security data to be set
* The current task must be the one that nominated @secid.
* Return 0 if successful.
* @kernel_create_files_as:
@@ -1598,7 +1598,7 @@ union security_list_options {
gfp_t gfp);
void (*cred_transfer)(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old);
void (*cred_getsecid)(const struct cred *c, struct lsm_export *l);
- int (*kernel_act_as)(struct cred *new, u32 secid);
+ int (*kernel_act_as)(struct cred *new, struct lsm_export *l);
int (*kernel_create_files_as)(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode);
int (*kernel_module_request)(char *kmod_name);
int (*kernel_load_data)(enum kernel_load_data_id id);
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 802557ff6f60..3a766755b722 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -742,6 +742,15 @@ static inline void lsm_export_secid(struct lsm_export *data, u32 *secid)
}
}
+static inline void lsm_export_to_all(struct lsm_export *data, u32 secid)
+{
+ data->selinux = secid;
+ data->smack = secid;
+ data->apparmor = secid;
+ data->flags = LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX | LSM_EXPORT_SMACK |
+ LSM_EXPORT_APPARMOR;
+}
+
/* Security operations */
int security_binder_set_context_mgr(struct task_struct *mgr)
@@ -1647,7 +1656,11 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_cred_getsecid);
int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
{
- return call_int_hook(kernel_act_as, 0, new, secid);
+ struct lsm_export data = { .flags = LSM_EXPORT_NONE };
+
+ lsm_export_to_all(&data, secid);
+
+ return call_int_hook(kernel_act_as, 0, new, &data);
}
int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index c82108793fb5..b88a51b6ca41 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -222,6 +222,14 @@ static inline void selinux_export_secid(struct lsm_export *l, u32 secid)
l->flags |= LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX;
}
+static inline void selinux_import_secid(struct lsm_export *l, u32 *secid)
+{
+ if (l->flags & LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX)
+ *secid = l->selinux;
+ else
+ *secid = SECSID_NULL;
+}
+
/*
* get the security ID of a set of credentials
*/
@@ -3773,19 +3781,22 @@ static void selinux_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, struct lsm_export *l)
* set the security data for a kernel service
* - all the creation contexts are set to unlabelled
*/
-static int selinux_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
+static int selinux_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, struct lsm_export *l)
{
struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(new);
+ u32 nsid;
u32 sid = current_sid();
int ret;
+ selinux_import_secid(l, &nsid);
+
ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
- sid, secid,
+ sid, nsid,
SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
KERNEL_SERVICE__USE_AS_OVERRIDE,
NULL);
if (ret == 0) {
- tsec->sid = secid;
+ tsec->sid = nsid;
tsec->create_sid = 0;
tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 13ac3045a388..3b77a0324c3d 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -475,6 +475,14 @@ static inline void smack_export_secid(struct lsm_export *l, u32 secid)
l->flags |= LSM_EXPORT_SMACK;
}
+static inline void smack_import_secid(struct lsm_export *l, u32 *secid)
+{
+ if (l->flags & LSM_EXPORT_SMACK)
+ *secid = l->smack;
+ else
+ *secid = 0;
+}
+
/*
* LSM hooks.
* We he, that is fun!
@@ -1997,10 +2005,12 @@ static void smack_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *cred, struct lsm_export *l)
*
* Set the security data for a kernel service.
*/
-static int smack_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
+static int smack_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, struct lsm_export *l)
{
+ u32 secid;
struct task_smack *new_tsp = smack_cred(new);
+ smack_import_secid(l, &secid);
new_tsp->smk_task = smack_from_secid(secid);
return 0;
}
--
2.19.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 20+ messages in thread
end of thread, other threads:[~2019-06-02 16:51 UTC | newest]
Thread overview: 20+ messages (download: mbox.gz / follow: Atom feed)
-- links below jump to the message on this page --
2019-05-31 23:30 [PATCH 00/58] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Casey Schaufler
2019-05-31 23:30 ` [PATCH 01/58] LSM: Infrastructure management of the superblock Casey Schaufler
2019-05-31 23:30 ` [PATCH 02/58] LSM: Infrastructure management of the sock security Casey Schaufler
2019-05-31 23:30 ` [PATCH 03/58] LSM: Infrastructure management of the key security blob Casey Schaufler
2019-05-31 23:30 ` [PATCH 04/58] LSM: Create an lsm_export data structure Casey Schaufler
2019-05-31 23:30 ` [PATCH 05/58] LSM: Use lsm_export in the inode_getsecid hooks Casey Schaufler
2019-05-31 23:30 ` [PATCH 06/58] LSM: Use lsm_export in the cred_getsecid hooks Casey Schaufler
2019-05-31 23:30 ` [PATCH 07/58] LSM: Use lsm_export in the ipc_getsecid and task_getsecid hooks Casey Schaufler
2019-05-31 23:30 ` [PATCH 08/58] LSM: Use lsm_export in the kernel_ask_as hooks Casey Schaufler
2019-05-31 23:31 ` [PATCH 09/58] LSM: Use lsm_export in the getpeersec_dgram hooks Casey Schaufler
2019-05-31 23:31 ` [PATCH 10/58] LSM: Use lsm_export in the audit_rule_match hooks Casey Schaufler
2019-05-31 23:31 ` [PATCH 11/58] LSM: Use lsm_export in the secid_to_secctx hooks Casey Schaufler
2019-05-31 23:31 ` [PATCH 12/58] LSM: Use lsm_export in the secctx_to_secid hooks Casey Schaufler
2019-05-31 23:31 ` [PATCH 13/58] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_audit_rule_match Casey Schaufler
2019-05-31 23:31 ` [PATCH 14/58] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_kernel_act_as Casey Schaufler
2019-05-31 23:31 ` [PATCH 15/58] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_socket_getpeersec_dgram Casey Schaufler
2019-05-31 23:31 ` [PATCH 16/58] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_secctx_to_secid Casey Schaufler
2019-05-31 23:31 ` [PATCH 17/58] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_secid_to_secctx Casey Schaufler
-- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2019-06-02 16:50 [PATCH 00/58] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Casey Schaufler
2019-06-02 16:50 ` [PATCH 08/58] LSM: Use lsm_export in the kernel_ask_as hooks Casey Schaufler
2019-05-31 23:09 [PATCH 00/58] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Casey Schaufler
2019-05-31 23:09 ` [PATCH 08/58] LSM: Use lsm_export in the kernel_ask_as hooks Casey Schaufler
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