[PATCH AUTOSEL 5.5 181/542] selinux: revert "stop passing MAY_NOT_BLOCK to the AVC upon follow_link"

[PATCH AUTOSEL 5.5 181/542] selinux: revert "stop passing MAY_NOT_BLOCK to the AVC upon follow_link"

[Sasha Levin]

From: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

[ Upstream commit 1a37079c236d55fb31ebbf4b59945dab8ec8764c ]

This reverts commit e46e01eebbbc ("selinux: stop passing MAY_NOT_BLOCK
to the AVC upon follow_link"). The correct fix is to instead fall
back to ref-walk if audit is required irrespective of the specific
audit data type.  This is done in the next commit.

Fixes: e46e01eebbbc ("selinux: stop passing MAY_NOT_BLOCK to the AVC upon follow_link")
Reported-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 security/selinux/avc.c         | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++--
 security/selinux/hooks.c       |  5 +++--
 security/selinux/include/avc.h |  5 +++++
 3 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/selinux/avc.c b/security/selinux/avc.c
index ecd3829996aa4..74c43ebe34bb8 100644
--- a/security/selinux/avc.c
+++ b/security/selinux/avc.c
@@ -862,8 +862,9 @@ static int avc_update_node(struct selinux_avc *avc,
 	 * permissive mode that only appear when in enforcing mode.
 	 *
 	 * See the corresponding handling in slow_avc_audit(), and the
-	 * logic in selinux_inode_permission for the MAY_NOT_BLOCK flag,
-	 * which is transliterated into AVC_NONBLOCKING.
+	 * logic in selinux_inode_follow_link and selinux_inode_permission
+	 * for the VFS MAY_NOT_BLOCK flag, which is transliterated into
+	 * AVC_NONBLOCKING for avc_has_perm_noaudit().
 	 */
 	if (flags & AVC_NONBLOCKING)
 		return 0;
@@ -1205,6 +1206,25 @@ int avc_has_perm(struct selinux_state *state, u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
 	return rc;
 }
 
+int avc_has_perm_flags(struct selinux_state *state,
+		       u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, u32 requested,
+		       struct common_audit_data *auditdata,
+		       int flags)
+{
+	struct av_decision avd;
+	int rc, rc2;
+
+	rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(state, ssid, tsid, tclass, requested,
+				  (flags & MAY_NOT_BLOCK) ? AVC_NONBLOCKING : 0,
+				  &avd);
+
+	rc2 = avc_audit(state, ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, &avd, rc,
+			auditdata, flags);
+	if (rc2)
+		return rc2;
+	return rc;
+}
+
 u32 avc_policy_seqno(struct selinux_state *state)
 {
 	return state->avc->avc_cache.latest_notif;
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 116b4d644f689..710a4fffa66f4 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -3004,8 +3004,9 @@ static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode,
 	if (IS_ERR(isec))
 		return PTR_ERR(isec);
 
-	return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
-			    sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, FILE__READ, &ad);
+	return avc_has_perm_flags(&selinux_state,
+				  sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, FILE__READ, &ad,
+				  rcu ? MAY_NOT_BLOCK : 0);
 }
 
 static noinline int audit_inode_permission(struct inode *inode,
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/avc.h b/security/selinux/include/avc.h
index 7be0e1e90e8be..74ea50977c201 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/avc.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/avc.h
@@ -153,6 +153,11 @@ int avc_has_perm(struct selinux_state *state,
 		 u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
 		 u16 tclass, u32 requested,
 		 struct common_audit_data *auditdata);
+int avc_has_perm_flags(struct selinux_state *state,
+		       u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
+		       u16 tclass, u32 requested,
+		       struct common_audit_data *auditdata,
+		       int flags);
 
 int avc_has_extended_perms(struct selinux_state *state,
 			   u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, u32 requested,
-- 
2.20.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL 5.5 182/542] selinux: fall back to ref-walk if audit is required

[Sasha Levin]

From: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

[ Upstream commit 0188d5c025ca8fe756ba3193bd7d150139af5a88 ]

commit bda0be7ad994 ("security: make inode_follow_link RCU-walk aware")
passed down the rcu flag to the SELinux AVC, but failed to adjust the
test in slow_avc_audit() to also return -ECHILD on LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY.
Previously, we only returned -ECHILD if generating an audit record with
LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE since this was only relevant from inode_permission.
Move the handling of MAY_NOT_BLOCK to avc_audit() and its inlined
equivalent in selinux_inode_permission() immediately after we determine
that audit is required, and always fall back to ref-walk in this case.

Fixes: bda0be7ad994 ("security: make inode_follow_link RCU-walk aware")
Reported-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Suggested-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 security/selinux/avc.c         | 24 +++++-------------------
 security/selinux/hooks.c       | 11 +++++++----
 security/selinux/include/avc.h |  8 +++++---
 3 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/selinux/avc.c b/security/selinux/avc.c
index 74c43ebe34bb8..23dc888ae3056 100644
--- a/security/selinux/avc.c
+++ b/security/selinux/avc.c
@@ -424,7 +424,7 @@ static inline int avc_xperms_audit(struct selinux_state *state,
 	if (likely(!audited))
 		return 0;
 	return slow_avc_audit(state, ssid, tsid, tclass, requested,
-			audited, denied, result, ad, 0);
+			audited, denied, result, ad);
 }
 
 static void avc_node_free(struct rcu_head *rhead)
@@ -758,8 +758,7 @@ static void avc_audit_post_callback(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *a)
 noinline int slow_avc_audit(struct selinux_state *state,
 			    u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
 			    u32 requested, u32 audited, u32 denied, int result,
-			    struct common_audit_data *a,
-			    unsigned int flags)
+			    struct common_audit_data *a)
 {
 	struct common_audit_data stack_data;
 	struct selinux_audit_data sad;
@@ -772,17 +771,6 @@ noinline int slow_avc_audit(struct selinux_state *state,
 		a->type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE;
 	}
 
-	/*
-	 * When in a RCU walk do the audit on the RCU retry.  This is because
-	 * the collection of the dname in an inode audit message is not RCU
-	 * safe.  Note this may drop some audits when the situation changes
-	 * during retry. However this is logically just as if the operation
-	 * happened a little later.
-	 */
-	if ((a->type == LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE) &&
-	    (flags & MAY_NOT_BLOCK))
-		return -ECHILD;
-
 	sad.tclass = tclass;
 	sad.requested = requested;
 	sad.ssid = ssid;
@@ -855,16 +843,14 @@ static int avc_update_node(struct selinux_avc *avc,
 	/*
 	 * If we are in a non-blocking code path, e.g. VFS RCU walk,
 	 * then we must not add permissions to a cache entry
-	 * because we cannot safely audit the denial.  Otherwise,
+	 * because we will not audit the denial.  Otherwise,
 	 * during the subsequent blocking retry (e.g. VFS ref walk), we
 	 * will find the permissions already granted in the cache entry
 	 * and won't audit anything at all, leading to silent denials in
 	 * permissive mode that only appear when in enforcing mode.
 	 *
-	 * See the corresponding handling in slow_avc_audit(), and the
-	 * logic in selinux_inode_follow_link and selinux_inode_permission
-	 * for the VFS MAY_NOT_BLOCK flag, which is transliterated into
-	 * AVC_NONBLOCKING for avc_has_perm_noaudit().
+	 * See the corresponding handling of MAY_NOT_BLOCK in avc_audit()
+	 * and selinux_inode_permission().
 	 */
 	if (flags & AVC_NONBLOCKING)
 		return 0;
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 710a4fffa66f4..65641c61ecb94 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -3011,8 +3011,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode,
 
 static noinline int audit_inode_permission(struct inode *inode,
 					   u32 perms, u32 audited, u32 denied,
-					   int result,
-					   unsigned flags)
+					   int result)
 {
 	struct common_audit_data ad;
 	struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
@@ -3023,7 +3022,7 @@ static noinline int audit_inode_permission(struct inode *inode,
 
 	rc = slow_avc_audit(&selinux_state,
 			    current_sid(), isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms,
-			    audited, denied, result, &ad, flags);
+			    audited, denied, result, &ad);
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 	return 0;
@@ -3070,7 +3069,11 @@ static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
 	if (likely(!audited))
 		return rc;
 
-	rc2 = audit_inode_permission(inode, perms, audited, denied, rc, flags);
+	/* fall back to ref-walk if we have to generate audit */
+	if (flags & MAY_NOT_BLOCK)
+		return -ECHILD;
+
+	rc2 = audit_inode_permission(inode, perms, audited, denied, rc);
 	if (rc2)
 		return rc2;
 	return rc;
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/avc.h b/security/selinux/include/avc.h
index 74ea50977c201..cf4cc3ef959b5 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/avc.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/avc.h
@@ -100,8 +100,7 @@ static inline u32 avc_audit_required(u32 requested,
 int slow_avc_audit(struct selinux_state *state,
 		   u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
 		   u32 requested, u32 audited, u32 denied, int result,
-		   struct common_audit_data *a,
-		   unsigned flags);
+		   struct common_audit_data *a);
 
 /**
  * avc_audit - Audit the granting or denial of permissions.
@@ -135,9 +134,12 @@ static inline int avc_audit(struct selinux_state *state,
 	audited = avc_audit_required(requested, avd, result, 0, &denied);
 	if (likely(!audited))
 		return 0;
+	/* fall back to ref-walk if we have to generate audit */
+	if (flags & MAY_NOT_BLOCK)
+		return -ECHILD;
 	return slow_avc_audit(state, ssid, tsid, tclass,
 			      requested, audited, denied, result,
-			      a, flags);
+			      a);
 }
 
 #define AVC_STRICT 1 /* Ignore permissive mode. */
-- 
2.20.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL 5.5 190/542] selinux: ensure we cleanup the internal AVC counters on error in avc_insert()

[Sasha Levin]

From: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>

[ Upstream commit d8db60cb23e49a92cf8cada3297395c7fa50fdf8 ]

Fix avc_insert() to call avc_node_kill() if we've already allocated
an AVC node and the code fails to insert the node in the cache.

Fixes: fa1aa143ac4a ("selinux: extended permissions for ioctls")
Reported-by: rsiddoji@codeaurora.org
Suggested-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 security/selinux/avc.c | 51 ++++++++++++++++++++----------------------
 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/selinux/avc.c b/security/selinux/avc.c
index 23dc888ae3056..6646300f7ccb2 100644
--- a/security/selinux/avc.c
+++ b/security/selinux/avc.c
@@ -617,40 +617,37 @@ static struct avc_node *avc_insert(struct selinux_avc *avc,
 	struct avc_node *pos, *node = NULL;
 	int hvalue;
 	unsigned long flag;
+	spinlock_t *lock;
+	struct hlist_head *head;
 
 	if (avc_latest_notif_update(avc, avd->seqno, 1))
-		goto out;
+		return NULL;
 
 	node = avc_alloc_node(avc);
-	if (node) {
-		struct hlist_head *head;
-		spinlock_t *lock;
-		int rc = 0;
-
-		hvalue = avc_hash(ssid, tsid, tclass);
-		avc_node_populate(node, ssid, tsid, tclass, avd);
-		rc = avc_xperms_populate(node, xp_node);
-		if (rc) {
-			kmem_cache_free(avc_node_cachep, node);
-			return NULL;
-		}
-		head = &avc->avc_cache.slots[hvalue];
-		lock = &avc->avc_cache.slots_lock[hvalue];
+	if (!node)
+		return NULL;
 
-		spin_lock_irqsave(lock, flag);
-		hlist_for_each_entry(pos, head, list) {
-			if (pos->ae.ssid == ssid &&
-			    pos->ae.tsid == tsid &&
-			    pos->ae.tclass == tclass) {
-				avc_node_replace(avc, node, pos);
-				goto found;
-			}
+	avc_node_populate(node, ssid, tsid, tclass, avd);
+	if (avc_xperms_populate(node, xp_node)) {
+		avc_node_kill(avc, node);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	hvalue = avc_hash(ssid, tsid, tclass);
+	head = &avc->avc_cache.slots[hvalue];
+	lock = &avc->avc_cache.slots_lock[hvalue];
+	spin_lock_irqsave(lock, flag);
+	hlist_for_each_entry(pos, head, list) {
+		if (pos->ae.ssid == ssid &&
+			pos->ae.tsid == tsid &&
+			pos->ae.tclass == tclass) {
+			avc_node_replace(avc, node, pos);
+			goto found;
 		}
-		hlist_add_head_rcu(&node->list, head);
-found:
-		spin_unlock_irqrestore(lock, flag);
 	}
-out:
+	hlist_add_head_rcu(&node->list, head);
+found:
+	spin_unlock_irqrestore(lock, flag);
 	return node;
 }
 
-- 
2.20.1

Re: [PATCH AUTOSEL 5.5 190/542] selinux: ensure we cleanup the internal AVC counters on error in avc_insert()

[Stephen Smalley]

On 2/14/20 10:43 AM, Sasha Levin wrote:
> From: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
> 
> [ Upstream commit d8db60cb23e49a92cf8cada3297395c7fa50fdf8 ]
> 
> Fix avc_insert() to call avc_node_kill() if we've already allocated
> an AVC node and the code fails to insert the node in the cache.
> 
> Fixes: fa1aa143ac4a ("selinux: extended permissions for ioctls")
> Reported-by: rsiddoji@codeaurora.org
> Suggested-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

You should also apply 030b995ad9ece9fa2d218af4429c1c78c2342096 
("selinux: ensure we cleanup the internal AVC counters on error in 
avc_update()") which fixes one additional instance of the same kind of 
bug not addressed by this patch.

> ---
>   security/selinux/avc.c | 51 ++++++++++++++++++++----------------------
>   1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/security/selinux/avc.c b/security/selinux/avc.c
> index 23dc888ae3056..6646300f7ccb2 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/avc.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/avc.c
> @@ -617,40 +617,37 @@ static struct avc_node *avc_insert(struct selinux_avc *avc,
>   	struct avc_node *pos, *node = NULL;
>   	int hvalue;
>   	unsigned long flag;
> +	spinlock_t *lock;
> +	struct hlist_head *head;
>   
>   	if (avc_latest_notif_update(avc, avd->seqno, 1))
> -		goto out;
> +		return NULL;
>   
>   	node = avc_alloc_node(avc);
> -	if (node) {
> -		struct hlist_head *head;
> -		spinlock_t *lock;
> -		int rc = 0;
> -
> -		hvalue = avc_hash(ssid, tsid, tclass);
> -		avc_node_populate(node, ssid, tsid, tclass, avd);
> -		rc = avc_xperms_populate(node, xp_node);
> -		if (rc) {
> -			kmem_cache_free(avc_node_cachep, node);
> -			return NULL;
> -		}
> -		head = &avc->avc_cache.slots[hvalue];
> -		lock = &avc->avc_cache.slots_lock[hvalue];
> +	if (!node)
> +		return NULL;
>   
> -		spin_lock_irqsave(lock, flag);
> -		hlist_for_each_entry(pos, head, list) {
> -			if (pos->ae.ssid == ssid &&
> -			    pos->ae.tsid == tsid &&
> -			    pos->ae.tclass == tclass) {
> -				avc_node_replace(avc, node, pos);
> -				goto found;
> -			}
> +	avc_node_populate(node, ssid, tsid, tclass, avd);
> +	if (avc_xperms_populate(node, xp_node)) {
> +		avc_node_kill(avc, node);
> +		return NULL;
> +	}
> +
> +	hvalue = avc_hash(ssid, tsid, tclass);
> +	head = &avc->avc_cache.slots[hvalue];
> +	lock = &avc->avc_cache.slots_lock[hvalue];
> +	spin_lock_irqsave(lock, flag);
> +	hlist_for_each_entry(pos, head, list) {
> +		if (pos->ae.ssid == ssid &&
> +			pos->ae.tsid == tsid &&
> +			pos->ae.tclass == tclass) {
> +			avc_node_replace(avc, node, pos);
> +			goto found;
>   		}
> -		hlist_add_head_rcu(&node->list, head);
> -found:
> -		spin_unlock_irqrestore(lock, flag);
>   	}
> -out:
> +	hlist_add_head_rcu(&node->list, head);
> +found:
> +	spin_unlock_irqrestore(lock, flag);
>   	return node;
>   }
>   
> 

Re: [PATCH AUTOSEL 5.5 190/542] selinux: ensure we cleanup the internal AVC counters on error in avc_insert()

[Sasha Levin]

On Fri, Feb 14, 2020 at 11:07:37AM -0500, Stephen Smalley wrote:
>On 2/14/20 10:43 AM, Sasha Levin wrote:
>>From: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
>>
>>[ Upstream commit d8db60cb23e49a92cf8cada3297395c7fa50fdf8 ]
>>
>>Fix avc_insert() to call avc_node_kill() if we've already allocated
>>an AVC node and the code fails to insert the node in the cache.
>>
>>Fixes: fa1aa143ac4a ("selinux: extended permissions for ioctls")
>>Reported-by: rsiddoji@codeaurora.org
>>Suggested-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
>>Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
>>Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
>>Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
>
>You should also apply 030b995ad9ece9fa2d218af4429c1c78c2342096 
>("selinux: ensure we cleanup the internal AVC counters on error in 
>avc_update()") which fixes one additional instance of the same kind of 
>bug not addressed by this patch.

I took that patch as well, thank you.

-- 
Thanks,
Sasha

[PATCH AUTOSEL 5.5 249/542] selinux: ensure we cleanup the internal AVC counters on error in avc_update()

[Sasha Levin]

From: Jaihind Yadav <jaihindyadav@codeaurora.org>

[ Upstream commit 030b995ad9ece9fa2d218af4429c1c78c2342096 ]

In AVC update we don't call avc_node_kill() when avc_xperms_populate()
fails, resulting in the avc->avc_cache.active_nodes counter having a
false value.  In last patch this changes was missed , so correcting it.

Fixes: fa1aa143ac4a ("selinux: extended permissions for ioctls")
Signed-off-by: Jaihind Yadav <jaihindyadav@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Ravi Kumar Siddojigari <rsiddoji@codeaurora.org>
[PM: merge fuzz, minor description cleanup]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 security/selinux/avc.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/security/selinux/avc.c b/security/selinux/avc.c
index 6646300f7ccb2..d18cb32a242ae 100644
--- a/security/selinux/avc.c
+++ b/security/selinux/avc.c
@@ -891,7 +891,7 @@ static int avc_update_node(struct selinux_avc *avc,
 	if (orig->ae.xp_node) {
 		rc = avc_xperms_populate(node, orig->ae.xp_node);
 		if (rc) {
-			kmem_cache_free(avc_node_cachep, node);
+			avc_node_kill(avc, node);
 			goto out_unlock;
 		}
 	}
-- 
2.20.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL 5.5 417/542] selinux: fix regression introduced by move_mount(2) syscall

[Sasha Levin]

From: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

[ Upstream commit 98aa00345de54b8340dc2ddcd87f446d33387b5e ]

commit 2db154b3ea8e ("vfs: syscall: Add move_mount(2) to move mounts around")
introduced a new move_mount(2) system call and a corresponding new LSM
security_move_mount hook but did not implement this hook for any existing
LSM.  This creates a regression for SELinux with respect to consistent
checking of mounts; the existing selinux_mount hook checks mounton
permission to the mount point path.  Provide a SELinux hook
implementation for move_mount that applies this same check for
consistency.  In the future we may wish to add a new move_mount
filesystem permission and check as well, but this addresses
the immediate regression.

Fixes: 2db154b3ea8e ("vfs: syscall: Add move_mount(2) to move mounts around")
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Reviewed-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 security/selinux/hooks.c | 10 ++++++++++
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)

diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 65641c61ecb94..db44c7eb43213 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -2762,6 +2762,14 @@ static int selinux_mount(const char *dev_name,
 		return path_has_perm(cred, path, FILE__MOUNTON);
 }
 
+static int selinux_move_mount(const struct path *from_path,
+			      const struct path *to_path)
+{
+	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+
+	return path_has_perm(cred, to_path, FILE__MOUNTON);
+}
+
 static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
 {
 	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
@@ -6907,6 +6915,8 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_clone_mnt_opts, selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_add_mnt_opt, selinux_add_mnt_opt),
 
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(move_mount, selinux_move_mount),
+
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(dentry_init_security, selinux_dentry_init_security),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(dentry_create_files_as, selinux_dentry_create_files_as),
 
-- 
2.20.1