From: Cedric Xing <cedric.xing@intel.com>
To: linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
selinux@vger.kernel.org, cedric.xing@intel.com
Subject: [RFC PATCH v3 2/4] x86/64: Call LSM hooks from SGX subsystem/module
Date: Sun, 7 Jul 2019 16:41:32 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <a1a4f6a4f7be05ce1635b48a80cea86c27ee14cc.1562542383.git.cedric.xing@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <cover.1562542383.git.cedric.xing@intel.com>
In-Reply-To: <cover.1562542383.git.cedric.xing@intel.com>
It’s straightforward to call new LSM hooks from the SGX subsystem/module. There
are three places where LSM hooks are invoked.
1) sgx_mmap() invokes security_file_mprotect() to validate requested
protection. It is necessary because security_mmap_file() invoked by mmap()
syscall only validates protections against /dev/sgx/enclave file, but not
against those files from which the pages were loaded from.
2) security_enclave_load() is invoked upon loading of every enclave page by
the EADD ioctl. Please note that if pages are EADD’ed in batch, the SGX
subsystem/module is responsible for dividing pages in trunks so that each
trunk is loaded from a single VMA.
3) security_enclave_init() is invoked before initializing (EINIT) every
enclave.
Signed-off-by: Cedric Xing <cedric.xing@intel.com>
---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver/ioctl.c | 80 +++++++++++++++++++++++---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver/main.c | 16 +++++-
2 files changed, 85 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver/ioctl.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver/ioctl.c
index b186fb7b48d5..4f5abf9819a7 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver/ioctl.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver/ioctl.c
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
// SPDX-License-Identifier: (GPL-2.0 OR BSD-3-Clause)
// Copyright(c) 2016-19 Intel Corporation.
-#include <asm/mman.h>
+#include <linux/mman.h>
#include <linux/delay.h>
#include <linux/file.h>
#include <linux/hashtable.h>
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
#include <linux/shmem_fs.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/suspend.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
#include "driver.h"
struct sgx_add_page_req {
@@ -575,6 +576,46 @@ static int sgx_encl_add_page(struct sgx_encl *encl, unsigned long addr,
return ret;
}
+static int sgx_encl_prepare_page(struct file *filp, unsigned long dst,
+ unsigned long src, void *buf)
+{
+ struct vm_area_struct *vma;
+ unsigned long prot;
+ int rc;
+
+ if (dst & ~PAGE_SIZE)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ rc = down_read_killable(¤t->mm->mmap_sem);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ vma = find_vma(current->mm, dst);
+ if (vma && dst >= vma->vm_start)
+ prot = _calc_vm_trans(vma->vm_flags, VM_READ, PROT_READ) |
+ _calc_vm_trans(vma->vm_flags, VM_WRITE, PROT_WRITE) |
+ _calc_vm_trans(vma->vm_flags, VM_EXEC, PROT_EXEC);
+ else
+ prot = 0;
+
+ vma = find_vma(current->mm, src);
+ if (!vma || src < vma->vm_start || src + PAGE_SIZE > vma->vm_end)
+ rc = -EFAULT;
+
+ if (!rc && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_MAYEXEC))
+ rc = -EACCES;
+
+ if (!rc && copy_from_user(buf, (void __user *)src, PAGE_SIZE))
+ rc = -EFAULT;
+
+ if (!rc)
+ rc = security_enclave_load(filp, dst, PAGE_SIZE, prot, vma);
+
+ up_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem);
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
/**
* sgx_ioc_enclave_add_page - handler for %SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGE
*
@@ -613,10 +654,9 @@ static long sgx_ioc_enclave_add_page(struct file *filep, unsigned int cmd,
data = kmap(data_page);
- if (copy_from_user((void *)data, (void __user *)addp->src, PAGE_SIZE)) {
- ret = -EFAULT;
+ ret = sgx_encl_prepare_page(filep, addp->addr, addp->src, data);
+ if (ret)
goto out;
- }
ret = sgx_encl_add_page(encl, addp->addr, data, &secinfo, addp->mrmask);
if (ret)
@@ -718,6 +758,31 @@ static int sgx_encl_init(struct sgx_encl *encl, struct sgx_sigstruct *sigstruct,
return ret;
}
+static int sgx_encl_prepare_sigstruct(struct file *filp, unsigned long src,
+ struct sgx_sigstruct *ss)
+{
+ struct vm_area_struct *vma;
+ int rc;
+
+ rc = down_read_killable(¤t->mm->mmap_sem);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ vma = find_vma(current->mm, src);
+ if (!vma || src < vma->vm_start || src + sizeof(*ss) > vma->vm_end)
+ rc = -EFAULT;
+
+ if (!rc && copy_from_user(ss, (void __user *)src, sizeof(*ss)))
+ rc = -EFAULT;
+
+ if (!rc)
+ rc = security_enclave_init(filp, ss, vma);
+
+ up_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem);
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
/**
* sgx_ioc_enclave_init - handler for %SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_INIT
*
@@ -753,12 +818,9 @@ static long sgx_ioc_enclave_init(struct file *filep, unsigned int cmd,
((unsigned long)sigstruct + PAGE_SIZE / 2);
memset(einittoken, 0, sizeof(*einittoken));
- if (copy_from_user(sigstruct, (void __user *)initp->sigstruct,
- sizeof(*sigstruct))) {
- ret = -EFAULT;
+ ret = sgx_encl_prepare_sigstruct(filep, initp->sigstruct, sigstruct);
+ if (ret)
goto out;
- }
-
ret = sgx_encl_init(encl, sigstruct, einittoken);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver/main.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver/main.c
index 58ba6153070b..8848711a55bd 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver/main.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver/main.c
@@ -63,14 +63,26 @@ static long sgx_compat_ioctl(struct file *filep, unsigned int cmd,
static int sgx_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
{
struct sgx_encl *encl = file->private_data;
+ unsigned long prot;
+ int rc;
vma->vm_ops = &sgx_vm_ops;
vma->vm_flags |= VM_PFNMAP | VM_DONTEXPAND | VM_DONTDUMP | VM_IO;
vma->vm_private_data = encl;
- kref_get(&encl->refcount);
+ prot = vma->vm_flags & (VM_READ | VM_WRITE | VM_EXEC);
+ vma->vm_flags &= ~prot;
- return 0;
+ prot = _calc_vm_trans(prot, VM_READ, PROT_READ) |
+ _calc_vm_trans(prot, VM_WRITE, PROT_WRITE) |
+ _calc_vm_trans(prot, VM_EXEC, PROT_EXEC);
+ rc = security_file_mprotect(vma, prot, prot);
+ if (!rc) {
+ vma->vm_flags |= calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, 0);
+ kref_get(&encl->refcount);
+ }
+
+ return rc;
}
static unsigned long sgx_get_unmapped_area(struct file *file,
--
2.17.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-07-07 23:41 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 156+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-06-19 22:23 [RFC PATCH v4 00/12] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM Sean Christopherson
2019-06-19 22:23 ` [RFC PATCH v4 01/12] x86/sgx: Use mmu_notifier.release() instead of per-vma refcounting Sean Christopherson
2019-06-20 21:03 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-07-08 14:57 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-07-09 16:18 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-06-19 22:23 ` [RFC PATCH v4 02/12] x86/sgx: Do not naturally align MAP_FIXED address Sean Christopherson
2019-06-20 21:09 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-06-20 22:09 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-06-19 22:23 ` [RFC PATCH v4 03/12] selftests: x86/sgx: Mark the enclave loader as not needing an exec stack Sean Christopherson
2019-06-20 21:17 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-06-19 22:23 ` [RFC PATCH v4 04/12] x86/sgx: Require userspace to define enclave pages' protection bits Sean Christopherson
2019-06-21 1:07 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-06-21 1:16 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-06-21 16:42 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-07-08 16:34 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-07-08 17:29 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-07-01 18:00 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-07-01 19:22 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-06-19 22:23 ` [RFC PATCH v4 05/12] x86/sgx: Enforce noexec filesystem restriction for enclaves Sean Christopherson
2019-06-21 1:26 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-07-07 19:03 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-06-19 22:23 ` [RFC PATCH v4 06/12] mm: Introduce vm_ops->may_mprotect() Sean Christopherson
2019-06-21 1:35 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-06-19 22:23 ` [RFC PATCH v4 07/12] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_map() hook for Intel SGX Sean Christopherson
2019-06-21 2:28 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-06-21 16:54 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-06-25 20:48 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-06-27 20:29 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-07-07 18:01 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-06-19 22:23 ` [RFC PATCH v4 08/12] security/selinux: Require SGX_MAPWX to map enclave page WX Sean Christopherson
2019-06-21 17:09 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-06-25 21:05 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-06-27 20:26 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-06-25 20:19 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-06-26 12:49 ` Dr. Greg
2019-06-19 22:23 ` [RFC PATCH v4 09/12] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_load() hook for Intel SGX Sean Christopherson
2019-06-21 17:05 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-06-25 21:01 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-06-25 21:49 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-06-27 19:38 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-06-19 22:23 ` [RFC PATCH v4 10/12] security/selinux: Add enclave_load() implementation Sean Christopherson
2019-06-21 21:22 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-06-25 21:09 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-06-27 20:19 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-06-28 16:16 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-06-28 21:20 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-06-29 1:15 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-07-01 18:14 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-06-29 23:41 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-07-01 17:46 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-07-01 17:53 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-07-01 18:54 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-07-01 19:03 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-07-01 19:32 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-07-01 20:03 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-07-07 18:46 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-06-25 20:34 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-06-19 22:24 ` [RFC PATCH v4 11/12] security/apparmor: " Sean Christopherson
2019-06-19 22:24 ` [RFC PATCH v4 12/12] LSM: x86/sgx: Show line of sight to LSM support SGX2's EAUG Sean Christopherson
2019-06-21 17:18 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-07-08 14:34 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-06-21 1:32 ` [RFC PATCH v4 00/12] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-06-27 18:56 ` [RFC PATCH v2 0/3] security/x86/sgx: SGX specific LSM hooks Cedric Xing
2019-07-03 23:16 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-07-03 23:22 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-07-03 23:23 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-07-06 5:04 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-07-08 14:46 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-07-07 23:41 ` [RFC PATCH v3 0/4] " Cedric Xing
2019-07-08 15:55 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-07-08 17:49 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-07-08 18:49 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-07-08 22:26 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-07-07 23:41 ` [RFC PATCH v3 1/4] x86/sgx: Add " Cedric Xing
2019-07-07 23:41 ` Cedric Xing [this message]
2019-07-09 1:03 ` [RFC PATCH v3 2/4] x86/64: Call LSM hooks from SGX subsystem/module Sean Christopherson
2019-07-07 23:41 ` [RFC PATCH v3 3/4] X86/sgx: Introduce EMA as a new LSM module Cedric Xing
2019-07-08 16:26 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-07-08 17:16 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-07-08 23:53 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-07-09 22:13 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-07-10 0:10 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-07-10 0:55 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-07-10 21:14 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-07-11 13:51 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-07-11 15:12 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-07-11 16:11 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-07-11 16:25 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-07-11 16:32 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-07-11 23:41 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-07-07 23:41 ` [RFC PATCH v3 4/4] x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux Cedric Xing
2019-07-09 1:33 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-07-09 21:26 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-07-10 15:49 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-07-10 16:08 ` Jethro Beekman
2019-07-10 18:16 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-07-10 17:54 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-06-27 18:56 ` [RFC PATCH v2 1/3] x86/sgx: Add SGX specific LSM hooks Cedric Xing
2019-06-27 22:06 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-06-27 22:52 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-06-27 23:37 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-06-28 0:47 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-06-28 17:22 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-06-28 22:29 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-06-29 1:37 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-06-29 21:35 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-07-01 17:57 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-07-01 19:53 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-07-01 21:45 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-07-01 23:11 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-07-02 7:42 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-07-02 15:44 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-07-03 9:46 ` Dr. Greg
2019-07-03 15:32 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-07-07 13:30 ` Dr. Greg
2019-07-09 0:02 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-07-09 1:52 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-07-09 21:16 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-07-11 10:22 ` Dr. Greg
2019-07-15 22:23 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-06-28 16:37 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-06-28 21:53 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-06-29 1:22 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-07-01 18:02 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-06-29 23:46 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-07-01 17:11 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-07-01 17:58 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-07-01 18:31 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-07-01 19:36 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-07-01 19:56 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-07-02 2:29 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-07-02 6:35 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-06-27 18:56 ` [RFC PATCH v2 2/3] x86/sgx: Call LSM hooks from SGX subsystem/module Cedric Xing
2019-06-27 18:56 ` [RFC PATCH v2 3/3] x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux Cedric Xing
2019-07-05 16:05 ` [RFC PATCH v4 00/12] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-07-08 17:29 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-07-08 17:33 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-07-09 16:22 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-07-09 17:09 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-07-09 20:41 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-07-09 22:25 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-07-09 23:11 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-07-10 16:57 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-07-10 20:19 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-07-10 20:31 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-07-11 9:06 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-07-10 22:00 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-07-10 22:16 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-07-10 23:16 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-07-11 9:26 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-07-11 14:32 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-07-11 17:51 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-07-12 0:08 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-07-10 1:28 ` Dr. Greg
2019-07-10 2:04 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-07-10 3:21 ` Jethro Beekman
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