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* [PATCH v3] default_range glblub implementation
@ 2019-08-30 15:39 Joshua Brindle
  2019-08-30 15:44 ` Stephen Smalley
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 4+ messages in thread
From: Joshua Brindle @ 2019-08-30 15:39 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: selinux; +Cc: paul, Joshua Brindle

A policy developer can now specify glblub as a default_range default and
the computed transition will be the intersection of the mls range of
the two contexts.

The glb (greatest lower bound) lub (lowest upper bound) of a range is calculated
as the greater of the low sensitivities and the lower of the high sensitivities
and the and of each category bitmap.

This can be used by MLS solution developers to compute a context that satisfies,
for example, the range of a network interface and the range of a user logging in.

Some examples are:

User Permitted Range | Network Device Label | Computed Label
---------------------|----------------------|----------------
S0-S1:c0.c12         | S0                   | S0
S0-S1:c0.c12         | S0-S1:c0.c1024       | S0-S1:c0.c12
S0-S4:c0.c512        | S1-S1:c0.c1024       | S1-S1:c0.c512
S0-S16:c0,c2         | S4-S6:c0.c128        | S4-S6:c0,c2
S0-S4                | S2-S6                | S2-S4
S0-S4                | S5-S8                | INVALID
S5-S8                | S0-S4                | INVALID
S6:c0,c2-S7:c4,c5    | S0:c2,c4-S6:c5.c100  | S6:c2-S6:c5

Signed-off-by: Joshua Brindle <joshua.brindle@crunchydata.com>
---
 security/selinux/include/security.h |  3 ++-
 security/selinux/ss/context.h       | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c       | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
 security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h       |  1 +
 security/selinux/ss/mls.c           |  2 ++
 security/selinux/ss/policydb.c      |  5 +++++
 security/selinux/ss/policydb.h      |  1 +
 7 files changed, 57 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/security/selinux/include/security.h b/security/selinux/include/security.h
index 111121281c47..ae840634e3c7 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/security.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h
@@ -40,10 +40,11 @@
 #define POLICYDB_VERSION_CONSTRAINT_NAMES	29
 #define POLICYDB_VERSION_XPERMS_IOCTL	30
 #define POLICYDB_VERSION_INFINIBAND		31
+#define POLICYDB_VERSION_GLBLUB		32
 
 /* Range of policy versions we understand*/
 #define POLICYDB_VERSION_MIN   POLICYDB_VERSION_BASE
-#define POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX   POLICYDB_VERSION_INFINIBAND
+#define POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX   POLICYDB_VERSION_GLBLUB
 
 /* Mask for just the mount related flags */
 #define SE_MNTMASK	0x0f
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/context.h b/security/selinux/ss/context.h
index 2260c44a568c..ea2a56d910a5 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/context.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/context.h
@@ -95,6 +95,34 @@ static inline int mls_context_cpy_high(struct context *dst, struct context *src)
 	return rc;
 }
 
+
+static inline int mls_context_glblub(struct context *dst, struct context *c1, struct context *c2)
+{
+	struct mls_range *dr = &dst->range, *r1 = &c1->range, *r2 = &c2->range;
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	if (r1->level[1].sens < r2->level[0].sens || r2->level[1].sens < r1->level[0].sens)
+		/* These ranges have no common sensitivities */
+		return -1;
+
+	/* Take the greatest of the low */
+	dr->level[0].sens = max(r1->level[0].sens, r2->level[0].sens);
+
+	/* Take the least of the high */
+	dr->level[1].sens = min(r1->level[1].sens, r2->level[1].sens);
+
+	rc = ebitmap_and(&dr->level[0].cat, &r1->level[0].cat, &r2->level[0].cat);
+	if (rc)
+		goto out;
+
+	rc = ebitmap_and(&dr->level[1].cat, &r1->level[1].cat, &r2->level[1].cat);
+	if (rc)
+		goto out;
+
+out:
+	return rc;
+}
+
 static inline int mls_context_cmp(struct context *c1, struct context *c2)
 {
 	return ((c1->range.level[0].sens == c2->range.level[0].sens) &&
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c
index 09929fc5ab47..c8c3663111e2 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c
@@ -77,6 +77,24 @@ int ebitmap_cpy(struct ebitmap *dst, struct ebitmap *src)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+int ebitmap_and(struct ebitmap *dst, struct ebitmap *e1, struct ebitmap *e2)
+{
+	struct ebitmap_node *n;
+	int bit, rc;
+
+	ebitmap_init(dst);
+
+	ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(e1, n, bit) {
+		if (ebitmap_get_bit(e2, bit)) {
+			rc = ebitmap_set_bit(dst, bit, 1);
+			if (rc < 0)
+				return rc;
+		}
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_NETLABEL
 /**
  * ebitmap_netlbl_export - Export an ebitmap into a NetLabel category bitmap
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h
index 6aa7cf6a2197..9a23b81b8832 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h
@@ -124,6 +124,7 @@ static inline void ebitmap_node_clr_bit(struct ebitmap_node *n,
 
 int ebitmap_cmp(struct ebitmap *e1, struct ebitmap *e2);
 int ebitmap_cpy(struct ebitmap *dst, struct ebitmap *src);
+int ebitmap_and(struct ebitmap *dst, struct ebitmap *e1, struct ebitmap *e2);
 int ebitmap_contains(struct ebitmap *e1, struct ebitmap *e2, u32 last_e2bit);
 int ebitmap_get_bit(struct ebitmap *e, unsigned long bit);
 int ebitmap_set_bit(struct ebitmap *e, unsigned long bit, int value);
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/mls.c b/security/selinux/ss/mls.c
index 5e05f5b902d7..76c8ad014ac9 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/mls.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/mls.c
@@ -529,6 +529,8 @@ int mls_compute_sid(struct policydb *p,
 			return mls_context_cpy_high(newcontext, tcontext);
 		case DEFAULT_TARGET_LOW_HIGH:
 			return mls_context_cpy(newcontext, tcontext);
+		case DEFAULT_GLBLUB:
+			return mls_context_glblub(newcontext, scontext, tcontext);
 		}
 
 		/* Fallthrough */
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
index f8efaa9f647c..1b59f72effbb 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
@@ -160,6 +160,11 @@ static struct policydb_compat_info policydb_compat[] = {
 		.sym_num	= SYM_NUM,
 		.ocon_num	= OCON_NUM,
 	},
+	{
+		.version	= POLICYDB_VERSION_GLBLUB,
+		.sym_num	= SYM_NUM,
+		.ocon_num	= OCON_NUM,
+	},
 };
 
 static struct policydb_compat_info *policydb_lookup_compat(int version)
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h
index fcc6366b447f..0c41d0b4da96 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h
@@ -69,6 +69,7 @@ struct class_datum {
 #define DEFAULT_TARGET_LOW     4
 #define DEFAULT_TARGET_HIGH    5
 #define DEFAULT_TARGET_LOW_HIGH        6
+#define DEFAULT_GLBLUB		7
 	char default_range;
 };
 
-- 
2.21.0


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 4+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v3] default_range glblub implementation
  2019-08-30 15:39 [PATCH v3] default_range glblub implementation Joshua Brindle
@ 2019-08-30 15:44 ` Stephen Smalley
  2019-08-30 15:47   ` Joshua Brindle
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 4+ messages in thread
From: Stephen Smalley @ 2019-08-30 15:44 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Joshua Brindle, selinux; +Cc: paul

On 8/30/19 11:39 AM, Joshua Brindle wrote:
> A policy developer can now specify glblub as a default_range default and
> the computed transition will be the intersection of the mls range of
> the two contexts.
> 
> The glb (greatest lower bound) lub (lowest upper bound) of a range is calculated
> as the greater of the low sensitivities and the lower of the high sensitivities
> and the and of each category bitmap.
> 
> This can be used by MLS solution developers to compute a context that satisfies,
> for example, the range of a network interface and the range of a user logging in.
> 
> Some examples are:
> 
> User Permitted Range | Network Device Label | Computed Label
> ---------------------|----------------------|----------------
> S0-S1:c0.c12         | S0                   | S0
> S0-S1:c0.c12         | S0-S1:c0.c1024       | S0-S1:c0.c12
> S0-S4:c0.c512        | S1-S1:c0.c1024       | S1-S1:c0.c512
> S0-S16:c0,c2         | S4-S6:c0.c128        | S4-S6:c0,c2
> S0-S4                | S2-S6                | S2-S4
> S0-S4                | S5-S8                | INVALID
> S5-S8                | S0-S4                | INVALID
> S6:c0,c2-S7:c4,c5    | S0:c2,c4-S6:c5.c100  | S6:c2-S6:c5
> 
> Signed-off-by: Joshua Brindle <joshua.brindle@crunchydata.com>
> ---
>   security/selinux/include/security.h |  3 ++-
>   security/selinux/ss/context.h       | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>   security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c       | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
>   security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h       |  1 +
>   security/selinux/ss/mls.c           |  2 ++
>   security/selinux/ss/policydb.c      |  5 +++++
>   security/selinux/ss/policydb.h      |  1 +
>   7 files changed, 57 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> 
> diff --git a/security/selinux/include/security.h b/security/selinux/include/security.h
> index 111121281c47..ae840634e3c7 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/include/security.h
> +++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h
> @@ -40,10 +40,11 @@
>   #define POLICYDB_VERSION_CONSTRAINT_NAMES	29
>   #define POLICYDB_VERSION_XPERMS_IOCTL	30
>   #define POLICYDB_VERSION_INFINIBAND		31
> +#define POLICYDB_VERSION_GLBLUB		32
>   
>   /* Range of policy versions we understand*/
>   #define POLICYDB_VERSION_MIN   POLICYDB_VERSION_BASE
> -#define POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX   POLICYDB_VERSION_INFINIBAND
> +#define POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX   POLICYDB_VERSION_GLBLUB
>   
>   /* Mask for just the mount related flags */
>   #define SE_MNTMASK	0x0f
> diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/context.h b/security/selinux/ss/context.h
> index 2260c44a568c..ea2a56d910a5 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/ss/context.h
> +++ b/security/selinux/ss/context.h
> @@ -95,6 +95,34 @@ static inline int mls_context_cpy_high(struct context *dst, struct context *src)
>   	return rc;
>   }
>   
> +
> +static inline int mls_context_glblub(struct context *dst, struct context *c1, struct context *c2)
> +{
> +	struct mls_range *dr = &dst->range, *r1 = &c1->range, *r2 = &c2->range;
> +	int rc = 0;
> +
> +	if (r1->level[1].sens < r2->level[0].sens || r2->level[1].sens < r1->level[0].sens)
> +		/* These ranges have no common sensitivities */
> +		return -1;

I mentioned this on the prior patch, but perhaps you didn't read past 
the first comment: I think you need to return -EINVAL or some other 
-errno value here since this will get propagated up to the userspace 
caller as an errno if I am not mistaken.

> +
> +	/* Take the greatest of the low */
> +	dr->level[0].sens = max(r1->level[0].sens, r2->level[0].sens);
> +
> +	/* Take the least of the high */
> +	dr->level[1].sens = min(r1->level[1].sens, r2->level[1].sens);
> +
> +	rc = ebitmap_and(&dr->level[0].cat, &r1->level[0].cat, &r2->level[0].cat);
> +	if (rc)
> +		goto out;
> +
> +	rc = ebitmap_and(&dr->level[1].cat, &r1->level[1].cat, &r2->level[1].cat);
> +	if (rc)
> +		goto out;
> +
> +out:
> +	return rc;
> +}
> +
>   static inline int mls_context_cmp(struct context *c1, struct context *c2)
>   {
>   	return ((c1->range.level[0].sens == c2->range.level[0].sens) &&
> diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c
> index 09929fc5ab47..c8c3663111e2 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c
> @@ -77,6 +77,24 @@ int ebitmap_cpy(struct ebitmap *dst, struct ebitmap *src)
>   	return 0;
>   }
>   
> +int ebitmap_and(struct ebitmap *dst, struct ebitmap *e1, struct ebitmap *e2)
> +{
> +	struct ebitmap_node *n;
> +	int bit, rc;
> +
> +	ebitmap_init(dst);
> +
> +	ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(e1, n, bit) {
> +		if (ebitmap_get_bit(e2, bit)) {
> +			rc = ebitmap_set_bit(dst, bit, 1);
> +			if (rc < 0)
> +				return rc;
> +		}
> +	}
> +	return 0;
> +}
> +
> +
>   #ifdef CONFIG_NETLABEL
>   /**
>    * ebitmap_netlbl_export - Export an ebitmap into a NetLabel category bitmap
> diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h
> index 6aa7cf6a2197..9a23b81b8832 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h
> +++ b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h
> @@ -124,6 +124,7 @@ static inline void ebitmap_node_clr_bit(struct ebitmap_node *n,
>   
>   int ebitmap_cmp(struct ebitmap *e1, struct ebitmap *e2);
>   int ebitmap_cpy(struct ebitmap *dst, struct ebitmap *src);
> +int ebitmap_and(struct ebitmap *dst, struct ebitmap *e1, struct ebitmap *e2);
>   int ebitmap_contains(struct ebitmap *e1, struct ebitmap *e2, u32 last_e2bit);
>   int ebitmap_get_bit(struct ebitmap *e, unsigned long bit);
>   int ebitmap_set_bit(struct ebitmap *e, unsigned long bit, int value);
> diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/mls.c b/security/selinux/ss/mls.c
> index 5e05f5b902d7..76c8ad014ac9 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/ss/mls.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/ss/mls.c
> @@ -529,6 +529,8 @@ int mls_compute_sid(struct policydb *p,
>   			return mls_context_cpy_high(newcontext, tcontext);
>   		case DEFAULT_TARGET_LOW_HIGH:
>   			return mls_context_cpy(newcontext, tcontext);
> +		case DEFAULT_GLBLUB:
> +			return mls_context_glblub(newcontext, scontext, tcontext);
>   		}
>   
>   		/* Fallthrough */
> diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
> index f8efaa9f647c..1b59f72effbb 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
> @@ -160,6 +160,11 @@ static struct policydb_compat_info policydb_compat[] = {
>   		.sym_num	= SYM_NUM,
>   		.ocon_num	= OCON_NUM,
>   	},
> +	{
> +		.version	= POLICYDB_VERSION_GLBLUB,
> +		.sym_num	= SYM_NUM,
> +		.ocon_num	= OCON_NUM,
> +	},
>   };
>   
>   static struct policydb_compat_info *policydb_lookup_compat(int version)
> diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h
> index fcc6366b447f..0c41d0b4da96 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h
> +++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h
> @@ -69,6 +69,7 @@ struct class_datum {
>   #define DEFAULT_TARGET_LOW     4
>   #define DEFAULT_TARGET_HIGH    5
>   #define DEFAULT_TARGET_LOW_HIGH        6
> +#define DEFAULT_GLBLUB		7
>   	char default_range;
>   };
>   
> 


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 4+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v3] default_range glblub implementation
  2019-08-30 15:44 ` Stephen Smalley
@ 2019-08-30 15:47   ` Joshua Brindle
  2019-08-30 21:44     ` Paul Moore
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 4+ messages in thread
From: Joshua Brindle @ 2019-08-30 15:47 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Stephen Smalley; +Cc: selinux, Paul Moore

<snip>
> > +
> > +static inline int mls_context_glblub(struct context *dst, struct context *c1, struct context *c2)
> > +{
> > +     struct mls_range *dr = &dst->range, *r1 = &c1->range, *r2 = &c2->range;
> > +     int rc = 0;
> > +
> > +     if (r1->level[1].sens < r2->level[0].sens || r2->level[1].sens < r1->level[0].sens)
> > +             /* These ranges have no common sensitivities */
> > +             return -1;
>
> I mentioned this on the prior patch, but perhaps you didn't read past
> the first comment: I think you need to return -EINVAL or some other
> -errno value here since this will get propagated up to the userspace
> caller as an errno if I am not mistaken.

Yes, you are right. Sorry about that. I'll fix this on the next spin
if everyone is okay with everything else.  I think -EINVAL is
appropriate unless anyone else objects.

Thank you.

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 4+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v3] default_range glblub implementation
  2019-08-30 15:47   ` Joshua Brindle
@ 2019-08-30 21:44     ` Paul Moore
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 4+ messages in thread
From: Paul Moore @ 2019-08-30 21:44 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Joshua Brindle; +Cc: Stephen Smalley, selinux

On Fri, Aug 30, 2019 at 11:47 AM Joshua Brindle
<joshua.brindle@crunchydata.com> wrote:
> <snip>
> > > +
> > > +static inline int mls_context_glblub(struct context *dst, struct context *c1, struct context *c2)
> > > +{
> > > +     struct mls_range *dr = &dst->range, *r1 = &c1->range, *r2 = &c2->range;
> > > +     int rc = 0;
> > > +
> > > +     if (r1->level[1].sens < r2->level[0].sens || r2->level[1].sens < r1->level[0].sens)
> > > +             /* These ranges have no common sensitivities */
> > > +             return -1;
> >
> > I mentioned this on the prior patch, but perhaps you didn't read past
> > the first comment: I think you need to return -EINVAL or some other
> > -errno value here since this will get propagated up to the userspace
> > caller as an errno if I am not mistaken.
>
> Yes, you are right. Sorry about that. I'll fix this on the next spin
> if everyone is okay with everything else.  I think -EINVAL is
> appropriate unless anyone else objects.

Other than this, v3 seems reasonable to me, but it would be good to
see a thumbs-up on the latest userspace patches before we merge this.
Changes to the kernel/user interface are
<haunting_voice>FOREVER</haunting_voice>.

-- 
paul moore
www.paul-moore.com

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 4+ messages in thread

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Thread overview: 4+ messages (download: mbox.gz / follow: Atom feed)
-- links below jump to the message on this page --
2019-08-30 15:39 [PATCH v3] default_range glblub implementation Joshua Brindle
2019-08-30 15:44 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-08-30 15:47   ` Joshua Brindle
2019-08-30 21:44     ` Paul Moore

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