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From: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
To: casey.schaufler@intel.com, jmorris@namei.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org
Cc: casey@schaufler-ca.com, keescook@chromium.org,
	john.johansen@canonical.com, penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp,
	paul@paul-moore.com, sds@tycho.nsa.gov
Subject: [PATCH v4 21/23] Audit: Store LSM audit information in an lsmblob
Date: Wed, 26 Jun 2019 12:22:32 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190626192234.11725-22-casey@schaufler-ca.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190626192234.11725-1-casey@schaufler-ca.com>

Change the audit code to store full lsmblob data instead of
a single u32 secid. This allows for multiple security modules
to use the audit system at the same time. It also allows the
removal of scaffolding code that was included during the
revision of LSM interfaces.

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
 kernel/audit.h   |  6 +++---
 kernel/auditsc.c | 40 +++++++++++++---------------------------
 2 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-)

diff --git a/kernel/audit.h b/kernel/audit.h
index 29e29c6f4afb..a8dd479e9556 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.h
+++ b/kernel/audit.h
@@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ struct audit_names {
 	kuid_t			uid;
 	kgid_t			gid;
 	dev_t			rdev;
-	u32			osid;
+	struct lsmblob		olsm;
 	struct audit_cap_data	fcap;
 	unsigned int		fcap_ver;
 	unsigned char		type;		/* record type */
@@ -148,7 +148,7 @@ struct audit_context {
 	kuid_t		    target_auid;
 	kuid_t		    target_uid;
 	unsigned int	    target_sessionid;
-	struct lsmblob   target_lsm;
+	struct lsmblob	    target_lsm;
 	char		    target_comm[TASK_COMM_LEN];
 
 	struct audit_tree_refs *trees, *first_trees;
@@ -165,7 +165,7 @@ struct audit_context {
 			kuid_t			uid;
 			kgid_t			gid;
 			umode_t			mode;
-			u32			osid;
+			struct lsmblob		olsm;
 			int			has_perm;
 			uid_t			perm_uid;
 			gid_t			perm_gid;
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 0478680cd0a8..ec8872430fb6 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -646,17 +646,15 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
 			if (f->lsm_rule) {
 				/* Find files that match */
 				if (name) {
-					lsmblob_init(&blob, name->osid);
 					result = security_audit_rule_match(
-								&blob,
+								&name->olsm,
 								f->type,
 								f->op,
 								f->lsm_rule);
 				} else if (ctx) {
 					list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
-						lsmblob_init(&blob, n->osid);
 						if (security_audit_rule_match(
-								&blob,
+								&n->olsm,
 								f->type,
 								f->op,
 								f->lsm_rule)) {
@@ -668,8 +666,7 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
 				/* Find ipc objects that match */
 				if (!ctx || ctx->type != AUDIT_IPC)
 					break;
-				lsmblob_init(&blob, ctx->ipc.osid);
-				if (security_audit_rule_match(&blob,
+				if (security_audit_rule_match(&ctx->ipc.olsm,
 							      f->type, f->op,
 							      f->lsm_rule))
 					++result;
@@ -955,7 +952,7 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
 			 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid), sessionid);
 	if (lsmblob_is_set(blob)) {
 		if (security_secid_to_secctx(blob, &lsmctx)) {
-			audit_log_format(ab, " obj=(none)");
+			audit_log_format(ab, " obj=?");
 			rc = 1;
 		} else {
 			audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", lsmctx.context);
@@ -1187,19 +1184,17 @@ static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
 				context->socketcall.args[i]);
 		break; }
 	case AUDIT_IPC: {
-		u32 osid = context->ipc.osid;
+		struct lsmblob *olsm = &context->ipc.olsm;
 
 		audit_log_format(ab, "ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#ho",
 				 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, context->ipc.uid),
 				 from_kgid(&init_user_ns, context->ipc.gid),
 				 context->ipc.mode);
-		if (osid) {
+		if (lsmblob_is_set(olsm)) {
 			struct lsmcontext lsmcxt;
-			struct lsmblob blob;
 
-			lsmblob_init(&blob, osid);
-			if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmcxt)) {
-				audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", osid);
+			if (security_secid_to_secctx(olsm, &lsmcxt)) {
+				audit_log_format(ab, " obj=?");
 				*call_panic = 1;
 			} else {
 				audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", lsmcxt.context);
@@ -1346,13 +1341,11 @@ static void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n,
 				 from_kgid(&init_user_ns, n->gid),
 				 MAJOR(n->rdev),
 				 MINOR(n->rdev));
-	if (n->osid != 0) {
-		struct lsmblob blob;
+	if (lsmblob_is_set(&n->olsm)) {
 		struct lsmcontext lsmctx;
 
-		lsmblob_init(&blob, n->osid);
-		if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmctx)) {
-			audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", n->osid);
+		if (security_secid_to_secctx(&n->olsm, &lsmctx)) {
+			audit_log_format(ab, " obj=?");
 			if (call_panic)
 				*call_panic = 2;
 		} else {
@@ -1906,17 +1899,13 @@ static inline int audit_copy_fcaps(struct audit_names *name,
 void audit_copy_inode(struct audit_names *name, const struct dentry *dentry,
 		      struct inode *inode, unsigned int flags)
 {
-	struct lsmblob blob;
-
 	name->ino   = inode->i_ino;
 	name->dev   = inode->i_sb->s_dev;
 	name->mode  = inode->i_mode;
 	name->uid   = inode->i_uid;
 	name->gid   = inode->i_gid;
 	name->rdev  = inode->i_rdev;
-	security_inode_getsecid(inode, &blob);
-	/* scaffolding until osid is updated */
-	name->osid = blob.secid[0];
+	security_inode_getsecid(inode, &name->olsm);
 	if (flags & AUDIT_INODE_NOEVAL) {
 		name->fcap_ver = -1;
 		return;
@@ -2266,14 +2255,11 @@ void __audit_mq_getsetattr(mqd_t mqdes, struct mq_attr *mqstat)
 void __audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp)
 {
 	struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
-	struct lsmblob blob;
 	context->ipc.uid = ipcp->uid;
 	context->ipc.gid = ipcp->gid;
 	context->ipc.mode = ipcp->mode;
 	context->ipc.has_perm = 0;
-	security_ipc_getsecid(ipcp, &blob);
-	/* scaffolding on the [0] - change "osid" to a lsmblob */
-	context->ipc.osid = blob.secid[0];
+	security_ipc_getsecid(ipcp, &context->ipc.olsm);
 	context->type = AUDIT_IPC;
 }
 
-- 
2.20.1


  parent reply	other threads:[~2019-06-26 19:23 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 96+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-06-26 19:22 [PATCH v4 00/23] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Casey Schaufler
2019-06-26 19:22 ` [PATCH v4 01/23] LSM: Infrastructure management of the superblock Casey Schaufler
2019-06-26 19:22 ` [PATCH v4 02/23] LSM: Infrastructure management of the sock security Casey Schaufler
2019-06-26 19:22 ` [PATCH v4 03/23] LSM: Infrastructure management of the key blob Casey Schaufler
2019-06-26 19:22 ` [PATCH v4 04/23] LSM: Create and manage the lsmblob data structure Casey Schaufler
2019-06-26 23:39   ` John Johansen
2019-06-27 17:43     ` Casey Schaufler
2019-06-26 19:22 ` [PATCH v4 05/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_audit_rule_match Casey Schaufler
2019-06-26 23:07   ` Kees Cook
2019-06-26 23:45   ` John Johansen
2019-06-26 19:22 ` [PATCH v4 06/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_kernel_act_as Casey Schaufler
2019-06-26 23:07   ` Kees Cook
2019-06-26 23:47   ` John Johansen
2019-06-26 19:22 ` [PATCH v4 07/23] net: Prepare UDS for secuirty module stacking Casey Schaufler
2019-06-26 23:07   ` Kees Cook
2019-06-26 23:48   ` John Johansen
2019-06-26 19:22 ` [PATCH v4 08/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secctx_to_secid Casey Schaufler
2019-06-26 23:07   ` Kees Cook
2019-06-26 23:50   ` John Johansen
2019-06-26 19:22 ` [PATCH v4 09/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secid_to_secctx Casey Schaufler
2019-06-26 23:07   ` Kees Cook
2019-06-26 23:51   ` John Johansen
2019-06-26 19:22 ` [PATCH v4 10/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_ipc_getsecid Casey Schaufler
2019-06-26 23:08   ` Kees Cook
2019-06-26 23:53   ` John Johansen
2019-06-26 19:22 ` [PATCH v4 11/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_task_getsecid Casey Schaufler
2019-06-26 23:08   ` Kees Cook
2019-06-26 23:55   ` John Johansen
2019-06-26 19:22 ` [PATCH v4 12/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_inode_getsecid Casey Schaufler
2019-06-26 23:08   ` Kees Cook
2019-06-26 23:56   ` John Johansen
2019-06-26 19:22 ` [PATCH v4 13/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_cred_getsecid Casey Schaufler
2019-06-26 23:09   ` Kees Cook
2019-06-26 23:57   ` John Johansen
2019-06-26 19:22 ` [PATCH v4 14/23] IMA: Change internal interfaces to use lsmblobs Casey Schaufler
2019-06-26 23:09   ` Kees Cook
2019-06-26 23:58   ` John Johansen
2019-06-26 19:22 ` [PATCH v4 15/23] LSM: Specify which LSM to display Casey Schaufler
2019-06-26 23:12   ` Kees Cook
2019-06-27 21:33   ` John Johansen
2019-06-28 14:45   ` Stephen Smalley
2019-06-28 16:15     ` Casey Schaufler
2019-06-28 18:08       ` John Johansen
     [not found]       ` <CAB9W1A1nwE7WBZqTe-GV8xNb83_B2ybV7cco++nfMjtDz9NJrg@mail.gmail.com>
2019-06-29  1:01         ` Fwd: " Stephen Smalley
2019-06-29 19:45           ` Casey Schaufler
2019-07-02  0:49           ` James Morris
2019-07-02  1:20             ` Casey Schaufler
2019-06-26 19:22 ` [PATCH v4 16/23] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_secid_to_secctx Casey Schaufler
2019-06-26 23:14   ` Kees Cook
2019-06-27 21:34   ` John Johansen
2019-06-26 19:22 ` [PATCH v4 17/23] " Casey Schaufler
2019-06-26 23:15   ` Kees Cook
2019-06-27  3:53   ` Kees Cook
2019-06-27 16:29     ` Casey Schaufler
2019-06-27 17:17       ` Kees Cook
2019-06-27 17:36         ` Casey Schaufler
2019-06-27 21:34   ` John Johansen
2019-06-27 21:36     ` John Johansen
2019-06-26 19:22 ` [PATCH v4 18/23] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_dentry_init_security Casey Schaufler
2019-06-26 23:15   ` Kees Cook
2019-06-27 21:34   ` John Johansen
2019-06-28 10:07   ` Ondrej Mosnacek
2019-06-26 19:22 ` [PATCH v4 19/23] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_inode_getsecctx Casey Schaufler
2019-06-26 23:16   ` Kees Cook
2019-06-27 21:36   ` John Johansen
2019-06-26 19:22 ` [PATCH v4 20/23] LSM: security_secid_to_secctx in netlink netfilter Casey Schaufler
2019-06-26 23:16   ` Kees Cook
2019-06-27 21:37   ` John Johansen
2019-06-26 19:22 ` Casey Schaufler [this message]
2019-06-26 23:16   ` [PATCH v4 21/23] Audit: Store LSM audit information in an lsmblob Kees Cook
2019-06-27 21:37   ` John Johansen
2019-06-26 19:22 ` [PATCH v4 22/23] NET: Store LSM netlabel data in a lsmblob Casey Schaufler
2019-06-26 23:18   ` Kees Cook
2019-06-27 21:38   ` John Johansen
2019-06-26 19:22 ` [PATCH v4 23/23] AppArmor: Remove the exclusive flag Casey Schaufler
2019-06-26 23:18   ` Kees Cook
2019-06-27  2:22   ` James Morris
2019-06-27  3:28     ` Kees Cook
2019-06-27  3:44     ` John Johansen
2019-06-27  3:49       ` James Morris
2019-06-27 21:38   ` John Johansen
2019-06-26 21:04 ` [PATCH v4 00/23] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Kees Cook
2019-06-26 21:11   ` John Johansen
2019-06-26 23:04     ` Kees Cook
2019-06-26 21:25   ` Casey Schaufler
2019-06-27  2:41 ` James Morris
2019-06-27  2:46   ` James Morris
2019-06-27  3:45     ` James Morris
2019-06-27  4:10       ` James Morris
2019-06-27 17:07         ` Kees Cook
2019-06-27 18:10           ` James Morris
2019-06-27  3:51     ` Kees Cook
2019-06-27 21:52 ` John Johansen
2019-06-27 22:33   ` Casey Schaufler
2019-06-27 23:16   ` James Morris
2019-06-27 23:44     ` John Johansen

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