* [PATCH 01/97] LSM: Infrastructure management of the superblock
2019-02-28 22:17 [PATCH 00/97] LSM: Complete module stacking Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-02-28 22:17 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-03-01 14:02 ` Edwin Zimmerman
2019-02-28 22:17 ` [PATCH 02/97] LSM: Infrastructure management of the sock security Casey Schaufler
` (69 subsequent siblings)
70 siblings, 1 reply; 80+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-02-28 22:17 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul
From: Casey Schaufler <cschaufler@localhost.localdomain>
Move management of the superblock->sb_security blob out
of the individual security modules and into the security
infrastructure. Instead of allocating the blobs from within
the modules the modules tell the infrastructure how much
space is required, and the space is allocated there.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 1 +
security/security.c | 46 ++++++++++++++++++++++----
security/selinux/hooks.c | 55 +++++++++++--------------------
security/selinux/include/objsec.h | 6 ++++
security/selinux/ss/services.c | 3 +-
security/smack/smack.h | 6 ++++
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 35 +++++---------------
7 files changed, 83 insertions(+), 69 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index 22fc786d723a..97510e9b9288 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -2036,6 +2036,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes {
int lbs_cred;
int lbs_file;
int lbs_inode;
+ int lbs_superblock;
int lbs_ipc;
int lbs_msg_msg;
int lbs_task;
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index b6bff646d373..fd8d7ae967c0 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -172,6 +172,7 @@ static void __init lsm_set_blob_sizes(struct lsm_blob_sizes *needed)
lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_inode, &blob_sizes.lbs_inode);
lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_ipc, &blob_sizes.lbs_ipc);
lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_msg_msg, &blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg);
+ lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_superblock, &blob_sizes.lbs_superblock);
lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_task, &blob_sizes.lbs_task);
}
@@ -296,12 +297,13 @@ static void __init ordered_lsm_init(void)
for (lsm = ordered_lsms; *lsm; lsm++)
prepare_lsm(*lsm);
- init_debug("cred blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_cred);
- init_debug("file blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_file);
- init_debug("inode blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_inode);
- init_debug("ipc blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_ipc);
- init_debug("msg_msg blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg);
- init_debug("task blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_task);
+ init_debug("cred blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_cred);
+ init_debug("file blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_file);
+ init_debug("inode blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_inode);
+ init_debug("ipc blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_ipc);
+ init_debug("msg_msg blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg);
+ init_debug("superblock blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_superblock);
+ init_debug("task blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_task);
/*
* Create any kmem_caches needed for blobs
@@ -599,6 +601,27 @@ static void __init lsm_early_task(struct task_struct *task)
panic("%s: Early task alloc failed.\n", __func__);
}
+/**
+ * lsm_superblock_alloc - allocate a composite superblock blob
+ * @sb: the superblock that needs a blob
+ *
+ * Allocate the superblock blob for all the modules
+ *
+ * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated.
+ */
+int lsm_superblock_alloc(struct super_block *sb)
+{
+ if (blob_sizes.lbs_superblock == 0) {
+ sb->s_security = NULL;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ sb->s_security = kzalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_superblock, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (sb->s_security == NULL)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ return 0;
+}
+
/*
* Hook list operation macros.
*
@@ -762,12 +785,21 @@ void security_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
int security_sb_alloc(struct super_block *sb)
{
- return call_int_hook(sb_alloc_security, 0, sb);
+ int rc = lsm_superblock_alloc(sb);
+
+ if (unlikely(rc))
+ return rc;
+ rc = call_int_hook(sb_alloc_security, 0, sb);
+ if (unlikely(rc))
+ security_sb_free(sb);
+ return rc;
}
void security_sb_free(struct super_block *sb)
{
call_void_hook(sb_free_security, sb);
+ kfree(sb->s_security);
+ sb->s_security = NULL;
}
void security_free_mnt_opts(void **mnt_opts)
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 5d92167dbe05..f36cf93695ad 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -333,7 +333,7 @@ static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
if (!isec)
return;
- sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
+ sbsec = selinux_superblock(inode->i_sb);
/*
* As not all inode security structures are in a list, we check for
* empty list outside of the lock to make sure that we won't waste
@@ -364,11 +364,7 @@ static int file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
static int superblock_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
{
- struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
-
- sbsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!sbsec)
- return -ENOMEM;
+ struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
mutex_init(&sbsec->lock);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->isec_head);
@@ -377,18 +373,10 @@ static int superblock_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
sbsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
sbsec->def_sid = SECINITSID_FILE;
sbsec->mntpoint_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
- sb->s_security = sbsec;
return 0;
}
-static void superblock_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
-{
- struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
- sb->s_security = NULL;
- kfree(sbsec);
-}
-
struct selinux_mnt_opts {
const char *fscontext, *context, *rootcontext, *defcontext;
};
@@ -492,7 +480,7 @@ static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid,
static int selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(struct super_block *sb)
{
- struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
+ struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
return sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR ||
sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS ||
@@ -511,7 +499,7 @@ static int selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(struct super_block *sb)
static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
{
- struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
+ struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
struct inode *root_inode = d_backing_inode(root);
int rc = 0;
@@ -624,7 +612,7 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
unsigned long *set_kern_flags)
{
const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
- struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
+ struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
struct dentry *root = sbsec->sb->s_root;
struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts = mnt_opts;
struct inode_security_struct *root_isec;
@@ -857,8 +845,8 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
static int selinux_cmp_sb_context(const struct super_block *oldsb,
const struct super_block *newsb)
{
- struct superblock_security_struct *old = oldsb->s_security;
- struct superblock_security_struct *new = newsb->s_security;
+ struct superblock_security_struct *old = selinux_superblock(oldsb);
+ struct superblock_security_struct *new = selinux_superblock(newsb);
char oldflags = old->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
char newflags = new->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
@@ -890,8 +878,9 @@ static int selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
unsigned long *set_kern_flags)
{
int rc = 0;
- const struct superblock_security_struct *oldsbsec = oldsb->s_security;
- struct superblock_security_struct *newsbsec = newsb->s_security;
+ const struct superblock_security_struct *oldsbsec =
+ selinux_superblock(oldsb);
+ struct superblock_security_struct *newsbsec = selinux_superblock(newsb);
int set_fscontext = (oldsbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT);
int set_context = (oldsbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT);
@@ -1057,7 +1046,7 @@ static int show_sid(struct seq_file *m, u32 sid)
static int selinux_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb)
{
- struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
+ struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
int rc;
if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
@@ -1349,7 +1338,7 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dent
if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_FILE)
isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
- sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
+ sbsec = selinux_superblock(inode->i_sb);
if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)) {
/* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
after the initial policy is loaded and the security
@@ -1739,7 +1728,8 @@ selinux_determine_inode_label(const struct task_security_struct *tsec,
const struct qstr *name, u16 tclass,
u32 *_new_isid)
{
- const struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
+ const struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec =
+ selinux_superblock(dir->i_sb);
if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) &&
(sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)) {
@@ -1770,7 +1760,7 @@ static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
int rc;
dsec = inode_security(dir);
- sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
+ sbsec = selinux_superblock(dir->i_sb);
sid = tsec->sid;
@@ -1919,7 +1909,7 @@ static int superblock_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
- sbsec = sb->s_security;
+ sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, perms, ad);
}
@@ -2550,11 +2540,6 @@ static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
return superblock_alloc_security(sb);
}
-static void selinux_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
-{
- superblock_free_security(sb);
-}
-
static inline int opt_len(const char *s)
{
bool open_quote = false;
@@ -2625,7 +2610,7 @@ static int selinux_sb_eat_lsm_opts(char *options, void **mnt_opts)
static int selinux_sb_remount(struct super_block *sb, void *mnt_opts)
{
struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts = mnt_opts;
- struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
+ struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
u32 sid;
int rc;
@@ -2779,7 +2764,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
int rc;
char *context;
- sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
+ sbsec = selinux_superblock(dir->i_sb);
newsid = tsec->create_sid;
@@ -3016,7 +3001,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
return dentry_has_perm(current_cred(), dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
}
- sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
+ sbsec = selinux_superblock(inode->i_sb);
if (!(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
@@ -6538,6 +6523,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes selinux_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
.lbs_inode = sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
.lbs_ipc = sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct),
.lbs_msg_msg = sizeof(struct msg_security_struct),
+ .lbs_superblock = sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct),
};
static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
@@ -6563,7 +6549,6 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committed_creds, selinux_bprm_committed_creds),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_alloc_security, selinux_sb_alloc_security),
- LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_security, selinux_sb_free_security),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_eat_lsm_opts, selinux_sb_eat_lsm_opts),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_mnt_opts, selinux_free_mnt_opts),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_remount, selinux_sb_remount),
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
index 231262d8eac9..d08d7e5d2f93 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
@@ -188,4 +188,10 @@ static inline struct ipc_security_struct *selinux_ipc(
return ipc->security + selinux_blob_sizes.lbs_ipc;
}
+static inline struct superblock_security_struct *selinux_superblock(
+ const struct super_block *superblock)
+{
+ return superblock->s_security + selinux_blob_sizes.lbs_superblock;
+}
+
#endif /* _SELINUX_OBJSEC_H_ */
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index d6e7b4856d93..4190c5e9e66c 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -51,6 +51,7 @@
#include <linux/mutex.h>
#include <linux/flex_array.h>
#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
+#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
#include <net/netlabel.h>
#include "flask.h"
@@ -2732,7 +2733,7 @@ int security_fs_use(struct selinux_state *state, struct super_block *sb)
struct sidtab *sidtab;
int rc = 0;
struct ocontext *c;
- struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
+ struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
const char *fstype = sb->s_type->name;
read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
diff --git a/security/smack/smack.h b/security/smack/smack.h
index 9c7c95a5c497..e943e0fd3ea1 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack.h
+++ b/security/smack/smack.h
@@ -384,6 +384,12 @@ static inline struct smack_known **smack_ipc(const struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc)
return ipc->security + smack_blob_sizes.lbs_ipc;
}
+static inline struct superblock_smack *smack_superblock(
+ const struct super_block *superblock)
+{
+ return superblock->s_security + smack_blob_sizes.lbs_superblock;
+}
+
/*
* Is the directory transmuting?
*/
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 79d6d2a6a0bc..18892df4ecaf 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -539,12 +539,7 @@ static int smack_syslog(int typefrom_file)
*/
static int smack_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
{
- struct superblock_smack *sbsp;
-
- sbsp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_smack), GFP_KERNEL);
-
- if (sbsp == NULL)
- return -ENOMEM;
+ struct superblock_smack *sbsp = smack_superblock(sb);
sbsp->smk_root = &smack_known_floor;
sbsp->smk_default = &smack_known_floor;
@@ -553,22 +548,10 @@ static int smack_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
/*
* SMK_SB_INITIALIZED will be zero from kzalloc.
*/
- sb->s_security = sbsp;
return 0;
}
-/**
- * smack_sb_free_security - free a superblock blob
- * @sb: the superblock getting the blob
- *
- */
-static void smack_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
-{
- kfree(sb->s_security);
- sb->s_security = NULL;
-}
-
struct smack_mnt_opts {
const char *fsdefault, *fsfloor, *fshat, *fsroot, *fstransmute;
};
@@ -694,7 +677,7 @@ static int smack_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
{
struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(root);
- struct superblock_smack *sp = sb->s_security;
+ struct superblock_smack *sp = smack_superblock(sb);
struct inode_smack *isp;
struct smack_known *skp;
struct smack_mnt_opts *opts = mnt_opts;
@@ -793,7 +776,7 @@ static int smack_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
*/
static int smack_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
{
- struct superblock_smack *sbp = dentry->d_sb->s_security;
+ struct superblock_smack *sbp = smack_superblock(dentry->d_sb);
int rc;
struct smk_audit_info ad;
@@ -830,7 +813,7 @@ static int smack_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
if (isp->smk_task == NULL || isp->smk_task == bsp->smk_task)
return 0;
- sbsp = inode->i_sb->s_security;
+ sbsp = smack_superblock(inode->i_sb);
if ((sbsp->smk_flags & SMK_SB_UNTRUSTED) &&
isp->smk_task != sbsp->smk_root)
return 0;
@@ -1081,7 +1064,7 @@ static int smack_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode,
*/
static int smack_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
{
- struct superblock_smack *sbsp = inode->i_sb->s_security;
+ struct superblock_smack *sbsp = smack_superblock(inode->i_sb);
struct smk_audit_info ad;
int no_block = mask & MAY_NOT_BLOCK;
int rc;
@@ -1323,7 +1306,7 @@ static int smack_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
*/
if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0) {
struct super_block *sbp = dentry->d_sb;
- struct superblock_smack *sbsp = sbp->s_security;
+ struct superblock_smack *sbsp = smack_superblock(sbp);
isp->smk_inode = sbsp->smk_default;
} else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0)
@@ -1593,7 +1576,7 @@ static int smack_mmap_file(struct file *file,
isp = smack_inode(file_inode(file));
if (isp->smk_mmap == NULL)
return 0;
- sbsp = file_inode(file)->i_sb->s_security;
+ sbsp = smack_superblock(file_inode(file)->i_sb);
if (sbsp->smk_flags & SMK_SB_UNTRUSTED &&
isp->smk_mmap != sbsp->smk_root)
return -EACCES;
@@ -3201,7 +3184,7 @@ static void smack_d_instantiate(struct dentry *opt_dentry, struct inode *inode)
goto unlockandout;
sbp = inode->i_sb;
- sbsp = sbp->s_security;
+ sbsp = smack_superblock(sbp);
/*
* We're going to use the superblock default label
* if there's no label on the file.
@@ -4491,6 +4474,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes smack_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
.lbs_inode = sizeof(struct inode_smack),
.lbs_ipc = sizeof(struct smack_known *),
.lbs_msg_msg = sizeof(struct smack_known *),
+ .lbs_superblock = sizeof(struct superblock_smack),
};
static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
@@ -4499,7 +4483,6 @@ static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(syslog, smack_syslog),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_alloc_security, smack_sb_alloc_security),
- LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_security, smack_sb_free_security),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_mnt_opts, smack_free_mnt_opts),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_eat_lsm_opts, smack_sb_eat_lsm_opts),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_statfs, smack_sb_statfs),
--
2.17.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread* RE: [PATCH 01/97] LSM: Infrastructure management of the superblock
2019-02-28 22:17 ` [PATCH 01/97] LSM: Infrastructure management of the superblock Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-03-01 14:02 ` Edwin Zimmerman
2019-03-01 16:50 ` Casey Schaufler
0 siblings, 1 reply; 80+ messages in thread
From: Edwin Zimmerman @ 2019-03-01 14:02 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: 'Casey Schaufler', jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul
On Thursday2/28/2019 Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> wrote:
> From: Casey Schaufler <cschaufler@localhost.localdomain>
>
> Move management of the superblock->sb_security blob out
> of the individual security modules and into the security
> infrastructure. Instead of allocating the blobs from within
> the modules the modules tell the infrastructure how much
> space is required, and the space is allocated there.
>
...
> @@ -296,12 +297,13 @@ static void __init ordered_lsm_init(void)
> for (lsm = ordered_lsms; *lsm; lsm++)
> prepare_lsm(*lsm);
>
> - init_debug("cred blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_cred);
> - init_debug("file blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_file);
> - init_debug("inode blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_inode);
> - init_debug("ipc blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_ipc);
> - init_debug("msg_msg blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg);
> - init_debug("task blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_task);
> + init_debug("cred blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_cred);
> + init_debug("file blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_file);
> + init_debug("inode blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_inode);
> + init_debug("ipc blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_ipc);
> + init_debug("msg_msg blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg);
> + init_debug("superblock blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_superblock);
> + init_debug("task blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_task);
>
Any reason this couldn't be a single line, or am I missing something?
It took a second look to realize that the only line actually being added was
+ init_debug("superblock blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_superblock);
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH 01/97] LSM: Infrastructure management of the superblock
2019-03-01 14:02 ` Edwin Zimmerman
@ 2019-03-01 16:50 ` Casey Schaufler
0 siblings, 0 replies; 80+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-03-01 16:50 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Edwin Zimmerman, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul
On 3/1/2019 6:02 AM, Edwin Zimmerman wrote:
> On Thursday2/28/2019 Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> wrote:
>> From: Casey Schaufler <cschaufler@localhost.localdomain>
>>
>> Move management of the superblock->sb_security blob out
>> of the individual security modules and into the security
>> infrastructure. Instead of allocating the blobs from within
>> the modules the modules tell the infrastructure how much
>> space is required, and the space is allocated there.
>>
> ...
>> @@ -296,12 +297,13 @@ static void __init ordered_lsm_init(void)
>> for (lsm = ordered_lsms; *lsm; lsm++)
>> prepare_lsm(*lsm);
>>
>> - init_debug("cred blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_cred);
>> - init_debug("file blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_file);
>> - init_debug("inode blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_inode);
>> - init_debug("ipc blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_ipc);
>> - init_debug("msg_msg blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg);
>> - init_debug("task blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_task);
>> + init_debug("cred blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_cred);
>> + init_debug("file blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_file);
>> + init_debug("inode blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_inode);
>> + init_debug("ipc blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_ipc);
>> + init_debug("msg_msg blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg);
>> + init_debug("superblock blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_superblock);
>> + init_debug("task blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_task);
>>
> Any reason this couldn't be a single line, or am I missing something?
Indentation. If the preceding patches had gotten the indentation
right this would be the one line patch you suggest. To be fixed in
the next version.
> It took a second look to realize that the only line actually being added was
> + init_debug("superblock blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_superblock);
>
>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 02/97] LSM: Infrastructure management of the sock security
2019-02-28 22:17 [PATCH 00/97] LSM: Complete module stacking Casey Schaufler
2019-02-28 22:17 ` [PATCH 01/97] LSM: Infrastructure management of the superblock Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-02-28 22:17 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-02-28 22:17 ` [PATCH 03/97] LSM: Infrastructure management of the key security blob Casey Schaufler
` (68 subsequent siblings)
70 siblings, 0 replies; 80+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-02-28 22:17 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul
Move management of the sock->sk_security blob out
of the individual security modules and into the security
infrastructure. Instead of allocating the blobs from within
the modules the modules tell the infrastructure how much
space is required, and the space is allocated there.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 1 +
security/apparmor/include/net.h | 6 ++-
security/apparmor/lsm.c | 38 ++++-----------
security/security.c | 36 +++++++++++++-
security/selinux/hooks.c | 78 +++++++++++++++----------------
security/selinux/include/objsec.h | 5 ++
security/selinux/netlabel.c | 23 ++++-----
security/smack/smack.h | 5 ++
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 64 ++++++++++++-------------
security/smack/smack_netfilter.c | 8 ++--
10 files changed, 144 insertions(+), 120 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index 97510e9b9288..22145f2a6464 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -2036,6 +2036,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes {
int lbs_cred;
int lbs_file;
int lbs_inode;
+ int lbs_sock;
int lbs_superblock;
int lbs_ipc;
int lbs_msg_msg;
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/net.h b/security/apparmor/include/net.h
index 7334ac966d01..adac04e3b3cc 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/net.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/net.h
@@ -55,7 +55,11 @@ struct aa_sk_ctx {
struct aa_label *peer;
};
-#define SK_CTX(X) ((X)->sk_security)
+static inline struct aa_sk_ctx *aa_sock(const struct sock *sk)
+{
+ return sk->sk_security + apparmor_blob_sizes.lbs_sock;
+}
+
#define SOCK_ctx(X) SOCK_INODE(X)->i_security
#define DEFINE_AUDIT_NET(NAME, OP, SK, F, T, P) \
struct lsm_network_audit NAME ## _net = { .sk = (SK), \
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index bb5a02d2439f..b77571ddbed3 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -757,33 +757,15 @@ static int apparmor_task_kill(struct task_struct *target, struct kernel_siginfo
return error;
}
-/**
- * apparmor_sk_alloc_security - allocate and attach the sk_security field
- */
-static int apparmor_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t flags)
-{
- struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx;
-
- ctx = kzalloc(sizeof(*ctx), flags);
- if (!ctx)
- return -ENOMEM;
-
- SK_CTX(sk) = ctx;
-
- return 0;
-}
-
/**
* apparmor_sk_free_security - free the sk_security field
*/
static void apparmor_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
{
- struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
+ struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk);
- SK_CTX(sk) = NULL;
aa_put_label(ctx->label);
aa_put_label(ctx->peer);
- kfree(ctx);
}
/**
@@ -792,8 +774,8 @@ static void apparmor_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
static void apparmor_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk,
struct sock *newsk)
{
- struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
- struct aa_sk_ctx *new = SK_CTX(newsk);
+ struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk);
+ struct aa_sk_ctx *new = aa_sock(newsk);
new->label = aa_get_label(ctx->label);
new->peer = aa_get_label(ctx->peer);
@@ -844,7 +826,7 @@ static int apparmor_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
label = aa_get_current_label();
if (sock->sk) {
- struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sock->sk);
+ struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sock->sk);
aa_put_label(ctx->label);
ctx->label = aa_get_label(label);
@@ -1029,7 +1011,7 @@ static int apparmor_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
*/
static int apparmor_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
- struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
+ struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk);
if (!skb->secmark)
return 0;
@@ -1042,7 +1024,7 @@ static int apparmor_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
static struct aa_label *sk_peer_label(struct sock *sk)
{
- struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
+ struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk);
if (ctx->peer)
return ctx->peer;
@@ -1126,7 +1108,7 @@ static int apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
*/
static void apparmor_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
{
- struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
+ struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk);
if (!ctx->label)
ctx->label = aa_get_current_label();
@@ -1136,7 +1118,7 @@ static void apparmor_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
static int apparmor_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
struct request_sock *req)
{
- struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
+ struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk);
if (!skb->secmark)
return 0;
@@ -1153,6 +1135,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes apparmor_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
.lbs_cred = sizeof(struct aa_task_ctx *),
.lbs_file = sizeof(struct aa_file_ctx),
.lbs_task = sizeof(struct aa_task_ctx),
+ .lbs_sock = sizeof(struct aa_sk_ctx),
};
static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
@@ -1189,7 +1172,6 @@ static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(getprocattr, apparmor_getprocattr),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(setprocattr, apparmor_setprocattr),
- LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_alloc_security, apparmor_sk_alloc_security),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_free_security, apparmor_sk_free_security),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_clone_security, apparmor_sk_clone_security),
@@ -1581,7 +1563,7 @@ static unsigned int apparmor_ip_postroute(void *priv,
if (sk == NULL)
return NF_ACCEPT;
- ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
+ ctx = aa_sock(sk);
if (!apparmor_secmark_check(ctx->label, OP_SENDMSG, AA_MAY_SEND,
skb->secmark, sk))
return NF_ACCEPT;
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index fd8d7ae967c0..43bed5fd6da3 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@
#include <linux/string.h>
#include <linux/msg.h>
#include <net/flow.h>
+#include <net/sock.h>
#define MAX_LSM_EVM_XATTR 2
@@ -172,6 +173,7 @@ static void __init lsm_set_blob_sizes(struct lsm_blob_sizes *needed)
lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_inode, &blob_sizes.lbs_inode);
lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_ipc, &blob_sizes.lbs_ipc);
lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_msg_msg, &blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg);
+ lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_sock, &blob_sizes.lbs_sock);
lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_superblock, &blob_sizes.lbs_superblock);
lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_task, &blob_sizes.lbs_task);
}
@@ -302,6 +304,7 @@ static void __init ordered_lsm_init(void)
init_debug("inode blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_inode);
init_debug("ipc blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_ipc);
init_debug("msg_msg blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg);
+ init_debug("sock blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_sock);
init_debug("superblock blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_superblock);
init_debug("task blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_task);
@@ -601,6 +604,28 @@ static void __init lsm_early_task(struct task_struct *task)
panic("%s: Early task alloc failed.\n", __func__);
}
+/**
+ * lsm_sock_alloc - allocate a composite sock blob
+ * @sock: the sock that needs a blob
+ * @priority: allocation mode
+ *
+ * Allocate the sock blob for all the modules
+ *
+ * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated.
+ */
+int lsm_sock_alloc(struct sock *sock, gfp_t priority)
+{
+ if (blob_sizes.lbs_sock == 0) {
+ sock->sk_security = NULL;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ sock->sk_security = kzalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_sock, priority);
+ if (sock->sk_security == NULL)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ return 0;
+}
+
/**
* lsm_superblock_alloc - allocate a composite superblock blob
* @sb: the superblock that needs a blob
@@ -2034,12 +2059,21 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_socket_getpeersec_dgram);
int security_sk_alloc(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
{
- return call_int_hook(sk_alloc_security, 0, sk, family, priority);
+ int rc = lsm_sock_alloc(sk, priority);
+
+ if (unlikely(rc))
+ return rc;
+ rc = call_int_hook(sk_alloc_security, 0, sk, family, priority);
+ if (unlikely(rc))
+ security_sk_free(sk);
+ return rc;
}
void security_sk_free(struct sock *sk)
{
call_void_hook(sk_free_security, sk);
+ kfree(sk->sk_security);
+ sk->sk_security = NULL;
}
void security_sk_clone(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index f36cf93695ad..6133bf4b737d 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -4215,7 +4215,7 @@ static int socket_sockcreate_sid(const struct task_security_struct *tsec,
static int sock_has_perm(struct sock *sk, u32 perms)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
struct common_audit_data ad;
struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
@@ -4272,7 +4272,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
if (sock->sk) {
- sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ sksec = selinux_sock(sock->sk);
sksec->sclass = sclass;
sksec->sid = sid;
/* Allows detection of the first association on this socket */
@@ -4288,8 +4288,8 @@ static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
static int selinux_socket_socketpair(struct socket *socka,
struct socket *sockb)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec_a = socka->sk->sk_security;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec_b = sockb->sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec_a = selinux_sock(socka->sk);
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec_b = selinux_sock(sockb->sk);
sksec_a->peer_sid = sksec_b->sid;
sksec_b->peer_sid = sksec_a->sid;
@@ -4304,7 +4304,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_socketpair(struct socket *socka,
static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
u16 family;
int err;
@@ -4436,7 +4436,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_connect_helper(struct socket *sock,
struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
int err;
err = sock_has_perm(sk, SOCKET__CONNECT);
@@ -4607,9 +4607,9 @@ static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
struct sock *other,
struct sock *newsk)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec_sock = sock->sk_security;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec_other = other->sk_security;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec_new = newsk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec_sock = selinux_sock(sock);
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec_other = selinux_sock(other);
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec_new = selinux_sock(newsk);
struct common_audit_data ad;
struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
int err;
@@ -4641,8 +4641,8 @@ static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
struct socket *other)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
- struct sk_security_struct *osec = other->sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *ssec = selinux_sock(sock->sk);
+ struct sk_security_struct *osec = selinux_sock(other->sk);
struct common_audit_data ad;
struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
@@ -4684,7 +4684,7 @@ static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
u16 family)
{
int err = 0;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
struct common_audit_data ad;
struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
@@ -4717,7 +4717,7 @@ static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
int err;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
u16 family = sk->sk_family;
u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
struct common_audit_data ad;
@@ -4785,13 +4785,15 @@ static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
return err;
}
-static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
- int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
+static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock,
+ __user char *optval,
+ __user int *optlen,
+ unsigned int len)
{
int err = 0;
char *scontext;
u32 scontext_len;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sock->sk);
u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET ||
@@ -4851,34 +4853,27 @@ static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *
static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
-
- sksec = kzalloc(sizeof(*sksec), priority);
- if (!sksec)
- return -ENOMEM;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
sksec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
sksec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
sksec->sclass = SECCLASS_SOCKET;
selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(sksec);
- sk->sk_security = sksec;
return 0;
}
static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
- sk->sk_security = NULL;
selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(sksec);
- kfree(sksec);
}
static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
- struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
+ struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = selinux_sock(newsk);
newsksec->sid = sksec->sid;
newsksec->peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid;
@@ -4892,7 +4887,7 @@ static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid)
if (!sk)
*secid = SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET;
else {
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
*secid = sksec->sid;
}
@@ -4902,7 +4897,7 @@ static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
{
struct inode_security_struct *isec =
inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(parent));
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET || sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 ||
sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
@@ -4917,7 +4912,7 @@ static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
static int selinux_sctp_assoc_request(struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
struct sk_buff *skb)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = ep->base.sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(ep->base.sk);
struct common_audit_data ad;
struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
u8 peerlbl_active;
@@ -5065,8 +5060,8 @@ static int selinux_sctp_bind_connect(struct sock *sk, int optname,
static void selinux_sctp_sk_clone(struct sctp_endpoint *ep, struct sock *sk,
struct sock *newsk)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
- struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
+ struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = selinux_sock(newsk);
/* If policy does not support SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET then call
* the non-sctp clone version.
@@ -5083,7 +5078,7 @@ static void selinux_sctp_sk_clone(struct sctp_endpoint *ep, struct sock *sk,
static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
struct request_sock *req)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
int err;
u16 family = req->rsk_ops->family;
u32 connsid;
@@ -5104,7 +5099,7 @@ static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
const struct request_sock *req)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = selinux_sock(newsk);
newsksec->sid = req->secid;
newsksec->peer_sid = req->peer_secid;
@@ -5121,7 +5116,7 @@ static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
u16 family = sk->sk_family;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
/* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
@@ -5205,7 +5200,7 @@ static int selinux_tun_dev_attach_queue(void *security)
static int selinux_tun_dev_attach(struct sock *sk, void *security)
{
struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
/* we don't currently perform any NetLabel based labeling here and it
* isn't clear that we would want to do so anyway; while we could apply
@@ -5246,7 +5241,7 @@ static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
int err = 0;
u32 perm;
struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
if (skb->len < NLMSG_HDRLEN) {
err = -EINVAL;
@@ -5387,7 +5382,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(struct sk_buff *skb,
return NF_ACCEPT;
/* standard practice, label using the parent socket */
- sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
sid = sksec->sid;
} else
sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
@@ -5426,7 +5421,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
if (sk == NULL)
return NF_ACCEPT;
- sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
ad.u.net = &net;
@@ -5518,7 +5513,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb,
u32 skb_sid;
struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
- sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &skb_sid))
return NF_DROP;
/* At this point, if the returned skb peerlbl is SECSID_NULL
@@ -5547,7 +5542,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb,
} else {
/* Locally generated packet, fetch the security label from the
* associated socket. */
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
peer_sid = sksec->sid;
secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
}
@@ -6523,6 +6518,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes selinux_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
.lbs_inode = sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
.lbs_ipc = sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct),
.lbs_msg_msg = sizeof(struct msg_security_struct),
+ .lbs_sock = sizeof(struct sk_security_struct),
.lbs_superblock = sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct),
};
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
index d08d7e5d2f93..29f02b8f8f31 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
@@ -194,4 +194,9 @@ static inline struct superblock_security_struct *selinux_superblock(
return superblock->s_security + selinux_blob_sizes.lbs_superblock;
}
+static inline struct sk_security_struct *selinux_sock(const struct sock *sock)
+{
+ return sock->sk_security + selinux_blob_sizes.lbs_sock;
+}
+
#endif /* _SELINUX_OBJSEC_H_ */
diff --git a/security/selinux/netlabel.c b/security/selinux/netlabel.c
index 186e727b737b..c40914a157b7 100644
--- a/security/selinux/netlabel.c
+++ b/security/selinux/netlabel.c
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
#include <linux/gfp.h>
#include <linux/ip.h>
#include <linux/ipv6.h>
+#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
#include <net/sock.h>
#include <net/netlabel.h>
#include <net/ip.h>
@@ -81,7 +82,7 @@ static int selinux_netlbl_sidlookup_cached(struct sk_buff *skb,
static struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *selinux_netlbl_sock_genattr(struct sock *sk)
{
int rc;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr;
if (sksec->nlbl_secattr != NULL)
@@ -114,7 +115,7 @@ static struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *selinux_netlbl_sock_getattr(
const struct sock *sk,
u32 sid)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr = sksec->nlbl_secattr;
if (secattr == NULL)
@@ -249,7 +250,7 @@ int selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(struct sk_buff *skb,
* being labeled by it's parent socket, if it is just exit */
sk = skb_to_full_sk(skb);
if (sk != NULL) {
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
if (sksec->nlbl_state != NLBL_REQSKB)
return 0;
@@ -287,7 +288,7 @@ int selinux_netlbl_sctp_assoc_request(struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
{
int rc;
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = ep->base.sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(ep->base.sk);
struct sockaddr *addr;
struct sockaddr_in addr4;
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
@@ -370,7 +371,7 @@ int selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(struct request_sock *req, u16 family)
*/
void selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *sk, u16 family)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
if (family == PF_INET)
sksec->nlbl_state = NLBL_LABELED;
@@ -388,8 +389,8 @@ void selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *sk, u16 family)
*/
void selinux_netlbl_sctp_sk_clone(struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
- struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
+ struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = selinux_sock(newsk);
newsksec->nlbl_state = sksec->nlbl_state;
}
@@ -407,7 +408,7 @@ void selinux_netlbl_sctp_sk_clone(struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
int selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(struct sock *sk, u16 family)
{
int rc;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr;
if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
@@ -522,7 +523,7 @@ int selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock,
{
int rc = 0;
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
if (selinux_netlbl_option(level, optname) &&
@@ -560,7 +561,7 @@ static int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_helper(struct sock *sk,
struct sockaddr *addr)
{
int rc;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr;
/* connected sockets are allowed to disconnect when the address family
@@ -599,7 +600,7 @@ static int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_helper(struct sock *sk,
int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_locked(struct sock *sk,
struct sockaddr *addr)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
if (sksec->nlbl_state != NLBL_REQSKB &&
sksec->nlbl_state != NLBL_CONNLABELED)
diff --git a/security/smack/smack.h b/security/smack/smack.h
index e943e0fd3ea1..010236b198d9 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack.h
+++ b/security/smack/smack.h
@@ -384,6 +384,11 @@ static inline struct smack_known **smack_ipc(const struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc)
return ipc->security + smack_blob_sizes.lbs_ipc;
}
+static inline struct socket_smack *smack_sock(const struct sock *sock)
+{
+ return sock->sk_security + smack_blob_sizes.lbs_sock;
+}
+
static inline struct superblock_smack *smack_superblock(
const struct super_block *superblock)
{
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 18892df4ecaf..b09b19e6466f 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -1352,7 +1352,7 @@ static int smack_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode,
if (sock == NULL || sock->sk == NULL)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
- ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPIN) == 0)
isp = ssp->smk_in;
@@ -1734,7 +1734,7 @@ static int smack_file_receive(struct file *file)
if (inode->i_sb->s_magic == SOCKFS_MAGIC) {
sock = SOCKET_I(inode);
- ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
tsp = smack_cred(current_cred());
/*
* If the receiving process can't write to the
@@ -2144,11 +2144,7 @@ static void smack_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode)
static int smack_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t gfp_flags)
{
struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
- struct socket_smack *ssp;
-
- ssp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct socket_smack), gfp_flags);
- if (ssp == NULL)
- return -ENOMEM;
+ struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sk);
/*
* Sockets created by kernel threads receive web label.
@@ -2162,11 +2158,10 @@ static int smack_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t gfp_flags)
}
ssp->smk_packet = NULL;
- sk->sk_security = ssp;
-
return 0;
}
+#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
/**
* smack_sk_free_security - Free a socket blob
* @sk: the socket
@@ -2175,7 +2170,6 @@ static int smack_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t gfp_flags)
*/
static void smack_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
{
-#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
struct smk_port_label *spp;
if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET6) {
@@ -2188,9 +2182,8 @@ static void smack_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
}
rcu_read_unlock();
}
-#endif
- kfree(sk->sk_security);
}
+#endif
/**
* smack_ipv4host_label - check host based restrictions
@@ -2308,7 +2301,7 @@ static struct smack_known *smack_ipv6host_label(struct sockaddr_in6 *sip)
static int smack_netlabel(struct sock *sk, int labeled)
{
struct smack_known *skp;
- struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
+ struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sk);
int rc = 0;
/*
@@ -2353,7 +2346,7 @@ static int smack_netlabel_send(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr_in *sap)
int rc;
int sk_lbl;
struct smack_known *hkp;
- struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
+ struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sk);
struct smk_audit_info ad;
rcu_read_lock();
@@ -2429,7 +2422,7 @@ static void smk_ipv6_port_label(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6;
- struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
struct smk_port_label *spp;
unsigned short port = 0;
@@ -2516,7 +2509,7 @@ static int smk_ipv6_port_check(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr_in6 *address,
int act)
{
struct smk_port_label *spp;
- struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
+ struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sk);
struct smack_known *skp = NULL;
unsigned short port;
struct smack_known *object;
@@ -2610,7 +2603,7 @@ static int smack_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
if (sock == NULL || sock->sk == NULL)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
- ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPIN) == 0)
ssp->smk_in = skp;
@@ -2658,7 +2651,7 @@ static int smack_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
* Sockets created by kernel threads receive web label.
*/
if (unlikely(current->flags & PF_KTHREAD)) {
- ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
ssp->smk_in = &smack_known_web;
ssp->smk_out = &smack_known_web;
}
@@ -2683,8 +2676,8 @@ static int smack_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
static int smack_socket_socketpair(struct socket *socka,
struct socket *sockb)
{
- struct socket_smack *asp = socka->sk->sk_security;
- struct socket_smack *bsp = sockb->sk->sk_security;
+ struct socket_smack *asp = smack_sock(socka->sk);
+ struct socket_smack *bsp = smack_sock(sockb->sk);
asp->smk_packet = bsp->smk_out;
bsp->smk_packet = asp->smk_out;
@@ -2738,7 +2731,7 @@ static int smack_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *sap,
return 0;
#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING
- ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
#endif
switch (sock->sk->sk_family) {
@@ -3480,9 +3473,9 @@ static int smack_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
{
struct smack_known *skp;
struct smack_known *okp;
- struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk_security;
- struct socket_smack *osp = other->sk_security;
- struct socket_smack *nsp = newsk->sk_security;
+ struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sock);
+ struct socket_smack *osp = smack_sock(other);
+ struct socket_smack *nsp = smack_sock(newsk);
struct smk_audit_info ad;
int rc = 0;
#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
@@ -3528,8 +3521,8 @@ static int smack_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
*/
static int smack_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock, struct socket *other)
{
- struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
- struct socket_smack *osp = other->sk->sk_security;
+ struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
+ struct socket_smack *osp = smack_sock(other->sk);
struct smk_audit_info ad;
int rc;
@@ -3566,7 +3559,7 @@ static int smack_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
struct sockaddr_in6 *sap = (struct sockaddr_in6 *) msg->msg_name;
#endif
#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING
- struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
struct smack_known *rsp;
#endif
int rc = 0;
@@ -3731,7 +3724,7 @@ static int smk_skb_to_addr_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sockaddr_in6 *sip)
static int smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
- struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
+ struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sk);
struct smack_known *skp = NULL;
int rc = 0;
struct smk_audit_info ad;
@@ -3848,7 +3841,7 @@ static int smack_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock,
int slen = 1;
int rc = 0;
- ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
if (ssp->smk_packet != NULL) {
rcp = ssp->smk_packet->smk_known;
slen = strlen(rcp) + 1;
@@ -3898,7 +3891,7 @@ static int smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
switch (family) {
case PF_UNIX:
- ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
s = ssp->smk_out->smk_secid;
break;
case PF_INET:
@@ -3911,7 +3904,7 @@ static int smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
* Translate what netlabel gave us.
*/
if (sock != NULL && sock->sk != NULL)
- ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
rc = netlbl_skbuff_getattr(skb, family, &secattr);
if (rc == 0) {
@@ -3949,7 +3942,7 @@ static void smack_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
(sk->sk_family != PF_INET && sk->sk_family != PF_INET6))
return;
- ssp = sk->sk_security;
+ ssp = smack_sock(sk);
ssp->smk_in = skp;
ssp->smk_out = skp;
/* cssp->smk_packet is already set in smack_inet_csk_clone() */
@@ -3969,7 +3962,7 @@ static int smack_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
{
u16 family = sk->sk_family;
struct smack_known *skp;
- struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
+ struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sk);
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
struct sockaddr_in addr;
struct iphdr *hdr;
@@ -4068,7 +4061,7 @@ static int smack_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
static void smack_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *sk,
const struct request_sock *req)
{
- struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
+ struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sk);
struct smack_known *skp;
if (req->peer_secid != 0) {
@@ -4474,6 +4467,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes smack_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
.lbs_inode = sizeof(struct inode_smack),
.lbs_ipc = sizeof(struct smack_known *),
.lbs_msg_msg = sizeof(struct smack_known *),
+ .lbs_sock = sizeof(struct socket_smack),
.lbs_superblock = sizeof(struct superblock_smack),
};
@@ -4580,7 +4574,9 @@ static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_stream, smack_socket_getpeersec_stream),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_dgram, smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_alloc_security, smack_sk_alloc_security),
+#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_free_security, smack_sk_free_security),
+#endif
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sock_graft, smack_sock_graft),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_request, smack_inet_conn_request),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_csk_clone, smack_inet_csk_clone),
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_netfilter.c b/security/smack/smack_netfilter.c
index e36d17835d4f..701a1cc1bdcc 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_netfilter.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_netfilter.c
@@ -31,8 +31,8 @@ static unsigned int smack_ipv6_output(void *priv,
struct socket_smack *ssp;
struct smack_known *skp;
- if (sk && sk->sk_security) {
- ssp = sk->sk_security;
+ if (sk && smack_sock(sk)) {
+ ssp = smack_sock(sk);
skp = ssp->smk_out;
skb->secmark = skp->smk_secid;
}
@@ -49,8 +49,8 @@ static unsigned int smack_ipv4_output(void *priv,
struct socket_smack *ssp;
struct smack_known *skp;
- if (sk && sk->sk_security) {
- ssp = sk->sk_security;
+ if (sk && smack_sock(sk)) {
+ ssp = smack_sock(sk);
skp = ssp->smk_out;
skb->secmark = skp->smk_secid;
}
--
2.17.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread* [PATCH 03/97] LSM: Infrastructure management of the key security blob
2019-02-28 22:17 [PATCH 00/97] LSM: Complete module stacking Casey Schaufler
2019-02-28 22:17 ` [PATCH 01/97] LSM: Infrastructure management of the superblock Casey Schaufler
2019-02-28 22:17 ` [PATCH 02/97] LSM: Infrastructure management of the sock security Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-02-28 22:17 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-02-28 22:18 ` [PATCH 04/97] SCAFFOLD: Move sock_graft out of sock.h Casey Schaufler
` (67 subsequent siblings)
70 siblings, 0 replies; 80+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-02-28 22:17 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul
From: Casey Schaufler <cschaufler@schaufler-ca.com>
Move management of the key->security blob out of the
individual security modules and into the security
infrastructure. Instead of allocating the blobs from within
the modules the modules tell the infrastructure how much
space is required, and the space is allocated there.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 1 +
security/security.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
security/selinux/hooks.c | 23 +++++-------------
security/selinux/include/objsec.h | 7 ++++++
security/smack/smack.h | 7 ++++++
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 33 ++++++++++++-------------
6 files changed, 75 insertions(+), 36 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index 22145f2a6464..f19751dc53be 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -2039,6 +2039,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes {
int lbs_sock;
int lbs_superblock;
int lbs_ipc;
+ int lbs_key;
int lbs_msg_msg;
int lbs_task;
};
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 43bed5fd6da3..750b1b63edbb 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -172,6 +172,9 @@ static void __init lsm_set_blob_sizes(struct lsm_blob_sizes *needed)
blob_sizes.lbs_inode = sizeof(struct rcu_head);
lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_inode, &blob_sizes.lbs_inode);
lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_ipc, &blob_sizes.lbs_ipc);
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
+ lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_key, &blob_sizes.lbs_key);
+#endif
lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_msg_msg, &blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg);
lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_sock, &blob_sizes.lbs_sock);
lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_superblock, &blob_sizes.lbs_superblock);
@@ -303,6 +306,9 @@ static void __init ordered_lsm_init(void)
init_debug("file blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_file);
init_debug("inode blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_inode);
init_debug("ipc blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_ipc);
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
+ init_debug("key blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_key);
+#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
init_debug("msg_msg blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg);
init_debug("sock blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_sock);
init_debug("superblock blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_superblock);
@@ -569,6 +575,29 @@ static int lsm_ipc_alloc(struct kern_ipc_perm *kip)
return 0;
}
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
+/**
+ * lsm_key_alloc - allocate a composite key blob
+ * @key: the key that needs a blob
+ *
+ * Allocate the key blob for all the modules
+ *
+ * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated.
+ */
+int lsm_key_alloc(struct key *key)
+{
+ if (blob_sizes.lbs_key == 0) {
+ key->security = NULL;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ key->security = kzalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_key, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (key->security == NULL)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
+
/**
* lsm_msg_msg_alloc - allocate a composite msg_msg blob
* @mp: the msg_msg that needs a blob
@@ -2325,12 +2354,21 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_skb_classify_flow);
int security_key_alloc(struct key *key, const struct cred *cred,
unsigned long flags)
{
- return call_int_hook(key_alloc, 0, key, cred, flags);
+ int rc = lsm_key_alloc(key);
+
+ if (unlikely(rc))
+ return rc;
+ rc = call_int_hook(key_alloc, 0, key, cred, flags);
+ if (unlikely(rc))
+ security_key_free(key);
+ return rc;
}
void security_key_free(struct key *key)
{
call_void_hook(key_free, key);
+ kfree(key->security);
+ key->security = NULL;
}
int security_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 6133bf4b737d..54b8a42ed3a3 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -6243,11 +6243,7 @@ static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, const struct cred *cred,
unsigned long flags)
{
const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
- struct key_security_struct *ksec;
-
- ksec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!ksec)
- return -ENOMEM;
+ struct key_security_struct *ksec = selinux_key(k);
tsec = selinux_cred(cred);
if (tsec->keycreate_sid)
@@ -6255,18 +6251,9 @@ static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, const struct cred *cred,
else
ksec->sid = tsec->sid;
- k->security = ksec;
return 0;
}
-static void selinux_key_free(struct key *k)
-{
- struct key_security_struct *ksec = k->security;
-
- k->security = NULL;
- kfree(ksec);
-}
-
static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
const struct cred *cred,
unsigned perm)
@@ -6284,7 +6271,7 @@ static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
sid = cred_sid(cred);
key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
- ksec = key->security;
+ ksec = selinux_key(key);
return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
sid, ksec->sid, SECCLASS_KEY, perm, NULL);
@@ -6292,7 +6279,7 @@ static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
{
- struct key_security_struct *ksec = key->security;
+ struct key_security_struct *ksec = selinux_key(key);
char *context = NULL;
unsigned len;
int rc;
@@ -6517,6 +6504,9 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes selinux_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
.lbs_file = sizeof(struct file_security_struct),
.lbs_inode = sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
.lbs_ipc = sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct),
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
+ .lbs_key = sizeof(struct key_security_struct),
+#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
.lbs_msg_msg = sizeof(struct msg_security_struct),
.lbs_sock = sizeof(struct sk_security_struct),
.lbs_superblock = sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct),
@@ -6729,7 +6719,6 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_alloc, selinux_key_alloc),
- LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_free, selinux_key_free),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_permission, selinux_key_permission),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_getsecurity, selinux_key_getsecurity),
#endif
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
index 29f02b8f8f31..3b78aa4ee98f 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
@@ -194,6 +194,13 @@ static inline struct superblock_security_struct *selinux_superblock(
return superblock->s_security + selinux_blob_sizes.lbs_superblock;
}
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
+static inline struct key_security_struct *selinux_key(const struct key *key)
+{
+ return key->security + selinux_blob_sizes.lbs_key;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
+
static inline struct sk_security_struct *selinux_sock(const struct sock *sock)
{
return sock->sk_security + selinux_blob_sizes.lbs_sock;
diff --git a/security/smack/smack.h b/security/smack/smack.h
index 010236b198d9..f623d059421d 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack.h
+++ b/security/smack/smack.h
@@ -395,6 +395,13 @@ static inline struct superblock_smack *smack_superblock(
return superblock->s_security + smack_blob_sizes.lbs_superblock;
}
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
+static inline struct smack_known **smack_key(const struct key *key)
+{
+ return key->security + smack_blob_sizes.lbs_key;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
+
/*
* Is the directory transmuting?
*/
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index b09b19e6466f..d748c709f31a 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -4093,23 +4093,13 @@ static void smack_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *sk,
static int smack_key_alloc(struct key *key, const struct cred *cred,
unsigned long flags)
{
+ struct smack_known **blob = smack_key(key);
struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task(smack_cred(cred));
- key->security = skp;
+ *blob = skp;
return 0;
}
-/**
- * smack_key_free - Clear the key security blob
- * @key: the object
- *
- * Clear the blob pointer
- */
-static void smack_key_free(struct key *key)
-{
- key->security = NULL;
-}
-
/**
* smack_key_permission - Smack access on a key
* @key_ref: gets to the object
@@ -4122,6 +4112,8 @@ static void smack_key_free(struct key *key)
static int smack_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
const struct cred *cred, unsigned perm)
{
+ struct smack_known **blob;
+ struct smack_known *skp;
struct key *keyp;
struct smk_audit_info ad;
struct smack_known *tkp = smk_of_task(smack_cred(cred));
@@ -4141,7 +4133,9 @@ static int smack_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
* If the key hasn't been initialized give it access so that
* it may do so.
*/
- if (keyp->security == NULL)
+ blob = smack_key(keyp);
+ skp = *blob;
+ if (skp == NULL)
return 0;
/*
* This should not occur
@@ -4161,8 +4155,8 @@ static int smack_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
request |= MAY_READ;
if (perm & (KEY_NEED_WRITE | KEY_NEED_LINK | KEY_NEED_SETATTR))
request |= MAY_WRITE;
- rc = smk_access(tkp, keyp->security, request, &ad);
- rc = smk_bu_note("key access", tkp, keyp->security, request, rc);
+ rc = smk_access(tkp, skp, request, &ad);
+ rc = smk_bu_note("key access", tkp, skp, request, rc);
return rc;
}
@@ -4177,11 +4171,12 @@ static int smack_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
*/
static int smack_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
{
- struct smack_known *skp = key->security;
+ struct smack_known **blob = smack_key(key);
+ struct smack_known *skp = *blob;
size_t length;
char *copy;
- if (key->security == NULL) {
+ if (skp == NULL) {
*_buffer = NULL;
return 0;
}
@@ -4466,6 +4461,9 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes smack_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
.lbs_file = sizeof(struct smack_known *),
.lbs_inode = sizeof(struct inode_smack),
.lbs_ipc = sizeof(struct smack_known *),
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
+ .lbs_key = sizeof(struct smack_known *),
+#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
.lbs_msg_msg = sizeof(struct smack_known *),
.lbs_sock = sizeof(struct socket_smack),
.lbs_superblock = sizeof(struct superblock_smack),
@@ -4584,7 +4582,6 @@ static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
/* key management security hooks */
#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_alloc, smack_key_alloc),
- LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_free, smack_key_free),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_permission, smack_key_permission),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_getsecurity, smack_key_getsecurity),
#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
--
2.17.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread* [PATCH 04/97] SCAFFOLD: Move sock_graft out of sock.h
2019-02-28 22:17 [PATCH 00/97] LSM: Complete module stacking Casey Schaufler
` (2 preceding siblings ...)
2019-02-28 22:17 ` [PATCH 03/97] LSM: Infrastructure management of the key security blob Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-02-28 22:18 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-02-28 22:18 ` [PATCH 05/97] LSM: Create an lsm_export data structure Casey Schaufler
` (66 subsequent siblings)
70 siblings, 0 replies; 80+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-02-28 22:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul
Move sock_graft out of sock.h so that sock.h doesn't need security.h.
This makes Casey's life easier as lots less recompiles after a change
to security.h. DO NOT TAKE THIS PATCH!
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <caey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
include/net/sock.h | 14 ++------------
net/socket.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/net/sock.h b/include/net/sock.h
index 2b229f7be8eb..2beeda35e39f 100644
--- a/include/net/sock.h
+++ b/include/net/sock.h
@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@
#include <linux/netdevice.h>
#include <linux/skbuff.h> /* struct sk_buff */
#include <linux/mm.h>
-#include <linux/security.h>
+//CBS #include <linux/security.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
#include <linux/page_counter.h>
@@ -1800,17 +1800,7 @@ static inline void sock_orphan(struct sock *sk)
write_unlock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock);
}
-static inline void sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
-{
- WARN_ON(parent->sk);
- write_lock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock);
- rcu_assign_pointer(sk->sk_wq, parent->wq);
- parent->sk = sk;
- sk_set_socket(sk, parent);
- sk->sk_uid = SOCK_INODE(parent)->i_uid;
- security_sock_graft(sk, parent);
- write_unlock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock);
-}
+void sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent);
kuid_t sock_i_uid(struct sock *sk);
unsigned long sock_i_ino(struct sock *sk);
diff --git a/net/socket.c b/net/socket.c
index e89884e2197b..d5da935302a7 100644
--- a/net/socket.c
+++ b/net/socket.c
@@ -3425,3 +3425,20 @@ u32 kernel_sock_ip_overhead(struct sock *sk)
}
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(kernel_sock_ip_overhead);
+
+//CBS - HACK TO SPEED COMPILES
+
+void sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
+{
+ WARN_ON(parent->sk);
+ write_lock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock);
+ rcu_assign_pointer(sk->sk_wq, parent->wq);
+ parent->sk = sk;
+ sk_set_socket(sk, parent);
+ sk->sk_uid = SOCK_INODE(parent)->i_uid;
+ security_sock_graft(sk, parent);
+ write_unlock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(sock_graft);
+
+//CBS - HACK TO SPEED COMPILES
--
2.17.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread* [PATCH 05/97] LSM: Create an lsm_export data structure.
2019-02-28 22:17 [PATCH 00/97] LSM: Complete module stacking Casey Schaufler
` (3 preceding siblings ...)
2019-02-28 22:18 ` [PATCH 04/97] SCAFFOLD: Move sock_graft out of sock.h Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-02-28 22:18 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-03-01 14:00 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-02-28 22:18 ` [PATCH 06/97] LSM: Use lsm_export in the inode_getsecid hooks Casey Schaufler
` (65 subsequent siblings)
70 siblings, 1 reply; 80+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-02-28 22:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul
When more than one security module is exporting data to
audit and networking sub-systems a single 32 bit integer
is no longer sufficient to represent the data. Add a
structure to be used instead.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
include/linux/security.h | 12 ++++++++++++
1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 13537a49ae97..a79fe8ef9d84 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -73,6 +73,18 @@ enum lsm_event {
LSM_POLICY_CHANGE,
};
+/* Data exported by the security modules */
+struct lsm_export {
+ u32 selinux;
+ u32 smack;
+ u32 apparmor;
+ u32 flags;
+};
+#define LSM_EXPORT_NONE 0x00
+#define LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX 0x01
+#define LSM_EXPORT_SMACK 0x02
+#define LSM_EXPORT_APPARMOR 0x04
+
/* These functions are in security/commoncap.c */
extern int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
int cap, unsigned int opts);
--
2.17.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH 05/97] LSM: Create an lsm_export data structure.
2019-02-28 22:18 ` [PATCH 05/97] LSM: Create an lsm_export data structure Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-03-01 14:00 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-03-01 16:46 ` Casey Schaufler
0 siblings, 1 reply; 80+ messages in thread
From: Stephen Smalley @ 2019-03-01 14:00 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Casey Schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul
On 2/28/19 5:18 PM, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> When more than one security module is exporting data to
> audit and networking sub-systems a single 32 bit integer
> is no longer sufficient to represent the data. Add a
> structure to be used instead.
>
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
> ---
> include/linux/security.h | 12 ++++++++++++
> 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> index 13537a49ae97..a79fe8ef9d84 100644
> --- a/include/linux/security.h
> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> @@ -73,6 +73,18 @@ enum lsm_event {
> LSM_POLICY_CHANGE,
> };
>
> +/* Data exported by the security modules */
> +struct lsm_export {
> + u32 selinux;
> + u32 smack;
> + u32 apparmor;
> + u32 flags;
> +};
> +#define LSM_EXPORT_NONE 0x00
> +#define LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX 0x01
> +#define LSM_EXPORT_SMACK 0x02
> +#define LSM_EXPORT_APPARMOR 0x04
Can this be generalized to avoid hardcoding the names of specific
security modules in the field and symbol names? Possibly just an array
of secids with the indices dynamically assigned by the infrastructure at
registration time? We don't really want to have to patch this structure
every time someone adds a new security module that needs audit and/or
network facilities, right?
> +
> /* These functions are in security/commoncap.c */
> extern int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
> int cap, unsigned int opts);
>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH 05/97] LSM: Create an lsm_export data structure.
2019-03-01 14:00 ` Stephen Smalley
@ 2019-03-01 16:46 ` Casey Schaufler
0 siblings, 0 replies; 80+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-03-01 16:46 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Stephen Smalley, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul
On 3/1/2019 6:00 AM, Stephen Smalley wrote:
> On 2/28/19 5:18 PM, Casey Schaufler wrote:
>> When more than one security module is exporting data to
>> audit and networking sub-systems a single 32 bit integer
>> is no longer sufficient to represent the data. Add a
>> structure to be used instead.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
>> ---
>> include/linux/security.h | 12 ++++++++++++
>> 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)
>>
>> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
>> index 13537a49ae97..a79fe8ef9d84 100644
>> --- a/include/linux/security.h
>> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
>> @@ -73,6 +73,18 @@ enum lsm_event {
>> LSM_POLICY_CHANGE,
>> };
>> +/* Data exported by the security modules */
>> +struct lsm_export {
>> + u32 selinux;
>> + u32 smack;
>> + u32 apparmor;
>> + u32 flags;
>> +};
>> +#define LSM_EXPORT_NONE 0x00
>> +#define LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX 0x01
>> +#define LSM_EXPORT_SMACK 0x02
>> +#define LSM_EXPORT_APPARMOR 0x04
>
> Can this be generalized to avoid hardcoding the names of specific
> security modules in the field and symbol names? Possibly just an
> array of secids with the indices dynamically assigned by the
> infrastructure at registration time?
Yes, it can. I considered doing so very seriously. The reason
not to do it is data lifecycle management. In today's code secids
are often allocated on the stack and passed to code that holds the
value indefinitely. If every assignment became an allocate and copy
operation there would have to be reference counting and a lot more
intelligence.
The other advantage to the scheme used here is that an lsm_export
can include something other than a secid should a security module
so choose. It's not in this set, but I plan to change the Smack
entry from a u32 to a struct smack_known *, making several operations
much more efficient. Of course, that could be done using blob
management, but the complexity increases yet again.
> We don't really want to have to patch this structure every time
> someone adds a new security module that needs audit and/or network
> facilities, right?
It's not a design that is being proposed without consideration.
I seem to recall hearing the lifecycle arguments as a primary
rationale for secids more than once.
>
>> +
>> /* These functions are in security/commoncap.c */
>> extern int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct
>> user_namespace *ns,
>> int cap, unsigned int opts);
>>
>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 06/97] LSM: Use lsm_export in the inode_getsecid hooks
2019-02-28 22:17 [PATCH 00/97] LSM: Complete module stacking Casey Schaufler
` (4 preceding siblings ...)
2019-02-28 22:18 ` [PATCH 05/97] LSM: Create an lsm_export data structure Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-02-28 22:18 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-02-28 22:18 ` [PATCH 07/97] SCAFFOLD: Move security.h out of route.h Casey Schaufler
` (64 subsequent siblings)
70 siblings, 0 replies; 80+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-02-28 22:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul
Convert the inode_getsecid hooks to use the lsm_export
structure instead of a u32 secid. There is some scaffolding
involved that will be removed when security_inode_getsecid()
is updated.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 4 ++--
include/linux/security.h | 5 +++++
security/security.c | 35 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
security/selinux/hooks.c | 21 ++++++++++++++++-----
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 13 +++++++++++--
5 files changed, 68 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index f19751dc53be..ff97f57a87bb 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -409,7 +409,7 @@
* @inode_getsecid:
* Get the secid associated with the node.
* @inode contains a pointer to the inode.
- * @secid contains a pointer to the location where result will be saved.
+ * @data contains a pointer to the location where result will be saved.
* In case of failure, @secid will be set to zero.
* @inode_copy_up:
* A file is about to be copied up from lower layer to upper layer of
@@ -1556,7 +1556,7 @@ union security_list_options {
int flags);
int (*inode_listsecurity)(struct inode *inode, char *buffer,
size_t buffer_size);
- void (*inode_getsecid)(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid);
+ void (*inode_getsecid)(struct inode *inode, struct lsm_export *data);
int (*inode_copy_up)(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new);
int (*inode_copy_up_xattr)(const char *name);
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index a79fe8ef9d84..785d21c81dea 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -85,6 +85,11 @@ struct lsm_export {
#define LSM_EXPORT_SMACK 0x02
#define LSM_EXPORT_APPARMOR 0x04
+static inline void lsm_export_init(struct lsm_export *l)
+{
+ memset(l, 0, sizeof(*l));
+}
+
/* These functions are in security/commoncap.c */
extern int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
int cap, unsigned int opts);
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 750b1b63edbb..5bee7e0b0bf3 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -708,6 +708,36 @@ int lsm_superblock_alloc(struct super_block *sb)
RC; \
})
+/**
+ * lsm_export_secid - pull the useful secid out of a lsm_export
+ * @data: the containing data structure
+ * @secid: where to put the one that matters.
+ *
+ * Shim that will disappear when all lsm_export conversions are done.
+ */
+static inline void lsm_export_secid(struct lsm_export *data, u32 *secid)
+{
+ switch (data->flags) {
+ case LSM_EXPORT_NONE:
+ *secid = 0;
+ break;
+ case LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX:
+ *secid = data->selinux;
+ break;
+ case LSM_EXPORT_SMACK:
+ *secid = data->smack;
+ break;
+ case LSM_EXPORT_APPARMOR:
+ *secid = data->apparmor;
+ break;
+ default:
+ pr_warn("%s flags=0x%u - not a valid set\n", __func__,
+ data->flags);
+ *secid = 0;
+ break;
+ }
+}
+
/* Security operations */
int security_binder_set_context_mgr(struct task_struct *mgr)
@@ -1375,7 +1405,10 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_listsecurity);
void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
{
- call_void_hook(inode_getsecid, inode, secid);
+ struct lsm_export data = { .flags = LSM_EXPORT_NONE };
+
+ call_void_hook(inode_getsecid, inode, &data);
+ lsm_export_secid(&data, secid);
}
int security_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new)
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 54b8a42ed3a3..cbf7bf3fa4af 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -211,6 +211,15 @@ static void cred_init_security(void)
tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
}
+/*
+ * Set the SELinux secid in an lsm_export structure
+ */
+static inline void selinux_export_secid(struct lsm_export *l, u32 secid)
+{
+ l->selinux = secid;
+ l->flags |= LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX;
+}
+
/*
* get the security ID of a set of credentials
*/
@@ -3212,15 +3221,16 @@ static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t
return len;
}
-static void selinux_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
+static void selinux_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, struct lsm_export *l)
{
struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security_novalidate(inode);
- *secid = isec->sid;
+
+ selinux_export_secid(l, isec->sid);
}
static int selinux_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new)
{
- u32 sid;
+ struct lsm_export l;
struct task_security_struct *tsec;
struct cred *new_creds = *new;
@@ -3232,8 +3242,9 @@ static int selinux_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new)
tsec = selinux_cred(new_creds);
/* Get label from overlay inode and set it in create_sid */
- selinux_inode_getsecid(d_inode(src), &sid);
- tsec->create_sid = sid;
+ lsm_export_init(&l);
+ selinux_inode_getsecid(d_inode(src), &l);
+ tsec->create_sid = l.selinux;
*new = new_creds;
return 0;
}
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index d748c709f31a..a9277a942ca2 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -464,6 +464,15 @@ static int smk_ptrace_rule_check(struct task_struct *tracer,
return rc;
}
+/*
+ * Set the Smack secid in an lsm_export structure
+ */
+static inline void smack_export_secid(struct lsm_export *l, u32 secid)
+{
+ l->smack = secid;
+ l->flags |= LSM_EXPORT_SMACK;
+}
+
/*
* LSM hooks.
* We he, that is fun!
@@ -1394,11 +1403,11 @@ static int smack_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer,
* @inode: inode to extract the info from
* @secid: where result will be saved
*/
-static void smack_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
+static void smack_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, struct lsm_export *l)
{
struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_inode(inode);
- *secid = skp->smk_secid;
+ smack_export_secid(l, skp->smk_secid);
}
/*
--
2.17.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread* [PATCH 07/97] SCAFFOLD: Move security.h out of route.h
2019-02-28 22:17 [PATCH 00/97] LSM: Complete module stacking Casey Schaufler
` (5 preceding siblings ...)
2019-02-28 22:18 ` [PATCH 06/97] LSM: Use lsm_export in the inode_getsecid hooks Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-02-28 22:18 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-02-28 22:18 ` [PATCH 08/97] LSM: Use lsm_export in the cred_getsecid hooks Casey Schaufler
` (63 subsequent siblings)
70 siblings, 0 replies; 80+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-02-28 22:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul
Move staic inlines out of route.h so that route.h doesn't need security.h.
This makes Casey's life easier as lots less recompiles after a change
to security.h. DO NOT TAKE THIS PATCH!
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <caey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
include/net/route.h | 55 ++++++----------------------------------
net/ipv4/route.c | 61 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 68 insertions(+), 48 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/net/route.h b/include/net/route.h
index 9883dc82f723..de599f20ea5b 100644
--- a/include/net/route.h
+++ b/include/net/route.h
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@
#include <linux/route.h>
#include <linux/ip.h>
#include <linux/cache.h>
-#include <linux/security.h>
+//CBS #include <linux/security.h>
/* IPv4 datagram length is stored into 16bit field (tot_len) */
#define IP_MAX_MTU 0xFFFFU
@@ -146,20 +146,11 @@ static inline struct rtable *ip_route_output(struct net *net, __be32 daddr,
return ip_route_output_key(net, &fl4);
}
-static inline struct rtable *ip_route_output_ports(struct net *net, struct flowi4 *fl4,
+struct rtable *ip_route_output_ports(struct net *net, struct flowi4 *fl4,
struct sock *sk,
__be32 daddr, __be32 saddr,
__be16 dport, __be16 sport,
- __u8 proto, __u8 tos, int oif)
-{
- flowi4_init_output(fl4, oif, sk ? sk->sk_mark : 0, tos,
- RT_SCOPE_UNIVERSE, proto,
- sk ? inet_sk_flowi_flags(sk) : 0,
- daddr, saddr, dport, sport, sock_net_uid(net, sk));
- if (sk)
- security_sk_classify_flow(sk, flowi4_to_flowi(fl4));
- return ip_route_output_flow(net, fl4, sk);
-}
+ __u8 proto, __u8 tos, int oif);
static inline struct rtable *ip_route_output_gre(struct net *net, struct flowi4 *fl4,
__be32 daddr, __be32 saddr,
@@ -286,47 +277,15 @@ static inline void ip_route_connect_init(struct flowi4 *fl4, __be32 dst, __be32
sk->sk_uid);
}
-static inline struct rtable *ip_route_connect(struct flowi4 *fl4,
+struct rtable *ip_route_connect(struct flowi4 *fl4,
__be32 dst, __be32 src, u32 tos,
int oif, u8 protocol,
__be16 sport, __be16 dport,
- struct sock *sk)
-{
- struct net *net = sock_net(sk);
- struct rtable *rt;
-
- ip_route_connect_init(fl4, dst, src, tos, oif, protocol,
- sport, dport, sk);
-
- if (!dst || !src) {
- rt = __ip_route_output_key(net, fl4);
- if (IS_ERR(rt))
- return rt;
- ip_rt_put(rt);
- flowi4_update_output(fl4, oif, tos, fl4->daddr, fl4->saddr);
- }
- security_sk_classify_flow(sk, flowi4_to_flowi(fl4));
- return ip_route_output_flow(net, fl4, sk);
-}
-
-static inline struct rtable *ip_route_newports(struct flowi4 *fl4, struct rtable *rt,
+ struct sock *sk);
+struct rtable *ip_route_newports(struct flowi4 *fl4, struct rtable *rt,
__be16 orig_sport, __be16 orig_dport,
__be16 sport, __be16 dport,
- struct sock *sk)
-{
- if (sport != orig_sport || dport != orig_dport) {
- fl4->fl4_dport = dport;
- fl4->fl4_sport = sport;
- ip_rt_put(rt);
- flowi4_update_output(fl4, sk->sk_bound_dev_if,
- RT_CONN_FLAGS(sk), fl4->daddr,
- fl4->saddr);
- security_sk_classify_flow(sk, flowi4_to_flowi(fl4));
- return ip_route_output_flow(sock_net(sk), fl4, sk);
- }
- return rt;
-}
-
+ struct sock *sk);
static inline int inet_iif(const struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct rtable *rt = skb_rtable(skb);
diff --git a/net/ipv4/route.c b/net/ipv4/route.c
index ce92f73cf104..1160f4ba5073 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/route.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/route.c
@@ -199,6 +199,67 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(ip_tos2prio);
static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct rt_cache_stat, rt_cache_stat);
#define RT_CACHE_STAT_INC(field) raw_cpu_inc(rt_cache_stat.field)
+/*CBS*/
+struct rtable *ip_route_output_ports(struct net *net, struct flowi4 *fl4,
+ struct sock *sk,
+ __be32 daddr, __be32 saddr,
+ __be16 dport, __be16 sport,
+ __u8 proto, __u8 tos, int oif)
+{
+ flowi4_init_output(fl4, oif, sk ? sk->sk_mark : 0, tos,
+ RT_SCOPE_UNIVERSE, proto,
+ sk ? inet_sk_flowi_flags(sk) : 0,
+ daddr, saddr, dport, sport, sock_net_uid(net, sk));
+ if (sk)
+ security_sk_classify_flow(sk, flowi4_to_flowi(fl4));
+ return ip_route_output_flow(net, fl4, sk);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(ip_route_output_ports);
+
+struct rtable *ip_route_connect(struct flowi4 *fl4,
+ __be32 dst, __be32 src, u32 tos,
+ int oif, u8 protocol,
+ __be16 sport, __be16 dport,
+ struct sock *sk)
+{
+ struct net *net = sock_net(sk);
+ struct rtable *rt;
+
+ ip_route_connect_init(fl4, dst, src, tos, oif, protocol,
+ sport, dport, sk);
+
+ if (!dst || !src) {
+ rt = __ip_route_output_key(net, fl4);
+ if (IS_ERR(rt))
+ return rt;
+ ip_rt_put(rt);
+ flowi4_update_output(fl4, oif, tos, fl4->daddr, fl4->saddr);
+ }
+ security_sk_classify_flow(sk, flowi4_to_flowi(fl4));
+ return ip_route_output_flow(net, fl4, sk);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(ip_route_connect);
+
+struct rtable *ip_route_newports(struct flowi4 *fl4, struct rtable *rt,
+ __be16 orig_sport, __be16 orig_dport,
+ __be16 sport, __be16 dport,
+ struct sock *sk)
+{
+ if (sport != orig_sport || dport != orig_dport) {
+ fl4->fl4_dport = dport;
+ fl4->fl4_sport = sport;
+ ip_rt_put(rt);
+ flowi4_update_output(fl4, sk->sk_bound_dev_if,
+ RT_CONN_FLAGS(sk), fl4->daddr,
+ fl4->saddr);
+ security_sk_classify_flow(sk, flowi4_to_flowi(fl4));
+ return ip_route_output_flow(sock_net(sk), fl4, sk);
+ }
+ return rt;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(ip_route_newports);
+/*CBS*/
+
#ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
static void *rt_cache_seq_start(struct seq_file *seq, loff_t *pos)
{
--
2.17.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread* [PATCH 08/97] LSM: Use lsm_export in the cred_getsecid hooks
2019-02-28 22:17 [PATCH 00/97] LSM: Complete module stacking Casey Schaufler
` (6 preceding siblings ...)
2019-02-28 22:18 ` [PATCH 07/97] SCAFFOLD: Move security.h out of route.h Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-02-28 22:18 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-02-28 22:18 ` [PATCH 09/97] LSM: Use lsm_export in the ipc_getsecid and task_getsecid hooks Casey Schaufler
` (62 subsequent siblings)
70 siblings, 0 replies; 80+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-02-28 22:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul
Convert the cred_getsecid hooks to use the lsm_export
structure instead of a u32 secid. There is some scaffolding
involved that will be removed when security_cred_getsecid()
is updated.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 5 +++--
security/security.c | 6 ++++--
security/selinux/hooks.c | 4 ++--
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 4 ++--
4 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index ff97f57a87bb..2e8516447bfd 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -556,7 +556,8 @@
* Transfer data from original creds to new creds
* @cred_getsecid:
* Retrieve the security identifier of the cred structure @c
- * @c contains the credentials, secid will be placed into @secid.
+ * @c contains the credentials
+ * @l contains a pointer to the location where result will be saved.
* In case of failure, @secid will be set to zero.
* @kernel_act_as:
* Set the credentials for a kernel service to act as (subjective context).
@@ -1586,7 +1587,7 @@ union security_list_options {
int (*cred_prepare)(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
gfp_t gfp);
void (*cred_transfer)(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old);
- void (*cred_getsecid)(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid);
+ void (*cred_getsecid)(const struct cred *c, struct lsm_export *l);
int (*kernel_act_as)(struct cred *new, u32 secid);
int (*kernel_create_files_as)(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode);
int (*kernel_module_request)(char *kmod_name);
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 5bee7e0b0bf3..9c10d9aae83f 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1624,8 +1624,10 @@ void security_transfer_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid)
{
- *secid = 0;
- call_void_hook(cred_getsecid, c, secid);
+ struct lsm_export data = { .flags = LSM_EXPORT_NONE };
+
+ call_void_hook(cred_getsecid, c, &data);
+ lsm_export_secid(&data, secid);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_cred_getsecid);
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index cbf7bf3fa4af..d9179b75acb7 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -3660,9 +3660,9 @@ static void selinux_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
*tsec = *old_tsec;
}
-static void selinux_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid)
+static void selinux_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, struct lsm_export *l)
{
- *secid = cred_sid(c);
+ selinux_export_secid(l, cred_sid(c));
}
/*
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index a9277a942ca2..e3639d6f1b62 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -1893,13 +1893,13 @@ static void smack_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
*
* Sets the secid to contain a u32 version of the smack label.
*/
-static void smack_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *cred, u32 *secid)
+static void smack_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *cred, struct lsm_export *l)
{
struct smack_known *skp;
rcu_read_lock();
skp = smk_of_task(smack_cred(cred));
- *secid = skp->smk_secid;
+ smack_export_secid(l, skp->smk_secid);
rcu_read_unlock();
}
--
2.17.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread* [PATCH 09/97] LSM: Use lsm_export in the ipc_getsecid and task_getsecid hooks
2019-02-28 22:17 [PATCH 00/97] LSM: Complete module stacking Casey Schaufler
` (7 preceding siblings ...)
2019-02-28 22:18 ` [PATCH 08/97] LSM: Use lsm_export in the cred_getsecid hooks Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-02-28 22:18 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-02-28 22:18 ` [PATCH 10/97] LSM: Use lsm_export in the sk_getsecid hooks Casey Schaufler
` (61 subsequent siblings)
70 siblings, 0 replies; 80+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-02-28 22:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul
Convert the cred_getsecid and task_getsecid hooks to use the
lsm_export structure instead of a u32 secid. There is some
scaffolding involved that will be removed when
security_ipc_getsecid() and security_task_getsecid() are
updated.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 8 ++++----
security/apparmor/lsm.c | 12 ++++++++++--
security/security.c | 12 ++++++++----
security/selinux/hooks.c | 10 ++++++----
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 8 ++++----
5 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index 2e8516447bfd..f798a947bf8d 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -622,7 +622,7 @@
* Return 0 if permission is granted.
* @task_getsecid:
* Retrieve the security identifier of the process @p.
- * @p contains the task_struct for the process and place is into @secid.
+ * @p contains the task_struct for the process and place is into @l.
* In case of failure, @secid will be set to zero.
*
* @task_setnice:
@@ -1080,7 +1080,7 @@
* @ipc_getsecid:
* Get the secid associated with the ipc object.
* @ipcp contains the kernel IPC permission structure.
- * @secid contains a pointer to the location where result will be saved.
+ * @l contains a pointer to the location where result will be saved.
* In case of failure, @secid will be set to zero.
*
* Security hooks for individual messages held in System V IPC message queues
@@ -1600,7 +1600,7 @@ union security_list_options {
int (*task_setpgid)(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid);
int (*task_getpgid)(struct task_struct *p);
int (*task_getsid)(struct task_struct *p);
- void (*task_getsecid)(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid);
+ void (*task_getsecid)(struct task_struct *p, struct lsm_export *l);
int (*task_setnice)(struct task_struct *p, int nice);
int (*task_setioprio)(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio);
int (*task_getioprio)(struct task_struct *p);
@@ -1618,7 +1618,7 @@ union security_list_options {
void (*task_to_inode)(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode);
int (*ipc_permission)(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag);
- void (*ipc_getsecid)(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid);
+ void (*ipc_getsecid)(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, struct lsm_export *l);
int (*msg_msg_alloc_security)(struct msg_msg *msg);
void (*msg_msg_free_security)(struct msg_msg *msg);
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index b77571ddbed3..377fa4ed1518 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -49,6 +49,14 @@ int apparmor_initialized;
DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct aa_buffers, aa_buffers);
+/*
+ * Set the AppArmor secid in an lsm_export structure
+ */
+static inline void apparmor_export_secid(struct lsm_export *l, u32 secid)
+{
+ l->apparmor = secid;
+ l->flags |= LSM_EXPORT_APPARMOR;
+}
/*
* LSM hook functions
@@ -710,10 +718,10 @@ static void apparmor_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
return;
}
-static void apparmor_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
+static void apparmor_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, struct lsm_export *l)
{
struct aa_label *label = aa_get_task_label(p);
- *secid = label->secid;
+ apparmor_export_secid(l, label->secid);
aa_put_label(label);
}
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 9c10d9aae83f..f6ee25ebfa3c 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1708,8 +1708,10 @@ int security_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
void security_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
{
- *secid = 0;
- call_void_hook(task_getsecid, p, secid);
+ struct lsm_export data = { .flags = LSM_EXPORT_NONE };
+
+ call_void_hook(task_getsecid, p, &data);
+ lsm_export_secid(&data, secid);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_task_getsecid);
@@ -1791,8 +1793,10 @@ int security_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
{
- *secid = 0;
- call_void_hook(ipc_getsecid, ipcp, secid);
+ struct lsm_export data = { .flags = LSM_EXPORT_NONE };
+
+ call_void_hook(ipc_getsecid, ipcp, &data);
+ lsm_export_secid(&data, secid);
}
int security_msg_msg_alloc(struct msg_msg *msg)
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index d9179b75acb7..104b2315d36d 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -3807,9 +3807,9 @@ static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
PROCESS__GETSESSION, NULL);
}
-static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
+static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, struct lsm_export *l)
{
- *secid = task_sid(p);
+ selinux_export_secid(l, task_sid(p));
}
static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
@@ -5987,10 +5987,12 @@ static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av);
}
-static void selinux_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
+static void selinux_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp,
+ struct lsm_export *l)
{
struct ipc_security_struct *isec = selinux_ipc(ipcp);
- *secid = isec->sid;
+
+ selinux_export_secid(l, isec->sid);
}
static void selinux_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index e3639d6f1b62..d5ff34a5803b 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -2000,11 +2000,11 @@ static int smack_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
*
* Sets the secid to contain a u32 version of the smack label.
*/
-static void smack_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
+static void smack_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, struct lsm_export *l)
{
struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task_struct(p);
- *secid = skp->smk_secid;
+ smack_export_secid(l, skp->smk_secid);
}
/**
@@ -3144,12 +3144,12 @@ static int smack_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipp, short flag)
* @ipp: the object permissions
* @secid: where result will be saved
*/
-static void smack_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipp, u32 *secid)
+static void smack_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipp, struct lsm_export *l)
{
struct smack_known **blob = smack_ipc(ipp);
struct smack_known *iskp = *blob;
- *secid = iskp->smk_secid;
+ smack_export_secid(l, iskp->smk_secid);
}
/**
--
2.17.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread* [PATCH 10/97] LSM: Use lsm_export in the sk_getsecid hooks
2019-02-28 22:17 [PATCH 00/97] LSM: Complete module stacking Casey Schaufler
` (8 preceding siblings ...)
2019-02-28 22:18 ` [PATCH 09/97] LSM: Use lsm_export in the ipc_getsecid and task_getsecid hooks Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-02-28 22:18 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-02-28 22:18 ` [PATCH 11/97] LSM: Use lsm_export in the kernel_ask_as hooks Casey Schaufler
` (60 subsequent siblings)
70 siblings, 0 replies; 80+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-02-28 22:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul
Convert the cred_getsecid hooks to use the lsm_export
structure instead of a u32 secid. There is some scaffolding
involved that will be removed when security_sk_classify_flow()
is updated.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 4 ++--
security/security.c | 5 ++++-
security/selinux/hooks.c | 6 +++---
3 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index f798a947bf8d..44597189fea4 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -877,7 +877,7 @@
* @sk_clone_security:
* Clone/copy security structure.
* @sk_getsecid:
- * Retrieve the LSM-specific secid for the sock to enable caching
+ * Retrieve the LSM exported data for the sock to enable caching
* of network authorizations.
* @sock_graft:
* Sets the socket's isec sid to the sock's sid.
@@ -1696,7 +1696,7 @@ union security_list_options {
int (*sk_alloc_security)(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority);
void (*sk_free_security)(struct sock *sk);
void (*sk_clone_security)(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk);
- void (*sk_getsecid)(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid);
+ void (*sk_getsecid)(struct sock *sk, struct lsm_export *l);
void (*sock_graft)(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent);
int (*inet_conn_request)(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
struct request_sock *req);
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index f6ee25ebfa3c..909b6b8d1a50 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -2152,7 +2152,10 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sk_clone);
void security_sk_classify_flow(struct sock *sk, struct flowi *fl)
{
- call_void_hook(sk_getsecid, sk, &fl->flowi_secid);
+ struct lsm_export data = { .flags = LSM_EXPORT_NONE };
+
+ call_void_hook(sk_getsecid, sk, &data);
+ lsm_export_secid(&data, &fl->flowi_secid);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sk_classify_flow);
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 104b2315d36d..6f61a894f7c5 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -4893,14 +4893,14 @@ static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newsksec);
}
-static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid)
+static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, struct lsm_export *l)
{
if (!sk)
- *secid = SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET;
+ selinux_export_secid(l, SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET);
else {
struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
- *secid = sksec->sid;
+ selinux_export_secid(l, sksec->sid);
}
}
--
2.17.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread* [PATCH 11/97] LSM: Use lsm_export in the kernel_ask_as hooks
2019-02-28 22:17 [PATCH 00/97] LSM: Complete module stacking Casey Schaufler
` (9 preceding siblings ...)
2019-02-28 22:18 ` [PATCH 10/97] LSM: Use lsm_export in the sk_getsecid hooks Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-02-28 22:18 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-03-01 14:59 ` Edwin Zimmerman
2019-02-28 22:18 ` [PATCH 12/97] LSM: Use lsm_export in the getpeersec_dgram hooks Casey Schaufler
` (59 subsequent siblings)
70 siblings, 1 reply; 80+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-02-28 22:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul
Convert the kernel_ask_as hooks to use the lsm_export
structure instead of a u32 secid. There is some scaffolding
involved that will be removed when security_kernel_ask_as()
is updated.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 4 ++--
security/security.c | 15 ++++++++++++++-
security/selinux/hooks.c | 17 ++++++++++++++---
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 12 +++++++++++-
4 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index 44597189fea4..796eb441be95 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -562,7 +562,7 @@
* @kernel_act_as:
* Set the credentials for a kernel service to act as (subjective context).
* @new points to the credentials to be modified.
- * @secid specifies the security ID to be set
+ * @l specifies the security data to be set
* The current task must be the one that nominated @secid.
* Return 0 if successful.
* @kernel_create_files_as:
@@ -1588,7 +1588,7 @@ union security_list_options {
gfp_t gfp);
void (*cred_transfer)(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old);
void (*cred_getsecid)(const struct cred *c, struct lsm_export *l);
- int (*kernel_act_as)(struct cred *new, u32 secid);
+ int (*kernel_act_as)(struct cred *new, struct lsm_export *l);
int (*kernel_create_files_as)(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode);
int (*kernel_module_request)(char *kmod_name);
int (*kernel_load_data)(enum kernel_load_data_id id);
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 909b6b8d1a50..1a29fe08a5d9 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -738,6 +738,15 @@ static inline void lsm_export_secid(struct lsm_export *data, u32 *secid)
}
}
+static inline void lsm_export_to_all(struct lsm_export *data, u32 secid)
+{
+ data->selinux = secid;
+ data->smack = secid;
+ data->apparmor = secid;
+ data->flags = LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX | LSM_EXPORT_SMACK |
+ LSM_EXPORT_APPARMOR;
+}
+
/* Security operations */
int security_binder_set_context_mgr(struct task_struct *mgr)
@@ -1633,7 +1642,11 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_cred_getsecid);
int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
{
- return call_int_hook(kernel_act_as, 0, new, secid);
+ struct lsm_export data = { .flags = LSM_EXPORT_NONE };
+
+ lsm_export_to_all(&data, secid);
+
+ return call_int_hook(kernel_act_as, 0, new, &data);
}
int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 6f61a894f7c5..efcd905bdabf 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -220,6 +220,14 @@ static inline void selinux_export_secid(struct lsm_export *l, u32 secid)
l->flags |= LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX;
}
+static inline void selinux_import_secid(struct lsm_export *l, u32 *secid)
+{
+ if (l->flags | LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX)
+ *secid = l->selinux;
+ else
+ *secid = SECSID_NULL;
+}
+
/*
* get the security ID of a set of credentials
*/
@@ -3669,19 +3677,22 @@ static void selinux_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, struct lsm_export *l)
* set the security data for a kernel service
* - all the creation contexts are set to unlabelled
*/
-static int selinux_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
+static int selinux_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, struct lsm_export *l)
{
struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(new);
+ u32 nsid;
u32 sid = current_sid();
int ret;
+ selinux_import_secid(l, &nsid);
+
ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
- sid, secid,
+ sid, nsid,
SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
KERNEL_SERVICE__USE_AS_OVERRIDE,
NULL);
if (ret == 0) {
- tsec->sid = secid;
+ tsec->sid = nsid;
tsec->create_sid = 0;
tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index d5ff34a5803b..0e1f6ef25eb2 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -473,6 +473,14 @@ static inline void smack_export_secid(struct lsm_export *l, u32 secid)
l->flags |= LSM_EXPORT_SMACK;
}
+static inline void smack_import_secid(struct lsm_export *l, u32 *secid)
+{
+ if (l->flags | LSM_EXPORT_SMACK)
+ *secid = l->smack;
+ else
+ *secid = 0;
+}
+
/*
* LSM hooks.
* We he, that is fun!
@@ -1910,10 +1918,12 @@ static void smack_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *cred, struct lsm_export *l)
*
* Set the security data for a kernel service.
*/
-static int smack_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
+static int smack_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, struct lsm_export *l)
{
+ u32 secid;
struct task_smack *new_tsp = smack_cred(new);
+ smack_import_secid(l, &secid);
new_tsp->smk_task = smack_from_secid(secid);
return 0;
}
--
2.17.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread* RE: [PATCH 11/97] LSM: Use lsm_export in the kernel_ask_as hooks
2019-02-28 22:18 ` [PATCH 11/97] LSM: Use lsm_export in the kernel_ask_as hooks Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-03-01 14:59 ` Edwin Zimmerman
2019-03-01 16:59 ` Casey Schaufler
0 siblings, 1 reply; 80+ messages in thread
From: Edwin Zimmerman @ 2019-03-01 14:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: 'Casey Schaufler', jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul
On Thursday, 2/28/2019 at 5:18 PM, Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> wrote:
> Convert the kernel_ask_as hooks to use the lsm_export
Should be act_as, not? ^^
> structure instead of a u32 secid. There is some scaffolding
> involved that will be removed when security_kernel_ask_as()
> is updated.
>
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
> ---
> include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 4 ++--
> security/security.c | 15 ++++++++++++++-
> security/selinux/hooks.c | 17 ++++++++++++++---
> security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 12 +++++++++++-
> 4 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> index 44597189fea4..796eb441be95 100644
> --- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> @@ -562,7 +562,7 @@
> * @kernel_act_as:
> * Set the credentials for a kernel service to act as (subjective context).
> * @new points to the credentials to be modified.
> - * @secid specifies the security ID to be set
> + * @l specifies the security data to be set
> * The current task must be the one that nominated @secid.
> * Return 0 if successful.
> * @kernel_create_files_as:
> @@ -1588,7 +1588,7 @@ union security_list_options {
> gfp_t gfp);
> void (*cred_transfer)(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old);
> void (*cred_getsecid)(const struct cred *c, struct lsm_export *l);
> - int (*kernel_act_as)(struct cred *new, u32 secid);
> + int (*kernel_act_as)(struct cred *new, struct lsm_export *l);
> int (*kernel_create_files_as)(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode);
> int (*kernel_module_request)(char *kmod_name);
> int (*kernel_load_data)(enum kernel_load_data_id id);
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index 909b6b8d1a50..1a29fe08a5d9 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -738,6 +738,15 @@ static inline void lsm_export_secid(struct lsm_export *data, u32 *secid)
> }
> }
>
> +static inline void lsm_export_to_all(struct lsm_export *data, u32 secid)
> +{
> + data->selinux = secid;
> + data->smack = secid;
> + data->apparmor = secid;
> + data->flags = LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX | LSM_EXPORT_SMACK |
> + LSM_EXPORT_APPARMOR;
> +}
> +
> /* Security operations */
>
> int security_binder_set_context_mgr(struct task_struct *mgr)
> @@ -1633,7 +1642,11 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_cred_getsecid);
>
> int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
> {
> - return call_int_hook(kernel_act_as, 0, new, secid);
> + struct lsm_export data = { .flags = LSM_EXPORT_NONE };
> +
> + lsm_export_to_all(&data, secid);
> +
> + return call_int_hook(kernel_act_as, 0, new, &data);
> }
>
> int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
> diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> index 6f61a894f7c5..efcd905bdabf 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> @@ -220,6 +220,14 @@ static inline void selinux_export_secid(struct lsm_export *l, u32 secid)
> l->flags |= LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX;
> }
>
> +static inline void selinux_import_secid(struct lsm_export *l, u32 *secid)
> +{
> + if (l->flags | LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX)
> + *secid = l->selinux;
> + else
> + *secid = SECSID_NULL;
> +}
> +
> /*
> * get the security ID of a set of credentials
> */
> @@ -3669,19 +3677,22 @@ static void selinux_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, struct lsm_export *l)
> * set the security data for a kernel service
> * - all the creation contexts are set to unlabelled
> */
> -static int selinux_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
> +static int selinux_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, struct lsm_export *l)
> {
> struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(new);
> + u32 nsid;
> u32 sid = current_sid();
> int ret;
>
> + selinux_import_secid(l, &nsid);
> +
> ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
> - sid, secid,
> + sid, nsid,
> SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
> KERNEL_SERVICE__USE_AS_OVERRIDE,
> NULL);
> if (ret == 0) {
> - tsec->sid = secid;
> + tsec->sid = nsid;
> tsec->create_sid = 0;
> tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
> tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
> diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> index d5ff34a5803b..0e1f6ef25eb2 100644
> --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> @@ -473,6 +473,14 @@ static inline void smack_export_secid(struct lsm_export *l, u32 secid)
> l->flags |= LSM_EXPORT_SMACK;
> }
>
> +static inline void smack_import_secid(struct lsm_export *l, u32 *secid)
> +{
> + if (l->flags | LSM_EXPORT_SMACK)
> + *secid = l->smack;
> + else
> + *secid = 0;
> +}
> +
> /*
> * LSM hooks.
> * We he, that is fun!
> @@ -1910,10 +1918,12 @@ static void smack_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *cred, struct lsm_export *l)
> *
> * Set the security data for a kernel service.
> */
> -static int smack_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
> +static int smack_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, struct lsm_export *l)
> {
> + u32 secid;
> struct task_smack *new_tsp = smack_cred(new);
>
> + smack_import_secid(l, &secid);
> new_tsp->smk_task = smack_from_secid(secid);
> return 0;
> }
> --
> 2.17.0
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH 11/97] LSM: Use lsm_export in the kernel_ask_as hooks
2019-03-01 14:59 ` Edwin Zimmerman
@ 2019-03-01 16:59 ` Casey Schaufler
0 siblings, 0 replies; 80+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-03-01 16:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Edwin Zimmerman, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul
On 3/1/2019 6:59 AM, Edwin Zimmerman wrote:
> On Thursday, 2/28/2019 at 5:18 PM, Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> wrote:
>> Convert the kernel_ask_as hooks to use the lsm_export
> Should be act_as, not? ^^
You are correct.
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 12/97] LSM: Use lsm_export in the getpeersec_dgram hooks
2019-02-28 22:17 [PATCH 00/97] LSM: Complete module stacking Casey Schaufler
` (10 preceding siblings ...)
2019-02-28 22:18 ` [PATCH 11/97] LSM: Use lsm_export in the kernel_ask_as hooks Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-02-28 22:18 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-02-28 22:18 ` [PATCH 13/97] LSM: Use lsm_export in the audit_rule_match hooks Casey Schaufler
` (58 subsequent siblings)
70 siblings, 0 replies; 80+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-02-28 22:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul
Convert the getpeersec_dgram hooks to use the lsm_export
structure instead of a u32 secid. There is some scaffolding
involved that will be removed when security_getpeersec_dgram()
is updated.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 7 ++++---
security/apparmor/lsm.c | 3 ++-
security/security.c | 13 ++++++++++---
security/selinux/hooks.c | 6 ++++--
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 5 +++--
5 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index 796eb441be95..d4f260812c20 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -865,9 +865,9 @@
* the IP_PASSSEC option via getsockopt. It can then retrieve the
* security state returned by this hook for a packet via the SCM_SECURITY
* ancillary message type.
+ * @sock is the socket
* @skb is the skbuff for the packet being queried
- * @secdata is a pointer to a buffer in which to copy the security data
- * @seclen is the maximum length for @secdata
+ * @l is a pointer to a buffer in which to copy the security data
* Return 0 on success, error on failure.
* @sk_alloc_security:
* Allocate and attach a security structure to the sk->sk_security field,
@@ -1692,7 +1692,8 @@ union security_list_options {
char __user *optval,
int __user *optlen, unsigned len);
int (*socket_getpeersec_dgram)(struct socket *sock,
- struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid);
+ struct sk_buff *skb,
+ struct lsm_export *l);
int (*sk_alloc_security)(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority);
void (*sk_free_security)(struct sock *sk);
void (*sk_clone_security)(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk);
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index 377fa4ed1518..0f8e671df5fe 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -1096,7 +1096,8 @@ static int apparmor_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock,
* Sets the netlabel socket state on sk from parent
*/
static int apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
- struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
+ struct sk_buff *skb,
+ struct lsm_export *l)
{
/* TODO: requires secid support */
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 1a29fe08a5d9..bbb206b01e8e 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -2131,10 +2131,17 @@ int security_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
optval, optlen, len);
}
-int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
+int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb,
+ u32 *secid)
{
- return call_int_hook(socket_getpeersec_dgram, -ENOPROTOOPT, sock,
- skb, secid);
+ int rc;
+ struct lsm_export data = { .flags = LSM_EXPORT_NONE };
+
+ rc = call_int_hook(socket_getpeersec_dgram, -ENOPROTOOPT, sock, skb,
+ &data);
+
+ lsm_export_secid(&data, secid);
+ return rc;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_socket_getpeersec_dgram);
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index efcd905bdabf..1004aa4fc5db 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -4845,7 +4845,9 @@ static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock,
return err;
}
-static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
+static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
+ struct sk_buff *skb,
+ struct lsm_export *l)
{
u32 peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
u16 family;
@@ -4867,7 +4869,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *
selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_secid);
out:
- *secid = peer_secid;
+ selinux_export_secid(l, peer_secid);
if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL)
return -EINVAL;
return 0;
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 0e1f6ef25eb2..0bed974b833b 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -3887,7 +3887,8 @@ static int smack_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock,
* Sets the netlabel socket state on sk from parent
*/
static int smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
- struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
+ struct sk_buff *skb,
+ struct lsm_export *l)
{
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
@@ -3938,7 +3939,7 @@ static int smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
#endif
break;
}
- *secid = s;
+ smack_export_secid(l, s);
if (s == 0)
return -EINVAL;
return 0;
--
2.17.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread* [PATCH 13/97] LSM: Use lsm_export in the audit_rule_match hooks
2019-02-28 22:17 [PATCH 00/97] LSM: Complete module stacking Casey Schaufler
` (11 preceding siblings ...)
2019-02-28 22:18 ` [PATCH 12/97] LSM: Use lsm_export in the getpeersec_dgram hooks Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-02-28 22:18 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-02-28 22:18 ` [PATCH 14/97] LSM: Fix logical operation in lsm_export checks Casey Schaufler
` (57 subsequent siblings)
70 siblings, 0 replies; 80+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-02-28 22:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul
From: Casey Schaufler <cschaufler@schaufler-ca.com>
Convert the audit_rule_match hooks to use the lsm_export
structure instead of a u32 secid. There is quite a bit of scaffolding
involved that will be removed when security_audit_rule_match()
is updated.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 6 +++---
security/apparmor/audit.c | 4 ++--
security/apparmor/include/audit.h | 2 +-
security/apparmor/include/secid.h | 2 +-
security/apparmor/secid.c | 17 +++++++++++++++--
security/security.c | 7 ++++++-
security/selinux/hooks.c | 17 -----------------
security/selinux/include/audit.h | 6 +++---
security/selinux/include/objsec.h | 17 +++++++++++++++++
security/selinux/ss/services.c | 7 +++++--
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 8 +++++---
11 files changed, 58 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index d4f260812c20..932af86333b4 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -1341,7 +1341,7 @@
* @audit_rule_match:
* Determine if given @secid matches a rule previously approved
* by @audit_rule_known.
- * @secid contains the security id in question.
+ * @l points to the security data in question.
* @field contains the field which relates to current LSM.
* @op contains the operator that will be used for matching.
* @rule points to the audit rule that will be checked against.
@@ -1768,8 +1768,8 @@ union security_list_options {
int (*audit_rule_init)(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
void **lsmrule);
int (*audit_rule_known)(struct audit_krule *krule);
- int (*audit_rule_match)(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule,
- struct audit_context *actx);
+ int (*audit_rule_match)(struct lsm_export *l, u32 field, u32 op,
+ void *lsmrule, struct audit_context *actx);
void (*audit_rule_free)(void *lsmrule);
#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
diff --git a/security/apparmor/audit.c b/security/apparmor/audit.c
index eeaddfe0c0fb..9a726892a068 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/audit.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/audit.c
@@ -225,14 +225,14 @@ int aa_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *rule)
return 0;
}
-int aa_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule,
+int aa_audit_rule_match(struct lsm_export *l, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule,
struct audit_context *actx)
{
struct aa_audit_rule *rule = vrule;
struct aa_label *label;
int found = 0;
- label = aa_secid_to_label(sid);
+ label = aa_secid_to_label(l);
if (!label)
return -ENOENT;
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
index b8c8b1066b0a..5e4632bacd32 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
@@ -192,7 +192,7 @@ static inline int complain_error(int error)
void aa_audit_rule_free(void *vrule);
int aa_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule);
int aa_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *rule);
-int aa_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule,
+int aa_audit_rule_match(struct lsm_export *l, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule,
struct audit_context *actx);
#endif /* __AA_AUDIT_H */
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/secid.h b/security/apparmor/include/secid.h
index fa2062711b63..c283c620efe3 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/secid.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/secid.h
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ struct aa_label;
/* secid value that matches any other secid */
#define AA_SECID_WILDCARD 1
-struct aa_label *aa_secid_to_label(u32 secid);
+struct aa_label *aa_secid_to_label(struct lsm_export *l);
int apparmor_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen);
int apparmor_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid);
void apparmor_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen);
diff --git a/security/apparmor/secid.c b/security/apparmor/secid.c
index 05373d9a3d6a..1546c45a2a18 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/secid.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/secid.c
@@ -61,9 +61,12 @@ void aa_secid_update(u32 secid, struct aa_label *label)
*
* see label for inverse aa_label_to_secid
*/
-struct aa_label *aa_secid_to_label(u32 secid)
+struct aa_label *aa_secid_to_label(struct lsm_export *l)
{
struct aa_label *label;
+ u32 secid;
+
+ secid = (l->flags & LSM_EXPORT_APPARMOR) ? l->apparmor : 0;
rcu_read_lock();
label = idr_find(&aa_secids, secid);
@@ -72,12 +75,22 @@ struct aa_label *aa_secid_to_label(u32 secid)
return label;
}
+static inline void aa_import_secid(struct lsm_export *l, u32 secid)
+{
+ l->flags = LSM_EXPORT_APPARMOR;
+ l->apparmor = secid;
+}
+
int apparmor_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
{
/* TODO: cache secctx and ref count so we don't have to recreate */
- struct aa_label *label = aa_secid_to_label(secid);
+ struct lsm_export data;
+ struct aa_label *label;
int len;
+ aa_import_secid(&data, secid);
+ label = aa_secid_to_label(&data);
+
AA_BUG(!seclen);
if (!label)
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index bbb206b01e8e..51491fda1bc2 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -2467,8 +2467,13 @@ void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule,
struct audit_context *actx)
{
- return call_int_hook(audit_rule_match, 0, secid, field, op, lsmrule,
+ int rc;
+ struct lsm_export data = { .flags = LSM_EXPORT_NONE };
+
+ rc = call_int_hook(audit_rule_match, 0, &data, field, op, lsmrule,
actx);
+ lsm_export_secid(&data, &secid);
+ return rc;
}
#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 1004aa4fc5db..1cde918e4140 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -211,23 +211,6 @@ static void cred_init_security(void)
tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
}
-/*
- * Set the SELinux secid in an lsm_export structure
- */
-static inline void selinux_export_secid(struct lsm_export *l, u32 secid)
-{
- l->selinux = secid;
- l->flags |= LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX;
-}
-
-static inline void selinux_import_secid(struct lsm_export *l, u32 *secid)
-{
- if (l->flags | LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX)
- *secid = l->selinux;
- else
- *secid = SECSID_NULL;
-}
-
/*
* get the security ID of a set of credentials
*/
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/audit.h b/security/selinux/include/audit.h
index 36e1d44c0209..7daa44d188f7 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/audit.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/audit.h
@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ void selinux_audit_rule_free(void *rule);
/**
* selinux_audit_rule_match - determine if a context ID matches a rule.
- * @sid: the context ID to check
+ * @l: points to the context ID to check
* @field: the field this rule refers to
* @op: the operater the rule uses
* @rule: pointer to the audit rule to check against
@@ -48,8 +48,8 @@ void selinux_audit_rule_free(void *rule);
* Returns 1 if the context id matches the rule, 0 if it does not, and
* -errno on failure.
*/
-int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *rule,
- struct audit_context *actx);
+int selinux_audit_rule_match(struct lsm_export *l, u32 field, u32 op,
+ void *rule, struct audit_context *actx);
/**
* selinux_audit_rule_known - check to see if rule contains selinux fields.
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
index 3b78aa4ee98f..d7efc5f23c1e 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
@@ -50,6 +50,23 @@ static inline u32 current_sid(void)
return tsec->sid;
}
+/*
+ * Set the SELinux secid in an lsm_export structure
+ */
+static inline void selinux_export_secid(struct lsm_export *l, u32 secid)
+{
+ l->selinux = secid;
+ l->flags |= LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX;
+}
+
+static inline void selinux_import_secid(struct lsm_export *l, u32 *secid)
+{
+ if (l->flags | LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX)
+ *secid = l->selinux;
+ else
+ *secid = SECSID_NULL;
+}
+
enum label_initialized {
LABEL_INVALID, /* invalid or not initialized */
LABEL_INITIALIZED, /* initialized */
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index 4190c5e9e66c..fcd11105fafa 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -3376,14 +3376,15 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *rule)
return 0;
}
-int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule,
- struct audit_context *actx)
+int selinux_audit_rule_match(struct lsm_export *l, u32 field, u32 op,
+ void *vrule, struct audit_context *actx)
{
struct selinux_state *state = &selinux_state;
struct context *ctxt;
struct mls_level *level;
struct selinux_audit_rule *rule = vrule;
int match = 0;
+ u32 sid;
if (unlikely(!rule)) {
WARN_ONCE(1, "selinux_audit_rule_match: missing rule\n");
@@ -3397,6 +3398,8 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule,
goto out;
}
+ selinux_import_secid(l, &sid);
+
ctxt = sidtab_search(state->ss->sidtab, sid);
if (unlikely(!ctxt)) {
WARN_ONCE(1, "selinux_audit_rule_match: unrecognized SID %d\n",
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 0bed974b833b..d26a5e77a92c 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -4283,7 +4283,7 @@ static int smack_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule)
/**
* smack_audit_rule_match - Audit given object ?
- * @secid: security id for identifying the object to test
+ * @l: security id for identifying the object to test
* @field: audit rule flags given from user-space
* @op: required testing operator
* @vrule: smack internal rule presentation
@@ -4292,11 +4292,12 @@ static int smack_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule)
* The core Audit hook. It's used to take the decision of
* whether to audit or not to audit a given object.
*/
-static int smack_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule,
- struct audit_context *actx)
+static int smack_audit_rule_match(struct lsm_export *l, u32 field, u32 op,
+ void *vrule, struct audit_context *actx)
{
struct smack_known *skp;
char *rule = vrule;
+ u32 secid;
if (unlikely(!rule)) {
WARN_ONCE(1, "Smack: missing rule\n");
@@ -4306,6 +4307,7 @@ static int smack_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule,
if (field != AUDIT_SUBJ_USER && field != AUDIT_OBJ_USER)
return 0;
+ smack_import_secid(l, &secid);
skp = smack_from_secid(secid);
/*
--
2.17.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread* [PATCH 14/97] LSM: Fix logical operation in lsm_export checks
2019-02-28 22:17 [PATCH 00/97] LSM: Complete module stacking Casey Schaufler
` (12 preceding siblings ...)
2019-02-28 22:18 ` [PATCH 13/97] LSM: Use lsm_export in the audit_rule_match hooks Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-02-28 22:18 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-02-28 22:18 ` [PATCH 15/97] LSM: Use lsm_export in the secid_to_secctx hooks Casey Schaufler
` (56 subsequent siblings)
70 siblings, 0 replies; 80+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-02-28 22:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul
Fix the logic in Smack and SELinux when checking to
see if the secid is included.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
security/selinux/include/objsec.h | 2 +-
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 2 +-
2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
index d7efc5f23c1e..59a3b1cd5ba9 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ static inline void selinux_export_secid(struct lsm_export *l, u32 secid)
static inline void selinux_import_secid(struct lsm_export *l, u32 *secid)
{
- if (l->flags | LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX)
+ if (l->flags & LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX)
*secid = l->selinux;
else
*secid = SECSID_NULL;
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index d26a5e77a92c..a1a9fdd3f1c7 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -475,7 +475,7 @@ static inline void smack_export_secid(struct lsm_export *l, u32 secid)
static inline void smack_import_secid(struct lsm_export *l, u32 *secid)
{
- if (l->flags | LSM_EXPORT_SMACK)
+ if (l->flags & LSM_EXPORT_SMACK)
*secid = l->smack;
else
*secid = 0;
--
2.17.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread* [PATCH 15/97] LSM: Use lsm_export in the secid_to_secctx hooks
2019-02-28 22:17 [PATCH 00/97] LSM: Complete module stacking Casey Schaufler
` (13 preceding siblings ...)
2019-02-28 22:18 ` [PATCH 14/97] LSM: Fix logical operation in lsm_export checks Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-02-28 22:18 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-02-28 22:18 ` [PATCH 16/97] LSM: Use lsm_export in the secctx_to_secid hooks Casey Schaufler
` (55 subsequent siblings)
70 siblings, 0 replies; 80+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-02-28 22:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul
Convert the secid_to_secctx hooks to use the lsm_export
structure instead of a u32 secid. There is some scaffolding
involved that will be removed when security_secid_to_secctx()
is updated.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 5 +++--
security/apparmor/include/secid.h | 2 +-
security/apparmor/secid.c | 6 ++----
security/security.c | 5 ++++-
security/selinux/hooks.c | 6 +++++-
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 9 +++++++--
6 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index 932af86333b4..50629fb10cd5 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -1306,7 +1306,7 @@
* This does mean that the length could change between calls to check the
* length and the next call which actually allocates and returns the
* secdata.
- * @secid contains the security ID.
+ * @l points to the security information.
* @secdata contains the pointer that stores the converted security
* context.
* @seclen pointer which contains the length of the data
@@ -1654,7 +1654,8 @@ union security_list_options {
int (*getprocattr)(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value);
int (*setprocattr)(const char *name, void *value, size_t size);
int (*ismaclabel)(const char *name);
- int (*secid_to_secctx)(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen);
+ int (*secid_to_secctx)(struct lsm_export *l, char **secdata,
+ u32 *seclen);
int (*secctx_to_secid)(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid);
void (*release_secctx)(char *secdata, u32 seclen);
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/secid.h b/security/apparmor/include/secid.h
index c283c620efe3..03369183f512 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/secid.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/secid.h
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ struct aa_label;
#define AA_SECID_WILDCARD 1
struct aa_label *aa_secid_to_label(struct lsm_export *l);
-int apparmor_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen);
+int apparmor_secid_to_secctx(struct lsm_export *l, char **secdata, u32 *seclen);
int apparmor_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid);
void apparmor_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen);
diff --git a/security/apparmor/secid.c b/security/apparmor/secid.c
index 1546c45a2a18..ab4dc165e43e 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/secid.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/secid.c
@@ -81,15 +81,13 @@ static inline void aa_import_secid(struct lsm_export *l, u32 secid)
l->apparmor = secid;
}
-int apparmor_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
+int apparmor_secid_to_secctx(struct lsm_export *l, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
{
/* TODO: cache secctx and ref count so we don't have to recreate */
- struct lsm_export data;
struct aa_label *label;
int len;
- aa_import_secid(&data, secid);
- label = aa_secid_to_label(&data);
+ label = aa_secid_to_label(l);
AA_BUG(!seclen);
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 51491fda1bc2..6e05d3127760 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1988,7 +1988,10 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ismaclabel);
int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
{
- return call_int_hook(secid_to_secctx, -EOPNOTSUPP, secid, secdata,
+ struct lsm_export data;
+
+ lsm_export_to_all(&data, secid);
+ return call_int_hook(secid_to_secctx, -EOPNOTSUPP, &data, secdata,
seclen);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secid_to_secctx);
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 1cde918e4140..eae3c42c07fd 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -6194,8 +6194,12 @@ static int selinux_ismaclabel(const char *name)
return (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX) == 0);
}
-static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
+static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(struct lsm_export *l, char **secdata,
+ u32 *seclen)
{
+ u32 secid;
+
+ selinux_import_secid(l, &secid);
return security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, secid,
secdata, seclen);
}
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index a1a9fdd3f1c7..83a2b1153790 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -4348,9 +4348,14 @@ static int smack_ismaclabel(const char *name)
*
* Exists for networking code.
*/
-static int smack_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
+static int smack_secid_to_secctx(struct lsm_export *l, char **secdata,
+ u32 *seclen)
{
- struct smack_known *skp = smack_from_secid(secid);
+ struct smack_known *skp;
+ u32 secid;
+
+ smack_import_secid(l, &secid);
+ skp = smack_from_secid(secid);
if (secdata)
*secdata = skp->smk_known;
--
2.17.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread* [PATCH 16/97] LSM: Use lsm_export in the secctx_to_secid hooks
2019-02-28 22:17 [PATCH 00/97] LSM: Complete module stacking Casey Schaufler
` (14 preceding siblings ...)
2019-02-28 22:18 ` [PATCH 15/97] LSM: Use lsm_export in the secid_to_secctx hooks Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-02-28 22:18 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-02-28 22:18 ` [PATCH 17/97] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_audit_rule_match Casey Schaufler
` (54 subsequent siblings)
70 siblings, 0 replies; 80+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-02-28 22:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul
Convert the secctx_to_secid hooks to use the lsm_export
structure instead of a u32 secid. There is some scaffolding
involved that will be removed when security_secctx_to_secid()
is updated.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 7 ++++---
security/apparmor/include/secid.h | 3 ++-
security/apparmor/secid.c | 9 +++++----
security/security.c | 8 ++++++--
security/selinux/hooks.c | 12 +++++++++---
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 7 ++++---
6 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index 50629fb10cd5..97ef535dafd0 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -1311,8 +1311,8 @@
* context.
* @seclen pointer which contains the length of the data
* @secctx_to_secid:
- * Convert security context to secid.
- * @secid contains the pointer to the generated security ID.
+ * Convert security context to exported lsm data.
+ * @l contains the pointer to the generated security data.
* @secdata contains the security context.
*
* @release_secctx:
@@ -1656,7 +1656,8 @@ union security_list_options {
int (*ismaclabel)(const char *name);
int (*secid_to_secctx)(struct lsm_export *l, char **secdata,
u32 *seclen);
- int (*secctx_to_secid)(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid);
+ int (*secctx_to_secid)(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
+ struct lsm_export *l);
void (*release_secctx)(char *secdata, u32 seclen);
void (*inode_invalidate_secctx)(struct inode *inode);
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/secid.h b/security/apparmor/include/secid.h
index 03369183f512..5381eff03d4f 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/secid.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/secid.h
@@ -27,7 +27,8 @@ struct aa_label;
struct aa_label *aa_secid_to_label(struct lsm_export *l);
int apparmor_secid_to_secctx(struct lsm_export *l, char **secdata, u32 *seclen);
-int apparmor_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid);
+int apparmor_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
+ struct lsm_export *l);
void apparmor_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen);
diff --git a/security/apparmor/secid.c b/security/apparmor/secid.c
index ab4dc165e43e..69d98a89db75 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/secid.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/secid.c
@@ -75,9 +75,9 @@ struct aa_label *aa_secid_to_label(struct lsm_export *l)
return label;
}
-static inline void aa_import_secid(struct lsm_export *l, u32 secid)
+static inline void aa_export_secid(struct lsm_export *l, u32 secid)
{
- l->flags = LSM_EXPORT_APPARMOR;
+ l->flags |= LSM_EXPORT_APPARMOR;
l->apparmor = secid;
}
@@ -111,7 +111,8 @@ int apparmor_secid_to_secctx(struct lsm_export *l, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
return 0;
}
-int apparmor_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
+int apparmor_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
+ struct lsm_export *l)
{
struct aa_label *label;
@@ -119,7 +120,7 @@ int apparmor_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
seclen, GFP_KERNEL, false, false);
if (IS_ERR(label))
return PTR_ERR(label);
- *secid = label->secid;
+ aa_export_secid(l, label->secid);
return 0;
}
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 6e05d3127760..f3c29dd51c7a 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1998,8 +1998,12 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secid_to_secctx);
int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
{
- *secid = 0;
- return call_int_hook(secctx_to_secid, 0, secdata, seclen, secid);
+ struct lsm_export data = { .flags = LSM_EXPORT_NONE };
+ int rc;
+
+ rc = call_int_hook(secctx_to_secid, 0, secdata, seclen, &data);
+ lsm_export_secid(&data, secid);
+ return rc;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secctx_to_secid);
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index eae3c42c07fd..744fa6141ae1 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -6204,10 +6204,16 @@ static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(struct lsm_export *l, char **secdata,
secdata, seclen);
}
-static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
+static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
+ struct lsm_export *l)
{
- return security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state, secdata, seclen,
- secid, GFP_KERNEL);
+ u32 secid;
+ int rc;
+
+ rc = security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state, secdata, seclen,
+ &secid, GFP_KERNEL);
+ selinux_export_secid(l, secid);
+ return rc;
}
static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 83a2b1153790..1ee9c94c0e16 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -4371,14 +4371,15 @@ static int smack_secid_to_secctx(struct lsm_export *l, char **secdata,
*
* Exists for audit and networking code.
*/
-static int smack_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
+static int smack_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
+ struct lsm_export *l)
{
struct smack_known *skp = smk_find_entry(secdata);
if (skp)
- *secid = skp->smk_secid;
+ smack_export_secid(l, skp->smk_secid);
else
- *secid = 0;
+ smack_export_secid(l, 0);
return 0;
}
--
2.17.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread* [PATCH 17/97] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_audit_rule_match
2019-02-28 22:17 [PATCH 00/97] LSM: Complete module stacking Casey Schaufler
` (15 preceding siblings ...)
2019-02-28 22:18 ` [PATCH 16/97] LSM: Use lsm_export in the secctx_to_secid hooks Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-02-28 22:18 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-02-28 22:18 ` [PATCH 18/97] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_kernel_act_as Casey Schaufler
` (53 subsequent siblings)
70 siblings, 0 replies; 80+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-02-28 22:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul
Convert security_audit_rule_match to use the lsm_export structure
instead of a u32 secid. There is some scaffolding involved that
will be removed when the related data is updated.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
include/linux/security.h | 48 ++++++++++++++++++++++++---
kernel/auditfilter.c | 4 ++-
kernel/auditsc.c | 13 +++++---
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 7 ++--
security/security.c | 51 ++---------------------------
5 files changed, 64 insertions(+), 59 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 785d21c81dea..73017c9e937a 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -90,6 +90,45 @@ static inline void lsm_export_init(struct lsm_export *l)
memset(l, 0, sizeof(*l));
}
+/**
+ * lsm_export_secid - pull the useful secid out of a lsm_export
+ * @data: the containing data structure
+ * @secid: where to put the one that matters.
+ *
+ * Shim that will disappear when all lsm_export conversions are done.
+ */
+static inline void lsm_export_secid(struct lsm_export *data, u32 *secid)
+{
+ switch (data->flags) {
+ case LSM_EXPORT_NONE:
+ *secid = 0;
+ break;
+ case LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX:
+ *secid = data->selinux;
+ break;
+ case LSM_EXPORT_SMACK:
+ *secid = data->smack;
+ break;
+ case LSM_EXPORT_APPARMOR:
+ *secid = data->apparmor;
+ break;
+ default:
+ pr_warn("%s flags=0x%u - not a valid set\n", __func__,
+ data->flags);
+ *secid = 0;
+ break;
+ }
+}
+
+static inline void lsm_export_to_all(struct lsm_export *data, u32 secid)
+{
+ data->selinux = secid;
+ data->smack = secid;
+ data->apparmor = secid;
+ data->flags = LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX | LSM_EXPORT_SMACK |
+ LSM_EXPORT_APPARMOR;
+}
+
/* These functions are in security/commoncap.c */
extern int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
int cap, unsigned int opts);
@@ -1696,8 +1735,8 @@ static inline int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule);
int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule);
-int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule,
- struct audit_context *actx);
+int security_audit_rule_match(struct lsm_export *l, u32 field, u32 op,
+ void *lsmrule, struct audit_context *actx);
void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule);
#else
@@ -1713,8 +1752,9 @@ static inline int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule)
return 0;
}
-static inline int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
- void *lsmrule, struct audit_context *actx)
+static inline int security_audit_rule_match(struct lsm_export *l, u32 field,
+ u32 op, void *lsmrule,
+ struct audit_context *actx)
{
return 0;
}
diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c
index bf309f2592c4..c784dfa9fa23 100644
--- a/kernel/auditfilter.c
+++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c
@@ -1324,6 +1324,7 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)
struct audit_field *f = &e->rule.fields[i];
pid_t pid;
u32 sid;
+ struct lsm_export le;
switch (f->type) {
case AUDIT_PID:
@@ -1354,7 +1355,8 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)
case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
if (f->lsm_rule) {
security_task_getsecid(current, &sid);
- result = security_audit_rule_match(sid,
+ lsm_export_to_all(&le, sid);
+ result = security_audit_rule_match(&le,
f->type, f->op, f->lsm_rule, NULL);
}
break;
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 6593a5207fb0..5988f4fce7de 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -445,6 +445,7 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
const struct cred *cred;
int i, need_sid = 1;
u32 sid;
+ struct lsm_export le;
unsigned int sessionid;
cred = rcu_dereference_check(tsk->cred, tsk == current || task_creation);
@@ -630,7 +631,8 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
security_task_getsecid(tsk, &sid);
need_sid = 0;
}
- result = security_audit_rule_match(sid, f->type,
+ lsm_export_to_all(&le, sid);
+ result = security_audit_rule_match(&le, f->type,
f->op,
f->lsm_rule,
ctx);
@@ -646,12 +648,14 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
if (f->lsm_rule) {
/* Find files that match */
if (name) {
+ lsm_export_to_all(&le, name->osid);
result = security_audit_rule_match(
- name->osid, f->type, f->op,
+ &le, f->type, f->op,
f->lsm_rule, ctx);
} else if (ctx) {
list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
- if (security_audit_rule_match(n->osid, f->type,
+ lsm_export_to_all(&le, n->osid);
+ if (security_audit_rule_match(&le, f->type,
f->op, f->lsm_rule,
ctx)) {
++result;
@@ -662,7 +666,8 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
/* Find ipc objects that match */
if (!ctx || ctx->type != AUDIT_IPC)
break;
- if (security_audit_rule_match(ctx->ipc.osid,
+ lsm_export_to_all(&le, ctx->ipc.osid);
+ if (security_audit_rule_match(&le,
f->type, f->op,
f->lsm_rule, ctx))
++result;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index 8bc8a1c8cb3f..72eb0efb22ad 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -327,6 +327,7 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,
for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) {
int rc = 0;
u32 osid;
+ struct lsm_export le;
int retried = 0;
if (!rule->lsm[i].rule)
@@ -337,7 +338,8 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,
case LSM_OBJ_ROLE:
case LSM_OBJ_TYPE:
security_inode_getsecid(inode, &osid);
- rc = security_filter_rule_match(osid,
+ lsm_export_to_all(&le, osid);
+ rc = security_filter_rule_match(&le,
rule->lsm[i].type,
Audit_equal,
rule->lsm[i].rule,
@@ -346,7 +348,8 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,
case LSM_SUBJ_USER:
case LSM_SUBJ_ROLE:
case LSM_SUBJ_TYPE:
- rc = security_filter_rule_match(secid,
+ lsm_export_to_all(&le, secid);
+ rc = security_filter_rule_match(&le,
rule->lsm[i].type,
Audit_equal,
rule->lsm[i].rule,
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index f3c29dd51c7a..43afcdf1e424 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -708,45 +708,6 @@ int lsm_superblock_alloc(struct super_block *sb)
RC; \
})
-/**
- * lsm_export_secid - pull the useful secid out of a lsm_export
- * @data: the containing data structure
- * @secid: where to put the one that matters.
- *
- * Shim that will disappear when all lsm_export conversions are done.
- */
-static inline void lsm_export_secid(struct lsm_export *data, u32 *secid)
-{
- switch (data->flags) {
- case LSM_EXPORT_NONE:
- *secid = 0;
- break;
- case LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX:
- *secid = data->selinux;
- break;
- case LSM_EXPORT_SMACK:
- *secid = data->smack;
- break;
- case LSM_EXPORT_APPARMOR:
- *secid = data->apparmor;
- break;
- default:
- pr_warn("%s flags=0x%u - not a valid set\n", __func__,
- data->flags);
- *secid = 0;
- break;
- }
-}
-
-static inline void lsm_export_to_all(struct lsm_export *data, u32 secid)
-{
- data->selinux = secid;
- data->smack = secid;
- data->apparmor = secid;
- data->flags = LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX | LSM_EXPORT_SMACK |
- LSM_EXPORT_APPARMOR;
-}
-
/* Security operations */
int security_binder_set_context_mgr(struct task_struct *mgr)
@@ -2471,16 +2432,10 @@ void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
call_void_hook(audit_rule_free, lsmrule);
}
-int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule,
- struct audit_context *actx)
+int security_audit_rule_match(struct lsm_export *l, u32 field, u32 op,
+ void *lsmrule, struct audit_context *actx)
{
- int rc;
- struct lsm_export data = { .flags = LSM_EXPORT_NONE };
-
- rc = call_int_hook(audit_rule_match, 0, &data, field, op, lsmrule,
- actx);
- lsm_export_secid(&data, &secid);
- return rc;
+ return call_int_hook(audit_rule_match, 0, l, field, op, lsmrule, actx);
}
#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
--
2.17.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread* [PATCH 18/97] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_kernel_act_as
2019-02-28 22:17 [PATCH 00/97] LSM: Complete module stacking Casey Schaufler
` (16 preceding siblings ...)
2019-02-28 22:18 ` [PATCH 17/97] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_audit_rule_match Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-02-28 22:18 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-02-28 22:18 ` [PATCH 19/97] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_socket_getpeersec_dgram Casey Schaufler
` (52 subsequent siblings)
70 siblings, 0 replies; 80+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-02-28 22:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul
From: Casey Schaufler <cschaufler@schaufler-ca.com>
Convert security_kernel_act_as to use the lsm_export structure
instead of a u32 secid. There is some scaffolding involved
that will be removed when the related data is updated.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
include/linux/cred.h | 3 ++-
include/linux/security.h | 5 +++--
kernel/cred.c | 10 ++++++----
security/security.c | 8 ++------
4 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/cred.h b/include/linux/cred.h
index ddd45bb74887..023f422eefd6 100644
--- a/include/linux/cred.h
+++ b/include/linux/cred.h
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
struct cred;
struct inode;
+struct lsm_export;
/*
* COW Supplementary groups list
@@ -165,7 +166,7 @@ extern const struct cred *override_creds(const struct cred *);
extern void revert_creds(const struct cred *);
extern struct cred *prepare_kernel_cred(struct task_struct *);
extern int change_create_files_as(struct cred *, struct inode *);
-extern int set_security_override(struct cred *, u32);
+extern int set_security_override(struct cred *, struct lsm_export *);
extern int set_security_override_from_ctx(struct cred *, const char *);
extern int set_create_files_as(struct cred *, struct inode *);
extern int cred_fscmp(const struct cred *, const struct cred *);
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 73017c9e937a..08fb928cc86b 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -373,7 +373,7 @@ void security_cred_free(struct cred *cred);
int security_prepare_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, gfp_t gfp);
void security_transfer_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old);
void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid);
-int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid);
+int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, struct lsm_export *l);
int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode);
int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name);
int security_kernel_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id);
@@ -945,7 +945,8 @@ static inline void security_transfer_creds(struct cred *new,
{
}
-static inline int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *cred, u32 secid)
+static inline int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *cred,
+ struct lsm_export *l)
{
return 0;
}
diff --git a/kernel/cred.c b/kernel/cred.c
index 45d77284aed0..40a3fde22667 100644
--- a/kernel/cred.c
+++ b/kernel/cred.c
@@ -701,14 +701,14 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(prepare_kernel_cred);
/**
* set_security_override - Set the security ID in a set of credentials
* @new: The credentials to alter
- * @secid: The LSM security ID to set
+ * @l: The LSM security information to set
*
* Set the LSM security ID in a set of credentials so that the subjective
* security is overridden when an alternative set of credentials is used.
*/
-int set_security_override(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
+int set_security_override(struct cred *new, struct lsm_export *l)
{
- return security_kernel_act_as(new, secid);
+ return security_kernel_act_as(new, l);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_security_override);
@@ -724,6 +724,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_security_override);
*/
int set_security_override_from_ctx(struct cred *new, const char *secctx)
{
+ struct lsm_export le;
u32 secid;
int ret;
@@ -731,7 +732,8 @@ int set_security_override_from_ctx(struct cred *new, const char *secctx)
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
- return set_security_override(new, secid);
+ lsm_export_to_all(&le, secid);
+ return set_security_override(new, &le);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_security_override_from_ctx);
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 43afcdf1e424..1607f19f2824 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1601,13 +1601,9 @@ void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_cred_getsecid);
-int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
+int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, struct lsm_export *l)
{
- struct lsm_export data = { .flags = LSM_EXPORT_NONE };
-
- lsm_export_to_all(&data, secid);
-
- return call_int_hook(kernel_act_as, 0, new, &data);
+ return call_int_hook(kernel_act_as, 0, new, l);
}
int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
--
2.17.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread* [PATCH 19/97] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_socket_getpeersec_dgram
2019-02-28 22:17 [PATCH 00/97] LSM: Complete module stacking Casey Schaufler
` (17 preceding siblings ...)
2019-02-28 22:18 ` [PATCH 18/97] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_kernel_act_as Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-02-28 22:18 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-02-28 22:18 ` [PATCH 20/97] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_secctx_to_secid Casey Schaufler
` (51 subsequent siblings)
70 siblings, 0 replies; 80+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-02-28 22:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul
Convert security_socket_getpeersec_dgram to use the lsm_export structure
instead of a u32 secid. There is some scaffolding involved
that will be removed when the related data is updated.
In particular, the le entry in scm_cookie includes the secid
data. The secid will go away.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
include/linux/security.h | 7 +++++--
include/net/scm.h | 4 +++-
net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c | 4 +++-
security/security.c | 13 ++++---------
4 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 08fb928cc86b..5837cc2a5dad 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -1254,7 +1254,8 @@ int security_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how);
int security_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
int security_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
int __user *optlen, unsigned len);
-int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid);
+int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb,
+ struct lsm_export *l);
int security_sk_alloc(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority);
void security_sk_free(struct sock *sk);
void security_sk_clone(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk);
@@ -1392,7 +1393,9 @@ static inline int security_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __
return -ENOPROTOOPT;
}
-static inline int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
+static inline int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
+ struct sk_buff *skb,
+ struct lsm_export *l)
{
return -ENOPROTOOPT;
}
diff --git a/include/net/scm.h b/include/net/scm.h
index 1ce365f4c256..13b8a369fd89 100644
--- a/include/net/scm.h
+++ b/include/net/scm.h
@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ struct scm_cookie {
struct scm_creds creds; /* Skb credentials */
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
u32 secid; /* Passed security ID */
+ struct lsm_export le; /* Passed LSM data */
#endif
};
@@ -46,7 +47,8 @@ struct scm_fp_list *scm_fp_dup(struct scm_fp_list *fpl);
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
static __inline__ void unix_get_peersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct scm_cookie *scm)
{
- security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(sock, NULL, &scm->secid);
+ security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(sock, NULL, &scm->le);
+ lsm_export_secid(&scm->le, &scm->secid);
}
#else
static __inline__ void unix_get_peersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct scm_cookie *scm)
diff --git a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
index 82f341e84fae..b8ef7677a7e5 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
@@ -130,14 +130,16 @@ static void ip_cmsg_recv_checksum(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb,
static void ip_cmsg_recv_security(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
+ struct lsm_export le;
char *secdata;
u32 seclen, secid;
int err;
- err = security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(NULL, skb, &secid);
+ err = security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(NULL, skb, &le);
if (err)
return;
+ lsm_export_secid(&le, &secid);
err = security_secid_to_secctx(secid, &secdata, &seclen);
if (err)
return;
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 1607f19f2824..b86ac7b8a946 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -2096,16 +2096,11 @@ int security_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
}
int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb,
- u32 *secid)
+ struct lsm_export *l)
{
- int rc;
- struct lsm_export data = { .flags = LSM_EXPORT_NONE };
-
- rc = call_int_hook(socket_getpeersec_dgram, -ENOPROTOOPT, sock, skb,
- &data);
-
- lsm_export_secid(&data, secid);
- return rc;
+ lsm_export_init(l);
+ return call_int_hook(socket_getpeersec_dgram, -ENOPROTOOPT, sock, skb,
+ l);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_socket_getpeersec_dgram);
--
2.17.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread* [PATCH 20/97] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_secctx_to_secid
2019-02-28 22:17 [PATCH 00/97] LSM: Complete module stacking Casey Schaufler
` (18 preceding siblings ...)
2019-02-28 22:18 ` [PATCH 19/97] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_socket_getpeersec_dgram Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-02-28 22:18 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-02-28 22:18 ` [PATCH 21/97] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_secid_to_secctx Casey Schaufler
` (50 subsequent siblings)
70 siblings, 0 replies; 80+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-02-28 22:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul
Convert security_secctx_to_secid to use the lsm_export structure
instead of a u32 secid. There is some scaffolding involved
that will be removed when the related data is updated.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
include/linux/security.h | 5 +++--
kernel/cred.c | 4 +---
net/netfilter/nft_meta.c | 4 +++-
net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c | 5 +++--
net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 8 ++++++--
security/security.c | 10 +++-------
6 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 5837cc2a5dad..330fc7ac8d7d 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -432,7 +432,8 @@ int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value,
int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
int security_ismaclabel(const char *name);
int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen);
-int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid);
+int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
+ struct lsm_export *l);
void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen);
void security_inode_invalidate_secctx(struct inode *inode);
@@ -1204,7 +1205,7 @@ static inline int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *secle
static inline int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata,
u32 seclen,
- u32 *secid)
+ struct lsm_export *l)
{
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
diff --git a/kernel/cred.c b/kernel/cred.c
index 40a3fde22667..7792538b1ca6 100644
--- a/kernel/cred.c
+++ b/kernel/cred.c
@@ -725,14 +725,12 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_security_override);
int set_security_override_from_ctx(struct cred *new, const char *secctx)
{
struct lsm_export le;
- u32 secid;
int ret;
- ret = security_secctx_to_secid(secctx, strlen(secctx), &secid);
+ ret = security_secctx_to_secid(secctx, strlen(secctx), &le);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
- lsm_export_to_all(&le, secid);
return set_security_override(new, &le);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_security_override_from_ctx);
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nft_meta.c b/net/netfilter/nft_meta.c
index 6df486c5ebd3..a03de2ab833a 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nft_meta.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nft_meta.c
@@ -564,13 +564,15 @@ static const struct nla_policy nft_secmark_policy[NFTA_SECMARK_MAX + 1] = {
static int nft_secmark_compute_secid(struct nft_secmark *priv)
{
+ struct lsm_export le;
u32 tmp_secid = 0;
int err;
- err = security_secctx_to_secid(priv->ctx, strlen(priv->ctx), &tmp_secid);
+ err = security_secctx_to_secid(priv->ctx, strlen(priv->ctx), &le);
if (err)
return err;
+ lsm_export_secid(&le, &tmp_secid);
if (!tmp_secid)
return -ENOENT;
diff --git a/net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c b/net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c
index f16202d26c20..2def8d8898e6 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c
@@ -49,13 +49,13 @@ secmark_tg(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct xt_action_param *par)
static int checkentry_lsm(struct xt_secmark_target_info *info)
{
+ struct lsm_export le;
int err;
info->secctx[SECMARK_SECCTX_MAX - 1] = '\0';
info->secid = 0;
- err = security_secctx_to_secid(info->secctx, strlen(info->secctx),
- &info->secid);
+ err = security_secctx_to_secid(info->secctx, strlen(info->secctx), &le);
if (err) {
if (err == -EINVAL)
pr_info_ratelimited("invalid security context \'%s\'\n",
@@ -63,6 +63,7 @@ static int checkentry_lsm(struct xt_secmark_target_info *info)
return err;
}
+ lsm_export_secid(&le, &info->secid);
if (!info->secid) {
pr_info_ratelimited("unable to map security context \'%s\'\n",
info->secctx);
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
index c92894c3e40a..fc38934ccb35 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
@@ -896,6 +896,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticadd(struct sk_buff *skb,
void *mask;
u32 addr_len;
u32 secid;
+ struct lsm_export le;
struct netlbl_audit audit_info;
/* Don't allow users to add both IPv4 and IPv6 addresses for a
@@ -919,10 +920,11 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticadd(struct sk_buff *skb,
ret_val = security_secctx_to_secid(
nla_data(info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX]),
nla_len(info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX]),
- &secid);
+ &le);
if (ret_val != 0)
return ret_val;
+ lsm_export_secid(&le, &secid);
return netlbl_unlhsh_add(&init_net,
dev_name, addr, mask, addr_len, secid,
&audit_info);
@@ -947,6 +949,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticadddef(struct sk_buff *skb,
void *mask;
u32 addr_len;
u32 secid;
+ struct lsm_export le;
struct netlbl_audit audit_info;
/* Don't allow users to add both IPv4 and IPv6 addresses for a
@@ -968,10 +971,11 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticadddef(struct sk_buff *skb,
ret_val = security_secctx_to_secid(
nla_data(info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX]),
nla_len(info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX]),
- &secid);
+ &le);
if (ret_val != 0)
return ret_val;
+ lsm_export_secid(&le, &secid);
return netlbl_unlhsh_add(&init_net,
NULL, addr, mask, addr_len, secid,
&audit_info);
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index b86ac7b8a946..da3ccb19dcae 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1953,14 +1953,10 @@ int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secid_to_secctx);
-int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
+int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
+ struct lsm_export *l)
{
- struct lsm_export data = { .flags = LSM_EXPORT_NONE };
- int rc;
-
- rc = call_int_hook(secctx_to_secid, 0, secdata, seclen, &data);
- lsm_export_secid(&data, secid);
- return rc;
+ return call_int_hook(secctx_to_secid, 0, secdata, seclen, l);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secctx_to_secid);
--
2.17.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread* [PATCH 21/97] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_secid_to_secctx
2019-02-28 22:17 [PATCH 00/97] LSM: Complete module stacking Casey Schaufler
` (19 preceding siblings ...)
2019-02-28 22:18 ` [PATCH 20/97] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_secctx_to_secid Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-02-28 22:18 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-02-28 22:18 ` [PATCH 22/97] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_ipc_getsecid Casey Schaufler
` (49 subsequent siblings)
70 siblings, 0 replies; 80+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-02-28 22:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul
Convert security_secid_to_secctx to use the lsm_export structure
instead of a u32 secid. There is some scaffolding involved
that will be removed when the related data is updated.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
include/linux/security.h | 9 +++++++--
include/net/scm.h | 4 +---
kernel/audit.c | 15 +++++++++++----
kernel/auditsc.c | 8 ++++++--
net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c | 5 ++---
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c | 8 ++++++--
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c | 2 ++
net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c | 6 +++++-
net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 18 ++++++++++++++----
net/unix/af_unix.c | 9 ++++++---
security/security.c | 8 ++------
11 files changed, 62 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 330fc7ac8d7d..d0adf4032baf 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -112,6 +112,10 @@ static inline void lsm_export_secid(struct lsm_export *data, u32 *secid)
case LSM_EXPORT_APPARMOR:
*secid = data->apparmor;
break;
+ case LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX | LSM_EXPORT_SMACK | LSM_EXPORT_APPARMOR:
+ /* For scaffolding only */
+ *secid = data->selinux;
+ break;
default:
pr_warn("%s flags=0x%u - not a valid set\n", __func__,
data->flags);
@@ -431,7 +435,7 @@ int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value,
size_t size);
int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
int security_ismaclabel(const char *name);
-int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen);
+int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsm_export *l, char **secdata, u32 *seclen);
int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
struct lsm_export *l);
void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen);
@@ -1198,7 +1202,8 @@ static inline int security_ismaclabel(const char *name)
return 0;
}
-static inline int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
+static inline int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsm_export *l,
+ char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
{
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
diff --git a/include/net/scm.h b/include/net/scm.h
index 13b8a369fd89..b5d1c24318e3 100644
--- a/include/net/scm.h
+++ b/include/net/scm.h
@@ -33,7 +33,6 @@ struct scm_cookie {
struct scm_fp_list *fp; /* Passed files */
struct scm_creds creds; /* Skb credentials */
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
- u32 secid; /* Passed security ID */
struct lsm_export le; /* Passed LSM data */
#endif
};
@@ -48,7 +47,6 @@ struct scm_fp_list *scm_fp_dup(struct scm_fp_list *fpl);
static __inline__ void unix_get_peersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct scm_cookie *scm)
{
security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(sock, NULL, &scm->le);
- lsm_export_secid(&scm->le, &scm->secid);
}
#else
static __inline__ void unix_get_peersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct scm_cookie *scm)
@@ -99,7 +97,7 @@ static inline void scm_passec(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct sc
int err;
if (test_bit(SOCK_PASSSEC, &sock->flags)) {
- err = security_secid_to_secctx(scm->secid, &secdata, &seclen);
+ err = security_secid_to_secctx(&scm->le, &secdata, &seclen);
if (!err) {
put_cmsg(msg, SOL_SOCKET, SCM_SECURITY, seclen, secdata);
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index 632d36059556..aeed1368a166 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -1418,7 +1418,10 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
case AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO:
len = 0;
if (audit_sig_sid) {
- err = security_secid_to_secctx(audit_sig_sid, &ctx, &len);
+ struct lsm_export le;
+
+ lsm_export_to_all(&le, audit_sig_sid);
+ err = security_secid_to_secctx(&le, &ctx, &len);
if (err)
return err;
}
@@ -2167,8 +2170,10 @@ void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n,
if (n->osid != 0) {
char *ctx = NULL;
u32 len;
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(
- n->osid, &ctx, &len)) {
+ struct lsm_export le;
+
+ lsm_export_to_all(&le, n->osid);
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(&le, &ctx, &len)) {
audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", n->osid);
if (call_panic)
*call_panic = 2;
@@ -2207,12 +2212,14 @@ int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
unsigned len;
int error;
u32 sid;
+ struct lsm_export le;
security_task_getsecid(current, &sid);
if (!sid)
return 0;
- error = security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len);
+ lsm_export_to_all(&le, sid);
+ error = security_secid_to_secctx(&le, &ctx, &len);
if (error) {
if (error != -EINVAL)
goto error_path;
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 5988f4fce7de..0d4e006a7ae1 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -943,6 +943,7 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
char *ctx = NULL;
u32 len;
int rc = 0;
+ struct lsm_export le;
ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_OBJ_PID);
if (!ab)
@@ -952,7 +953,8 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, auid),
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid), sessionid);
if (sid) {
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len)) {
+ lsm_export_to_all(&le, sid);
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(&le, &ctx, &len)) {
audit_log_format(ab, " obj=(none)");
rc = 1;
} else {
@@ -1168,7 +1170,9 @@ static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
if (osid) {
char *ctx = NULL;
u32 len;
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(osid, &ctx, &len)) {
+ struct lsm_export le;
+ lsm_export_to_all(&le, osid);
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(&le, &ctx, &len)) {
audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", osid);
*call_panic = 1;
} else {
diff --git a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
index b8ef7677a7e5..a4f37ba6dbe2 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
@@ -132,15 +132,14 @@ static void ip_cmsg_recv_security(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct lsm_export le;
char *secdata;
- u32 seclen, secid;
+ u32 seclen;
int err;
err = security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(NULL, skb, &le);
if (err)
return;
- lsm_export_secid(&le, &secid);
- err = security_secid_to_secctx(secid, &secdata, &seclen);
+ err = security_secid_to_secctx(&le, &secdata, &seclen);
if (err)
return;
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
index 1213beb5a714..d19092fc6580 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
@@ -330,8 +330,10 @@ static int ctnetlink_dump_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_conn *ct)
struct nlattr *nest_secctx;
int len, ret;
char *secctx;
+ struct lsm_export le;
- ret = security_secid_to_secctx(ct->secmark, &secctx, &len);
+ lsm_export_to_all(&le, ct->secmark);
+ ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&le, &secctx, &len);
if (ret)
return 0;
@@ -615,8 +617,10 @@ static inline int ctnetlink_secctx_size(const struct nf_conn *ct)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK_SECMARK
int len, ret;
+ struct lsm_export le;
- ret = security_secid_to_secctx(ct->secmark, NULL, &len);
+ lsm_export_to_all(&le, ct->secmark);
+ ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&le, NULL, &len);
if (ret)
return 0;
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
index b6177fd73304..51dc1e390d84 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
@@ -171,7 +171,9 @@ static void ct_show_secctx(struct seq_file *s, const struct nf_conn *ct)
int ret;
u32 len;
char *secctx;
+ struct lsm_export le;
+ lsm_export_to_all(&le, ct->secmark);
ret = security_secid_to_secctx(ct->secmark, &secctx, &len);
if (ret)
return;
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
index 0dcc3592d053..537effb6e5be 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
@@ -309,13 +309,17 @@ static u32 nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, char **secdata)
{
u32 seclen = 0;
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK)
+ struct lsm_export le;
+
if (!skb || !sk_fullsock(skb->sk))
return 0;
read_lock_bh(&skb->sk->sk_callback_lock);
- if (skb->secmark)
+ if (skb->secmark) {
+ lsm_export_to_all(&le, skb->secmark);
security_secid_to_secctx(skb->secmark, secdata, &seclen);
+ }
read_unlock_bh(&skb->sk->sk_callback_lock);
#endif
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
index fc38934ccb35..00922f55dd9e 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
@@ -389,6 +389,7 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
struct audit_buffer *audit_buf = NULL;
char *secctx = NULL;
u32 secctx_len;
+ struct lsm_export le;
if (addr_len != sizeof(struct in_addr) &&
addr_len != sizeof(struct in6_addr))
@@ -451,7 +452,8 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
unlhsh_add_return:
rcu_read_unlock();
if (audit_buf != NULL) {
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(secid,
+ lsm_export_to_all(&le, secid);
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(&le,
&secctx,
&secctx_len) == 0) {
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s", secctx);
@@ -488,6 +490,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net,
struct net_device *dev;
char *secctx;
u32 secctx_len;
+ struct lsm_export le;
spin_lock(&netlbl_unlhsh_lock);
list_entry = netlbl_af4list_remove(addr->s_addr, mask->s_addr,
@@ -507,8 +510,10 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net,
addr->s_addr, mask->s_addr);
if (dev != NULL)
dev_put(dev);
+ if (entry != NULL)
+ lsm_export_to_all(&le, entry->secid);
if (entry != NULL &&
- security_secid_to_secctx(entry->secid,
+ security_secid_to_secctx(&le,
&secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s", secctx);
security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_len);
@@ -550,6 +555,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net,
struct net_device *dev;
char *secctx;
u32 secctx_len;
+ struct lsm_export le;
spin_lock(&netlbl_unlhsh_lock);
list_entry = netlbl_af6list_remove(addr, mask, &iface->addr6_list);
@@ -568,8 +574,10 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net,
addr, mask);
if (dev != NULL)
dev_put(dev);
+ if (entry != NULL)
+ lsm_export_to_all(&le, entry->secid);
if (entry != NULL &&
- security_secid_to_secctx(entry->secid,
+ security_secid_to_secctx(&le,
&secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s", secctx);
security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_len);
@@ -1092,6 +1100,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,
u32 secid;
char *secctx;
u32 secctx_len;
+ struct lsm_export le;
data = genlmsg_put(cb_arg->skb, NETLINK_CB(cb_arg->nl_cb->skb).portid,
cb_arg->seq, &netlbl_unlabel_gnl_family,
@@ -1146,7 +1155,8 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,
secid = addr6->secid;
}
- ret_val = security_secid_to_secctx(secid, &secctx, &secctx_len);
+ lsm_export_to_all(&le, secid);
+ ret_val = security_secid_to_secctx(&le, &secctx, &secctx_len);
if (ret_val != 0)
goto list_cb_failure;
ret_val = nla_put(cb_arg->skb,
diff --git a/net/unix/af_unix.c b/net/unix/af_unix.c
index 74d1eed7cbd4..e2327428aecb 100644
--- a/net/unix/af_unix.c
+++ b/net/unix/af_unix.c
@@ -141,17 +141,20 @@ static struct hlist_head *unix_sockets_unbound(void *addr)
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
static void unix_get_secdata(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
- UNIXCB(skb).secid = scm->secid;
+ lsm_export_secid(&scm->le, &(UNIXCB(skb).secid));
}
static inline void unix_set_secdata(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
- scm->secid = UNIXCB(skb).secid;
+ lsm_export_to_all(&scm->le, UNIXCB(skb).secid);
}
static inline bool unix_secdata_eq(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
- return (scm->secid == UNIXCB(skb).secid);
+ u32 best_secid;
+
+ lsm_export_secid(&scm->le, &best_secid);
+ return (best_secid == UNIXCB(skb).secid);
}
#else
static inline void unix_get_secdata(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb)
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index da3ccb19dcae..0026edf0a424 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1943,13 +1943,9 @@ int security_ismaclabel(const char *name)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ismaclabel);
-int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
+int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsm_export *l, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
{
- struct lsm_export data;
-
- lsm_export_to_all(&data, secid);
- return call_int_hook(secid_to_secctx, -EOPNOTSUPP, &data, secdata,
- seclen);
+ return call_int_hook(secid_to_secctx, -EOPNOTSUPP, l, secdata, seclen);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secid_to_secctx);
--
2.17.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread* [PATCH 22/97] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_ipc_getsecid
2019-02-28 22:17 [PATCH 00/97] LSM: Complete module stacking Casey Schaufler
` (20 preceding siblings ...)
2019-02-28 22:18 ` [PATCH 21/97] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_secid_to_secctx Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-02-28 22:18 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-02-28 22:18 ` [PATCH 23/97] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_task_getsecid Casey Schaufler
` (48 subsequent siblings)
70 siblings, 0 replies; 80+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-02-28 22:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul
Convert security_ipc_getsecid to use the lsm_export structure
instead of a u32 secid. There is some scaffolding involved
that will be removed when the related data is updated.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
include/linux/security.h | 7 ++++---
kernel/auditsc.c | 4 +++-
security/security.c | 8 +++-----
3 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index d0adf4032baf..48ad03f6631e 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -406,7 +406,7 @@ int security_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5);
void security_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode);
int security_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag);
-void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid);
+void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, struct lsm_export *l);
int security_msg_msg_alloc(struct msg_msg *msg);
void security_msg_msg_free(struct msg_msg *msg);
int security_msg_queue_alloc(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq);
@@ -1080,9 +1080,10 @@ static inline int security_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp,
return 0;
}
-static inline void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
+static inline void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp,
+ struct lsm_export *l)
{
- *secid = 0;
+ lsm_export_init(l);
}
static inline int security_msg_msg_alloc(struct msg_msg *msg)
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 0d4e006a7ae1..6a991e4b1492 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -2166,11 +2166,13 @@ void __audit_mq_getsetattr(mqd_t mqdes, struct mq_attr *mqstat)
void __audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp)
{
struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
+ struct lsm_export le;
context->ipc.uid = ipcp->uid;
context->ipc.gid = ipcp->gid;
context->ipc.mode = ipcp->mode;
context->ipc.has_perm = 0;
- security_ipc_getsecid(ipcp, &context->ipc.osid);
+ security_ipc_getsecid(ipcp, &le);
+ lsm_export_secid(&le, &context->ipc.osid);
context->type = AUDIT_IPC;
}
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 0026edf0a424..8e4cdc88acce 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1761,12 +1761,10 @@ int security_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
return call_int_hook(ipc_permission, 0, ipcp, flag);
}
-void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
+void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, struct lsm_export *l)
{
- struct lsm_export data = { .flags = LSM_EXPORT_NONE };
-
- call_void_hook(ipc_getsecid, ipcp, &data);
- lsm_export_secid(&data, secid);
+ lsm_export_init(l);
+ call_void_hook(ipc_getsecid, ipcp, l);
}
int security_msg_msg_alloc(struct msg_msg *msg)
--
2.17.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread* [PATCH 23/97] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_task_getsecid
2019-02-28 22:17 [PATCH 00/97] LSM: Complete module stacking Casey Schaufler
` (21 preceding siblings ...)
2019-02-28 22:18 ` [PATCH 22/97] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_ipc_getsecid Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-02-28 22:18 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-02-28 22:18 ` [PATCH 24/97] LSM: FIXUP - security_secctx_to_secid Casey Schaufler
` (47 subsequent siblings)
70 siblings, 0 replies; 80+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-02-28 22:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul
Convert security_task_getsecid to use the lsm_export structure
instead of a u32 secid. There is some scaffolding involved
that will be removed when the related data is updated.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
include/linux/security.h | 7 ++++---
kernel/audit.c | 4 ++--
kernel/auditfilter.c | 4 +---
kernel/auditsc.c | 18 +++++++++++-------
net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 4 +++-
net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h | 5 ++++-
security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 4 +++-
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 16 ++++++++++++----
security/security.c | 8 +++-----
9 files changed, 43 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 48ad03f6631e..d6c56bbebc84 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -389,7 +389,7 @@ int security_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
int security_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid);
int security_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p);
int security_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p);
-void security_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid);
+void security_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, struct lsm_export *l);
int security_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice);
int security_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio);
int security_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p);
@@ -1007,9 +1007,10 @@ static inline int security_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
return 0;
}
-static inline void security_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
+static inline void security_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p,
+ struct lsm_export *l)
{
- *secid = 0;
+ lsm_export_init(l);
}
static inline int security_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index aeed1368a166..32753b1e686a 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -2214,11 +2214,11 @@ int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
u32 sid;
struct lsm_export le;
- security_task_getsecid(current, &sid);
+ security_task_getsecid(current, &le);
+ lsm_export_secid(&le, &sid);
if (!sid)
return 0;
- lsm_export_to_all(&le, sid);
error = security_secid_to_secctx(&le, &ctx, &len);
if (error) {
if (error != -EINVAL)
diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c
index c784dfa9fa23..223e5e949247 100644
--- a/kernel/auditfilter.c
+++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c
@@ -1323,7 +1323,6 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)
for (i = 0; i < e->rule.field_count; i++) {
struct audit_field *f = &e->rule.fields[i];
pid_t pid;
- u32 sid;
struct lsm_export le;
switch (f->type) {
@@ -1354,8 +1353,7 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)
case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
if (f->lsm_rule) {
- security_task_getsecid(current, &sid);
- lsm_export_to_all(&le, sid);
+ security_task_getsecid(current, &le);
result = security_audit_rule_match(&le,
f->type, f->op, f->lsm_rule, NULL);
}
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 6a991e4b1492..8f0748395ae7 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -444,7 +444,6 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
{
const struct cred *cred;
int i, need_sid = 1;
- u32 sid;
struct lsm_export le;
unsigned int sessionid;
@@ -628,10 +627,9 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
logged upon error */
if (f->lsm_rule) {
if (need_sid) {
- security_task_getsecid(tsk, &sid);
+ security_task_getsecid(tsk, &le);
need_sid = 0;
}
- lsm_export_to_all(&le, sid);
result = security_audit_rule_match(&le, f->type,
f->op,
f->lsm_rule,
@@ -2262,12 +2260,14 @@ int __audit_sockaddr(int len, void *a)
void __audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t)
{
struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
+ struct lsm_export le;
context->target_pid = task_tgid_nr(t);
context->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
context->target_uid = task_uid(t);
context->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
- security_task_getsecid(t, &context->target_sid);
+ security_task_getsecid(t, &le);
+ lsm_export_secid(&le, &context->target_sid);
memcpy(context->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
}
@@ -2284,6 +2284,7 @@ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
struct audit_aux_data_pids *axp;
struct audit_context *ctx = audit_context();
kuid_t uid = current_uid(), auid, t_uid = task_uid(t);
+ struct lsm_export le;
if (auditd_test_task(t) &&
(sig == SIGTERM || sig == SIGHUP ||
@@ -2294,7 +2295,8 @@ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
audit_sig_uid = auid;
else
audit_sig_uid = uid;
- security_task_getsecid(current, &audit_sig_sid);
+ security_task_getsecid(current, &le);
+ lsm_export_secid(&le, &audit_sig_sid);
}
if (!audit_signals || audit_dummy_context())
@@ -2307,7 +2309,8 @@ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
ctx->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
ctx->target_uid = t_uid;
ctx->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
- security_task_getsecid(t, &ctx->target_sid);
+ security_task_getsecid(t, &le);
+ lsm_export_secid(&le, &ctx->target_sid);
memcpy(ctx->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
return 0;
}
@@ -2328,7 +2331,8 @@ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
axp->target_auid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_loginuid(t);
axp->target_uid[axp->pid_count] = t_uid;
axp->target_sessionid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_sessionid(t);
- security_task_getsecid(t, &axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count]);
+ security_task_getsecid(t, &le);
+ lsm_export_secid(&le, &axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count]);
memcpy(axp->target_comm[axp->pid_count], t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
axp->pid_count++;
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
index 00922f55dd9e..7f245d593c8f 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
@@ -1554,11 +1554,13 @@ int __init netlbl_unlabel_defconf(void)
int ret_val;
struct netlbl_dom_map *entry;
struct netlbl_audit audit_info;
+ struct lsm_export le;
/* Only the kernel is allowed to call this function and the only time
* it is called is at bootup before the audit subsystem is reporting
* messages so don't worry to much about these values. */
- security_task_getsecid(current, &audit_info.secid);
+ security_task_getsecid(current, &le);
+ lsm_export_secid(&le, &audit_info.secid);
audit_info.loginuid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID;
audit_info.sessionid = 0;
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h
index 4a397cde1a48..2dbc4276bdcc 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h
@@ -48,7 +48,10 @@
static inline void netlbl_netlink_auditinfo(struct sk_buff *skb,
struct netlbl_audit *audit_info)
{
- security_task_getsecid(current, &audit_info->secid);
+ struct lsm_export le;
+
+ security_task_getsecid(current, &le);
+ lsm_export_secid(&le, &audit_info->secid);
audit_info->loginuid = audit_get_loginuid(current);
audit_info->sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current);
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
index a2baa85ea2f5..d0580a1f157e 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
@@ -51,11 +51,13 @@ bool is_ima_appraise_enabled(void)
int ima_must_appraise(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func)
{
u32 secid;
+ struct lsm_export le;
if (!ima_appraise)
return 0;
- security_task_getsecid(current, &secid);
+ security_task_getsecid(current, &le);
+ lsm_export_secid(&le, &secid);
return ima_match_policy(inode, current_cred(), secid, func, mask,
IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_HASH, NULL);
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index 4ffac4f5c647..e78658b26a74 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -336,9 +336,11 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot)
{
u32 secid;
+ struct lsm_export le;
if (file && (prot & PROT_EXEC)) {
- security_task_getsecid(current, &secid);
+ security_task_getsecid(current, &le);
+ lsm_export_secid(&le, &secid);
return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL,
0, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK);
}
@@ -363,8 +365,10 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
int ret;
u32 secid;
+ struct lsm_export le;
- security_task_getsecid(current, &secid);
+ security_task_getsecid(current, &le);
+ lsm_export_secid(&le, &secid);
ret = process_measurement(bprm->file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, 0,
MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK);
if (ret)
@@ -388,8 +392,10 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask)
{
u32 secid;
+ struct lsm_export le;
- security_task_getsecid(current, &secid);
+ security_task_getsecid(current, &le);
+ lsm_export_secid(&le, &secid);
return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, 0,
mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC |
MAY_APPEND), FILE_CHECK);
@@ -469,6 +475,7 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
{
enum ima_hooks func;
u32 secid;
+ struct lsm_export le;
if (!file && read_id == READING_FIRMWARE) {
if ((ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE) &&
@@ -490,7 +497,8 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
}
func = read_idmap[read_id] ?: FILE_CHECK;
- security_task_getsecid(current, &secid);
+ security_task_getsecid(current, &le);
+ lsm_export_secid(&le, &secid);
return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, buf, size,
MAY_READ, func);
}
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 8e4cdc88acce..a0767f8d7822 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1676,12 +1676,10 @@ int security_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
return call_int_hook(task_getsid, 0, p);
}
-void security_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
+void security_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, struct lsm_export *l)
{
- struct lsm_export data = { .flags = LSM_EXPORT_NONE };
-
- call_void_hook(task_getsecid, p, &data);
- lsm_export_secid(&data, secid);
+ lsm_export_init(l);
+ call_void_hook(task_getsecid, p, l);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_task_getsecid);
--
2.17.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread* [PATCH 24/97] LSM: FIXUP - security_secctx_to_secid
2019-02-28 22:17 [PATCH 00/97] LSM: Complete module stacking Casey Schaufler
` (22 preceding siblings ...)
2019-02-28 22:18 ` [PATCH 23/97] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_task_getsecid Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-02-28 22:18 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-02-28 22:18 ` [PATCH 25/97] LSM: FIXUP - security_secid_to_secctx Casey Schaufler
` (46 subsequent siblings)
70 siblings, 0 replies; 80+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-02-28 22:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul
Initialize l in security_secctx_to_secid
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
security/security.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index a0767f8d7822..66f8ee392af5 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1948,6 +1948,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secid_to_secctx);
int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
struct lsm_export *l)
{
+ lsm_export_init(l);
return call_int_hook(secctx_to_secid, 0, secdata, seclen, l);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secctx_to_secid);
--
2.17.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread* [PATCH 25/97] LSM: FIXUP - security_secid_to_secctx
2019-02-28 22:17 [PATCH 00/97] LSM: Complete module stacking Casey Schaufler
` (23 preceding siblings ...)
2019-02-28 22:18 ` [PATCH 24/97] LSM: FIXUP - security_secctx_to_secid Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-02-28 22:18 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-02-28 22:18 ` [PATCH 26/97] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_inode_getsecid Casey Schaufler
` (45 subsequent siblings)
70 siblings, 0 replies; 80+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-02-28 22:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul
Fix in netlabel for security_secid_to_secctx
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c | 5 ++++-
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
index 4676f5bb16ae..0266879efef1 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
@@ -100,6 +100,7 @@ struct audit_buffer *netlbl_audit_start_common(int type,
struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;
char *secctx;
u32 secctx_len;
+ struct lsm_export le;
if (audit_enabled == AUDIT_OFF)
return NULL;
@@ -112,8 +113,10 @@ struct audit_buffer *netlbl_audit_start_common(int type,
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_info->loginuid),
audit_info->sessionid);
+ if (audit_info->secid != 0)
+ lsm_export_to_all(&le, audit_info->secid);
if (audit_info->secid != 0 &&
- security_secid_to_secctx(audit_info->secid,
+ security_secid_to_secctx(&le,
&secctx,
&secctx_len) == 0) {
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " subj=%s", secctx);
--
2.17.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread* [PATCH 26/97] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_inode_getsecid
2019-02-28 22:17 [PATCH 00/97] LSM: Complete module stacking Casey Schaufler
` (24 preceding siblings ...)
2019-02-28 22:18 ` [PATCH 25/97] LSM: FIXUP - security_secid_to_secctx Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-02-28 22:18 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-02-28 22:18 ` [PATCH 27/97] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_cred_getsecid Casey Schaufler
` (44 subsequent siblings)
70 siblings, 0 replies; 80+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-02-28 22:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul
Convert security_inode_getsecid to use the lsm_export structure
instead of a u32 secid. There is some scaffolding involved
that will be removed when the related data is updated.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
include/linux/security.h | 7 ++++---
kernel/audit.c | 5 ++++-
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 4 +---
security/security.c | 8 +++-----
4 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index d6c56bbebc84..07fd36f6616d 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -351,7 +351,7 @@ int security_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry);
int security_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc);
int security_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, const void *value, size_t size, int flags);
int security_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size);
-void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid);
+void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, struct lsm_export *l);
int security_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new);
int security_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name);
int security_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask);
@@ -836,9 +836,10 @@ static inline int security_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer,
return 0;
}
-static inline void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
+static inline void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode,
+ struct lsm_export *l)
{
- *secid = 0;
+ lsm_export_init(l);
}
static inline int security_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new)
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index 32753b1e686a..4b1fe327145d 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -2104,13 +2104,16 @@ static inline int audit_copy_fcaps(struct audit_names *name,
void audit_copy_inode(struct audit_names *name, const struct dentry *dentry,
struct inode *inode)
{
+ struct lsm_export le;
+
name->ino = inode->i_ino;
name->dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev;
name->mode = inode->i_mode;
name->uid = inode->i_uid;
name->gid = inode->i_gid;
name->rdev = inode->i_rdev;
- security_inode_getsecid(inode, &name->osid);
+ security_inode_getsecid(inode, &le);
+ lsm_export_secid(&le, &name->osid);
audit_copy_fcaps(name, dentry);
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index 72eb0efb22ad..6f05e96e5db0 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -326,7 +326,6 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,
return false;
for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) {
int rc = 0;
- u32 osid;
struct lsm_export le;
int retried = 0;
@@ -337,8 +336,7 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,
case LSM_OBJ_USER:
case LSM_OBJ_ROLE:
case LSM_OBJ_TYPE:
- security_inode_getsecid(inode, &osid);
- lsm_export_to_all(&le, osid);
+ security_inode_getsecid(inode, &le);
rc = security_filter_rule_match(&le,
rule->lsm[i].type,
Audit_equal,
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 66f8ee392af5..c2cf82b063ca 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1373,12 +1373,10 @@ int security_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_listsecurity);
-void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
+void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, struct lsm_export *l)
{
- struct lsm_export data = { .flags = LSM_EXPORT_NONE };
-
- call_void_hook(inode_getsecid, inode, &data);
- lsm_export_secid(&data, secid);
+ lsm_export_init(l);
+ call_void_hook(inode_getsecid, inode, l);
}
int security_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new)
--
2.17.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread* [PATCH 27/97] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_cred_getsecid
2019-02-28 22:17 [PATCH 00/97] LSM: Complete module stacking Casey Schaufler
` (25 preceding siblings ...)
2019-02-28 22:18 ` [PATCH 26/97] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_inode_getsecid Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-02-28 22:18 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-02-28 22:18 ` [PATCH 28/97] LSM: REVERT Use lsm_export in the sk_getsecid hooks Casey Schaufler
` (43 subsequent siblings)
70 siblings, 0 replies; 80+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-02-28 22:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul
Convert security_cred_getsecid to use the lsm_export structure
instead of a u32 secid. There is some scaffolding involved
that will be removed when the related data is updated.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
include/linux/security.h | 2 +-
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 3 ++-
security/security.c | 8 +++-----
3 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 07fd36f6616d..87085ff519bf 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -376,7 +376,7 @@ int security_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp);
void security_cred_free(struct cred *cred);
int security_prepare_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, gfp_t gfp);
void security_transfer_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old);
-void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid);
+void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, struct lsm_export *l);
int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, struct lsm_export *l);
int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode);
int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name);
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index e78658b26a74..7efc806eb5ab 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -374,7 +374,8 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
if (ret)
return ret;
- security_cred_getsecid(bprm->cred, &secid);
+ security_cred_getsecid(bprm->cred, &le);
+ lsm_export_secid(&le, &secid);
return process_measurement(bprm->file, bprm->cred, secid, NULL, 0,
MAY_EXEC, CREDS_CHECK);
}
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index c2cf82b063ca..06461712c881 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1590,12 +1590,10 @@ void security_transfer_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
call_void_hook(cred_transfer, new, old);
}
-void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid)
+void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, struct lsm_export *l)
{
- struct lsm_export data = { .flags = LSM_EXPORT_NONE };
-
- call_void_hook(cred_getsecid, c, &data);
- lsm_export_secid(&data, secid);
+ lsm_export_init(l);
+ call_void_hook(cred_getsecid, c, l);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_cred_getsecid);
--
2.17.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread* [PATCH 28/97] LSM: REVERT Use lsm_export in the sk_getsecid hooks
2019-02-28 22:17 [PATCH 00/97] LSM: Complete module stacking Casey Schaufler
` (26 preceding siblings ...)
2019-02-28 22:18 ` [PATCH 27/97] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_cred_getsecid Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-02-28 22:18 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-02-28 22:18 ` [PATCH 29/97] Audit: Change audit_sig_sid to audit_sig_lsm Casey Schaufler
` (42 subsequent siblings)
70 siblings, 0 replies; 80+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-02-28 22:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul
REVERT sk_getsecid use of lsm_export
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 2 +-
security/security.c | 5 +----
security/selinux/hooks.c | 6 +++---
3 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index 97ef535dafd0..cbfc2a9b5f27 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -1699,7 +1699,7 @@ union security_list_options {
int (*sk_alloc_security)(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority);
void (*sk_free_security)(struct sock *sk);
void (*sk_clone_security)(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk);
- void (*sk_getsecid)(struct sock *sk, struct lsm_export *l);
+ void (*sk_getsecid)(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid);
void (*sock_graft)(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent);
int (*inet_conn_request)(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
struct request_sock *req);
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 06461712c881..e52b500adb27 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -2116,10 +2116,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sk_clone);
void security_sk_classify_flow(struct sock *sk, struct flowi *fl)
{
- struct lsm_export data = { .flags = LSM_EXPORT_NONE };
-
- call_void_hook(sk_getsecid, sk, &data);
- lsm_export_secid(&data, &fl->flowi_secid);
+ call_void_hook(sk_getsecid, sk, &fl->flowi_secid);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sk_classify_flow);
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 744fa6141ae1..9879dd828e1c 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -4889,14 +4889,14 @@ static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newsksec);
}
-static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, struct lsm_export *l)
+static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid)
{
if (!sk)
- selinux_export_secid(l, SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET);
+ *secid = SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET;
else {
struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
- selinux_export_secid(l, sksec->sid);
+ *secid = sksec->sid;
}
}
--
2.17.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread* [PATCH 29/97] Audit: Change audit_sig_sid to audit_sig_lsm
2019-02-28 22:17 [PATCH 00/97] LSM: Complete module stacking Casey Schaufler
` (27 preceding siblings ...)
2019-02-28 22:18 ` [PATCH 28/97] LSM: REVERT Use lsm_export in the sk_getsecid hooks Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-02-28 22:18 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-02-28 22:18 ` [PATCH 30/97] Audit: Convert target_sid to an lsm_export structure Casey Schaufler
` (41 subsequent siblings)
70 siblings, 0 replies; 80+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-02-28 22:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul
Remove lsm_export scaffolding around audit_sig_sid by
changing the u32 secid into an lsm_export structure named
audit_sig_lsm.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
include/linux/security.h | 7 +++++++
kernel/audit.c | 18 ++++++++----------
kernel/audit.h | 2 +-
kernel/auditsc.c | 3 +--
4 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 87085ff519bf..ae79b24f076d 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -90,6 +90,13 @@ static inline void lsm_export_init(struct lsm_export *l)
memset(l, 0, sizeof(*l));
}
+static inline bool lsm_export_any(struct lsm_export *l)
+{
+ return (((l->flags & LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX) && l->selinux) ||
+ ((l->flags & LSM_EXPORT_SMACK) && l->smack) ||
+ ((l->flags & LSM_EXPORT_APPARMOR) && l->apparmor));
+}
+
/**
* lsm_export_secid - pull the useful secid out of a lsm_export
* @data: the containing data structure
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index 4b1fe327145d..f89fc60b34d3 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -135,9 +135,9 @@ static u32 audit_backlog_limit = 64;
static u32 audit_backlog_wait_time = AUDIT_BACKLOG_WAIT_TIME;
/* The identity of the user shutting down the audit system. */
-kuid_t audit_sig_uid = INVALID_UID;
-pid_t audit_sig_pid = -1;
-u32 audit_sig_sid = 0;
+kuid_t audit_sig_uid = INVALID_UID;
+pid_t audit_sig_pid = -1;
+struct lsm_export audit_sig_lsm;
/* Records can be lost in several ways:
0) [suppressed in audit_alloc]
@@ -1417,23 +1417,21 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
}
case AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO:
len = 0;
- if (audit_sig_sid) {
- struct lsm_export le;
-
- lsm_export_to_all(&le, audit_sig_sid);
- err = security_secid_to_secctx(&le, &ctx, &len);
+ if (lsm_export_any(&audit_sig_lsm)) {
+ err = security_secid_to_secctx(&audit_sig_lsm, &ctx,
+ &len);
if (err)
return err;
}
sig_data = kmalloc(sizeof(*sig_data) + len, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!sig_data) {
- if (audit_sig_sid)
+ if (lsm_export_any(&audit_sig_lsm))
security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
return -ENOMEM;
}
sig_data->uid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_sig_uid);
sig_data->pid = audit_sig_pid;
- if (audit_sig_sid) {
+ if (lsm_export_any(&audit_sig_lsm)) {
memcpy(sig_data->ctx, ctx, len);
security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
}
diff --git a/kernel/audit.h b/kernel/audit.h
index 91421679a168..06c732e0f301 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.h
+++ b/kernel/audit.h
@@ -330,7 +330,7 @@ extern char *audit_unpack_string(void **bufp, size_t *remain, size_t len);
extern pid_t audit_sig_pid;
extern kuid_t audit_sig_uid;
-extern u32 audit_sig_sid;
+extern struct lsm_export audit_sig_lsm;
extern int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype);
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 8f0748395ae7..c57c2e346c6d 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -2295,8 +2295,7 @@ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
audit_sig_uid = auid;
else
audit_sig_uid = uid;
- security_task_getsecid(current, &le);
- lsm_export_secid(&le, &audit_sig_sid);
+ security_task_getsecid(current, &audit_sig_lsm);
}
if (!audit_signals || audit_dummy_context())
--
2.17.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread* [PATCH 30/97] Audit: Convert target_sid to an lsm_export structure
2019-02-28 22:17 [PATCH 00/97] LSM: Complete module stacking Casey Schaufler
` (28 preceding siblings ...)
2019-02-28 22:18 ` [PATCH 29/97] Audit: Change audit_sig_sid to audit_sig_lsm Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-02-28 22:18 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-02-28 22:18 ` [PATCH 31/97] Audit: Convert osid " Casey Schaufler
` (40 subsequent siblings)
70 siblings, 0 replies; 80+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-02-28 22:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul
Convert target_sid to be an lsm_export structure
instead of a u32 secid. Clean out the associated
scaffolding. Change the name to target_lsm to be
descriptive.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
kernel/audit.h | 3 ++-
kernel/auditsc.c | 30 ++++++++++++------------------
2 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/audit.h b/kernel/audit.h
index 06c732e0f301..63883a773aa2 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.h
+++ b/kernel/audit.h
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
#include <linux/fs.h>
#include <linux/audit.h>
#include <linux/skbuff.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
#include <uapi/linux/mqueue.h>
#include <linux/tty.h>
@@ -146,7 +147,7 @@ struct audit_context {
kuid_t target_auid;
kuid_t target_uid;
unsigned int target_sessionid;
- u32 target_sid;
+ struct lsm_export target_lsm;
char target_comm[TASK_COMM_LEN];
struct audit_tree_refs *trees, *first_trees;
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index c57c2e346c6d..2ee74d18c90c 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ struct audit_aux_data_pids {
kuid_t target_auid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
kuid_t target_uid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
unsigned int target_sessionid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
- u32 target_sid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
+ struct lsm_export target_lsm[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
char target_comm[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS][TASK_COMM_LEN];
int pid_count;
};
@@ -934,14 +934,14 @@ static inline void audit_free_context(struct audit_context *context)
}
static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
- kuid_t auid, kuid_t uid, unsigned int sessionid,
- u32 sid, char *comm)
+ kuid_t auid, kuid_t uid,
+ unsigned int sessionid,
+ struct lsm_export *l, char *comm)
{
struct audit_buffer *ab;
char *ctx = NULL;
u32 len;
int rc = 0;
- struct lsm_export le;
ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_OBJ_PID);
if (!ab)
@@ -950,9 +950,8 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
audit_log_format(ab, "opid=%d oauid=%d ouid=%d oses=%d", pid,
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, auid),
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid), sessionid);
- if (sid) {
- lsm_export_to_all(&le, sid);
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(&le, &ctx, &len)) {
+ if (lsm_export_any(l)) {
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(l, &ctx, &len)) {
audit_log_format(ab, " obj=(none)");
rc = 1;
} else {
@@ -1401,7 +1400,7 @@ static void audit_log_exit(void)
axs->target_auid[i],
axs->target_uid[i],
axs->target_sessionid[i],
- axs->target_sid[i],
+ &axs->target_lsm[i],
axs->target_comm[i]))
call_panic = 1;
}
@@ -1410,7 +1409,7 @@ static void audit_log_exit(void)
audit_log_pid_context(context, context->target_pid,
context->target_auid, context->target_uid,
context->target_sessionid,
- context->target_sid, context->target_comm))
+ &context->target_lsm, context->target_comm))
call_panic = 1;
if (context->pwd.dentry && context->pwd.mnt) {
@@ -1587,7 +1586,7 @@ void __audit_syscall_exit(int success, long return_code)
context->aux = NULL;
context->aux_pids = NULL;
context->target_pid = 0;
- context->target_sid = 0;
+ lsm_export_init(&context->target_lsm);
context->sockaddr_len = 0;
context->type = 0;
context->fds[0] = -1;
@@ -2260,14 +2259,12 @@ int __audit_sockaddr(int len, void *a)
void __audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t)
{
struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
- struct lsm_export le;
context->target_pid = task_tgid_nr(t);
context->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
context->target_uid = task_uid(t);
context->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
- security_task_getsecid(t, &le);
- lsm_export_secid(&le, &context->target_sid);
+ security_task_getsecid(t, &context->target_lsm);
memcpy(context->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
}
@@ -2284,7 +2281,6 @@ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
struct audit_aux_data_pids *axp;
struct audit_context *ctx = audit_context();
kuid_t uid = current_uid(), auid, t_uid = task_uid(t);
- struct lsm_export le;
if (auditd_test_task(t) &&
(sig == SIGTERM || sig == SIGHUP ||
@@ -2308,8 +2304,7 @@ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
ctx->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
ctx->target_uid = t_uid;
ctx->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
- security_task_getsecid(t, &le);
- lsm_export_secid(&le, &ctx->target_sid);
+ security_task_getsecid(t, &ctx->target_lsm);
memcpy(ctx->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
return 0;
}
@@ -2330,8 +2325,7 @@ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
axp->target_auid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_loginuid(t);
axp->target_uid[axp->pid_count] = t_uid;
axp->target_sessionid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_sessionid(t);
- security_task_getsecid(t, &le);
- lsm_export_secid(&le, &axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count]);
+ security_task_getsecid(t, &axp->target_lsm[axp->pid_count]);
memcpy(axp->target_comm[axp->pid_count], t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
axp->pid_count++;
--
2.17.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread* [PATCH 31/97] Audit: Convert osid to an lsm_export structure
2019-02-28 22:17 [PATCH 00/97] LSM: Complete module stacking Casey Schaufler
` (29 preceding siblings ...)
2019-02-28 22:18 ` [PATCH 30/97] Audit: Convert target_sid to an lsm_export structure Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-02-28 22:18 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-02-28 22:18 ` [PATCH 32/97] IMA: Clean out lsm_export scaffolding Casey Schaufler
` (39 subsequent siblings)
70 siblings, 0 replies; 80+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-02-28 22:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul
Convert osid to be an lsm_export structure
instead of a u32 secid. Clean out the associated
scaffolding. Change the name to olsm to be
descriptive.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
kernel/audit.c | 17 +++++------------
kernel/audit.h | 4 ++--
kernel/auditsc.c | 23 ++++++++---------------
3 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index f89fc60b34d3..8f76f164d2af 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -2102,16 +2102,13 @@ static inline int audit_copy_fcaps(struct audit_names *name,
void audit_copy_inode(struct audit_names *name, const struct dentry *dentry,
struct inode *inode)
{
- struct lsm_export le;
-
name->ino = inode->i_ino;
name->dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev;
name->mode = inode->i_mode;
name->uid = inode->i_uid;
name->gid = inode->i_gid;
name->rdev = inode->i_rdev;
- security_inode_getsecid(inode, &le);
- lsm_export_secid(&le, &name->osid);
+ security_inode_getsecid(inode, &name->olsm);
audit_copy_fcaps(name, dentry);
}
@@ -2168,14 +2165,12 @@ void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n,
from_kgid(&init_user_ns, n->gid),
MAJOR(n->rdev),
MINOR(n->rdev));
- if (n->osid != 0) {
+ if (lsm_export_any(&n->olsm)) {
char *ctx = NULL;
u32 len;
- struct lsm_export le;
- lsm_export_to_all(&le, n->osid);
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(&le, &ctx, &len)) {
- audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", n->osid);
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(&n->olsm, &ctx, &len)) {
+ audit_log_format(ab, " osid=(unknown)");
if (call_panic)
*call_panic = 2;
} else {
@@ -2212,12 +2207,10 @@ int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
char *ctx = NULL;
unsigned len;
int error;
- u32 sid;
struct lsm_export le;
security_task_getsecid(current, &le);
- lsm_export_secid(&le, &sid);
- if (!sid)
+ if (!lsm_export_any(&le))
return 0;
error = security_secid_to_secctx(&le, &ctx, &len);
diff --git a/kernel/audit.h b/kernel/audit.h
index 63883a773aa2..7bcabad8104c 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.h
+++ b/kernel/audit.h
@@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ struct audit_names {
kuid_t uid;
kgid_t gid;
dev_t rdev;
- u32 osid;
+ struct lsm_export olsm;
struct audit_cap_data fcap;
unsigned int fcap_ver;
unsigned char type; /* record type */
@@ -164,7 +164,7 @@ struct audit_context {
kuid_t uid;
kgid_t gid;
umode_t mode;
- u32 osid;
+ struct lsm_export olsm;
int has_perm;
uid_t perm_uid;
gid_t perm_gid;
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 2ee74d18c90c..090f9f2cb571 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -646,14 +646,12 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
if (f->lsm_rule) {
/* Find files that match */
if (name) {
- lsm_export_to_all(&le, name->osid);
result = security_audit_rule_match(
- &le, f->type, f->op,
+ &name->olsm, f->type, f->op,
f->lsm_rule, ctx);
} else if (ctx) {
list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
- lsm_export_to_all(&le, n->osid);
- if (security_audit_rule_match(&le, f->type,
+ if (security_audit_rule_match(&n->olsm, f->type,
f->op, f->lsm_rule,
ctx)) {
++result;
@@ -664,8 +662,7 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
/* Find ipc objects that match */
if (!ctx || ctx->type != AUDIT_IPC)
break;
- lsm_export_to_all(&le, ctx->ipc.osid);
- if (security_audit_rule_match(&le,
+ if (security_audit_rule_match(&ctx->ipc.olsm,
f->type, f->op,
f->lsm_rule, ctx))
++result;
@@ -1158,19 +1155,17 @@ static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
context->socketcall.args[i]);
break; }
case AUDIT_IPC: {
- u32 osid = context->ipc.osid;
+ struct lsm_export *l = &context->ipc.olsm;
audit_log_format(ab, "ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#ho",
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, context->ipc.uid),
from_kgid(&init_user_ns, context->ipc.gid),
context->ipc.mode);
- if (osid) {
+ if (lsm_export_any(l)) {
char *ctx = NULL;
u32 len;
- struct lsm_export le;
- lsm_export_to_all(&le, osid);
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(&le, &ctx, &len)) {
- audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", osid);
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(l, &ctx, &len)) {
+ audit_log_format(ab, " osid=(unknown)");
*call_panic = 1;
} else {
audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
@@ -2163,13 +2158,11 @@ void __audit_mq_getsetattr(mqd_t mqdes, struct mq_attr *mqstat)
void __audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp)
{
struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
- struct lsm_export le;
context->ipc.uid = ipcp->uid;
context->ipc.gid = ipcp->gid;
context->ipc.mode = ipcp->mode;
context->ipc.has_perm = 0;
- security_ipc_getsecid(ipcp, &le);
- lsm_export_secid(&le, &context->ipc.osid);
+ security_ipc_getsecid(ipcp, &context->ipc.olsm);
context->type = AUDIT_IPC;
}
--
2.17.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread* [PATCH 32/97] IMA: Clean out lsm_export scaffolding
2019-02-28 22:17 [PATCH 00/97] LSM: Complete module stacking Casey Schaufler
` (30 preceding siblings ...)
2019-02-28 22:18 ` [PATCH 31/97] Audit: Convert osid " Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-02-28 22:18 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-02-28 22:18 ` [PATCH 33/97] NET: Store LSM access information in the socket blob for UDS Casey Schaufler
` (38 subsequent siblings)
70 siblings, 0 replies; 80+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-02-28 22:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul
Clean out the scaffolding used in the lsm_export transition.
This requires changing some of the IMA internal interfaces
from u32 to struct lsm_export pointers.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 10 ++++++----
security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 9 +++++----
security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 4 +---
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 25 ++++++++-----------------
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 14 +++++++-------
5 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index cc12f3449a72..2edaf4c41300 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -191,8 +191,9 @@ enum ima_hooks {
};
/* LIM API function definitions */
-int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid,
- int mask, enum ima_hooks func, int *pcr);
+int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred,
+ struct lsm_export *l, int mask, enum ima_hooks func,
+ int *pcr);
int ima_must_measure(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func);
int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
@@ -212,8 +213,9 @@ void ima_free_template_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry);
const char *ima_d_path(const struct path *path, char **pathbuf, char *filename);
/* IMA policy related functions */
-int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid,
- enum ima_hooks func, int mask, int flags, int *pcr);
+int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred,
+ struct lsm_export *l, enum ima_hooks func, int mask,
+ int flags, int *pcr);
void ima_init_policy(void);
void ima_update_policy(void);
void ima_update_policy_flag(void);
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
index c7505fb122d4..7e493af96134 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
@@ -159,7 +159,7 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
* ima_get_action - appraise & measure decision based on policy.
* @inode: pointer to inode to measure
* @cred: pointer to credentials structure to validate
- * @secid: secid of the task being validated
+ * @l: LAM data of the task being validated
* @mask: contains the permission mask (MAY_READ, MAY_WRITE, MAY_EXEC,
* MAY_APPEND)
* @func: caller identifier
@@ -175,14 +175,15 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
* Returns IMA_MEASURE, IMA_APPRAISE mask.
*
*/
-int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid,
- int mask, enum ima_hooks func, int *pcr)
+int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred,
+ struct lsm_export *l, int mask, enum ima_hooks func,
+ int *pcr)
{
int flags = IMA_MEASURE | IMA_AUDIT | IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_HASH;
flags &= ima_policy_flag;
- return ima_match_policy(inode, cred, secid, func, mask, flags, pcr);
+ return ima_match_policy(inode, cred, l, func, mask, flags, pcr);
}
/*
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
index d0580a1f157e..b2203ff2bef5 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
@@ -50,15 +50,13 @@ bool is_ima_appraise_enabled(void)
*/
int ima_must_appraise(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func)
{
- u32 secid;
struct lsm_export le;
if (!ima_appraise)
return 0;
security_task_getsecid(current, &le);
- lsm_export_secid(&le, &secid);
- return ima_match_policy(inode, current_cred(), secid, func, mask,
+ return ima_match_policy(inode, current_cred(), &le, func, mask,
IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_HASH, NULL);
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index 7efc806eb5ab..c3186ae42371 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -169,8 +169,8 @@ void ima_file_free(struct file *file)
}
static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
- u32 secid, char *buf, loff_t size, int mask,
- enum ima_hooks func)
+ struct lsm_export *l, char *buf, loff_t size,
+ int mask, enum ima_hooks func)
{
struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
struct integrity_iint_cache *iint = NULL;
@@ -192,7 +192,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
* bitmask based on the appraise/audit/measurement policy.
* Included is the appraise submask.
*/
- action = ima_get_action(inode, cred, secid, mask, func, &pcr);
+ action = ima_get_action(inode, cred, l, mask, func, &pcr);
violation_check = ((func == FILE_CHECK || func == MMAP_CHECK) &&
(ima_policy_flag & IMA_MEASURE));
if (!action && !violation_check)
@@ -335,13 +335,11 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
*/
int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot)
{
- u32 secid;
struct lsm_export le;
if (file && (prot & PROT_EXEC)) {
security_task_getsecid(current, &le);
- lsm_export_secid(&le, &secid);
- return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL,
+ return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), &le, NULL,
0, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK);
}
@@ -364,19 +362,16 @@ int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot)
int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
int ret;
- u32 secid;
struct lsm_export le;
security_task_getsecid(current, &le);
- lsm_export_secid(&le, &secid);
- ret = process_measurement(bprm->file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, 0,
+ ret = process_measurement(bprm->file, current_cred(), &le, NULL, 0,
MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK);
if (ret)
return ret;
security_cred_getsecid(bprm->cred, &le);
- lsm_export_secid(&le, &secid);
- return process_measurement(bprm->file, bprm->cred, secid, NULL, 0,
+ return process_measurement(bprm->file, bprm->cred, &le, NULL, 0,
MAY_EXEC, CREDS_CHECK);
}
@@ -392,12 +387,10 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
*/
int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask)
{
- u32 secid;
struct lsm_export le;
security_task_getsecid(current, &le);
- lsm_export_secid(&le, &secid);
- return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, 0,
+ return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), &le, NULL, 0,
mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC |
MAY_APPEND), FILE_CHECK);
}
@@ -475,7 +468,6 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
enum kernel_read_file_id read_id)
{
enum ima_hooks func;
- u32 secid;
struct lsm_export le;
if (!file && read_id == READING_FIRMWARE) {
@@ -499,8 +491,7 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
func = read_idmap[read_id] ?: FILE_CHECK;
security_task_getsecid(current, &le);
- lsm_export_secid(&le, &secid);
- return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, buf, size,
+ return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), &le, buf, size,
MAY_READ, func);
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index 6f05e96e5db0..b5d12db3cfb3 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -286,7 +286,7 @@ static void ima_lsm_update_rules(void)
* Returns true on rule match, false on failure.
*/
static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,
- const struct cred *cred, u32 secid,
+ const struct cred *cred, struct lsm_export *l,
enum ima_hooks func, int mask)
{
int i;
@@ -346,8 +346,7 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,
case LSM_SUBJ_USER:
case LSM_SUBJ_ROLE:
case LSM_SUBJ_TYPE:
- lsm_export_to_all(&le, secid);
- rc = security_filter_rule_match(&le,
+ rc = security_filter_rule_match(l,
rule->lsm[i].type,
Audit_equal,
rule->lsm[i].rule,
@@ -396,7 +395,7 @@ static int get_subaction(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, enum ima_hooks func)
* @inode: pointer to an inode for which the policy decision is being made
* @cred: pointer to a credentials structure for which the policy decision is
* being made
- * @secid: LSM secid of the task to be validated
+ * @l: LSM data of the task to be validated
* @func: IMA hook identifier
* @mask: requested action (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND | MAY_EXEC)
* @pcr: set the pcr to extend
@@ -408,8 +407,9 @@ static int get_subaction(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, enum ima_hooks func)
* list when walking it. Reads are many orders of magnitude more numerous
* than writes so ima_match_policy() is classical RCU candidate.
*/
-int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid,
- enum ima_hooks func, int mask, int flags, int *pcr)
+int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred,
+ struct lsm_export *l, enum ima_hooks func, int mask,
+ int flags, int *pcr)
{
struct ima_rule_entry *entry;
int action = 0, actmask = flags | (flags << 1);
@@ -420,7 +420,7 @@ int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid,
if (!(entry->action & actmask))
continue;
- if (!ima_match_rules(entry, inode, cred, secid, func, mask))
+ if (!ima_match_rules(entry, inode, cred, l, func, mask))
continue;
action |= entry->flags & IMA_ACTION_FLAGS;
--
2.17.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread* [PATCH 33/97] NET: Store LSM access information in the socket blob for UDS
2019-02-28 22:17 [PATCH 00/97] LSM: Complete module stacking Casey Schaufler
` (31 preceding siblings ...)
2019-02-28 22:18 ` [PATCH 32/97] IMA: Clean out lsm_export scaffolding Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-02-28 22:18 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-02-28 22:18 ` [PATCH 34/97] NET: Remove scaffolding on secmarks Casey Schaufler
` (37 subsequent siblings)
70 siblings, 0 replies; 80+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-02-28 22:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul
UNIX domain socket connections don't have sufficient
space in the socket buffer (skb) secmark for more than
one Linux security module (LSM) to pass data. Expanding
the secmark has been ruled out as an option. Store the
necessary data in the socket security blob pointed to
by the skb socket.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
include/linux/security.h | 20 +++++++++++++++++++-
net/unix/af_unix.c | 14 ++++++++------
security/security.c | 17 ++++++++++++++++-
3 files changed, 43 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index ae79b24f076d..6659ffa8cacc 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -68,6 +68,7 @@ struct ctl_table;
struct audit_krule;
struct user_namespace;
struct timezone;
+struct sk_buff;
enum lsm_event {
LSM_POLICY_CHANGE,
@@ -97,6 +98,22 @@ static inline bool lsm_export_any(struct lsm_export *l)
((l->flags & LSM_EXPORT_APPARMOR) && l->apparmor));
}
+static inline bool lsm_export_equal(struct lsm_export *l, struct lsm_export *m)
+{
+ if (l->flags != m->flags || l->flags == LSM_EXPORT_NONE)
+ return false;
+ if (l->flags & LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX &&
+ (l->selinux != m->selinux || l->selinux == 0))
+ return false;
+ if (l->flags & LSM_EXPORT_SMACK &&
+ (l->smack != m->smack || l->smack == 0))
+ return false;
+ if (l->flags & LSM_EXPORT_APPARMOR &&
+ (l->apparmor != m->apparmor || l->apparmor == 0))
+ return false;
+ return true;
+}
+
/**
* lsm_export_secid - pull the useful secid out of a lsm_export
* @data: the containing data structure
@@ -140,6 +157,8 @@ static inline void lsm_export_to_all(struct lsm_export *data, u32 secid)
LSM_EXPORT_APPARMOR;
}
+extern struct lsm_export *lsm_export_skb(struct sk_buff *skb);
+
/* These functions are in security/commoncap.c */
extern int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
int cap, unsigned int opts);
@@ -171,7 +190,6 @@ extern int cap_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice);
extern int cap_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages);
struct msghdr;
-struct sk_buff;
struct sock;
struct sockaddr;
struct socket;
diff --git a/net/unix/af_unix.c b/net/unix/af_unix.c
index e2327428aecb..df183ff69d61 100644
--- a/net/unix/af_unix.c
+++ b/net/unix/af_unix.c
@@ -141,21 +141,23 @@ static struct hlist_head *unix_sockets_unbound(void *addr)
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
static void unix_get_secdata(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
- lsm_export_secid(&scm->le, &(UNIXCB(skb).secid));
+ struct lsm_export *ble = lsm_export_skb(skb);
+
+ *ble = scm->le;
}
static inline void unix_set_secdata(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
- lsm_export_to_all(&scm->le, UNIXCB(skb).secid);
+ struct lsm_export *ble = lsm_export_skb(skb);
+
+ scm->le = *ble;
}
static inline bool unix_secdata_eq(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
- u32 best_secid;
-
- lsm_export_secid(&scm->le, &best_secid);
- return (best_secid == UNIXCB(skb).secid);
+ return lsm_export_equal(&scm->le, lsm_export_skb(skb));
}
+
#else
static inline void unix_get_secdata(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb)
{ }
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index e52b500adb27..2f9411b93f70 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -46,7 +46,22 @@ static struct kmem_cache *lsm_file_cache;
static struct kmem_cache *lsm_inode_cache;
char *lsm_names;
-static struct lsm_blob_sizes blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init;
+
+/* Socket blobs include infrastructure managed data */
+static struct lsm_blob_sizes blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
+ .lbs_sock = sizeof(struct lsm_export),
+};
+
+/**
+ * lsm_export_skb - pointer to the lsm_export associated with the skb
+ * @skb: the socket buffer
+ *
+ * Returns a pointer to the LSM managed data.
+ */
+struct lsm_export *lsm_export_skb(struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+ return skb->sk->sk_security;
+}
/* Boot-time LSM user choice */
static __initdata const char *chosen_lsm_order;
--
2.17.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread* [PATCH 34/97] NET: Remove scaffolding on secmarks
2019-02-28 22:17 [PATCH 00/97] LSM: Complete module stacking Casey Schaufler
` (32 preceding siblings ...)
2019-02-28 22:18 ` [PATCH 33/97] NET: Store LSM access information in the socket blob for UDS Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-02-28 22:18 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-02-28 22:18 ` [PATCH 35/97] NET: Remove scaffolding on new secmarks Casey Schaufler
` (36 subsequent siblings)
70 siblings, 0 replies; 80+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-02-28 22:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul
Replace the lsm_export scaffolding in xt_SECMARK.c
This raises an issue, in that Smack users have been
using SECMARK_MODE_SEL, which is suppoed to be exclusively
for SELinux. This is worked around in the code, but not
fully addressed.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c | 8 +++++++-
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c b/net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c
index 2def8d8898e6..9a2a97c200a2 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c
@@ -55,6 +55,7 @@ static int checkentry_lsm(struct xt_secmark_target_info *info)
info->secctx[SECMARK_SECCTX_MAX - 1] = '\0';
info->secid = 0;
+ lsm_export_init(&le);
err = security_secctx_to_secid(info->secctx, strlen(info->secctx), &le);
if (err) {
if (err == -EINVAL)
@@ -63,7 +64,12 @@ static int checkentry_lsm(struct xt_secmark_target_info *info)
return err;
}
- lsm_export_secid(&le, &info->secid);
+ /* Smack is cheating, using SECMARK_MODE_SEL */
+ if (le.selinux)
+ info->secid = le.selinux;
+ else
+ info->secid = le.smack;
+
if (!info->secid) {
pr_info_ratelimited("unable to map security context \'%s\'\n",
info->secctx);
--
2.17.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread* [PATCH 35/97] NET: Remove scaffolding on new secmarks
2019-02-28 22:17 [PATCH 00/97] LSM: Complete module stacking Casey Schaufler
` (33 preceding siblings ...)
2019-02-28 22:18 ` [PATCH 34/97] NET: Remove scaffolding on secmarks Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-02-28 22:18 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-02-28 22:18 ` [PATCH 36/97] NET: Remove netfilter scaffolding for lsm_export Casey Schaufler
` (35 subsequent siblings)
70 siblings, 0 replies; 80+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-02-28 22:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul
Replace the lsm_export scaffolding in nft_meta.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
net/netfilter/nft_meta.c | 8 +++++++-
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nft_meta.c b/net/netfilter/nft_meta.c
index a03de2ab833a..9f5040140fe0 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nft_meta.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nft_meta.c
@@ -568,11 +568,17 @@ static int nft_secmark_compute_secid(struct nft_secmark *priv)
u32 tmp_secid = 0;
int err;
+ lsm_export_init(&le);
err = security_secctx_to_secid(priv->ctx, strlen(priv->ctx), &le);
if (err)
return err;
- lsm_export_secid(&le, &tmp_secid);
+ /* Use the "best" secid */
+ if (le.selinux)
+ tmp_secid = le.selinux;
+ else
+ tmp_secid = le.smack;
+
if (!tmp_secid)
return -ENOENT;
--
2.17.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread* [PATCH 36/97] NET: Remove netfilter scaffolding for lsm_export
2019-02-28 22:17 [PATCH 00/97] LSM: Complete module stacking Casey Schaufler
` (34 preceding siblings ...)
2019-02-28 22:18 ` [PATCH 35/97] NET: Remove scaffolding on new secmarks Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-02-28 22:18 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-02-28 22:18 ` [PATCH 37/97] Netlabel: Replace secids with lsm_export Casey Schaufler
` (34 subsequent siblings)
70 siblings, 0 replies; 80+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-02-28 22:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul
Remove scaffolding functions from the netfilter code.
Replace with direct access to lsm_export fields so as
to be explicit about how the secmarks are being
handled.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c | 12 ++++++++++--
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c | 9 +++++++--
net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c | 8 ++++++--
3 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
index d19092fc6580..65741838985f 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
@@ -332,7 +332,11 @@ static int ctnetlink_dump_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_conn *ct)
char *secctx;
struct lsm_export le;
- lsm_export_to_all(&le, ct->secmark);
+ lsm_export_init(&le);
+ le.flags = LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX | LSM_EXPORT_SMACK;
+ le.selinux = ct->secmark;
+ le.smack = ct->secmark;
+
ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&le, &secctx, &len);
if (ret)
return 0;
@@ -619,7 +623,11 @@ static inline int ctnetlink_secctx_size(const struct nf_conn *ct)
int len, ret;
struct lsm_export le;
- lsm_export_to_all(&le, ct->secmark);
+ lsm_export_init(&le);
+ le.flags = LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX | LSM_EXPORT_SMACK;
+ le.selinux = ct->secmark;
+ le.smack = ct->secmark;
+
ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&le, NULL, &len);
if (ret)
return 0;
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
index 51dc1e390d84..b47ca79b8e14 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
@@ -173,8 +173,13 @@ static void ct_show_secctx(struct seq_file *s, const struct nf_conn *ct)
char *secctx;
struct lsm_export le;
- lsm_export_to_all(&le, ct->secmark);
- ret = security_secid_to_secctx(ct->secmark, &secctx, &len);
+ /* Whichever LSM may be using the secmark */
+ lsm_export_init(&le);
+ le.flags = LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX | LSM_EXPORT_SMACK;
+ le.selinux = ct->secmark;
+ le.smack = ct->secmark;
+
+ ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&le, &secctx, &len);
if (ret)
return;
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
index 537effb6e5be..a0670137477b 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
@@ -317,8 +317,12 @@ static u32 nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, char **secdata)
read_lock_bh(&skb->sk->sk_callback_lock);
if (skb->secmark) {
- lsm_export_to_all(&le, skb->secmark);
- security_secid_to_secctx(skb->secmark, secdata, &seclen);
+ /* Whichever LSM may be using the secmark */
+ lsm_export_init(&le);
+ le.flags = LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX | LSM_EXPORT_SMACK;
+ le.selinux = skb->secmark;
+ le.smack = skb->secmark;
+ security_secid_to_secctx(&le, secdata, &seclen);
}
read_unlock_bh(&skb->sk->sk_callback_lock);
--
2.17.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread* [PATCH 37/97] Netlabel: Replace secids with lsm_export
2019-02-28 22:17 [PATCH 00/97] LSM: Complete module stacking Casey Schaufler
` (35 preceding siblings ...)
2019-02-28 22:18 ` [PATCH 36/97] NET: Remove netfilter scaffolding for lsm_export Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-02-28 22:18 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-02-28 22:18 ` [PATCH 38/97] LSM: Remove lsm_export scaffolding functions Casey Schaufler
` (33 subsequent siblings)
70 siblings, 0 replies; 80+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-02-28 22:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul
Convert to lsm_export structures instead of u32 secids.
Clean out the associated scaffolding. This requires changes
to several internal interfaces, but no change in behavior.
Change the LOC tag type to pass an lsm_export instead of
a single u32. As this tag is only used locally there is
no change to externally exposed interfaces.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
include/net/netlabel.h | 10 ++---
net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c | 13 ++++---
net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c | 5 +--
net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 65 ++++++++++++-------------------
net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.h | 2 +-
net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c | 7 +---
net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h | 5 +--
security/selinux/netlabel.c | 2 +-
security/selinux/ss/services.c | 9 +++--
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 5 ++-
security/smack/smackfs.c | 12 ++++--
11 files changed, 63 insertions(+), 72 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/net/netlabel.h b/include/net/netlabel.h
index 72d6435fc16c..546c75f27d05 100644
--- a/include/net/netlabel.h
+++ b/include/net/netlabel.h
@@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ struct calipso_doi;
/* NetLabel audit information */
struct netlbl_audit {
- u32 secid;
+ struct lsm_export le;
kuid_t loginuid;
unsigned int sessionid;
};
@@ -180,7 +180,7 @@ struct netlbl_lsm_catmap {
* @attr.mls: MLS sensitivity label
* @attr.mls.cat: MLS category bitmap
* @attr.mls.lvl: MLS sensitivity level
- * @attr.secid: LSM specific secid token
+ * @attr.le: LSM specific data
*
* Description:
* This structure is used to pass security attributes between NetLabel and the
@@ -215,7 +215,7 @@ struct netlbl_lsm_secattr {
struct netlbl_lsm_catmap *cat;
u32 lvl;
} mls;
- u32 secid;
+ struct lsm_export le;
} attr;
};
@@ -429,7 +429,7 @@ int netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_add(struct net *net,
const void *addr,
const void *mask,
u16 family,
- u32 secid,
+ struct lsm_export *l,
struct netlbl_audit *audit_info);
int netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_del(struct net *net,
const char *dev_name,
@@ -537,7 +537,7 @@ static inline int netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_add(struct net *net,
const void *addr,
const void *mask,
u16 family,
- u32 secid,
+ struct lsm_export *l,
struct netlbl_audit *audit_info)
{
return -ENOSYS;
diff --git a/net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c b/net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c
index 777fa3b7fb13..bd6b47fbc1a4 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c
@@ -122,13 +122,16 @@ int cipso_v4_rbm_strictvalid = 1;
*
* 0 8 16 24 32
* +----------+----------+----------+----------+
- * | 10000000 | 00000110 | 32-bit secid value |
+ * | 10000000 | 00000110 | SELinux secid |
* +----------+----------+----------+----------+
- * | in (host byte order)|
+ * | Smack secid | AppArmor secid |
+ * +----------+----------+----------+----------+
+ * | LSM export flags |
* +----------+----------+
*
+ * All secid and flag fields are in host byte order.
*/
-#define CIPSO_V4_TAG_LOC_BLEN 6
+#define CIPSO_V4_TAG_LOC_BLEN (2 + sizeof(struct lsm_export))
/*
* Helper Functions
@@ -1480,7 +1483,7 @@ static int cipso_v4_gentag_loc(const struct cipso_v4_doi *doi_def,
buffer[0] = CIPSO_V4_TAG_LOCAL;
buffer[1] = CIPSO_V4_TAG_LOC_BLEN;
- *(u32 *)&buffer[2] = secattr->attr.secid;
+ memcpy(&buffer[2], &secattr->attr.le, sizeof(secattr->attr.le));
return CIPSO_V4_TAG_LOC_BLEN;
}
@@ -1500,7 +1503,7 @@ static int cipso_v4_parsetag_loc(const struct cipso_v4_doi *doi_def,
const unsigned char *tag,
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
{
- secattr->attr.secid = *(u32 *)&tag[2];
+ memcpy(&secattr->attr.le, &tag[2], sizeof(secattr->attr.le));
secattr->flags |= NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID;
return 0;
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c
index ea7c67050792..01b8006c7c55 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c
@@ -224,7 +224,7 @@ int netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_add(struct net *net,
const void *addr,
const void *mask,
u16 family,
- u32 secid,
+ struct lsm_export *l,
struct netlbl_audit *audit_info)
{
u32 addr_len;
@@ -243,8 +243,7 @@ int netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_add(struct net *net,
}
return netlbl_unlhsh_add(net,
- dev_name, addr, mask, addr_len,
- secid, audit_info);
+ dev_name, addr, mask, addr_len, l, audit_info);
}
/**
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
index 7f245d593c8f..934667e8969c 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ struct netlbl_unlhsh_tbl {
#define netlbl_unlhsh_addr4_entry(iter) \
container_of(iter, struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr4, list)
struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr4 {
- u32 secid;
+ struct lsm_export le;
struct netlbl_af4list list;
struct rcu_head rcu;
@@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr4 {
#define netlbl_unlhsh_addr6_entry(iter) \
container_of(iter, struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr6, list)
struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr6 {
- u32 secid;
+ struct lsm_export le;
struct netlbl_af6list list;
struct rcu_head rcu;
@@ -244,7 +244,7 @@ static struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *netlbl_unlhsh_search_iface(int ifindex)
static int netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr4(struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface,
const struct in_addr *addr,
const struct in_addr *mask,
- u32 secid)
+ struct lsm_export *l)
{
int ret_val;
struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr4 *entry;
@@ -256,7 +256,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr4(struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface,
entry->list.addr = addr->s_addr & mask->s_addr;
entry->list.mask = mask->s_addr;
entry->list.valid = 1;
- entry->secid = secid;
+ entry->le = *l;
spin_lock(&netlbl_unlhsh_lock);
ret_val = netlbl_af4list_add(&entry->list, &iface->addr4_list);
@@ -284,7 +284,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr4(struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface,
static int netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr6(struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface,
const struct in6_addr *addr,
const struct in6_addr *mask,
- u32 secid)
+ struct lsm_export *l)
{
int ret_val;
struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr6 *entry;
@@ -300,7 +300,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr6(struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface,
entry->list.addr.s6_addr32[3] &= mask->s6_addr32[3];
entry->list.mask = *mask;
entry->list.valid = 1;
- entry->secid = secid;
+ entry->le = *l;
spin_lock(&netlbl_unlhsh_lock);
ret_val = netlbl_af6list_add(&entry->list, &iface->addr6_list);
@@ -379,7 +379,7 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
const void *addr,
const void *mask,
u32 addr_len,
- u32 secid,
+ struct lsm_export *l,
struct netlbl_audit *audit_info)
{
int ret_val;
@@ -389,7 +389,6 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
struct audit_buffer *audit_buf = NULL;
char *secctx = NULL;
u32 secctx_len;
- struct lsm_export le;
if (addr_len != sizeof(struct in_addr) &&
addr_len != sizeof(struct in6_addr))
@@ -422,7 +421,7 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
const struct in_addr *addr4 = addr;
const struct in_addr *mask4 = mask;
- ret_val = netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr4(iface, addr4, mask4, secid);
+ ret_val = netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr4(iface, addr4, mask4, l);
if (audit_buf != NULL)
netlbl_af4list_audit_addr(audit_buf, 1,
dev_name,
@@ -435,7 +434,7 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
const struct in6_addr *addr6 = addr;
const struct in6_addr *mask6 = mask;
- ret_val = netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr6(iface, addr6, mask6, secid);
+ ret_val = netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr6(iface, addr6, mask6, l);
if (audit_buf != NULL)
netlbl_af6list_audit_addr(audit_buf, 1,
dev_name,
@@ -452,10 +451,7 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
unlhsh_add_return:
rcu_read_unlock();
if (audit_buf != NULL) {
- lsm_export_to_all(&le, secid);
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(&le,
- &secctx,
- &secctx_len) == 0) {
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(l, &secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s", secctx);
security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_len);
}
@@ -490,7 +486,6 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net,
struct net_device *dev;
char *secctx;
u32 secctx_len;
- struct lsm_export le;
spin_lock(&netlbl_unlhsh_lock);
list_entry = netlbl_af4list_remove(addr->s_addr, mask->s_addr,
@@ -510,10 +505,8 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net,
addr->s_addr, mask->s_addr);
if (dev != NULL)
dev_put(dev);
- if (entry != NULL)
- lsm_export_to_all(&le, entry->secid);
if (entry != NULL &&
- security_secid_to_secctx(&le,
+ security_secid_to_secctx(&entry->le,
&secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s", secctx);
security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_len);
@@ -555,7 +548,6 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net,
struct net_device *dev;
char *secctx;
u32 secctx_len;
- struct lsm_export le;
spin_lock(&netlbl_unlhsh_lock);
list_entry = netlbl_af6list_remove(addr, mask, &iface->addr6_list);
@@ -574,10 +566,8 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net,
addr, mask);
if (dev != NULL)
dev_put(dev);
- if (entry != NULL)
- lsm_export_to_all(&le, entry->secid);
if (entry != NULL &&
- security_secid_to_secctx(&le,
+ security_secid_to_secctx(&entry->le,
&secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s", secctx);
security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_len);
@@ -903,7 +893,6 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticadd(struct sk_buff *skb,
void *addr;
void *mask;
u32 addr_len;
- u32 secid;
struct lsm_export le;
struct netlbl_audit audit_info;
@@ -932,9 +921,8 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticadd(struct sk_buff *skb,
if (ret_val != 0)
return ret_val;
- lsm_export_secid(&le, &secid);
return netlbl_unlhsh_add(&init_net,
- dev_name, addr, mask, addr_len, secid,
+ dev_name, addr, mask, addr_len, &le,
&audit_info);
}
@@ -956,7 +944,6 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticadddef(struct sk_buff *skb,
void *addr;
void *mask;
u32 addr_len;
- u32 secid;
struct lsm_export le;
struct netlbl_audit audit_info;
@@ -983,10 +970,8 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticadddef(struct sk_buff *skb,
if (ret_val != 0)
return ret_val;
- lsm_export_secid(&le, &secid);
return netlbl_unlhsh_add(&init_net,
- NULL, addr, mask, addr_len, secid,
- &audit_info);
+ NULL, addr, mask, addr_len, &le, &audit_info);
}
/**
@@ -1097,10 +1082,9 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,
struct netlbl_unlhsh_walk_arg *cb_arg = arg;
struct net_device *dev;
void *data;
- u32 secid;
char *secctx;
u32 secctx_len;
- struct lsm_export le;
+ struct lsm_export *lep;
data = genlmsg_put(cb_arg->skb, NETLINK_CB(cb_arg->nl_cb->skb).portid,
cb_arg->seq, &netlbl_unlabel_gnl_family,
@@ -1138,7 +1122,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,
if (ret_val != 0)
goto list_cb_failure;
- secid = addr4->secid;
+ lep = &addr4->le;
} else {
ret_val = nla_put_in6_addr(cb_arg->skb,
NLBL_UNLABEL_A_IPV6ADDR,
@@ -1152,11 +1136,10 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,
if (ret_val != 0)
goto list_cb_failure;
- secid = addr6->secid;
+ lep = &addr6->le;
}
- lsm_export_to_all(&le, secid);
- ret_val = security_secid_to_secctx(&le, &secctx, &secctx_len);
+ ret_val = security_secid_to_secctx(lep, &secctx, &secctx_len);
if (ret_val != 0)
goto list_cb_failure;
ret_val = nla_put(cb_arg->skb,
@@ -1501,26 +1484,30 @@ int netlbl_unlabel_getattr(const struct sk_buff *skb,
case PF_INET: {
struct iphdr *hdr4;
struct netlbl_af4list *addr4;
+ struct lsm_export *lep;
hdr4 = ip_hdr(skb);
addr4 = netlbl_af4list_search(hdr4->saddr,
&iface->addr4_list);
if (addr4 == NULL)
goto unlabel_getattr_nolabel;
- secattr->attr.secid = netlbl_unlhsh_addr4_entry(addr4)->secid;
+ lep = &netlbl_unlhsh_addr4_entry(addr4)->le;
+ secattr->attr.le = *lep;
break;
}
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
case PF_INET6: {
struct ipv6hdr *hdr6;
struct netlbl_af6list *addr6;
+ struct lsm_export *lep;
hdr6 = ipv6_hdr(skb);
addr6 = netlbl_af6list_search(&hdr6->saddr,
&iface->addr6_list);
if (addr6 == NULL)
goto unlabel_getattr_nolabel;
- secattr->attr.secid = netlbl_unlhsh_addr6_entry(addr6)->secid;
+ lep = &netlbl_unlhsh_addr6_entry(addr6)->le;
+ secattr->attr.le = *lep;
break;
}
#endif /* IPv6 */
@@ -1554,13 +1541,11 @@ int __init netlbl_unlabel_defconf(void)
int ret_val;
struct netlbl_dom_map *entry;
struct netlbl_audit audit_info;
- struct lsm_export le;
/* Only the kernel is allowed to call this function and the only time
* it is called is at bootup before the audit subsystem is reporting
* messages so don't worry to much about these values. */
- security_task_getsecid(current, &le);
- lsm_export_secid(&le, &audit_info.secid);
+ security_task_getsecid(current, &audit_info.le);
audit_info.loginuid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID;
audit_info.sessionid = 0;
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.h b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.h
index 3a9e5dc9511b..0803f1e6e3c1 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.h
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.h
@@ -225,7 +225,7 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
const void *addr,
const void *mask,
u32 addr_len,
- u32 secid,
+ struct lsm_export *l,
struct netlbl_audit *audit_info);
int netlbl_unlhsh_remove(struct net *net,
const char *dev_name,
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
index 0266879efef1..eae91a11accc 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
@@ -100,7 +100,6 @@ struct audit_buffer *netlbl_audit_start_common(int type,
struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;
char *secctx;
u32 secctx_len;
- struct lsm_export le;
if (audit_enabled == AUDIT_OFF)
return NULL;
@@ -113,10 +112,8 @@ struct audit_buffer *netlbl_audit_start_common(int type,
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_info->loginuid),
audit_info->sessionid);
- if (audit_info->secid != 0)
- lsm_export_to_all(&le, audit_info->secid);
- if (audit_info->secid != 0 &&
- security_secid_to_secctx(&le,
+ if (lsm_export_any(&audit_info->le) &&
+ security_secid_to_secctx(&audit_info->le,
&secctx,
&secctx_len) == 0) {
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " subj=%s", secctx);
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h
index 2dbc4276bdcc..ee73711e0756 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h
@@ -48,10 +48,7 @@
static inline void netlbl_netlink_auditinfo(struct sk_buff *skb,
struct netlbl_audit *audit_info)
{
- struct lsm_export le;
-
- security_task_getsecid(current, &le);
- lsm_export_secid(&le, &audit_info->secid);
+ security_task_getsecid(current, &audit_info->le);
audit_info->loginuid = audit_get_loginuid(current);
audit_info->sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current);
}
diff --git a/security/selinux/netlabel.c b/security/selinux/netlabel.c
index c40914a157b7..4bbd50237a8a 100644
--- a/security/selinux/netlabel.c
+++ b/security/selinux/netlabel.c
@@ -122,7 +122,7 @@ static struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *selinux_netlbl_sock_getattr(
return NULL;
if ((secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID) &&
- (secattr->attr.secid == sid))
+ (secattr->attr.le.selinux == sid))
return secattr;
return NULL;
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index fcd11105fafa..d3e730b2ed3b 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -3577,8 +3577,9 @@ int security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_CACHE)
*sid = *(u32 *)secattr->cache->data;
- else if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID)
- *sid = secattr->attr.secid;
+ else if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID &&
+ (secattr->attr.le.flags & LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX))
+ *sid = secattr->attr.le.selinux;
else if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_LVL) {
rc = -EIDRM;
ctx = sidtab_search(sidtab, SECINITSID_NETMSG);
@@ -3651,7 +3652,9 @@ int security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(struct selinux_state *state,
if (secattr->domain == NULL)
goto out;
- secattr->attr.secid = sid;
+ lsm_export_init(&secattr->attr.le);
+ secattr->attr.le.flags = LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX;
+ secattr->attr.le.selinux = sid;
secattr->flags |= NETLBL_SECATTR_DOMAIN_CPY | NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID;
mls_export_netlbl_lvl(policydb, ctx, secattr);
rc = mls_export_netlbl_cat(policydb, ctx, secattr);
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 1ee9c94c0e16..37b0ef6ca767 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -3670,11 +3670,12 @@ static struct smack_known *smack_from_secattr(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *sap,
return &smack_known_web;
return &smack_known_star;
}
- if ((sap->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID) != 0)
+ if ((sap->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID) != 0 &&
+ (sap->attr.le.flags & LSM_EXPORT_SMACK))
/*
* Looks like a fallback, which gives us a secid.
*/
- return smack_from_secid(sap->attr.secid);
+ return smack_from_secid(sap->attr.le.smack);
/*
* Without guidance regarding the smack value
* for the packet fall back on the network
diff --git a/security/smack/smackfs.c b/security/smack/smackfs.c
index faf2ea3968b3..28c567465f6c 100644
--- a/security/smack/smackfs.c
+++ b/security/smack/smackfs.c
@@ -197,7 +197,8 @@ static void smk_netlabel_audit_set(struct netlbl_audit *nap)
nap->loginuid = audit_get_loginuid(current);
nap->sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current);
- nap->secid = skp->smk_secid;
+ nap->le.flags = LSM_EXPORT_SMACK;
+ nap->le.smack = skp->smk_secid;
}
/*
@@ -1150,6 +1151,7 @@ static void smk_net4addr_insert(struct smk_net4addr *new)
static ssize_t smk_write_net4addr(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
+ struct lsm_export le;
struct smk_net4addr *snp;
struct sockaddr_in newname;
char *smack;
@@ -1281,10 +1283,14 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_net4addr(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
* this host so that incoming packets get labeled.
* but only if we didn't get the special CIPSO option
*/
- if (rc == 0 && skp != NULL)
+ if (rc == 0 && skp != NULL) {
+ lsm_export_init(&le);
+ le.flags = LSM_EXPORT_SMACK;
+ le.smack = snp->smk_label->smk_secid;
rc = netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_add(&init_net, NULL,
&snp->smk_host, &snp->smk_mask, PF_INET,
- snp->smk_label->smk_secid, &audit_info);
+ &le, &audit_info);
+ }
if (rc == 0)
rc = count;
--
2.17.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread* [PATCH 38/97] LSM: Remove lsm_export scaffolding functions
2019-02-28 22:17 [PATCH 00/97] LSM: Complete module stacking Casey Schaufler
` (36 preceding siblings ...)
2019-02-28 22:18 ` [PATCH 37/97] Netlabel: Replace secids with lsm_export Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-02-28 22:18 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-02-28 22:18 ` [PATCH 39/97] IMA: FIXUP prototype using lsm_export Casey Schaufler
` (32 subsequent siblings)
70 siblings, 0 replies; 80+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-02-28 22:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul
The scaffolding functions lsm_export_secid and lsm_export_to_all
are no longer required. Remove them.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
include/linux/security.h | 43 ----------------------------------------
1 file changed, 43 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 6659ffa8cacc..b8c67da7409e 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -114,49 +114,6 @@ static inline bool lsm_export_equal(struct lsm_export *l, struct lsm_export *m)
return true;
}
-/**
- * lsm_export_secid - pull the useful secid out of a lsm_export
- * @data: the containing data structure
- * @secid: where to put the one that matters.
- *
- * Shim that will disappear when all lsm_export conversions are done.
- */
-static inline void lsm_export_secid(struct lsm_export *data, u32 *secid)
-{
- switch (data->flags) {
- case LSM_EXPORT_NONE:
- *secid = 0;
- break;
- case LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX:
- *secid = data->selinux;
- break;
- case LSM_EXPORT_SMACK:
- *secid = data->smack;
- break;
- case LSM_EXPORT_APPARMOR:
- *secid = data->apparmor;
- break;
- case LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX | LSM_EXPORT_SMACK | LSM_EXPORT_APPARMOR:
- /* For scaffolding only */
- *secid = data->selinux;
- break;
- default:
- pr_warn("%s flags=0x%u - not a valid set\n", __func__,
- data->flags);
- *secid = 0;
- break;
- }
-}
-
-static inline void lsm_export_to_all(struct lsm_export *data, u32 secid)
-{
- data->selinux = secid;
- data->smack = secid;
- data->apparmor = secid;
- data->flags = LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX | LSM_EXPORT_SMACK |
- LSM_EXPORT_APPARMOR;
-}
-
extern struct lsm_export *lsm_export_skb(struct sk_buff *skb);
/* These functions are in security/commoncap.c */
--
2.17.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread* [PATCH 39/97] IMA: FIXUP prototype using lsm_export
2019-02-28 22:17 [PATCH 00/97] LSM: Complete module stacking Casey Schaufler
` (37 preceding siblings ...)
2019-02-28 22:18 ` [PATCH 38/97] LSM: Remove lsm_export scaffolding functions Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-02-28 22:18 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-02-28 22:18 ` [PATCH 40/97] Smack: Restore the release_secctx hook Casey Schaufler
` (31 subsequent siblings)
70 siblings, 0 replies; 80+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-02-28 22:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul
Fix the prototype on a function stub
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index 2edaf4c41300..c46e856b077b 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -308,8 +308,8 @@ static inline int security_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
return -EINVAL;
}
-static inline int security_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
- void *lsmrule,
+static inline int security_filter_rule_match(struct lsm_export *l, u32 field,
+ u32 op, void *lsmrule,
struct audit_context *actx)
{
return -EINVAL;
--
2.17.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread* [PATCH 40/97] Smack: Restore the release_secctx hook
2019-02-28 22:17 [PATCH 00/97] LSM: Complete module stacking Casey Schaufler
` (38 preceding siblings ...)
2019-02-28 22:18 ` [PATCH 39/97] IMA: FIXUP prototype using lsm_export Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-02-28 22:18 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-02-28 22:18 ` [PATCH 41/97] AppArmor: Remove unnecessary hook stub Casey Schaufler
` (30 subsequent siblings)
70 siblings, 0 replies; 80+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-02-28 22:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul
The secid_to_secctx() hook has to be balanced with a release_secctx
hook for stacking. This hook does nothing.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 8 +++++---
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 37b0ef6ca767..2695bd373752 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -4385,10 +4385,11 @@ static int smack_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
}
/*
- * There used to be a smack_release_secctx hook
- * that did nothing back when hooks were in a vector.
- * Now that there's a list such a hook adds cost.
+ * There smack_release_secctx hook does nothing
*/
+static void smack_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
+{
+}
static int smack_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
{
@@ -4625,6 +4626,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(ismaclabel, smack_ismaclabel),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(secid_to_secctx, smack_secid_to_secctx),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(secctx_to_secid, smack_secctx_to_secid),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(release_secctx, smack_release_secctx),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_notifysecctx, smack_inode_notifysecctx),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecctx, smack_inode_setsecctx),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecctx, smack_inode_getsecctx),
--
2.17.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread* [PATCH 41/97] AppArmor: Remove unnecessary hook stub
2019-02-28 22:17 [PATCH 00/97] LSM: Complete module stacking Casey Schaufler
` (39 preceding siblings ...)
2019-02-28 22:18 ` [PATCH 40/97] Smack: Restore the release_secctx hook Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-02-28 22:18 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-02-28 22:18 ` [PATCH 42/97] LSM: Limit calls to certain module hooks Casey Schaufler
` (29 subsequent siblings)
70 siblings, 0 replies; 80+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-02-28 22:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul
Remove the getpeersec_dgram hook stub. It's unnecessary
and disrupts stacking.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
security/apparmor/lsm.c | 12 ++----------
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index 0f8e671df5fe..8c854f95d814 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -1094,15 +1094,9 @@ static int apparmor_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock,
* @secid: pointer to where to put the secid of the packet
*
* Sets the netlabel socket state on sk from parent
+ *
+ * The TODO stub interfered with stacking and was removed - Casey
*/
-static int apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
- struct sk_buff *skb,
- struct lsm_export *l)
-
-{
- /* TODO: requires secid support */
- return -ENOPROTOOPT;
-}
/**
* apparmor_sock_graft - Initialize newly created socket
@@ -1202,8 +1196,6 @@ static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
#endif
LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_stream,
apparmor_socket_getpeersec_stream),
- LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_dgram,
- apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sock_graft, apparmor_sock_graft),
#ifdef CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_request, apparmor_inet_conn_request),
--
2.17.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread* [PATCH 42/97] LSM: Limit calls to certain module hooks
2019-02-28 22:17 [PATCH 00/97] LSM: Complete module stacking Casey Schaufler
` (40 preceding siblings ...)
2019-02-28 22:18 ` [PATCH 41/97] AppArmor: Remove unnecessary hook stub Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-02-28 22:18 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-02-28 22:18 ` [PATCH 43/97] LSM: Create a data structure for a security context Casey Schaufler
` (28 subsequent siblings)
70 siblings, 0 replies; 80+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-02-28 22:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul
LSM hooks dealing with security context strings should
only be called for one security module. Add call macros
that invoke a single module hook and us in for those cases.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
security/security.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
1 file changed, 28 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 2f9411b93f70..c81010db34bf 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -709,6 +709,16 @@ int lsm_superblock_alloc(struct super_block *sb)
P->hook.FUNC(__VA_ARGS__); \
} while (0)
+#define call_one_void_hook(FUNC, ...) \
+ do { \
+ struct security_hook_list *P; \
+ \
+ hlist_for_each_entry(P, &security_hook_heads.FUNC, list) { \
+ P->hook.FUNC(__VA_ARGS__); \
+ break; \
+ } \
+ } while (0)
+
#define call_int_hook(FUNC, IRC, ...) ({ \
int RC = IRC; \
do { \
@@ -723,6 +733,19 @@ int lsm_superblock_alloc(struct super_block *sb)
RC; \
})
+#define call_one_int_hook(FUNC, IRC, ...) ({ \
+ int RC = IRC; \
+ do { \
+ struct security_hook_list *P; \
+ \
+ hlist_for_each_entry(P, &security_hook_heads.FUNC, list) { \
+ RC = P->hook.FUNC(__VA_ARGS__); \
+ break; \
+ } \
+ } while (0); \
+ RC; \
+})
+
/* Security operations */
int security_binder_set_context_mgr(struct task_struct *mgr)
@@ -1952,7 +1975,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ismaclabel);
int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsm_export *l, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
{
- return call_int_hook(secid_to_secctx, -EOPNOTSUPP, l, secdata, seclen);
+ return call_one_int_hook(secid_to_secctx, -EOPNOTSUPP, l, secdata,
+ seclen);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secid_to_secctx);
@@ -1960,13 +1984,13 @@ int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
struct lsm_export *l)
{
lsm_export_init(l);
- return call_int_hook(secctx_to_secid, 0, secdata, seclen, l);
+ return call_one_int_hook(secctx_to_secid, 0, secdata, seclen, l);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secctx_to_secid);
void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
{
- call_void_hook(release_secctx, secdata, seclen);
+ call_one_void_hook(release_secctx, secdata, seclen);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_release_secctx);
@@ -2091,7 +2115,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sock_rcv_skb);
int security_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
{
- return call_int_hook(socket_getpeersec_stream, -ENOPROTOOPT, sock,
+ return call_one_int_hook(socket_getpeersec_stream, -ENOPROTOOPT, sock,
optval, optlen, len);
}
--
2.17.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread* [PATCH 43/97] LSM: Create a data structure for a security context
2019-02-28 22:17 [PATCH 00/97] LSM: Complete module stacking Casey Schaufler
` (41 preceding siblings ...)
2019-02-28 22:18 ` [PATCH 42/97] LSM: Limit calls to certain module hooks Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-02-28 22:18 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-02-28 22:18 ` [PATCH 44/97] LSM: Use lsm_context in secid_to_secctx hooks Casey Schaufler
` (27 subsequent siblings)
70 siblings, 0 replies; 80+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-02-28 22:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul
A "security context" is the text representation of
the information used by LSMs. This provides a structure
so that the use can be made consistant.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
include/linux/security.h | 11 +++++++++++
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index b8c67da7409e..b60152334d9f 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -116,6 +116,17 @@ static inline bool lsm_export_equal(struct lsm_export *l, struct lsm_export *m)
extern struct lsm_export *lsm_export_skb(struct sk_buff *skb);
+/* Text representation of LSM specific security information - a "context" */
+struct lsm_context {
+ char *context;
+ u32 len;
+};
+
+static inline void lsm_context_init(struct lsm_context *cp)
+{
+ memset(cp, 0, sizeof(*cp));
+}
+
/* These functions are in security/commoncap.c */
extern int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
int cap, unsigned int opts);
--
2.17.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread* [PATCH 44/97] LSM: Use lsm_context in secid_to_secctx hooks
2019-02-28 22:17 [PATCH 00/97] LSM: Complete module stacking Casey Schaufler
` (42 preceding siblings ...)
2019-02-28 22:18 ` [PATCH 43/97] LSM: Create a data structure for a security context Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-02-28 22:18 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-02-28 22:18 ` [PATCH 45/97] LSM: Use lsm_context in secctx_to_secid hooks Casey Schaufler
` (26 subsequent siblings)
70 siblings, 0 replies; 80+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-02-28 22:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul
Convert SELinux, Smack and AppArmor to use the lsm_context structure
instead of a context/secid pair. There is some scaffolding involved
that will be removed when the related data is updated.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 6 ++----
security/apparmor/include/secid.h | 2 +-
security/apparmor/secid.c | 11 +++++------
security/security.c | 12 ++++++++++--
security/selinux/hooks.c | 5 ++---
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 8 +++-----
6 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index cbfc2a9b5f27..97b258488e4d 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -1307,9 +1307,8 @@
* length and the next call which actually allocates and returns the
* secdata.
* @l points to the security information.
- * @secdata contains the pointer that stores the converted security
+ * @cp contains the pointer that stores the converted security
* context.
- * @seclen pointer which contains the length of the data
* @secctx_to_secid:
* Convert security context to exported lsm data.
* @l contains the pointer to the generated security data.
@@ -1654,8 +1653,7 @@ union security_list_options {
int (*getprocattr)(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value);
int (*setprocattr)(const char *name, void *value, size_t size);
int (*ismaclabel)(const char *name);
- int (*secid_to_secctx)(struct lsm_export *l, char **secdata,
- u32 *seclen);
+ int (*secid_to_secctx)(struct lsm_export *l, struct lsm_context *cp);
int (*secctx_to_secid)(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
struct lsm_export *l);
void (*release_secctx)(char *secdata, u32 seclen);
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/secid.h b/security/apparmor/include/secid.h
index 5381eff03d4f..964d3dc92635 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/secid.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/secid.h
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ struct aa_label;
#define AA_SECID_WILDCARD 1
struct aa_label *aa_secid_to_label(struct lsm_export *l);
-int apparmor_secid_to_secctx(struct lsm_export *l, char **secdata, u32 *seclen);
+int apparmor_secid_to_secctx(struct lsm_export *l, struct lsm_context *cp);
int apparmor_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
struct lsm_export *l);
void apparmor_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen);
diff --git a/security/apparmor/secid.c b/security/apparmor/secid.c
index 69d98a89db75..4e11434605d6 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/secid.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/secid.c
@@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ static inline void aa_export_secid(struct lsm_export *l, u32 secid)
l->apparmor = secid;
}
-int apparmor_secid_to_secctx(struct lsm_export *l, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
+int apparmor_secid_to_secctx(struct lsm_export *l, struct lsm_context *cp)
{
/* TODO: cache secctx and ref count so we don't have to recreate */
struct aa_label *label;
@@ -89,13 +89,12 @@ int apparmor_secid_to_secctx(struct lsm_export *l, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
label = aa_secid_to_label(l);
- AA_BUG(!seclen);
-
if (!label)
return -EINVAL;
- if (secdata)
- len = aa_label_asxprint(secdata, root_ns, label,
+ /* scaffolding check - Casey */
+ if (cp)
+ len = aa_label_asxprint(&cp->context, root_ns, label,
FLAG_SHOW_MODE | FLAG_VIEW_SUBNS |
FLAG_HIDDEN_UNCONFINED | FLAG_ABS_ROOT,
GFP_ATOMIC);
@@ -106,7 +105,7 @@ int apparmor_secid_to_secctx(struct lsm_export *l, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
if (len < 0)
return -ENOMEM;
- *seclen = len;
+ cp->len = len;
return 0;
}
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index c81010db34bf..9b25f0113b4f 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1975,8 +1975,16 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ismaclabel);
int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsm_export *l, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
{
- return call_one_int_hook(secid_to_secctx, -EOPNOTSUPP, l, secdata,
- seclen);
+ struct lsm_context lc = { .context = NULL, .len = 0, };
+ int rc;
+
+ rc = call_one_int_hook(secid_to_secctx, -EOPNOTSUPP, l, &lc);
+ if (secdata)
+ *secdata = lc.context;
+ else
+ security_release_secctx(lc.context, lc.len);
+ *seclen = lc.len;
+ return rc;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secid_to_secctx);
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 9879dd828e1c..4d679697cdad 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -6194,14 +6194,13 @@ static int selinux_ismaclabel(const char *name)
return (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX) == 0);
}
-static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(struct lsm_export *l, char **secdata,
- u32 *seclen)
+static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(struct lsm_export *l, struct lsm_context *cp)
{
u32 secid;
selinux_import_secid(l, &secid);
return security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, secid,
- secdata, seclen);
+ &cp->context, &cp->len);
}
static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 2695bd373752..015a2342aad5 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -4349,8 +4349,7 @@ static int smack_ismaclabel(const char *name)
*
* Exists for networking code.
*/
-static int smack_secid_to_secctx(struct lsm_export *l, char **secdata,
- u32 *seclen)
+static int smack_secid_to_secctx(struct lsm_export *l, struct lsm_context *cp)
{
struct smack_known *skp;
u32 secid;
@@ -4358,9 +4357,8 @@ static int smack_secid_to_secctx(struct lsm_export *l, char **secdata,
smack_import_secid(l, &secid);
skp = smack_from_secid(secid);
- if (secdata)
- *secdata = skp->smk_known;
- *seclen = strlen(skp->smk_known);
+ cp->context = skp->smk_known;
+ cp->len = strlen(skp->smk_known);
return 0;
}
--
2.17.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread* [PATCH 45/97] LSM: Use lsm_context in secctx_to_secid hooks
2019-02-28 22:17 [PATCH 00/97] LSM: Complete module stacking Casey Schaufler
` (43 preceding siblings ...)
2019-02-28 22:18 ` [PATCH 44/97] LSM: Use lsm_context in secid_to_secctx hooks Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-02-28 22:18 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-02-28 22:18 ` [PATCH 46/97] LSM: Use lsm_context in inode_getsecctx hooks Casey Schaufler
` (25 subsequent siblings)
70 siblings, 0 replies; 80+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-02-28 22:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul
Convert SELinux, Smack and AppArmor to use the lsm_context structure
instead of a context/secid pair. There is some scaffolding involved
that will be removed when the related data is updated.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 4 ++--
security/apparmor/include/secid.h | 2 +-
security/apparmor/secid.c | 7 +++----
security/security.c | 6 +++++-
security/selinux/hooks.c | 4 ++--
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 4 ++--
6 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index 97b258488e4d..bb748b0a045b 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -1311,8 +1311,8 @@
* context.
* @secctx_to_secid:
* Convert security context to exported lsm data.
+ * @cp contains the security context.
* @l contains the pointer to the generated security data.
- * @secdata contains the security context.
*
* @release_secctx:
* Release the security context.
@@ -1654,7 +1654,7 @@ union security_list_options {
int (*setprocattr)(const char *name, void *value, size_t size);
int (*ismaclabel)(const char *name);
int (*secid_to_secctx)(struct lsm_export *l, struct lsm_context *cp);
- int (*secctx_to_secid)(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
+ int (*secctx_to_secid)(const struct lsm_context *cp,
struct lsm_export *l);
void (*release_secctx)(char *secdata, u32 seclen);
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/secid.h b/security/apparmor/include/secid.h
index 964d3dc92635..acfcf99bff0e 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/secid.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/secid.h
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ struct aa_label;
struct aa_label *aa_secid_to_label(struct lsm_export *l);
int apparmor_secid_to_secctx(struct lsm_export *l, struct lsm_context *cp);
-int apparmor_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
+int apparmor_secctx_to_secid(const struct lsm_context *cp,
struct lsm_export *l);
void apparmor_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen);
diff --git a/security/apparmor/secid.c b/security/apparmor/secid.c
index 4e11434605d6..35df38592b6e 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/secid.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/secid.c
@@ -110,13 +110,12 @@ int apparmor_secid_to_secctx(struct lsm_export *l, struct lsm_context *cp)
return 0;
}
-int apparmor_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
- struct lsm_export *l)
+int apparmor_secctx_to_secid(const struct lsm_context *cp, struct lsm_export *l)
{
struct aa_label *label;
- label = aa_label_strn_parse(&root_ns->unconfined->label, secdata,
- seclen, GFP_KERNEL, false, false);
+ label = aa_label_strn_parse(&root_ns->unconfined->label, cp->context,
+ cp->len, GFP_KERNEL, false, false);
if (IS_ERR(label))
return PTR_ERR(label);
aa_export_secid(l, label->secid);
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 9b25f0113b4f..fa94f012a7ab 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1991,8 +1991,12 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secid_to_secctx);
int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
struct lsm_export *l)
{
+ struct lsm_context lc;
+
+ lc.context = secdata;
+ lc.len = seclen;
lsm_export_init(l);
- return call_one_int_hook(secctx_to_secid, 0, secdata, seclen, l);
+ return call_one_int_hook(secctx_to_secid, 0, &lc, l);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secctx_to_secid);
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 4d679697cdad..00b47c01960b 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -6203,13 +6203,13 @@ static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(struct lsm_export *l, struct lsm_context *cp)
&cp->context, &cp->len);
}
-static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
+static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const struct lsm_context *cp,
struct lsm_export *l)
{
u32 secid;
int rc;
- rc = security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state, secdata, seclen,
+ rc = security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state, cp->context, cp->len,
&secid, GFP_KERNEL);
selinux_export_secid(l, secid);
return rc;
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 015a2342aad5..a5108215ed49 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -4370,10 +4370,10 @@ static int smack_secid_to_secctx(struct lsm_export *l, struct lsm_context *cp)
*
* Exists for audit and networking code.
*/
-static int smack_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
+static int smack_secctx_to_secid(const struct lsm_context *cp,
struct lsm_export *l)
{
- struct smack_known *skp = smk_find_entry(secdata);
+ struct smack_known *skp = smk_find_entry(cp->context);
if (skp)
smack_export_secid(l, skp->smk_secid);
--
2.17.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread* [PATCH 46/97] LSM: Use lsm_context in inode_getsecctx hooks
2019-02-28 22:17 [PATCH 00/97] LSM: Complete module stacking Casey Schaufler
` (44 preceding siblings ...)
2019-02-28 22:18 ` [PATCH 45/97] LSM: Use lsm_context in secctx_to_secid hooks Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-02-28 22:18 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-02-28 22:18 ` [PATCH 47/97] LSM: Use lsm_context in inode_notifysecctx hooks Casey Schaufler
` (24 subsequent siblings)
70 siblings, 0 replies; 80+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-02-28 22:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul
Convert SELinux and Smack to use the lsm_context structure
instead of a context/secid pair. There is some scaffolding involved
that will be removed when the related data is updated.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 7 +++----
security/security.c | 9 ++++++++-
security/selinux/hooks.c | 6 +++---
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 6 +++---
4 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index bb748b0a045b..713378bdd69a 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -1386,12 +1386,11 @@
* @ctxlen contains the length of @ctx.
*
* @inode_getsecctx:
- * On success, returns 0 and fills out @ctx and @ctxlen with the security
+ * On success, returns 0 and fills out @cp with the security
* context for the given @inode.
*
* @inode we wish to get the security context of.
- * @ctx is a pointer in which to place the allocated security context.
- * @ctxlen points to the place to put the length of @ctx.
+ * @cp is a pointer in which to place the allocated security context.
*
* Security hooks for using the eBPF maps and programs functionalities through
* eBPF syscalls.
@@ -1661,7 +1660,7 @@ union security_list_options {
void (*inode_invalidate_secctx)(struct inode *inode);
int (*inode_notifysecctx)(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen);
int (*inode_setsecctx)(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen);
- int (*inode_getsecctx)(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen);
+ int (*inode_getsecctx)(struct inode *inode, struct lsm_context *cp);
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
int (*unix_stream_connect)(struct sock *sock, struct sock *other,
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index fa94f012a7ab..b2aa50a583c7 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -2026,7 +2026,14 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_setsecctx);
int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
{
- return call_int_hook(inode_getsecctx, -EOPNOTSUPP, inode, ctx, ctxlen);
+ struct lsm_context lc = { .context = NULL, .len = 0, };
+ int rc;
+
+ rc = call_int_hook(inode_getsecctx, -EOPNOTSUPP, inode, &lc);
+
+ *ctx = (void *)lc.context;
+ *ctxlen = lc.len;
+ return rc;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_getsecctx);
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 00b47c01960b..a67b8a3e6b9c 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -6245,14 +6245,14 @@ static int selinux_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
return __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, ctx, ctxlen, 0);
}
-static int selinux_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
+static int selinux_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, struct lsm_context *cp)
{
int len = 0;
len = selinux_inode_getsecurity(inode, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX,
- ctx, true);
+ (void **)&cp->context, true);
if (len < 0)
return len;
- *ctxlen = len;
+ cp->len = len;
return 0;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index a5108215ed49..b3d4410696a6 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -4399,12 +4399,12 @@ static int smack_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
return __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SMACK, ctx, ctxlen, 0);
}
-static int smack_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
+static int smack_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, struct lsm_context *cp)
{
struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_inode(inode);
- *ctx = skp->smk_known;
- *ctxlen = strlen(skp->smk_known);
+ cp->context = skp->smk_known;
+ cp->len = strlen(skp->smk_known);
return 0;
}
--
2.17.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread* [PATCH 47/97] LSM: Use lsm_context in inode_notifysecctx hooks
2019-02-28 22:17 [PATCH 00/97] LSM: Complete module stacking Casey Schaufler
` (45 preceding siblings ...)
2019-02-28 22:18 ` [PATCH 46/97] LSM: Use lsm_context in inode_getsecctx hooks Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-02-28 22:18 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-02-28 22:18 ` [PATCH 48/97] LSM: Use lsm_context in dentry_init_security hooks Casey Schaufler
` (23 subsequent siblings)
70 siblings, 0 replies; 80+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-02-28 22:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul
Convert SELinux and Smack to use the lsm_context structure
instead of a context/secid pair. There is some scaffolding involved
that will be removed when the related data is updated.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 5 ++---
security/security.c | 6 +++++-
security/selinux/hooks.c | 6 ++++--
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 5 +++--
4 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index 713378bdd69a..a7a68be7e507 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -1367,8 +1367,7 @@
* Must be called with inode->i_mutex locked.
*
* @inode we wish to set the security context of.
- * @ctx contains the string which we wish to set in the inode.
- * @ctxlen contains the length of @ctx.
+ * @cp contains the string which we wish to set in the inode.
*
* @inode_setsecctx:
* Change the security context of an inode. Updates the
@@ -1658,7 +1657,7 @@ union security_list_options {
void (*release_secctx)(char *secdata, u32 seclen);
void (*inode_invalidate_secctx)(struct inode *inode);
- int (*inode_notifysecctx)(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen);
+ int (*inode_notifysecctx)(struct inode *inode, struct lsm_context *cp);
int (*inode_setsecctx)(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen);
int (*inode_getsecctx)(struct inode *inode, struct lsm_context *cp);
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index b2aa50a583c7..a0c4ae7da840 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -2014,7 +2014,11 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_invalidate_secctx);
int security_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
{
- return call_int_hook(inode_notifysecctx, 0, inode, ctx, ctxlen);
+ struct lsm_context lc;
+
+ lc.context = ctx;
+ lc.len = ctxlen;
+ return call_int_hook(inode_notifysecctx, 0, inode, &lc);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_notifysecctx);
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index a67b8a3e6b9c..33e58efe59ce 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -6232,9 +6232,11 @@ static void selinux_inode_invalidate_secctx(struct inode *inode)
/*
* called with inode->i_mutex locked
*/
-static int selinux_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
+static int selinux_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode,
+ struct lsm_context *cp)
{
- return selinux_inode_setsecurity(inode, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, ctx, ctxlen, 0);
+ return selinux_inode_setsecurity(inode, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX,
+ cp->context, cp->len, 0);
}
/*
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index b3d4410696a6..26cf42ddba0e 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -4389,9 +4389,10 @@ static void smack_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
{
}
-static int smack_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
+static int smack_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, struct lsm_context *cp)
{
- return smack_inode_setsecurity(inode, XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX, ctx, ctxlen, 0);
+ return smack_inode_setsecurity(inode, XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX, cp->context,
+ cp->len, 0);
}
static int smack_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
--
2.17.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread* [PATCH 48/97] LSM: Use lsm_context in dentry_init_security hooks
2019-02-28 22:17 [PATCH 00/97] LSM: Complete module stacking Casey Schaufler
` (46 preceding siblings ...)
2019-02-28 22:18 ` [PATCH 47/97] LSM: Use lsm_context in inode_notifysecctx hooks Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-02-28 22:18 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-02-28 22:18 ` [PATCH 49/97] LSM: Use lsm_context in security_dentry_init_security Casey Schaufler
` (22 subsequent siblings)
70 siblings, 0 replies; 80+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-02-28 22:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul
From: Casey Schaufler <cschaufler@schaufler-ca.com>
Convert SELinux to use the lsm_context structure
instead of a context/secid pair. There is some scaffolding involved
that will be removed when the related data is updated.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 7 +++----
security/security.c | 10 ++++++++--
security/selinux/hooks.c | 8 ++++----
3 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index a7a68be7e507..29e52aedd6ac 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -150,8 +150,7 @@
* @dentry dentry to use in calculating the context.
* @mode mode used to determine resource type.
* @name name of the last path component used to create file
- * @ctx pointer to place the pointer to the resulting context in.
- * @ctxlen point to place the length of the resulting context.
+ * @cp pointer to place the pointer to the resulting context in.
* @dentry_create_files_as:
* Compute a context for a dentry as the inode is not yet available
* and set that context in passed in creds so that new files are
@@ -1482,8 +1481,8 @@ union security_list_options {
int (*sb_add_mnt_opt)(const char *option, const char *val, int len,
void **mnt_opts);
int (*dentry_init_security)(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
- const struct qstr *name, void **ctx,
- u32 *ctxlen);
+ const struct qstr *name,
+ struct lsm_context *cp);
int (*dentry_create_files_as)(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
struct qstr *name,
const struct cred *old,
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index a0c4ae7da840..bacfb690392e 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1018,8 +1018,14 @@ int security_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
const struct qstr *name, void **ctx,
u32 *ctxlen)
{
- return call_int_hook(dentry_init_security, -EOPNOTSUPP, dentry, mode,
- name, ctx, ctxlen);
+ struct lsm_context lc = { .context = NULL, .len = 0, };
+ int rc;
+
+ rc = call_int_hook(dentry_init_security, -EOPNOTSUPP, dentry, mode,
+ name, &lc);
+ *ctx = (void *)lc.context;
+ *ctxlen = lc.len;
+ return rc;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_dentry_init_security);
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 33e58efe59ce..8b8eb5115d6d 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -2715,8 +2715,8 @@ static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
}
static int selinux_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
- const struct qstr *name, void **ctx,
- u32 *ctxlen)
+ const struct qstr *name,
+ struct lsm_context *cp)
{
u32 newsid;
int rc;
@@ -2728,8 +2728,8 @@ static int selinux_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
if (rc)
return rc;
- return security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, newsid, (char **)ctx,
- ctxlen);
+ return security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, newsid, &cp->context,
+ &cp->len);
}
static int selinux_dentry_create_files_as(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
--
2.17.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread* [PATCH 49/97] LSM: Use lsm_context in security_dentry_init_security
2019-02-28 22:17 [PATCH 00/97] LSM: Complete module stacking Casey Schaufler
` (47 preceding siblings ...)
2019-02-28 22:18 ` [PATCH 48/97] LSM: Use lsm_context in dentry_init_security hooks Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-02-28 22:18 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-02-28 22:18 ` [PATCH 50/97] LSM: Use lsm_context in security_inode_notifysecctx Casey Schaufler
` (21 subsequent siblings)
70 siblings, 0 replies; 80+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-02-28 22:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul
From: Casey Schaufler <cschaufler@schaufler-ca.com>
Convert security_dentry_init_security to use the lsm_context structure
instead of a context/secid pair. There is some scaffolding involved
that will be removed when the related data is updated.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c | 5 ++++-
include/linux/security.h | 7 +++----
security/security.c | 14 ++++----------
3 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c b/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c
index 557a5d636183..f56963c995b0 100644
--- a/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c
+++ b/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c
@@ -113,6 +113,7 @@ static inline struct nfs4_label *
nfs4_label_init_security(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
struct iattr *sattr, struct nfs4_label *label)
{
+ struct lsm_context lc; /* Scaffolding -Casey */
int err;
if (label == NULL)
@@ -122,7 +123,9 @@ nfs4_label_init_security(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
return NULL;
err = security_dentry_init_security(dentry, sattr->ia_mode,
- &dentry->d_name, (void **)&label->label, &label->len);
+ &dentry->d_name, &lc);
+ label->label = lc.context;
+ label->len = lc.len;
if (err == 0)
return label;
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index b60152334d9f..7940a92e8b5c 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -299,8 +299,8 @@ int security_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
int security_add_mnt_opt(const char *option, const char *val,
int len, void **mnt_opts);
int security_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
- const struct qstr *name, void **ctx,
- u32 *ctxlen);
+ const struct qstr *name,
+ struct lsm_context *cp);
int security_dentry_create_files_as(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
struct qstr *name,
const struct cred *old,
@@ -660,8 +660,7 @@ static inline void security_inode_free(struct inode *inode)
static inline int security_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry,
int mode,
const struct qstr *name,
- void **ctx,
- u32 *ctxlen)
+ struct lsm_context *cp)
{
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index bacfb690392e..a821e0558370 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1015,17 +1015,11 @@ void security_inode_free(struct inode *inode)
}
int security_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
- const struct qstr *name, void **ctx,
- u32 *ctxlen)
+ const struct qstr *name,
+ struct lsm_context *cp)
{
- struct lsm_context lc = { .context = NULL, .len = 0, };
- int rc;
-
- rc = call_int_hook(dentry_init_security, -EOPNOTSUPP, dentry, mode,
- name, &lc);
- *ctx = (void *)lc.context;
- *ctxlen = lc.len;
- return rc;
+ return call_int_hook(dentry_init_security, -EOPNOTSUPP, dentry, mode,
+ name, cp);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_dentry_init_security);
--
2.17.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread* [PATCH 50/97] LSM: Use lsm_context in security_inode_notifysecctx
2019-02-28 22:17 [PATCH 00/97] LSM: Complete module stacking Casey Schaufler
` (48 preceding siblings ...)
2019-02-28 22:18 ` [PATCH 49/97] LSM: Use lsm_context in security_dentry_init_security Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-02-28 22:18 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-02-28 22:18 ` [PATCH 51/97] LSM: Use lsm_context in security_inode_getsecctx Casey Schaufler
` (20 subsequent siblings)
70 siblings, 0 replies; 80+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-02-28 22:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul
Convert security_inode_notifysecctx to use the lsm_context structure
instead of a context/secid pair. There is some scaffolding involved
that will be removed when the related data is updated.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
fs/kernfs/inode.c | 6 ++++--
fs/nfs/inode.c | 6 ++++--
include/linux/security.h | 5 +++--
security/security.c | 8 ++------
4 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/kernfs/inode.c b/fs/kernfs/inode.c
index 80cebcd94c90..7c5b0d5140c4 100644
--- a/fs/kernfs/inode.c
+++ b/fs/kernfs/inode.c
@@ -184,6 +184,7 @@ static inline void set_inode_attr(struct inode *inode, struct iattr *iattr)
static void kernfs_refresh_inode(struct kernfs_node *kn, struct inode *inode)
{
struct kernfs_iattrs *attrs = kn->iattr;
+ struct lsm_context lc; /* Scaffolding -Casey */
inode->i_mode = kn->mode;
if (attrs) {
@@ -192,8 +193,9 @@ static void kernfs_refresh_inode(struct kernfs_node *kn, struct inode *inode)
* persistent copy in kernfs_node.
*/
set_inode_attr(inode, &attrs->ia_iattr);
- security_inode_notifysecctx(inode, attrs->ia_secdata,
- attrs->ia_secdata_len);
+ lc.context = attrs->ia_secdata;
+ lc.len = attrs->ia_secdata_len;
+ security_inode_notifysecctx(inode, &lc);
}
if (kernfs_type(kn) == KERNFS_DIR)
diff --git a/fs/nfs/inode.c b/fs/nfs/inode.c
index 094775ea0781..f6c339d4e6fb 100644
--- a/fs/nfs/inode.c
+++ b/fs/nfs/inode.c
@@ -339,14 +339,16 @@ static void nfs_clear_label_invalid(struct inode *inode)
void nfs_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, struct nfs_fattr *fattr,
struct nfs4_label *label)
{
+ struct lsm_context lc; /* Scaffolding -Casey */
int error;
if (label == NULL)
return;
if ((fattr->valid & NFS_ATTR_FATTR_V4_SECURITY_LABEL) && inode->i_security) {
- error = security_inode_notifysecctx(inode, label->label,
- label->len);
+ lc.context = label->label;
+ lc.len = label->len;
+ error = security_inode_notifysecctx(inode, &lc);
if (error)
printk(KERN_ERR "%s() %s %d "
"security_inode_notifysecctx() %d\n",
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 7940a92e8b5c..4194f6b8b97f 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -434,7 +434,7 @@ int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen);
void security_inode_invalidate_secctx(struct inode *inode);
-int security_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen);
+int security_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, struct lsm_context *cp);
int security_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen);
int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen);
#else /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
@@ -1218,7 +1218,8 @@ static inline void security_inode_invalidate_secctx(struct inode *inode)
{
}
-static inline int security_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
+static inline int security_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode,
+ struct lsm_context *cp);
{
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index a821e0558370..464dee357986 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -2012,13 +2012,9 @@ void security_inode_invalidate_secctx(struct inode *inode)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_invalidate_secctx);
-int security_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
+int security_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, struct lsm_context *cp)
{
- struct lsm_context lc;
-
- lc.context = ctx;
- lc.len = ctxlen;
- return call_int_hook(inode_notifysecctx, 0, inode, &lc);
+ return call_int_hook(inode_notifysecctx, 0, inode, cp);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_notifysecctx);
--
2.17.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread* [PATCH 51/97] LSM: Use lsm_context in security_inode_getsecctx
2019-02-28 22:17 [PATCH 00/97] LSM: Complete module stacking Casey Schaufler
` (49 preceding siblings ...)
2019-02-28 22:18 ` [PATCH 50/97] LSM: Use lsm_context in security_inode_notifysecctx Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-02-28 22:18 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-02-28 22:18 ` [PATCH 52/97] LSM: Use lsm_context in security_secctx_to_secid Casey Schaufler
` (19 subsequent siblings)
70 siblings, 0 replies; 80+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-02-28 22:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul
From: Casey Schaufler <cschaufler@schaufler-ca.com>
Convert security_inode_getsecctx to use the lsm_context structure
instead of a context/secid pair. There is some scaffolding involved
that will be removed when the related data is updated.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
fs/kernfs/inode.c | 11 +++++------
fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c | 14 ++++++--------
include/linux/security.h | 5 +++--
security/security.c | 11 ++---------
4 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/kernfs/inode.c b/fs/kernfs/inode.c
index 7c5b0d5140c4..1da14b56888e 100644
--- a/fs/kernfs/inode.c
+++ b/fs/kernfs/inode.c
@@ -351,8 +351,7 @@ static int kernfs_security_xattr_set(const struct xattr_handler *handler,
{
struct kernfs_node *kn = inode->i_private;
struct kernfs_iattrs *attrs;
- void *secdata;
- u32 secdata_len = 0;
+ struct lsm_context lc = { .context = NULL, .len = 0, };
int error;
attrs = kernfs_iattrs(kn);
@@ -362,16 +361,16 @@ static int kernfs_security_xattr_set(const struct xattr_handler *handler,
error = security_inode_setsecurity(inode, suffix, value, size, flags);
if (error)
return error;
- error = security_inode_getsecctx(inode, &secdata, &secdata_len);
+ error = security_inode_getsecctx(inode, &lc);
if (error)
return error;
mutex_lock(&kernfs_mutex);
- error = kernfs_node_setsecdata(attrs, &secdata, &secdata_len);
+ error = kernfs_node_setsecdata(attrs, (void **)&lc.context, &lc.len);
mutex_unlock(&kernfs_mutex);
- if (secdata)
- security_release_secctx(secdata, secdata_len);
+ if (lc.context)
+ security_release_secctx(lc.context, lc.len);
return error;
}
diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c b/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c
index 3de42a729093..1bf34730d054 100644
--- a/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c
+++ b/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c
@@ -2420,8 +2420,7 @@ nfsd4_encode_fattr(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct svc_fh *fhp,
__be32 status;
int err;
struct nfs4_acl *acl = NULL;
- void *context = NULL;
- int contextlen;
+ struct lsm_context lc = { .context = NULL, .len = 0, };
bool contextsupport = false;
struct nfsd4_compoundres *resp = rqstp->rq_resp;
u32 minorversion = resp->cstate.minorversion;
@@ -2477,8 +2476,7 @@ nfsd4_encode_fattr(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct svc_fh *fhp,
if ((bmval2 & FATTR4_WORD2_SECURITY_LABEL) ||
bmval0 & FATTR4_WORD0_SUPPORTED_ATTRS) {
if (exp->ex_flags & NFSEXP_SECURITY_LABEL)
- err = security_inode_getsecctx(d_inode(dentry),
- &context, &contextlen);
+ err = security_inode_getsecctx(d_inode(dentry), &lc);
else
err = -EOPNOTSUPP;
contextsupport = (err == 0);
@@ -2907,8 +2905,8 @@ nfsd4_encode_fattr(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct svc_fh *fhp,
}
if (bmval2 & FATTR4_WORD2_SECURITY_LABEL) {
- status = nfsd4_encode_security_label(xdr, rqstp, context,
- contextlen);
+ status = nfsd4_encode_security_label(xdr, rqstp, lc.context,
+ lc.len);
if (status)
goto out;
}
@@ -2919,8 +2917,8 @@ nfsd4_encode_fattr(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct svc_fh *fhp,
out:
#ifdef CONFIG_NFSD_V4_SECURITY_LABEL
- if (context)
- security_release_secctx(context, contextlen);
+ if (lc.context)
+ security_release_secctx(lc.context, lc.len);
#endif /* CONFIG_NFSD_V4_SECURITY_LABEL */
kfree(acl);
if (tempfh) {
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 4194f6b8b97f..2d948f1104cb 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -436,7 +436,7 @@ void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen);
void security_inode_invalidate_secctx(struct inode *inode);
int security_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, struct lsm_context *cp);
int security_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen);
-int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen);
+int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, struct lsm_context *cp);
#else /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
static inline int call_lsm_notifier(enum lsm_event event, void *data)
@@ -1227,7 +1227,8 @@ static inline int security_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32
{
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
-static inline int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
+static inline int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode,
+ struct lsm_context *cp);
{
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 464dee357986..fd1ce1116969 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -2024,16 +2024,9 @@ int security_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_setsecctx);
-int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
+int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, struct lsm_context *cp)
{
- struct lsm_context lc = { .context = NULL, .len = 0, };
- int rc;
-
- rc = call_int_hook(inode_getsecctx, -EOPNOTSUPP, inode, &lc);
-
- *ctx = (void *)lc.context;
- *ctxlen = lc.len;
- return rc;
+ return call_int_hook(inode_getsecctx, -EOPNOTSUPP, inode, cp);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_getsecctx);
--
2.17.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread* [PATCH 52/97] LSM: Use lsm_context in security_secctx_to_secid
2019-02-28 22:17 [PATCH 00/97] LSM: Complete module stacking Casey Schaufler
` (50 preceding siblings ...)
2019-02-28 22:18 ` [PATCH 51/97] LSM: Use lsm_context in security_inode_getsecctx Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-02-28 22:18 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-02-28 22:18 ` [PATCH 53/97] LSM: Use lsm_context in release_secctx hooks Casey Schaufler
` (18 subsequent siblings)
70 siblings, 0 replies; 80+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-02-28 22:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul
Convert security_secctx_to_secid to use the lsm_context structure
instead of a context/secid pair. There is some scaffolding involved
that will be removed when the related data is updated.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
include/linux/security.h | 6 ++----
kernel/cred.c | 5 ++++-
net/netfilter/nft_meta.c | 5 ++++-
net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c | 5 ++++-
net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 16 ++++++++--------
security/security.c | 8 ++------
6 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 2d948f1104cb..23b776bc16bf 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -429,8 +429,7 @@ int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value,
int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
int security_ismaclabel(const char *name);
int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsm_export *l, char **secdata, u32 *seclen);
-int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
- struct lsm_export *l);
+int security_secctx_to_secid(struct lsm_context *cp, struct lsm_export *l);
void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen);
void security_inode_invalidate_secctx(struct inode *inode);
@@ -1203,8 +1202,7 @@ static inline int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsm_export *l,
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
-static inline int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata,
- u32 seclen,
+static inline int security_secctx_to_secid(struct lsm_context *cp,
struct lsm_export *l)
{
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
diff --git a/kernel/cred.c b/kernel/cred.c
index 7792538b1ca6..ebae67fdd4d0 100644
--- a/kernel/cred.c
+++ b/kernel/cred.c
@@ -724,10 +724,13 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_security_override);
*/
int set_security_override_from_ctx(struct cred *new, const char *secctx)
{
+ struct lsm_context lc;
struct lsm_export le;
int ret;
- ret = security_secctx_to_secid(secctx, strlen(secctx), &le);
+ lc.context = secctx;
+ lc.len = strlen(secctx);
+ ret = security_secctx_to_secid(&lc, &le);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nft_meta.c b/net/netfilter/nft_meta.c
index 9f5040140fe0..ad1aa430f733 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nft_meta.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nft_meta.c
@@ -565,11 +565,14 @@ static const struct nla_policy nft_secmark_policy[NFTA_SECMARK_MAX + 1] = {
static int nft_secmark_compute_secid(struct nft_secmark *priv)
{
struct lsm_export le;
+ struct lsm_context lc;
u32 tmp_secid = 0;
int err;
lsm_export_init(&le);
- err = security_secctx_to_secid(priv->ctx, strlen(priv->ctx), &le);
+ lc.context = priv->ctx;
+ lc.len = strlen(priv->ctx);
+ err = security_secctx_to_secid(&lc, &le);
if (err)
return err;
diff --git a/net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c b/net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c
index 9a2a97c200a2..a06e50535194 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c
@@ -50,13 +50,16 @@ secmark_tg(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct xt_action_param *par)
static int checkentry_lsm(struct xt_secmark_target_info *info)
{
struct lsm_export le;
+ struct lsm_context lc;
int err;
info->secctx[SECMARK_SECCTX_MAX - 1] = '\0';
info->secid = 0;
lsm_export_init(&le);
- err = security_secctx_to_secid(info->secctx, strlen(info->secctx), &le);
+ lc.context = info->secctx;
+ lc.len = strlen(info->secctx);
+ err = security_secctx_to_secid(&lc, &le);
if (err) {
if (err == -EINVAL)
pr_info_ratelimited("invalid security context \'%s\'\n",
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
index 934667e8969c..314528bca31c 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
@@ -894,6 +894,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticadd(struct sk_buff *skb,
void *mask;
u32 addr_len;
struct lsm_export le;
+ struct lsm_context lc;
struct netlbl_audit audit_info;
/* Don't allow users to add both IPv4 and IPv6 addresses for a
@@ -914,10 +915,9 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticadd(struct sk_buff *skb,
if (ret_val != 0)
return ret_val;
dev_name = nla_data(info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_IFACE]);
- ret_val = security_secctx_to_secid(
- nla_data(info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX]),
- nla_len(info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX]),
- &le);
+ lc.context = nla_data(info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX]);
+ lc.len = nla_len(info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX]);
+ ret_val = security_secctx_to_secid(&lc, &le);
if (ret_val != 0)
return ret_val;
@@ -945,6 +945,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticadddef(struct sk_buff *skb,
void *mask;
u32 addr_len;
struct lsm_export le;
+ struct lsm_context lc;
struct netlbl_audit audit_info;
/* Don't allow users to add both IPv4 and IPv6 addresses for a
@@ -963,10 +964,9 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticadddef(struct sk_buff *skb,
ret_val = netlbl_unlabel_addrinfo_get(info, &addr, &mask, &addr_len);
if (ret_val != 0)
return ret_val;
- ret_val = security_secctx_to_secid(
- nla_data(info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX]),
- nla_len(info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX]),
- &le);
+ lc.context = nla_data(info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX]);
+ lc.len = nla_len(info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX]);
+ ret_val = security_secctx_to_secid(&lc, &le);
if (ret_val != 0)
return ret_val;
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index fd1ce1116969..dadb1cb72920 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1988,15 +1988,11 @@ int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsm_export *l, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secid_to_secctx);
-int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
- struct lsm_export *l)
+int security_secctx_to_secid(struct lsm_context *cp, struct lsm_export *l)
{
- struct lsm_context lc;
- lc.context = secdata;
- lc.len = seclen;
lsm_export_init(l);
- return call_one_int_hook(secctx_to_secid, 0, &lc, l);
+ return call_one_int_hook(secctx_to_secid, 0, cp, l);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secctx_to_secid);
--
2.17.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread* [PATCH 53/97] LSM: Use lsm_context in release_secctx hooks
2019-02-28 22:17 [PATCH 00/97] LSM: Complete module stacking Casey Schaufler
` (51 preceding siblings ...)
2019-02-28 22:18 ` [PATCH 52/97] LSM: Use lsm_context in security_secctx_to_secid Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-02-28 22:18 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-02-28 22:18 ` [PATCH 54/97] LSM: Use lsm_context in security_release_secctx Casey Schaufler
` (17 subsequent siblings)
70 siblings, 0 replies; 80+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-02-28 22:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul
Convert SELinux, Smack and AppAror to use the lsm_context structure
instead of a context/secid pair. There is some scaffolding involved
that will be removed when the related data is updated.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 3 +--
security/apparmor/include/secid.h | 2 +-
security/apparmor/secid.c | 4 ++--
security/security.c | 7 +++++--
security/selinux/hooks.c | 4 ++--
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 4 ++--
6 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index 29e52aedd6ac..2f07be4b9800 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -1316,7 +1316,6 @@
* @release_secctx:
* Release the security context.
* @secdata contains the security context.
- * @seclen contains the length of the security context.
*
* Security hooks for Audit
*
@@ -1653,7 +1652,7 @@ union security_list_options {
int (*secid_to_secctx)(struct lsm_export *l, struct lsm_context *cp);
int (*secctx_to_secid)(const struct lsm_context *cp,
struct lsm_export *l);
- void (*release_secctx)(char *secdata, u32 seclen);
+ void (*release_secctx)(struct lsm_context *cp);
void (*inode_invalidate_secctx)(struct inode *inode);
int (*inode_notifysecctx)(struct inode *inode, struct lsm_context *cp);
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/secid.h b/security/apparmor/include/secid.h
index acfcf99bff0e..a780e56d4f5b 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/secid.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/secid.h
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ struct aa_label *aa_secid_to_label(struct lsm_export *l);
int apparmor_secid_to_secctx(struct lsm_export *l, struct lsm_context *cp);
int apparmor_secctx_to_secid(const struct lsm_context *cp,
struct lsm_export *l);
-void apparmor_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen);
+void apparmor_release_secctx(struct lsm_context *cp);
int aa_alloc_secid(struct aa_label *label, gfp_t gfp);
diff --git a/security/apparmor/secid.c b/security/apparmor/secid.c
index 35df38592b6e..46c8b9a67ac7 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/secid.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/secid.c
@@ -123,9 +123,9 @@ int apparmor_secctx_to_secid(const struct lsm_context *cp, struct lsm_export *l)
return 0;
}
-void apparmor_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
+void apparmor_release_secctx(struct lsm_context *cp)
{
- kfree(secdata);
+ kfree(cp->context);
}
/**
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index dadb1cb72920..4dfe053ced5b 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1990,7 +1990,6 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secid_to_secctx);
int security_secctx_to_secid(struct lsm_context *cp, struct lsm_export *l)
{
-
lsm_export_init(l);
return call_one_int_hook(secctx_to_secid, 0, cp, l);
}
@@ -1998,7 +1997,11 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secctx_to_secid);
void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
{
- call_one_void_hook(release_secctx, secdata, seclen);
+ struct lsm_context lc;
+
+ lc.context = secdata;
+ lc.len = seclen;
+ call_one_void_hook(release_secctx, &lc);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_release_secctx);
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 8b8eb5115d6d..ea9603b63f77 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -6215,9 +6215,9 @@ static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const struct lsm_context *cp,
return rc;
}
-static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
+static void selinux_release_secctx(struct lsm_context *cp)
{
- kfree(secdata);
+ kfree(cp->context);
}
static void selinux_inode_invalidate_secctx(struct inode *inode)
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 26cf42ddba0e..332ac71e8a41 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -4383,9 +4383,9 @@ static int smack_secctx_to_secid(const struct lsm_context *cp,
}
/*
- * There smack_release_secctx hook does nothing
+ * The smack_release_secctx hook does nothing
*/
-static void smack_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
+static void smack_release_secctx(struct lsm_context *cp)
{
}
--
2.17.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread* [PATCH 54/97] LSM: Use lsm_context in security_release_secctx
2019-02-28 22:17 [PATCH 00/97] LSM: Complete module stacking Casey Schaufler
` (52 preceding siblings ...)
2019-02-28 22:18 ` [PATCH 53/97] LSM: Use lsm_context in release_secctx hooks Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-02-28 22:18 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-02-28 22:18 ` [PATCH 55/97] LSM: Use lsm_context in security_secid_to_secctx Casey Schaufler
` (16 subsequent siblings)
70 siblings, 0 replies; 80+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-02-28 22:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul
Convert security_release_secctx to use the lsm_context structure
instead of a context/secid pair. There is some scaffolding involved
that will be removed when the related data is updated.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
fs/kernfs/dir.c | 9 ++++---
fs/kernfs/inode.c | 2 +-
fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c | 9 +++++--
fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c | 2 +-
include/linux/security.h | 4 +--
include/net/scm.h | 10 +++----
kernel/audit.c | 36 +++++++++++--------------
kernel/auditsc.c | 18 ++++++-------
net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c | 9 +++----
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c | 10 +++----
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c | 9 +++----
net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c | 28 ++++++++++---------
net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 36 ++++++++++++-------------
net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c | 12 ++++-----
security/security.c | 10 +++----
15 files changed, 99 insertions(+), 105 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/kernfs/dir.c b/fs/kernfs/dir.c
index 4ca0b5c18192..a2f8543b88f1 100644
--- a/fs/kernfs/dir.c
+++ b/fs/kernfs/dir.c
@@ -532,9 +532,12 @@ void kernfs_put(struct kernfs_node *kn)
kfree_const(kn->name);
if (kn->iattr) {
- if (kn->iattr->ia_secdata)
- security_release_secctx(kn->iattr->ia_secdata,
- kn->iattr->ia_secdata_len);
+ if (kn->iattr->ia_secdata) {
+ struct lsm_context lc; /* Scaffolding -Casey */
+ lc.context = kn->iattr->ia_secdata;
+ lc.len = kn->iattr->ia_secdata_len;
+ security_release_secctx(&lc);
+ }
simple_xattrs_free(&kn->iattr->xattrs);
}
kfree(kn->iattr);
diff --git a/fs/kernfs/inode.c b/fs/kernfs/inode.c
index 1da14b56888e..62b152c24f59 100644
--- a/fs/kernfs/inode.c
+++ b/fs/kernfs/inode.c
@@ -370,7 +370,7 @@ static int kernfs_security_xattr_set(const struct xattr_handler *handler,
mutex_unlock(&kernfs_mutex);
if (lc.context)
- security_release_secctx(lc.context, lc.len);
+ security_release_secctx(&lc);
return error;
}
diff --git a/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c b/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c
index f56963c995b0..fe95c055c27b 100644
--- a/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c
+++ b/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c
@@ -134,8 +134,13 @@ nfs4_label_init_security(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
static inline void
nfs4_label_release_security(struct nfs4_label *label)
{
- if (label)
- security_release_secctx(label->label, label->len);
+ struct lsm_context lc; /* Scaffolding -Casey */
+
+ if (label) {
+ lc.context = label->label;
+ lc.len = label->len;
+ security_release_secctx(&lc);
+ }
}
static inline u32 *nfs4_bitmask(struct nfs_server *server, struct nfs4_label *label)
{
diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c b/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c
index 1bf34730d054..3d1251bd588f 100644
--- a/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c
+++ b/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c
@@ -2918,7 +2918,7 @@ nfsd4_encode_fattr(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct svc_fh *fhp,
out:
#ifdef CONFIG_NFSD_V4_SECURITY_LABEL
if (lc.context)
- security_release_secctx(lc.context, lc.len);
+ security_release_secctx(&lc);
#endif /* CONFIG_NFSD_V4_SECURITY_LABEL */
kfree(acl);
if (tempfh) {
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 23b776bc16bf..b5c03e326e32 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -430,7 +430,7 @@ int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
int security_ismaclabel(const char *name);
int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsm_export *l, char **secdata, u32 *seclen);
int security_secctx_to_secid(struct lsm_context *cp, struct lsm_export *l);
-void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen);
+void security_release_secctx(struct lsm_context *cp);
void security_inode_invalidate_secctx(struct inode *inode);
int security_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, struct lsm_context *cp);
@@ -1208,7 +1208,7 @@ static inline int security_secctx_to_secid(struct lsm_context *cp,
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
-static inline void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
+static inline void security_release_secctx(struct lsm_context *cp);
{
}
diff --git a/include/net/scm.h b/include/net/scm.h
index b5d1c24318e3..7e242ebdd258 100644
--- a/include/net/scm.h
+++ b/include/net/scm.h
@@ -92,16 +92,16 @@ static __inline__ int scm_send(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
static inline void scm_passec(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie *scm)
{
- char *secdata;
- u32 seclen;
+ struct lsm_context lc;
int err;
if (test_bit(SOCK_PASSSEC, &sock->flags)) {
- err = security_secid_to_secctx(&scm->le, &secdata, &seclen);
+ err = security_secid_to_secctx(&scm->le, &lc.context, &lc.len);
if (!err) {
- put_cmsg(msg, SOL_SOCKET, SCM_SECURITY, seclen, secdata);
- security_release_secctx(secdata, seclen);
+ put_cmsg(msg, SOL_SOCKET, SCM_SECURITY,
+ lc.len, lc.context);
+ security_release_secctx(&lc);
}
}
}
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index 8f76f164d2af..55b9431489fc 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -1184,8 +1184,7 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
struct audit_buffer *ab;
u16 msg_type = nlh->nlmsg_type;
struct audit_sig_info *sig_data;
- char *ctx = NULL;
- u32 len;
+ struct lsm_context lc = { .context = NULL, .len = 0, };
err = audit_netlink_ok(skb, msg_type);
if (err)
@@ -1416,27 +1415,26 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
break;
}
case AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO:
- len = 0;
if (lsm_export_any(&audit_sig_lsm)) {
- err = security_secid_to_secctx(&audit_sig_lsm, &ctx,
- &len);
+ err = security_secid_to_secctx(&audit_sig_lsm,
+ &lc.context, &lc.len);
if (err)
return err;
}
- sig_data = kmalloc(sizeof(*sig_data) + len, GFP_KERNEL);
+ sig_data = kmalloc(sizeof(*sig_data) + lc.len, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!sig_data) {
if (lsm_export_any(&audit_sig_lsm))
- security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
+ security_release_secctx(&lc);
return -ENOMEM;
}
sig_data->uid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_sig_uid);
sig_data->pid = audit_sig_pid;
if (lsm_export_any(&audit_sig_lsm)) {
- memcpy(sig_data->ctx, ctx, len);
- security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
+ memcpy(sig_data->ctx, lc.context, lc.len);
+ security_release_secctx(&lc);
}
audit_send_reply(skb, seq, AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO, 0, 0,
- sig_data, sizeof(*sig_data) + len);
+ sig_data, sizeof(*sig_data) + lc.len);
kfree(sig_data);
break;
case AUDIT_TTY_GET: {
@@ -2166,16 +2164,15 @@ void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n,
MAJOR(n->rdev),
MINOR(n->rdev));
if (lsm_export_any(&n->olsm)) {
- char *ctx = NULL;
- u32 len;
+ struct lsm_context lc;
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(&n->olsm, &ctx, &len)) {
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(&n->olsm, &lc.context, &lc.len)) {
audit_log_format(ab, " osid=(unknown)");
if (call_panic)
*call_panic = 2;
} else {
- audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
- security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
+ audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", lc.context);
+ security_release_secctx(&lc);
}
}
@@ -2204,24 +2201,23 @@ void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n,
int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
{
- char *ctx = NULL;
- unsigned len;
int error;
struct lsm_export le;
+ struct lsm_context lc = { .context = NULL, };
security_task_getsecid(current, &le);
if (!lsm_export_any(&le))
return 0;
- error = security_secid_to_secctx(&le, &ctx, &len);
+ error = security_secid_to_secctx(&le, &lc.context, &lc.len);
if (error) {
if (error != -EINVAL)
goto error_path;
return 0;
}
- audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", ctx);
- security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
+ audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", lc.context);
+ security_release_secctx(&lc);
return 0;
error_path:
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 090f9f2cb571..797a9f1847cb 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -935,9 +935,8 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
unsigned int sessionid,
struct lsm_export *l, char *comm)
{
+ struct lsm_context lc = { .context = NULL, };
struct audit_buffer *ab;
- char *ctx = NULL;
- u32 len;
int rc = 0;
ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_OBJ_PID);
@@ -948,12 +947,12 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, auid),
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid), sessionid);
if (lsm_export_any(l)) {
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(l, &ctx, &len)) {
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(l, &lc.context, &lc.len)) {
audit_log_format(ab, " obj=(none)");
rc = 1;
} else {
- audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
- security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
+ audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", lc.context);
+ security_release_secctx(&lc);
}
}
audit_log_format(ab, " ocomm=");
@@ -1162,14 +1161,13 @@ static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
from_kgid(&init_user_ns, context->ipc.gid),
context->ipc.mode);
if (lsm_export_any(l)) {
- char *ctx = NULL;
- u32 len;
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(l, &ctx, &len)) {
+ struct lsm_context lc = { .context = NULL, };
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(l, &lc.context, &lc.len)) {
audit_log_format(ab, " osid=(unknown)");
*call_panic = 1;
} else {
- audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
- security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
+ audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", lc.context);
+ security_release_secctx(&lc);
}
}
if (context->ipc.has_perm) {
diff --git a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
index a4f37ba6dbe2..18a7fab8b2d3 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
@@ -131,20 +131,19 @@ static void ip_cmsg_recv_checksum(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb,
static void ip_cmsg_recv_security(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct lsm_export le;
- char *secdata;
- u32 seclen;
+ struct lsm_context lc;
int err;
err = security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(NULL, skb, &le);
if (err)
return;
- err = security_secid_to_secctx(&le, &secdata, &seclen);
+ err = security_secid_to_secctx(&le, &lc.context, &lc.len);
if (err)
return;
- put_cmsg(msg, SOL_IP, SCM_SECURITY, seclen, secdata);
- security_release_secctx(secdata, seclen);
+ put_cmsg(msg, SOL_IP, SCM_SECURITY, lc.len, lc.context);
+ security_release_secctx(&lc);
}
static void ip_cmsg_recv_dstaddr(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb)
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
index 65741838985f..03c3488a37d8 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
@@ -328,16 +328,16 @@ static int ctnetlink_dump_mark(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_conn *ct)
static int ctnetlink_dump_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_conn *ct)
{
struct nlattr *nest_secctx;
- int len, ret;
- char *secctx;
+ int ret;
struct lsm_export le;
+ struct lsm_context lc;
lsm_export_init(&le);
le.flags = LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX | LSM_EXPORT_SMACK;
le.selinux = ct->secmark;
le.smack = ct->secmark;
- ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&le, &secctx, &len);
+ ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&le, &lc.context, &lc.len);
if (ret)
return 0;
@@ -346,13 +346,13 @@ static int ctnetlink_dump_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_conn *ct)
if (!nest_secctx)
goto nla_put_failure;
- if (nla_put_string(skb, CTA_SECCTX_NAME, secctx))
+ if (nla_put_string(skb, CTA_SECCTX_NAME, lc.context))
goto nla_put_failure;
nla_nest_end(skb, nest_secctx);
ret = 0;
nla_put_failure:
- security_release_secctx(secctx, len);
+ security_release_secctx(&lc);
return ret;
}
#else
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
index b47ca79b8e14..e1a8eaa3a62d 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
@@ -169,9 +169,8 @@ static void ct_seq_stop(struct seq_file *s, void *v)
static void ct_show_secctx(struct seq_file *s, const struct nf_conn *ct)
{
int ret;
- u32 len;
- char *secctx;
struct lsm_export le;
+ struct lsm_context lc;
/* Whichever LSM may be using the secmark */
lsm_export_init(&le);
@@ -179,13 +178,13 @@ static void ct_show_secctx(struct seq_file *s, const struct nf_conn *ct)
le.selinux = ct->secmark;
le.smack = ct->secmark;
- ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&le, &secctx, &len);
+ ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&le, &lc.context, &lc.len);
if (ret)
return;
- seq_printf(s, "secctx=%s ", secctx);
+ seq_printf(s, "secctx=%s ", lc.context);
- security_release_secctx(secctx, len);
+ security_release_secctx(&lc);
}
#else
static inline void ct_show_secctx(struct seq_file *s, const struct nf_conn *ct)
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
index a0670137477b..b70871693368 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
@@ -307,9 +307,9 @@ static int nfqnl_put_sk_uidgid(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sock *sk)
static u32 nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, char **secdata)
{
- u32 seclen = 0;
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK)
struct lsm_export le;
+ struct lsm_context lc = { .context = NULL, .len = 0, };
if (!skb || !sk_fullsock(skb->sk))
return 0;
@@ -322,12 +322,15 @@ static u32 nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, char **secdata)
le.flags = LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX | LSM_EXPORT_SMACK;
le.selinux = skb->secmark;
le.smack = skb->secmark;
- security_secid_to_secctx(&le, secdata, &seclen);
+ security_secid_to_secctx(&le, &lc.context, &lc.len);
+ *secdata = lc.context;
}
read_unlock_bh(&skb->sk->sk_callback_lock);
+ return lc.len;
+#else
+ return 0;
#endif
- return seclen;
}
static u32 nfqnl_get_bridge_size(struct nf_queue_entry *entry)
@@ -403,8 +406,7 @@ nfqnl_build_packet_message(struct net *net, struct nfqnl_instance *queue,
enum ip_conntrack_info uninitialized_var(ctinfo);
struct nfnl_ct_hook *nfnl_ct;
bool csum_verify;
- char *secdata = NULL;
- u32 seclen = 0;
+ struct lsm_context lc = { .context = NULL, };
size = nlmsg_total_size(sizeof(struct nfgenmsg))
+ nla_total_size(sizeof(struct nfqnl_msg_packet_hdr))
@@ -470,9 +472,9 @@ nfqnl_build_packet_message(struct net *net, struct nfqnl_instance *queue,
}
if ((queue->flags & NFQA_CFG_F_SECCTX) && entskb->sk) {
- seclen = nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(entskb, &secdata);
- if (seclen)
- size += nla_total_size(seclen);
+ lc.len = nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(entskb, &lc.context);
+ if (lc.len)
+ size += nla_total_size(lc.len);
}
skb = alloc_skb(size, GFP_ATOMIC);
@@ -605,7 +607,7 @@ nfqnl_build_packet_message(struct net *net, struct nfqnl_instance *queue,
nfqnl_put_sk_uidgid(skb, entskb->sk) < 0)
goto nla_put_failure;
- if (seclen && nla_put(skb, NFQA_SECCTX, seclen, secdata))
+ if (lc.len && nla_put(skb, NFQA_SECCTX, lc.len, lc.context))
goto nla_put_failure;
if (ct && nfnl_ct->build(skb, ct, ctinfo, NFQA_CT, NFQA_CT_INFO) < 0)
@@ -633,8 +635,8 @@ nfqnl_build_packet_message(struct net *net, struct nfqnl_instance *queue,
}
nlh->nlmsg_len = skb->len;
- if (seclen)
- security_release_secctx(secdata, seclen);
+ if (lc.context)
+ security_release_secctx(&lc);
return skb;
nla_put_failure:
@@ -642,8 +644,8 @@ nfqnl_build_packet_message(struct net *net, struct nfqnl_instance *queue,
kfree_skb(skb);
net_err_ratelimited("nf_queue: error creating packet message\n");
nlmsg_failure:
- if (seclen)
- security_release_secctx(secdata, seclen);
+ if (lc.context)
+ security_release_secctx(&lc);
return NULL;
}
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
index 314528bca31c..19cdcf58683d 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
@@ -387,8 +387,6 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
struct net_device *dev;
struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface;
struct audit_buffer *audit_buf = NULL;
- char *secctx = NULL;
- u32 secctx_len;
if (addr_len != sizeof(struct in_addr) &&
addr_len != sizeof(struct in6_addr))
@@ -451,9 +449,10 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
unlhsh_add_return:
rcu_read_unlock();
if (audit_buf != NULL) {
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(l, &secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {
- audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s", secctx);
- security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_len);
+ struct lsm_context lc;
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(l, &lc.context, &lc.len) == 0) {
+ audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s", lc.context);
+ security_release_secctx(&lc);
}
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " res=%u", ret_val == 0 ? 1 : 0);
audit_log_end(audit_buf);
@@ -484,8 +483,6 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net,
struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr4 *entry;
struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;
struct net_device *dev;
- char *secctx;
- u32 secctx_len;
spin_lock(&netlbl_unlhsh_lock);
list_entry = netlbl_af4list_remove(addr->s_addr, mask->s_addr,
@@ -499,6 +496,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net,
audit_buf = netlbl_audit_start_common(AUDIT_MAC_UNLBL_STCDEL,
audit_info);
if (audit_buf != NULL) {
+ struct lsm_context lc;
dev = dev_get_by_index(net, iface->ifindex);
netlbl_af4list_audit_addr(audit_buf, 1,
(dev != NULL ? dev->name : NULL),
@@ -507,9 +505,9 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net,
dev_put(dev);
if (entry != NULL &&
security_secid_to_secctx(&entry->le,
- &secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {
- audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s", secctx);
- security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_len);
+ &lc.context, &lc.len) == 0) {
+ audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s", lc.context);
+ security_release_secctx(&lc);
}
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " res=%u", entry != NULL ? 1 : 0);
audit_log_end(audit_buf);
@@ -560,6 +558,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net,
audit_buf = netlbl_audit_start_common(AUDIT_MAC_UNLBL_STCDEL,
audit_info);
if (audit_buf != NULL) {
+ struct lsm_context lc;
dev = dev_get_by_index(net, iface->ifindex);
netlbl_af6list_audit_addr(audit_buf, 1,
(dev != NULL ? dev->name : NULL),
@@ -568,9 +567,9 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net,
dev_put(dev);
if (entry != NULL &&
security_secid_to_secctx(&entry->le,
- &secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {
- audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s", secctx);
- security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_len);
+ &lc.context, &lc.len) == 0) {
+ audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s", lc.context);
+ security_release_secctx(&lc);
}
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " res=%u", entry != NULL ? 1 : 0);
audit_log_end(audit_buf);
@@ -1082,9 +1081,8 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,
struct netlbl_unlhsh_walk_arg *cb_arg = arg;
struct net_device *dev;
void *data;
- char *secctx;
- u32 secctx_len;
struct lsm_export *lep;
+ struct lsm_context lc;
data = genlmsg_put(cb_arg->skb, NETLINK_CB(cb_arg->nl_cb->skb).portid,
cb_arg->seq, &netlbl_unlabel_gnl_family,
@@ -1139,14 +1137,14 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,
lep = &addr6->le;
}
- ret_val = security_secid_to_secctx(lep, &secctx, &secctx_len);
+ ret_val = security_secid_to_secctx(lep, &lc.context, &lc.len);
if (ret_val != 0)
goto list_cb_failure;
ret_val = nla_put(cb_arg->skb,
NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX,
- secctx_len,
- secctx);
- security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_len);
+ lc.len,
+ lc.context);
+ security_release_secctx(&lc);
if (ret_val != 0)
goto list_cb_failure;
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
index eae91a11accc..0418f0935199 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
@@ -98,8 +98,7 @@ struct audit_buffer *netlbl_audit_start_common(int type,
struct netlbl_audit *audit_info)
{
struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;
- char *secctx;
- u32 secctx_len;
+ struct lsm_context lc;
if (audit_enabled == AUDIT_OFF)
return NULL;
@@ -113,11 +112,10 @@ struct audit_buffer *netlbl_audit_start_common(int type,
audit_info->sessionid);
if (lsm_export_any(&audit_info->le) &&
- security_secid_to_secctx(&audit_info->le,
- &secctx,
- &secctx_len) == 0) {
- audit_log_format(audit_buf, " subj=%s", secctx);
- security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_len);
+ security_secid_to_secctx(&audit_info->le, &lc.context,
+ &lc.len) == 0) {
+ audit_log_format(audit_buf, " subj=%s", lc.context);
+ security_release_secctx(&lc);
}
return audit_buf;
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 4dfe053ced5b..4f0c7d2cd1dd 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1982,7 +1982,7 @@ int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsm_export *l, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
if (secdata)
*secdata = lc.context;
else
- security_release_secctx(lc.context, lc.len);
+ security_release_secctx(&lc);
*seclen = lc.len;
return rc;
}
@@ -1995,13 +1995,9 @@ int security_secctx_to_secid(struct lsm_context *cp, struct lsm_export *l)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secctx_to_secid);
-void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
+void security_release_secctx(struct lsm_context *cp)
{
- struct lsm_context lc;
-
- lc.context = secdata;
- lc.len = seclen;
- call_one_void_hook(release_secctx, &lc);
+ call_one_void_hook(release_secctx, cp);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_release_secctx);
--
2.17.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread* [PATCH 55/97] LSM: Use lsm_context in security_secid_to_secctx
2019-02-28 22:17 [PATCH 00/97] LSM: Complete module stacking Casey Schaufler
` (53 preceding siblings ...)
2019-02-28 22:18 ` [PATCH 54/97] LSM: Use lsm_context in security_release_secctx Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-02-28 22:18 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-02-28 22:18 ` [PATCH 56/97] fs: remove lsm_context scaffolding Casey Schaufler
` (15 subsequent siblings)
70 siblings, 0 replies; 80+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-02-28 22:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul
Convert security_secid_to_secctx to use the lsm_context structure
instead of a context/secid pair. There is some scaffolding involved
that will be removed when the related data is updated.
Add a flag for lsm_export to indicate that the caller of
security_secid_to_secctx() is only interested in the length
of the context.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
include/linux/security.h | 13 +++++++------
include/net/scm.h | 2 +-
kernel/audit.c | 7 +++----
kernel/auditsc.c | 8 ++++----
net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c | 2 +-
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c | 9 +++++----
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c | 2 +-
net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c | 2 +-
net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 10 ++++------
net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c | 3 +--
security/apparmor/secid.c | 3 +--
security/security.c | 13 ++-----------
security/selinux/hooks.c | 3 +++
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 2 +-
14 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 44 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index b5c03e326e32..46cc16a67212 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -81,10 +81,11 @@ struct lsm_export {
u32 apparmor;
u32 flags;
};
-#define LSM_EXPORT_NONE 0x00
-#define LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX 0x01
-#define LSM_EXPORT_SMACK 0x02
-#define LSM_EXPORT_APPARMOR 0x04
+#define LSM_EXPORT_NONE 0x00000000
+#define LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX 0x00000001
+#define LSM_EXPORT_SMACK 0x00000002
+#define LSM_EXPORT_APPARMOR 0x00000004
+#define LSM_EXPORT_LENGTH 0x80000000 /* Only the length required */
static inline void lsm_export_init(struct lsm_export *l)
{
@@ -428,7 +429,7 @@ int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value,
size_t size);
int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
int security_ismaclabel(const char *name);
-int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsm_export *l, char **secdata, u32 *seclen);
+int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsm_export *l, struct lsm_context *cp);
int security_secctx_to_secid(struct lsm_context *cp, struct lsm_export *l);
void security_release_secctx(struct lsm_context *cp);
@@ -1197,7 +1198,7 @@ static inline int security_ismaclabel(const char *name)
}
static inline int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsm_export *l,
- char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
+ struct lsm_seccontext *cp)
{
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
diff --git a/include/net/scm.h b/include/net/scm.h
index 7e242ebdd258..b25ca3b6a514 100644
--- a/include/net/scm.h
+++ b/include/net/scm.h
@@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ static inline void scm_passec(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct sc
int err;
if (test_bit(SOCK_PASSSEC, &sock->flags)) {
- err = security_secid_to_secctx(&scm->le, &lc.context, &lc.len);
+ err = security_secid_to_secctx(&scm->le, &lc);
if (!err) {
put_cmsg(msg, SOL_SOCKET, SCM_SECURITY,
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index 55b9431489fc..87e5f6fffb7b 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -1416,8 +1416,7 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
}
case AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO:
if (lsm_export_any(&audit_sig_lsm)) {
- err = security_secid_to_secctx(&audit_sig_lsm,
- &lc.context, &lc.len);
+ err = security_secid_to_secctx(&audit_sig_lsm, &lc);
if (err)
return err;
}
@@ -2166,7 +2165,7 @@ void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n,
if (lsm_export_any(&n->olsm)) {
struct lsm_context lc;
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(&n->olsm, &lc.context, &lc.len)) {
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(&n->olsm, &lc)) {
audit_log_format(ab, " osid=(unknown)");
if (call_panic)
*call_panic = 2;
@@ -2209,7 +2208,7 @@ int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
if (!lsm_export_any(&le))
return 0;
- error = security_secid_to_secctx(&le, &lc.context, &lc.len);
+ error = security_secid_to_secctx(&le, &lc);
if (error) {
if (error != -EINVAL)
goto error_path;
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 797a9f1847cb..8e48053d4a74 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -935,7 +935,7 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
unsigned int sessionid,
struct lsm_export *l, char *comm)
{
- struct lsm_context lc = { .context = NULL, };
+ struct lsm_context lc;
struct audit_buffer *ab;
int rc = 0;
@@ -947,7 +947,7 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, auid),
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid), sessionid);
if (lsm_export_any(l)) {
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(l, &lc.context, &lc.len)) {
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(l, &lc)) {
audit_log_format(ab, " obj=(none)");
rc = 1;
} else {
@@ -1161,8 +1161,8 @@ static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
from_kgid(&init_user_ns, context->ipc.gid),
context->ipc.mode);
if (lsm_export_any(l)) {
- struct lsm_context lc = { .context = NULL, };
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(l, &lc.context, &lc.len)) {
+ struct lsm_context lc;
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(l, &lc)) {
audit_log_format(ab, " osid=(unknown)");
*call_panic = 1;
} else {
diff --git a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
index 18a7fab8b2d3..56035b53952d 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
@@ -138,7 +138,7 @@ static void ip_cmsg_recv_security(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb)
if (err)
return;
- err = security_secid_to_secctx(&le, &lc.context, &lc.len);
+ err = security_secid_to_secctx(&le, &lc);
if (err)
return;
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
index 03c3488a37d8..72aeba0de49c 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
@@ -337,7 +337,7 @@ static int ctnetlink_dump_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_conn *ct)
le.selinux = ct->secmark;
le.smack = ct->secmark;
- ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&le, &lc.context, &lc.len);
+ ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&le, &lc);
if (ret)
return 0;
@@ -622,18 +622,19 @@ static inline int ctnetlink_secctx_size(const struct nf_conn *ct)
#ifdef CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK_SECMARK
int len, ret;
struct lsm_export le;
+ struct lsm_context lc;
lsm_export_init(&le);
- le.flags = LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX | LSM_EXPORT_SMACK;
+ le.flags = LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX | LSM_EXPORT_SMACK | LSM_EXPORT_LENGTH;
le.selinux = ct->secmark;
le.smack = ct->secmark;
- ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&le, NULL, &len);
+ ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&le, &lc);
if (ret)
return 0;
return nla_total_size(0) /* CTA_SECCTX */
- + nla_total_size(sizeof(char) * len); /* CTA_SECCTX_NAME */
+ + nla_total_size(sizeof(char) * lc.len); /* CTA_SECCTX_NAME */
#else
return 0;
#endif
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
index e1a8eaa3a62d..8574a5611823 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
@@ -178,7 +178,7 @@ static void ct_show_secctx(struct seq_file *s, const struct nf_conn *ct)
le.selinux = ct->secmark;
le.smack = ct->secmark;
- ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&le, &lc.context, &lc.len);
+ ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&le, &lc);
if (ret)
return;
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
index b70871693368..4a3d4b52caef 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
@@ -322,7 +322,7 @@ static u32 nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, char **secdata)
le.flags = LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX | LSM_EXPORT_SMACK;
le.selinux = skb->secmark;
le.smack = skb->secmark;
- security_secid_to_secctx(&le, &lc.context, &lc.len);
+ security_secid_to_secctx(&le, &lc);
*secdata = lc.context;
}
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
index 19cdcf58683d..f01c97eb6285 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
@@ -450,7 +450,7 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
rcu_read_unlock();
if (audit_buf != NULL) {
struct lsm_context lc;
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(l, &lc.context, &lc.len) == 0) {
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(l, &lc) == 0) {
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s", lc.context);
security_release_secctx(&lc);
}
@@ -504,8 +504,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net,
if (dev != NULL)
dev_put(dev);
if (entry != NULL &&
- security_secid_to_secctx(&entry->le,
- &lc.context, &lc.len) == 0) {
+ security_secid_to_secctx(&entry->le, &lc) == 0) {
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s", lc.context);
security_release_secctx(&lc);
}
@@ -566,8 +565,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net,
if (dev != NULL)
dev_put(dev);
if (entry != NULL &&
- security_secid_to_secctx(&entry->le,
- &lc.context, &lc.len) == 0) {
+ security_secid_to_secctx(&entry->le, &lc) == 0) {
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s", lc.context);
security_release_secctx(&lc);
}
@@ -1137,7 +1135,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,
lep = &addr6->le;
}
- ret_val = security_secid_to_secctx(lep, &lc.context, &lc.len);
+ ret_val = security_secid_to_secctx(lep, &lc);
if (ret_val != 0)
goto list_cb_failure;
ret_val = nla_put(cb_arg->skb,
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
index 0418f0935199..11ea98525c4e 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
@@ -112,8 +112,7 @@ struct audit_buffer *netlbl_audit_start_common(int type,
audit_info->sessionid);
if (lsm_export_any(&audit_info->le) &&
- security_secid_to_secctx(&audit_info->le, &lc.context,
- &lc.len) == 0) {
+ security_secid_to_secctx(&audit_info->le, &lc) == 0) {
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " subj=%s", lc.context);
security_release_secctx(&lc);
}
diff --git a/security/apparmor/secid.c b/security/apparmor/secid.c
index 46c8b9a67ac7..9dc17903a936 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/secid.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/secid.c
@@ -92,8 +92,7 @@ int apparmor_secid_to_secctx(struct lsm_export *l, struct lsm_context *cp)
if (!label)
return -EINVAL;
- /* scaffolding check - Casey */
- if (cp)
+ if (!(l->flags & LSM_EXPORT_LENGTH))
len = aa_label_asxprint(&cp->context, root_ns, label,
FLAG_SHOW_MODE | FLAG_VIEW_SUBNS |
FLAG_HIDDEN_UNCONFINED | FLAG_ABS_ROOT,
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 4f0c7d2cd1dd..2b2520ba9554 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1973,18 +1973,9 @@ int security_ismaclabel(const char *name)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ismaclabel);
-int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsm_export *l, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
+int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsm_export *l, struct lsm_context *cp)
{
- struct lsm_context lc = { .context = NULL, .len = 0, };
- int rc;
-
- rc = call_one_int_hook(secid_to_secctx, -EOPNOTSUPP, l, &lc);
- if (secdata)
- *secdata = lc.context;
- else
- security_release_secctx(&lc);
- *seclen = lc.len;
- return rc;
+ return call_one_int_hook(secid_to_secctx, -EOPNOTSUPP, l, cp);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secid_to_secctx);
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index ea9603b63f77..07213ae8929f 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -6199,6 +6199,9 @@ static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(struct lsm_export *l, struct lsm_context *cp)
u32 secid;
selinux_import_secid(l, &secid);
+ if (l->flags & LSM_EXPORT_LENGTH)
+ return security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, secid,
+ NULL, &cp->len);
return security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, secid,
&cp->context, &cp->len);
}
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 332ac71e8a41..1861587b3620 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -4357,7 +4357,7 @@ static int smack_secid_to_secctx(struct lsm_export *l, struct lsm_context *cp)
smack_import_secid(l, &secid);
skp = smack_from_secid(secid);
- cp->context = skp->smk_known;
+ cp->context = (l->flags & LSM_EXPORT_LENGTH) ? NULL : skp->smk_known;
cp->len = strlen(skp->smk_known);
return 0;
}
--
2.17.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread* [PATCH 56/97] fs: remove lsm_context scaffolding
2019-02-28 22:17 [PATCH 00/97] LSM: Complete module stacking Casey Schaufler
` (54 preceding siblings ...)
2019-02-28 22:18 ` [PATCH 55/97] LSM: Use lsm_context in security_secid_to_secctx Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-02-28 22:18 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-02-28 22:18 ` [PATCH 57/97] LSM: Add the release function to the lsm_context Casey Schaufler
` (14 subsequent siblings)
70 siblings, 0 replies; 80+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-02-28 22:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul
From: Casey Schaufler <cschaufler@schaufler-ca.com>
The conversion from secctx/seclen pairs to the lsm_context
structure used scaffolding in kernfs and nfs. Replace the
secctx/seclen pairs in the filesystem local datastructures
with a lsm_context.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
fs/kernfs/dir.c | 9 +++------
fs/kernfs/inode.c | 13 +++++--------
fs/kernfs/kernfs-internal.h | 4 ++--
fs/nfs/inode.c | 15 ++++++---------
fs/nfs/internal.h | 8 ++++----
fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c | 27 +++++++++++----------------
fs/nfs/nfs4xdr.c | 16 +++++++++-------
include/linux/nfs4.h | 8 ++++----
8 files changed, 44 insertions(+), 56 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/kernfs/dir.c b/fs/kernfs/dir.c
index a2f8543b88f1..a99ceae97e0f 100644
--- a/fs/kernfs/dir.c
+++ b/fs/kernfs/dir.c
@@ -532,12 +532,9 @@ void kernfs_put(struct kernfs_node *kn)
kfree_const(kn->name);
if (kn->iattr) {
- if (kn->iattr->ia_secdata) {
- struct lsm_context lc; /* Scaffolding -Casey */
- lc.context = kn->iattr->ia_secdata;
- lc.len = kn->iattr->ia_secdata_len;
- security_release_secctx(&lc);
- }
+ if (kn->iattr->ia_context.context)
+ security_release_secctx(
+ &kn->iattr->ia_context);
simple_xattrs_free(&kn->iattr->xattrs);
}
kfree(kn->iattr);
diff --git a/fs/kernfs/inode.c b/fs/kernfs/inode.c
index 62b152c24f59..6db050b7c6ab 100644
--- a/fs/kernfs/inode.c
+++ b/fs/kernfs/inode.c
@@ -141,11 +141,11 @@ static int kernfs_node_setsecdata(struct kernfs_iattrs *attrs, void **secdata,
void *old_secdata;
size_t old_secdata_len;
- old_secdata = attrs->ia_secdata;
- old_secdata_len = attrs->ia_secdata_len;
+ old_secdata = attrs->ia_context.context;
+ old_secdata_len = attrs->ia_context.len;
- attrs->ia_secdata = *secdata;
- attrs->ia_secdata_len = *secdata_len;
+ attrs->ia_context.context = *secdata;
+ attrs->ia_context.len = *secdata_len;
*secdata = old_secdata;
*secdata_len = old_secdata_len;
@@ -184,7 +184,6 @@ static inline void set_inode_attr(struct inode *inode, struct iattr *iattr)
static void kernfs_refresh_inode(struct kernfs_node *kn, struct inode *inode)
{
struct kernfs_iattrs *attrs = kn->iattr;
- struct lsm_context lc; /* Scaffolding -Casey */
inode->i_mode = kn->mode;
if (attrs) {
@@ -193,9 +192,7 @@ static void kernfs_refresh_inode(struct kernfs_node *kn, struct inode *inode)
* persistent copy in kernfs_node.
*/
set_inode_attr(inode, &attrs->ia_iattr);
- lc.context = attrs->ia_secdata;
- lc.len = attrs->ia_secdata_len;
- security_inode_notifysecctx(inode, &lc);
+ security_inode_notifysecctx(inode, &attrs->ia_context);
}
if (kernfs_type(kn) == KERNFS_DIR)
diff --git a/fs/kernfs/kernfs-internal.h b/fs/kernfs/kernfs-internal.h
index 3d83b114bb08..f9187731e2b5 100644
--- a/fs/kernfs/kernfs-internal.h
+++ b/fs/kernfs/kernfs-internal.h
@@ -15,13 +15,13 @@
#include <linux/fs.h>
#include <linux/mutex.h>
#include <linux/xattr.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
#include <linux/kernfs.h>
struct kernfs_iattrs {
struct iattr ia_iattr;
- void *ia_secdata;
- u32 ia_secdata_len;
+ struct lsm_context ia_context;
struct simple_xattrs xattrs;
};
diff --git a/fs/nfs/inode.c b/fs/nfs/inode.c
index f6c339d4e6fb..1679011f7854 100644
--- a/fs/nfs/inode.c
+++ b/fs/nfs/inode.c
@@ -339,22 +339,19 @@ static void nfs_clear_label_invalid(struct inode *inode)
void nfs_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, struct nfs_fattr *fattr,
struct nfs4_label *label)
{
- struct lsm_context lc; /* Scaffolding -Casey */
int error;
if (label == NULL)
return;
if ((fattr->valid & NFS_ATTR_FATTR_V4_SECURITY_LABEL) && inode->i_security) {
- lc.context = label->label;
- lc.len = label->len;
- error = security_inode_notifysecctx(inode, &lc);
+ error = security_inode_notifysecctx(inode, &label->context);
if (error)
printk(KERN_ERR "%s() %s %d "
"security_inode_notifysecctx() %d\n",
__func__,
- (char *)label->label,
- label->len, error);
+ label->context.context,
+ label->context.len, error);
nfs_clear_label_invalid(inode);
}
}
@@ -374,12 +371,12 @@ struct nfs4_label *nfs4_label_alloc(struct nfs_server *server, gfp_t flags)
if (label == NULL)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
- label->label = kzalloc(NFS4_MAXLABELLEN, flags);
- if (label->label == NULL) {
+ label->context.context = kzalloc(NFS4_MAXLABELLEN, flags);
+ if (label->context.context == NULL) {
kfree(label);
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
}
- label->len = NFS4_MAXLABELLEN;
+ label->context.len = NFS4_MAXLABELLEN;
return label;
}
diff --git a/fs/nfs/internal.h b/fs/nfs/internal.h
index b1e577302518..67ec16c1b6e1 100644
--- a/fs/nfs/internal.h
+++ b/fs/nfs/internal.h
@@ -306,20 +306,20 @@ nfs4_label_copy(struct nfs4_label *dst, struct nfs4_label *src)
if (!dst || !src)
return NULL;
- if (src->len > NFS4_MAXLABELLEN)
+ if (src->context.len > NFS4_MAXLABELLEN)
return NULL;
dst->lfs = src->lfs;
dst->pi = src->pi;
- dst->len = src->len;
- memcpy(dst->label, src->label, src->len);
+ dst->context.len = src->context.len;
+ memcpy(dst->context.context, src->context.context, src->context.len);
return dst;
}
static inline void nfs4_label_free(struct nfs4_label *label)
{
if (label) {
- kfree(label->label);
+ kfree(label->context.context);
kfree(label);
}
return;
diff --git a/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c b/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c
index fe95c055c27b..cc4d7d631feb 100644
--- a/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c
+++ b/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c
@@ -113,7 +113,6 @@ static inline struct nfs4_label *
nfs4_label_init_security(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
struct iattr *sattr, struct nfs4_label *label)
{
- struct lsm_context lc; /* Scaffolding -Casey */
int err;
if (label == NULL)
@@ -123,9 +122,7 @@ nfs4_label_init_security(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
return NULL;
err = security_dentry_init_security(dentry, sattr->ia_mode,
- &dentry->d_name, &lc);
- label->label = lc.context;
- label->len = lc.len;
+ &dentry->d_name, &label->context);
if (err == 0)
return label;
@@ -134,13 +131,8 @@ nfs4_label_init_security(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
static inline void
nfs4_label_release_security(struct nfs4_label *label)
{
- struct lsm_context lc; /* Scaffolding -Casey */
-
- if (label) {
- lc.context = label->label;
- lc.len = label->len;
- security_release_secctx(&lc);
- }
+ if (label)
+ security_release_secctx(&label->context);
}
static inline u32 *nfs4_bitmask(struct nfs_server *server, struct nfs4_label *label)
{
@@ -3557,7 +3549,9 @@ nfs4_atomic_open(struct inode *dir, struct nfs_open_context *ctx,
int open_flags, struct iattr *attr, int *opened)
{
struct nfs4_state *state;
- struct nfs4_label l = {0, 0, 0, NULL}, *label = NULL;
+ struct nfs4_label *label = NULL;
+ struct nfs4_label l = {0, 0,
+ .context = { .context = NULL, .len = 0, }, };
label = nfs4_label_init_security(dir, ctx->dentry, attr, &l);
@@ -5596,7 +5590,8 @@ static int _nfs4_get_security_label(struct inode *inode, void *buf,
{
struct nfs_server *server = NFS_SERVER(inode);
struct nfs_fattr fattr;
- struct nfs4_label label = {0, 0, buflen, buf};
+ struct nfs4_label label = {0, 0,
+ .context = { .context = buf, .len = buflen, }, };
u32 bitmask[3] = { 0, 0, FATTR4_WORD2_SECURITY_LABEL };
struct nfs4_getattr_arg arg = {
@@ -5622,7 +5617,7 @@ static int _nfs4_get_security_label(struct inode *inode, void *buf,
return ret;
if (!(fattr.valid & NFS_ATTR_FATTR_V4_SECURITY_LABEL))
return -ENOENT;
- if (buflen < label.len)
+ if (buflen < label.context.len)
return -ERANGE;
return 0;
}
@@ -5714,8 +5709,8 @@ nfs4_set_security_label(struct inode *inode, const void *buf, size_t buflen)
ilabel.pi = 0;
ilabel.lfs = 0;
- ilabel.label = (char *)buf;
- ilabel.len = buflen;
+ ilabel.context.context = (char *)buf;
+ ilabel.context.len = buflen;
olabel = nfs4_label_alloc(NFS_SERVER(inode), GFP_KERNEL);
if (IS_ERR(olabel)) {
diff --git a/fs/nfs/nfs4xdr.c b/fs/nfs/nfs4xdr.c
index 2fc8f6fa25e4..e3a237490e09 100644
--- a/fs/nfs/nfs4xdr.c
+++ b/fs/nfs/nfs4xdr.c
@@ -1140,7 +1140,7 @@ static void encode_attrs(struct xdr_stream *xdr, const struct iattr *iap,
}
if (label && (attrmask[2] & FATTR4_WORD2_SECURITY_LABEL)) {
- len += 4 + 4 + 4 + (XDR_QUADLEN(label->len) << 2);
+ len += 4 + 4 + 4 + (XDR_QUADLEN(label->context.len) << 2);
bmval[2] |= FATTR4_WORD2_SECURITY_LABEL;
}
@@ -1174,8 +1174,9 @@ static void encode_attrs(struct xdr_stream *xdr, const struct iattr *iap,
if (bmval[2] & FATTR4_WORD2_SECURITY_LABEL) {
*p++ = cpu_to_be32(label->lfs);
*p++ = cpu_to_be32(label->pi);
- *p++ = cpu_to_be32(label->len);
- p = xdr_encode_opaque_fixed(p, label->label, label->len);
+ *p++ = cpu_to_be32(label->context.len);
+ p = xdr_encode_opaque_fixed(p, label->context.context,
+ label->context.len);
}
if (bmval[2] & FATTR4_WORD2_MODE_UMASK) {
*p++ = cpu_to_be32(iap->ia_mode & S_IALLUGO);
@@ -4280,8 +4281,8 @@ static int decode_attr_security_label(struct xdr_stream *xdr, uint32_t *bitmap,
goto out_overflow;
if (len < NFS4_MAXLABELLEN) {
if (label) {
- memcpy(label->label, p, len);
- label->len = len;
+ memcpy(label->context.context, p, len);
+ label->context.len = len;
label->pi = pi;
label->lfs = lfs;
status = NFS_ATTR_FATTR_V4_SECURITY_LABEL;
@@ -4291,9 +4292,10 @@ static int decode_attr_security_label(struct xdr_stream *xdr, uint32_t *bitmap,
printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: label too long (%u)!\n",
__func__, len);
}
- if (label && label->label)
+ if (label && label->context.context)
dprintk("%s: label=%s, len=%d, PI=%d, LFS=%d\n", __func__,
- (char *)label->label, label->len, label->pi, label->lfs);
+ (char *)label->context.context, label->context.len,
+ label->pi, label->lfs);
return status;
out_overflow:
diff --git a/include/linux/nfs4.h b/include/linux/nfs4.h
index 1b06f0b28453..d34865c57324 100644
--- a/include/linux/nfs4.h
+++ b/include/linux/nfs4.h
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
#include <linux/list.h>
#include <linux/uidgid.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
#include <uapi/linux/nfs4.h>
enum nfs4_acl_whotype {
@@ -43,10 +44,9 @@ struct nfs4_acl {
#define NFS4_MAXLABELLEN 2048
struct nfs4_label {
- uint32_t lfs;
- uint32_t pi;
- u32 len;
- char *label;
+ uint32_t lfs;
+ uint32_t pi;
+ struct lsm_context context;
};
typedef struct { char data[NFS4_VERIFIER_SIZE]; } nfs4_verifier;
--
2.17.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread* [PATCH 57/97] LSM: Add the release function to the lsm_context
2019-02-28 22:17 [PATCH 00/97] LSM: Complete module stacking Casey Schaufler
` (55 preceding siblings ...)
2019-02-28 22:18 ` [PATCH 56/97] fs: remove lsm_context scaffolding Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-02-28 22:18 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-02-28 22:18 ` [PATCH 58/97] LSM: Use lsm_context in inode_setsecctx hooks Casey Schaufler
` (13 subsequent siblings)
70 siblings, 0 replies; 80+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-02-28 22:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul
In order to ensure that the release function for a
lsm_context matches the LSM that allocated it an element
is added to the lsm_context structure to contain a
pointer to it. This function is called in security_release_secctx
instead of relying on a value in a hook list.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 6 ------
include/linux/security.h | 1 +
security/apparmor/lsm.c | 1 -
security/apparmor/secid.c | 11 ++++++-----
security/security.c | 5 ++++-
security/selinux/hooks.c | 14 ++++++++------
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 16 ++++++++--------
7 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index 2f07be4b9800..349d7c28147a 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -1313,10 +1313,6 @@
* @cp contains the security context.
* @l contains the pointer to the generated security data.
*
- * @release_secctx:
- * Release the security context.
- * @secdata contains the security context.
- *
* Security hooks for Audit
*
* @audit_rule_init:
@@ -1652,7 +1648,6 @@ union security_list_options {
int (*secid_to_secctx)(struct lsm_export *l, struct lsm_context *cp);
int (*secctx_to_secid)(const struct lsm_context *cp,
struct lsm_export *l);
- void (*release_secctx)(struct lsm_context *cp);
void (*inode_invalidate_secctx)(struct inode *inode);
int (*inode_notifysecctx)(struct inode *inode, struct lsm_context *cp);
@@ -1927,7 +1922,6 @@ struct security_hook_heads {
struct hlist_head ismaclabel;
struct hlist_head secid_to_secctx;
struct hlist_head secctx_to_secid;
- struct hlist_head release_secctx;
struct hlist_head inode_invalidate_secctx;
struct hlist_head inode_notifysecctx;
struct hlist_head inode_setsecctx;
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 46cc16a67212..749acb6a28a6 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -121,6 +121,7 @@ extern struct lsm_export *lsm_export_skb(struct sk_buff *skb);
struct lsm_context {
char *context;
u32 len;
+ void (*release)(struct lsm_context *cp); /* frees .context */
};
static inline void lsm_context_init(struct lsm_context *cp)
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index 8c854f95d814..732b4de175bf 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -1225,7 +1225,6 @@ static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(secid_to_secctx, apparmor_secid_to_secctx),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(secctx_to_secid, apparmor_secctx_to_secid),
- LSM_HOOK_INIT(release_secctx, apparmor_release_secctx),
};
/*
diff --git a/security/apparmor/secid.c b/security/apparmor/secid.c
index 9dc17903a936..30fd4ad80948 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/secid.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/secid.c
@@ -81,6 +81,11 @@ static inline void aa_export_secid(struct lsm_export *l, u32 secid)
l->apparmor = secid;
}
+void apparmor_release_secctx(struct lsm_context *cp)
+{
+ kfree(cp->context);
+}
+
int apparmor_secid_to_secctx(struct lsm_export *l, struct lsm_context *cp)
{
/* TODO: cache secctx and ref count so we don't have to recreate */
@@ -105,6 +110,7 @@ int apparmor_secid_to_secctx(struct lsm_export *l, struct lsm_context *cp)
return -ENOMEM;
cp->len = len;
+ cp->release = apparmor_release_secctx;
return 0;
}
@@ -122,11 +128,6 @@ int apparmor_secctx_to_secid(const struct lsm_context *cp, struct lsm_export *l)
return 0;
}
-void apparmor_release_secctx(struct lsm_context *cp)
-{
- kfree(cp->context);
-}
-
/**
* aa_alloc_secid - allocate a new secid for a profile
* @label: the label to allocate a secid for
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 2b2520ba9554..a49095112416 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1988,7 +1988,10 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secctx_to_secid);
void security_release_secctx(struct lsm_context *cp)
{
- call_one_void_hook(release_secctx, cp);
+ if (WARN_ON(cp->release == NULL))
+ return;
+ cp->release(cp);
+ lsm_context_init(cp);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_release_secctx);
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 07213ae8929f..8ecdf975c53d 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -2714,6 +2714,11 @@ static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
inode_free_security(inode);
}
+static void selinux_release_secctx(struct lsm_context *cp)
+{
+ kfree(cp->context);
+}
+
static int selinux_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
const struct qstr *name,
struct lsm_context *cp)
@@ -2728,6 +2733,7 @@ static int selinux_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
if (rc)
return rc;
+ cp->release = selinux_release_secctx;
return security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, newsid, &cp->context,
&cp->len);
}
@@ -6199,6 +6205,7 @@ static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(struct lsm_export *l, struct lsm_context *cp)
u32 secid;
selinux_import_secid(l, &secid);
+ cp->release = selinux_release_secctx;
if (l->flags & LSM_EXPORT_LENGTH)
return security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, secid,
NULL, &cp->len);
@@ -6218,11 +6225,6 @@ static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const struct lsm_context *cp,
return rc;
}
-static void selinux_release_secctx(struct lsm_context *cp)
-{
- kfree(cp->context);
-}
-
static void selinux_inode_invalidate_secctx(struct inode *inode)
{
struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
@@ -6258,6 +6260,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, struct lsm_context *cp)
if (len < 0)
return len;
cp->len = len;
+ cp->release = selinux_release_secctx;
return 0;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
@@ -6669,7 +6672,6 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(ismaclabel, selinux_ismaclabel),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(secid_to_secctx, selinux_secid_to_secctx),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(secctx_to_secid, selinux_secctx_to_secid),
- LSM_HOOK_INIT(release_secctx, selinux_release_secctx),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_invalidate_secctx, selinux_inode_invalidate_secctx),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_notifysecctx, selinux_inode_notifysecctx),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecctx, selinux_inode_setsecctx),
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 1861587b3620..4fcd8271ca24 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -4340,6 +4340,12 @@ static int smack_ismaclabel(const char *name)
return (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX) == 0);
}
+/*
+ * The smack_release_secctx hook does nothing
+ */
+static void smack_release_secctx(struct lsm_context *cp)
+{
+}
/**
* smack_secid_to_secctx - return the smack label for a secid
@@ -4359,6 +4365,7 @@ static int smack_secid_to_secctx(struct lsm_export *l, struct lsm_context *cp)
cp->context = (l->flags & LSM_EXPORT_LENGTH) ? NULL : skp->smk_known;
cp->len = strlen(skp->smk_known);
+ cp->release = smack_release_secctx;
return 0;
}
@@ -4382,13 +4389,6 @@ static int smack_secctx_to_secid(const struct lsm_context *cp,
return 0;
}
-/*
- * The smack_release_secctx hook does nothing
- */
-static void smack_release_secctx(struct lsm_context *cp)
-{
-}
-
static int smack_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, struct lsm_context *cp)
{
return smack_inode_setsecurity(inode, XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX, cp->context,
@@ -4406,6 +4406,7 @@ static int smack_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, struct lsm_context *cp)
cp->context = skp->smk_known;
cp->len = strlen(skp->smk_known);
+ cp->release = smack_release_secctx;
return 0;
}
@@ -4625,7 +4626,6 @@ static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(ismaclabel, smack_ismaclabel),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(secid_to_secctx, smack_secid_to_secctx),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(secctx_to_secid, smack_secctx_to_secid),
- LSM_HOOK_INIT(release_secctx, smack_release_secctx),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_notifysecctx, smack_inode_notifysecctx),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecctx, smack_inode_setsecctx),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecctx, smack_inode_getsecctx),
--
2.17.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread* [PATCH 58/97] LSM: Use lsm_context in inode_setsecctx hooks
2019-02-28 22:17 [PATCH 00/97] LSM: Complete module stacking Casey Schaufler
` (56 preceding siblings ...)
2019-02-28 22:18 ` [PATCH 57/97] LSM: Add the release function to the lsm_context Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-02-28 22:18 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-02-28 22:18 ` [PATCH 59/97] LSM: Use lsm_context in security_inode_setsecctx Casey Schaufler
` (12 subsequent siblings)
70 siblings, 0 replies; 80+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-02-28 22:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul
Convert SELinux and Smack to use the lsm_context structure
instead of a context/secid pair. There is some scaffolding involved
that will be removed when the related data is updated.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 5 ++---
security/security.c | 6 +++++-
security/selinux/hooks.c | 6 ++++--
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 5 +++--
4 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index 349d7c28147a..84035aea5a2e 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -1375,8 +1375,7 @@
* Must be called with inode->i_mutex locked.
*
* @dentry contains the inode we wish to set the security context of.
- * @ctx contains the string which we wish to set in the inode.
- * @ctxlen contains the length of @ctx.
+ * @cp contains the string which we wish to set in the inode.
*
* @inode_getsecctx:
* On success, returns 0 and fills out @cp with the security
@@ -1651,7 +1650,7 @@ union security_list_options {
void (*inode_invalidate_secctx)(struct inode *inode);
int (*inode_notifysecctx)(struct inode *inode, struct lsm_context *cp);
- int (*inode_setsecctx)(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen);
+ int (*inode_setsecctx)(struct dentry *dentry, struct lsm_context *cp);
int (*inode_getsecctx)(struct inode *inode, struct lsm_context *cp);
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index a49095112416..42c5467ccedc 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -2009,7 +2009,11 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_notifysecctx);
int security_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
{
- return call_int_hook(inode_setsecctx, 0, dentry, ctx, ctxlen);
+ struct lsm_context lc;
+
+ lc.context = ctx;
+ lc.len = ctxlen;
+ return call_int_hook(inode_setsecctx, 0, dentry, &lc);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_setsecctx);
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 8ecdf975c53d..f58c96e2b6c1 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -6247,9 +6247,11 @@ static int selinux_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode,
/*
* called with inode->i_mutex locked
*/
-static int selinux_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
+static int selinux_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry,
+ struct lsm_context *cp)
{
- return __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, ctx, ctxlen, 0);
+ return __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, cp->context,
+ cp->len, 0);
}
static int selinux_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, struct lsm_context *cp)
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 4fcd8271ca24..d3ec5f49ef44 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -4395,9 +4395,10 @@ static int smack_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, struct lsm_context *cp)
cp->len, 0);
}
-static int smack_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
+static int smack_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, struct lsm_context *cp)
{
- return __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SMACK, ctx, ctxlen, 0);
+ return __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SMACK, cp->context,
+ cp->len, 0);
}
static int smack_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, struct lsm_context *cp)
--
2.17.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread* [PATCH 59/97] LSM: Use lsm_context in security_inode_setsecctx
2019-02-28 22:17 [PATCH 00/97] LSM: Complete module stacking Casey Schaufler
` (57 preceding siblings ...)
2019-02-28 22:18 ` [PATCH 58/97] LSM: Use lsm_context in inode_setsecctx hooks Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-02-28 22:18 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-02-28 22:18 ` [PATCH 60/97] kernfs: remove lsm_context scaffolding Casey Schaufler
` (11 subsequent siblings)
70 siblings, 0 replies; 80+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-02-28 22:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul
From: Casey Schaufler <cschaufler@schaufler-ca.com>
Convert security_inode_setsecctx to use the lsm_context structure
instead of a context/secid pair. There is some scaffolding involved
that will be removed when the related data is updated.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
fs/nfsd/nfs4proc.c | 8 ++++++--
fs/nfsd/vfs.c | 7 ++++++-
include/linux/security.h | 5 +++--
security/security.c | 8 ++------
4 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfs4proc.c b/fs/nfsd/nfs4proc.c
index 0cfd257ffdaf..5b4ea2a317ed 100644
--- a/fs/nfsd/nfs4proc.c
+++ b/fs/nfsd/nfs4proc.c
@@ -54,12 +54,16 @@
static inline void
nfsd4_security_inode_setsecctx(struct svc_fh *resfh, struct xdr_netobj *label, u32 *bmval)
{
+ struct lsm_context lc;
struct inode *inode = d_inode(resfh->fh_dentry);
int status;
inode_lock(inode);
- status = security_inode_setsecctx(resfh->fh_dentry,
- label->data, label->len);
+
+ lsm_context_init(&lc);
+ lc.context = label->data;
+ lc.len = label->len;
+ status = security_inode_setsecctx(resfh->fh_dentry, &lc);
inode_unlock(inode);
if (status)
diff --git a/fs/nfsd/vfs.c b/fs/nfsd/vfs.c
index 9824e32b2f23..d9e408c3d0a2 100644
--- a/fs/nfsd/vfs.c
+++ b/fs/nfsd/vfs.c
@@ -531,6 +531,7 @@ __be32 nfsd4_set_nfs4_label(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_fh *fhp,
__be32 error;
int host_error;
struct dentry *dentry;
+ struct lsm_context lc;
error = fh_verify(rqstp, fhp, 0 /* S_IFREG */, NFSD_MAY_SATTR);
if (error)
@@ -539,7 +540,11 @@ __be32 nfsd4_set_nfs4_label(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_fh *fhp,
dentry = fhp->fh_dentry;
inode_lock(d_inode(dentry));
- host_error = security_inode_setsecctx(dentry, label->data, label->len);
+
+ lsm_context_init(&lc);
+ lc.context = label->data;
+ lc.len = label->len;
+ host_error = security_inode_setsecctx(dentry, &lc);
inode_unlock(d_inode(dentry));
return nfserrno(host_error);
}
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 749acb6a28a6..cb5e685f60eb 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -436,7 +436,7 @@ void security_release_secctx(struct lsm_context *cp);
void security_inode_invalidate_secctx(struct inode *inode);
int security_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, struct lsm_context *cp);
-int security_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen);
+int security_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, struct lsm_context *cp);
int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, struct lsm_context *cp);
#else /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
@@ -1223,7 +1223,8 @@ static inline int security_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode,
{
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
-static inline int security_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
+static inline int security_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry,
+ struct lsm_context *cp)
{
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 42c5467ccedc..b45136a8fd81 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -2007,13 +2007,9 @@ int security_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, struct lsm_context *cp)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_notifysecctx);
-int security_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
+int security_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, struct lsm_context *cp)
{
- struct lsm_context lc;
-
- lc.context = ctx;
- lc.len = ctxlen;
- return call_int_hook(inode_setsecctx, 0, dentry, &lc);
+ return call_int_hook(inode_setsecctx, 0, dentry, cp);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_setsecctx);
--
2.17.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread* [PATCH 60/97] kernfs: remove lsm_context scaffolding
2019-02-28 22:17 [PATCH 00/97] LSM: Complete module stacking Casey Schaufler
` (58 preceding siblings ...)
2019-02-28 22:18 ` [PATCH 59/97] LSM: Use lsm_context in security_inode_setsecctx Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-02-28 22:18 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-02-28 22:18 ` [PATCH 61/97] LSM: Remove unused macro Casey Schaufler
` (10 subsequent siblings)
70 siblings, 0 replies; 80+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-02-28 22:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul
Change the parameters to kernfs_node_setsecdata from a
data/length pair to a lsm_context struct as both the function
it calls and the function that calls it want that.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
fs/kernfs/inode.c | 19 +++++++------------
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/kernfs/inode.c b/fs/kernfs/inode.c
index 6db050b7c6ab..3d47fd74cc8c 100644
--- a/fs/kernfs/inode.c
+++ b/fs/kernfs/inode.c
@@ -135,20 +135,15 @@ int kernfs_iop_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
return error;
}
-static int kernfs_node_setsecdata(struct kernfs_iattrs *attrs, void **secdata,
- u32 *secdata_len)
+static int kernfs_node_setsecdata(struct kernfs_iattrs *attrs,
+ struct lsm_context *cp)
{
- void *old_secdata;
- size_t old_secdata_len;
+ struct lsm_context old_context;
- old_secdata = attrs->ia_context.context;
- old_secdata_len = attrs->ia_context.len;
+ old_context = attrs->ia_context;
+ attrs->ia_context = *cp;
+ *cp = old_context;
- attrs->ia_context.context = *secdata;
- attrs->ia_context.len = *secdata_len;
-
- *secdata = old_secdata;
- *secdata_len = old_secdata_len;
return 0;
}
@@ -363,7 +358,7 @@ static int kernfs_security_xattr_set(const struct xattr_handler *handler,
return error;
mutex_lock(&kernfs_mutex);
- error = kernfs_node_setsecdata(attrs, (void **)&lc.context, &lc.len);
+ error = kernfs_node_setsecdata(attrs, &lc);
mutex_unlock(&kernfs_mutex);
if (lc.context)
--
2.17.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread* [PATCH 61/97] LSM: Remove unused macro
2019-02-28 22:17 [PATCH 00/97] LSM: Complete module stacking Casey Schaufler
` (59 preceding siblings ...)
2019-02-28 22:18 ` [PATCH 60/97] kernfs: remove lsm_context scaffolding Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-02-28 22:18 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-02-28 22:18 ` [PATCH 62/97] LSM: Special handling for secctx lsm hooks Casey Schaufler
` (9 subsequent siblings)
70 siblings, 0 replies; 80+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-02-28 22:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul
The call_one_void_hook macro is unused since the change
to how releasing a secctx was made. Remove it.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
security/security.c | 10 ----------
1 file changed, 10 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index b45136a8fd81..257b7ff4b434 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -709,16 +709,6 @@ int lsm_superblock_alloc(struct super_block *sb)
P->hook.FUNC(__VA_ARGS__); \
} while (0)
-#define call_one_void_hook(FUNC, ...) \
- do { \
- struct security_hook_list *P; \
- \
- hlist_for_each_entry(P, &security_hook_heads.FUNC, list) { \
- P->hook.FUNC(__VA_ARGS__); \
- break; \
- } \
- } while (0)
-
#define call_int_hook(FUNC, IRC, ...) ({ \
int RC = IRC; \
do { \
--
2.17.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread* [PATCH 62/97] LSM: Special handling for secctx lsm hooks
2019-02-28 22:17 [PATCH 00/97] LSM: Complete module stacking Casey Schaufler
` (60 preceding siblings ...)
2019-02-28 22:18 ` [PATCH 61/97] LSM: Remove unused macro Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-02-28 22:18 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-02-28 22:18 ` [PATCH 63/97] SELinux: Use blob offset in current_sid Casey Schaufler
` (8 subsequent siblings)
70 siblings, 0 replies; 80+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-02-28 22:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul
Create a special set of LSM hooks for the translation
to human readable security data.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 10 ++++++++++
security/security.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
2 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index 84035aea5a2e..fc2a44e04d8e 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -2020,6 +2020,16 @@ struct security_hook_list {
char *lsm;
} __randomize_layout;
+/*
+ * The set of hooks that may be selected for a specific module.
+ */
+struct lsm_one_hooks {
+ char *lsm;
+ union security_list_options secid_to_secctx;
+ union security_list_options secctx_to_secid;
+ union security_list_options socket_getpeersec_stream;
+};
+
/*
* Security blob size or offset data.
*/
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 257b7ff4b434..217fa9d98699 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -431,6 +431,9 @@ static int lsm_append(char *new, char **result)
return 0;
}
+/* Base list of once-only hooks */
+struct lsm_one_hooks lsm_base_one;
+
/**
* security_add_hooks - Add a modules hooks to the hook lists.
* @hooks: the hooks to add
@@ -447,6 +450,25 @@ void __init security_add_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks, int count,
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
hooks[i].lsm = lsm;
hlist_add_tail_rcu(&hooks[i].list, hooks[i].head);
+
+ /*
+ * Check for the special hooks that are restricted to
+ * a single module to create the base set. Use the hooks
+ * from that module for the set, which may not be complete.
+ */
+ if (lsm_base_one.lsm && strcmp(lsm_base_one.lsm, hooks[i].lsm))
+ continue;
+ if (hooks[i].head == &security_hook_heads.secid_to_secctx)
+ lsm_base_one.secid_to_secctx = hooks[i].hook;
+ else if (hooks[i].head == &security_hook_heads.secctx_to_secid)
+ lsm_base_one.secctx_to_secid = hooks[i].hook;
+ else if (hooks[i].head ==
+ &security_hook_heads.socket_getpeersec_stream)
+ lsm_base_one.socket_getpeersec_stream = hooks[i].hook;
+ else
+ continue;
+ if (lsm_base_one.lsm == NULL)
+ lsm_base_one.lsm = kstrdup(hooks[i].lsm, GFP_KERNEL);
}
if (lsm_append(lsm, &lsm_names) < 0)
panic("%s - Cannot get early memory.\n", __func__);
@@ -725,14 +747,8 @@ int lsm_superblock_alloc(struct super_block *sb)
#define call_one_int_hook(FUNC, IRC, ...) ({ \
int RC = IRC; \
- do { \
- struct security_hook_list *P; \
- \
- hlist_for_each_entry(P, &security_hook_heads.FUNC, list) { \
- RC = P->hook.FUNC(__VA_ARGS__); \
- break; \
- } \
- } while (0); \
+ if (lsm_base_one.FUNC.FUNC) \
+ RC = lsm_base_one.FUNC.FUNC(__VA_ARGS__); \
RC; \
})
--
2.17.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread* [PATCH 63/97] SELinux: Use blob offset in current_sid
2019-02-28 22:17 [PATCH 00/97] LSM: Complete module stacking Casey Schaufler
` (61 preceding siblings ...)
2019-02-28 22:18 ` [PATCH 62/97] LSM: Special handling for secctx lsm hooks Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-02-28 22:18 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-02-28 22:19 ` [PATCH 64/97] LSM: Specify which LSM to display with /proc/self/attr/display Casey Schaufler
` (7 subsequent siblings)
70 siblings, 0 replies; 80+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-02-28 22:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul
Replace the use of current_security() with a call to current_cred()
so that the blob offset can be correctly applied.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
security/selinux/include/objsec.h | 7 +++++--
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
index 59a3b1cd5ba9..c9a88b7a96a7 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
@@ -31,6 +31,8 @@
#include "flask.h"
#include "avc.h"
+extern struct lsm_blob_sizes selinux_blob_sizes;
+
struct task_security_struct {
u32 osid; /* SID prior to last execve */
u32 sid; /* current SID */
@@ -45,7 +47,9 @@ struct task_security_struct {
*/
static inline u32 current_sid(void)
{
- const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
+ const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
+
+ tsec = current_cred()->security + selinux_blob_sizes.lbs_cred;
return tsec->sid;
}
@@ -174,7 +178,6 @@ struct bpf_security_struct {
u32 sid; /*SID of bpf obj creater*/
};
-extern struct lsm_blob_sizes selinux_blob_sizes;
static inline struct task_security_struct *selinux_cred(const struct cred *cred)
{
return cred->security + selinux_blob_sizes.lbs_cred;
--
2.17.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread* [PATCH 64/97] LSM: Specify which LSM to display with /proc/self/attr/display
2019-02-28 22:17 [PATCH 00/97] LSM: Complete module stacking Casey Schaufler
` (62 preceding siblings ...)
2019-02-28 22:18 ` [PATCH 63/97] SELinux: Use blob offset in current_sid Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-02-28 22:19 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-02-28 22:19 ` [PATCH 65/97] AppArmor: Remove the exclusive flag Casey Schaufler
` (6 subsequent siblings)
70 siblings, 0 replies; 80+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-02-28 22:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul
Create a new entry "display" in /proc/.../attr for controlling
which LSM security information is displayed for a process.
The name of an active LSM that supplies hooks for human readable
data may be written to "display" to set the value. The name of
the LSM currently in use can be read from "display".
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
fs/proc/base.c | 1 +
security/security.c | 123 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
2 files changed, 121 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
index c9d775fd24ef..632ec6b6d3d5 100644
--- a/fs/proc/base.c
+++ b/fs/proc/base.c
@@ -2637,6 +2637,7 @@ static const struct pid_entry attr_dir_stuff[] = {
ATTR(NULL, "fscreate", 0666),
ATTR(NULL, "keycreate", 0666),
ATTR(NULL, "sockcreate", 0666),
+ ATTR(NULL, "display", 0666),
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK
DIR("smack", 0555,
proc_smack_attr_dir_inode_ops, proc_smack_attr_dir_ops),
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 217fa9d98699..1259b3f50066 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -47,9 +47,13 @@ static struct kmem_cache *lsm_inode_cache;
char *lsm_names;
-/* Socket blobs include infrastructure managed data */
+/*
+ * Socket blobs include infrastructure managed data
+ * Cred blobs include context display instructions
+ */
static struct lsm_blob_sizes blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
.lbs_sock = sizeof(struct lsm_export),
+ .lbs_cred = sizeof(struct lsm_one_hooks),
};
/**
@@ -747,7 +751,10 @@ int lsm_superblock_alloc(struct super_block *sb)
#define call_one_int_hook(FUNC, IRC, ...) ({ \
int RC = IRC; \
- if (lsm_base_one.FUNC.FUNC) \
+ struct lsm_one_hooks *LOH = current_cred()->security; \
+ if (LOH->FUNC.FUNC) \
+ RC = LOH->FUNC.FUNC(__VA_ARGS__); \
+ else if (LOH->lsm == NULL && lsm_base_one.FUNC.FUNC) \
RC = lsm_base_one.FUNC.FUNC(__VA_ARGS__); \
RC; \
})
@@ -1603,6 +1610,7 @@ int security_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
void security_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
{
+ struct lsm_one_hooks *loh;
/*
* There is a failure case in prepare_creds() that
* may result in a call here with ->security being NULL.
@@ -1612,26 +1620,44 @@ void security_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
call_void_hook(cred_free, cred);
+ loh = cred->security;
+ kfree(loh->lsm);
kfree(cred->security);
cred->security = NULL;
}
+static int copy_loh(struct lsm_one_hooks *new, struct lsm_one_hooks *old,
+ gfp_t gfp)
+{
+ *new = *old;
+ if (old->lsm) {
+ new->lsm = kstrdup(old->lsm, gfp);
+ if (unlikely(new->lsm == NULL))
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
int security_prepare_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, gfp_t gfp)
{
int rc = lsm_cred_alloc(new, gfp);
- if (rc)
+ if (unlikely(rc))
return rc;
rc = call_int_hook(cred_prepare, 0, new, old, gfp);
if (unlikely(rc))
security_cred_free(new);
+ else
+ rc = copy_loh(new->security, old->security, gfp);
+
return rc;
}
void security_transfer_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
{
call_void_hook(cred_transfer, new, old);
+ WARN_ON(copy_loh(new->security, old->security, GFP_KERNEL));
}
void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, struct lsm_export *l)
@@ -1946,10 +1972,28 @@ int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, const char *lsm, char *name,
char **value)
{
struct security_hook_list *hp;
+ struct lsm_one_hooks *loh = current_cred()->security;
+ char *s;
+
+ if (!strcmp(name, "display")) {
+ if (loh->lsm)
+ s = loh->lsm;
+ else if (lsm_base_one.lsm)
+ s = lsm_base_one.lsm;
+ else
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ *value = kstrdup(s, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (*value)
+ return strlen(s);
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.getprocattr, list) {
if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsm))
continue;
+ if (lsm == NULL && loh->lsm && strcmp(loh->lsm, hp->lsm))
+ continue;
return hp->hook.getprocattr(p, name, value);
}
return -EINVAL;
@@ -1959,10 +2003,83 @@ int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value,
size_t size)
{
struct security_hook_list *hp;
+ struct lsm_one_hooks *loh = current_cred()->security;
+ bool found = false;
+ char *s;
+
+ /*
+ * End the passed name at a newline.
+ */
+ s = strnchr(value, size, '\n');
+ if (s)
+ *s = '\0';
+
+ if (!strcmp(name, "display")) {
+ union security_list_options secid_to_secctx;
+ union security_list_options secctx_to_secid;
+ union security_list_options socket_getpeersec_stream;
+
+ if (size == 0 || size >= 100)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ secid_to_secctx.secid_to_secctx = NULL;
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.secid_to_secctx,
+ list) {
+ if (size >= strlen(hp->lsm) &&
+ !strncmp(value, hp->lsm, size)) {
+ secid_to_secctx = hp->hook;
+ found = true;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ secctx_to_secid.secctx_to_secid = NULL;
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.secctx_to_secid,
+ list) {
+ if (size >= strlen(hp->lsm) &&
+ !strncmp(value, hp->lsm, size)) {
+ secctx_to_secid = hp->hook;
+ found = true;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ socket_getpeersec_stream.socket_getpeersec_stream = NULL;
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp,
+ &security_hook_heads.socket_getpeersec_stream,
+ list) {
+ if (size >= strlen(hp->lsm) &&
+ !strncmp(value, hp->lsm, size)) {
+ socket_getpeersec_stream = hp->hook;
+ found = true;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if (!found)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /*
+ * The named lsm is active and supplies one or more
+ * of the relevant hooks. Switch to it.
+ */
+ s = kmemdup(value, size + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (s == NULL)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ s[size] = '\0';
+
+ if (loh->lsm)
+ kfree(loh->lsm);
+ loh->lsm = s;
+ loh->secid_to_secctx = secid_to_secctx;
+ loh->secctx_to_secid = secctx_to_secid;
+ loh->socket_getpeersec_stream = socket_getpeersec_stream;
+
+ return size;
+ }
hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.setprocattr, list) {
if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsm))
continue;
+ if (lsm == NULL && loh->lsm && strcmp(loh->lsm, hp->lsm))
+ continue;
return hp->hook.setprocattr(name, value, size);
}
return -EINVAL;
--
2.17.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread* [PATCH 65/97] AppArmor: Remove the exclusive flag
2019-02-28 22:17 [PATCH 00/97] LSM: Complete module stacking Casey Schaufler
` (63 preceding siblings ...)
2019-02-28 22:19 ` [PATCH 64/97] LSM: Specify which LSM to display with /proc/self/attr/display Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-02-28 22:19 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-02-28 22:19 ` [PATCH 66/97] LSM: Add secmark_relabel_packet to the set of one call hooks Casey Schaufler
` (5 subsequent siblings)
70 siblings, 0 replies; 80+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-02-28 22:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul
With the inclusion of the "display" process attribute
mechanism AppArmor no longer needs to be treated as an
"exclusive" security module. Remove the flag that indicates
it is exclusive.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
security/apparmor/lsm.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index 732b4de175bf..d72d5b36dc87 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -1703,7 +1703,7 @@ static int __init apparmor_init(void)
DEFINE_LSM(apparmor) = {
.name = "apparmor",
- .flags = LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR | LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE,
+ .flags = LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR,
.enabled = &apparmor_enabled,
.blobs = &apparmor_blob_sizes,
.init = apparmor_init,
--
2.17.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread* [PATCH 66/97] LSM: Add secmark_relabel_packet to the set of one call hooks
2019-02-28 22:17 [PATCH 00/97] LSM: Complete module stacking Casey Schaufler
` (64 preceding siblings ...)
2019-02-28 22:19 ` [PATCH 65/97] AppArmor: Remove the exclusive flag Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-02-28 22:19 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-02-28 22:19 ` [PATCH 67/97] LSM: Make getting the secmark right cleaner with lsm_export_one_secid Casey Schaufler
` (4 subsequent siblings)
70 siblings, 0 replies; 80+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-02-28 22:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul
The secmark_relabel_packet hooks are dependent on the results
of secctx_to_secid hooks. Add secmark_relabel_packet to the set
of one call hooks, as the secid use will always match the
LSM providing the secid.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 1 +
security/security.c | 18 +++++++++++++++++-
2 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index fc2a44e04d8e..e76e5cd05180 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -2028,6 +2028,7 @@ struct lsm_one_hooks {
union security_list_options secid_to_secctx;
union security_list_options secctx_to_secid;
union security_list_options socket_getpeersec_stream;
+ union security_list_options secmark_relabel_packet;
};
/*
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 1259b3f50066..024601db215e 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -469,6 +469,9 @@ void __init security_add_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks, int count,
else if (hooks[i].head ==
&security_hook_heads.socket_getpeersec_stream)
lsm_base_one.socket_getpeersec_stream = hooks[i].hook;
+ else if (hooks[i].head ==
+ &security_hook_heads.secmark_relabel_packet)
+ lsm_base_one.secmark_relabel_packet = hooks[i].hook;
else
continue;
if (lsm_base_one.lsm == NULL)
@@ -2018,6 +2021,7 @@ int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value,
union security_list_options secid_to_secctx;
union security_list_options secctx_to_secid;
union security_list_options socket_getpeersec_stream;
+ union security_list_options secmark_relabel_packet;
if (size == 0 || size >= 100)
return -EINVAL;
@@ -2053,6 +2057,17 @@ int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value,
break;
}
}
+ secmark_relabel_packet.secmark_relabel_packet = NULL;
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp,
+ &security_hook_heads.secmark_relabel_packet,
+ list) {
+ if (size >= strlen(hp->lsm) &&
+ !strncmp(value, hp->lsm, size)) {
+ secmark_relabel_packet = hp->hook;
+ found = true;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
if (!found)
return -EINVAL;
@@ -2071,6 +2086,7 @@ int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value,
loh->secid_to_secctx = secid_to_secctx;
loh->secctx_to_secid = secctx_to_secid;
loh->socket_getpeersec_stream = socket_getpeersec_stream;
+ loh->secmark_relabel_packet = secmark_relabel_packet;
return size;
}
@@ -2317,7 +2333,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inet_conn_established);
int security_secmark_relabel_packet(u32 secid)
{
- return call_int_hook(secmark_relabel_packet, 0, secid);
+ return call_one_int_hook(secmark_relabel_packet, 0, secid);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secmark_relabel_packet);
--
2.17.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread* [PATCH 67/97] LSM: Make getting the secmark right cleaner with lsm_export_one_secid
2019-02-28 22:17 [PATCH 00/97] LSM: Complete module stacking Casey Schaufler
` (65 preceding siblings ...)
2019-02-28 22:19 ` [PATCH 66/97] LSM: Add secmark_relabel_packet to the set of one call hooks Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-02-28 22:19 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-02-28 22:19 ` [PATCH 68/97] netfilter: Fix memory leak introduced with lsm_context Casey Schaufler
` (3 subsequent siblings)
70 siblings, 0 replies; 80+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-02-28 22:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul
Getting the u32 secmark from the result of security_secctx_to_secid()
requires knowledge about which LSM interpreted the context. Add a
function lsm_export_one_secid() that finds the active secid in a
lsm_export structure. Use it in secmark processing.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
include/linux/security.h | 16 ++++++++++++++++
net/netfilter/nft_meta.c | 7 +------
net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c | 7 +------
3 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index cb5e685f60eb..cb392c6b620f 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -115,6 +115,22 @@ static inline bool lsm_export_equal(struct lsm_export *l, struct lsm_export *m)
return true;
}
+/*
+ * After calling security_secctx_to_secid() one, and only one
+ * of the LSM fields will be set in the lsm_export. Return
+ * whichever one was set. Used to supply secmarks.
+ */
+static inline u32 lsm_export_one_secid(struct lsm_export *l)
+{
+ if (l->flags & LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX)
+ return l->selinux;
+ if (l->flags & LSM_EXPORT_SMACK)
+ return l->smack;
+ if (l->flags & LSM_EXPORT_APPARMOR)
+ return l->apparmor;
+ return 0;
+}
+
extern struct lsm_export *lsm_export_skb(struct sk_buff *skb);
/* Text representation of LSM specific security information - a "context" */
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nft_meta.c b/net/netfilter/nft_meta.c
index ad1aa430f733..1a2b3efc79ee 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nft_meta.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nft_meta.c
@@ -576,12 +576,7 @@ static int nft_secmark_compute_secid(struct nft_secmark *priv)
if (err)
return err;
- /* Use the "best" secid */
- if (le.selinux)
- tmp_secid = le.selinux;
- else
- tmp_secid = le.smack;
-
+ tmp_secid = lsm_export_one_secid(&le);
if (!tmp_secid)
return -ENOENT;
diff --git a/net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c b/net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c
index a06e50535194..b20753957e8d 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c
@@ -67,12 +67,7 @@ static int checkentry_lsm(struct xt_secmark_target_info *info)
return err;
}
- /* Smack is cheating, using SECMARK_MODE_SEL */
- if (le.selinux)
- info->secid = le.selinux;
- else
- info->secid = le.smack;
-
+ info->secid = lsm_export_one_secid(&le);
if (!info->secid) {
pr_info_ratelimited("unable to map security context \'%s\'\n",
info->secctx);
--
2.17.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread* [PATCH 68/97] netfilter: Fix memory leak introduced with lsm_context
2019-02-28 22:17 [PATCH 00/97] LSM: Complete module stacking Casey Schaufler
` (66 preceding siblings ...)
2019-02-28 22:19 ` [PATCH 67/97] LSM: Make getting the secmark right cleaner with lsm_export_one_secid Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-02-28 22:19 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-02-28 22:19 ` [PATCH 69/97] Smack: Consolidate secmark conversions Casey Schaufler
` (2 subsequent siblings)
70 siblings, 0 replies; 80+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-02-28 22:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul
Fix a memory leak introduced by the scaffolding around
the introduction of lsm_context structures.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c | 18 ++++++------------
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
index 4a3d4b52caef..7a095b9d0a10 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
@@ -305,14 +305,13 @@ static int nfqnl_put_sk_uidgid(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sock *sk)
return -1;
}
-static u32 nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, char **secdata)
+static void nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, struct lsm_context *cp)
{
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK)
struct lsm_export le;
- struct lsm_context lc = { .context = NULL, .len = 0, };
if (!skb || !sk_fullsock(skb->sk))
- return 0;
+ return;
read_lock_bh(&skb->sk->sk_callback_lock);
@@ -322,14 +321,10 @@ static u32 nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, char **secdata)
le.flags = LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX | LSM_EXPORT_SMACK;
le.selinux = skb->secmark;
le.smack = skb->secmark;
- security_secid_to_secctx(&le, &lc);
- *secdata = lc.context;
+ security_secid_to_secctx(&le, cp);
}
read_unlock_bh(&skb->sk->sk_callback_lock);
- return lc.len;
-#else
- return 0;
#endif
}
@@ -406,7 +401,7 @@ nfqnl_build_packet_message(struct net *net, struct nfqnl_instance *queue,
enum ip_conntrack_info uninitialized_var(ctinfo);
struct nfnl_ct_hook *nfnl_ct;
bool csum_verify;
- struct lsm_context lc = { .context = NULL, };
+ struct lsm_context lc;
size = nlmsg_total_size(sizeof(struct nfgenmsg))
+ nla_total_size(sizeof(struct nfqnl_msg_packet_hdr))
@@ -472,7 +467,7 @@ nfqnl_build_packet_message(struct net *net, struct nfqnl_instance *queue,
}
if ((queue->flags & NFQA_CFG_F_SECCTX) && entskb->sk) {
- lc.len = nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(entskb, &lc.context);
+ nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(entskb, &lc);
if (lc.len)
size += nla_total_size(lc.len);
}
@@ -635,8 +630,7 @@ nfqnl_build_packet_message(struct net *net, struct nfqnl_instance *queue,
}
nlh->nlmsg_len = skb->len;
- if (lc.context)
- security_release_secctx(&lc);
+ security_release_secctx(&lc);
return skb;
nla_put_failure:
--
2.17.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread* [PATCH 69/97] Smack: Consolidate secmark conversions
2019-02-28 22:17 [PATCH 00/97] LSM: Complete module stacking Casey Schaufler
` (67 preceding siblings ...)
2019-02-28 22:19 ` [PATCH 68/97] netfilter: Fix memory leak introduced with lsm_context Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-02-28 22:19 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-02-28 22:19 ` [PATCH 70/97] netfilter: Remove unnecessary NULL check in lsm_context Casey Schaufler
2019-03-01 14:17 ` [PATCH 00/97] LSM: Complete module stacking Stephen Smalley
70 siblings, 0 replies; 80+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-02-28 22:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul
Add a helper function smack_from_skb() that does all the checks
required and maps a valid secmark to a smack_known structure.
Replace the direct use of the secmark in surrounding code.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 39 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------
1 file changed, 27 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index d3ec5f49ef44..7b8ad16c09e0 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -3734,6 +3734,20 @@ static int smk_skb_to_addr_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sockaddr_in6 *sip)
}
#endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
+/**
+ * smack_from_skb - Smack data from the secmark in an skb
+ * @skb: packet
+ *
+ * Returns smack_known of the secmark or NULL if that won't work.
+ */
+static struct smack_known *smack_from_skb(struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+ if (skb == NULL || skb->secmark == 0)
+ return NULL;
+
+ return smack_from_secid(skb->secmark);
+}
+
/**
* smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb - Smack packet delivery access check
* @sk: socket
@@ -3768,10 +3782,9 @@ static int smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
* If there is no secmark fall back to CIPSO.
* The secmark is assumed to reflect policy better.
*/
- if (skb && skb->secmark != 0) {
- skp = smack_from_secid(skb->secmark);
+ skp = smack_from_skb(skb);
+ if (skp)
goto access_check;
- }
#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER */
/*
* Translate what netlabel gave us.
@@ -3814,9 +3827,8 @@ static int smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
proto != IPPROTO_TCP && proto != IPPROTO_DCCP)
break;
#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING
- if (skb && skb->secmark != 0)
- skp = smack_from_secid(skb->secmark);
- else
+ skp = smack_from_skb(skb);
+ if (skp == NULL)
skp = smack_ipv6host_label(&sadd);
if (skp == NULL)
skp = smack_net_ambient;
@@ -3917,9 +3929,11 @@ static int smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
break;
case PF_INET:
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER
- s = skb->secmark;
- if (s != 0)
+ skp = smack_from_skb(skb);
+ if (skp) {
+ s = skp->smk_secid;
break;
+ }
#endif
/*
* Translate what netlabel gave us.
@@ -3936,7 +3950,9 @@ static int smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
break;
case PF_INET6:
#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING
- s = skb->secmark;
+ skp = smack_from_skb(skb);
+ if (skp)
+ s = skp->smk_secid;
#endif
break;
}
@@ -4014,10 +4030,9 @@ static int smack_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
* If there is no secmark fall back to CIPSO.
* The secmark is assumed to reflect policy better.
*/
- if (skb && skb->secmark != 0) {
- skp = smack_from_secid(skb->secmark);
+ skp = smack_from_skb(skb);
+ if (skp)
goto access_check;
- }
#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER */
netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
--
2.17.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread* [PATCH 70/97] netfilter: Remove unnecessary NULL check in lsm_context
2019-02-28 22:17 [PATCH 00/97] LSM: Complete module stacking Casey Schaufler
` (68 preceding siblings ...)
2019-02-28 22:19 ` [PATCH 69/97] Smack: Consolidate secmark conversions Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-02-28 22:19 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-03-01 14:17 ` [PATCH 00/97] LSM: Complete module stacking Stephen Smalley
70 siblings, 0 replies; 80+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-02-28 22:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul
There is a redundant NULL check when releasing a security context.
Remove it.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c | 3 +--
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
index 7a095b9d0a10..83bb44d70582 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
@@ -638,8 +638,7 @@ nfqnl_build_packet_message(struct net *net, struct nfqnl_instance *queue,
kfree_skb(skb);
net_err_ratelimited("nf_queue: error creating packet message\n");
nlmsg_failure:
- if (lc.context)
- security_release_secctx(&lc);
+ security_release_secctx(&lc);
return NULL;
}
--
2.17.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH 00/97] LSM: Complete module stacking
2019-02-28 22:17 [PATCH 00/97] LSM: Complete module stacking Casey Schaufler
` (69 preceding siblings ...)
2019-02-28 22:19 ` [PATCH 70/97] netfilter: Remove unnecessary NULL check in lsm_context Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-03-01 14:17 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-03-01 17:06 ` Casey Schaufler
70 siblings, 1 reply; 80+ messages in thread
From: Stephen Smalley @ 2019-03-01 14:17 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Casey Schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul
On 2/28/19 5:17 PM, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> This is a preliminary version of the complete stacking
> implementation. The patches need to be cleaned up, and
> several are not strictly necessary. There is likely to
> be work required in the audit sub-system. It does address
> all the shared data, including CIPSO headers. It should
> handle CALIPSO once Smack supports it. I will be revising
> the set after 5.1.
>
> Complete the transition from module based blob management
> to infrastructure based blob management. This includes
> the socket, superblock and key blobs.
>
> Change the LSM infrastructure from exposing secids to
> exposing an opaque "lsm_export" structure that can contain
> information for multiple active security modules. Update
> all of the security modules to use information from the
> lsm_export structure. Update the LSM interfaces that expose
> secids for more than one module to use the export structure.
> Update all the users of these interfaces.
>
> Change the LSM infrastructure from using a string/size pair
> for security "contexts" to a "lsm_context" structure that
> can represent information for multiple modules. This contains
> information that allows the "context" to be properly freed
> regardless of where it is allocated and where it is used.
>
> Add an interface to identify which security module data
> should be presented with SO_PEERSEC. /proc/.../attr/display
> will set and report the name of the LSM for which the
> security_secid_to_secctx() will use to translate to text.
> If it is not explicitly set, the first security module that
> supplies secid (now lsm_export) interfaces will be used.
> To ensure consistency, a set of module hooks dealing with
> the secid/context processing is maintained with each process
> that explicitly sets it.
>
> Before sending a network packet verify that all interested
> security modules agree on the labeling. Fail if the labeling
> cannot be reconciled. This requires a new Netlabel interface
> to compare proposed labels, and a change to the return values
> from the existing netlabel attribute setting functions.
Have you run any benchmarks to assess the performance impact of these
changes?
>
> git://github.com/cschaufler/lsm-stacking.git#5.0-rc3-plus-a
>
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
> ---
> fs/kernfs/dir.c | 6 +-
> fs/kernfs/inode.c | 31 +-
> fs/kernfs/kernfs-internal.h | 4 +-
> fs/nfs/inode.c | 13 +-
> fs/nfs/internal.h | 8 +-
> fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c | 17 +-
> fs/nfs/nfs4xdr.c | 16 +-
> fs/nfsd/nfs4proc.c | 8 +-
> fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c | 14 +-
> fs/nfsd/vfs.c | 7 +-
> fs/proc/base.c | 1 +
> include/linux/cred.h | 3 +-
> include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 122 ++--
> include/linux/nfs4.h | 8 +-
> include/linux/security.h | 165 +++--
> include/net/netlabel.h | 18 +-
> include/net/route.h | 55 +-
> include/net/scm.h | 14 +-
> include/net/sock.h | 14 +-
> include/uapi/linux/netfilter/xt_CONNMARK.h | 45 +-
> include/uapi/linux/netfilter/xt_DSCP.h | 27 +-
> include/uapi/linux/netfilter/xt_MARK.h | 17 +-
> include/uapi/linux/netfilter/xt_RATEEST.h | 38 +-
> include/uapi/linux/netfilter/xt_TCPMSS.h | 13 +-
> include/uapi/linux/netfilter_ipv4/ipt_ECN.h | 40 +-
> include/uapi/linux/netfilter_ipv4/ipt_TTL.h | 14 +-
> include/uapi/linux/netfilter_ipv6/ip6t_HL.h | 14 +-
> kernel/audit.c | 60 +-
> kernel/audit.h | 9 +-
> kernel/auditfilter.c | 6 +-
> kernel/auditsc.c | 61 +-
> kernel/cred.c | 15 +-
> net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c | 13 +-
> net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c | 14 +-
> net/ipv4/route.c | 61 ++
> net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c | 27 +-
> net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c | 16 +-
> net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c | 35 +-
> net/netfilter/nft_meta.c | 8 +-
> net/netfilter/xt_DSCP.c | 149 ++---
> net/netfilter/xt_HL.c | 164 ++---
> net/netfilter/xt_RATEEST.c | 278 +++------
> net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c | 9 +-
> net/netfilter/xt_TCPMSS.c | 378 +++---------
> net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c | 125 +++-
> net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 99 ++-
> net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.h | 2 +-
> net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c | 13 +-
> net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h | 2 +-
> net/socket.c | 17 +
> net/unix/af_unix.c | 11 +-
> security/apparmor/audit.c | 4 +-
> security/apparmor/include/audit.h | 2 +-
> security/apparmor/include/net.h | 6 +-
> security/apparmor/include/secid.h | 9 +-
> security/apparmor/lsm.c | 64 +-
> security/apparmor/secid.c | 42 +-
> security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 14 +-
> security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 9 +-
> security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 6 +-
> security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 34 +-
> security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 19 +-
> security/security.c | 682 ++++++++++++++++++---
> security/selinux/hooks.c | 308 +++++-----
> security/selinux/include/audit.h | 6 +-
> security/selinux/include/netlabel.h | 7 +
> security/selinux/include/objsec.h | 43 +-
> security/selinux/netlabel.c | 69 ++-
> security/selinux/ss/services.c | 19 +-
> security/smack/smack.h | 34 +
> security/smack/smack_access.c | 14 +-
> security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 389 ++++++------
> security/smack/smack_netfilter.c | 48 +-
> security/smack/smackfs.c | 23 +-
> .../Z6.0+pooncelock+poonceLock+pombonce.litmus | 12 +-
> 75 files changed, 2369 insertions(+), 1798 deletions(-)
>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH 00/97] LSM: Complete module stacking
2019-03-01 14:17 ` [PATCH 00/97] LSM: Complete module stacking Stephen Smalley
@ 2019-03-01 17:06 ` Casey Schaufler
0 siblings, 0 replies; 80+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-03-01 17:06 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Stephen Smalley, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul
On 3/1/2019 6:17 AM, Stephen Smalley wrote:
> On 2/28/19 5:17 PM, Casey Schaufler wrote:
>> This is a preliminary version of the complete stacking
>> implementation. The patches need to be cleaned up, and
>> several are not strictly necessary. There is likely to
>> be work required in the audit sub-system. It does address
>> all the shared data, including CIPSO headers. It should
>> handle CALIPSO once Smack supports it. I will be revising
>> the set after 5.1.
>>
>> Complete the transition from module based blob management
>> to infrastructure based blob management. This includes
>> the socket, superblock and key blobs.
>>
>> Change the LSM infrastructure from exposing secids to
>> exposing an opaque "lsm_export" structure that can contain
>> information for multiple active security modules. Update
>> all of the security modules to use information from the
>> lsm_export structure. Update the LSM interfaces that expose
>> secids for more than one module to use the export structure.
>> Update all the users of these interfaces.
>>
>> Change the LSM infrastructure from using a string/size pair
>> for security "contexts" to a "lsm_context" structure that
>> can represent information for multiple modules. This contains
>> information that allows the "context" to be properly freed
>> regardless of where it is allocated and where it is used.
>>
>> Add an interface to identify which security module data
>> should be presented with SO_PEERSEC. /proc/.../attr/display
>> will set and report the name of the LSM for which the
>> security_secid_to_secctx() will use to translate to text.
>> If it is not explicitly set, the first security module that
>> supplies secid (now lsm_export) interfaces will be used.
>> To ensure consistency, a set of module hooks dealing with
>> the secid/context processing is maintained with each process
>> that explicitly sets it.
>>
>> Before sending a network packet verify that all interested
>> security modules agree on the labeling. Fail if the labeling
>> cannot be reconciled. This requires a new Netlabel interface
>> to compare proposed labels, and a change to the return values
>> from the existing netlabel attribute setting functions.
>
> Have you run any benchmarks to assess the performance impact of these
> changes?
Nothing I can publish. Benchmarking is getting close
to the top of the list.
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 80+ messages in thread