From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
To: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Cc: linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
selinux@vger.kernel.org,
Bill Roberts <william.c.roberts@intel.com>,
Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>,
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
Cedric Xing <cedric.xing@intel.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Jethro Beekman <jethro@fortanix.com>,
"Dr . Greg Wettstein" <greg@enjellic.com>,
Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v4 01/12] x86/sgx: Use mmu_notifier.release() instead of per-vma refcounting
Date: Fri, 21 Jun 2019 00:03:36 +0300 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190620210324.GF15383@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190619222401.14942-2-sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
On Wed, Jun 19, 2019 at 03:23:50PM -0700, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> Using per-vma refcounting to track mm_structs associated with an enclave
> requires hooking .vm_close(), which in turn prevents the mm from merging
> vmas (precisely to allow refcounting).
Why having sgx_vma_close() prevents that? I do not understand the
problem statement.
> Avoid refcounting encl_mm altogether by registering an mmu_notifier at
> .mmap(), removing the dying encl_mm at mmu_notifier.release() and
> protecting mm_list during reclaim via a per-enclave SRCU.
Right, there is the potential collision with my changes:
1. Your patch: enclave life-cycle equals life-cycle of all processes
that are associated with the enclave.
2. My (yet be sent) patch: enclave life-cycle equals the life cycle.
I won't rush with my patch. I rather merge neither at this point and
you can review mine after you come back from your vacation.
> Removing refcounting/vm_close() allows merging of enclave vmas, at the
> cost of delaying removal of encl_mm structs from mm_list, i.e. an mm is
> disassociated from an enclave when the mm exits or the enclave dies, as
> opposed to when the last vma (in a given mm) is closed.
>
> The impact of delying encl_mm removal is its memory footprint and
> whatever overhead is incurred during EPC reclaim (to walk an mm's vmas).
> Practically speaking, a stale encl_mm will exist for a meaningful amount
> of time if and only if the enclave is mapped in a long-lived process and
> then passed off to another long-lived process. It is expected that the
> vast majority of use cases will not encounter this condition, e.g. even
> using a daemon to build enclaves should not result in a stale encl_mm as
> the builder should never need to mmap() the enclave.
This paragraph speaks only about "well behaving" software.
> Even if there are scenarios that lead to defunct encl_mms, the cost is
> likely far outweighed by the benefits of reducing the number of vmas
> across all enclaves.
>
> Note, using SRCU to protect mm_list is not strictly necessary, i.e. the
> existing walker with encl_mm refcounting could be massaged to work with
> mmu_notifier.release(), but the resulting code is subtle and fragile (I
> never actually got it working). The primary issue is that an encl_mm
> can't be moved off the list until its refcount goes to zero, otherwise
> the custom walker goes off into the weeds. The refcount requirement
> then prevents using mm_list to identify if an mmu_notifier.release()
> has fired, i.e. another mechanism is needed to guard against races
> between exit_mmap() and sgx_release().
Is it really impossible to send a separate SRCU patch?
I fully agree with the SRCU whereas rest of this patch is still
under debate.
If you could do that, I can merge it in no time. It is a small
step into better direction.
> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Needs to be rebased because the master missing your earlier bug fix.
> ---
> arch/x86/Kconfig | 2 +
> arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver/ioctl.c | 14 --
> arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver/main.c | 38 ++++
> arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c | 234 +++++++++++--------------
> arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h | 19 +-
> arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/reclaim.c | 71 +++-----
> 6 files changed, 182 insertions(+), 196 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
> index a0fd17c32521..940c52762f24 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
> +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
> @@ -1918,6 +1918,8 @@ config X86_INTEL_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS
> config INTEL_SGX
> bool "Intel SGX core functionality"
> depends on X86_64 && CPU_SUP_INTEL
> + select MMU_NOTIFIER
> + select SRCU
> ---help---
> Intel(R) SGX is a set of CPU instructions that can be used by
> applications to set aside private regions of code and data, referred
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver/ioctl.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver/ioctl.c
> index d17c60dca114..3552d642b26f 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver/ioctl.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver/ioctl.c
> @@ -276,7 +276,6 @@ static int sgx_encl_create(struct sgx_encl *encl, struct sgx_secs *secs)
> {
> unsigned long encl_size = secs->size + PAGE_SIZE;
> struct sgx_epc_page *secs_epc;
> - struct sgx_encl_mm *encl_mm;
> unsigned long ssaframesize;
> struct sgx_pageinfo pginfo;
> struct sgx_secinfo secinfo;
> @@ -311,12 +310,6 @@ static int sgx_encl_create(struct sgx_encl *encl, struct sgx_secs *secs)
>
> INIT_WORK(&encl->work, sgx_add_page_worker);
>
> - encl_mm = sgx_encl_mm_add(encl, current->mm);
> - if (IS_ERR(encl_mm)) {
> - ret = PTR_ERR(encl_mm);
> - goto err_out;
> - }
> -
> secs_epc = sgx_alloc_page(&encl->secs, true);
> if (IS_ERR(secs_epc)) {
> ret = PTR_ERR(secs_epc);
> @@ -369,13 +362,6 @@ static int sgx_encl_create(struct sgx_encl *encl, struct sgx_secs *secs)
> encl->backing = NULL;
> }
>
> - if (!list_empty(&encl->mm_list)) {
> - encl_mm = list_first_entry(&encl->mm_list, struct sgx_encl_mm,
> - list);
> - list_del(&encl_mm->list);
> - kfree(encl_mm);
> - }
> -
> mutex_unlock(&encl->lock);
> return ret;
> }
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver/main.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver/main.c
> index 0c831ee5e2de..07aa5f91b2dd 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver/main.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver/main.c
> @@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ u32 sgx_xsave_size_tbl[64];
> static int sgx_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
> {
> struct sgx_encl *encl;
> + int ret;
>
> encl = kzalloc(sizeof(*encl), GFP_KERNEL);
> if (!encl)
> @@ -38,6 +39,12 @@ static int sgx_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
> INIT_LIST_HEAD(&encl->mm_list);
> spin_lock_init(&encl->mm_lock);
>
> + ret = init_srcu_struct(&encl->srcu);
> + if (ret) {
> + kfree(encl);
> + return ret;
> + }
> +
> file->private_data = encl;
>
> return 0;
> @@ -46,6 +53,32 @@ static int sgx_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
> static int sgx_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
> {
> struct sgx_encl *encl = file->private_data;
> + struct sgx_encl_mm *encl_mm;
> +
> + /*
> + * Objects can't be *moved* off an RCU protected list (deletion is ok),
> + * nor can the object be freed until after synchronize_srcu().
> + */
> +restart:
> + spin_lock(&encl->mm_lock);
> + if (list_empty(&encl->mm_list)) {
> + encl_mm = NULL;
> + } else {
> + encl_mm = list_first_entry(&encl->mm_list, struct sgx_encl_mm,
> + list);
> + list_del_rcu(&encl_mm->list);
> + }
> + spin_unlock(&encl->mm_lock);
> +
> + if (encl_mm) {
> + synchronize_srcu(&encl->srcu);
> +
> + mmu_notifier_unregister(&encl_mm->mmu_notifier, encl_mm->mm);
> +
> + sgx_encl_mm_release(encl_mm);
> +
> + goto restart;
> + }
>
> kref_put(&encl->refcount, sgx_encl_release);
>
> @@ -63,6 +96,11 @@ static long sgx_compat_ioctl(struct file *filep, unsigned int cmd,
> static int sgx_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
> {
> struct sgx_encl *encl = file->private_data;
> + int ret;
> +
> + ret = sgx_encl_mm_add(encl, vma->vm_mm);
> + if (ret)
> + return ret;
>
> vma->vm_ops = &sgx_vm_ops;
> vma->vm_flags |= VM_PFNMAP | VM_DONTEXPAND | VM_DONTDUMP | VM_IO;
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c
> index 9566eb72d417..c6436bbd4a68 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c
> @@ -132,103 +132,125 @@ static struct sgx_encl_page *sgx_encl_load_page(struct sgx_encl *encl,
> return entry;
> }
>
> -struct sgx_encl_mm *sgx_encl_mm_add(struct sgx_encl *encl,
> - struct mm_struct *mm)
> +static void sgx_encl_mm_release_wq(struct work_struct *work)
> +{
> + struct sgx_encl_mm *encl_mm =
> + container_of(work, struct sgx_encl_mm, release_work);
> +
> + sgx_encl_mm_release(encl_mm);
> +}
> +
> +/*
> + * Being a call_srcu() callback, this needs to be short, and sgx_encl_release()
> + * is anything but short. Do the final freeing in yet another async callback.
> + */
> +static void sgx_encl_mm_release_delayed(struct rcu_head *rcu)
Would rename this either as *_tail() or *_deferred().
> +{
> + struct sgx_encl_mm *encl_mm =
> + container_of(rcu, struct sgx_encl_mm, rcu);
> +
> + INIT_WORK(&encl_mm->release_work, sgx_encl_mm_release_wq);
> + schedule_work(&encl_mm->release_work);
> +}
> +
> +static void sgx_mmu_notifier_release(struct mmu_notifier *mn,
> + struct mm_struct *mm)
> +{
> + struct sgx_encl_mm *encl_mm =
> + container_of(mn, struct sgx_encl_mm, mmu_notifier);
> + struct sgx_encl_mm *tmp = NULL;
> +
> + /*
> + * The enclave itself can remove encl_mm. Note, objects can't be moved
> + * off an RCU protected list, but deletion is ok.
> + */
> + spin_lock(&encl_mm->encl->mm_lock);
> + list_for_each_entry(tmp, &encl_mm->encl->mm_list, list) {
> + if (tmp == encl_mm) {
> + list_del_rcu(&encl_mm->list);
> + break;
> + }
> + }
> + spin_unlock(&encl_mm->encl->mm_lock);
> +
> + if (tmp == encl_mm) {
> + synchronize_srcu(&encl_mm->encl->srcu);
> +
> + /*
> + * Delay freeing encl_mm until after mmu_notifier releases any
> + * SRCU locks. synchronize_srcu() must be called from process
> + * context, i.e. we can't throw mmu_notifier_unregister() in a
> + * work queue and be done with it.
> + */
> + mmu_notifier_unregister_no_release(mn, mm);
> + mmu_notifier_call_srcu(&encl_mm->rcu,
> + &sgx_encl_mm_release_delayed);
> + }
> +}
> +
> +static const struct mmu_notifier_ops sgx_mmu_notifier_ops = {
> + .release = sgx_mmu_notifier_release,
> +};
> +
> +static struct sgx_encl_mm *sgx_encl_find_mm(struct sgx_encl *encl,
> + struct mm_struct *mm)
> +{
> + struct sgx_encl_mm *encl_mm = NULL;
> + struct sgx_encl_mm *tmp;
> + int idx;
> +
> + idx = srcu_read_lock(&encl->srcu);
> +
> + list_for_each_entry_rcu(tmp, &encl->mm_list, list) {
> + if (tmp->mm == mm) {
> + encl_mm = tmp;
> + break;
> + }
> + }
> +
> + srcu_read_unlock(&encl->srcu, idx);
> +
> + return encl_mm;
> +}
> +
> +int sgx_encl_mm_add(struct sgx_encl *encl, struct mm_struct *mm)
> {
> struct sgx_encl_mm *encl_mm;
> + int ret;
> +
> + lockdep_assert_held_exclusive(&mm->mmap_sem);
> +
> + /*
> + * mm_structs are kept on mm_list until the mm or the enclave dies,
> + * i.e. once an mm is off the list, it's gone for good, therefore it's
> + * impossible to get a false positive on @mm due to a stale mm_list.
> + */
> + if (sgx_encl_find_mm(encl, mm))
> + return 0;
>
> encl_mm = kzalloc(sizeof(*encl_mm), GFP_KERNEL);
> if (!encl_mm)
> - return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
> + return -ENOMEM;
>
> encl_mm->encl = encl;
> encl_mm->mm = mm;
> - kref_init(&encl_mm->refcount);
> + encl_mm->mmu_notifier.ops = &sgx_mmu_notifier_ops;
> +
> + ret = __mmu_notifier_register(&encl_mm->mmu_notifier, mm);
> + if (ret) {
> + kfree(encl_mm);
> + return ret;
> + }
> +
> + kref_get(&encl->refcount);
>
> spin_lock(&encl->mm_lock);
> - list_add(&encl_mm->list, &encl->mm_list);
> + list_add_rcu(&encl_mm->list, &encl->mm_list);
> spin_unlock(&encl->mm_lock);
>
> - return encl_mm;
> -}
> + synchronize_srcu(&encl->srcu);
>
> -void sgx_encl_mm_release(struct kref *ref)
> -{
> - struct sgx_encl_mm *encl_mm =
> - container_of(ref, struct sgx_encl_mm, refcount);
> -
> - spin_lock(&encl_mm->encl->mm_lock);
> - list_del(&encl_mm->list);
> - spin_unlock(&encl_mm->encl->mm_lock);
> -
> - kfree(encl_mm);
> -}
> -
> -static struct sgx_encl_mm *sgx_encl_get_mm(struct sgx_encl *encl,
> - struct mm_struct *mm)
> -{
> - struct sgx_encl_mm *encl_mm = NULL;
> - struct sgx_encl_mm *prev_mm = NULL;
> - int iter;
> -
> - while (true) {
> - encl_mm = sgx_encl_next_mm(encl, prev_mm, &iter);
> - if (prev_mm)
> - kref_put(&prev_mm->refcount, sgx_encl_mm_release);
> - prev_mm = encl_mm;
> -
> - if (iter == SGX_ENCL_MM_ITER_DONE)
> - break;
> -
> - if (iter == SGX_ENCL_MM_ITER_RESTART)
> - continue;
> -
> - if (mm == encl_mm->mm)
> - return encl_mm;
> - }
> -
> - return NULL;
> -}
> -
> -static void sgx_vma_open(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
> -{
> - struct sgx_encl *encl = vma->vm_private_data;
> - struct sgx_encl_mm *encl_mm;
> -
> - if (!encl)
> - return;
> -
> - if (encl->flags & SGX_ENCL_DEAD)
> - goto error;
> -
> - encl_mm = sgx_encl_get_mm(encl, vma->vm_mm);
> - if (!encl_mm) {
> - encl_mm = sgx_encl_mm_add(encl, vma->vm_mm);
> - if (IS_ERR(encl_mm))
> - goto error;
> - }
> -
> - return;
> -
> -error:
> - vma->vm_private_data = NULL;
> -}
> -
> -static void sgx_vma_close(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
> -{
> - struct sgx_encl *encl = vma->vm_private_data;
> - struct sgx_encl_mm *encl_mm;
> -
> - if (!encl)
> - return;
> -
> - encl_mm = sgx_encl_get_mm(encl, vma->vm_mm);
> - if (encl_mm) {
> - kref_put(&encl_mm->refcount, sgx_encl_mm_release);
> -
> - /* Release kref for the VMA. */
> - kref_put(&encl_mm->refcount, sgx_encl_mm_release);
> - }
> + return 0;
> }
>
> static unsigned int sgx_vma_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf)
> @@ -366,8 +388,6 @@ static int sgx_vma_access(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long addr,
> }
>
> const struct vm_operations_struct sgx_vm_ops = {
> - .close = sgx_vma_close,
> - .open = sgx_vma_open,
> .fault = sgx_vma_fault,
> .access = sgx_vma_access,
> };
> @@ -465,7 +485,7 @@ void sgx_encl_release(struct kref *ref)
> if (encl->backing)
> fput(encl->backing);
>
> - WARN(!list_empty(&encl->mm_list), "sgx: mm_list non-empty");
> + WARN_ONCE(!list_empty(&encl->mm_list), "sgx: mm_list non-empty");
>
> kfree(encl);
> }
> @@ -503,46 +523,6 @@ struct page *sgx_encl_get_backing_page(struct sgx_encl *encl, pgoff_t index)
> return shmem_read_mapping_page_gfp(mapping, index, gfpmask);
> }
>
> -/**
> - * sgx_encl_next_mm() - Iterate to the next mm
> - * @encl: an enclave
> - * @mm: an mm list entry
> - * @iter: iterator status
> - *
> - * Return: the enclave mm or NULL
> - */
> -struct sgx_encl_mm *sgx_encl_next_mm(struct sgx_encl *encl,
> - struct sgx_encl_mm *encl_mm, int *iter)
> -{
> - struct list_head *entry;
> -
> - WARN(!encl, "%s: encl is NULL", __func__);
> - WARN(!iter, "%s: iter is NULL", __func__);
> -
> - spin_lock(&encl->mm_lock);
> -
> - entry = encl_mm ? encl_mm->list.next : encl->mm_list.next;
> - WARN(!entry, "%s: entry is NULL", __func__);
> -
> - if (entry == &encl->mm_list) {
> - spin_unlock(&encl->mm_lock);
> - *iter = SGX_ENCL_MM_ITER_DONE;
> - return NULL;
> - }
> -
> - encl_mm = list_entry(entry, struct sgx_encl_mm, list);
> -
> - if (!kref_get_unless_zero(&encl_mm->refcount)) {
> - spin_unlock(&encl->mm_lock);
> - *iter = SGX_ENCL_MM_ITER_RESTART;
> - return NULL;
> - }
> -
> - spin_unlock(&encl->mm_lock);
> - *iter = SGX_ENCL_MM_ITER_NEXT;
> - return encl_mm;
> -}
> -
> static int sgx_encl_test_and_clear_young_cb(pte_t *ptep, pgtable_t token,
> unsigned long addr, void *data)
> {
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h
> index c557f0374d74..0904b3c20ed0 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h
> @@ -9,9 +9,11 @@
> #include <linux/kref.h>
> #include <linux/list.h>
> #include <linux/mm_types.h>
> +#include <linux/mmu_notifier.h>
> #include <linux/mutex.h>
> #include <linux/notifier.h>
> #include <linux/radix-tree.h>
> +#include <linux/srcu.h>
> #include <linux/workqueue.h>
>
> /**
> @@ -57,8 +59,10 @@ enum sgx_encl_flags {
> struct sgx_encl_mm {
> struct sgx_encl *encl;
> struct mm_struct *mm;
> - struct kref refcount;
> struct list_head list;
> + struct mmu_notifier mmu_notifier;
> + struct work_struct release_work;
> + struct rcu_head rcu;
> };
>
> struct sgx_encl {
> @@ -72,6 +76,7 @@ struct sgx_encl {
> spinlock_t mm_lock;
> struct file *backing;
> struct kref refcount;
> + struct srcu_struct srcu;
> unsigned long base;
> unsigned long size;
> unsigned long ssaframesize;
> @@ -118,11 +123,13 @@ void sgx_encl_destroy(struct sgx_encl *encl);
> void sgx_encl_release(struct kref *ref);
> pgoff_t sgx_encl_get_index(struct sgx_encl *encl, struct sgx_encl_page *page);
> struct page *sgx_encl_get_backing_page(struct sgx_encl *encl, pgoff_t index);
> -struct sgx_encl_mm *sgx_encl_next_mm(struct sgx_encl *encl,
> - struct sgx_encl_mm *encl_mm, int *iter);
> -struct sgx_encl_mm *sgx_encl_mm_add(struct sgx_encl *encl,
> - struct mm_struct *mm);
> -void sgx_encl_mm_release(struct kref *ref);
> +int sgx_encl_mm_add(struct sgx_encl *encl, struct mm_struct *mm);
> +static inline void sgx_encl_mm_release(struct sgx_encl_mm *encl_mm)
> +{
> + kref_put(&encl_mm->encl->refcount, sgx_encl_release);
> +
> + kfree(encl_mm);
> +}
Please just open code this to the two call sites. Makes the code hard to
follow.
Right now I did not find anything else questionable from the code
changes. Repeating myself but if it is by any means possible before
going away, can you construct a pure SRCU patch.
I could then reconstruct my changes on top off that, which would
make evalution of both heck a lot easier.
/Jarkko
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-06-20 21:03 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 156+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-06-19 22:23 [RFC PATCH v4 00/12] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM Sean Christopherson
2019-06-19 22:23 ` [RFC PATCH v4 01/12] x86/sgx: Use mmu_notifier.release() instead of per-vma refcounting Sean Christopherson
2019-06-20 21:03 ` Jarkko Sakkinen [this message]
2019-07-08 14:57 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-07-09 16:18 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-06-19 22:23 ` [RFC PATCH v4 02/12] x86/sgx: Do not naturally align MAP_FIXED address Sean Christopherson
2019-06-20 21:09 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-06-20 22:09 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-06-19 22:23 ` [RFC PATCH v4 03/12] selftests: x86/sgx: Mark the enclave loader as not needing an exec stack Sean Christopherson
2019-06-20 21:17 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-06-19 22:23 ` [RFC PATCH v4 04/12] x86/sgx: Require userspace to define enclave pages' protection bits Sean Christopherson
2019-06-21 1:07 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-06-21 1:16 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-06-21 16:42 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-07-08 16:34 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-07-08 17:29 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-07-01 18:00 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-07-01 19:22 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-06-19 22:23 ` [RFC PATCH v4 05/12] x86/sgx: Enforce noexec filesystem restriction for enclaves Sean Christopherson
2019-06-21 1:26 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-07-07 19:03 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-06-19 22:23 ` [RFC PATCH v4 06/12] mm: Introduce vm_ops->may_mprotect() Sean Christopherson
2019-06-21 1:35 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-06-19 22:23 ` [RFC PATCH v4 07/12] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_map() hook for Intel SGX Sean Christopherson
2019-06-21 2:28 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-06-21 16:54 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-06-25 20:48 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-06-27 20:29 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-07-07 18:01 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-06-19 22:23 ` [RFC PATCH v4 08/12] security/selinux: Require SGX_MAPWX to map enclave page WX Sean Christopherson
2019-06-21 17:09 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-06-25 21:05 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-06-27 20:26 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-06-25 20:19 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-06-26 12:49 ` Dr. Greg
2019-06-19 22:23 ` [RFC PATCH v4 09/12] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_load() hook for Intel SGX Sean Christopherson
2019-06-21 17:05 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-06-25 21:01 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-06-25 21:49 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-06-27 19:38 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-06-19 22:23 ` [RFC PATCH v4 10/12] security/selinux: Add enclave_load() implementation Sean Christopherson
2019-06-21 21:22 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-06-25 21:09 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-06-27 20:19 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-06-28 16:16 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-06-28 21:20 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-06-29 1:15 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-07-01 18:14 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-06-29 23:41 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-07-01 17:46 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-07-01 17:53 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-07-01 18:54 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-07-01 19:03 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-07-01 19:32 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-07-01 20:03 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-07-07 18:46 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-06-25 20:34 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-06-19 22:24 ` [RFC PATCH v4 11/12] security/apparmor: " Sean Christopherson
2019-06-19 22:24 ` [RFC PATCH v4 12/12] LSM: x86/sgx: Show line of sight to LSM support SGX2's EAUG Sean Christopherson
2019-06-21 17:18 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-07-08 14:34 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-06-21 1:32 ` [RFC PATCH v4 00/12] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-06-27 18:56 ` [RFC PATCH v2 0/3] security/x86/sgx: SGX specific LSM hooks Cedric Xing
2019-07-03 23:16 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-07-03 23:22 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-07-03 23:23 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-07-06 5:04 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-07-08 14:46 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-07-07 23:41 ` [RFC PATCH v3 0/4] " Cedric Xing
2019-07-08 15:55 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-07-08 17:49 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-07-08 18:49 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-07-08 22:26 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-07-07 23:41 ` [RFC PATCH v3 1/4] x86/sgx: Add " Cedric Xing
2019-07-07 23:41 ` [RFC PATCH v3 2/4] x86/64: Call LSM hooks from SGX subsystem/module Cedric Xing
2019-07-09 1:03 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-07-07 23:41 ` [RFC PATCH v3 3/4] X86/sgx: Introduce EMA as a new LSM module Cedric Xing
2019-07-08 16:26 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-07-08 17:16 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-07-08 23:53 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-07-09 22:13 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-07-10 0:10 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-07-10 0:55 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-07-10 21:14 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-07-11 13:51 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-07-11 15:12 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-07-11 16:11 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-07-11 16:25 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-07-11 16:32 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-07-11 23:41 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-07-07 23:41 ` [RFC PATCH v3 4/4] x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux Cedric Xing
2019-07-09 1:33 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-07-09 21:26 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-07-10 15:49 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-07-10 16:08 ` Jethro Beekman
2019-07-10 18:16 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-07-10 17:54 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-06-27 18:56 ` [RFC PATCH v2 1/3] x86/sgx: Add SGX specific LSM hooks Cedric Xing
2019-06-27 22:06 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-06-27 22:52 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-06-27 23:37 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-06-28 0:47 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-06-28 17:22 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-06-28 22:29 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-06-29 1:37 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-06-29 21:35 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-07-01 17:57 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-07-01 19:53 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-07-01 21:45 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-07-01 23:11 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-07-02 7:42 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-07-02 15:44 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-07-03 9:46 ` Dr. Greg
2019-07-03 15:32 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-07-07 13:30 ` Dr. Greg
2019-07-09 0:02 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-07-09 1:52 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-07-09 21:16 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-07-11 10:22 ` Dr. Greg
2019-07-15 22:23 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-06-28 16:37 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-06-28 21:53 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-06-29 1:22 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-07-01 18:02 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-06-29 23:46 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-07-01 17:11 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-07-01 17:58 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-07-01 18:31 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-07-01 19:36 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-07-01 19:56 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-07-02 2:29 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-07-02 6:35 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-06-27 18:56 ` [RFC PATCH v2 2/3] x86/sgx: Call LSM hooks from SGX subsystem/module Cedric Xing
2019-06-27 18:56 ` [RFC PATCH v2 3/3] x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux Cedric Xing
2019-07-05 16:05 ` [RFC PATCH v4 00/12] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-07-08 17:29 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-07-08 17:33 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-07-09 16:22 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-07-09 17:09 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-07-09 20:41 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-07-09 22:25 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-07-09 23:11 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-07-10 16:57 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-07-10 20:19 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-07-10 20:31 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-07-11 9:06 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-07-10 22:00 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-07-10 22:16 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-07-10 23:16 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-07-11 9:26 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-07-11 14:32 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-07-11 17:51 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-07-12 0:08 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-07-10 1:28 ` Dr. Greg
2019-07-10 2:04 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-07-10 3:21 ` Jethro Beekman
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